March 28, 2007

Congressional Committees

Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces’ Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by the United States and the United Kingdom, was the United Nations-recognized authority responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the reconstruction effort. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the former regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new Iraqi security forces, including the police and a new Iraqi military. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of responsibility. In May 2004, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive stating that after the transition of power to the Iraqi government is achieved, the Department of Defense (DOD) would continue to be responsible for U.S. activities relating to security and military operations. The Presidential Directive also stated that the U.S. Central Command would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces.

In the summer of 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) developed and began implementing a comprehensive campaign plan, which elaborated on and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, which states that the Coalition will adjust its “posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow,” and that Coalition troop levels in Iraq will decrease over time as the Iraqis take on more responsibilities for themselves. The national strategy implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence in Iraq.

In April 2006, MNF-I revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, issued a Joint Campaign Plan that states as a goal the transfer of security responsibilities from MNF-I to the ISF and the Iraqi government. Finally, in August 2006, DOD issued its fifth report to Congress, Measuring Stability and

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1 The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan academies with support from the State Department and the Justice Department. The CPA’s Coalition Military Assistance Training Team was responsible for training a new Iraqi Army.
**Report Documentation Page**

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Security in Iraq, stating that even though 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, 85 battalions, and 2 National Police battalions had assumed lead responsibility for security in their areas of operation, most of these units still require support from Coalition forces. This is because logistics, sustainment, and command and control capabilities of the ISF are not yet fully developed. The ISF comprises the forces of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—that is, the Iraqi Army, Navy, Air Force, and several Strategic Infrastructure Battalions—and the forces of the Ministry of Interior (MOI)—which includes the police, border enforcement, and other Iraqi civilian security services.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates under MNF-I, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and organize the Iraqi Security Forces. Once ISF units are trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their employment is turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a command that is subordinate to MNF-I and is responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq.\(^2\)

According to DOD’s August 2006 report to Congress, the seating of the new government of Iraq, which was not fully complete until the appointment in June 2006 of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and State for National Security Affairs, sets the conditions for continuing progress toward Iraqi security self-reliance. Senior Coalition officials in Iraq echoed this sentiment, stating that prior to the seating of the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior in particular, only limited progress could be made toward forging a self-reliant ISF.

In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative\(^3\) to provide information on the status and challenges of developing ISF support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on the status of coordination and communication between and within the ministries.

On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to you containing our preliminary observations.\(^4\) This report is the unclassified version of that classified report. Certain specific information and data about the current state of ISF’s logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior’s logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army and police.\(^5\) We expect to provide a follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in the

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\(^2\) MNC-I is headquartered by the U.S. Army III Corps forward deployed to Camp Victory, Baghdad. 
development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the ISF’s support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security forces. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this report.

To determine the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, we reviewed relevant documents, orders, policies, and data that we obtained from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and contracting officials. We also met with and interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives in the United States and made two trips to Iraq, in January and August 2006. In Iraq, we met with officials from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. During our August 2006 trip, we also met with Iraqi Army officials and made a site visit to an Iraqi Army training compound and Iraq’s National Depot. During our visits, we talked with knowledgeable officials and determined that the data they provided us was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our review from January 2006 through August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Notwithstanding our repeated requests for DOD to expedite and complete its reviews, this report was under security review within the Department of Defense and MNF-I from October 2006 until February 2007. In our March 9th testimony, we updated information on the ISF’s logistical capabilities and, where appropriate, we have identified that information in footnotes throughout this report.

**Results in Brief**

Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. For example, there is a logistical concept in place for the MOD, and MNSTC-I is fielding many of the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the Coalition and MOD have established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi logistical and communications specialists are being trained. However, significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve self-sufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical concept, implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the development of national and regional logistics centers, impediments to training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, and maintenance shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage of military leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the ministerial level have further undermined efforts to develop this capability.

Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. For example, a logistics concept for the MOI is being worked on, the ministry has fielded communications technology, and a National Command Center is in operation. However, the MOI also faces challenges, such as supplying its forces and maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, the logistics concept may not fully include the forces that are based in the provinces.
With regard to command and control, maintenance and procedural challenges limit the capabilities of the MOI's communications technology.

**Background**

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign Iraqi government. The CPA was officially dissolved, and Iraq’s transitional period had begun. Under Iraq’s transitional law, the transitional period included the completion of a draft constitution in October 2005 and two subsequent elections—a referendum on the Iraqi constitution and an election for a permanent government. The Iraqi people approved the constitution on October 15, 2005, and voted for representatives to the Iraq Council of Representatives (COR) on December 15, 2005. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq certified the election results on February 10, 2006. On April 22, 2006, the COR elected senior members of the new government, including a president, two vice presidents, a speaker of the COR, and two deputy speakers. This Presidency Council subsequently nominated a prime minister-designate and two deputy prime minister-designates, signaling the start of a constitutionally-mandated 30-day period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to form his cabinet. On May 20, 2006, the Prime Minister-designate named his cabinet, which the COR approved the same day, with the Prime Minister and deputy prime ministers also serving temporarily as the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and State for National Security Affairs. On June 8, 2006, the Prime Minister submitted his nominees and the COR approved by a majority vote the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Minister of State for National Security Affairs.

Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, MNF-I has the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this process, working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach agreement on security and policy issues.

**Ministry of Defense is Developing Support Capabilities, but Faces Training, Procedural, Maintenance, and Staffing Issues**

Iraq's Ministry of Defense has established a logistical concept and its development is ongoing; however, implementation of the concept is hampered by the failure to develop national and regional logistics centers, training problems, and maintenance challenges. Similarly, as of August 2006, the standing up of a command and control capability in the MOD is hampered by a shortage of leadership and a lack of policies and procedures at the ministerial level, the lack of a communications doctrine, and training challenges.

**Implementation of Logistical Concept is Challenged**

In early 2005, the MOD and MNF-I approved a multilayered logistics concept for the Iraqi military. Inherent to the concept is the generation of a variety of units from the

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ministerial to the unit level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is expected to be the purview of Headquarters and Services Companies (HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and transportation support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, and divisions, and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to each of the Iraqi Army’s infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics support is expected to come from a National Depot, five Regional Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison Support Units (GSU). The National Depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of the Iraqi Armed Forces’ national stockholding of most classes of supply as well as the maintenance capability to overhaul vehicles and other equipment. The RSUs are to provide regionally focused supply, maintenance, and contract support for the Iraqi military while GSUs are to provide base support for each Iraqi military installation. A Support Command is to provide command and control of the National Depot and RSUs while the Iraqi Joint Headquarters logistics staff section (M-4) is to provide logistics input to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the Office of the Director General of Acquisitions, Logistics, and Infrastructure (DG AL&I), which is expected to direct the ministry’s overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital equipment, to develop ministerial policies and procedures, and to manage the budget. The envisioned end state is a comprehensive logistics system that will provide maintenance, supply, transportation, and garrison support to all elements of the Iraqi military.

However, several challenges remain in the standing up of this logistics system. First, the establishment of the National Depot, RSUs, and GSUs has lagged behind the creation of HSCs and MTRs. Second, the training of Iraqi logisticians has been affected by a lack of fuel, electricity, personnel, and materiel support to the training academy. Finally, the maintenance of the Iraqi military’s vehicles is complicated because of the heterogeneity of the MOD’s vehicular fleet and the lack of trained mechanics.

The Establishment of National and Regional Logistics Centers Has Lagged Behind

Although the MOD’s logistics concept does not delineate any priority to the establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, according to an August 13, 2006, MNSTC-I briefing, the priority has been on generating lower echelon logistics formations, specifically HSCs and MTRs. As of August 2006, most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs had been formed. Meanwhile, the creation of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind; a circumstance that Coalition officials contend makes the attainment of MOD self-sufficiency problematic. For example, the establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance. In August 2006, Coalition officials assigned to the National Depot told us that since April 2006, the amount of fuel delivered to the National Depot has been below that required to support routine warehouse, maintenance, and transportation requirements. The maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and generators necessary to support day-to-day

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8 The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this report.
operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare parts, a situation exacerbated by the variety of makes and models of the equipment with which the National Depot operates. In the words of one senior Coalition logistician, what presently exists at Taji is “a depot in name only.”

The establishment of the RSUs and GSUs faces similar challenges. As of August 2006, all five RSUs were still in the process of being formed and had significant shortfalls in personnel, leadership, training, and facilities. Furthermore, as of August 2006 the exact number of GSUs to be formed had not been determined, and only five were in the process of being formed.

Coalition logisticians have emphasized that development of all echelons of the logistic concept is crucial in order for MOD to become capable of independently sustaining its forces.

Challenges Exist in the Training of Iraqi Logisticians

Another challenge that the Coalition and MOD face in developing a logistics system for the Iraqi military is a shortage of experienced officers and noncommissioned officers available to staff logistics units. Providing trained officers and noncommissioned officers to fill support and combat service support positions throughout the Iraqi Army is the mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute (Institute). However, during our visit to the Institute, several problems that negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission were evident.

According to a senior Iraqi Army official from the Institute, one problem hampering the training of logisticians for the Iraqi military is illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students who report for each course are turned away because they are illiterate in Arabic and therefore incapable of reading the required manuals. This includes students from Kurdish provinces who, though literate in Kurdish, cannot read, write, or speak Arabic.

For those who are eventually accepted into one of the Institute’s courses, training has been hampered by quality-of-life problems, an insufficient number of trained cadre members, and equipment shortages. The quality-of-life problems stem from insufficient fuel for the generators which provide the power to run air conditioners,

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9 In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot. According to DOD, if these funds are not procured, the National Depot’s construction will be affected and the shortfall will necessitate the continued presence and support of Coalition forces further into the future.

10 According to updated information we obtained in December 2006, the MOD was still developing the RSUs and they would not be transitioned to full Iraqi control until June 2007. Moreover, the same update revealed that full transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control would not occur until late 2007. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities for GSUs and RSUs. Without this funding, DOD states that those facilities might go months or years without use while waiting for equipment to be delivered through Iraqi acquisitions systems. According to DOD, if that were to occur the Coalition would not be able to diminish its support.

11 As a result of the literacy problem within the country, MNSTC-I has developed a literacy course.
water pumps, and other life-support equipment. In August 2006, ambient
temperatures during the day ran as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit.

As of August 2006, the Institute was staffed with just over half of its authorized Iraqi
officer instructors. Although the reasons for this shortage are unclear, it has resulted
in the training of fewer logistics specialists for the Iraqi Army because without the
needed cadre the Institute has had to operate at less than full capacity.

Maintenance Is Challenged by a Heterogeneous Vehicle Fleet and Undermined
by a Lack of Trained Mechanics and Funds

Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that the MOD faces, a challenge
exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the ministry’s vehicular fleet, a
circumstance that has several causes: MOD vehicle purchases, gifts of vehicles from
donor countries, and vehicles left over from Saddam’s army. According to an
August 1, 2006, vehicle inventory, the Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel trucks,
at least 4 of which come from different manufacturers: Nissan, Ford, KrAZ
(Ukrainian), and MAZ (Belarusian); 21 different types of light utility vehicles,
including vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet, Gazelle (Russian), Honker (Czech),
Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and UAZ (Russian); and 15 different types of
medium cargo vehicles, including U.S. military 2.5- and 5-ton cargo trucks, as well as
vehicles manufactured by AMC, Ashok Leyland (Indian), GAZ (Russian), Hyundai,
Kamaz (Russian), Nissan, and Mercedes. 12 According to Coalition officials, obtaining
repair parts for such a heterogeneous vehicle fleet, especially parts for vehicles of
non-U.S. manufacture that are in relatively short supply in the MOD’s vehicle
inventory, is so expensive that it results in the cannibalization of parts from similar
vehicles awaiting repair. The result is that some vehicles never get repaired. 13

As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this heterogeneous
fleet, MNSTC-I committed to a national maintenance contract. According to the
statement of work, MNSTC-I’s intent, by way of a “focus sustainment” effort, was to
contract for the services of a maintenance contractor to support the sustainment of
the vehicles and equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi
Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of organizational
and intermediate maintenance tasks, the maintenance contractor was to be organized
to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi personnel. However, Coalition officials stated
that this training regimen has not produced sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi
mechanics. As of August 11, 2006, only 26 of the 191 Iraqis that had been enrolled in
the on-the-job training program had completed this training.

The national maintenance contract’s statement of work also requires the contractor
to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage level (ASL) for all
equipment repaired, with the intent of the ASL being to reduce the “wait time” for

12 Coalition officials stated that the information they provided us about the MOD’s vehicle inventory
was fairly complete as of that point in time, but acknowledged that there may be some vehicles in the
MOD’s inventory over which they do not have visibility.
13 According to DOD's Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, a portion of the $1,043 million it
has requested for equipment and transportation will be used to purchase common system vehicles for
the MOD, with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two systems.
parts. According to Coalition officials, although an ASL has been completed, updated, and partially funded by the Coalition, the MOD has not yet budgeted for maintaining the ASL once the contract expires in March 2007. Coalition officials fear that a failure by the Iraqis to budget for and maintain the ASL will result in repair part shortfalls that will have a concomitant negative impact on equipment readiness levels.\textsuperscript{14}

Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance contract is too expensive for the MOD to continue past its March 2007 end date. Coalition officials have presented an alternative to the national maintenance contract based on foreign military sales and direct vendor contracts to the MOD. As of August 2006, the MOD had taken no action with regard to this alternative.\textsuperscript{15}

**Command and Control Capability Is Hampered by Lack of Ministerial Policies and Procedures, a Shortage of Leadership, Lack of a Communications Doctrine, and Training Challenges**

Although the MOD’s command and control structure is still under development, Coalition and Iraqi Army officials identified several challenges that need to be addressed before full capability is achieved. These include the development of ministerial policies and procedures, the growth of Iraq's military leadership, the development of an effective communications infrastructure, and the training of communications specialists.

**Leadership, Procedures, and Policies Need to be Developed**

According to senior Coalition officials, one of their greatest challenges is getting their Iraqi counterparts on the ministerial and Joint Headquarters Staff to agree on their respective roles and responsibilities. This confusion stems in large part from an absence of accepted procedures and policies. Echoing this claim is an August 1, 2006, Coalition assessment of the MOD’s executive support measures of effectiveness. This assessment rates all of the following core competencies as “ineffective”: the ministry’s development and implementation of a decision-making process; a process for the overall professionalization of the ministry; a directive that establishes terms of reference for ministry officials, civilian and military; a process for oversight and periodic review of decisions; and development and establishment of policy and procedures for command and control under provisions of the Constitution. Coalition officials, working in concert with their Iraqi counterparts, are addressing each of these shortcomings. In August 2006, these officials stated that they believe that the June 2006 naming of a Minister of Defense will contribute much to the development and implementation of appropriate procedures and policies. They stress, however, that without effective procedures and policies, command and control of the Iraqi military will suffer from confusion, lack of coordination, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency.

\textsuperscript{14} In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for $499.6 million to procure recommended levels of supplies initially required to meet Iraqi wholesale and retail authorized stockage levels for most major classes of supplies. If it does not receive this funding, DOD states that the Iraqis will require continued support from Coalition forces.

\textsuperscript{15} According to a DOD official, MNSTC-I has reprogrammed some of its funds to extend the national maintenance contract beyond its March 2007 expiration date.
According to a July 2006 MNSTC-I report, although leadership development programs for the Iraqi military are under way and a senior officer selection committee has been established to identify Iraq’s future leaders, these measures will take time to have an effect. However, the report stresses that it has become increasingly evident that the larger and more complex the Iraqi Army has become, the harder it is to find senior leaders at the rank of lieutenant colonel and above able to provide confident, competent commanders and senior staff.

Communications Doctrine Needs to Be Developed

According to Coalition and Iraqi Army officials, as of August 2006, the MOD had not yet agreed on an Iraqi Army communications doctrine. According to these same officials, a communications doctrine is essential to the establishment of an effective communications system which, in turn, is an essential part of a command and control system.

Training Challenges Remain

As of August 2006, several challenges exist in training Iraqi signal officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The 28-day training program, which is conducted at the Iraqi Signal School at Taji, is the same for all students regardless of rank and includes basic computer skills, preventive maintenance checks and services, basic radio communications procedures, and hands-on training with antennae and the various radios employed by the Iraqi Army. The officials stated that what is needed are several more courses specifically designed to train Iraqi Army officers and noncommissioned officers in more advanced procedures. Five such courses are envisioned for the future (a signal officer basic and advanced course, a noncommissioned officer basic and advanced course, and a signal military occupational specialty course), but a lack of qualified instructors has undermined efforts to establish these courses. And finally, according to a senior Iraqi Army signal officer, there is a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to improperly employ the Signal School’s enlisted graduates. Despite having been trained in communications, once the students return to their units they are employed as infantrymen, while officers, who may not have graduated from the Signal School, run the radios.

Ministry of Interior Is Developing Support Capabilities, but Has Not Resolved Logistical and Communications Challenges

Although the Ministry of Interior and its Coalition advisers are developing a logistics concept and the ministry has demonstrated accountability for some commodities, the ministry faces challenges in the supply of its forces and maintenance of its vehicles and the logistics concept may not fully address MOI forces based in the provinces. In the area of command and control, the MOI has fielded communications technologies, but maintenance and procedural challenges limit the capabilities of these systems.
The Coalition and Ministry of Interior are currently developing a logistics concept for the ministry’s forces, but the concept may not be ready for ministry approval until December 2006. The ministry is experiencing logistics challenges in several areas, including the repair of police vehicles and the maintenance of its radios. Also, it is unclear whether the draft logistics concept for the MOI will fully address forces located outside the capital.

Logistics Concept May Not Be Ready for MOI Consideration until December 2006

According to a Coalition document, the Coalition’s goal is to develop a Ministry of Interior logistics system in which the central government procures and distributes commodities; supports both the MOI’s federal forces (National Police and Border Forces) and those forces that are based in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (Iraqi Police Service, Facility Protection Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and provides accountability of items such as vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. In August 2006, this was the end state envisioned by the Coalition for the ministry’s logistics system, and although the MOI has not yet approved the draft logistics concept being developed by the Coalition, Coalition officials stated that one of the ministry’s organizations has implemented accountability of some commodities.

The draft logistics concept calls for a system of five to seven warehouses that would perform maintenance on communications equipment and weapons and would include three distribution centers to dispense supplies. In addition, the concept is to include contracts that would provide maintenance of vehicles and communications equipment. Although we did not examine the proposed contracts, Coalition officials stated that the proposed contracts will include $130 million in Coalition funding for 12 months of vehicle maintenance and $4.5 million in MOI funding for 12 months of radio maintenance and training of Iraqi mechanics. A Coalition official also stated that these contracts are intended as temporary solutions to provide maintenance until the MOI is able to develop its own capabilities in these areas. An August 2006 Coalition document states that in February 2007, the MOI would assume operation of six warehouses that supply ministerial forces and were being run by a Coalition-funded contractor.

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16 As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the draft logistics concept proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear.

17 It seems that MOI’s dependence on Coalition support of its logistical facilities will continue into fiscal year 2008. DOD states that the MOI requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and sustainment of warehouse and maintenance depots.

18 According to an update we received from DOD in December 2006, only one of the six warehouses will transition to Iraqi control by February 2007. The remaining five are to continue under Coalition control until July 2007.
MOI Has Exercised Accountability over Some Commodities, but Still Faces Maintenance Challenges

The end state envisioned by the Coalition for the MOI’s logistics system calls for the logistics system to provide accountability over items including vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. While the ministry has not approved the draft logistics concept, a Coalition official stated that one of the ministry’s organizations, the National Police, has demonstrated accountability for certain commodities, for example, vehicles, weapons, and uniforms.

However, the ministry is experiencing significant supply and maintenance challenges in several other areas. According to a July 2006 Coalition assessment, the MOI’s logistics capabilities are ineffective because the force being developed by the Coalition for the MOI is overwhelming the ministry’s existing logistics capabilities and a lack of centralized contracting and budget authorities limit MOI oversight. Because of this ineffectiveness, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the MOI, and a Coalition-funded contractor was running warehouses that supply ministerial forces and providing transportation of supplies from these warehouses to MOI facilities.\(^{19}\)

Coalition officials also stated that the MOI faces maintenance challenges. In August 2006, approximately 1,600 police vehicles were inoperable in Baghdad alone. In addition, MOI personnel are unable to maintain a certain type of American truck delivered by Coalition forces because these personnel are unable to work with the vehicles’ computerized systems. As of August 2006, the ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand.\(^{20}\) Coalition officials also stated that there is little or no sustainment of certain types of police radio equipment.

Logistics Concept May Not Fully Address Provincial Forces’ Needs

Another related challenge is that the Coalition and ministry are unclear on how the concept will incorporate MOI forces in Iraq’s 18 provinces. One goal for the logistics system is to support ministerial forces in the provinces. However, in August 2006, a Coalition official explained that the future logistical relationship between the MOI’s headquarters and its forces located in the provinces remained unclear. For instance,

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\(^{19}\) These challenges have continued and the MOI remains dependent on the Coalition to operate its warehouse system.

\(^{20}\) According to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics remain unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are found in most of the MOI’s vehicles. Moreover, a significant component of the MOI’s forces, the National Police, is unable to maintain its vehicles.

\(^{21}\) DOD is requesting $145 million to build 130 maintenance facilities for the MOI. DOD states that without this infrastructure the ministry will not be able to maintain its vehicle fleet.
while Iraqi Police Service units located in the provinces are part of the ministry’s forces, funding for these units is controlled by each provincial governor. In August 2006, a Coalition official stated that the then-current draft logistics concept incorporated some of the ministry’s provincial forces. However, the extent to which the forces are included is unclear. Also, because the relationship between the ministry and its provincial forces is still being defined by Iraqi officials, the MOI’s eventual draft logistics concept may not fully address provincial forces.

Although the Coalition is currently focused on certain MOI forces that operate on a federal level (National Police, Border Forces, and the ministry’s national headquarters in Baghdad), as the relationship between the ministry and its provincial forces becomes clearer and the concept evolves, Coalition officials explained that the logistical relationship between the ministry’s headquarters and its provincial forces may be clarified in the concept. According to an August 2006 Coalition document, the focus of the ministry’s future logistics efforts were to shift to provincial forces. However, the timeline for this shift is unclear.

MOI Has Fielded Command and Control Communications Technologies, but Maintenance and Procedural Challenges Limit Capability

While we did not examine the contracts ourselves, a Coalition official stated that Coalition-funded contractors have built two command and control networks for the Ministry of Interior: the Advanced First Responder Network, which is intended to provide communication between police forces, the ministerial headquarters, and Iraqi military forces in 15 Iraqi cities; and the Iraqi Command and Control Network, which is designed to link the MOI’s national and provincial headquarters. The MOI’s forces are also being equipped with short- and long-range radios that allow these forces to communicate among themselves and with Iraqi military units.

As of August 2006, the MOI’s progress in developing a national command and control network had been mixed. Installation of the Advanced First Responder Network was complete; work on the Iraqi Command and Control Network was ongoing, with 52 percent of funded sites installed; and most of the of short- and long-range radios have been deployed (about 91 percent and 81 percent of authorized requirements, respectively).

Although these technologies have been fielded, the MOI faces substantial challenges in the area of national command and control. For example, the capability of the Advanced First Responder Network is limited by infrastructure insufficiencies, the fragility of Iraq’s electrical grid, and by the MOI’s inability to replace critical components.

Infrastructure, Maintenance, and Procedural Challenges Limit the Capabilities of Certain Communications Technologies

According to a Coalition document, the $218.5 million Advanced First Responder Network was installed through a Coalition-funded contract and is intended to provide a communications system for first responders by integrating MOI police with local, provincial, and national public safety headquarters and Iraqi military units through
radio, secure voice, data, and global positioning system services. In its current form, the network was designed to provide communication for MOI forces operating in 15 Iraqi cities. Although, according to a Coalition document, 65 percent of the country's population lives in these cities, the network does not provide national coverage. Several of Iraq's 18 provinces—including Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah in the northeast, al-Anbar in the west, and Maysan in the east—do not have a city covered by the network.

According to a Coalition document, other infrastructure insufficiencies also limit the network's capability. For instance, certain switches operate in a way that is not compatible with communications systems in Iraq and a system of microwave relay towers used to transmit signals is poorly designed.

Another challenge is maintaining consistent power for the network. According to a Coalition official who worked with the MOI's Directorate of Communications, the fragility of Iraq's electrical grid means that the network must be powered with generators. The relatively small number of backup generators presents an additional challenge because the loss of a generator can result in a substantial loss in network capability.

Challenges faced by the MOI in replacing parts compound the loss of capability caused by infrastructure insufficiencies and inconsistent power. For three reasons, the ministry has difficulty replacing parts. First, while we did not examine the contract, a Coalition official stated that the original contract to build the network does not require the contractor to provide spare parts. For instance, according to a Coalition document, replacement of faulty switches falls outside the scope of the operations and maintenance contract. Second, according to another Coalition document, although the ministry's Directorate of Communications has agreed to assume responsibility for operations and maintenance in January 2007, it is unclear whether the Minister of Interior has agreed to that decision. Third, the ministry's Directorate of Finance has refused a request for additional funding for the network made by the Directorate of Communications. In August 2006, a Coalition official stated that without additional funding to address these challenges, the network would likely fail within 3 months.

In addition, as of August 2006, the MOI had not yet begun to develop the standard operating procedures that govern how it will run its communications networks. However, according to Coalition officials, Iraqi staff in the National Command Center are implementing standard operating procedures provided by the Coalition.

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22 DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI communications maintenance and has stated that without this money, MOI's radio networks will be severely jeopardized, its first responder network will degrade and become inoperable, and the MOI will be unable to assume responsibility for its national command and control network.

23 Standard operating procedures are a set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.

24 According to a document provided by Coalition officials, the National Command Center maintains nationwide strategic and operational situational awareness and exercises command and control in order to implement plans and policy and track the execution of all operations for the Ministry of Interior.
and are making progress in their implementation. For instance, the outgoing shift now briefs the incoming shift, the center’s work space is arranged for more effective communication, and the Center staff now has adequate technology.

In a July 2006 assessment, the Coalition judged the MOI’s communication capabilities as partly effective. A Coalition official who works with the ministry to develop its command and control capabilities explained that while the MOI has several communications technologies in place or in the process of being installed, as of August 2006, these had not been coordinated to form a functioning national command and control network.

**Concluding Observations**

The Coalition has been working to transfer full security responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. With regard to the development of logistics capabilities, Coalition officials stated that the MOD has progressed further than the MOI. In regard to the development of command and control capabilities, we were unable to determine if one ministry had made significantly more progress than the other. This is because Coalition and Iraqi government efforts in this area are numerous and in various stages of development, making them difficult to compare. We plan to address this comparison in subsequent work on ISF support capabilities.

Further, according to senior Coalition officials, the seating of the Ministers of Defense and Interior in June 2006 sets the conditions for even greater progress toward attaining ISF self-reliance. However, significant challenges must be overcome before the ISF achieves full capability. These include training Iraqi logisticians and communications specialists, maintaining Iraqi vehicles and equipment, and developing policies and procedures within the ministries. Without qualified logisticians and communications specialists, reliable vehicles and equipment, and accepted policies and procedures, the Iraqi forces cannot achieve the self-sufficiency upon which the drawdown of Coalition forces depends. Coalition officials recognize these challenges and state they work daily to rectify them.

**Agency Comments**

DOD provided official oral comments on a draft of this correspondence and stated that it had no comments on our findings and observations. DOD also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the correspondence where appropriate.

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Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report included Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director; Katherine Lenane, Guy LoFaro, Christopher Turner, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin.

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