PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS:
IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS

by

Cameron S. Sellers

September 2007

Thesis Co-Advisors: Karen Guttieri
Anna Simons

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
**Provincial Reconstruction Teams:** Improving Effectiveness

**Author:** Cameron S. Sellers

**Abstract (maximum 200 words)**

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are currently prominent constructs for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are composed of civil-military teams, including elements from coalition partners and the host-nation, and involve multiple military services and civilian agencies. Their missions are to extend the legitimacy of the central government throughout the country and to use Civil Military Operations (CMO) to counter anti-government forces.

PRTs are prominent, but controversial. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complain that the U.S. military blurs the lines between humanitarian assistance and military operations. Other critics have called PRTs interagency failures because the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and other government agencies have not contributed the personnel, resources, or training required to make PRTs operationally functional. The result is both lack of integration and of effectiveness.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine how to make PRTs more effective in the future. While host-nation participation is necessary for success, this thesis will focus only on the controversies involving NGOs and interagency communities. These include humanitarian space, general attributes, and effectiveness of PRTs.

The policy prescription for future PRTs is found in the concept of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), which is described in U.S. Army’s FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*. The core tasks of a CMOC, especially those of Civil Information Management (CIM), are designed to accomplish a variety of missions relating to Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR). They would serve well as foundational components of a PRT. Also, because of the interagency nature of PRTs, commanders of these teams must have the right character and skill sets to operate in this complex environment.
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS

Cameron S. Sellers
Major, United States Army Reserve
B.A., Wheaton College, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
and
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(SEcurity STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2007

Author: Cameron S. Sellers

Approved by: Dr. Karen Guttieri
Co-Thesis Advisor

Dr. Anna Simons
Co-Thesis Advisor

Dr. Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

Dr. Douglas Porch
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are currently prominent constructs for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are composed of civil-military teams, including elements from coalition partners and the host-nation, and involve multiple military services and civilian agencies. Their missions are to extend the legitimacy of the central government throughout the country and to use Civil Military Operations (CMO) to counter anti-government forces.

PRTs are prominent, but controversial. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complain that the U.S. military blurs the lines between humanitarian assistance and military operations. Other critics have called PRTs interagency failures because the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and other government agencies have not contributed the personnel, resources, or training required to make PRTs operationally functional. The result is both lack of integration and of effectiveness.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine how to make PRTs more effective in the future. While host-nation participation is necessary for success, this thesis will focus only on the controversies involving NGOs and interagency communities. These include humanitarian space, general attributes, and effectiveness of PRTs.

The policy prescription for future PRTs is found in the concept of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), which is described in U.S. Army’s FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. The core tasks of a CMOC, especially those of Civil Information Management (CIM), are designed to accomplish a variety of missions relating to Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR). They would serve well as foundational components of a PRT. Also, because of the interagency nature of PRTs, commanders of these teams must have the right character and skill sets to operate in this complex environment.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
   A. RELEVANCE ..................................................................................................1
   B. THESIS .........................................................................................................2
   C. OUTLINE ......................................................................................................4

II. THE HISTORY OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS ............5
   A. COALITION JOINT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE ..............5
   B. U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS - AFGHANISTAN ..............8
   C. ISAF/ NATO PRTS — AFGHANISTAN ....................................................12
      1. British PRT — Masar-e-Shariff ..........................................................13
      2. German PRT — Kunduz ..................................................................14
   D. GOVERNORATE SUPPORT TEAMS (GSTS) — IRAQ ..................15
   E. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRTS — IRAQ ...........................................17
   F. EMBED PRTS — IRAQ ............................................................................20

III. PRT SUCCESSES AND CONTROVERSIES ...........................................25
   A. PRT SUCCESSES ..................................................................................25
      1. Security ...............................................................................................25
      2. Security Sector Reform (SSR) ............................................................26
      3. Local Governance ..............................................................................27
   B. PRT CONTROVERSIES ..........................................................................27
      1. Irreconcilable Philosophies: Humanitarian Space .........................27
         a. Treaty Obligation ....................................................................30
         b. Minimizing the Differences ....................................................31
      2. Practical Issues: Gaps in Attributes of a PRT .......................33
         a. Lack of Resources, Personnel, and Training ......................33
         b. Lack of Integration ..................................................................35
         c. Civil Information Management (CIM) ..................................38

IV. IMPROVING PRT EFFECTIVENESS .................................................41
   A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) .........................................41
      1. What are the Right Metrics? .............................................................42
   B. THE PROBLEM OF ADHOCRACY ....................................................44
   C. THE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC) ............47
      1. When does a CMOC become a PRT? ...........................................50
      2. Putting It Together: A CMOC Transitions into a PRT ...............51
   D. THE INTERAGENCY PUZZLE ..............................................................52
      1. The Problem .......................................................................................52
      2. Minimizing the Turbulence of Adhocracy ..................................54
   E. SELECTING THE RIGHT PRT COMMANDER ..................................55
1. Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Environment.................................................................56
2. Civil Affairs Common Skills ...............................................................57
3. The Boundary Spanner Skill Set ......................................................58
4. Selection or Training .........................................................................60

V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................63
   A. FURTHER STUDY ..............................................................................................64
      1. Comparative Study of the CORDS Program and PRTs ................64
      2. An Interagency Command — SSTR.......................................................65
      3. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as the Foundation for PRTs........66
      4. Building Cohesive Civil Military Teams..........................................66

APPENDIX A: PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN .................................................................67
APPENDIX B: PRT LOCATIONS IN IRAQ............................................................69
APPENDIX C: THE CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS) PROGRAM ....................................71
APPENDIX D: SELECTED PRT MODELS..............................................................75
APPENDIX E: ISAF/NATO PRT MISSION PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES ........81
APPENDIX F: DOS PRT - IRAQ ........................................................................83
APPENDIX G: EMBED PRTS – IRAQ .................................................................87
APPENDIX H: THE GENEVA AND THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS ...........89
APPENDIX I: SUGGESTED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) .....93
APPENDIX J: HISTORY OF THE CMOC ..........................................................99
APPENDIX K: CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE DOCUMENT UPDATES ..............105
APPENDIX L: CIVIL INFORMATION AND THE COP ...............................107
APPENDIX M: CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMON SKILLS ........................................111

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................115

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..............................................................................123
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>U.S. and ISAF/ NATO PRT locations.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>UK PRT Masar-e-Sariff.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>German PRT Konduz Organizational Chart.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>DOS PRT locations (Embed PRTs not included).</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>PRT Line of Coordination and Authority.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Map of Embed PRTs in Baghdad.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>Aspects of counterinsurgency operations.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Standing Capability of the new CMOC.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Advance Civilian Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Afghan Transitional Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>Army Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSA</td>
<td>Association of the United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commanders Emergency Response Program Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC-A</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Coalition Forces Land Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIM</td>
<td>Civil Information Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Military Operations Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-76</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-180</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operating Picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provincial Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Security and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDU</td>
<td>Force Document Updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOA</td>
<td>Government of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GST</td>
<td>Governorate Support Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operations and Planning Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRT</td>
<td>Joint Regional Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K2</td>
<td>Karshi-Khanabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGP</td>
<td>Local Governance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Corps-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Forces-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCT</td>
<td>National Coordination Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODHACA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>Other Government Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCR</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Provincial Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDOJ</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>U.S. government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>U.S. Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I recognize Colonel John Dickenson and his team for developing the concept of the PRT and for establishing the first ones in Afghanistan. Also, to Colonel Michael Stout and Dr. Deborah Alexander for helping establish the first PRT in Gardez. Lastly, to the countless individuals who made PRTs happen. All these individuals poured their sweat, hearts, and souls into making this concept work. They must be applauded and recognized by those of us who work in these types of operations.

Second, I want to thank the Chairmen and staff of both Defense Analysis (Dr. Gordon McCormick, Dr. Anna Simons, Dr. Doug Borer, Dr. Frank Giordano, Professor Robert O’Connell, Dr. Dorothy Denning, Professor George Lober, and Dr. Nancy Roberts), and National Security Affairs (Dr. Douglas Porch, Dr. Karen Guttieri, Dr. Robert McNab, Dr. Nancy Hocevar, Dr. Thomas Bruneau, and Dr. James Wirtz) at the Naval Postgraduate School. The numerous classes I took in both departments contributed to my completion of this thesis and, also, to my current work as a Battalion Operations officer. Not one day escapes me without applying a framework or theory that I learned from them. Of course, I would be remiss not to thank Jennifer Duncan, Colonel Brian Greenshield, and Dora Martinez who helped me navigate the inter-departmental bureaucracy to meet the requirements of my dual Master’s Degrees.

Third, as an Army Reservist, I want to thank Major General Herbert Altschuler, the former Commander of United States Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), and Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry for encouraging and supporting me to attend the Naval Postgraduate School. Both of them believe that Army Reserve Officers need graduate education as much as their active duty counterparts for their professional development as Civil Affairs Officers.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my father, Lloyd Dwayne Sellers, Petty Officer Third Class (United States Navy), who was proud that I was selected for the Naval Postgraduate School. He could not wait to see me graduate. Unfortunately, he passed away before he could watch me walk across the stage. This thesis is in memory of Dad.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. RELEVANCE

The United States is many years into what U.S. policy-makers call a Global War on Terrorism (or the Long War). Due to the asymmetric nature of the threat, the U.S. military is actively looking for alternatives to its conventional approach, known as direct action. U.S. policy has, in effect, endorsed nation building through regime change and reconstruction.\(^1\) This strategy addresses population grievances in the area of concern, so that publics will no longer harbor, or be susceptible to, insurgents and terrorists.

The U.S. and the Afghan governments used a Civil Military Operations (CMO) strategy in the fall of 2002 by establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) composed of Afghani (or host- nation), coalition, joint (multiple service), civilian, and military elements. The mission of the PRTs was to extend central government authority into the rural areas and to use non-lethal measures to counter anti-government forces. PRTs were meant to do two things: first, to integrate military and traditional aid programs toward common goals; and, second, to decentralize Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) tasks by having the local population participate in determining projects and by building local and provincial governance capacity. This thesis focuses on the former.

PRTs are controversial. As you will read in this thesis, one criticism concerns roles. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complain that PRTs blur the lines between humanitarian assistance and military operations. A second criticism relates to effectiveness. Some critics have called PRTs an interagency failure because the Department of Defense (DoD), and other government agencies (OGA), have not contributed the personnel, resources, or training required to make PRTs operationally functional.

B. THESIS

This paper will review these criticisms through a survey of the literature and selected interviews with 15 military and civilian personnel who were involved with the planning, establishment, or participated in the first PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of issues revolves around a concept called “humanitarian space.” This term refers to “the access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to access and meet humanitarian needs.”2 IOs/NGOs are deeply concerned by the rise of humanitarian aid activity being conducted by PRTs because they see them as violating this sensitive principal. My research finds that this issue will be difficult to reconcile. Military personnel must clearly convey that they are not trying to take aid workers’ jobs and they must never try to pass themselves off as NGOs. The military must ensure that military-led PRTs are temporary and they will transition to civilian led organizations when the security environment permits. As much as possible, the military must be transparent about its activities so that the local population will not be confused about the difference between an NGO and the military. However, the military has legitimate reasons to conduct humanitarian activities, particularly in counterinsurgency operations (COIN).

The practical criticism primarily centers on the operations and the effectiveness of PRTs. My research shows that their operational dysfunction and ineffectiveness is largely due to the ad hoc nature of the planning and establishment of PRTs. The first PRTs in Afghanistan had high personnel shortages and the people who did show up were not qualified for their jobs. PRTs had to borrow equipment that was old and barely workable from other units. The military and civilian personnel did not collectively train together before they arrived at a PRT. Cultures clashed as they determined who was in charge. When operational planners created these ad hoc organizations in war zones, the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Management system, which had to fill them, had a difficult time supporting them due to the peculiarities of a 5-year budget cycle. While DoD Force Management may have been able to meet limited equipment needs immediately, it needed months, if not years, to budget and build a training program or a

---

2 European Commission’s Directorate for Humanitarian Aid.
personnel pipeline to meet the right skill sets needed for the PRTs. When the first PRTs stood up in 2003, DoD had to wait until 2004 to budget them.

The policy prescription for future PRTs is to resolve the challenges presented by ad hoc units in advance. Future PRTs must be represented in future budgets. DoD and the other government agencies need standing capabilities that can easily be joined into a PRT on a moments notice. I will argue that the U.S. military has done some of this by transforming the U.S. Army Civil Affairs forces in 2005. The Army rewrote its doctrine (Field Manual or FM 3-05.40) and transformed the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) - for years the CMOC had been an ad hoc organization - into a standing capability. This paper will demonstrate that the CMOC has the same capabilities as a PRT with the exception of the civilian personnel. The core tasks of the new standing CMOC, especially Civil Information Management (CIM), are designed to accomplish most- if not all- of the PRT’s missions. The CMOC can easily accommodate civilian members. If the CMOC should become the foundation of future PRTs, it will resolve various issues that plagued the first group of PRTs.

While the Army has gone a long way to resolve the ad hoc problem for the military, the problem may never be resolved in the civilian sector. U.S. government agency culture, and the budget process, may not be amendable to the needed reforms. However, the State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction may help minimize the turbulence of “adhocracy” by identifying civilian personnel for PRT duty in advance and ensuring civilian personnel annually train with the military in exercises and training events.

Finally, the interagency nature of PRTs requires future commanders to have the skill sets of a Civil Affairs officer and a profile of the “boundary spanner.” A boundary spanner is a business term for individuals who can work in an environment where there is no hierarchy or multiple “chain of commands.” With the standing capability of a CMOC, intensive and collective interagency training, and the right leader, the operational difficulties experienced by PRTs can be vastly minimized or eliminated.

---

3 Standing capability is being defined as a permanent structure that is part of an Army Table and Organization (TOE) and Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
C. OUTLINE

This thesis is broken down into three chapters. Chapter II describes the history of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq and how the environment determined the different missions of PRTs in them. Chapter III discusses the successes and controversies surrounding the PRTs as far as the international and interagency community are concerned, and discuss the practical issues of PRT operations. Chapter IV explores ways to improve the effectiveness of PRTs by looking at the new standing capability of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). It examines how to minimize interagency adhocracy and determine the right profile and skill sets of a PRT commander.
II. THE HISTORY OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

This chapter describes the history of development of PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The history reveals difficulties establishing these organizations, why ISAF became enthusiastic about PRTs after some reluctance, and how PRTs came to Iraq. In each country PRTs replaced similar organizations, such as the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Center Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Afghanistan and the Governorate Support Teams (GST) in Iraq. These previous organizations, especially in Afghanistan, were party to controversies in the humanitarian community.

A. COALITION JOINT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

The military involvement in stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan originated in the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) in 2001-2002. These were first established in Islamabad and Karshi-Khanabad (K2), an Air Force Base located in Uzbekistan near the Afghan border. The Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell in Islamabad was designed as a coordination cell that interfaced with the headquarters of both the international organizations (IOs) and NGOs. The Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell in Karshi-Khanabad worked with the local population near the Air Force Base and, later was turned into a CMOC that helped push Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell Teams into Afghanistan. The missions of the first Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells in Afghanistan supported counterinsurgency operations being conducted by Task

4 The CHLC in Islamabad was established in October 2001 and later moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, in December 2001. I was in Islamabad when the CHLC left for Kabul as part of BG John H. Kern’s fact finding mission on behalf of Central Command. The Islamabad CHLC would later be downsized but remained open as long as the UN and other NGOs still kept a significant presence in the Pakistani capital. Long before the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, the UN had its Afghan headquarters and other agencies such as UNHCR and WFP in Islamabad. A few international NGOs, also, had their headquarters located in Islamabad as well.

5 K2 became the first U.S. forward military base for coalition forces. It was the main hub until Bagram Air Base located 50 miles from Kabul, replaced it in December 2001. K2 still remained active as a support base for Afghan operations before it was shut down in November 2005.
Force Mountain and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) and were co-located with Special Forces teams throughout the country.  

Concurrently, in the fall of 2001, Central Command (CENTCOM), through Army Central (ARCENT or 3rd Army), began planning for the establishment of a CJCMOTF to become the central hub for all military humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activity when Afghanistan was declared to be in a PCR environment or what the Army was calling Phase IV of operations. The CJCMOTF was designed around logistic capabilities to directly build projects, in contrast to a traditional Civil Affairs mission, which would be to facilitate the work of others — primarily IOs/NGOs — to rebuild the country. Consequently, the IOs/ NGO community accused the CJCMOTF of duplicating humanitarian assistance efforts that were already being done by them.

In January 2002, the CJCMOTF deployed to Afghanistan and all existing coalition humanitarian liaison cells in the country were placed under its command. While the JCMOTF answered to the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Commander at Bagram, its activities were independent of the missions being conducted by the JSOTF and the maneuver brigade located at Kandahar airport. The lack of integration and coordination between the activities of the CJCOMTF with the rest of the military began to generate criticism by some military commanders and staffers that

---

6 Subsequent CHLCs were set up in other Afghan cities and towns like Masar-E-Shariff, Kandahar, Konduz, Heart, and Bamyan. Active duty Civil Affairs personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion (Airborne) out of Fort Bragg, NC manned these CHLCs.

7 Phase IV was post-hostilities according to CENTCOM planning staff, meaning major combat operations had ended. However, the decision point was political and Phase IV was not declared in Afghanistan until long after the JCMOTF was established.

8 The CJCMOTF was built with troops and assets from the 377th Theater Support Command, an Army Reserve unit from New Orleans, LA; and 122nd Rear Operations Center (ROC), a Georgia National Guard unit. The 489th CA Battalion (BN) from Nashville, TN, filled out the remaining headquarters. Follow on CJCMOTF rotations would become more CA centric. The 360th CA Brigade from Columbia, South Carolina would replace the 377th TSC and 122nd ROC.

9 The 489th CA BN replaced all of the CHLCs in passive areas. The 96th CA BN still manned CHLCs that were still considered in combat zones, such as Gardez, Khost, and Ghazni.

10 While CFLCC and the 10th Mountain Division had their headquarters in Bagram, the coalition ground maneuver unit ran operations out of Kandahar airport. This Brigade also had its own Civil Affairs Teams that conducted their own HA projects independent of the CJCMOTF.
the CJCMOTF was just another NGO without accountability. These critics, and even some members of the Civil Affairs community, would later refer to the activities as “NGO R Us.”

Military personnel were not the only ones grumbling about the CJCMOTF. A few IO/NGO workers complained that CJCMOTF personnel were hard to distinguish from them because they wore civilian clothes, drove in unmarked vehicles, and put up signs that looked similar to their organizations. Thus began the debate of “humanitarian space.”

The CJCMOTF had a few successes. For example, it was able to “break the code” on how to access humanitarian assistance funds called Overseas, Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDCA). With these funds, the CJCMOTF, through the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells, was able to build projects quickly ranging from wells to schools to repaving debilitated roads. Prior to Afghanistan, the OHDACA process for funding was slow and hierarchical with every project having to be approved by Central Command. During the conflict, the approval process was delegated to the CFLCC commander and later to the CJTF Commander at Bagram. USAID was able to

11 When I was working for the Office of Military Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in the summer of 2002, the former CJCMOTF officer told me a Special Forces Colonel complained to him that the CJCMOTF was a renegade organization that did nothing for him or his teams in the southeast area of the country.

12 Charlotte Watkins. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): An Analysis of their contribution to Security in Afghanistan.” Institute for Afghan Studies, Oxford Brookes University (September 30, 2003), 19-20. Available at http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/Watkins-PRT; Internet accessed on January 9, 2007. The CJCMOTF personnel were told to wear civilian clothes for force protection purposes; that is, they would be safer if they were to blend into the environment. Before more adjacent property could be rented next to the CJCMOTF building, personnel lived throughout the city in safe houses. Soldiers in the CHLC wore a mix of civilian clothes and uniforms for the same reason. I was working as an aide-de-camp to BG John Kern, the director of CMO, at Central Command in Tampa, FL when this issue was debated and, later, saw it firsthand when I was deployed to Afghanistan.

13 In previous mission such as Kosovo and Bosnia, clear roles were established between the military and aid workers of their roles. In Bosnia, for example, the Dayton Accord specifically stated what the military would not be involved in reconstruction efforts.

14 In Bosnia, OHDACA was not available to U.S. forces. Soldiers only had two types of funds: Commander’s Emergency Relief Funds (CERPs), which were much smaller than today, and Troop Training Projects (TTPs) that could not exceed $1200. Therefore, Civil Affairs Teams had to use networking skills to persuade IO/NGOs to build their projects that they accessed.

15 MAJ Peggy Murray, who headed the office of Humanitarian Assistance and De-mining at CENTCOM, was instrumental in streamlining the process.
send its field workers into the rural areas because they could stay in the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells for weeks at a time.\textsuperscript{16} The Civil Affairs Teams would provide escorts for field workers, so they could do on site assessments and approve the projects. The CJCMOTF had already created a climate for civil military teams to work together.\textsuperscript{17}

B. U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS - AFGHANISTAN

By late summer of 2002, Coalition Joint Task Force — 180 (CJTF-180), which consisted of coalition of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), had virtually contained Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces along the Pakistan boarder. ISAF had stabilized and created a relatively secure environment for the capital city of Kabul. President Karzai had just been elected by an emergency Loya Jirga as the head of the ATA government until elections could be held in mid-2004.\textsuperscript{18}

During this period, stabilization and reconstruction activities were not coordinated or integrated into any long-term plan for the country. This was not due to lack of trying. Rather, in the previous January, the United Nations, United States, and the Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA) convened a donor conference in Tokyo in which countries pledged donations and coordination of all reconstruction activities.

Numerous problems thwarted reconstruction. First, President Karzai needed to move his influence into the areas that the U.S. led Coalition occupied. However, the majority of all occupied areas were under the control of local and regional warlords that had only pledged verbal loyalty to the new government. The challenge for the government was how to begin to exert influence and, later, to co-opt the warlords. Second, U.S. forces were too few, numbering only around seven thousand military personnel, to not only support the central government in controlling the country, but to also fight Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces along the border of Pakistan. Third, the Afghan

\textsuperscript{16} Dr. Deborah Alexander argues that the CHLCs had PRT capabilities by the fact USAID OTIs were working out of them.

\textsuperscript{17} Dr. Deborah Alexander who worked for USAID/ Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) in Afghanistan from 2002-2004. Interview by phone on April 27, 2007.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 20.
government asked the UN to expand the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul. However, contributing countries, mostly from Europe, resisted this request because it would expand the number of soldiers beyond five thousand. The U.S. also resisted the expansion because it did not want ISAF soldiers in areas where it was conducting combat operations.

The planners of CJTF-180 saw opportunities in all of these challenges to integrate reconstruction and military activity toward two common goals: one, to move control of the Karzai government out of the capital of Kabul into the thirty-four provinces of the country and, two, to defeat Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Their solution was modeled on the Civil Organization and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program during the Vietnam War which created joint civilian military teams to work at the provincial and local level (See Appendix A).

The PRT concept evolved over time. The original name, Joint Regional Teams (JRT), was changed to PRT at the request of President Karzai who wanted to emphasize the extension of governing authority into the provinces. The first six PRTs were originally planned to be established in the Southeast where combat was still active. However, President Karzai changed this and they were instead spread out across the country in Gardez, Masar-e-Shariff, Bamyan, Bagram, Herat, and Kandahar. Finally, PRTs expanded to include interagency representatives from the U.S. Department of State.

19 Alexander interview.
20 Ibid., 19-20.
(DOS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), USAID, and representatives from the Afghan government.24

Once the plan was finalized, the implementation of the PRTs fell upon Colonel Michael Stout, the Deputy Commander of the CJCMOTF. Since the PRTs had no funds or equipment, Colonel Stout had to use his networking skills within CJTF-180 to convince it to give up internal resources in order to establish the first PRT. Finally, in February 2003, the U.S. opened its first PRT in Gardez. This PRT was so robust in force protection that its base looked like a French fort in the movie Beau Guest. Building upon the successful establishment of the Gardez PRT, CJTF-180 established PRTs in Masar-e-Shariff, Bamyan, Bagram, Herat, and Kandahar by the end of the year.

---

Over time the U.S. PRTs developed three characteristics: First, the PRT was part of its counterinsurgency operations against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces and, as such, was to be located in hostile areas of the country. Second, the PRT was to use quick impact projects and reconstruction activities as incentives for the local population to switch sides. Consequently, PRTs had no problem withholding aid to villages if they were deemed sympathetic to the Taliban. Third, the U.S. PRTs were still military-led and had no immediate transition plan for being handed over to the DOS or to the Afghan government (See Appendix B).

---

25 Based on the ISAF/NATO Handbook (February 2007).
C. ISAF/ NATO PRTS — AFGHANISTAN

After initial skepticism, the PRT concept became amenable to ISAF when NATO assumed the UN mandate in October 2003. NATO had already supported ISAF logistically through the previous summer by helping support Germany and the Netherlands to establish a joint-headquarters to run the ISAF mission. Logically, the next step would be for NATO to assume full control of the mission.

Further, the PRT concept overcame the European and U.S. objections to large troop increases. Europe’s original projection saw a troop increase from 5,000 to 25,000 troops outside of Kabul. PRTs became an economy of force solution: small footprint and high impact. For the U.S., ISAF PRTs met practical problems by not having ISAF troops in U.S. zones where there was active combat. Thus, ISAF troops would only operate PRTs in the passive zones. Proponents of this solution called it the “ISAF effect.” In December 2003, NATO authorized PRTs to expand into the rest of the country.

ISAF/ NATO PRTs were only established in permissive environments. This allowed ISAF/ NATO PRTs to avoid the issue of the humanitarian principle of neutrality that plagued Americans. ISAF PRTs tried to keep its military units out of reconstruction and development activities (See Appendix C). Each PRT developed its own national characteristic with national caveats regarding its missions. The following descriptions of British and German-led PRTs illustrate this point.

---

26 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 officially expanded the ISAF mission to include the whole country.


29 Ibid., 20.

30 ISAF PRT Handbook, 2.
1. **British PRT — Masar-e-Shariff**

In July 2003, the British government (UK) assumed control of the PRT in Masar-e-Shariff. The British government brought in approximately 100 personnel, equally divided among military personnel and civilians. The PRT was run by the military, but its lead civilian development agency, the Department of International Development (DFID), supervised and had firm control over all reconstruction and development projects. Consequently, there were few civil-military conflicts with international and non-governmental agencies:

DFID has stipulated that funding has not been used on projects deemed to be better serviced through the capabilities of NGOs (such as water provisioning, education and health services), and has stressed that they hope to maintain a clear separation between PRT and NGO activities.

The British PRT concept of operation was more precise than that of the U.S. because it included security sector reform (SSR), supported institution building, and promoted economic development. Moreover, these three areas were roughly aligned with government departments and agencies: Security and SSR belonged to the Ministry of Defence (MOD); institution building belonged to the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO); and promoting economic development belonged to DFID (see Figure 2).

If the IO/ NGOs were not in the area, the military only did quick impact projects. For example, the UK military stopped building mobile health clinics or health camps in the city of Saripul when the NGOs complained that it was competing with their work in the area.

---

31 ISAF PRT Handbook, D-3-2.
33 Ibid., 20.
34 Ibid., 22.
2. German PRT — Konduz

In 2004, the German-led PRT in Konduz was the largest, with 300 plus personnel including 30 civilians. Like the U.S. and UK approaches, the German PRT model in Konduz was country-centric. This meant that the PRT was designed by the German Government and its needs, not by ISAF HQs in Kabul.

While the command structure is clearly divided between the civilian and the military personnel, their perspective activities seem to blur, or even cross over, into each other’s jurisdictions. For example, the military has a medical company, a country information advisor for information operations, and a Civil Military Cooperation (CMIC) company. Further, they provided medical and logistical support to the local community.

---


37 CIMIC is a NATO and European term that roughly translates to Civil Affairs.
as well as minor reconstruction projects, such as police stations and water projects. The Foreign Ministry Representative conducts a broad spectrum of activities ranging from security sector reform to infrastructure support (see Figure 3).³⁸

![Steering Board](source: NATO/ISAF briefing)

**Figure 3.** German PRT Konduz Organizational Chart.

A unique German characteristic of this PRT is its micromanagement and control by Berlin. Konduz civilian agencies answer directly to Berlin and this circumvents Kabul. The Foreign Ministry, along with Ministry of Interior and the Economic Cooperation and Development, fill all of their civilian positions. The Germans go further to ensure complete separation by not allowing any of the civilians to be under ISAF control. ³⁹

### D. GOVERNORATE SUPPORT TEAMS (GSTS) — IRAQ

When PRTs per se were introduced to Iraq in 2005, the concept itself was not new to the two-year U.S.-led occupation. Joint interagency team concepts had been tried before as Governorate Support Teams (GSTs). Two years earlier, in March 2003, on the

³⁸ Jakobsen, 26.
³⁹ Ibid.
eve of the invasion of Iraq, a similar concept was introduced by Central Command and was referred to as the Governorate Support Teams.\textsuperscript{40} In a central Command “FRAGORD 09-87” released on March 3, 2003, GST was to be the hub to synchronize both the governance and the public administration efforts across the spectrum of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{41} It would take months before the Governorate Support Teams would become operational throughout the country and they still faced many obstacles.

The first obstacle that the Governorate Support Teams faced was acceptance. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) saw them as threats to their regional headquarters. One regional administrator objected to Governorate Support Teams, “What is the point of having regional Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters if these things exist?”\textsuperscript{42} Second, neither the military nor the Coalition Provisional Authority could fill the personnel requirements for these teams. The military, in the original request for forces, had not planned for these organizations. Some Marine and Army Brigades tried to fix this by having their Civil Affairs Teams fill the military portion of the organizations. Meanwhile, the civilian job description required graduate education and extensive field experience which precluded many position from being fulfilled. A later solution to this problem was to drop the education and field experience.

Because of their association with the Coalition Provincial Authority, Governorate Support Teams disbanded when the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved in June

\textsuperscript{40} “Governorate Support Team.” Central Command (PowerPoint June 2003). When I was a CMO LNO planner for CFLCC and 352 CA CMD, I saw an earlier version of this slide presentation, in March 2003. The June copy is the only hard copy I have available.

\textsuperscript{41} FRAGORD 09-087 Governorate Support Teams (March 3, 2005). This FRAGO directs CFC Forces to provide all support necessary to establish a central coordination mechanism within each Governorate of Iraq. FRAGO is an acronym for Fragmentation Order which is a modification to the Operations Order (OPORD). Hundreds of FRAGOs are issued during an operation. Only the S3/ G3/ C3/ J3 on the commander’s staff have the authority to issue FRAGOs.

\textsuperscript{42} When I was the Humanitarian Air Operations Officer at the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC), from April to October 2003, one of the CA officers at CPA told us this story in a 352 CA CMD GST meeting as example of the difficulty of setting up these organizations.
2004. However, the knowledge and experience of the Governorate Support Teams, along with the Afghan PRTs, would help lay the foundation for the future PRT a year later.43

E. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRTS — IRAQ

The former Iraqi Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who also served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003–2005, and John Negroponte, the first U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, have been credited for bringing the PRT concept to Iraq.44 Ambassador Negroponte tried to create the Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) for each province and directed DOS to set them up. Unenthusiastic about this idea, DOS did not try to develop them past the conceptual stage.45 However, when Ambassador Khalilzad came to Iraq, he made them a priority and received support from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. On November 11, 2005, Secretary Rice inaugurated the first Iraq PRT in the northern city of Mosul, declaring that the PRT would “… marry our economic, military, and political people in teams to help local and provincial governments get the job done.”46 Eventually, DOS would stand up seven PRTs at the end of 2006. Coalition partners would set up three more in Al Basra (UK), An Nasiriyah (Italian), and Erbil (South Korea) (See Figure 4).

---

43 Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Goddard, U.S. Army Civil Affairs, MNF-I C9 Planner from 2005-2006. Interviewed in person on April 22, 2007. His PowerPoint slide presentation, “The Way Ahead: Provincial and regional Reconstruction Teams (PRT/RRT).” MNF-I, C9. (PowerPoint on February 13, 2004) has been turned into a narrated presentation and can be found on NPS Blackboard, Cebrowski Institute, in the PRT Distance Learning Module developed by Dr. Karen Guttieri.


45 LTC Goddard interview.

46 Perito, PRTs in Iraq, 1.
Three characteristics distinguish the American PRTs in Iraq from those in Afghanistan. First, the Department of State (DOS) established and supervised the Iraq PRTs. The primary reason for this was that the PRTs in Afghanistan were supposed to transition from military to DOS control. However, because of manning and funding problems, this never happened. So, when Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) CMO Directorate (C9) planned the establishment of the first nine PRTs, they made sure that

---

47 Slide created by the author for his PRT presentation for his class, Stabilization and Reconstruction Capstone Presentation.

48 Ibid.

49 I have not been able to find any MOAs or MOUs that specifically state this but, from interviews, the planners and executors for the Afghan PRTs assumed that DOS would, at some point in the near future, take them over.
DOS took charge from the outset. Second, the Multinational Forces – Iraq C9 planning team sought to apply other lessons from the Afghan and GST experiences. A Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who was on the Multinational Forces – Iraq C9 planning team had served on a GST and thought it offered a good concept which built the foundation of PRTs. The planners tried to set up a framework and to build infrastructure to ensure that PRTs were given direction and to integrate the PRTs into a national strategy. The result was the creation of the National Coordination Team (NCT). The PowerPoint slide in Figure 5 shows the coordination and integration links from the PRTs up through the dual chain of command.

---

**Figure 5.** PRT Line of Coordination and Authority.

---

50 Goddard interview.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Goddard interview.
54 *CALL Iraq PRT Handbook*, 16.
Third, the planners wanted to make sure that the PRTs were supporting successful local programs and wanted a transition plan in which the local Iraqi government would assume control at some point in the future.\(^{55}\) They saw the USAID’s Local Governance Program (LGP) as the foundation for the Iraqi Provincial government to assume control. The Local Governance Program was to train local Iraqi leaders in public administration and transparency. What also made them a good choice was that the PRT primary support would be governance - not reconstruction.\(^{56}\) The planning team mission statement reflects this:

To assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.\(^{57}\)

This mission statement would not change and became the basis for “Embed” PRTs (See Appendix D).

F. EMBED PRTS — IRAQ

In 2007, as DOS regional PRTs were still being established across the 18 Provinces, General David Petraeus, the new Multinational Forces – Iraq commander, introduced 10 Embed PRTs as part of his surge strategy to secure Baghdad.\(^{58}\) Unlike the DOS led PRTs, Embed PRTs were assigned to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and smaller geographic areas. As shown on the Baghdad map below (See Figure 6), seven Embed PRTs would cover Baghdad alone. Also the Embed PRT concept allowed local military commanders to control and influence PRTs activities in their sector, responding

\(^{55}\) CALL Iraq PRT Handbook, 16.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Goddard interview, 3.

\(^{58}\) MAJ Glenn Woodson, NPS Student who traveled to Iraq and visited PRTs from January 13–February 16, 2007. Interviewed in person on March 29, 2007. His presentation, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: An Oral Interview” (PowerPoint on March 29, 2007), has been turned into an articulate and can be found on NPS Blackboard, Cebrowski Institute, in the PRT Distance Learning Module, developed by Dr. Karen Guttieri.
to the criticism that PRT activities were too independent of combat operations. Now Brigade Commanders could use the PRT activities to help shape their fight. The Embed PRT concept also empowered the civilians. In matters of reconstruction, the civilian director of Embed PRTs would have equal status with the BCT commander.

Also, General Petraeus’ concept was to have Embed PRTs work closely with local police forces, called Joint Security Stations. The Embeds became part of his overall counterinsurgency strategy to put coalition troops back in the towns and on the streets. Whether this was General Petraeus intention or not, Embed PRTs became an economy of force like the Afghan PRTs. Unable to put a one-to-twenty ratio of security force to the population of 26 million, the Embed PRTs became a solution to countering the continuous criticism of not enough security forces.

Another characteristic of Embed PRTs is location. Embeds would not be placed across the country, but in strategic hotspots. General Petraeus envisioned only ten Embed PRTs, seven of them in Baghdad and three in Al Anbar Province.59

---

59 Woodson interview.
Just like the start ups in Afghanistan and the DOS PRTs, these Embed PRTs are ad hoc and the personnel and equipment will come from existing units until the DoD Force Management process can catch up to resource them. For example, functional experts will not arrive in the country until mid-summer 2007 and this is a “stop gap” measure with Army Civil Affairs Functional Experts filling a need until DOS can find their own experts. How the embeds plan to coordinate and integrate with the DOS Provincial PRTs has still not been worked out by either the Strategic Mission Council or the Executive Steering Committee. Finally, while the Embeds work closely with Brigade Combat Teams, the funds for reconstruction still come from Baghdad – it is still a hierarchical system. The Embeds are experiencing growing pains similar to those of DOS PRTs and PRTs in Afghanistan. So much for lessons learned (See Appendix G).

This brief sketch of the history of the PRTs demonstrates that the only similarity among the four sets of PRTs developed in Afghanistan and Iraq — other than in name —

---

60 Woodson interview.
was that they attempted to be joint interagency teams at both regional and local levels. The next chapter discusses the successes and controversies that PRTs generated from the IO/NGO, military, and interagency perspectives.
III. PRT SUCCESSES AND CONTROVERSIES

While most written work on PRTs focuses on controversies, I read about some successes.\(^61\) This chapter describes both the successes and controversies of PRTs. Some PRT successes are in the areas of security, security sector reforms, and local governance. The controversies of PRTs cover some operational areas, such as humanitarian space, and PRT attributes, such as lack of information sharing. The successes and controversies of the PRTs mostly refer to the Afghan experience. This is because four years have passed which allows for more in depth critical review than the ones in Iraq. However, the Iraq effort has not escaped negative press. As time passes, Iraq PRTs will suffer the same scrutiny that Afghan PRTs did.

A. PRT SUCCESSES

The literature has been mixed on how successful PRTs have been. Depending on one’s criteria and one’s worldview, PRTs have been a partial success. Michael J. McNerney concludes, “PRTs have shown tremendous improvement from the muddled early days.”\(^62\) Peter Viggo Jakobsen believes, “PRTs are successful but not sufficient.”\(^63\) Robert Borders argues that the PRT concept “… is a proven, flexible model for post-conflict reconstruction…”\(^64\)

1. Security

Despite criticism that the 2004 *Save the Children (UK)* report heaped on PRTs, it also recognized successes in security. The mere presence of the PRTs can “reduce the

---

\(^{61}\) Most of the stories come from interviews, conducted over the past six months, with military officers who were involved in the planning, execution, or command.

\(^{62}\) Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06), 44.

\(^{63}\) Jakobsen and Peter Viggo, “PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient.” *Danish Institute for International Studies* (June 2005). His thesis of his report is that future PRTs need to model themselves on the UK.

propensity for local conflict between warlords.”\textsuperscript{65} Also, the PRTs have “a reach back”
capability to bring more reinforcements when needed.\textsuperscript{66} In some instances, PRTs have
relied on the ultimate “stick” – bombs from above.\textsuperscript{67} Two examples are cited in the ISAF
PRT handbook as successful security tasks: PRT Masar-e-shariff helped negotiate a
peaceful solution when warlord Dostum, an Uzbek, and Atta, a Panjir Tajik, almost went
to war over disputed territory.\textsuperscript{68} PRT Herat helped negotiate the transition of Fahim
Khan out of power, a regional warlord who had been in power since 2001.

2. Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A positive unintended consequence of PRTs has been the support of the Security
Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
process. PRTs, especially those under ISAF/NATO, have taken up security sector reform
by training local police and supported DDR.\textsuperscript{69} In its mission statement, the PRT
handbook states that security sector reform is one of its tasks.\textsuperscript{70} PRTs have become hubs
where local police chiefs share information on criminal activity, such as illegal
checkpoints.

While DDR was not an original task of PRTs, they took on the mission later when
SSR was added to the task list.\textsuperscript{71} PRT support for the DDR process evolved as a result of
the Afghan Ministry of Defense’s New Beginning Program, an effort to disarm local
militias, and as a result of the on going training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).\textsuperscript{72}
Coincidentally, as the DDR process got started in 2004, ISAF/ NATO began to move out

\textsuperscript{65} Save the Children (UK), 29.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} McNerney, 41
\textsuperscript{68} ISAF PRT Handbook, D-2-2.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 42
\textsuperscript{70} ISAF PRT Handbook, 2.
\textsuperscript{71} Stout interview. COL Stout was told that DDR would be a UN mission and his PRTs would not
conduct or support this activity.
\textsuperscript{72} Yuji Uesugi, Research Fellow, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and their
Contribution to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process in Afghanistan.”
Hiroshima University Partnership for Peacebuilding and Social Capacity (HIPEC) 3. Available at
of Kabul via the PRTs. Consequently, two-thirds of DDR completion occurred in areas where PRTs operated. While PRTs cannot be given sole credit for the DDR success for that year, they were surely a critical contributing factor.

3. Local Governance

Finally, the one area that critics and proponents of PRT have agreed upon is that PRTs need to expand support for local governance. When PRTs get involved with local governance, they have a positive effect as seen in successes in local DDR programs and local government involvement with quick impact projects. In Iraq PRTs support the Local Governance Program in their areas and likewise contribute to local governance.

B. PRT CONTROVERSIES

Controversy over PRTs can be broken down into two categories: There is a philosophical question: Should PRTs engage in reconstruction and development? And there is a practical question: Are PRTs set up for successes?

1. Irreconcilable Philosophies: Humanitarian Space

An NGO community criticism is that PRTs blur the line in aid work between the military and civilians. This is a violation of “humanitarian space.” The IO/NGO community defines humanitarian space as “… the independence and neutrality from military and political forces that allowed NGOs and, to some extent, the United Nations itself, to provide life-saving aid to needy civilians on all sides of the conflict.”

---

73 Uesugi, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams.”
74 Ibid.
75 McNerney, 42
76 Goddard interview.
77 Lara Olson, “Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9, no. 1 Fall 2006, 9-10. Also, the European Commission’s Directorate for Humanitarian Aid defines “humanitarian space” as “the access and freedom for humanitarian organizations to assess and meet humanitarian needs.”
Neutrality means that aid workers are distinguished from the military. Specifically, aid workers stay independent from military coordination, or sharing workspace, projects, uniforms, and, also, vehicles.

Most aid workers pride themselves on living in accordance with the guidelines of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) of 1994.

The primacy of the humanitarian imperative:

The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle, which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries.

The independence of humanitarian aid:

Humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint... Humanitarian NGOs (NGHAs) shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. NGHAs are agencies, which act independently from governments.

Providing aid impartially:

Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.\(^{78}\)

Military commanders consider military necessity as well as humanitarian principles. With these guidelines in mind, aid workers complain that the military uses aid as a tactic, as depicted in the phrase “winning hearts and minds.” This type of tactics compromises public perceptions of humanitarian assistance as politically neutral and have led the local population to see NGOs as simply part of the military.\(^{79}\) For example,

---

\(^{78}\) Save the Children (UK), 7.

\(^{79}\) Olson, 13.
in the first year in Afghanistan, NGOs complained that Special Forces and Civil Affairs blurred the line by operating in civilian clothes and unmarked vehicles when conducting civic action projects.\textsuperscript{80}

According to the NGO community, this blurring of the line has resulted in increased violence against NGOs.\textsuperscript{81} According to \textit{Global Civil Society Yearbook}, Afghanistan has become the most dangerous country in the world for aid agencies. Specifically, from the early 1990s to 2005, targeting of NGOs has increased by a significant number of 1,300 percent.\textsuperscript{82} Another report from the Afghanistan NGO Security Office reports a sharp increase in attacks on aid workers for 2003.\textsuperscript{83} After 24 years of aid work in Afghanistan, \textit{Doctors Without Borders} (MSF) pulled out and “…cited the assertion made by Taliban representatives after the killings that organizations like MSF work for U.S. interests and were therefore targets for future attacks.”\textsuperscript{84}

The data presented is irrefutable: violence toward NGOs has increased significantly, but the data itself may be debatable, even if their figures are correct. It is hard to isolate the variable that PRTs are the cause. For example, Islamic extremists do not follow the rules of the Geneva Convention and would target NGOs anyway whether or not PRTs are in the area.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{81} NGOs operate from a paradigm of security that differs from that of military and corporate approaches. If the military approach to force protection is primarily deterrence, and the corporate approach is protection (for example, hiring bodyguards), the NGO approach has been characterized by acceptance.\textsuperscript{http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Nov/guttieriNov05.asp}

\textsuperscript{82} Olson, 11. It would be critical to know if violence against NGOs has not increased worldwide over the last decade in areas where the U.S. has no military presence.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Save the Children (UK)}, 14.

\textsuperscript{84} Olson, 13.

\textsuperscript{85} Borders, 10. As Robert Borders notes “radical extremists don’t respect NGO neutrality or independence any more than they do government authority.”
\end{flushleft}
a. Treaty Obligation

As mentioned, the rise of the PRTs in Afghanistan has raised several concerns on the part of both International Organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This includes concerns about humanitarian security and the proper role of the military in reconstruction efforts. The real question being asked by IOs and NGOs, and even some members of the military community, is: do PRTs have a place in post-conflict reconstructions (PCR) at all? In a private meeting between President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell about the decision to invade Iraq, Secretary Powell warned the President about the U.S.’s obligation — “If you break it, you own it.” What Secretary Powell likely meant was that the United States, based on treaties and conventions, has certain treaty obligations to civilians on the battlefield and during military occupations.

The two primary guiding documents are the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague II (commonly referred to as the Hague Convention), and The Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (commonly referred to as the Fourth Geneva Convention). The Hague Convention is “… animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme hypothesis, the interest of humanity and the ever increasing requirements of civilization.” The document covers the occupation’s obligation in Section III, “On Military Authority over Hostile Territory,” articles 42 – 56(Appendix F).

---


88 Ibid.
b. Minimizing the Differences

While the different philosophies between NGOs and the U.S. military are irreconcilable, policy makers, NGO field workers, and military commanders should not ignore the issue of humanitarian space. First, both seek to enable the Afghan people to enjoy peace:

The U.S.-led coalition forces and the international humanitarian community share the common goal of assisting the Afghan people achieve a long-awaited stable and prosperous peace. PRTs can be an important part of that effort without compromising the ability of the humanitarian community to contribute and help speed this important effort.89

Second, there is a time and place when the military is the only actor that can deliver humanitarian assistance:

Even the majority of the humanitarian community would generally agree that in situations of dire need, where access for humanitarian agencies is denied, there is a role for the military in providing life-saving assistance. In other words, military involvement is generally acceptable as a ‘last resort’ when no other agencies are either present or capable of acting.90

The military, meanwhile, provides humanitarian assistance (or engage in civic action) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations because the population is the center of gravity in the conflict and both the rebels and the government are vying for the support of the people, who will ultimately bestow legitimacy (Figure 7).91

---

89 Boarder, 10.
90 Watkins, 11.
91 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-21. The new COIN manual states legitimacy is the main objective. In this section legitimacy of the government is derived when, “…most of its citizens voluntarily accept its rule.”
Counterinsurgency campaigns must deliver quickly to build confidence within the population. They cannot wait for others to conduct these programs. As shown above, civic action projects, such as medical clinics and other activities that characterize traditional humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects are used as incentives so that local population will support legitimate governance and not insurgent groups. Currently, the U.S. and the Afghan government are conducting counterinsurgency operations in certain areas of Afghanistan and Iraq and PRTs are vital to this effort. While this controversy is new, such methods have been used in the past by the British in Malaya and the U.S. in Vietnam and the Philippines. What is different today the larger presence of international organizations and the existence of non-governmental organizations.

The third consideration for minimizing the differences is that the U.S. military should only provide aid temporarily. The military needs to ensure that it has a transition plan in place and advertised that either a civilian led organization or the host nation government will take over. One logical point for transition could be when the area is declared permissive by the IO/NGO and they begin to move into the area to operate.

---

2. **Practical Issues: Gaps in Attributes of a PRT**

The second category of criticism with PRTs relates to practical issues of organizational design, integration, and methods of operation. Problems with resources, qualified personnel, and training were inherent from the beginning because PRTs were hastily organized. The ad hoc nature of the first PRT guaranteed a shortfall in resources, personnel, and training. The ad hoc nature also affected the integration of the PRTs in the long-term reconstruction and development plan. Finally, the biggest practical issue is the lack of civil information management capability to measure effectiveness.

**a. Lack of Resources, Personnel, and Training**

Colonel Michael Stout, who set up the first U.S. PRTs back in 2003, lamented that he had to beg, borrow, and steal from existing resources at CJTF-180 to stand up PRT Gardez.93 Finally, Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, commander of CJTF-180, intervened and ordered his subordinate units to give Colonel Stout what they needed. The order worked, but resources were still lacking. As one author described it that PRTs looked like those vehicles (SUVs) he saw in post-apocalyptic movie *Mad Max* — held together with duct-taped.94

Resource problems have also plagued Iraq PRTs. The DOS-led PRTs have been slow to establish because of lack of resources and interagency fighting. Resources have become such a problem that DoD and DOS fight over who paid for PRT meals. Another example is that MNF-I C9 had to scrap a couple of PRT locations because the military closed its forward operating bases (FOBs).

Slowly but surely, the resource problem is getting fixed as PRTs become part of the joint planning and manning process. Military funding of PRTs is now built into the contingency plans and the President has included DOS PRTs as part of his supplemental appropriations request to Congress.

---

93 Stout Interview.
94 McNerney, 36.
From a personnel point of view, many PRT civilian positions are still left unfilled for months and the ones that did show up were only there for 90 days. The PRT in Parwan was constantly short of interagency personnel. (See Appendix B; 2)

Afghan PRTs are not the only ones suffering from personnel shortages. Talking about Iraq PRTs, Ambassador James Jeffrey, Department of State coordinator for Iraq policy, said in an interview that putting more civilian experts on the ground is neither possible nor necessary:

The military talks to us about that all the time ... The problem is that this would require tens of thousands more military personnel to provide security for them — and it’s a very big issue ... The point is, do we need that many people? I’m skeptical.

Later, he also admitted that the Department of State does not have the people to send to Iraq.

Personnel shortages continue, but the 90-day tours have been replaced with one-year tours. Also, DOS continues to recognize the problem and recommends, “To fill key U.S. PRT positions and better achieve assignment objectives, civilian agencies need to further develop policies and incentive structures.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has tried to correct this by instituting her Transformational Diplomacy Road Map. This shifts Foreign Service Officers’ jobs from Europe and Washington, DC to the Third World, specifically the Middle East, and “pegs” promotions to hardship tours. So far, this has met resistance within the State Department culture. According to

---

95 McNerney, 36. One New Zealand officer told me a story that NZ Aid, the equivalent to USAID, was left unfilled at Banyan until the Prime Minister of New Zealand directed NZ Aid to fill it. For more Banyan PRT information is available at http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/default.htm. Access on September 25, 2007.

96 Gordon Trowbridge, “State Department is unlikely to send more civilians to Iraq.” Times (NTD), 1

97 Ibid.

98 Provincial Reconstruction Team: An Interagency Assessment. PN-ADG-252 USAID (Washington, DC: June 2006), 5

a poll released by the *American Foreign Service Association* in a recent newsletter, the majority of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) opposes promotion based on hardship assignments.100

To help integrate civilian personnel with the military, 2006 *USAID Assessment Report* recommends aligning civilian tours to match military tours and to ensure future teams have collective training.101 Currently, DOS and DoD are moving in the right direction by conducting an introductory course on PRTs to both military and civilians heading into theater.102

While the U.S. has done little in joint training prior to deployment, the British did this from the beginning when they assumed control of the PRT in Masar-e-Shariff.103 Its teams trained and deployed together back in England. This allowed both the civilians and the military to get to know each other’s culture and mission, and also, to let them feel out how to work together and support each other. The result is that PRT Masar-e-Shariff became the successful model of choice for one Danish Institute study.104

**b. Lack of Integration**

Lack of integration has come in three forms: absence from the campaign plan, amateurism, and the duplication of effort. The original plan for PRTs was for them to be decentralized, but integrated work. This helped ensure the right projects for the locals were being built. However, NGOs complained that the PRTs were amateurs in the aid business by duplicating their projects in the same areas. One NGO recommended that the military stay in its lane because humanitarian assistance is not a business for amateurs:

---

100 “AFSA Polls Members on Proposed Iraq PRT Service Incentives.” *AFSANews*. American Foreign Service Association (June 2006). Available at [http://www.afsa.org/news](http://www.afsa.org/news). DOS, USCG, USAID, USDA, NOAA, and PHS have commissioned officers that are not part of DoD.


102 McNerney, 39-40.

103 McNerney, 39-40.

104 Jakobsen, 37. While Save the Children (UK) had problems with the British PRT, it agreed that the British PRT had a better working relationship with NGOs than any other PRT. See the *Save the Children (UK)*, 25-26
I can understand why the military forces are involved in these things. The main reason is to conquer the hearts and minds of the people. Mainly to stop being shot at, so they are seen as the good guys. For an army it’s better to do this than kick in doors and insult people. Leave the NGOs to build kindergartens. Some things are better left to professionals.105

The aid community recognizes that PRTs have the right cultural attitude. However, they accuse PRTs of not having the proper understanding of the locals’ specific needs. In essence, PRTs do not listen to the locals.106 However, this could also reflect NGO’s own biases since no individual from the NGO community could not back up this claim with any evidence. On the contrary, PRTs “did an excellent job involving local communities, hiring local workers, and sometimes trying to incorporate training components in their various projects.”107

As for duplicating efforts and poor project management, for example, in Kandahar, the NGOs have accused the local PRT of duplicating their projects.108 Civil Affairs teams have built elementary schools and secondary schools in the same areas of NGOs.109 Also, NGOs have challenged PRTs to remedy their poor project management, which have resulted in projects that are unsustainable and lacking community input.110 NGOs frequently give examples of schools that have been built and not used.111 While this criticism is valid, the NGO community needs to take some responsibility for this as well. If they want neutrality, but refuse to coordinate their activities with the military, duplication of effort is virtually assured. To ISAF’s credit, it has tried to steer their military units in PRTs away from relief and reconstruction efforts and toward security sector reform.112

105 Borders, 6.
106 McNerney, 42.
107 Ibid., 42.
108 Save the Children (UK), 11.
109 Borders, 11.
110 McNearny, 42.
111 Olson, 16 and Save the Children (UK), 30.
But even military commanders complained that PRTs acted autonomously without regard to their mission. They spent money and built projects that did not seem to be anchored toward any common goal. Some even call them “Motel 6,” referring to PRTs as “All Things to All People.”\(^\text{113}\)

To help redress these issues, LTG David Barno, commander of CJTF-180 from November 2003–2004, initiated five changes: First, he expanded the number of PRTs from eight to fourteen. Second, he integrated PRTs by placing them under Regional Brigades. Third, he ensured that all U.S. and NATO PRT Commanders were senior colonels. Fourth, he moved the U.S. effort from a conventional to a counterinsurgency approach. Fifth, he relocated his headquarters from Bagram Air Base to Kabul to better facilitate the integration of military, political, and economic efforts.\(^\text{114}\)

In 2005, the Afghan Government, the U.S., and ISAF established the PRT Steering Committee, headed by the Minister of Interior of the Afghan Government, to create a forum for consultation among the Afghan government ministries, U.S., ISAF, IOs/NGOs to help prioritize all reconstruction projects.\(^\text{115}\) ISAF has also tried to create a framework by publishing a comprehensive handbook that addresses missions, purpose, tasks, and organizations. Since January 1, 2007, CFC-A and ISAF duties have been merged under NATO. Both U.S. and NATO PRTs are now under the same command.

In 2003, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued the *Principles Guiding PRT Working Relations with UNAMA, NGOs, and Local Government* to give the U.S. PRTs some framework.\(^\text{116}\) Endorsed by the PRT Steering Committee, this document “established three primary objectives for the PRT Program: extend the authority of the Afghan central government, improve security, and promote reconstruction.” The State Department also created a PRT coordinator in 2004 to ensure that DOS personnel were integrated into the PRTs. The coordinator later became an advocate for civilians who

\(^{113}\) McNerney, 36.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 38

\(^{115}\) Perito, Lessons Identified, 2. Also, the PRT Executive Steering Committee Charter can be found in the *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Handbook I & II*, no. 3. International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)/NATO/UNMA (Kabul, Afghanistan: February 3, 2007), B-1-1 to B-1-3.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.
were having problems with their military counterparts.\textsuperscript{117} With these steps, lack of integration has presumably become less of an issue.

c. Civil Information Management (CIM)

A major problem affecting PRT effectiveness is rarely mentioned as a problem and, further, does not show up in any PRT organizational charts for Afghanistan and Iraq: namely the inadequacies of PRT civil information management capability. The \textit{USAID Assessment Report} is one of the few documents to acknowledge the problem:

Many DOS and USAID PRT representatives indicated that they did not have reliable access to information about national projects in their province. Their inability to provide comprehensive information about U.S. activities to PRT and regional commanders undermined civilian credibility and limited their ability to integrate their activities with national programs.

For example, an initiative to map all development activities has been underway for a considerable period, but the information is still not easily accessible to field staff.\textsuperscript{118}

The only other references I have found to information management failures came in interviews. For example, Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell, former commander of PRT Bagram, lamented that his PRT transition and continuity would have been better had he had a civil information management capability in place?\textsuperscript{119} When he arrived in Bagram, he was surprised that there was no system and few archives of CMO projects. He assumed there would be a plethora of Excel spreadsheets. As he pointed

\textsuperscript{117} Colonel Dennis J. Cahill, Assistant Chief of Staff, G8 USACAPOC and a member of the CALL Assessment Team that travels to Afghanistan to assess the current status of PRTs in April 2007. Interview on May 2, 2007.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{USAID Assessment Report}, 5.6.10-15.

\textsuperscript{119} Lieutenant Colonel George McDonnell, who was commander of PRT Bagram from 2005-2006. Interview by phone on April 24, 2007. He also showed me his Command Brief “Bagram PRT, April 22, 2006” (PowerPoint) and it has been turned into an articulate and can be found on NPS Blackboard, Cebrowski Institute, in the PRT Distance Learning Module, developed by Dr. Karen Guttieri.
out, if he had a civil information management capability, he would not have wasted months rebuilding data that previous commanders had collected.\(^{120}\)

Not only would a civil information management capability help with project tracking, but it could alleviate inefficiencies when PRT teams transition and rotate in and out.\(^{121}\) This data could help campaign planners determine whether they are obtaining the desired effects toward their mission goals. It could be likewise used to gauge how ongoing operations are affecting the civilian realm. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Warmack explained why Civil Information Management recently became recognized in doctrine as a core task for Civil Affairs soldiers:

Civil information management … becomes a focal point for data collection at each level of operations. The civil information management cell receives data from the CATs, the Coalition Liaison Teams (CLTs), and Functional Specialists in the field and processes the data to help build the civil common operating picture (COP). The civil common operating picture is passed on to the commander through the Civil Affairs Planning Teams (CAPTs) who are analyzing the products for effects-base targeting and future planning. The Civil Affairs Planning Teams inputs the civil common operating picture into the supported Commander’s common operating picture. This results in decision superiority and improved effects-based Civil Military Operations activities.\(^{122}\)

Finally, a CIM could produce data and trends to help whether the successes and concerns cited by critics and proponents of PRTs are well-grounded. Currently, almost all support for both sides of the arguments has been anecdotal. For example, as already mentioned, NGOs have accused PRTs of increased levels of violence toward them.\(^{123}\) Alternatively, critics have argued that PRTs do not bring real security

\(^{120}\) An information management problem is not the same as an information collection problem. While the PRTs had difficulty collecting information, the SFOR AC in Bosnia had exactly the opposite problem — too much information. To read more about the problem SFOR AC had with information management, read William J. Owen. “Measure of Effectiveness: Progress on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Road to Peace,” NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (June 1997), 10-12.

\(^{121}\) PRT rotations varied from six months to one year. For example, LTC McDonnell was to supposed to stay in Afghanistan for a year, but was rotated out after nine months. Currently, PRT rotations will last for one year.

\(^{122}\) LTC Kenneth (Ritchie) Moore and LTC Michael Warmack, “Civil Affairs (CA) Transformation” (PowerPoint). Presented to Joint Special Operations University, March 24, 2006, 93.

\(^{123}\) Olson, 10-14.
because the security footprint is insignificant. They point to the statistical rise of violence against NGOs and to the fact that not one warlord has been held accountable for abuse of power.\textsuperscript{124} Beyond this, they offer stories from the field, but no concrete evidence. On their part, proponents do not have data to support their positions either. One article reported that PRTs first tried to measure their success by the number of smiling Afghan children.\textsuperscript{125} Another attempt was to measure money spent on OHDACA projects.\textsuperscript{126} At the very least, with a civil information management system in place, proponents might just have a chance to rebut the charges.

This chapter has addressed controversies — both philosophical and practical and has identified PRT shortfalls. The next chapter will recommend ways to redress them; thus, improving PRTs’ overall effectiveness.

\begin{flushright}
124 Save the Children (UK), 30.
125 McNerney, 39.
126 Ibid.
\end{flushright}
IV. IMPROVING PRT EFFECTIVENESS

This chapter will recommend ways to improve effectiveness. First, I will examine what it means to measure effectiveness, especially when the performance is hard to quantify. In both counterinsurgency and post-conflict stability environments, as witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, identified measures of effectiveness continue to elude U.S. and ISAF/NATO forces.

Thus, I will explore the question, “What are the right metrics, and, why are they so hard to develop?” I will explore different organizational approaches such as Save the Children (UK), ISAF, Multinational Forces – Iraq, and United States Institute for Peace (USIP).

From the discussion on effectiveness, this chapter will recommend how to improve PRT internal attributes by adopting the new standing Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) found in FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. Selecting commanders (military or civilian) with the right skill sets is the most important decision to ensure success of a PRT because the commander’s competence and networking skills can compensate greatly for overall PRT capability gaps.

Finally, the focus up to this point has been the internal improvement of the PRT. This chapter considers what external factors, such as legislative fixes and improvements to the bureaucratic processes within the DoD and other government agencies, might improve effectiveness.

A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES)

Measures of Effectiveness will have different meanings for different people. For example, some may misunderstand “measure of effectiveness” to be a measure of effort (how many wells were dug today or how many militia persons have been disarmed?). For others, it may be a measure of performance (every soldier reported for duty today). It is
crucial, however, that the measure of effectiveness specifically addresses “an impact on the target” or “effectiveness for whom.” 127

Traditionally, the military could measure effectiveness by the maximum damage done to the enemy with minimal damage to its own side.128 Effects Based Operations (EBO) is a perfect example of this traditional military MOE. However, civil military effectiveness that PRTs are involved in is less quantifiable and more subjective. For instance, how do you measure a return to normalcy, safety, and economic well-being?129 When EBO is applied to the civil military dimension, it had difficulty measuring effectiveness.

1. **What are the Right Metrics?**

The pursuit of the right metrics must be grounded in the right questions. Unfortunately, scant attention in the PRT literature has been given to developing metrics to see if the PRTs are meeting their desired goals. Most literature or reports have concentrated on job descriptions, reporting chains, and successful attributes of a PRT. Save the Children (UK) did try to create metrics that linked PRT activities to security outcomes (See Appendix I). 130 However, even with metrics for security, Save the Children only dealt with one task (security) in the PRT mission statement. Alternatively, Michael J. McNerney attempted to measure success of an Afghan PRT by developing criteria for tactical-level coordination, building relationships, and building capacity.131

Still, the question remains: Are these the right criteria? To determine the right questions for effectiveness, I recommend first looking at specific PRT mission statements

---


128 Ibid.

129 One measure of effectiveness developed for PCR is Normality indicators. Some were developed during the NATO mission in Bosnia. See Stephan B. Fleming, William J. Owens, and James Eckworth. “Measurement of Post-Conflict Resolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Implications for Command of Peace Operations.” Presented at Human in Command Meetings, Breda on June 2000.

130 *Save the Children (UK)*, 39

131 McNerney, 39.
for their tasks. For example, analyzing both the mission statements from ISAF PRT and PRT Gardez and the DOS PRT statement from MFN-I C9, yields the following tasks:

- Assist the host nation (Iraq or Afghanistan) to extend its authority
- Help develop good governance (transparency, rule of law)
- Develop a stable and secure environment
- Enable Security Sector reform (police, DDR, de-mining)
- Support reconstruction efforts (HN, IO/NGO, quick impact projects)\(^{132}\)

From these tasks, metrics can be developed along the lines of operations (governance, security, economics and social well being, and justice). While these logical lines of operations are good, they are still too broad. Understanding this, the CALL PRT Handbook published the National Coordination Team assessment guide for measuring success (See Appendix G) that tries to narrow the focus within the logical lines.\(^{133}\) NCT tried to develop a 4-phase process to measure success. However, an in-depth look reveals a primary problem with the assessment guide: the Handbook does not explain the methodology of the NCT metric.

The best example of MOEs that I have come across is the United States Institute of Peace document called “Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization.”\(^{134}\) Like other models, they have stages to measure progress to get to their stated goals.\(^{135}\) USIP tries to use a hybrid of methodologies to measure effectiveness: Content Analysis (CA), Expert Opinion (EO), Statistical Analysis (SA), and Survey/
Polling Data (S/PD) (See Appendix I). In the example below, a goal to achieve political moderation and stable democracy is measured by applying the four methodologies to see if there has been improvement:

**Drivers of Conflict**

**Competition for Absolute Power Diminished** *(Do political elites/leaders and identity groups perceive the political process in “zero-sum” terms?)*

Perception among identity group members that loss of power (e.g., to other identity groups) will preclude the prospect of regaining power in the future. (S/PD)

Public rhetoric from political elites/leaders asserting that their rivals have negotiated the peace settlement in bad faith (i.e., that the settlement is a trick or that their rivals will manipulate the peace settlement to assert control over security forces). (CA)

Number of assaults and assassinations perpetrated by members of one of the former warring factions against leaders of other identity groups. (SA) (EO)

Number of assaults and assassinations perpetrated by members of one of the former warring factions against other members of their own identity group. (EO)\footnote{Stages of Conflict Transformation and Stabilization, 8.}

The USIP metrics seems promising. However, unless it is coupled with a civil information management capability, it will be difficult — if not impossible — for commanders or anyone to accurately measure effectively a PRT other than anecdotes.

**B. THE PROBLEM OF ADHOCRACY**

Within the current PRT concept, is another element that makes it difficult to measure, and, until recently, a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) shares this attribute that still plagues PRTs – adhocracy. According to Joint Civil Affairs doctrine,
“a CMOC is an ad hoc organization...”\textsuperscript{137} Also, as different as the four PRTs discussed so far are, all of them conduct similar tasks of a traditional CMOC such as “… to assist in the coordination of activities of participating military forces, and other [U.S. government] USG agencies, nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations.”\textsuperscript{138}

A common issue of a PRT is establishment. In all four cases, PRTs had huge growing pains because all of them were built from scratch from operational needs in the field. When this happens, DoD and other government agencies in Washington DC will have to provide money, equipment, and personnel to include training. Enormous bureaucracies are cumbersome. Rules and regulations that develop organization processes and practices, such as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), Joint Operations and Planning Execution Systems (JOPES), mobilization, and union rules, are slow to react.\textsuperscript{139} To make matters worse, they usually resist changes. According to James Q. Wilson in his seminal book \textit{Bureaucracy}:

> These organizations resist innovations. They are supposed to do it. The reason an organization is created is in large part to replace the uncertain expectations and haphazard activities of voluntary endeavors with the stability and routine of organized relationships. The standard operating procedure (SOP) is not the enemy of organization; it is the essence of an organization.\textsuperscript{140}

---

\textsuperscript{137} Joint Publication 3-57.1, \textit{Joint Civil Affairs Operations} (Washington, DC; Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 14, 2003), xi. The full definition reads, “A CMOC is an ad hoc organization. Normally established by the geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, or other commanders to assist in the coordination of activities of participating military forces, and other USG agencies, nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations.”

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} POM is the DoD five-year budget that is produced every two years. The POM also feeds into the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) that looks fifteen years into the future. It is fair to say that the U.S. Forces that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq were budgeted in the late 1990s. A General Officer interviewed on September 4, 2006, told me that when he worked as a civilian in Army G4 in 1999, the Secretary of Defense vetoed the Army’s plan to armor all of the HUMVVs and give every soldier level-3 body armor. The reason given was that cost and troops behind the lines did not need it. The U.S. Military deploys based on Joint Operations Plans and Execution System (JOPES). Planners who write the war plans feed the information called Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) into JOPES. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) controls JOPES.

Colonel Stout experienced this type of bureaucracy first hand with CJTF-180 when he stood up PRT Gardez. He would be the first person to argue that these commanders were not trying to undermine his success. Rather, most were supportive of his mission; however, they defaulted to their bureaucratic tendencies and would not give up resources.\textsuperscript{141}

As long as PRTs start out as ad hoc organizations, gaps in the attributes mentioned in the previous chapter will remain a chronic problem. United States Institute for Peace Coordinator for Afghanistan Robert Perito summed it up best, “The ad hoc approach taken in the PRT program is indicative of the overall U.S. response to the challenges of post-conflict intervention in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{142}

To address the problem of adhocracy, various experts have suggested operational changes, such as applying a different strategy, but without offering specifics such as better personnel or more funds. For example, Robert Perito makes the following suggestions that, while noble and on the right track, are unrealistic:

The USDA and other civilian agencies should fund and assign representatives.

While USDA’s program lacked program funding and logistic support, the agency deserves credit for the effort, courage, and ingenuity of its volunteers. Other civilian agencies did not make such an attempt, but could make useful contributions. These agencies should develop programs to recruit, train, equip, and deploy personnel with logistical support and program funding.

The State Department should develop a program of public diplomacy for State representatives in PRTs.

Currently, FSOs assigned to PRTs have no programs or project funding. There is a need, however, for public diplomacy, which is a traditional State Department function. Such an effort would replicate the role once

\textsuperscript{141} Stout interview. I witnessed another incident that was indicative of this problem. The Turkish Air Force Commander at Kabul International Airport requested a U.S. LNO. The request took three months to fill. Even though many officers at Bagram volunteered for the assignment, the CJTF-180 felt it could not give anyone up and requested that the position to be filled by DA back in Washington, DC.

\textsuperscript{142} Perito, Lessons Identified, 14.
played by the U.S. Information Service’s educational and cultural programming. This would strengthen the role of the State representative, who would have a real “seat at the table” in the Project Review Committee and additional reasons to interact with Afghans.

Match PRT military capabilities with a robust component of specially trained, adequately resourced, and logistically supported civilian representatives.

Much could be achieved if the military component of the PRT was matched with a robust staff of civilian personnel. The Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam might provide a model for such a program…143

Perito is asking for major changes to DOS culture and bureaucracy but, as noted in the previous chapter, this is being met with resistance by the American Foreign Service Association.144 Instead of changing the bureaucracy, it may be better to take into account the process already in existence in these different bureaucracies and use them to improve the PRT. The next section will offer the new Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) as a way to use existing bureaucracies toward improving the PRTs. While this approach cannot resolve all of the shortfalls that current PRTs are experiencing, it can quickly close the gap.

C. THE CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC)

The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command (USACAPOC) Force Management Directorate (G8) has already done much of the hard work needed to improve effectiveness. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, PRTs conduct tasks that CMOCs have traditionally performed (See Appendix H). However, in 2004-2006, USACAPOC G8 improved the CMOC by changing doctrine to transform it from an ad hoc organization to a permanent structure (or standing capability). According to the new FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, a CMOC is:

---

143 Perito, Lessons Identified, 14 The author did give one recommendation that was specific when he called on Congress to create a new funding line: “Congress should pass legislation rationalizing the funding sources available to military and civilian personnel in stability operations.”

144 An officer I interviewed told me the DOS culture is extremely resistant to Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy Initiative. He heard her speech; when she was giving it, the FSO next to him told his friend, “Don’t worry about this. All we have to do is wait her out.”
A standing capability formed by all Civil Affairs units from the company level to the Civil Affairs command levels that serves as the primary coordination interface for the United States armed forces among indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the United States Government.145

FM 3-05.40 also gives the CMOC a new task, developing the civil common operating picture:

CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants …from local levels to international levels …and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the civil common operating picture.146

USACAPOC has already received Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) approval for the Force Document Updates (FDU) that reorganizes Civil Affairs units.147 This is significant because Force Document Updates become part of the Army and Special Operations Command’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which means that they must procure equipment, recruit and train personnel, and accept the CMOC as a standing capability (See Appendix I).148

What does this mean operationally? A CMOC conducts civil military operations (CMOC) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) via these core tasks:

---


146 Ibid. This would be the basis for the creation of the Civil Information Management (CIM) core task and the CIM cell in the CMOC.

147 U.S. Army Civil Affairs has split proponency, meaning they have two bosses. Each boss is required approve any changes to CA organization. When I worked at USACAPOC G8 from 2004-2005, I witnessed the painful process of watching all of the different agencies and command in both DA and SOCOM approve the new CA doctrine and FDUs. Ironically, DA, which has traditionally has been hostile toward CA, approved the new CA doctrine and FDUs a year before SOCOM. MTOEs refer to Modified Table Organization & Equipment.

148 A year after FM 3-05.40 approval and two years after the FDU approval, USACAPOC finally got CIM into the POM and is trying to get CIM to become a Program of Record. Civil Affairs units, both active and reserve, are currently reorganizing in accordance with the new FDUs.
1. Key leader engagement by serving as the primary coordination interface between the U.S. and host nations, and IO/NGOs.

2. Project management by tracking all humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction projects in the area of operations.

3. Civil Reconnaissance by Civil Liaison Teams, Civil Affairs Teams, and Functional Experts on civil dimensions in the Area of Operations based on the methodology called ASCOPE.

4. Civil Information Management (CIM) by developing, managing, and analyzing the civil inputs to the Commander common operating picture (COP).

For example, according to two U.S. PRT mission statements, and the ISAF handbook, PRTs are, by definition, conducting some of the new CMOC tasks. For instance, the PRT in Jalalabad, “… conducts civil-military operations in Nangarhar Province [in order to] facilitate reconstruction and development….”149 PRT Bagram’s “purpose slide” states “… facilitating reconstruction, development, and economic growth.”150 In the ISAF Handbook, the PRT mission is “…to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment … enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”151

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the only task that PRTs are not currently performing is Civil Information Management (See Appendix J).

Referring back to COL Stout’s story about the bureaucratic hurdles that he faced setting up PRT Gardez, imagine what could have happened if he had access to the new CMOC. He would not have had to plead with commanders of existing units to give up supplies, resources, and personnel to meet his deadlines. He would not have had to ask

---

149 Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, who was PRT Jalalabad commander from 2004-2005. Interview by phone in July 2006. He also showed me his Command Brief, “PRT Command Brief, NDK” (PowerPoint), 7.

150 McDonnell, 10.

151 ISAF PRT Handbook, 3-4.
LTG McNeill, the JTF Commander, to force his staff and subordinate commanders to release their resources to him. His capability would already have been in the Army inventory and ready to go.

1. **When Does a CMOC Become a PRT?**

Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry expresses frustration when he hears claims that PRTs are a joint civil-military innovation. His response is, “A PRT is a CMOC on steroids.”

Having served the Civil Affairs community for most of his career, he and other officers recognize that the civil or interagency part of the CMOC is “the steroids.” A CMOC becomes a PRT when the interagency folded into the organization. The decision for interagency participation will be decided by policy makers. However, CMO planners and Civil Affairs officers acting as Principal CMO advisors to the JTF commander will help determine when the interagency needs to be involved (See Appendix K).\(^{152}\)

---

\(^{152}\) Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry, formerly the Assistant Chief of Staff (G3) of USACAPOC and currently Commander of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne). Interviewed by telephone on June 6, 2006. COL Stout has made the same statement to me.

\(^{153}\) Principal CMO Advisor is usually an S9, G9, C9, or a J9 on the commander’s staff. The letter destination refers to which level of command the CMO staffer serves.
2. Putting It Together: A CMOC Transitions into a PRT

A CMOC>PRT is the JTF commander’s/ U.S. Ambassador’s ideal tool for shaping his civil-military environment. Because the PRT is built on the foundation of the new standing CMOC, it is modular, scalable, and sufficiently flexible to perform the full range of civil-military activities. Basically, the CMOC>PRT is similar to a Christmas tree with plug and play capabilities (CIM function experts, Civilian Liaison Teams, and interagency). The CMOC>PRT is the focal point for collaboration, coordination, and communication, primarily dealing with the civilian sector.

CMOC>PRT focuses on the civil battle rhythm and manages functions within and around the commanders’ areas. This may include elections, donor conferences, and priority requirements to support indigenous authorities, the linking of resources for stabilization and reconstruction, and the identification of civil flashpoints, indicators, and warnings.
The new CMOC brings another standing capability: Civilian Liaison Teams (CLTs). This is the storefront that offers IOs/NGOs and indigenous institutions unfettered access to the military. Civilian Liaison Teams engage key leaders in the community and reach out to be IO/NGO community through hosting and attending meetings to exchange information. By conducting civil reconnaissance, they have also a key node in the civil information network.

Further, the new CMOC has Functional Experts who are ready to support specialized projects needed for the civil-military operations campaign plan. These experts may help with planning, assessment, and supporting the civil administration. In addition, the interagency will also bring other experts to enhance the PRT’s capabilities.

By using the Civil Information Management cell, the CMOC>PRT can look at the second order effects of civil-military actions on the populations. It will maximize and synchronize civil activities and resources among disparate organizations. For instance, if President Karzai needs health care in the north, then CMOC>PRT can coordinate military and civilian health related resources for this region. In the context of the civil campaign, CMOC should have the coordinating lead.

D. THE INTERAGENCY PUZZLE

1. The Problem

The interagency shortfalls make for the biggest gap that plagues the PRT. For example, from the USAID Assessment Report:

In filling key U.S.-PRT positions, civilian agencies need to further develop policies and incentive structures to better achieve assignment objectives. …Civilian personnel assigned to PRTs need to be capable of making key assessments, refining analysis, and implementing response activities. Early in the PRT implementation, desirable skills for personnel could include short-term stabilization and conflict mitigation experience. Subsequent staffing might well emphasize expertise in the development of basic infrastructure for security sector reform and local governance.

Additionally, civilian agencies must do more to find senior staff for PRT positions. Because of staff shortages, DOS, USAID, and USDA were
generally able to put only one representative on each PRT or regional command. In the startup phase, many civilian slots remained vacant... While USAID, DOS, and USDA were able to eventually staff most positions, many civilian representatives lacked the experience to function as leaders on the PRT or were short-term volunteers... junior or non-direct hire staff civilian representatives often lacked experience with and knowledge of their own agencies. By comparison, most of their military counterparts had 16–20 years experience prior to PRT command.154

To compound the inexperience problem, the interagency coordination piece is the most difficult puzzle to solve. USAID and DoD recognizes this: “There are significant limits to what civilian agencies can do to address this issue given current funding and staffing levels.”155

There is no reason to keep reinventing the wheel. The DoD already understands and is now prepared to provide resources for the new standing CMOC. From the civilian side, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Team is the closest comparison to the CMOC; but they are only temporary, short term, and only called upon in emergencies. While DoD has many subcultures within its organization, it is more monolithic than the rest of the U.S. government. Other agencies within the other U.S. Departments (Treasury, State, etc…) are not only independent, but have their own rules, regulations, and culture. Even within bureaus, they have their own way of doing things. When Congress gave reconstruction duty in Iraq to the DOS it appeared to make sense. However, DOS is oriented toward diplomacy between states, and not post-conflict processes within them. One joins DOS to be a diplomat – not an aid worker. This is the reason why USAID exists.156

Third, DoD does not have to deal with unions or other labor regulations. For example, other government agencies cannot compel their employees into a combat zone. In order to fill PRT positions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, DOS has had to recall retirees

154 USAID PRT Assessment Report, 15.
155 Ibid.
156 USAID was created by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
and hire contractors. Even though the Public Health Service has commissioned officers, they cannot be involuntarily deployed overseas. Short of a legislative fix, there is no real solution to the problem.

Fourth, in reference to legislation, Congress has passed legislation that will prohibit civilian agencies from conducting action that make sense. For example, using local vendors and labor makes sense for reconstruction projects. However, USAID is under the guidelines of the 1933 Buy American Act that its reconstruction contracts go to American firms. The consequence is that contracts cost more than if USAID had contracted local goods and services. Former USAID Administrator Brian Atwood said to the Washington Post, after leaving the Agency in 1999, that the Buy American procurement laws were “the biggest headache I had to deal with.”

2. Minimizing the Turbulence of Adhocracy

The reality is that there will always be an ad hoc nature to how the interagency responds to both natural and man-made disasters. Accepting this as a reality, we should take steps to minimize those obstacles and disruptions with the CMOC as the PRT. The only requirement for the interagency would be to ensure that it has the right people with equipment and access to immediate funds. I understand this is easier said than done and proponents have already suggested this in their reports. The USAID Assessment Report offers two examples:

PRT access to funds and capabilities needs to be improved to support moving the center of effort to the provinces. USAID needs to [re-open the bid process to] the Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding mechanism to draw in implementing partners who are able to operate more effectively in unstable provinces.


158 Ibid.
USDA representatives need access to dedicated funding, as should any civilian agencies that place representatives on PRTs.\textsuperscript{159}

The interagency is trying to act upon the above recommendations when it can. The Department of State/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (DOS/CRS) created the Advance Civilian Teams (ACT). However other agencies need to create standing teams as well so that departments do not have to take people “out of hide.” This would help eliminate unpredictable change within departments. Again, the only resolution may be legislative—to enable departments to grow an excess of personnel to specifically fill PRTs when needed.

DoD, DOS, and USAID can also diminish problems that arise from hastily formed teams if there is regular training and joint exercises. Likewise, Joint Forces Command, as well as the Regional Combatant Command, must not only make it mandatory to have PRTs written into their exercises, but demand that the interagency send its people to these exercises.

\textbf{E. SELECTING THE RIGHT PRT COMMANDER}

What is your goal as the PRT Commander? – \textit{CALL PRT Assessment Team.}

364 days! – \textit{Air Force PRT Commander.}

What do you mean by that? – \textit{CALL PRT Assessment Team.}

I have 364 days left and then I go home. That is my goal! – \textit{Air Force PRT Commander.}\textsuperscript{160}

Fortunately, the Air Force PRT commander interviewed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned team does not reflect the attitude of the majority of PRT commanders. However, opponents and proponents alike have lamented the quality of some commanders in the field. As USAID put it:

\begin{quote}
The importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate influence on the effectiveness and impact of the PRT. In places where PRT commanders worked closely with
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{USAID PRT Assessment Report}, 16.

\textsuperscript{160} Cahill Interview.
the civilian and military team members, the PRT developed as a team with a common vision and sense of aligned purpose. In other cases, the PRT effort was fragmented.161

The report continues to lament that some PRT commanders did not include representatives from other agencies in the decision making process and did not try to integrate civilians into the DoD structure.162 Understanding the importance of the right commander, USAID recommended, “Given the importance of PRTs in the USG strategy for Afghanistan, PRT commanders need broad operational experience, appropriate past assignments, and service school training.”163

Selection of the PRT commander can make or break the success of the PRT. PRT commanders need to have the right skill sets and need to be trained appropriately to meet the complex and demanding nature of the job. This will only strengthen the attributes of a PRT. Also, PRT commanders need not be civil affairs officers or even military officers. Even though the CMOC is a military organization, civilians are capable of being commanders if they have the right skills. As noted already, regional PRTs in Iraq have DOS leaders.

1. Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Environment

Because SSTR is a complex operational environment, certain skills are necessary for PRT commanders.164 The Defense Advance Research Agency (DARPA) explains in detail in a recent request for information (RFI):

The SSTR/HADR [humanitarian assistance/disaster relief] environment is considerably more complex than traditional single-service, joint-service, or even coalition operations, in that they typically involve a large, diverse mix of military organizations, non-military government organizations, regional and international government agencies, (NGOs)… and the local

162 Ibid., 14
163 Ibid., 15.
population… These operations are large-scale… are dynamic, structurally and interactively complex… These operations are ad hoc. These operations are cross-domain. Effective operations require those involved to cut across multiple organizations and institutions, fields of expertise, and cultures. … These operations have many and diverse actors… with diverse skills, orientations, cultures, interests, objectives, and languages. These operations require participants to collaborate across domains, organizations, cultures, and languages. Some call this type of collaboration, Strategic Collaboration.165

While collaboration and networking are required for mission success, completion of the mission may not come for years because SSTR operations can last for years — if not generations. Given the lack of control PRT commanders will face in the field and, with so many different actors in the area of operations with irreconcilable agendas, commanders will face “wicked” problems.

What are wicked problems? According to Paul Williams:

• They bridge and permeate jurisdictional, organizational, functional, professional, and generational boundaries.

• They are not amendable to optimal solutions.

• Finally, this kind of problem does not yield readily to single efforts and is beyond the capacity of any one agency or jurisdiction.166

Military officers, who are taught to solve problems by the end of their short rotations, the SSTR environment will require them to cope with wicked problems that will not be solved in their tenure.

2. Civil Affairs Common Skills

Civil Affairs’ common skills provide a good starting point for qualifications needed by a PRT commander, even if that person comes from different military or

civilian background. Civil Affairs personnel are trained to work in an SSTR environment. Of the 14 common skills that the Civil Affairs manual lists, 7 should be required for a PRT Commander:

- **Civil Information Management.** Able to perform using automation devices…. to assist in developing the civil inputs to the common operational picture.

- **Methods of Instruction.** Able to deliver performance-oriented training to teach civil/military subjects.

- **Language.** [Should at least] have limited ability to express themselves within the context of the customs, traditions, and mores of a specific culture…

- **Regional Focus and Cultural Awareness.** Knowledgeable of regional geography, political, social, and economic systems. Familiar with Indigenous Population Institutions and their specific regional religious and ethnic differences…

- **Negotiation and Mediation.** Able to mediate, negotiate, and facilitate interaction across the civil-military spectrum.

- **Project Management.** Able to manage projects and programs associated with the delivery of effects, including financial management.

- **International Civilian Response.** Familiar with the international civilian organizations...167 (See Appendix K)

### 3. The Boundary Spanner Skill Set

These skills are critical for military personnel who work with civilians, but additional skills are needed when civilians are to be part of an organization that does not have control over them. Mr. Williams believes that interagency success is based on individuals — not structural organizations.168 While reorganization helps to handle wicked problems, individuals, who have the collaborative skills and mind-sets to resolve complex problems, are the key to success in inter-organizational ventures. What type of

167 FM 3-05.40, 1-7 & 1-8.
168 Williams, 105-106.
individuals can cut across these organizations to accomplish these complex tasks? Mr. Williams describes what a “boundary spanner” is. Here is his profile:

- **Reticulists (or networkers)** emphasize the importance of cultivating inter-personal relationships, communications, political skills, and an appreciation of the interdependencies surrounding the structure of problems… [they are seen] as entrepreneurs of power, … especially sensitive to and skilled in bridging interests, professions and organizations.

- **Entrepreneurs and innovators** tend not be amendable to traditional or conventional approaches … are flexible … civic entrepreneurs, creative, lateral thinking rule-breakers, who frequently combine a capacity for visionary thinking with an appetite for opportunism … or skilled at coupling problems, policies and politics, particularly opportunistically in response to opening policy windows.

- **Otherness** is the ability to engage with others and to deploy effective relational and interpersonal competencies. They are motivated to acquire an understanding of people and organizations outside their own circles.

- **Trust** is the most important characteristic of boundary spanners. Because of their abilities to accomplish complex problems, people are willing to trust the judgment and motives of a boundary spanner.

- **Personality** helps define boundary spanners. They are personable, respectful, reliable, tolerant, diplomatic, caring, and committed. Other traits include honesty, commitment, and reliability.

- **Leadership** for boundary spanners has been called charismatic or catalytic. They think and act strategically. Also, they espouse interpersonal skills for facilitating a productive, working group or network.

With these characteristics, boundary spanners build sustainable relationships by communicating and listening, understanding, empathizing, and resolving conflict via demonstrating trust worthiness. They manage through influencing, negotiating, networking through complexity, and understanding who is accountable in each organization and what motivates them.
4. Selection or Training

A PRT commander can be either a military officer or a civilian with boundary spanner characteristics. The commander must also be personable and demonstrate leadership.

Now that we have the profile of the perfect PRT commander, where would one find people who have most of these skills—in or out of the military? Is it possible to teach these skills or is a selection process needed? I would recommend a selection process. While it may be possible to produce these types of leaders through training, it would take years. However, when PRTs stand up, even with the foundation of CMOC, the interagency piece will still be ad hoc. In this scenario, there is no training time. Unfortunately, history shows that when joint civilian teams have been created, it is a long time before a training program is created. The first group of PRT commanders needs to be selected for these skill sets.

This chapter has looked at ways to improve PRTs by building them on the new standing CMOC. This would mitigate the challenges inherent in adhocracy on the military side. The CMOC would not solve the ad hoc nature of the interagency. However, the interagency could select personnel for future PRT duty and train them for working with the military.

Also, this chapter has outlined the profile of a PRT commander who possesses the right skills. Once skills are identified, another question remains: Should the skill sets be selected or trained? Until a training and education pipeline is created to produce these skill sets and characteristics, a selection process is critical to identifying who already possesses these traits.

John Hersey, author of the novel A Bell for Adano, understood that selecting the right commander for civil military operations is extremely important. In fact, he wrote a fictional account based on an actual Civil Affairs officer who had a positive effect by obtaining a new bell for an Italian town. He did this by working with different
organizations, specifically with the U.S. Navy. The fictional character, Major Victor Joppolo, understood the importance of civil military operations and was a quintessential boundary spanner:

Therefore, I beg you to get to know this man Joppolo well. We have need of him. He is our future in the world. Neither the eloquence of Churchill nor the humanness of Roosevelt, no Charter, no four freedoms or fourteen points, no dreamer’s diagram so symmetrical and so faultless on paper, no plan, no hope, no treaty – none of these things can guarantee anything. Only men can guarantee, only the behavior of men under pressure, only our Joppolo. \(^{169}\)

V. CONCLUSION

Provincial Reconstruction Teams were created in Afghanistan and Iraq to fill a governance and reconstruction gap. The purpose of PRTs in both locales was to strengthen the central government in local areas. In Afghanistan, the U.S. and ISAF PRTs were established to circumvent the problems of the DoD and NATO force cap imposed on the operation. The PRTs were meant as a way to have a small footprint (small military force) but have high impact (influence the local population).

Whether or not the PRTs were successful in this endeavor depends on whom you ask. Many aid workers would say “no” because the PRTs blur the line of humanitarian space. They question whether or not PRTs have actually endangered them.

It is also difficult to determine whether PRTs have been less successful than they otherwise could have been given resources, personnel, and training. However, attributes are important: If there are gaps in inputs, it is hard to meet effectiveness goals. It is mandatory that future studies focus on how to assist PRTs to fulfill their potential by ensuring such things as quick access to funds, joint training and exercises for future civil-military teams, and better selection of personnel.

In the beginning, the primary reason for the lack of resources, personnel, and training was the PRT’s ad hoc nature. As time passed, DoD and other government bureaucracies had to adjust their budget cycle to accommodate PRTs. In the future, to avoid forcing PRTs into their budgets, planners should look to the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), as the foundation for PRTs. CMOCs are now a standing capability built into Civil Affairs Battalions, Civil Affairs Brigades, and Civil Affairs Commands. By being “standing,” these organizations will already be included in the DoD budget process and be ready to deploy. In other words, the CMOC will be funded to include resources, personnel, and training.

The CMOC helps resolve a number of military issues but not the civilian part of the PRT challenge. The ad hoc nature of the civilian side will likely endure. However, with a standing capability already in place on the military side, civilians can fall-in on the
military organization. To help minimize the turbulence of the civilian side, other
government agencies can ensure that selected personnel for future PRT assignments train
and exercise with Civil Affairs CMOCs during peacetime.

In the future, the CMOC will feature one critical attributes that PRTs currently do
not possess – the civil information management capability. Addressing this capability
gap will help generate relevant data to develop quantifiable metrics. CIM capability also
addresses other issues, such as continuity as teams rotate in and out of the PRTs. It also
can help develop a civil common operating picture to assist commanders to make more
informed decisions and to help planners adjust future campaigns.

Something else that should not be overlooked is having commanders with
boundary spanner skills to operate in complex operations like SSTR. Whether we
conduct a selection process for boundary spanners or whether we train to standard is a
matter of debate. But what is not debatable is that we cannot produce such individuals
overnight. To develop boundary spanners with CA common skills will take training,
education, and time. Until an appropriate pipeline can be built, DoD and DOS need to
select and identify those officers with the right traits and skills for immediate assignment
when a decision is made to establish a PRT.

A. FURTHER STUDY

This thesis, like most others, has raised more questions than it has answered. Based on my research, I propose four topics for further study.

1. Comparative Study of the CORDS Program and PRTs

Similarities between the CORDS Program and the PRTs are striking. The
establishment of the PRTs suffered the same start up problems as the CORDS program.
CORDS started a year before the Tet Offensive and faced the same type of violence that
PRTs are facing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While CORDS was supposed to be
civilian led, the military had to support it both logistically and with personnel because it
was the only organization in the U.S. government capable of doing so.
A comparative study should also compare DOS and USAID culture — then and now. Were DOS and USAID Foreign Service Officers in the 1960s more willing to serve in a combat zone than they are today? If they were, what event or events caused the shift in attitude? Also, if the CORDS Program was a great model for civil military teams, why was it not institutionalized after the war for future use? This thesis only scratched the surface of the CORDS Program, and an in-depth analysis would provide insights that could benefit future PRTs.

2. An Interagency Command — SSTR

I suspect the future of PRTs or the civil-military team concept for SSTR is pegged to the future of SSTR in general. The struggle for acceptance by both DoD and DOS is reminiscent of the struggle of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the conventional services until the creation of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in 1986. SOCOM now has its own personnel and training budget, plus its own procurement funds to develop SOF-related programs. Does SSTR need the same thing?

Such a radical solution would require congressional legislation. Ideally, an Interagency Command for SSTR would have responsibilities equivalent to that of a force provider joint command. This proposed command would have responsibility to train and equip personnel designated for work in an SSTR environment, which would include PRTs. Military units and interagency personnel would be assigned to the command for training and would deploy to a Regional Combatant Command when a SSTR crisis develops. Treated like a joint billet, both DoD and interagency personnel would have to serve in the Interagency Command in order to be promoted to Senior Executive Service, Senior Foreign Service, or Flag Officer ranks. Next, like SOCOM, SSTR would have its own procurement budget to develop programs specific to SSTR.

A further study could determine if this is even a viable option by comparing it to the Goldwater-Nichols Act which strengthened the Joint Chief of Staff and Regional Combatant Commands.
3. **Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as the Foundation for PRTs**

NPS Student MAJ Kenneth J. Burgess is writing his thesis on the Army’s BCT design to determine whether its organizational design is optimally suited for SSTR and counterinsurgency conflicts.\(^{170}\) His study will determine what organizational changes, if any, are needed for the Brigade Combat Team to efficiently perform SSTR task.

Building on MAJ Burgess’ thesis, could the BCT become the foundation of a PRT? This would resolve two issues: First, one of the complaints out of Iraq and Afghanistan is that PRTs do not have enough security to send civil military teams out of the compound. The BCT capability would have enough firepower to handle this duty. Second, another complaint is that having BCTs and PRTs serving in the same area creates stovepipes in with no integration between them. If the civil component were integrated into the BCT, this would guarantee integration.

4. **Building Cohesive Civil Military Teams**

NPS Student MAJ Glenn Woodson Thesis just completed a study of joint Civil Affairs Teams deploying for one year to Iraq.\(^{171}\) These teams combined of Army Reservists, Soldiers from the Inactive Ready Reserve, Sailors from the United States Navy and Navy Reserve, and Airmen from the United States Air Force. MAJ Woodson’s thesis investigates how to improve ad hoc team’s effectiveness and efficiency. Building on the Army Training Management Cycle developed in Army Field Manual 7-0; he has found a better methodology for improving the preparation of ad hoc units by leveraging time management throughout the training, validation, and operational phases of operations and by linking social, cultural, and task cohesion, units are able to become more effective at developing detailed plans to maximize the limited time available to train prior to deployment. Using his findings, further research can determine whether this model can be used for PRT teams as well.

\(^{170}\) The thesis is called “Organizing for SSTR: Implications for the Brigade Combat Team.”

\(^{171}\) The thesis is called “How My Revised Training Model Would Enhance the Effectiveness of Otherwise FUBAR Ad Hoc Units.”
**APPENDIX A: PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN**

(Chronological Order)\(^ {172} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>PROVINCES COVERED</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>OPENING DATE</th>
<th>ESTABLISHING NATION</th>
<th>CURRENT LEAD NATION</th>
<th>CURRENT CONTRIBUTING NATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Bagram</td>
<td>Parwan Kapisa</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Nov 2003</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Qalat</td>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Apr 2004</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Feyzabad</td>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Jul 2004</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Meymaneh</td>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Jul 2004</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Norway, since Sep 2005</td>
<td>Finland, Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Farah</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Sep 2004</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Sep 2004</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Netherlands, since Aug 2006</td>
<td>Australia, U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Qala-i-Naw</td>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Jul 2005</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Chaghcharan</td>
<td>Ghour</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Aug 2005</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{172}\) ISAF PRT Handbook, D-3-2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Oct 2005</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kala Gush</td>
<td>Nurestan</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Nov 2006</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Vardak</td>
<td>Vardak</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Nov 2006</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: PRT LOCATIONS IN IRAQ

(Does not include Embed PRTs)173

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PRT Location</th>
<th>Nearest City</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Anbar</td>
<td>Cam Blue Diamond</td>
<td>Al Ramadi</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>Regional Embassy Office (REO) Al Hillah</td>
<td>Al Hillah</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Freedom Building Iraq</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Basrah (UK)</td>
<td>Basrah Palace Compound</td>
<td>Al Basrah</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhi Qar (Italian)</td>
<td>Camp Adder</td>
<td>An Nasiryah</td>
<td>Operating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>FOB Warhorse</td>
<td>Baquba</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>Camp Zaytun</td>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>To be determined (TBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil (South Korea)</td>
<td>Camp Zaytun</td>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>REO Al Hillah</td>
<td>Al Hillah</td>
<td>At REO Al Hillah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>REO Kirkuk/ FOB Warrior</td>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>Camp Adder</td>
<td>Al Nasiryah</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>Camp Adder</td>
<td>Al Nasiryah</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>REO Al Hillah</td>
<td>Al Hillah</td>
<td>At REO Al Hillah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninewa</td>
<td>FOB Marez</td>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiyah</td>
<td>REO Al Hillah</td>
<td>Al Hillah</td>
<td>At REO Al Hillah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah ad Din</td>
<td>Camp Speicher</td>
<td>Tikrit</td>
<td>Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>Camp Zaytun</td>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>REO Al Hillah</td>
<td>Al Hillah</td>
<td>At REO Al Hillah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

173 CALL PRT Iraq Handbook, 5.
APPENDIX C: THE CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS) PROGRAM

A. RELEVANCE

As a historical example of effective civil military teams, PRTs are commonly compared to the CORDS program. They are compared, too, in terms of measure of effectiveness. In his recommendations regarding PRTs, Robert Perito refers to the CORDS program:

Much could be achieved if the military component of the PRT was matched with a robust staff of civilian personnel. The Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam might provide a model for such a program. CORDS was an integrated civilian-military organization, but USAID was the lead agency and its personnel were overwhelmingly civilian. Even in the hotly contested I Corps area of Vietnam, only 750 of 2,000 CORDS personnel were military. The State Department assigned several hundred FSOs to serve on CORDS Provincial and District Advisory Teams, according to a veteran FSO who served in CORDS and in a PRT in Afghanistan. These officers received four to six months of Vietnamese language and area training prior to eighteen-month to two-year assignments. CORDS received funding for development assistance and was provided its own transport and logistical support. CORDS was developed when it became apparent that U.S. military operations were alienating the rural population they were trying to protect.174

Un fortunately, with 30 years of hindsight, only the positive aspects of the program are remembered. While today the CORDS program offers an interesting civil-military concept, the program itself reveals that it suffered the same start up problems that PRTs faced. The CORDS program matured over time and accomplished great things, but the final verdict was, as with the PRTs, also mixed.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The CORDS program was created in 1967 to merge all of the military and other government agencies (CIA, USAID, USIA) and pacification programs under one office. They included the CIA’s Revolutionary Development (RD) program which operated under the Vietnamese Army; USAID’s New Life Development Program and Police Field Force; the Army’s Mobility Advisory Teams MATs; and other various programs. President Johnston appointed Robert W. Komer with Ambassador Rank as the Deputy to Military Advisory Command – Vietnam (MACV) which gave him coequal status with all of General Westmoreland’s staff.

CORDS’ organizational structure, “…was a unique experiment in a unified civil/military field advisory and support organization, quite different from World War II civil affairs or military government.” The hierarchy would be a mix of civilians and soldiers who reported to each other. Separate chain of commands disappeared:

Soldiers served directly under civilians, and vice versa, at all levels. They wrote each other’s efficiency reports. Personnel were drawn from all the military services, and from State, AID, CIA, USIA, and the White House. But CORDS was fully integrated into the theater military structure. The Deputy for CORDS served directly under General Westmoreland and later General Abrams to support him, a MACV general staff section was created under a civilian assistant chief of staff with a general officer deputy. Four regional deputies for CORDS served under the U.S. corps level commanders. The cutting edge was unified civil-military advisory teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces.

C. NOTABLE FEATURES

John A. Nagl wrote, “CORDS encouraged innovation from its personnel as a primary facet of its developing organization organizational culture, creating or improving:”

175 Surprisingly, the USMC Combine Arms Platoons (CAP) and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) were not under the CORDS program. An interesting account of a person’s involvement in the Army MAT program, read David Donovan’s Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Book, 1986), 32.
178 Ibid.
a) A series of new measurement systems designed primarily for management purposes
b) The “Chieu Hoi” defector program
c) 59-man RD teams associated village self-development programs
d) The GVN National training Center at Vung Tau
e) A new Vietnam training center in Washington to train CORDS advisors
f) The GVN Phung Hoang program, an ambitious effort to destroy Viet Cong infrastructure by any means necessary, known as “Phoenix” to Americans
g) The CORDS Evaluation Branch to provide accurate reports of conditions in the field to top management
h) The People’s Self-Defense forces, created after 1968 Tet Offensive 179

D. ISSUES WITH THE CORDS PROGRAM

Even though much innovation was credited to CORDS’ lack of bureaucratic history and culture, this also proved a major obstacle to obtaining material and funds. Komer writes, “Generating an adequate management structure on the GVN side was much more difficult, since what needed to be pulled together was not just modest U.S. advisory and support effort but major administrative and operational programs.”180

Similar to the PRTs, CORDS should have been established and run by DOS or some other government agency. However, just with PRT start-up problems in Iraq, it was placed under the military because “…if you are going to get a program going, you are only going to be able to do it by stealing from the military. They have all the trucks, they have all the planes, they have all the people, they have all the money.”181

E. FINAL ASSESSMENT

Komer rated the success of the CORDS program “…at best only a qualified success.” The flaws and weaknesses of the program were indicative of


180 Komer, 120. My literature search did not establish how long it took to establish the CORDS program. I figured that it took three to four years to mature and to get trained personnel from the U.S. to fill all of the required billets in the country.

181 Krepinevich, 217.
how the U.S. approached Vietnam. First, from a management point of view, Washington ran the war as a peacetime management structure as opposed to crisis management. This created a lack of unified management between Saigon and Washington, DC. Another problem was that the U.S. military did not take pacification seriously as a primary task or incorporate it into the institution at large. One senior officer statement sums up why CORDS was a limited success and why the military never tried to institute the concept, “I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.”

---

182 Komer, 86.
183 Nagl, 172.
APPENDIX D: SELECTED PRT MODELS

1. PRT PARWAN OR BAGRAM (2005–2006)\textsuperscript{184}

**Purpose**

Our purpose is to conduct civil-military operations in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces in order to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan by:

- Promoting good governance and justice
- Enabling an effective Afghan security apparatus through training and mentorship
- Facilitating reconstruction, development, and economic growth

Ultimately creating the conditions for self-sufficiency, enduring prosperity, a secure and stable environment in the province.

---

\textsuperscript{184} McDonnell. “Bagram PRT, April 22, 2006.”
**CFC-A Lines of Operation**

- **CONSOLIDATION**
  - Governance & Justice
  - Economic & Strategic Reconstruction

2001

- **TRANSITION**
  - Stable and representative government and independent Judicial System established
  - Al Qaida and Associated Movements Defeated in Operational Area
  - Afghanistan Capable and Responsible for its Security
  - CFC-A’s Posture Reshaped for the Long War

2005

- **STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY**
  - Economic growth facilitated by Infrastructure and Reconstruction Development
  - Security Cooperation with Pakistan Enhanced
  - GoA able to execute long-term CN program, based on an effective law enforcement system, with limited support from International Community
  - GoA able to execute long-term CN program, complemented by credible economic measures, with limited support from International Community

2007

- Strategic Communications

**CONSOLIDATION**

**TRANSITION**

**STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY**

**“Progress Through Interagency Synergy”**

Create a moderate, stable, and representative Afghanistan capable of controlling and governing its territory.

- PRT Maneuver
- Department of State
- US Agency for International Development
- US Department of Agriculture
- Provincial Government
- Afghan Security Entities
- UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
Mission

PRT Jalalabad conducts civil-military operations in Nangarhar Province IOT facilitate reconstruction & development, enable the democratically elected Afghan Government, and create the conditions for successful National Assembly Elections ISO central government.

Lines of Operation

- Enable an effective Afghan security apparatus
- Facilitate and coordinate reconstruction and development
- Extend the reach of the central government
- Support the election / post election

---

185 Ruf, “PRT Command Brief, NDK” (PowerPoint).
Civil Military Activities

Project Focus:
1. Security
2. Power
3. Road systems
4. Humanitarian Assistance
5. Other
   • Government buildings
   • Clinics, Ambulances
   • Schools
   • Mosques
   • Fruit tree orchard

Balanced portfolio
• Coordinated through PRT Project Boards

Challenges:
• Reach-back expertise
• Ensuring quality construction
• Funding limitations
Commander’s Assessment
Successes and Challenges

Successes:
• DDR: 1st Corp DDR’d 5 Feb 05
• Excellent Rapport with Local Leadership
• Synch of PRT activities
• Build on Nat’l Elections Momentum

Challenges:
• Information Sharing (Higher to Lower)
• Land Disputes
• Counternarcotics production, smuggling, operations
• Encouraging “Self – Sustainment”
• DIAG

Commander’s Assessment
PRT End state

USAID-led / Afghanistan sub-office replaces PRT
Or
PRT “taken over by coalition”

Conditions:
• Minimal terrorism activity
• Stable, elected, functioning government
• Rule of law
• Sustained economic growth
• Infrastructure providing basic services
APPENDIX E: ISAF/NATO PRT MISSION
PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES

A. The PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) published PRT mission statement and guidelines on January 27, 2005. The following text comes from ISAF/NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Handbook:

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”

B. The ESC also published guidelines that all PRTs should follow:

- Focus upon improving stability.
- Operate as an integrated military-civilian organization.
- Work to a common purpose or endstate with unity of effort.
- Lead from behind and underneath, ensuring Afghan ownership. Promote Afghan primacy and legitimacy.
- Actively engage with the Governor, GoA officials, the local communities and population through Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees, Shuras and other established and traditional bodies.
- Facilitate the visibility of GoA presence in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transport, communications, etc.).
- Promise ONLY what can be delivered; manage expectations.
- Engage in programs or projects which the PRT rotation can complete or hand-over.

• Sustainability must be “planned in” at the outset.
• Ensure that projects do not duplicate the work of others.
• Ensure that interventions at provincial level support national GoA processes...
• Lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes.
• Be committed to consulting and/or working with international partners, such as UNAMA, IOs and NGOs.
• Be aware and respectful of civil military sensitivities - lives may depend on it.
• Have a finite lifespan, linked to an endstate of improved stability.\footnote{\textit{Provincial Reconstruction Teams}, 3.}
PRT Mission Statement

To assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

Task-Focused Activities

- **Train, coach and mentor** provincial governments entities, in order to develop their capacity to:
  - Develop core competencies of provincial governments;
  - Establish effective provincial linkages with ministries and central government;
  - Plan and prioritize provincial government direction and activities;
  - Prepare budgets, identify funding needs, and develop fiscal responsibility;
  - Determine government staffing requirements and address these via government code;
  - Plan and coordinate civil construction and development activities, and coordinate support by Iraqi national and local government resources, donors, NGOs and private capital investment;
  - Communicate with constituents via effective public affairs initiatives;
  - Provide and enhance the delivery of provincial and municipal services;
  - Develop by-laws and effective committee structures;
  - Conduct local elections using uniformly applied model elections ordinance.
- **Provide qualitative measurements of success against established benchmarks.**

---

Transition to Self Reliance

1st Phase  2nd Phase  3rd Phase  4th Phase

Coalition Military Forces Presence

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Local Governance Program

Local Governance Capability

USAID

PRT Concept of Operations

- Design Intent of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).
  - Modular in nature, with standard core structure that is tailored to each province.
  - Reliant on in-place REO & FOB support for housing, administration, logistics, and security, where available; but has organic personnel movement security, communications, transportation, etc.
  - Utilizes existing PST assets; augmented with military resources (personnel, security, transportation, communications).
  - Absorbs current SET and designated REO personnel and assets into PRTs.
  - Built-in flexibility to “outlive” current REO and MNF-I positioning.
- Overall DOS Program Lead. PRT Team Leader responsible for all facets of initiative in the province, to include political liaison, governance development, reconstruction & assistance, etc.
  - PRT subordinate to National Coordination Team: team elements and members under authority (TACON) of Team Leader (US/Coalition civilian or MNF-I Officer).
  - Deputy Team Leader CF military officer (or USG/Coalition civilian, if TL military officer).
  - Coordinates with MNF-I, AmEmb and Coalition Diplomatic Missions for asset allocation, logistical and administrative support, strategic guidance, etc.
  - Includes Iraqi government representation.
PRT Functional Responsibilities

PRT Team Leader
- Overall responsibility for management of PRT; reports to Regional Coordinator.
- Assesses, tasks, & prioritizes work of PRT.
- Liaises with senior provincial leadership, Regional Coordinator, National Coordination Team.

Deputy Team Leader
- Manages day-to-day operations and security of PRT.
- Monitors intelligence reporting and coordinates with RSO, RROC and other security elements.
- Focal point for PRT reporting (SITREPS, etc.).

Civil Affairs Company (-)
- Develops assessments of governance, infrastructure and provincial needs.
- Provides limited subject matter experts (gov, econ, education, public works, energy)
- Coordinates Civil Affairs activities with MSC.

IRMO Provincial Program Manager
- Provides oversight and deconfliction of USG reconstruction efforts.
- Coordinates, liaises, coaches & mentors provincial reconstruction and development committee members in all phases of project execution.

Iraq Provincial Action Officer
- Interfaces with local officials and private citizens in support of PRT initiatives.
- Advocates US policy as PRT public affairs action officer.
- Provides political and economic reporting to US Mission.

USAID Officer
- Coordinates USAID efforts with PRT and provincial leaders.
- Trains, coaches, liaises w/ provincial leaders regarding USAID support and training of provincial leadership.

MSC (Major Subordinate Command) Liaison Officer (LNO)
- Coordinates PRT activities with MSC
- Route security, communication, emergency/contingency planning, ISF LNO.
- Coordinates PRT activities with P3 and PJCC programs.

Engineer Officer
- Trains, coaches, mentors Iraqi counterparts on project development, engineering assessments, scopes of work, quality assurance and quality control, construction processes, and project administrative considerations.
- Works with IRMO PPM for coordination of CERP and IRRF project oversight.
- Provides link with SROC, RROC and ROC.

Local Governance Team/Functional Team
- Core members provide training and mentoring of core governmental functions: public administration, public finance and budgeting, and urban/municipal planning.
- Other members provide training and mentoring in functional areas specific to each province, to include: public safety, health, economics and commerce, education, tourism, agriculture, public transportation, public communications, public affairs, rule of law, energy, and public works.

Rule of Law Coordinator
- Coordinates ROL activities and programs in province.
APPENDIX G: EMBED PRTS – IRAQ

A. CONCEPT:
- Combined with local policing effort (Joint Security Stations)
- Integrated directly into Brigade Combat Teams in Baghdad (6 total) and Al Anbar Province (3 total)
- DOS Team Lead equal in status to BCT commander in matters of reconstruction
- Ad hoc organization
  - True functional specialists assigned by district
  - Based on skills versus rank or origin (DoD → DOS)
  - Requirements are bottom up vice top down

B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
- Goal: Improve on Regional Embassy Office (REO) and Provincial Support Team (PST) programs.
- Implementation: Integrated capacity-building effort built around Local Governance Program (LGP)

C. COMPOSITION:
- Team Lead: Department of State
- Deputy Team Leader: Department of Defense
- Function Specialists: USAID, USDA, USDOJ
- Civil Reconnaissance: Civil Affairs Company
- Security: Military Brigade Combat Team

D. TIMELINE:
- Phase I: Leadership by 31 Mar 07
- Phase II: Function Experts by 30 Jun 07
- Phase III: Augment and Expand Stand Alone PRTs by 31 Dec 07

---

APPENDIX H: THE GENEVA AND THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS

A. CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, THE HAGUE II (July 29, 1899)

The Hague Convention is “… animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme hypothesis, the interest of humanity and the ever increasing requirements of civilization.” The document covers the moral obligation in Section III, “On Military Authority Over Hostile Territory,” articles 42–56. However, articles 43, 53, 55, and 56 sum up the PCR responsibilities of the military:

Article 43: The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

Article 53: An army of occupation can only take possession of the cash, funds, and property liable to requisition belonging strictly to the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property of the State which may be used for military operations … they must be restored at the conclusion of peace, and indemnities paid for them.

Article 55: The occupying State shall only be regarded as administrator and usufructuary of the public buildings, real property, forests, and agricultural works belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must protect the capital of these properties, and administer it according to the rules of usufruct.

Article 56: The property of the communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and those of arts and science, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.
B. THE CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION) (AUGUST 12, 1949)

The Fourth Geneva Conventions Section III, article 59 best sums up the military obligation in an occupied territory:

If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.

Also, Section III, “Occupied Territories,” that covers other areas, such as children, women, protection of workers, prohibited destruction, food and medical supplies for the population, hygiene and public health, and collective relief.

Article 51: The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.

The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to work unless they are over eighteen years of age, and then only on work which is necessary either for the needs of the army of occupation, or for the public utility services, or for the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health of the population of the occupied country. Protected persons may not be compelled to undertake any work which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations. The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to employ forcible means to ensure the security of the installations where they are performing compulsory labor.

The work shall be carried out only in the occupied territory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned are. Every such person shall, so far as possible, be kept in his usual place of employment. Workers shall be paid a fair wage and the work shall be proportionate to their physical and intellectual capacities. The legislation in force in the occupied country concerning working conditions, and safeguards as regards, in particular, such matters as wages, hours
of work, equipment, preliminary training and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases, shall be applicable to the protected persons assigned to the work referred to in this Article.

Article 52: No contract, agreement or regulation shall impair the right of any worker, whether voluntary or not and wherever he may be, to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Power in order to request the said Power’s intervention.

Article 53: Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

Article 55: To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate. The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical occupation forces and administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods. The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to verify the state of the food and medical supplies in occupied territories, except where temporary restrictions are made necessary by imperative military requirements.

Article 56: To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the public Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to
combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

Article 58: The Occupying Power shall permit ministers of religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of their religious communities.

Article 62: Subject to imperative reasons of security, protected persons in occupied territories shall be permitted to receive the individual relief consignments sent to them.

ANNEX I: Draft Agreement Relating to Hospital and Safety Zones and Localities

Article 1: Hospital and safety zones shall be strictly reserved for the persons mentioned in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, and in Article 14 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and for the personnel entrusted with the organization and administration of these zones and localities, and with the care of the persons therein assembled.

Article 12: In the case of occupation of a territory, the hospital and safety zones therein shall continue to be respected and utilized as such.
APPENDIX I: SUGGESTED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES)

A. Save the Children (UK) suggested Security Metrics\textsuperscript{190}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Suggested measures of effectiveness (MoEs)</th>
<th>Suggested indicators/data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Changes in humanitarian security</td>
<td>Attacks on humanitarian workers (Source: ANSO) Humanitarian access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in overall security environment</td>
<td>Swisspeace FAST Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-militia intervention rate</td>
<td>Percentage of known inter-militia disputes in which PRT intervened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-militia mediation success rate</td>
<td>Percentage of inter-militia disputes (in which PRT intervened) that were successfully mediated/resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in levels of lawlessness/banditry</td>
<td>Reported incidents of banditry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in land area under poppy cultivation in a specific region</td>
<td>Land area under cultivation [hectares]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People’s ambient security expectations (including in returnee areas)</td>
<td>Surveys of public opinion on perceptions of security (should not be undertaken by military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of ANP personnel/trainees that can be supported by PRT</td>
<td>Number of ANP personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security (‘hearts and minds’ activities)</td>
<td>Increased acceptance of military’s mission</td>
<td>Views expressed by local community members of military’s mission and role (interviews should not be undertaken by military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved co-operation between military and local population</td>
<td>Number of engagements by local community representatives with military in liaison capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Activity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Suggested measures of effectiveness (MoEs)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Suggested indicators/data sources</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force protection</td>
<td>Security intelligence on PRTs provided directly by members of the local community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Support to road network construction</td>
<td>Km road/year (with reference to any government targets) Use of roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local employment in PRT-funded reconstruction projects</td>
<td>Number of workers (full/part-time) Employee salaries compared to local salaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component of reconstruction needs (per province) addressed by PRT activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison of needs (from ‘Securing Afghanistan’s Future’) and PRT activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of facilities directly or under contract from PRT to support deployment of ANP (eg, police stations)</td>
<td>New/refurbished facilities (possibly measured by square meter) constructed by PRT in province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to central government</td>
<td>Relative authority of central government in PRT catchment area</td>
<td>Qualitative data: who collects ‘taxes’/customs duties? Who provides security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical infrastructure available to support</td>
<td>Offices are staffed and functioning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support by PRT to local government councils</td>
<td>Number of functioning local government bodies supported by PRT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relief Operations</strong></td>
<td>Note: focuses only on delivery of relief supplies in areas where NGHAs are unable to operate, or ‘exceptional circumstances’</td>
<td>Sphere standards and indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief delivered in specific sectors, according to verified need (eg, health; food and nutrition; water and sanitation; and education sectors)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. **NCT’s Measuring Progress/ Success for the Province**\(^{191}\)

The National Coordination Center conducts a monthly assessment of progress within each province. There are four phases of progress, and the majority of the PRTs fall somewhere between Phase I and Phase II. The transition between phases is based on functional assessment, not time.

**Phase I:** Generally a non-permissive environment where the local provincial government is struggling to create a functioning administrative structure in order to provide for the basic needs of the populace. Heavy emphasis is placed on the basic role of the governor, PC … and other key government functionaries. Providing basic needs will be problematic and often is beyond the means of the local government. Civil society organizations are rare and often not functioning correctly. Schools tend to be understaffed and ill resourced.

**Phase II:** A more secure, but still non-permissive environment where increased movement is possible. Key government players understand their roles and what needs to be done, but lack the technical knowledge or will to accomplish their goals. Basic needs of the population for food, water, and shelter are generally met, but significant shortages exist in electricity, fuel, and other requirements for normal commerce. Civil organizations are established and function with the help from non-Iraqi government sources. The majority of children attends and graduates from elementary school.

**Phase III:** A semi-permissive environment that allows reduced security measures including a minimal military presence. Provincial government officials are trying to stand on their own but still require occasional assistance or “course corrections” from the LGP. Basic needs and services are generally met to allow for normal economic and living standards. Civil society organizations branch out into community and charitable

\(^{191}\) *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq Tactics, Techniques & Procedures Handbook*, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), No 07-11 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: January 2007 (Draft), 18.
groups. The vast majority of children attend school and many graduate from high school. Trade and vocational schools create a significant number of skilled workers.

Phase IV: Generally a permissive environment, although pockets of “trouble areas” may still exist. The provincial government functions acceptably, and the LGP effort concentrates on subprovincial government organizations such as city or tribal leaders. Basic needs and services are regular and allow good economic function. A service industry begins to develop. Civil society organizations contribute heavily to the daily function of society and provide a basic safety net for the underclass. A significant portion of the population graduates from high school; some go on to the university.

C. Methodology Definitions from USIP’s Metric Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization (May, 2007) (Draft)\(^{192}\)

1. Content analysis (CA):\(^{193}\) Involves surveying media publications in order to gauge popular and/or elite impressions of an issue.

   *Advantages:* Relies on readily available publications; newspapers, in particular, can be important shapers of public opinion.

   *Disadvantages:* Difficult to choose which publications to survey; Labor intensive process of conducting the analysis.

2. Expert opinion (EO): Entails creating a panel of independent, knowledgeable, and experienced experts to assess an issue of interest (e.g., the capacity of law enforcement agencies to perform essential administrative and bureaucratic functions). In this case, a panel of 3-5 experts might be used observe operations in the field and to report on their quality. The reliability and replicability of the findings depend on specifying the evaluation criteria and data gathering methodology in advance and following them consistently in the field.

\(^{192}\) USIP.

\(^{193}\) The Fund for Peace’s Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) uses content analysis to assess the degree to which drivers of conflict improve or worsen as well as to determine the strength of key institutions (based on three criteria: legitimacy, representativeness and professionalism). CAST scans data from over 11,000 sources (including reports from the media, government and NGOs). CAST currently evaluates a number of rule of law and human rights areas, including the degree of criminalization and corruption of the state and evaluations of the domestic police force, corrections system, and judicial system. CAST can be used for countrywide or province-level analysis.
Advantages: Experts have the knowledge and expertise to offer informed and useful opinions on a situation and can make sound qualitative judgments in a relatively short period. They may be used to study program documents, interviews participants, and make observations in the field. The major costs involved are salaries and travel rather than complicated data-collection procedures.

Disadvantages: Experts may have political agendas to advance; one needs to be wary of relying on a biased sample of experts. It is especially important that the panelists be capable of independent judgment. They cannot be permanent employees of the contracting agency or have a financial stake in the future of the program being evaluated.


Advantages: Statistics can appear to be a more objective way of assessing progress; Provide a useful standard for comparing progress at two different times.

Disadvantages: Can be difficult to locate reliable indicators of the larger issue one is assessing—for example, some have argued that number of deaths per month alone is not a particularly good indicator of the strength of the insurgency in Iraq; Statistics are easily manipulated to accommodate a variety of interpretations.

4. Survey/Polling Data (S/PD): Involves conducting public opinion surveys in order to assess how the public views a variety of issues.

Advantages: Can provide useful general overview of societal views and values; can easily be conducted on a large number of people, which provides more confidence in the findings.

Disadvantages: Surveys must be carefully designed to ensure that the sampled public is representative; Poorly worded questions or untrained survey conductors can lead to inaccurate responses.
APPENDIX J: HISTORY OF THE CMOC

A. WHAT’S IN A NAME

PRT activities in the past were conducted through Civil Military Operation Centers. Even though the term CMOC did not become doctrinal until the 1993 update of FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, the Army has been conducting them since World War II. Civil Affairs and CMO literature reveals that current PRT activities were executed by Army Civil Affairs through various ad hoc organization to support a full spectrum of operations from military occupation to counterinsurgency.

In the Pulitzer Prize Winning book, A Bell for Adano, the fictional character, Major Victor Joppolo, conducts CMOC tasks out of his Civil Affairs/ Military Government (CA/MG) Headquarters in a converted city hall. If he had interagency people in it, he would have had a PRT. In Military/Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin, Major General John J. Maginnis, recounts his experience as a CA/MG Officer across Northern Europe. In each city, he set up a CA/MG headquarters and conducted CMOC tasks. The editor comments that he was surprised how many diplomatic activities that CA/MG officers conducted with allies, civilian administrators, private citizens, and resistance fighters. World War II was not the exception. CMOC activities supported other major combat operations, counterinsurgencies, peace operations, SSTR, and natural disasters. In numerous situations CMOCs became the natural hub for civil military activity.

What surprised me after a limited literature review was that it took more than 50 years for the Army or the Civil Affairs community to standardize the name. As late as 2000, FM 41-10 still admitted that a “…CMOC can also have a variety of names, depending on the level of command or organization and the region of the world that establishes it.” I was also surprised how long it took the Army to make a CMOC a standing capability

given the number of times it had to stand one up. As late as 2001, Joint Civil Affairs doctrine still defined a CMOC as “…an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, or other commanders to assist in the coordination of activities of participating military forces, and other USG agencies, nongovernmental, regional, and international organizations.\textsuperscript{197}

With this in mind, it should be no surprise that PRTs started and will continue to be ad hoc organizations and will probably be dubbed as something else in the future such as Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) or Forward Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs). If this happened, it would not be without precedence. I have listed all of the names that I have come across in a limited CA/ CMO literature review:

\textbf{Civil Affairs/Military Government Headquarters (AMGOT)} conducted CMOC activities in both liberated and occupied territories. They were ad hoc organizations that operated separately from the G-5 staff section of a division or higher headquarters. Sometimes these headquarters reported directly to DOS in friendly territories.

\textbf{Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program} was an ad hoc combination of civil military teams (DOS and DoD) that operated under MACV. This newly formed agency sought to pacify the population of South Vietnam. The interagency teams provided millions of dollars of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to the population to win their loyalty (i.e., “hearts and minds”). CORDS also trained local militias to protect their villages from the Viet Cong.\textsuperscript{198}

\textbf{The Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF)} was an ad hoc organization which supported the Panama invasion and conducted CMO throughout the country.

\textsuperscript{197} Joint Publication 3-57.1, \textit{Joint Civil Affairs Operations} (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff: April 14, 2003), XI.

\textsuperscript{198} Komer, 118-21.
CATF belonged to SOUTHCOM before it was moved to the CJCMOTF which was under the control of the U.S. Ambassador. The CATF would later be used in both Kuwait and Northern Iraq.\(^{199}\)

**Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF)** was an ad hoc interagency organization created during Desert Shield/Storm. The core organization was the 352 Civil Affairs Command with interagency elements attached. The purpose of the KTF was to plan the post-conflict reconstruction of Kuwait with the government in exile.\(^{200}\)

**Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF)** was a compromise ad hoc organization created by the CENTCOM Commander and the U.S. Ambassador of Kuwait. It combined the 352 CA CMD and the KTF to execute the reconstruction of post-conflict Kuwait. The CCATF included interagency, coalition partners, some NGOs, and the Kuwaiti government in exile.\(^{201}\)

**CIMIC House** was a NATO term for CMOCs that were set up in towns and villages across Bosnia and Kosovo. The Americans adopted the term in both operations and set up similar organizations that mirrored those of other NATO countries.\(^{202}\)

**Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)** is a joint task force specifically designed for a stability operations environment. Although, it is a Civil Affairs-centric organization, it does not have to be as demonstrated in the first year in Afghanistan.\(^{203}\)

---


\(^{201}\) Fishel, 161-62.

\(^{202}\) When I was a Civil Affairs Team leader in Bosnia, we interacted with the CIMIC House in Tuzla on a monthly basis.

\(^{203}\) Joint Publication 3-57.1, xi.
**Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)** has been used in operations with HA-centric operations. In Iraq HACCs operated at the operational level whereas CMOCs operated at the tactical level. Also, HACCs operated in adjacent countries to Iraq such as HACC – Jordan and HACC – Kuwait. HACC remains a joint term but was not included in FM 3-05.40.204

**Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)** is designed to be the primary coordinator at the strategic level. During Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), a HOC was set up in Kuwait to conduct IO/NGO facilitation and coordination. It was designed to have interagency participation to include USAID DARTs but they never joined. While the HOC was established by CFLCC, the Kuwaiti government assumed control of it. Once Iraq fell and the IAC was set up in Baghdad, the HOC downgraded to a HACC.205

**Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC)** were established in Afghanistan and in the neighboring countries of Uzbekistan and Pakistan. The name replaced CMOC as a way for Civil Affairs Teams (CATs) to interface with the IO/NGO community without stigma. Later, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells would build quick impact projects across Afghanistan. The interagency was never formally part of these ad hoc organizations. However, informally USAID kept OTI teams associated with them for long term fieldwork.

**Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC)** is another term to describe CMOC activities. 422nd Civil Battalion named its CMOC in Baghdad a CMCC. This term made it to the 2000 FM 41-10 update but disappeared in FM 3-05.40.206

---

204 Joint Publication 3-57.1, x.
205 Ibid.
**Governorate Support Teams (GST)** were ad hoc civil military teams set up in the first year of OIF. When the CPA dissolved so did the GSTs. Some of the concepts made it into DOS PRTs.

**Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC)** was originally planned as an ad hoc interagency organization under the control of ORHA/CPA in Baghdad. The plan was to have a majority of DOS and Iraqi Ministry personnel. When the transfer never happened, and the CPA never staffed the organization, it became a coalition military and Iraqi civilian hybrid organization.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are ad hoc** Civil-Military Teams that were established in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Plug and Play: Army Transformation created module sections in units. This means these units can be added or subtracted to other units determined by mission.

A. CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY

B. CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

---

C. CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE

Civil Affairs Brigade

- Supports Unit of Employment Y (UEy) / Corps and/or Joint Task Force
- Core of the UEy Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) Capability
- CMOC facilitates Civil Engagement / Interagency Coordination / Civil Information Fusion
- Civil Liaison Teams – CA Teams for the CMOC, ‘Store front’, Engagement Assets
- Civil Information Management Cell – Collates/ fuses Information and Produces Civil COP
- Functional Specialists – Plan, coordinate, facilitate critical stabilization tasks/areas, Engagement Assets
- Focus – National Level - Operational to Strategic-level Stabilization and Reconstruction
- Proposed design ADDS:
  - CMOC to each Brigade – Two (2) Civil Liaison Teams
  - Standing Planning Team
  - Additional Sustainment/Maintenance

D. CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND

Civil Affairs Command

- Supports Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) / Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC)
- CMOC - Facilitates Civil Engagement / Interagency Coordination / Civil Information Fusion
- Civil Liaison Teams – ‘Store front’, Engagement Assets to Coordinate Theater-level Resources
- Civil Information Management Cell – Collates/ fuses Information and Produces Civil COP
- Functional Specialists – Plan, coordinate, facilitate critical reconstruction tasks, Flexible Engagement Asset
- Focus – Theater Level - Strategic-level Reconstruction and Development
- Proposed design ADDS:
  - CMOC to each CACOM – Two (2) Civil Liaison Teams
  - Five (5) Standing Planning Teams – ‘Farmed out’ for increased planning capability
  - Bulk of Functional Specialists Provides Flexibility to Weight ‘Main Effort’
APPENDIX L: CIVIL INFORMATION AND THE COP

According to the Army Campaign Plan, “The Soldier is the Army’s best sensor…to receive and process information” because soldiers come into contact with relevant information throughout the area of operations in many unconventional ways. In the course of their normal duties, soldiers gather information through a variety of non-military people, in different civilian settings and locations, and at specific, non-military, events.

Civil Affairs soldiers have been doing this for years, but for stabilization and reconstruction purposes – not for direct action. The method used to organize civil information is PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Security, Infrastructure, and Information) or ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Organization, People, and Events). This process is called civil information management and helps develop the civil common operating picture (COP) for the commander. At the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, one of CMOC’s core capabilities is civil information management.

A. WHAT IS CIVIL INFORMATION

Civil information is “information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander’s … environment that can be fused or processed to increase DoD, interagency…. situational awareness understanding or dominance.”208 In other words, civil information includes ethnography, structural topography, and social networks. Civil information is not combat intelligence or actionable intelligence.

B. ASCOPE METHODOLOGY FROM FM 3-05.40

- Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s operational environment that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission. CA planners analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact on civilian activities in these

---

areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the course of actions being considered.

- **Structures** are existing civil structures that take on many significant roles. Some, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional HPTs. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. Structures analysis involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.

- Civil *capabilities* can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems. Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce. Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the host nation, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that may be taken and used by military forces consistent with international law.

- Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the 14 CA functional specialties. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, CAO/CMO planners consider how to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on strengths in capabilities.

- Civil *organizations* are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, and community watch groups. They might be IGOs or the NGO
community. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

- **People**, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, negative, or no impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term *people* includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA Soldiers consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. They also identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. 209

C. COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP)

While civil information should always remain unclassified and reside on unclassified networks, it should always be integrated into the commander’s full COP that includes operations and intelligence as pictured below:

---

209 Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 4-4.
APPENDIX M: CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMON SKILLS

A. CIVIL AFFAIRS SKILLS

Here is the complete list and description of Civil Affairs common skills found in FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations:

- **Warrior.** Able to perform as a member of a combat operation using both individual and squad movement techniques (mounted and dismounted) and executing live-fire defensive protective measures with common weapon systems. Skilled in basic combative techniques and force protection (FP) measures.

- **Communications.** Able to perform routine short and long-range (secured and unsecured) communications, including message formatting, encryption, and decryption.

- **Civil Information Management (CIM).** Able to perform using automation devices to conduct civil reconnaissance for the CIM process that can be partitioned from traditional military intelligence systems while maintaining the capability to geo-reference and interface pertinent civil and threat data to assist in developing the civil inputs to the common operational picture (COP) of the operational area, and establishing and maintaining a situation map. Familiar with common Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operational terms, graphics and symbols, and determining civil, military, and environmental threat identification and classification.

- **Field craft and Survival.** Able to perform evading and surviving in all environmental conditions using field craft techniques, and conventional and unconventional survival procedures.

- **Land Navigation.** Able to navigate in all environments over short and long distances individually or in groups, mounted and dismounted using advanced positioning devices, orienteering techniques, map and compass, and terrain association to accurately arrive at a destination.

- **Medical.** Able to administer immediate combat medical life-saving treatment to a wounded or distressed individual in preparation for emergency evacuation.

---

• **Methods of Instruction.** Able to deliver performance-oriented training to teach civil/military subjects.

• **Language.** Able to communicate in the soldier’s assigned foreign language and may have limited ability to express themselves within the context of the customs, traditions, and mores of a specific culture or mix of cultures endemic to the area of responsibility (AOR).

• **Regional Focus and Cultural Awareness.** Knowledgeable of regional geography, political, social, and economic systems. Familiar with Indigenous Population Institution and their specific regional religious and ethnic differences, and able to operate within the cultures indigenous to the AOR.

• **Negotiation and Mediation.** Able to mediate, negotiate, and facilitate interaction across the civil-military spectrum.

• **CA Mission Planning.** Able to plan for, execute, and continually assess CAO (explain). Able to advise conventional and unconventional units in CMO. Able to conduct CA support mission planning. Able to prepare to transition to CAO.

• **Information Operations.** Able to synchronize CAO with information operations (IO) objectives. Able to support the IO plan and integrate indigenous information systems and institutions.

• **Project Management.** Able to manage projects and programs associated with the delivery of effects, including financial management.

• **International Civilian Response.** Familiar with the international civilian organizations (United Nations [UN], International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], and so on) mandated with responding to the needs of civilian populations (for example, refugees, internally displaced persons [IDPs], and other vulnerable persons).

**B. CIVIL AFFAIRS CHARACTERISTICS:**

• **Responsiveness.** To be truly responsive to the needs of the Army, CA forces must be deployable and capable of quickly and effectively engaging the civil component of the AOR. The primary means that the CA force uses to coordinate actions and engage the civil component is CMOC, CLTs, and CATs. Additionally, some CA forces are capable of airborne, or air assault, insertion.

---

211 Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 1-11.
CA units ensure a shared COP with key nonorganic resources to exploit mutual strengths, and to reduce and protect vulnerabilities. CA units are capable of independent operations for a minimum of three days regardless of the operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Because CA units must remain responsive to the needs of joint, coalition, OGAs, interagency, conventional forces, SOF, IGOs, and NGOs, they possess robust communications capability. CA units are outfitted with the latest military secure and nonsecure voice and digital communications equipment so that they have reachback capability regardless of assignment to CA specialists, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs throughout the AOR.

- **Agility.** CA leaders are schooled in military art and science, doctrine, regional and cultural awareness, and are adept at troops leading in dynamic, fluid operational environments. This agility allows the CA leader to leverage military and civil resources to achieve U.S. and coalition force objectives. The CA/CMO command and control (C2) systems are optimized for mission accomplishment and allow the civil elements of the COP to be updated continuously and shared across the force. Agility, also, allows the CA unit to share nontactical information with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs outside the force, while facilitating rapid CMO decision making.

- **Versatility.** CA units have the inherent capability to conduct decisive CAO in support of CMO in all conditions synchronized with Army and joint fires, reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting acquisition (RSTA) and nonorganic assets. Although CA battalions are organized for maximum operability and effectiveness, to include embedded CMOC and CLT organizations, they may be adapted to changes in mission.

- **Lethality.** CA forces support lethality by providing commanders with civil information to increase their situational awareness and understanding to achieve full spectrum dominance.

  - CA forces do this through civil reconnaissance (CR) and nonlethal targeting to shape the battlefield, inform the lethal targeting process, and to mitigate civilian interference and collateral damage resulting from lethal targeting.

- **Survivability.** CA commanders must attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating FP considerations into all aspects of CAO. CA units must take advantage of all
available technologies that provide maximum protection at the soldier level. Further, CA soldiers gain significant survivability advantages through the development of rapport with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs who recognize that their success is tied to the ability of CA soldiers to operate in the AO. Survivability is achieved through situational awareness, force design, and collective training.

- **Sustainability.** CA units rely on technology to provide reach back (secure, nonsecure, voice, and digital), access to supplies, local nation supply procurement, and assistance of OGAs, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs for civil assistance support. CA forces support mission sustainability by planning and conducting CAO/CMO through, by, and with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, HN, and OGAs. This support involves providing assistance, coordination, and training to facilitate complete transition of CAO/CMO to IPI, IGOs, NGOs, HN, and OGA authorities. This type of CA support provides continuity and sustainability of CMO and, ultimately, the success of national objectives in a joint operations area (JOA/AOR).

- **Trainability.** CA forces must train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. CA leaders must be able to train their units without significant external support, be adaptive, and be able to learn and train during operations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


CJCSM 3500.04D Unified Joint Task Lists (UJTLs) (Washington, DC 20318: Joint Staff, August 1, 2005).


CMOC Handbook, U.S. John F. Kennedy School of Warfare and Center (Fort Bragg, NC: USJFKSWC, February 27, 2002)


Department of the Army. “Why we are changing the Army.” Department of the Army. Field Manuals.


Hinton, Donna, LTC. (Commander 490th CA BN) *Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group*.


Kensinger, Philip R. LTG. (Commander, USASOC) “ARSOF Transformation.”

Kern, John H., BG (Commander, 352 CA CMD) Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group.


McDonnell, George, LTC. “Bagram PRT, April 22, 2006.”


Moore, Ritchie, LTC and Michael Warmack. “Civil Affairs transformation.”


Organizational Design Paper for Civil Affairs (USAR) FDU 05-01, (February 16, 2005).


Ruf, James. LTC “PRT Command Brief.”


Stefula, John, MAJ. (G3 Plans Officer, 352nd CA CMD). “352nd Civil Affairs Command consolidated After Action Review” (draft) (March 3, 2004) for the OIFSG.


Trowbridge, Gordan. “State Department is unlikely to send more civilians to Iraq.” Times (NTD).


Wagner, BG. (Deputy Commandant CGSC), “Army Focus Area Stabilization & Reconstruction Brief (PowerPoint Presentation briefed to the staff of USACAPOC G8 at Fort Bragg, NC on March 4, 2004).


West, Lawrence, COL. (Chief, OPT I MEF) Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group.

Wilkins, Aaron L. “The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operations Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Air Command and Staff College (Maxwell AFB: March 1997).


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. Karen Guttieri, Cebrowski Institute
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

4. Jennifer Duncan, Code 64 Curriculum 699
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

5. Brian H. Greenshields, Colonel, USAF, DA Curriculum 699
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

6. Anna Simons, DA Curriculum 699
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

7. COL Dennis Cahill
   G3, USACAPOC
   Fort Bragg, North Carolina

8. COL Ferdinand Irizarry
   Commander, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)
   Fort Bragg, North Carolina