DYSFUNCTION JUNCTION: INTELLIGENCE, PEACEKEEPING, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

by

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**Dysfunction Junction: Intelligence, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations**

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

United Nations peace operations continue to play a vital role in international security, with 15 missions underway in 2007. The UN, however, lacks the institutional intelligence capacity to provide guidance, high-level assessments, and tactical/operational intelligence support for the over 100,000 peacekeepers around the world. The UN’s lack of focused capabilities is particularly surprising in the post-9/11 world and the 2003 bombing of its headquarters in Iraq. Since the UN’s first foray into peacekeeping in 1948, member states, fearful of violations of their sovereignty, have blocked previous reform attempts. This has forced UN operations to rely on ad hoc measures to meet their intelligence requirements, while the Secretary General and Security Council are at the mercy of member state intelligence agencies for their information. Despite this handicap, some improvements have been made, particularly at the mission level. Further, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) holds great promise for addressing many of the UN’s intelligence requirements. This study concludes that the UN would be well-served by adopting the existing NATO model for OSINT production, enabling the organization to effectively collate and analyze the vast information stores at its fingertips.
ABSTRACT

United Nations peace operations continue to play a vital role in international security, with 15 missions underway in 2007. The UN, however, lacks the institutional intelligence capacity to provide guidance, high-level assessments, and tactical/operational intelligence support for the over 100,000 peacekeepers around the world. The UN’s lack of focused capabilities is particularly surprising in the post-9/11 world and the 2003 bombing of its headquarters in Iraq. Since the UN’s first foray into peacekeeping in 1948, member states, fearful of violations of their sovereignty, have blocked previous reform attempts. This has forced UN operations to rely on ad hoc measures to meet their intelligence requirements, while the Secretary General and Security Council are at the mercy of member state intelligence agencies for their information. Despite this handicap, some improvements have been made, particularly at the mission level. Further, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) holds great promise for addressing many of the UN’s intelligence requirements. This study concludes that the UN would be well-served by adopting the existing NATO model for OSINT production, enabling the organization to effectively collate and analyze the vast information stores at its fingertips.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRIXS</td>
<td>Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dutchbat</td>
<td>Dutch Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECPS</td>
<td>Executive Committee on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>EISAS</td>
<td>ECPS Information and Strategy Analysis Secretariat</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>I&amp;R</td>
<td>Intelligence and Research Unit</td>
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<td>IEMF</td>
<td>International Emergency Multinational Force</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>Information Management Cell</td>
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<td>ISE</td>
<td>Intelligence Support Element</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Cell</td>
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<td>MIB</td>
<td>Military Information Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (French acronym)</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (French acronym)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French acronym)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NECBAT</td>
<td>Netherlands-Canada Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi (French acronym)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Congo (French acronym)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Open Source Data</td>
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<td>OSIF</td>
<td>Open Source Information</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSINT-V</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence -- Validated</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBPU</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SIOC</td>
<td>Security Information and Operations Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Situation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOB</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Virtual Intelligence Center</td>
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</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Patrick Cammaert, Dutch Marine, U.N. Commander. Nice to meet you, thanks

Kenneth Dombroski
UNMO, Nobel laureate? Professor writ large

Ops are the focus.
Captain Timothy Doorey:
Sailor, intel pro

I must thank my wife
In Baghdad while I was here;
I’m glad she’s home safe

Not to be outdone
Learned JMAC from John Otte
Next time, Oahu

To classmates: friends, its
All about the Collier.
May we meet again

Even a thesis
Gains from a sense of humor;
Read this page closely

Late Dag Hammarskjöld
Early precedent setter;
You made this happen
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This thesis examines the question, “What practical measures can the United Nations (UN) take to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence support for peace operations?” Following bloody attacks against UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda in the 1990s, and particularly in the post-9/11 world, and after the bombing of UN headquarters in Iraq in 2003, the need for accurate and timely intelligence has never been higher, yet repeated calls for improving the UN’s collection and analysis capability have brought little progress. This thesis reviews the historical application of intelligence in UN peace operations and the impact of recent proposals for improving UN intelligence, and provides recommendations for enhancing peacekeeping intelligence in today’s operational environment.

B. IMPORTANCE

UN peace operations play a vital role in international security. The UN charter does not mention peacekeeping, yet peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have been an important tool for conflict resolution since the first mission in 1948. In fact, the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia credited a rise in UN peace activities between 1990 and 2002 with a decline in conflict across the globe.1 From its ad hoc beginnings UN peacekeeping has evolved beyond simple cease-fire monitoring to encompass a wide range of conflict intervention and “nation-building” activities. Following the 1992 release of then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, the number of PKOs rose dramatically. In its first 42 years the UN ran only 13 PKOs; in the last 20 years, it engaged in 48 more, 15 of which are active today.2

Despite this surge in activity, the UN lacks the institutional intelligence capacity to provide guidance, high-level assessments, and operational/tactical intelligence support to the forces it commands, despite a 2007 responsibility for over 100,000 personnel from 115 countries deployed to 15 ongoing PKOs around the world.\(^3\) The organization’s worldwide involvement requires crisis early warning, careful pre-mission planning and robust information to support operations and force protection. Furthermore, field operations demand the integration of intelligence at a tactical level not just for force protection but to monitor cease-fires and track belligerent parties’ forces.\(^4\) Although requirements have increased, political considerations have trumped previous efforts to institutionalize UN intelligence practices. Some governments view intelligence use in the UN as spying on its member states.\(^5\) Member states, associating “intelligence” with espionage and fearful of violations of their sovereignty, have made the UN reluctant to do intelligence.\(^6\) The UN’s lack of standardized procedures for needed intelligence forces a reliance on ad hoc methods and/or member state intelligence support.

In multilateral or alliance military operations, sharing intelligence information enhances trust between troop contributing countries. Political scientist Robert Keohane demonstrates that an information differential exists within any given international organization,\(^7\) and states with the information advantage may be reluctant to share that information, especially intelligence, with the organization. The UN faces this problem on a large scale. This has prevented the organization from establishing an intelligence capability, especially at UN headquarters in New York.

\(^4\) Robert E. Rehbein, Informing the Blue Helmets: The United States, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Intelligence (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen’s University Press, 1996), 24-25.
The lack of focus on intelligence is particularly surprising in a post-9/11 world—especially following the UN’s loss of its chief representative in Iraq to a terrorist attack in 2003. This event drove home the need for intelligence, particularly for force protection: “Never before have UN unarmed personnel been so viciously and deliberately targeted, with such devastating effect.”\(^8\) Significantly, “intelligence” is no longer a dirty word at the UN. The organization has improved PKO intelligence, particularly at the mission level, but much room for development remains even today.\(^9\)

Member states in 2007 had volunteered to contribute over 100,000 fielded UN peacekeepers. After action reports produced within the UN say that these troop contributing countries need assurance that the UN will protect their soldiers.\(^10\) The need for intelligence has never been greater. This thesis argues that the time is ripe for an updated review of UN peace operation intelligence. Following this review, this study provides recommendations for improving UN intelligence in the current operational environment.

C. UN INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

The UN has made prior attempts to reform its intelligence capability. These previous initiatives have faced political, bureaucratic, and structural obstacles to their success. Despite these difficulties, some progress is evident, particularly at the mission level. Further, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) holds great promise for addressing many of the UN’s intelligence requirements. This study focuses on potential structural improvements the UN could pursue to enhance its intelligence performance, specifically

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\(^8\) Patrick Cammaert, “Conceptual, Organizational and Operational Issues Facing the United Nations in Providing Strategic Information and Peacekeeping Intelligence For Its Peace Support Operations” (Presentation, Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, December 2003), http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/doc/Cammaert.doc (accessed February 9, 2007), 1. At the time of this presentation, Maj Gen Cammaert was military advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

\(^9\) Simon Chesterman, “Does the UN Have Intelligence?” *Survival* 48, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 156.

in the realm of OSINT. This thesis concludes that the UN would be well-served by adopting the existing NATO model for OSINT production, enabling the organization to effectively collate and analyze the vast information stores at its fingertips.

1. Political

The UN is comprised of representatives of 192 different countries, making politics a defining feature of conducting business within the organization. Because UN actions must be rooted in a consensus of member states and have the support of the Security Council’s permanent five members, political issues cast their shadow over every significant initiative. To put it succinctly, “The U.N. secretary-general, no matter how skilled, is caught between big powers that refuse to make the institution fair and small powers that refuse to make it more efficient. The selfishness of one side encourages the irresponsibility of the other.”¹¹ These political considerations are a primary obstacle to effective intelligence reform.

2. Bureaucratic

Graham Allison presented the classic model of bureaucratic decision making using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study. In his analysis, each individual organization in the government acts to protect its own turf. This results in a “where you stand depends on where you sit” mentality, as the goals of offices and directorates cause leaders to stake out positions to protect their fiefdoms.¹² According to Allison, this created confusion within an American government nominally united by the need to solve a crisis.

The UN Secretariat is a massive bureaucracy employing 8,900 people from 170 countries,¹³ suggesting that bureaucratic pressures similar to those within the U.S.


government are magnified in the UN. In addition, there is not an imperative for intelligence reform within the UN, so the organization is not even nominally united in pursuing this goal. Any proposal to strengthen UN intelligence is likely to face resistance from entrenched UN bureaucrats in New York.

3. Structural

Another roadblock to reform is the association of intelligence with espionage.14 To some, “the only real difference between information and intelligence is the methods and secretiveness by which one goes about creating the latter.”15 Opponents of intelligence reform may latch on to this distinction and play on small-state fears of an independent, covert UN intelligence capability.16 In fact, the UN often eschews the term “intelligence,” preferring instead “military information” or simply “information,” though this tendency is changing. Yet this characterization misses a finer distinction. While secret information collection may certainly constitute part of an intelligence organization’s function, intelligence may also refer to the analytical process and the products generated thereby.17 UN intelligence, then, would be the product of openly obtainable information, available in great quantities at UN headquarters. In the PKO framework, these reports, analyzed and applied to the operational context, become open source intelligence (OSINT). At UN headquarters, this can provide for early warning of a crisis and an integrated understanding of the nature of a given conflict. At the operational and tactical levels in the field, OSINT may come from, for example, commercially available imagery (i.e., GoogleEarth or contracted imagery collection), and interviews with the local population. For the purpose of this study, improving the UN’s intelligence capability means enhancing its capacity for analyzing open source information—that is, creating OSINT.

15 Rehbein, 89.
17 Chesterman, 150.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Rather than chronologically survey the past 15 years of literature on the subject, this section divides the existing published works by topical focus. Some of the literature attempts an overarching view of the issues facing UN intelligence: these are grouped under the heading “scope of the problem.” Other authors have focused more narrowly on particular niches within the existing system: structural, technological, and training-related. Finally, commentators have evaluated the impact of previous UN intelligence reform attempts. While this study primarily focuses on potential structural measures to improve intelligence, there is a great deal of interplay among these categories; a concrete division is rarely possible.

1. Scope of the Problem

Hugh Smith, of the Australian Defence Force Academy’s University College Department of Politics, set the tone for in-depth discussion with his oft-cited 1994 article “Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping.” Smith demonstrates the need for an institutionalized intelligence function at UN Headquarters and in the field, while realizing that “[t]he concept of ‘UN intelligence’ promises to turn traditional principles of intelligence on their heads.” 18 According to Smith, UN intelligence must be collected openly, and will probably become public knowledge sooner rather than later. This reduces the willingness of the permanent five members of the Security Council and other countries to share intelligence data with the UN—and at the same time reduces the ability of the “blue helmets” to operate effectively.

To examine the dynamics inherent in the openness-security tension, Canada’s Pearson Peacekeeping Centre’s A. Walter Dorn divided the spectrum of PKO intelligence gathering into “white” (permissible), “black” (prohibited), and “grey” areas. 19 In general, the more overt the collection, the “whiter.” Peacekeeping forces and UN military observers have long carried out “white” missions, but the UN has operated in

---

dark grey areas on occasion. During the 1960’s mission in the Congo (ONUC), peacekeepers used agents to gather information about arms shipments, pushing the envelope of acceptability for PKO intelligence collection.20

Marc Fontaine, writing in *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, also addressed the openness-secrecy debate, saying that the UN’s fear of infringing on sovereignty did not apply in the post-Cold War era. He also says that New York must be able to provide assessments and continuity for tactical field units. 21 His argument carries even more weight in the post-9/11 world.

Simon Chesterman from New York University provided the latest scholarly work on UN intelligence in autumn 2006. He argues that the UN would be benefit from an independent analysis capability, but is skeptical that it will ever acquire one.22 He does not, however, explore the promise of adapting the NATO OSINT model, as this study does. Instead Chesterman focuses on developing UN use of state intelligence analysis.23

2. Structural

a. UN Headquarters

Cameron Graham and James Kiras, in *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, looked at intelligence at UN Headquarters, writing a short article that offered the following definition of intelligence: “it refers to that select portion of information that is necessary for leaders at all levels of command to make decisions. To be more precise, ‘Intelligence refers to information relevant to a government's formulating and implementing policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual or potential adversaries.’ Information is continually flowing into UN Headquarters … It is the refining and analysis of such information that the UN

22 Chesterman, 151.
23 Ibid., 157-159.
lacks.” They highlight the need for transparency as a major obstacle to effective UN intelligence. This study develops the idea that the UN can embrace openness and intelligence simultaneously through effective OSINT practices.

Writing in *Intelligence and National Security*, Thomas Quiggin also focused on the intelligence situation at UN Headquarters. He argued that there is no dearth of data but with no dedicated analysts, there is a “shortage of knowledge.” Norman Bowen also saw the need for crisis early warning as a main deficiency of peacekeeping. The UN is unable to correlate all the data at its disposal to organize early and effective intervention. With immense open-source information resources at its fingertips, UN headquarters has the potential to do good analysis, if only it could muster the political will to institutionalize the practice.

**b. Operational Level**

Graham and Kiras delve into UN history to show that peacekeepers have in fact used intelligence to accomplish their mission, regardless of the official status of “intelligence” within the UN. ONUC established a fairly robust ad hoc intelligence structure, proving that intelligence can work in the UN, at least under some conditions. Chapter II of this study elaborates on the history of UN intelligence.

Paul Johnston also believes that “UN intelligence” need not be an oxymoron. In *Intelligence and National Security* he contends that “the very essence of peacekeeping is ‘intelligence.’” If peacekeeping means monitoring cease-fire lines and

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28 Paul Johnston, “No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping,” *Intelligence and National Security* 12, no. 4 (October 1997): 103.
military withdrawals, and generally promoting transparency between belligerents, then
the entire PKO is in fact an intelligence operation. Without saying “intelligence,” the
UN’s own documents acknowledge the importance of this role. 29 Like Bowen and
Graham and Kiras, Johnston sees critical shortcomings in the correlation and analysis of
this data, particularly at the mission headquarters level. In his view, this “operational
level” (as distinct from strategic or tactical) of intelligence represented the biggest area
for improvement. Johnston saw that UN Headquarters (the strategic level) had plenty of
data flowing in, and the army battalions on loan from member states (the tactical level)
typically brought their own organic intelligence capability with them. 30 In fact the UN
has made significant strides at the operational level. These changes are detailed in
Chapter III.

Pär Eriksson, with Sweden’s National Defense Research Establishment in
Stockholm, agreed with the focus on the operational level and sketched a general
framework for intelligence requirements at that level. His three broad requirement
categories are 1) the ethnic situation, 2) the socio-economic situation, and 3) the attitude
of local leaders and civilians. 31 He left these requirements very general, though others
went into more depth on the subject.

Retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer Walter Clarke and Ambassador
Robert Gosende provided the literature’s most detailed list of specific PKO intelligence
requirements. The major categories these fall in are shown in Figure 1. These are the
areas the commander needs intelligence to plan the broad overview of the mission. 32

29 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on UN Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United Nations, 2003),
(accessed 10 October 2006), 60. Along with “Support to Peacemaking and Political Negotiations” and
“Providing a Secure Environment,” “Observation and Monitoring” (i.e., intelligence gathering) may be the
main function of a UN military force.

30 Johnston, 108.

31 Pär Eriksson, “Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations,” International Journal of Intelligence and

32 Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, “Keeping the Mission Focused: The Intelligence Component in
Clarke and Gosende do not provide a complete catalog of requirements. To this list can be added basic tactical-level information needs such as the disposition of belligerent forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Background elements which created the need for international intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Existing national and international humanitarian response</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Parameters of the international mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effects of military intervention on the crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Degree of cooperation expected from local authorities</td>
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<td>• Anticipated stages of the crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The withdrawal point</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Operational-level intelligence requirements

Unlike Clarke and Gosende, Eriksson examined some of the intelligence sources available to UN forces, as shown in Figure 2. UN peacekeepers have direct access to the population, and thus have access to very detailed localized information—it is analysis and correlation that UN missions lack. The more technical sources Eriksson identified may not be available to all missions, or may be restricted to only certain national contingents. Political considerations will dictate the extent of technical and national intelligence sharing in the mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AVAILABLE TO UN MISSIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Convoys</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Observation Posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interviews with population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Counter-battery radar</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Tactical Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Intelligence Sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Potential Intelligence Sources Available to UN Missions

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33 Clarke and Gosende, 60-63.
34 Eriksson, 8-11.
A great deal more information beyond these sources is openly available for use in intelligence products. These additional OSINT resources are discussed in Chapter IV.

c. **Tactical Level**

When member states send a battalion to a UN mission, the unit typically deploys with its own intelligence function. This organic capability varies to the extent that the contributing state trains and equips its battalion’s intelligence personnel. Thus, there is no standardized intelligence function at the unit level of a UN mission.

Moving down the spectrum to the tactical level, Bradley Runions and Richard Roy of Canada’s Royal Military College discuss the gap in intelligence on land mines. With mines one of the principal threats to peacekeepers and noncombatants alike, such information is vital to protect the force and civilians in the operations area.35 Land mine education resources are plentiful, but the sheer bulk of data inhibits use at the tactical level. Further, the land mine experts in explosive ordnance disposal are unprepared to teach deploying peacekeepers about the broad range of land mine employment.36

Also at the tactical level, Fontaine recommended the UN develop a methodology to apply intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to PKOs. He calls improved intelligence a “necessity” given the UN’s involvement in intra-state conflicts with their attendant factions and lack of front lines. Fontaine realized the UN faced resource constraints and saw the United States as a prime contributor to improving the UN’s IPB capability.37

Troops in the field also realize their need for improved intelligence. Swedish peacekeepers returning from the mission in the Bosnia (UNPROFOR) called for

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37 Fontaine, 12.
better understanding of the causes of the war and the ethnic situation. As Eriksson and Clarke and Gosende pointed out, this is a primary intelligence requirement for peacekeeping.

3. Technological

In a series of articles for *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, Peter Jones outlined the role of overt aerial reconnaissance in historical peacekeeping missions. He concludes that aerial reconnaissance can be applied in a UN context, but the details of the mission will define the extent to which it can function. James Kiras agreed, and saw unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as an outstanding source of PKO intelligence. While this makes sense, UAVs have remained under the control of their owning countries even when employed in support of UN missions. Despite their obvious utility in information gathering, widespread deployment of UN-controlled UAVs is unlikely.

Runions and Roy recommended technological solutions to the mine intelligence problem. They specify existing sources of information and recommend deploying peacekeepers be provided a CD-ROM containing relevant data. Additionally, they propose a comprehensive internet-based mine intelligence database for maintenance of current information. The problem with their proposals is that they are specific to the Canadian military. While Canada is historically a very active peacekeeping participant, other countries may not have the resources to outfit their troops with such technology.

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41 Kiras, 10.


4. Training

Few authors directly address the need for training. Instead, training requirements must be inferred from the various proposed solutions. Since PKOs are composed of contingents from multiple countries, training levels vary from unit to unit. Fontaine’s suggestion for a UN IPB methodology, for instance, requires a high degree of specialized training to learn the intricate IPB process. For example, the US Joint Doctrine for IPB is nearly 200 pages long.44

This does not mean the training issue is insurmountable. As U.S. forces in Haiti gave way to a UN mission (UNMIH) in 1995, the U.S. Army instituted a program to train the multi-national UNMIH Headquarters staff. Walter Kretchik from Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, detailed the training effort. Political considerations shaped the program; both the Army and the UN did not want the UNMIH staff “Americanized.” In the end, a multinational consensus on the syllabus emerged.45 Though an ad hoc effort, the training proved successful: the UN commander in Haiti, American Major General Joseph Kinzer, said the UNMIH staff was the most effective UN staff in history.46

5. Previous Reform Attempts

The earliest calls for intelligence improvement came shortly after the Agenda for Peace. For instance, Arms Control Today in 1992 noted that many airfields and weapons caches in Bosnia needed better UN monitoring.47 The UN did take some steps to address the shortcomings in PKO intelligence. In 1993, the UN created a 24/7 Situation Center as a preliminary step toward improving information flow, though it left much to be desired.48 Though less than a fully functional command-and-control center, the “SitCen”

46 Kretchik, 406.
48 Smith, 178-179.
still represented a step in the right direction. A concurrent effort to improve PKO management through the use of “gratis” officers on loan from their (mostly rich) home countries crumbled under political pressure from poorer states.\textsuperscript{49} More information on these attempted reforms can be found in Chapter II.

American support to any UN intelligence effort would be invaluable. In 1993 U.S. Navy Commander Charles Williams at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, DC noted that the United States in the post-cold war era “has neither the desire nor resources to impose and enforce a ‘Pax Americana.’”\textsuperscript{50} He recommended the United States step up its contributions to PKO intelligence, “contingent on the UN establishing a system of controls and security controls”\textsuperscript{51} to protect U.S.-provided information. Essentially he feared the release of intelligence to the UN could result in loss of classified or sensitive data, sources, and methods. A year later, Brenda Connors from the U.S. Naval War College said “U.S. leadership is desperately needed” to enhance the UN’s PKO effectiveness.\textsuperscript{52} She argued,\textit{ inter alia}, that America should help the UN to expand its capacity to handle intelligence.\textsuperscript{53}

In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi to chair a panel to review all facets of UN PKO and provide recommendations. The panel’s findings, known as the Brahimi Report, called for improvements to PKO intelligence at all levels, from the tactical (field) level up through UN headquarters in New York. Although the panel did not concentrate exclusively on intelligence, the report stated that at the operational and tactical level, peacekeepers need

\textsuperscript{49} Robert L. McClure and Morton Orlov II, “Is the UN Peacekeeping Role in Eclipse?”\textit{ Parameters} 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 100, 103.


\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 21.

\textsuperscript{52} Connors, 6.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 17.
more detailed intelligence to enhance their ability of peacekeepers to deter violence.\(^{54}\)

At the strategic level, the panel recommended creation of an independent analysis arm to support the Secretary General. This would be an expansion of the existing Situation Center to be known as the EISAS (Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategy Analysis Secretariat).\(^{55}\) The EISAS recommendation was never implemented, despite evidence of the need for improved analytical capability.\(^{56}\) Still, the Brahimi Report represents the most comprehensive review of PKO undertaken by the UN. Chapter III assesses the report’s impact on UN operations.

Shortly after the Brahimi Report’s release, scholars began to provide tentative analysis of its utility. For the most part these were long on summary and short on analysis. For instance, Norwegian Colonel Jon Lilland wrote a paper at the U.S. Army War College purporting to examine the effects of the report on PKO. Unfortunately, he did not get into any detail; all the references to the report were to the Executive Summary.\(^{57}\) Brian Zittel of the New York Times’ editorial board research staff gives a very brief overview. He makes the point that Brahimi essentially establishes a “Powell Doctrine” for PKO when it says that every mission should have an attainable mandate and enough resources to achieve it.\(^{58}\) Commandant Brendan O’Shea of the Irish Army critiques Brahimi in several areas, but sees EISAS as a positive recommendation.\(^{59}\)

\(^{54}\) United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2000, x. The report provided 20 major recommendations to improve peacekeeping, each with multiple sub-recommendations. These ranged from preventative actions, through civil administration, logistics, and information technology to operational and structural reform. Intelligence was only a small part of the overall report. This study refers to the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” as the “Brahimi Report” throughout the text.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., xi.

\(^{56}\) Isa Blumi, “Kosova: From the Brink—and Back Again,” Current History 100, no. 649 (November 2001): 374. Blumi says, “The ultimate lesson to be learned from Kosova, therefore, is that there is a desperate need to develop a more sensitive methodological approach to diplomacy, particularly in the intelligence gathering field.”


David Malone from the International Peace Academy in New York and Ramesh Thakur, vice-rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo, provide the most in-depth review of the report as a whole, though they do not address the intelligence question directly. They do agree that PKO face serious challenges, and Brahimi’s recommendations “to address the near-catastrophic drift in the DPKO” are excellent.60

Surprisingly little new research on UN PKO intelligence has been published since the Brahimi Report. Lawrence Cline, a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer and a professor at American Military University, looked at intelligence in U.S. peace operations, with lessons from the UN. His focus on the American military intelligence system does not translate directly to a UN context, but he does acknowledge that barriers to intelligence in UN PKO are slowly falling.61 Incremental progress notwithstanding, in 2005 Retired Indian Major General Dipkanar Banerjee, Director of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, identified the continuing salience of Brahimi’s unimplemented EISAS proposal.62

The organization still has immense potential to grow its intelligence processes, though not without some difficulty. The lack of scholarly focus on intelligence is particularly surprising in a post-9/11 world. The 2006 article published by New York University’s Simon Chesterman, described above, is a refreshing revisit of the UN intelligence topic, though it stops short of describing a potential model for an autonomous UN analysis capability. This thesis attempts to fill that void, and focuses on structural changes the UN might attempt to improve its intelligence capability.

E. COUNTERPOINTS

Intelligence reform within the UN has its critics. Some question its utility given the myriad other problems facing peacekeeping. Political sovereignty concerns prevent


many states from fully supporting an improved UN intelligence capability. Finally, there is the question of whether the UN, or any international organization, can be trusted with sensitive information.

1. Why Intelligence?

To date, UN peace operations have had a mixed record of success, and there is no shortage of areas for improvement. Malone and Thakur divide the problems into policy, managerial, and operational concerns. The Security Council gives missions ambitious broad and ambitious mandates based in large part on political considerations—and then often fails to provide the field operation with adequate resources for its assigned tasks. Peacekeeping staff posts are too often filled on the basis of politics, not merit.63 State-building efforts under UN aegis have a mixed record, and even the relatively successful Timor-Leste operation saw a resumption of violence.64 Most UN troops come from developing countries, while rich states contribute most of the funding.65 Intelligence is but a small part of the entire system, “not a panacea for deeper systemic problems.”66 Therefore, intelligence may not offer as much assistance in improving the overall record of PKOs as might be the case if the UN system otherwise was running smoothly.

Still, the need for improved intelligence is well documented. The UN itself is slowly becoming accustomed to this mode. The first-ever draft UN peacekeeping doctrine reflects the importance of analysis as embodied in the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC).67 Further, the costs of intelligence improvements are relatively small, as

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63 Malone and Thakur, 12-14.
66 Rehbein, 3.
noted in Chapter IV. Given the requirements for improved intelligence and the relatively poor state of the UN’s existing capability, a relatively small investment can provide great returns.

2. Sovereignty

A concerted strategic intelligence effort at UN headquarters does not exist. Brahimi’s EISAS recommendation failed because member states did not want their internal affairs to be the focus of a UN collection effort. Martha Finnemore documented a shift in the consideration of international intervention, and showed that the UN now considers despots as threats to peace and security. Some autocratic leaders may fear becoming the target of unwanted UN attention and possible intervention if the organization became officially aware of the nature of their policies. Some small states saw “the potential for early warning to conflict with state sovereignty.” The counter to this argument is that there would be no secret UN espionage agency, no “CIA for the UN,” since the information is already largely resident within the UN system. According to Chesterman, the distinction between collection and analysis requires better definition to establish that UN intelligence does not violate sovereignty. Furthermore, no UN intervention is possible without both the approval of the Security Council and the willingness for states to provide troops and equipment. Interventions are not likely to be undertaken lightly—UN deployments reached an all-time high in October 2006, and “oversretch” is a very real concern. There is neither an incentive nor capability for the organization to mount an operation without sufficient cause or the political will of troop

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68 Chesterman, 154.


70 Chesterman, 154.

71 Graham and Kiras, 3.

72 Chesterman, 157.


74 Center on International Cooperation, 8.
contributing countries. The norm of non-intervention remains very strong—witness the reluctance to take decisive action in Rwanda in 1994 or to compel an end to genocide in present-day Darfur.

The success of JMACs in several UN operations is evidence that member states can accept some form of UN intelligence capacity, at least at the mission level. This may be due, in part, to their acknowledgment of the importance of intelligence to the operation. It also suggests recognition that UN intelligence does not necessarily threaten the sovereignty of the member states.

3. Dependence and Trust

Intelligence capabilities have always rested with states, not international organizations like the UN. The big powers demand control of their intelligence assets, and tend to maintain their control of information. This follows Keohane’s theory that information asymmetry will exist inside international organizations. Since the permanent five members of the Security Council enjoy this information advantage, they may be less inclined to approve an independent UN intelligence capability. According to Robert Rehbein at Queen’s College in Kingston, Ontario, this information dependence is to the organization’s detriment, and opens the door to manipulation. Additionally, he points out that not even U.S. intelligence has information about every point on the globe—especially in the countries where the UN often operates. As Chesterman argues, an independent UN voice is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a UN operation. In other words, an autonomous analysis capacity frees the collective group from accusations of being a tool of the major powers.

F. STUDY DESIGN

Chapter II sets the stage through examination of the history of intelligence in the UN during the Cold War and the 1990s. The organization is no stranger to the use of

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75 Russett and Sutterlin, 81.
76 Rehbein, 55, 45
77 Chesterman, 160.
intelligence, but has repeatedly relied on ad hoc measures to accomplish the intelligence function. While certain efforts have proven more or less successful, UN officials have given little official recognition to the need for intelligence—let alone institutionalization of intelligence practices—until publication of the Brahimi Report. Chapter III begins with the Brahimi Report and analyzes UN intelligence successes and failures since its 2000 release. Chapter IV explores the concept of OSINT and the well-developed NATO OSINT doctrine. Chapter V concludes the UN could adapt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) model to build an effective intelligence function.
II. THE HISTORY OF UN INTELLIGENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations found itself running military peacekeeping operations beginning with its first military observer mission in 1948. The year before, the Security Council had experimented with the use of fact-finding missions partially staffed by military officers. The scale of UN operations expanded with a full-scale military deployment to the Sinai in the late 1950s. Early peacekeeping operations (PKOs) had to rely on ad hoc methods of command and control, including the management of intelligence. 78 Today’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), created in 1992, has improved mission management, but in the realm of intelligence the tendency for ad hoc measures continues. In 2001, DPKO established the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) in an effort to record lessons learned, but its coverage is haphazard. 79 This chapter answers the question, “What lessons can twentieth century PKOs teach the UN?” Cold War missions set many precedents for UN PKO; in the early post-Cold War era, the UN attempted to apply the same models to more complex situations like Somalia and Bosnia, with disastrous results. The Brahimi Report is a logical breakpoint in the discussion, and the cause for this chapter’s focus on pre-2000 operations.

In point of fact, the UN is no stranger to the use of intelligence. From its earliest days the Security Council used fact finding and observation missions to provide information about threats to peace and security. As peace operations grew more complex, technical survey teams deployed to prospective mission areas in advance of the main force to get the lay of the land.

1. Observation Missions

Observation missions as a means to inform the Security Council predate the establishment of peacekeeping operations. In contrast to PKOs, observer missions are typically smaller and not intended to either guard territory or interpose between belligerents. Therefore, military observers usually go unarmed. This is true even when observers work in the same mission with an armed peacekeeping force. Because they do not present a threat to any conflict party, the UN has used observation missions as fact finders to investigate conflict areas.

In 1947, the UN established a Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). The mission’s military observers patrolled the northern border of Greece to determine the extent of foreign support for communist guerillas fighting Athens. The mission, which lasted until 1953, is considered successful in helping to stabilize the political situation in Greece. UNSCOB observers in the field acted as intelligence collectors. They monitored cross-border traffic and interrogated guerillas captured by security forces. Notably, broadcast monitoring allowed the mission to determine that the pro-communist “Free Greece” radio station originated in Yugoslavia. Unlike later missions, UNSCOB reported to the UN General Assembly instead of the Security Council. The Security Council would take the lead in subsequent missions.

Both the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) monitored peace settlements on behalf of the Security Council. Starting in 1948 and continuing today, UNTSO military observers kept watch over Israel’s international frontiers. The mission’s main tools are

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81 Diehl, 7.
83 Diehl, 27.
84 Birgisson, “United Nations Special Committee,” 81.
observation posts, ground patrols, and inspections of demilitarized areas, though it spends much time addressing belligerents’ complaints. Although UNTSO has seen multiple wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the UN continues the mission as a confidence-building measure.

A similar situation exists in South Asia. UNMOGIP began as a means to monitor the Pakistan-India cease-fire in 1949. Initial intelligence efforts included ground and air reconnaissance of the mission area. Throughout its life, the mission reported on troop movements and investigated complaints from each party to the conflict. Despite the recurrence of war and the non-cooperation of India, the mission remains in place today. Perhaps its most important contribution is as a sign that the international community remains interested in peace in the area.

Observation missions are today usually integrated with larger PKOs. The current UN mission in Congo, for example, has over 16,000 peacekeeping troops complemented by 731 military observers. The Security Council also uses purpose-built monitoring groups to report on particular issues. In 1993, UN Security Council Resolution 1519 established the Somalia Monitoring Group. Essentially, this is an intelligence collection and analysis arm chartered specifically to “investigate violations of the arms embargo … carry out field based investigations … [and] assess the progress of the arms embargo.” The results of this effort can be controversial. The Group’s July 2007 report accused

85 Birgisson, “United Nations Special Committee,” 94.
86 Diehl, 28.
89 Diehl, 28.
91 United Nations, “Department of Peacekeeping Operations Background Note.”
Eritrea of sending “huge quantities of arms” to Somali insurgents. Eritrea denies the claim though the Bush administration is contemplating placing Eritrea on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. These ramifications highlight the potential effectiveness of a UN intelligence operation, and also explain why many countries are loath to accept the establishment of an institutionalized UN intelligence capability. In any case, the Security Council extended the Monitoring Group’s mandate in Resolution 1766 of July 2007.

2. Technical Surveys

As early as 60 days prior to a peacekeeping mission’s deployment, DPKO sends a technical survey team to the operating area. It “report[s] on the political, diplomatic, military and administrative support situation.” Usually consisting of 17-20 people, the team is weighted toward preparing the logistics of the impending deployment, but mission planners and military officers are also included. According to Mr. John Otte, a former technical survey team member, the effort is “essentially a reconnaissance mission.”

The team’s findings go to the Secretary General for him to use in formulating a report on mission establishment; that report is furnished to the Security Council. Infrastructure information, including data on roads, airports, and seaports, forms a large part of the report. The survey team also investigates potential peacekeeper deployment

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96 Center for Civil Military Relations, “Operational Support, Chapter 1” (Course Material, “Planning Peace Operations Course,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006), 25. Although actual UN pre-mission surveys are not publicly available, training documents from the “Planning Peace Operations Course” are adapted from original surveys, and reveal their general contents.

97 John Otte, interview by author, July 19, 2007 at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Mr. Otte is former U.S. Army officer. He served as a “gratis” officer at UN Headquarters from 1995-1999 and is a veteran of three UN PKOs. Currently he is adjunct faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School through the Center for Civil-Military Relations and he is also a member of the UN’s peacekeeping operations doctrine working group.
sites and evaluates them on sustainability and operational significance. Additional information such as terrain and climatology is also included.98

In short, the technical survey team’s work forms a pre-mission assessment of the situation, similar to what one might expect to find in the planning documents for any modern military operation. It is not an intelligence product per se, but fills some of the same roles. The technical survey, however, does not have a great capability for intelligence collection, and thus can leave gaps in the UN planner’s knowledge. Still, this is an improvement from the early days of peacekeeping, when very little information was available.

B. THE COLD WAR

The East-West standoff curtailed UN Security Council cooperation and limited the employment and roles of blue-helmeted UN troops. Competition between the United States and Soviet Union threatened to deadlock the UN Security Council during contentious discussions. Thus, the UN could not take any action which might run against the interests of either superpower. The net result was to limit Cold War UN action “to the margins of global security.”99 From its creation in 1945 to the thawing of U.S.-USSR relations in 1988, the UN ran only 13 “blue helmet” PKOs—and created none between 1978 and 1988. These early missions were important in precedent setting in all aspects of mission management and employment, including intelligence. Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary General from 1953-1961, outlined the norms that should govern all UN PKOs: impartiality, consent of the parties, and use of force only in self-defense.100 Even Secretary General Hammarskjöld recognized the need for intelligence, though he did not want to see UN operations take on clandestine operations.101

100 Russett and Sutterlin, 70
The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai from 1956 to 1967 was the first full-scale PKO, and thus became the model for future operations.\textsuperscript{102} From its inception in 1960, ONUC (the French acronym for the first UN operation in the Congo) foreshadowed the “peacekeeping” missions of the early 1990s. By its 1964 conclusion, ONUC had transformed from a peacekeeping and supervisory role to full scale military operation and direct intervention in Congolese affairs.\textsuperscript{103} This departure from the recently promulgated norms of impartiality and non-aggression caused the UN to view ONUC as an aberration. Other notable missions begun in this period were the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP 1964-present), UNEF II (Sinai, 1973-1979), and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, Golan Heights, 1974-present). These operations demonstrated the UN’s ad hoc approach to intelligence.

1. UNEF

UNEF deployed to the Sinai in 1956 to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces (Israeli, French, and British) from the Sinai Peninsula, patrol the border areas, and supervise the ceasefire.\textsuperscript{104} Secretary General Hammarskjöld had just two days to plan the operation. Mona Ghali, in her research for the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, claims that Hammarskjöld had no intelligence on the situation to guide him.\textsuperscript{105} This is not entirely true; in fact military observers from the already-in-place UNTSO mission provided some information.\textsuperscript{106} Fortunately the political situation was such that all parties to the conflict cooperated with UNEF for the most part, and the lack of pre-deployment intelligence did not prevent the mission from doing its job. The

\textsuperscript{102} Kenneth Dombroski, \textit{Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime} (New York: Routledge, 2006), 22.

\textsuperscript{103} Diehl, 50-52.


\textsuperscript{106} Diehl, 30.
observation and monitoring function assigned to UNEF essentially made it an intelligence-collection organization for the UN, although it did not operate covertly in any way.

Washington allowed the UNEF commander to view, but not maintain, certain U.S. satellite images.\textsuperscript{107} Despite this input, it would be the mission itself, using UN troops and equipment contributed by member states, which would gather most of UNEF’s intelligence. In addition to observation posts and infantry patrols, UNEF employed air reconnaissance to help patrol the area.\textsuperscript{108}

Canada sent a small detachment of five aircraft and fewer than 100 men to UNEF. This unit participated in UNEF operations from 1963 to 1965, supplementing the mission’s ground patrol activities. Aircraft watched more area and could direct peacekeepers to investigate suspicious activity. Budget pressures within the UN forced cut backs to the aerial reconnaissance capability. This was not because UNEF commanders found aerial intelligence irrelevant—on the contrary, mission leadership was prepared to sacrifice troop strength to maintain the air surveillance capability—but because the Secretary General deemed the political impact of troops’ physical presence to be a higher priority.\textsuperscript{109} Though these air operations were not a major player in the conduct of the operation, they did set the precedent for UN use of aircraft to collect intelligence. In its next operation, air reconnaissance would prove invaluable to the UN peacekeepers.

2. ONUC

ONUC, the 1960-64 Congo operation, was an attempt to apply the UNEF peacekeeping framework in a context far removed from its 1956 origins. This time, the UN intervened in an internal conflict and had difficulty forming a political consensus on the scope of its role. This forced the UN to constantly improvise and change its

\textsuperscript{107} Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 427.


\textsuperscript{109} Jones, “Peacekeeping and Aerial Surveillance,” 3.
The organization did not have a firm foundation on which to begin planning for the ONUC mission. Without its own intelligence arm, the UN had to depend on xenophobic Congolese leaders and self-interested member states for intelligence. This resulted in UN planners (and Secretary General Hammarskjöld in particular) lacking an appreciation of the situation on the ground and were not in a position to accurately outline troop, equipment, and mandate requirements. The combination of poor information and the East-West-divided Security Council made the mission weak from the start. Consequently, ONUC had fewer than 20,000 troops from 30 different countries (at its February 1963 peak) to cover an area roughly the size of Western Europe. As ONUC found itself involved in combat operations, the need to focus its limited tactical resources through improved intelligence became apparent.

When it began in 1960, the mission’s mandate was to support Congo’s territorial integrity and monitor the withdrawal of Belgian mercenaries. From November 1961 until it ended in 1964, ONUC’s role was to quell the rebellion in Katanga province. Once in country, the mission’s lack of intelligence proved to be a major obstacle for ONUC’s force commander. Research by Ernest Lefever, then at the Brookings Institution, directly after the operation also showed intelligence to be a problem, though no in-depth study of the intelligence issue was attempted. Years later, this situation prompted perhaps the most in-depth study of intelligence in a UN operation. A. Walter Dorn and David Bell from Canada’s Royal Military Academy published this in a 1995 issue of *International Peacekeeping*.

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112 Ibid.


114 O’Neill and Rees, 66.

According to Dorn and Bell, ONUC made do without any intelligence capability for its initial six months. At the same time, the UN received no intelligence from its members. As the ONUC’s mandate grew, out of necessity it established a “military information branch” (MIB) at force headquarters in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) to carry out intelligence analysis for the force commander.116 The MIB was the UN’s first intelligence organization at any level, and began the UN’s use of “information” as the euphemism for “intelligence.”117

Although the MIB had more officers—nine—than any other branch at ONUC headquarters, it suffered from a deficiency of intelligence experts.118 Despite resource shortcomings, the MIB evolved into a multidisciplinary organization, incorporating aerial photoreconnaissance, human intelligence from informers and detained mercenaries, and radio intercept analysis.119 ONUC made extensive use of MIB products in fighting the Katangese rebels.

The mission possessed a limited capability for aerial reconnaissance. Limited numbers of troops coupled with a lack of roads and maps meant that UN troops could not effectively patrol everywhere, and elevating the importance of aerial surveillance. Initially the air effort consisted of debriefings of transport aircraft crews rather than a focused collection effort. As a result, ONUC had little capability to find Katanga’s troop formations and build ground- and air- orders-of-battle. Late in the operation, a Swedish air reconnaissance unit arrived and provided a windfall of intelligence to the operation.120 The UN’s air arm, consisting of four Ethiopian F-86 and five Swedish J29 fighter jets, along with four Indian Canberra bombers,121 was then able to destroy most of Katanga’s small air force on the ground.122

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116 Dorn and Bell, 5, 1.
117 Ibid., 5.
119 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 189; also Dorn and Bell, 10.
120 Dorn and Bell, 11-12.
121 Ibid., 11.
122 Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, 152.
ONUC also gathered human intelligence through various mechanisms. ONUC detained and interrogated foreign mercenaries in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{123} Mission personnel interviewed defectors and attempted to set up a network of informants. This attempt was hampered by a lack of funds for buying information.\textsuperscript{124} This collection effort resulted in modest success, though not all of ONUC’s sources proved entirely trustworthy. A 1962 operation based on informant reports discovered a supply of aircraft spare parts, preventing an improvement to the small Katanga air capability.\textsuperscript{125} In the end, the human intelligence effort was limited by resources and also concerns about a backlash against the UN resulting from such direct activities. ONUC leadership decided that the risk of “a fall from grace” resulting from “employing spies” would outweigh any potential gains.\textsuperscript{126}

Despite intercepts and code-breaking clearly falling into the realm of intelligence, UN military advisor Major General Indar Jit Rikhye of India deemed these practices “non-intrusive” and thus acceptable for UN use.\textsuperscript{127} Though code breaking was not well-resourced,\textsuperscript{128} listening to open broadcasts provided ONUC with valuable intelligence on troop movements and arms caches.\textsuperscript{129} This information aided the UN’s “Operation Grandslam” in December 1962 and January 1963, which put a final end to the Katangese secession.\textsuperscript{130}

3. Other Cold War Missions

Other Cold War missions showcased intelligence successes and failures. ONUC ended in 1964; the same year saw the establishment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This operation was intended to prevent escalation of the conflict
between ethnic Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. The conflict remains unsettled, necessitating the continued presence of the UN peacekeepers. Especially in the mission’s first decade, lack of an intelligence capacity led to surprises. For instance, the UN did not grasp the size and scope of Greek army camps on the island. The Greeks had hidden an entire brigade, the appearance of which embarrassed and alarmed the UN in 1967. Even when UN forces had relevant information, it could not be properly analyzed and employed. Peacekeepers observed unusual movements of Greek army and National Guard officers in Cyprus prior to their 1974 coup in Nicosia. Since the UN lacked an effective reporting and analysis mechanism, no one attached any special relevance to this activity, causing surprise within UNFICYP and at UN headquarters.

Following the October 1973 Yom Kippur war between Israel and Egypt and Syria, the UN established UNEF II in the Sinai and UNDOF in the Golan Heights the same month. Both missions patrolled border areas and, like the original UNEF, are essentially overt intelligence collection operations. Covering the same territory of UNEF I, UNEF II in particular capitalized on infusions of technology to help monitor the border. Air reconnaissance again played its part. Canadian and Australian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters patrolled the skies to fulfill a growing number of intelligence requirements (compared to UNEF I). US civilians installed and operated an electronic surveillance network to monitor passes through the Sinai. In addition to this “Sinai Field Mission,” UNEF II also benefited from nearly weekly American overflights of the peninsula by SR-71 and U-2 reconnaissance planes. Though the United States

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132 O’Neill and Rees, 98.

133 O’Neill and Rees, 98.


136 Rehbein 29.
maintained control over its aircraft, Washington provided the aerial imagery to both Israel and Egypt. This proved instrumental in building confidence between the two countries.

During the Cold War, PKOs used ad hoc measures to fulfill intelligence requirements at the mission level. The Middle East truce-monitoring missions (UNEF, UNEF II, and UNDOF) effectively operated with consent of the parties and all were at least moderately successful in containing violence. These missions incorporated overt intelligence collections ranging from on-the-ground patrols to air and technical surveillance. UNFICYP, on the other hand, experienced the dramatic intelligence failures involving surprising large Greek army camps in 1967 and the 1974 coup. Despite these failures, the current calm on Cyprus suggests the mission has been at least partially successful. In the Congo, the UN eventually built a relatively robust intelligence organization which helped end the Katanga rebellion. Future UN missions, especially in the intra-state conflicts of the 1990s, could have learned the value of good intelligence from ONUC, but the UN did not institutionalize any of the Congo mission’s lessons.

The reasons for the UN’s PKO apparatus’ failure to learn are varied. Large states, the permanent five of Security Council, in particular, may fear the loss of their monopoly on information flow to the organization. Because the Security Council was unlikely to act throughout the Cold War, the UN could afford to ignore intelligence at the headquarters in New York and rely on ad hoc measures in the field. This stagnation is evident in the dearth of Cold War peacekeeping missions—just 13 between 1945 and 1988—most of which were designed and operated as observer missions. The complex PKOs of the 1990s demanded more intelligence than the UN could deliver.

139 Dombroski, 94.
140 Diehl, 56.
142 Smith, 174.
C. THE 1990S

The 1990s highlighted the need for intelligence in the UN, and saw the first serious (though unsuccessful) attempts to improve this capability. The end of the Cold War standoff and the unwillingness of the superpowers to maintain proxy forces in the third world allowed the UN (and others) to take on a more assertive role. Encouraged by 1989 success of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which succeeded in helping Namibia transition to independent rule, and inspired by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, many saw UN missions as a panacea for calming post-Cold War violence. UN forces took on more state-building and peace-building roles, moving away from former Secretary General Hammarskjöld’s peacekeeping principles. Somalia (UNOSOM I & II; April 1992-March 1995) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR; February 1992-December 1995) exemplify the UN field experience in the 1990s. The Somalia and Bosnia missions were both conceived as humanitarian intervention missions, justified by the UN as combating “threat[s] to international peace and security.” Both resulted in high UN fatality figures—160 for the UNOSOM mission and 213 in UNPROFOR. These two missions made 1993, 1994, and 1995 three of the five deadliest years in UN peacekeeping history, the other two resulting from Congo operations in 1961 and 2005.

The UN withdrew from Somalia and Bosnia having failed to fulfill its respective mandates. Judged by the criteria of limiting armed conflict and conflict resolution, the UN failed in both countries. These failures overshadowed the UN’s contemporaneous

145 O’Neill and Rees, 175.
moderate successes like Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique. The 1990s also saw the creation of arms control and disarmament missions like the UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM) and the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. During this period the UN attempted to improve its management of peacekeeping missions, including the first attempts to bring an intelligence function to UN headquarters.

UNOSOM and UNPROFOR found the UN embroiled in ongoing conflicts without the means to execute their ambiguous mandates. Fortunately in these instances, the UN commissioned after-action reports in an attempt to capture lessons for the future. Of particular note are the intensely detailed history of the massacre at the UN-designated safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia and the UN’s report on Somalia.

1. Somalia

From 1992 to 1995, the UN ran two operations in Somalia, UNOSOM I and II. The first mission was an ineffective 500-man operation, lasting from April 1992 to March 1993. Because of its ambitious mandate and spectacular failure, most analysis of the UN in Somalia focuses on UNOSOM II, which ran from March 1993 to March 1995. This mission took over for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF, also called Operation Restore Hope) led by the United States. After UNITAF’s withdrawal, the US contributed a 3,000-strong support force to provide logistics for the UN. Other American combat forces—including a Quick Reaction Force battalion and an Intelligence Support Element (ISE) nominally dedicated to UNOSOM—operated outside the UN command structure. UNOSOM II was the first time the UN directly ran a peace enforcement

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150 Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” 2, 18. Rwanda, the other notable UN failure of the 1990s, was due not so much to lack of intelligence as to an inadequate policy response.


153 Diehl, 184.

mission authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter. In contrast to previous PKOs authorized under Chapter VI, which are based on consent of the parties and limit the use of force to self-defense, Chapter VII missions are not consent based, and the peacekeeping force may “all means necessary” to accomplish its mandate. Since a peace enforcement operation is essentially “war by another name,” the intelligence requirements are significantly higher than in a traditional cease-fire monitoring mission.

The UN’s own after action report singled out intelligence issues as a key problem area.

When UNOSOM II deployed in 1993, it did not have a full picture of the situation on the ground. The post-mortem identified the need for better pre-deployment assessments on the nature of the conflict. Further, the UN realized this information was available from academics, non-governmental organizations, and other sources, but that the UN itself had made no attempt to assimilate and analyze any of this data.

The UN did not necessarily trust the U.S. intelligence community in Somalia, partly because of its corporate aversion to military intelligence but also because it wanted to avoid the perception of being Washington’s tool. On the ground though, the UNOSOM II commander had to rely on the imperfect relationship with American intelligence. The UN lacked its own intelligence structure, and so America provided much of the “hard intelligence” the UN used in planning raids on arms caches and other operations. This task was difficult, however, because the American ISE did not trust the UN’s information security. Afraid to compromise its sources to lax UN procedures,
the ISE faced difficulty sharing classified information.\textsuperscript{162} This lack of coordination affected the independent U.S. forces as well; U.S. Army Rangers raided a UN office in July 1993 believing it to be a hideout for Mohammad Aideed.\textsuperscript{163}

UNOSOM II’s state-building mandate caused it to aspire to neutrality at its outset in an attempt to bring all the Somali factions to the negotiating table. Faced with obstruction just two months into the process, the UN declared Mohammad Aideed and his militia as a target in June 1993, costing the UN force any pretense of neutrality.\textsuperscript{164} Now effectively a belligerent in the conflict, the UN could not use impartiality as a reason not to pursue an independent intelligence strategy.\textsuperscript{165} UNOSOM II undertook some intelligence activities; including paying for information,\textsuperscript{166} but there is no data to assess the efficacy of this collection effort. The UN found that it needed to enter peace enforcement missions with a plan for collecting and analyzing intelligence.\textsuperscript{167} Though UNOSOM II “was an object lesson in UN inadequacies,”\textsuperscript{168} evidence from the 1999 Congo mission (detailed in Chapter III) shows that the UN did not internalize this lesson. At the same time, the UN also failed to learn from the disastrous UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.

2. Bosnia

The UN began its UNPROFOR mission in February 1992 with a humanitarian mandate in Croatia. The Security Council quickly expanded the mission to Bosnia, and by 1993 assigned UNPROFOR the task of protecting designated “safe areas” from hostilities.\textsuperscript{169} While the UN found some success in providing aid to needy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy: Intervention in Somalia,” 335.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Smith, 178.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy: Intervention in Somalia,” 342.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Anderson, 270.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 430.
\item \textsuperscript{167} United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Comprehensive Report on UNOSOM,” 19.
\item \textsuperscript{168} O’Neill and Rees, 134.
\item \textsuperscript{169} William J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Durch, \textit{UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s}, 230.
\end{itemize}
communities,\textsuperscript{170} it failed in its mission to shield these zones from violence—up to 20,000 civilians, mostly Bosnian Muslim, died “in and around the safe areas.”\textsuperscript{171} In July 1995 at the “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb Army held 48 Dutch UNPROFOR peacekeepers hostage while it “terrorized” the 30,000 Bosnian Muslim residents.\textsuperscript{172} Bosnian Serbs killed between 6,000 and 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys.\textsuperscript{173} The Dutch Battalion (Dutchbat) knew the Bosnian Serbs surrounded the safe area, but lacked good intelligence on Serb objectives. In fact, military intelligence was “an endemic weakness throughout the conflict.”\textsuperscript{174} There was no established mechanism for NATO or other UN member states to deliver intelligence to UN headquarters or UNPROFOR, let alone to field units. If any of these producers had information on an impending Bosnian Serb attack, it did not reach the UN.\textsuperscript{175} The Secretary-General identified this procedural failing, along with the lack of a UN intelligence capability, as a “major operational constraint.”\textsuperscript{176}

The UN leadership knew intelligence was an issue even before Srebrenica,\textsuperscript{177} but took no significant steps to rectify the situation. Battalions in the field were on their own. Some UNPROFOR troop contributing countries took basic intelligence gathering into their own hands, without UN authorization.\textsuperscript{178} The extent of Dutch intelligence


\textsuperscript{173} Richard H. Curtiss, “Bosnia Ten Years Later,” \textit{The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs} 24, no. 7 (September/October 2005): 44. Curtiss says 6,000-7,000 were killed. Other estimates range from 7,500 to 8,000. See Haroon Ashraf, “Srebrenica Tragedy Forces Dutch Government to Resign,” \textit{The Lancet} 359, no. 9315:1409. The official UN report on Srebrenica declines to state the total, though when it was published in 1999 it acknowledged 2,500 bodies had been found, and thousands of men and boys were still missing. See United Nations, “The Fall of Srebrenica,” 102.


\textsuperscript{175} Janssen, 62.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 119.


\textsuperscript{178} A. Walter Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret,” 429.
collection effort is not documented; what is certain is that Dutchbat and the UN did not realize the full extent of Bosnian Serb intentions regarding the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.\textsuperscript{179}

Srebrenica is but one manifestation of intelligence failure in Bosnia, and was symptomatic of larger issues. The UNPROFOR headquarters and structure also bears some of the blame for deficiencies in information flow, military intelligence, and command and control. News of the initial Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica did not arrive at UN Headquarters until the next day, and Dutchbat requests for immediate reinforcement did not reach the UN’s Balkan headquarters in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{180} Key UN leaders did not know about the gravity of the situation until three days after the attack began.\textsuperscript{181} This communication breakdown prevented mere consideration of solutions, though given the UN’s lackluster response, a timely communication system may not have helped defuse the situation. Even perfect intelligence cannot guarantee an appropriate policy or military response.

As in Somalia, the UN in Bosnia faced a task it was not equipped to handle. At its largest troop level in November 1995, UNPROFOR had only 23,630 “blue helmet” peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{182} It is telling that the follow-on NATO Implementation Force had over 60,000 heavily armed troops\textsuperscript{183} with more robust rules of engagement and full integration into the NATO command, control, and intelligence structures.\textsuperscript{184}

\section*{3. \textbf{Other 1990s Operations}}

In Angola, the UN carried out a series of three verification and one observation mission (UNAVEM I, II, III, and MONUA—the United Nations Observer Mission in

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    \item \textsuperscript{179} United Nations, “The Fall of Srebrenica,” 86, 106.
    \item \textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 58-59.
    \item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 61.
    \item \textsuperscript{182} Durch and Schear, 239.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushright}
Angola) from January 1989-February 1999 intended to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country and to assist in post-civil war demobilization and disarmament efforts. While UNAVEM I succeeded in facilitating the Cubans’ departure, ultimately the country fell back into violence. UNAVEM II and III and MONUA had to cover too much territory with their limited resources—initially “just 450 military observers for an area the size of Germany, France and Spain put together.” Lack of an intelligence capability kept the mission from focusing its limited resources, precluding arms cache discovery. To be fair, these missions were designed to oversee internal implementation of peace agreements, not to direct a comprehensive disarmament effort—“UNAVEM’s role was therefore to ensure that … the other monitoring groups did their job.” Conversely, since the missions were not designed to be omnipresent throughout the country, they needed intelligence all the more to direct their efforts.

A more intense and intrusive UN intelligence collection effort—the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)—focused on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction disarmament in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Though not a peacekeeping mission, it was the most intrusive information gathering operation in UN history. UNSCOM’s mandate allowed it to interrogate Iraqi officials, perform intrusive, unannounced site inspections, and use its own aircraft to patrol anywhere in the country. The mission incorporated personal on-site inspections with high-tech collection including signals intelligence, and electronic surveillance. UNSCOM also enjoyed a close working relationship with U.S. and British intelligence. It was the first instance of the UN assuming operational control over

185 Diehl, 150.
188 Ibid., 162.
an American U-2 high altitude spy plane. The UN used this intelligence to find potential weapons sites. In addition, many of the technical weapon systems experts came from western countries. This politically disadvantaged the mission, as some smaller states resented the dependence. Allegations of Central Intelligence Agency infiltration of UNSCOM did not help the UN cause, nor did data sharing with Israel. Though UN field missions need an intelligence capability, they must be careful to conduct their collection operations aboveboard.

4. Reform Attempts

The UN began to adapt its structure to the changing reality of peacekeeping in the 1990s. In 1991, only a couple of dozen staff officers at UN headquarters focused on peacekeeping; later in the 1990s this grew to approximately 50. The UN did not have a permanent organization for administering PKOs until the 1992 creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Kofi Annan became the first head Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, a role he filled until he became Secretary General in 1997. The new DPKO was not capable of providing real-time command and control to the various missions, since UN Headquarters was in communication with the field only Monday to Friday, between 9 am and 5 pm New York time. This

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192 Durch, “Running the Show: Planning and Implementation,” 69.
194 Fabri, 156.
196 Durch, “Running the Show: Planning and Implementation,” 60.
197 O’Neill and Rees 193.
200 Smith, 179.
deficiency was somewhat rectified in 1993 with the establishment of a 24-hour “Situation Centre.” With only two people on duty at any given time, the “SitCen” was not completely effective.201

That the SitCen continues to exist today is tacit acknowledgement of the importance of information flow. The UN still does not task the Centre with actual intelligence production.202 Despite an “information gathering” mission, the SitCen has no analysis function, though it does monitor the media and attempts to track activity in UN missions around the world. Information gathering, as described on the SitCen website, is more akin to collating media reports.203 However necessary this may be, it cannot be said to equal intelligence production.

After the failures in Somalia and Bosnia, member states recognized the need to improve UN management of peacekeeping operations. Several countries seconded military officers to DPKO in an effort to set up a professional PKO staff. By 1997, 111 "gratis" officers worked at DPKO; their home countries continued to pay their salaries.204 Seconded officers from France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States formed an “Information and Research Unit” (I&R) with ties back to their home intelligence communities.205 For instance, the U.S. officer was on loan from the Defense Intelligence Agency; Washington used this officer as a conduit for delivering “sanitized” intelligence to the UN. Although I&R was not an independent UN analysis arm, the officers counterbalanced each others’ national biases in their assessments.206

201 Smith, 178.
204 Robert L. McClure and Morton Orlov II, “Is the UN Peacekeeping Role in Eclipse?” Parameters 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 100.
205 A. Walter Dorn, “Intelligence at UN Headquarters? The Information and Research Unit and the Intervention in Eastern Zaire 1996,” Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (September 2005): 444.
206 Ibid., 446.
Although UN officials such as then-Undersecretary General Kofi Annan valued I&R reporting,\textsuperscript{207} the developing countries of the Non-alignment Movement resented the preponderance of rich-country officers on the staff. In June 1997, these states began to push for the removal of the gratis officers. In September 1997, General Assembly Resolution 51/243 called for replacement of these officers with an international civilian staff.\textsuperscript{208} Such an arrangement would guarantee decreased western participation, since geographic quotas regulate the international civilian bureaucracy. A series of political compromises followed. The net result was the February 1999 elimination of the final gratis officer positions. Despite the loss of these 111 officers, the UN had no plan to replace their expertise. This set DPKO back several years.\textsuperscript{209}

D. CONCLUSION

Just as UN peacekeeping operations began as an ad hoc measure, so too did its intelligence capability. Field mission commanders quickly realized that they needed military intelligence to execute their mandates, and in fact the early PKOs (with the notable exception of ONUC) were essentially large intelligence-gathering operations. The overt nature of truce supervision backed by the consent of all parties enabled the UN to pursue its goals without institutionalizing intelligence practices. When the UN found itself fighting a war in the Congo, the organization was unprepared. Ad hoc measures within the mission contributed to the end of the Katanga rebellion. Unfortunately the UN did not learn from this experience, nor did it institutionalize its fledgling intelligence capabilities.

The end of the Cold War allowed the UN Security Council to build a consensus for intervention.\textsuperscript{210} The intrastate conflicts of the 1990s pulled UN peacekeepers into a chaotic environment more akin to situation facing ONUC in the Congo than the traditional PKOs on which the organization had built its reputation. Operational failures

\textsuperscript{207} Dorn, “Intelligence at UN Headquarters,” 457.
\textsuperscript{208} McClure and Orlov, 100.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 103.
in Bosnia and Somalia forced the UN to relearn the lessons of the Congo. New York began to learn from the field, and attempted to professionalize the management of PKOs, including development of a small analysis cell. Politics proved to be the undoing of its existence and the smaller states eliminated the embryonic institutional intelligence capacity at the headquarters.

Twentieth century PKOs set many precedents for UN use of intelligence at the headquarters and in the field. Unfortunately, the organization found itself relearning the same lessons with each operation. In the 1990s, the UN did not adapt its intelligence practices to meet the demands of complex peacekeeping, allowing missions to fail. Faced with this reality, a 2000 UN-commissioned study called for improvements to intelligence; operations since 9/11 have highlighted the need for continued attention in this area.
III. THE BRAHIMI REPORT AND BEYOND

A. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations emerged from the 1990s with its nose bloodied from failed interventions in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda, along with less-than-stellar records in Angola and Haiti. In 1999, the UN found itself entering complex missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN peace operations in the 1990s “repeatedly failed to meet the challenge” of preventing war and bringing peace.

To address the UN’s systemic post-Cold War failures, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi to chair a panel to review UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). After months of study, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, was issued on August 21, 2000 and quickly became known as the Brahimi Report. The significance of the report bears reiteration of its key findings. Notably, Foreign Minister Brahimi and his panel recommended improvements to UN intelligence at the tactical, operation, and strategic levels. The report recognizes that operationally and tactically, enhanced intelligence advances ceasefire monitoring, peace enforcement, and force protection. To support strategic decision-making, the panel recommended creating the EISAS (Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategy Analysis Secretariat) organization. Even though EISAS failed for political reasons, the report has proved influential. UN operations since the Brahimi Report’s publication have made some improvements to their intelligence functions, but not without experiencing significant growing pains.

213 Ibid., x.
214 Ibid., xi.
215 Lilland, 8.
B. POST-BRAHIMI REPORT FAILURES

While the UN did not fully embrace the Brahimi Report’s recommendations, field experience continued to highlight the need for improved intelligence in the UN system. A full case study of the 18 ongoing UN operations is beyond the scope of this study, but the UN created the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU)\(^{216}\) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the aftermath of the Brahimi report to fuse lessons learned and policy analysis.\(^{217}\) Since its founding in 2001, PBPU has performed studies and commissioned outside institutions to develop analyses of missions and procedures. Only a few missions have received in-depth treatment from PBPU on their military components and specifically the role of intelligence, but these studies show that the problem of insufficient intelligence continues to plague UN missions.\(^{218}\) Several examples from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels will suffice to demonstrate the point.

Politically, the run-up to the Iraq war highlighted the UN’s reliance on member state-provided intelligence. The United States shared intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction program. From the UN point of view, the issue is not so much that the United States chose to share intelligence, but that it shared intelligence to pursue a national objective rather than for the general advancement of the UN.\(^{219}\) The 1990s-vintage Intelligence and Research Unit, described in Chapter II, showed that the UN could produce relatively unbiased reports for the UN leadership. Though not perfect, a revitalized UN analysis capability could free the organization (to some degree) from national agendas.\(^{220}\) Despite Foreign Minister Brahimi’s push for EISAS, member states have so far rejected this solution.

\(^{216}\) Sometimes noted as Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) in the literature.


\(^{218}\) Challenges Project, 35.


\(^{220}\) Chesterman, 157.
Strategic pre-deployment briefings for peacekeeping missions’ senior leadership are weak. They tend to focus on administrative and bureaucratic matters to the detriment of information about the history, culture, and context of the conflict. Lessons learned reports from the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000-present) and the UN Mission to Burundi (ONUB, 2004-2006) both highlighted this point. Although the Brahimi report identified the importance of pre-deployment briefings, this lesson was not fully institutionalized prior to ONUB’s 2004 deployment, four years after the Brahimi Report’s publication. Only two missions have deployed since ONUB; no information on their pre-deployment briefings was available.

A strategic intelligence failure was manifest in ONUB. The inability of the mission to turn raw data into political intelligence prevented the UN from forecasting election results. The operation suffered following the later 2005 inauguration of the new government. Though better intelligence could not have changed the election results, it could have allowed the mission to better prepare itself for dealing with a hostile host government.

UNMEE deployed shortly after the Brahimi Report’s release. PBPU made public a 2003 lessons learned report and a 2004 follow-up document. UNMEE, the first operational test of Brahimi’s recommendations succeeded in some regards, notably in humanitarian Quick Impact Projects, but improved intelligence was nowhere to be found. In the words of Dutch Major General Patrick Cammaert, the first UNMEE Force

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223 The two missions are the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005 and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste in August 2006.

224 Jackson, 22.

225 Ibid., 22-23.

226 Ibid., 24.

Commander, “We were blind in UNMEE.” 228 UNMEE lacked adequate intelligence on Ethiopian and Eritrean front lines and troop deployments; the lessons learned report states that UN headquarters should have given this information to the mission during the start-up phase. 229

UNMEE peacekeepers did not have the maps they needed to get around the area of operations. The Netherlands-Canada battalion (NECBAT) created its own maps and the other contingents had to rely on their own resources. 230 The author, an UNMEE military observer in 2001, recalls using a borrowed copy of the NECBAT map along with 1940s-vintage Russian maps, neither of which were wholly adequate for patrol planning or military analysis. Fortunately for peacekeepers on the ground, the UN took this lesson to heart. Geographic information cells were included in the 2004 startup of missions to Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti. 231

In a peace operation, every peacekeeper is a potential intelligence collector. 232 With easy access to the conflict area and extensive interaction with the local population, peacekeepers are well positioned to gather intelligence about troop movements and cross-border or inter-group incidents. Unfortunately there is no guidance from the UN to troop contributing countries (TCCs) on how to conduct investigations. In UNMEE, this resulted in several incidents not receiving satisfactory resolution. 233 In response to this finding, in 2004, Force Commander, British Major General Robert Gordon, issued guidance on investigations. 234 The lack of regulation or direction from UN headquarters

228 Patrick Cammaert, interview by author, February 6, 2007 at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Maj Gen Cammaert commanded UN forces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from February 2005 until his retirement in February 2007, and previously served as Military Advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and as Force Commander for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. He has been a leading proponent of increasing the UN’s intelligence capability.


230 Ibid.


suggests that there is room for development of standardized doctrine. In fact, PBPU commissioned a scoping project on peace operations doctrine in early 2006.\textsuperscript{235}

UNMEE faced difficulty tracking the movement of illegal weapons into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) between Eritrea and Ethiopia. There was no baseline information on the legal deployments of police, militia, and their weapons, so there was no way for peacekeepers to measure changes.\textsuperscript{236} Part of the solution is the political matter of establishing a mechanism for weapon registration during the peace process. With the baseline determined, in-mission intelligence can track these weapons. When peacekeepers inventory a cache, they can then determine if these stockpiles are legitimately registered. Weapons found in rebel hands can be cross-referenced to the baseline to determine if they came from declared stocks; this may point to the weapons’ origin. Peacekeepers can declare unregistered weapons illegitimate and seize them.

A dearth of intelligence on small arms and light weapons (SALW) also hinders the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process many peace operations undertake.\textsuperscript{237} Joanna Spear, a political scientist, explicitly blames the UN’s lack of intelligence and analysis for the failure of many DDR operations: “UN-led missions are crippled from the start in their attempts to robustly confront cheating.”\textsuperscript{238} For example, as part of its 2004 DDR program, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had collected only about one gun for every four militia members.\textsuperscript{239} Clearly this is inadequate for success. Improved intelligence would allow focused targeting of the

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missing arms, either through direct military action or increased incentives for particular types of weaponry. Further, improved SALW intelligence would help determine if new arms were arriving in the conflict area.

MONUC—the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—reinforces this point. Major General Cammaert commanded the 15,000 UN peacekeepers in Eastern DRC from February 2005 through February 2007. He said the many militias in the region, coupled with a flow of weapons from Uganda and Rwanda, proved difficult to track. Though the UN asked MONUC TCCs to provide intelligence resources, no country volunteered. The UN bureaucracy thwarted his attempt to contract for aerial reconnaissance since the companies with the requisite capability were not on the UN’s contracting list.240 Overall, the UN system has not institutionalized its intelligence practices, despite some improvements.

In a world of transnational terrorism, force protection intelligence is an absolute necessity. The UN sought to improve its security measures in the wake of the August 2003 attack in Baghdad which killed the UN’s chief representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello.241 The attack, just nine days after the Security Council had established the UN’s presence in Iraq, also killed 14 other people, and injured dozens more.242 Following the bombing, the UN withdrew its personnel from Iraq; they slowly returned with increased security beginning in April 2004.243 Despite this renewed emphasis on UN force protection, the threat has not gone away. In June 2007, a terrorist bomb targeted a UN patrol, killing six peacekeepers in Lebanon.244 The UN’s post-attack rhetoric has

240 Cammaert interview.
241 Ibid.
demonstrated resolve, but resources must follow to counter the undiminished threat. Improving force protection is a vital, but difficult, task. Potential TCCs must know the UN will safeguard their troops.

C. POST-BRAHIMI REPORT SUCCESSES

Denied a formal intelligence analysis capability, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) built up informal contacts with member state militaries. In some cases, the UN formalized this connection effort—for instance, the organization created a liaison officer post at NATO headquarters. In most cases, however, intelligence innovation is an ad hoc process within each mission.

In May 2003, the UN authorized an International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF—not a UN blue helmet operation) to complement MONUC’s efforts at humanitarian security in Eastern DRC. France was the lead nation for IEMF and provided signals intelligence and imagery intelligence, along with special operations forces for reconnaissance. A PBPU after-action report on IEMF concluded that this intelligence was critical to the IEMF’s success. Although the IEMF deployment lasted only three months, MONUC was able to apply some of the intelligence lessons learned from the short mission.

Subsequently, MONUC increased its own intelligence efforts. The UN Security Council, in a series of resolutions, expanded the number of authorized peacekeepers from 8,700 in December 2002 to over 16,000 by December 2006. The obvious benefit was to increase the number of UN eyes on the ground. As part of this increase, MONUC

246 Chesterman, 155.
248 Ibid., 14.
gained a Guatemalan special operations company—the first deployment of special forces with the UN. These troops perform reconnaissance and counter-smuggling missions.250

Maj Gen Cammaert also had some success in developing sources and informants among the local population. In his characterization, the Congolese are willing to provide information for a fee. The UN system is not set up to handle this sort of expense, so he took “creative measures,” using existing UN protocols for hiring local staff to build up his information gathering capability. The mission’s civilian financial bureaucracy resisted his initiative at first, but ultimately found a way to accommodate it.251

In addition to this human intelligence capability, MONUC has employed a small signals intelligence and imagery capability donated by member states like The Netherlands.252 This intelligence network has improved MONUC’s ability in the field, but politics will probably prevent it from becoming institutionalized in the wider system. Despite the ad hoc nature of tactical intelligence, the UN has made a significant stride forward in its information analysis capability at the mission level, and is working to standardize the practice throughout its field operations.

This innovation is the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC). As the Military Advisor to the Secretary General, Maj Gen Cammaert pushed the idea of a JMAC “as a central location for information to be received, analyzed, evaluated, and appropriately disseminated.”253 JMACs report to a mission’s top leader, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and provide the SRSG with consolidated political and military reporting.

In late 2003, the UN’s *Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* briefly described the JMAC’s purpose: “The JMAC is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force

250 Cammaert interview.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid., also Chesterman, 157.
commander’s decision-making process.” The handbook did not provide any further details on composition or procedures, leaving implementation to the individual missions.

The UN started to form JMACs by 2005, with trial versions underway in ONUB (Burundi) and MONUC. Because JMACs report to civilian SRSGs, civilian analysts lead them, although they may have a substantial military component. Thus, the JMAC is not a military intelligence cell, but instead integrates the full spectrum of information.

JMAC tasks, as outlined in a UN policy document, are shown in Figure 3.

| a. | Provide relevant and timely analysis to the SRSG, Senior Management Group and heads of office, components and agencies within a mission to allow informed decision-making. |
| b. | In conjunction with a SIOC [security information and operations cell], monitor and provide early warning of developments of threats. |
| c. | Establish a focal point for all information |
| d. | Collect information and create a database to ensure continuity. |
| e. | Provide short term and longer term assessments of events and developments in response to tasking and requests from the SRSG and other mission components. |
| f. | Provide input into threat and risk analysis and advice on the mitigation of risk in close coordination with the security component. |
| g. | Produce integrated written and verbal evaluations and distribute these as appropriate. |
| h. | Liaise with neighbouring missions to ensure the coordination and sharing of relevant information. |
| i. | Coordinate meetings and working groups to encourage the input of information of all mission components, offices, agencies and programmes to ensure a comprehensive security assessment as possible. |
| j. | Integrate specific threat estimates and analysis produced by the SIOC. |

Figure 3. JMAC Tasks

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255 Peace Dividend Trust, 15.

These JMAC tasks deserve explanation. The UN JMAC policy paper recognized that “intelligence capability is a priority for effectiveness of UN missions.”257 This directly addresses the Brahimi report recommendation that fielded forces receive an intelligence capability. The JMAC, however, is specifically designed not to be a military intelligence cell.258 Although it works in conjunction with the peacekeeping force’s Joint Operations Center, it has an independent voice.

Importantly, the JMAC will develop priority information requirements that drive reporting and analysis throughout the mission.259 This includes both the military force and civilian UN entities such as the civilian police and human rights organizations. The JMAC collates and evaluates all this information to build its assessments for the SRSG. The UN’s depiction of this information flow is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. JMAC Information Flow.260

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The JMAC is designed to be flexible, and may change over time. For instance, civilian police representatives may be absent at the outset of a mission but be integrated later. Conversely, the Humanitarian Assistance portion of a mission may be phased out as the situation becomes more stable and refugees return to their homes. This flexibility also extends to the JMAC’s functions. The SRSG can tailor the JMAC to suit local conditions. For example, the ONUB SRSG has added a requirement for daily reporting to the standard UN list.  

The ONUB case is instructive because it was one of the first missions to create a JMAC. The mission’s lessons learned report found JMAC implementation to be problematic. The UN faced difficulty filling key JMAC positions; the ONUB JMAC was generally under strength. Direct commentary on the MONUC JMAC was unavailable, though the 2006-2007 MONUC budget document may be instructive. While the MONUC JMAC began operations in 2005, the budget report speaks of the JMAC in a future tense: “The JMAC would be headed by a Senior Information Analyst… would be assisted by two Information Analysts.” This implies some key positions had either not been budgeted for at startup or had not yet been filled.

Despite these difficulties, by early in 2006 JMACs were at work in six missions: MONUC and ONUB, along with Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), and Haiti (MINUSTAH). These cells varied in size from two to 12 personnel, depending on mission requirements. Within a year, the missions in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Lebanon (UNIFIL), and East Timor (UNMIT) established

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262 Jackson, 22.


their own JMACs.266 The MINURSO report particularly lauds the JMAC: “Through its subsidiary units—the information collection cell and the information analysis cell—the joint mission analysis cell manages the collection, storage and analysis of data on issues of relevance to the implementation of the mandate of MINURSO. The joint mission analysis cell has thus gradually developed into an effective instrument for the strategic management and decision-making of MINURSO.”267

Still early in its development, the JMAC concept offers promise for the future. In an enlightened turn of a phrase, the UN actually acknowledged the real purpose of the JMACs: “the joint mission analysis cell will be responsible for intelligence analysis.”268 Finally, the UN has learned that “intelligence” is essential, not anathema to its mission. Underscoring the institutionalization of intelligence at the mission level, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in February 2007 proposed including a JMAC in any potential UN mission to Chad and the Central African Republic.269

D. POST-BRAHIMI LESSONS LEARNED

The UN has only slowly institutionalized intelligence. The JMAC concept shows potential, at least for analysis work within a mission, but is not without its problems. ONUB demonstrated the difficulty of filling JMAC civilian leadership positions.270 In practice, military staff will probably dominate the JMAC at its establishment due to the availability of military manpower.271 Ultimately, the JMAC must fall under civilian

266 Based on searches of UN documents: For MINURSO: S/2006/249; UNIFIL A/61/588; UNMIT A/61/519.


270 Jackson, 22.

271 Peace Dividend Trust, 15.
control to properly fulfill its political-military analysis function.\textsuperscript{272} This calls for establishment of a robust doctrine to guide the establishment and standard operating procedures of an intelligence cell. Well-developed processes would help keep the cell focused on its overarching mission even if most of the manpower came from the mission’s military component.

In contrast to the improving mission-level JMAC intelligence function, UN strategic political analysis has long been deficient. The missions need detailed operational and tactical intelligence to carry out their mandates, while the Security Council needs wide-ranging political and strategic intelligence to design appropriate missions. Resource shortfalls brought on by inappropriately designed mandates can lead to disaster.

The Rwanda experience in particular demonstrated the need for a strong mandate to prevent mission failure. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) had intelligence about the impending genocide and even provided a warning to UN headquarters.\textsuperscript{273} UN headquarters dismissed the warning and insisted that disarming the \textit{interhamwe} militia was beyond the mission’s mandate.\textsuperscript{274} Appropriate intelligence during the mission design phase—prior to UNAMIR’s initial deployment—could have resulted in a stronger mandate from the outset, empowering the mission to take action against the \textit{interhamwe}. \textsuperscript{275} This information was available and either ignored or overlooked—the Rwandan media was a key player in raising tensions.\textsuperscript{276} If the UN had been listening to the radio before sending in the troops, the mission might have been designed to counter the threat of genocide. Though the Brahimi Report was in part a

\textsuperscript{272} Peace Dividend Trust, 15.


\textsuperscript{275} Cammaert, “Conceptual, Organizational and Operational Issues,” 3.

reaction to UNAMIR’s failure, this key fault still needs attention; Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), as described in the next chapter, can fill the void.

The UN does not have procedures for its headquarters-level intelligence function nor does it possess an institutionalized capacity to evaluate information. As Graham and Kiras put it, “Information is continually flowing into UN Headquarters … It is the refining and analysis of such information that the UN lacks.” 277 The Brahimi report’s recommendation for the EISAS analytical organization, though ignored, attempted to address this problem, and the ongoing JMAC effort does little to fix the problems at UN headquarters. A strategic intelligence doctrine and the capability to acquire and analyze OSINT could help the UN improve in this area.

Due to the wide range of UN activities, a potential intelligence capability would likely need to extend beyond the political realm. To counter UNMEE’s issues of deploying troops “in the blind,” 278 a new mission needs a solid baseline military order of battle. Since the mission needs this information in the planning stage, a JMAC is not capable of creating this product—the JMAC has not been formed at this phase. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) intelligence complements the overall military order of battle. Recall how a lack of SALW information hindered the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs in UNMIL and MONUC. The mission and UN headquarters could share responsibility for SALW information. Headquarters would provide the mission with a baseline of SALW data; the mission should keep it updated with new intelligence. As Chapter IV shows, solutions to these problems are available without reliance on member state intelligence organizations.

Hand-in-hand with the need for order of battle intelligence goes the requirement for up-to-date maps of the mission area. The UN partially addressed this deficiency with the establishment of geographic information cells in UNOCI and MINUSTAH from the start-up phase. 279 The UN could explore further institutionalization of this practice as the


278 Cammaert interview.

organization’s peacekeeping doctrine develops. Commercially available imagery—an open source—can aid in map building and also have a further utility in military order of battle construction.

Previous attempts at intelligence reform failed in large part due to political conflict. The UN will likely face difficulty developing an intelligence doctrine or structure without taking into account the politicized nature of the institution. Before the Brahimi Report, a small “Information and Research Unit” staffed by officers seconded from member states performed an intelligence-like function. As explained in Chapter II, this branch disappeared when a 1999 UN General Assembly resolution sent the officers home without a plan to replace their expertise. Similarly, Chesterman describes how the Brahimi Report’s EISAS also failed because member states, fearing violations of their sovereignty, did not want their internal affairs to be the focus of a UN collection effort.

The successful institutionalization of JMACs is due in part to the proven need for operational intelligence, and also an acceptance on the part of member states that a mission-level JMAC does not threaten sovereignty. JMAC operations focus on the mission area, and begin only after the mission is in place. This gives the JMAC legitimacy within its area of operations and also limits its efforts to an authorized mission. This means that other states need not fear a JMAC “spying” on them—the JMAC’s role is constrained. The sovereignty question is the key obstacle to overcome in the quest to improve the overall ability of the UN to perform intelligence functions in support of peace operations. Furthermore, a demonstrably strengthened intelligence capability may make it easier for the UN to obtain troop contributions. Intelligence provides the underpinnings of force protection, which is a key factor in military deployment decisions, especially among casualty-averse Western states. As governments

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280 Chesteman, 153.
282 Chesteman, 154.
become more convinced that the UN can protect their citizens in the field, they will be more likely, all else being equal, to volunteer battalions for peace keeping duty.

E. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

An important first step in the institutionalization of peace operation intelligence is the formalization of procedures through establishment of some form of doctrine. The UN’s JMAC policy paper is a potential part of intelligence doctrine, but it is limited in scope. Currently, the UN lacks a formal definition of the roles, missions, and processes it would expect from any UN intelligence organization. That is, there is no existing UN intelligence doctrine. A peacekeeping intelligence conference at Carleton University in Ottawa addressed this issue in 2003. One panel developed four elements that should be included in any UN intelligence doctrine: ethics; accountability; disarmament and post-conflict security; and resources and training.

Regarding the ethical questions surrounding intelligence, the panel came to the consensus that the UN must establish that intelligence does not equate to spying. Instead, the panel felt intelligence should be portrayed as a tool to protect peacekeepers, non-governmental organizations, and civilians from attack and to fulfill humanitarian mandates; most of the information is available openly in any case. Viewed in this context, UN intelligence can be seen as a positive good rather than a necessary evil.

The second doctrinal issue is accountability. The conference panel concluded that ideally, a potential UN doctrine would allow for the conduct of an investigation in the event a mission fails due to faulty intelligence. At the same conference, Peter Kasurak said that UN doctrine must specify a chain of responsibility so that intelligence failures

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284 Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 28.
do not go unanswered. Accountability could apply at the strategic and mission level. The panel held that a UN intelligence doctrine must include a requirement to tell the organization what it “needs to hear and needs to know” to ensure the mission has the right mandate and strength. If poor intelligence led to a faulty mandate or insufficient resource allocation, the organization that provided the intelligence could be held accountable. At the mission level, the JMAC could be doctrinally accountable if a tactical intelligence failure led to operational failure.

The demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process and post-conflict security also deserve mention in an intelligence doctrine. As the peace operation yields to a civilian administration and police force, the panel said that the peacekeepers must be doctrinally directed to provide small arms and light weapons information to the new authorities. Such intelligence sharing is an argument against the secrecy and restrictive protocols associated with traditional intelligence. The panel believed that poor sharing and a poor handoff to civil authorities would increase the risk of the conflict backsliding into violence. Regarding intelligence sharing, the conference panel also noted that NATO could offer an example for the UN. They did not, however, mention the NATO OSINT model this thesis describes in Chapter IV.

The final doctrinal issue raised by the panel is resources and training. According to the panel, UN doctrine should ensure that intelligence is planned into missions from the earliest stages. This is an effort to provide sufficient resources for the mission’s intelligence functions from an operation’s inception. In addition to setting up an intelligence structure, the personnel who will do the actual collection, information fusion, and dissemination should have appropriate training for their tasks. A presentation by

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286 Ibid. This echoes the Brahimi Report’s caution that “The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates.” See United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” x, 12 and 54.

287 Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 28.

288 Ibid., 18.

289 Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 29.
Robert Heibel at the conference said that UN intelligence training would range from basic computer skills to more refined analytic methods.290

More than two years after the Ottawa conference, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) commissioned a scoping study focused on mission start-up issues.291 The resulting study by the Peace Dividend Trust reviewed the existing, scattered guidance and found a lack of standardization and specificity. With regard to intelligence, the study confirmed existing problems with political analysis.292 Because the study’s purpose was to describe the scope of the problem, it did not offer any prescriptions to fix peace operation intelligence.

DPKO in conjunction with the Challenges Project undertook to develop an overarching doctrine for peacekeeping operations. In September 2006, a draft of their capstone document appeared on the Challenges Project web site. This high-level doctrine document incorporated the JMAC concept, stating a requirement that all peacekeeping missions include JMACs.293 Though it is impossible to determine a causal relationship, this inclusion satisfied the 2003 conference’s call for institutionalizing intelligence functions in all missions at the outset. Since JMACs are inherently multi-disciplinary, encompassing military, civilian, and police functions, the capstone doctrine also allows for a clean handover of information to a post-operation civilian authority. The draft was not specific about JMAC design. This allows the mission needed flexibility, but more guidance is necessary. DPKO partially filled the vacuum with its DPKO policy paper, described earlier in this thesis. Since UN peacekeeping doctrine is still in draft form, many changes may still be made before the document is made official.

291 Peace Dividend Trust, 4.
292 Peace Dividend Trust, 10-11.
293 Challenges Project, 35.
As the UN refines its intelligence processes, it is essentially developing an open-source intelligence (OSINT) capability focused on peace operations. According to operators such as Maj Gen Cammaert and academics like Chesterman and others, open sources can meet most of the UN’s intelligence requirements.\(^{294}\) OSINT can provide much of the historical, cultural, infrastructure, geographical, and political information necessary for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations.\(^{295}\) The following chapter provides a brief introduction to OSINT and outlines the OSINT system developed in NATO doctrine.


\(^{295}\) Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 21.
IV. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND THE NATO MODEL

A. INTRODUCTION

Possible low-cost solutions to the United Nations intelligence challenge already exist. Since Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) can provide historical, cultural, infrastructure, geographical, and political information necessary for military operations, and is ready made for sharing, it can be explored as a possible UN capability.\(^{296}\) OSINT is by definition unclassified and fully sharable with all troop contributing countries and non-governmental organizations. While a modern, high-tech military operation will require more than OSINT can deliver, perhaps 80 percent of all information on any given problem is available from open sources, and at relatively low cost.\(^{297}\) The UN could realize great gains from borrowing an available model for OSINT collection, analysis, and dissemination.

Another international security institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), faced similar intelligence sharing issues during its post-Cold War complex peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions of the 1990s. Like the UN, NATO does not control its own intelligence assets and relies on member state intelligence contributions.\(^{298}\) As part of its response to meeting the challenge of timely and accurate information sharing, NATO developed a series of publications in 2001 and 2002 outlining its end-to-end OSINT process and guidance for the establishment of standing OSINT analysis cells.


\(^{297}\) Ibid., 9.

B. INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN NATO

This section presents empirical data on existing intelligence structures in NATO. The parallels between NATO and the UN are evident, though NATO’s problems in this realm are magnified in the UN. While member states in both organizations have long recognized the issue of intelligence sharing, progress over the years has been slow. In a dynamic world threatened by transnational terrorism and ethnic conflict, intelligence sharing will only increase in importance.

NATO began to institutionalize its intelligence sharing methods in the 1950s, as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) grew during the early Cold War. SHAPE coordinated the member states’ military planning efforts, which required sharing of at least some intelligence data. According to the official 2006 NATO Handbook, NATO strategic intelligence work is divided between SHAPE in Belgium and the Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia.

Since most of Europe’s (and North America’s) intelligence capability is centralized at the state level, NATO member states had to leverage their existing relationships with other states to obtain and share intelligence. The degree of NATO intelligence integration is less than the bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing relationships some individual states have established. For instance, the link between the United States and British intelligence communities is much stronger than NATO’s intelligence sharing arrangement. Faced primarily with the static threat of the USSR, for more than 40 years, NATO’s intelligence sharing proved adequate, if not prescient. The 1980s and 1990s emergence of the transnational terrorism threat provided an impetus for enhanced intelligence sharing within NATO, and the North Atlantic Council agreed to

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improve information exchange. As a result, intelligence cooperation has been somewhat closer, especially since 9/11, but only to a degree; in reality, significant problems still exist.

NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement spotlights some of the intelligence sharing difficulties that have always existed. NATO grew from 16 to 19 countries in 1999, and added seven more members in 2004. Since the new states came primarily from the old Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Senate grew concerned about these countries’ security and counterintelligence programs. A Senate committee report outlined fears that U.S.-provided intelligence could be subject to unauthorized disclosure or penetration by hostile intelligence services. Different conceptions of privacy and different analytical paradigms make sharing data problematic within NATO.

The United States controls the preponderance of high-technology intelligence systems, and will likely retain this lead for the foreseeable future. This supports Keohane’s contention that certain states will possess an information advantage over their co-members in an international organization. An intelligence gap can encourage free-riding as small states take advantage of the information the United States must necessarily provide for the success of any NATO operation. This was most apparent during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. NATO’s war demonstrated U.S. superiority in strategic lift, precision weaponry, and intelligence. In economic terms, a division of labor exploiting the U.S. comparative advantage in intelligence and high-technology

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303 Aldrich, 731.


305 Aldrich, 732, 746.

306 Aldrich, 746.


warfare and the European advantage in peacekeeping and low-intensity conflict may make sense. Richard Aldrich asserts that this division could erode the political unity upon which the alliance is based. \(^{309}\) He does not provide any evidence, though he may be referring to divergent threat perceptions within the alliance undermining its common cause. On the other hand, specialization and division of labor are important strategies for alliances in a unipolar world. \(^{310}\) In any case, NATO is taking steps to improve interoperability. \(^{311}\)

The alliance now operates a Situation Center at its headquarters in Brussels designed as a year-round intelligence clearinghouse. \(^{312}\) In 2005, NATO held a series of exercises aimed at testing intelligence interoperability. \(^{313}\) A sequel followed in 2006. \(^{314}\) One of the successes was the adaptation of the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) computer network for secure information transfer among coalition partners. \(^{315}\) NATO has also created new institutions. A NATO intelligence sharing center opened at Molesworth, UK in October, 2006, \(^{316}\) and an unprecedented Joint Intelligence Operations Center manned by officers from NATO, Pakistan, and Afghanistan opened in Kabul on January 25, 2007. \(^{317}\) These intelligence sharing measures are in addition to the promise of OSINT.

\(^{309}\) Aldrich, 746.


\(^{311}\) Aldrich, 746.

\(^{312}\) *NATO Handbook 2006*, 105.


\(^{315}\) Hodge, 1.


The UN faces more problems in the intelligence sharing realm than NATO. If NATO must contend with varying norms during enlargement, consider that the UN has 192 member states as compared to NATO’s 26. Inclusion of Partnership for Peace countries increases the number of governments dealing with NATO by 23, to a total of 49. If information asymmetry is so prominent inside the NATO alliance, consider the intra-UN difference between the United States’ intelligence capabilities and, for instance, Bangladesh’s—realizing that Bangladesh is second only to Pakistan in providing UN peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{318} This does not square with the UN’s need for effective intelligence in its peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{319}

C. WHAT IS OSINT?

OSINT is a subset of publicly available information. News reports, for instance, may feed OSINT, but are not OSINT by themselves. Instead, OSINT is data analyzed and tailored for a specific audience and purpose. For instance, a policymaker could request an analysis of media traffic or polling data in a particular country to support decision-making. According to NATO, “OSINT is unclassified information that has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated to a select audience in order to address a specific question.”\textsuperscript{320}

The advent of the internet has multiplied the volume of available information, but the internet is not the only source of OSINT. Traditional media sources are another part, along with overt human observation, commercially available imagery, internet sources (of varying quality), and importantly, so-called “grey literature.” The latter category is comprised of working papers, informal publications, and unpublished reports—all available openly and legally, if not widely disseminated (i.e., the practitioner has no need for espionage, but must know where to find the information).\textsuperscript{321}

\textsuperscript{318} United Nations, “Department of Peacekeeping Operations Background Note.”

\textsuperscript{319} Denofsky and Smith, 2.


\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 5-9.
The OSINT universe is a treasure trove of political, cultural, and historical information.\textsuperscript{322} Medical intelligence, essential for peacekeepers deployed to areas without reliable healthcare facilities, is accessible through open sources. Even detailed geospatial information—maps, charts, terrain, vegetation, and hydrology—is available through open sources like GoogleEarth.\textsuperscript{323} In fact, commercially produced imagery is widely available at 1-meter resolution or better, good enough to identify key building, vehicles and radar, for instance.\textsuperscript{324} As Google’s John Hanke put it, “ten years ago, this technology was the exclusive province of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Five years ago, it cost $14,000 for a single image. Now there’s free, global high-resolution imagery.”\textsuperscript{325} The military intelligence value of GoogleEarth and other commercial products was reinforced by the U.S. Air Force’s Chief of Intelligence, Lieutenant General David Deptula. Recognizing that the capability would not go away, he called it a “danger” and said, “It's something that was a closely guarded secret not that long ago and now everybody's got access to it.”\textsuperscript{326}

Stephen Mercado, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst, explained how OSINT proved its worth in World War II, and helped form the basis of intelligence assessments during the Cold War. Openly broadcasts informed Allied assessments of Japanese shipbuilding efforts during the Pacific War. The chief Far East analyst in the wartime U.S. Office of Strategic Services called open source information “indispensable.”\textsuperscript{327} In the Cold War, OSINT “probably furnish[ed] the greater part of all information used in the production of military intelligence on the Soviet Union,” according to a declassified 1963 article. Likewise, open sources were “essential” in the Vietnam War to keep abreast of

\textsuperscript{322} Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 3.

\textsuperscript{323} James Fallows, “Spy’s Eye View,” \textit{Atlantic Monthly} March, 2006, 140.

\textsuperscript{324} NATO OSINT Handbook 10.

\textsuperscript{325} Fallows, 142.

\textsuperscript{326} Kristin Roberts, “U.S. general: Google Earth danger to security. However, 'No one's going to undo commercial satellite imagery'”, Reuters, June 21, 2007.

developments from Hanoi. The advent of the information age has increased the amount of data publicly available. Realizing OSINT’s potential, NATO developed a doctrine to guide the formal processing of this wealth of data. This doctrine may be adopted by the UN with little effort or investment.

D. THE NATO SYSTEM

While NATO has dedicated resources within its international military staff to focus on intelligence, NATO owns no intelligence collection systems. Instead, it must rely on the goodwill of member states to provide intelligence to the alliance. States may fear compromising their sources and methods and seeing their secret capabilities revealed. To fill information gaps, NATO has setup a system to leverage the wide range of available OSINT. This section describes NATO’s OSINT architecture in general terms.

The primary doctrinal publication is the 2001 NATO OSINT Handbook. NATO also produced two companion volumes in 2002, the NATO OSINT Reader and NATO Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet. The OSINT Reader is a compilation of articles on OSINT subjects ranging from the history of open source analysis to the future of commercial imagery. The details of the NATO OSINT effort are beyond the scope of this study, though the book is an excellent resource for those interested in the topic. The Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet document is a 100+ page guide to search methodologies and web site evaluation. Though useful to the analyst culling information from the world-wide web, it is too far detailed for discussion here. The essential point is that these three documents together are a starting point for an organization (e.g., the UN) seeking to develop its own OSINT capability.

All of the various sources and combinations of open source material fall into four categories defined by NATO:

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• Open Source Data (OSD): raw information—photos, broadcasts, etc.
• Open Source Information (OSIF): compiled and edited OSD—newspapers, books, daily information summaries.
• OSINT: information processed and disseminated to answer a specific question
• Validated OSINT (OSINT-V): OSINT considered to be very accurate

With an eye toward achieving operationally relevant OSINT-V, NATO applies the traditional intelligence cycle to OSINT: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination. A brief look at each of these areas is necessary to fully understand the distinction between raw unclassified data and the finished product that is OSINT.

Planning and direction is essentially the requirements development process. The commander must determine “precisely what they want to know, and why.” These information requirements allow the OSINT team to focus their collection and analytic efforts to meet that intent. OSINT is more than just a summary of media stories; well-defined requirements allow the analyst to hone to meet the exact needs of the commander and the mission. In peacekeeping, this would include defining the geographical focus and time span under consideration, and posing particular questions about tribal, military, and economic factors important to the operation.

Collection refers to the search for data. The NATO doctrine holds that “knowing who knows” is the prime attribute of an OSINT team. More than just a Google search on the internet, a well-functioning OSINT cell will know the experts in the field of interest and have developed relationships with the “niche producers” who have focused time and resources on understanding particular issues. In contrast to large information brokers with only superficial knowledge of a given topic, niche producers are small entities that concentrate on particular problem sets. Because of their subject-matter

330 NATO OSINT Handbook, 2.
331 Ibid., 2, 16.
332 Ibid., 19.
expertise, they can produce the best possible OSINT. In many cases these producers may be from universities, private-sector think tanks or other research institutions, or they may be individuals within NATO or government bureaucracies.

Thus collected, the information must be processed and exploited. This means ensuring source reliability, particularly for information found via the internet, and also recognition of outside source biases. Irrelevant information should be discarded so that only the most salient data is included in the final analysis. Given the multiplicity of sources available, this can be a time consuming process.

Production includes not just the writing of reports, but the further expansion of information through the establishment of expert forums. This means making the research available for comment to the established authorities on the issue area. While a commander may need a report in the short term, expert forums allow for continuing refinement of the newly produced OSINT.

The final step in the cycle is dissemination. The best work of analysts is useless unless it reaches the target audience. The first recipient should be the commander who requested the production, but OSINT’s nature allows it to be freely given to any other interested parties—for instance, coalition partners or even non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For NATO, this means that all member states, and the 23 Partnership for Peace countries, would be able to fully share and discuss the intelligence. This opens up additional space for intelligence fusion—each state is able to bring its own resources to bear in a free discussion of the topic under consideration.

NATO’s end-to-end OSINT system ensures analytic value-added, rather than just a presentation of CNN clips to the commander. Properly followed, it guarantees focused information sharable throughout the alliance, fulfilling the theoretical requirement and building trust among members. Of course, OSINT cannot fully replace the production of all-source, classified intelligence, though many decisions, particularly at the political

333 NATO OSINT Handbook, 10.
334 Ibid., 23.
335 Ibid, 29.
level, do not require the technical detail that only specialized intelligence collectors can acquire. Further, building the baseline from OSINT frees expensive and sensitive intelligence assets to be directed toward the specific hard targets for which they are most suited. Since NATO owns none of these assets, the alliance can use its small intelligence staff to produce information of valuable to all members—and interested partners.

E. AN OSINT ORGANIZATION

Former Central Intelligence Agency case officer and OSINT proponent Robert David Steele builds on the framework presented by NATO to outline a functional OSINT cell. He envisions this small team as handling the immediate intelligence needs of a commander or other executive, while knowing the appropriate outside agencies to contract with for more detailed studies.336 His proposed cell includes at least six members, shown in Figure 5.

![Diagram of Proposed OSINT Cell]

Figure 5. Proposed OSINT cell337

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337 Ibid.
The requirements officer is responsible for ascertaining the commander’s intent and communicating it to the rest of the team. The primary research specialist maintains a database of experts and contacts and knows who to contact to find detailed information. The wide body of media and reporting online is researched by the internet specialist and the commercial online specialist. The difference is that the internet specialist sorts through the media and unofficial web content, while the commercial online specialist is expert in the use of wide-ranging tools such as Lexis/Nexis. A contracting specialist is empowered to seek out niche producers with access to pertinent information and employ them to build specific products. Finally, the team’s findings are packaged by a senior analyst for further dissemination.338

F. PRACTICAL OSINT

The American armed forces are no stranger to OSINT. Of particular note are the unclassified, book length country reference guides produced by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.339 The studies fit in a uniform’s pocket for quick accessibility in the field. These books are issued to U.S. officers embarking on United Nations Military Observer missions and are available throughout the Defense Department for general reference.

High quality OSINT has been invaluable in contemporary military missions. An open-source information clearinghouse called the Virtual Intelligence Center (VIC), established by the U.S. Pacific Command in 1999, produced an unclassified primer on East Timor that same year 1999. This “one-stop” database was updated twice daily and distributed to multiple countries and non-governmental organizations.340 As an information resource, the primer was invaluable for both the information itself and its

338 Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 25-26. Steele offers the chart but does not get into detail on each member’s responsibilities.


accessibility.\textsuperscript{341} Partners shared a common information baseline and fed their own data back into the system to further refine the document. The online nature of the VIC community and the database’s web-based interface meant it was available at any time to all of its users.

NATO built a similar product prior to its operations in the former Yugoslavia. The staff compiled an open source 400-page guidebook to Yugoslav infrastructure, communications, and politics. While the guidebook held a wealth of information, some military members dismissed the reference as irrelevant simply because it was not classified. Once NATO officers added certain technical notes on military equipment, the entire document became classified and thus more palatable to its critics.\textsuperscript{342} The UN, of course, does not deal in classified information and therefore is likely to have no qualms about accepting a high-quality OSINT document. OSINT is not a panacea for the UN’s intelligence woes, but establishing a structure is a necessary step in improving the timeliness and accuracy of information available to blue helmet peacekeepers.

\textsuperscript{341} Schuster, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{342} Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 21.
V. CONCLUSION

A. ADAPTING THE NATO MODEL

Like NATO, the United Nations lacks access to any traditional intelligence collection systems. In fact, the very diplomatic and open culture of the UN precludes consideration of acquiring such systems. In many respects the NATO Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) system resembles the EISAS analysis organization envisioned in the Brahimi Report. Unlike that document, the NATO publications offer details for organization and continual refinement of intelligence. The UN can take advantage of commercially available imagery, its own in-house specialists, and contract with established niche producers to produce focused OSINT.

Commercial imagery has great promise for peace operations. UN agencies from the World Food Program to the World Health Organization use satellite data regularly.\(^{343}\) In 2003, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit studied the application of commercial satellite imagery to peace operations, and concluded that it could be a valuable resource for peace operations.\(^{344}\)

Although the UN cannot task any intelligence agency, it is certainly free to search available media and databases, and to deal with experts in fields of interest. Many of these experts reside within the UN system or other international organizations such as the World Bank, the Red Cross or Crescent, Doctors without Borders, etc. Although many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) avoid information sharing to prevent accusations of bias, others are amenable to cooperation. The UN has established a forum for NGOs and other parties to bring information to the Security Council on an ad hoc basis.


\(^{344}\) Ibid., 3.
basis.\textsuperscript{345} Other UN entities, such as the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, also have information networks that are available to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)\textsuperscript{346}

Having these specialists in close proximity yields another important consideration: the ease with which the UN can establish the expert forums envisioned by NATO. Drawn together in the context of a particular peacekeeping mission, a cross-functional working group fed by analysis generated in a UN OSINT cell would be an effective tool in assessing mission effectiveness.

The UN can leverage niche producers to meet its needs. For instance, the Small Arms Survey is a niche producer of SALW intelligence. It can provide a baseline of small arms and light weapons (SALW) inventories to a mission running a DDR program.\textsuperscript{347} Armed with this information, the mission can target specific types of weapons known to be in the country, and design appropriate price structures for buy-back programs based on actual weapons supplies.\textsuperscript{348} This would address the SALW tracking issues encountered by the UN in Ethiopia/Eritrea and Liberia.

Dealing with these smaller firms may prove difficult for the UN with its Byzantine contracting system. For instance, an attempt by the UN Mission in the Congo to contract a private company for aerial photography was stymied because the two companies with the required capability were not on the UN’s contracting list.\textsuperscript{349} The UN bureaucracy may not be responsive enough to deal with a large number of small companies. It would be up to the Contracting Specialist on the OSINT team to make this system work efficiently.

\textsuperscript{345} Ekpe, 379.
\textsuperscript{346} Ekpe, 387.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{349} Cammaert interview.
In addition, the NATO template is compatible with the UN’s Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) structure. A notional JMAC organization as developed by the UN is shown in Figure 6. According to the UN, each JMAC would be tailored to mission needs, so this exact composition may not apply in all cases. The figure is potentially misleading—although the Information Management Cell (IMC) has more “boxes,” the Mid-Long Term Analysis Cell would receive the bulk of the JMAC’s manpower.\textsuperscript{350} It is this latter cell that could incorporate the OSINT team as drawn up in NATO’s doctrine and expanded on by Steele.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{JMAC_Structure.png}
\caption{JMAC Structure\textsuperscript{351}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{350} Otte interview.

The functions of NATO’s internet specialists and experts in commercial online capabilities could augment civilian and military analysis within the Mid-Long Term Analysis Cell. Editors, as described by NATO, are a natural complement to the JMAC administrative staff, and would provide quality control for the cell’s products. The most difficult fit may be the Contracting Specialist position, since a UN mission’s purse strings are controlled by the Department of Administration and Management, not the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This need not derail the entire process, as the JMAC reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, who has control of all UN elements in the mission. The SRSG can mandate the departments work together just as civilian and military analysts are united, and the JMAC IMC is collocated with the military’s Joint Operations Center.

Adapting the NATO model to the UN appears feasible, at least from a technical point of view. An OSINT cell can be small, and it need not have a huge budget, especially with so much information already resident within the UN system. The issue is political will. Member states are in a quandary, not wanting the UN to have anything approaching an “intelligence” function, but needing the UN to have the ability to analyze information for the sake of peacekeeping missions and to build trust in the organization among troop contributing countries. The success of JMACs should help assuage small-state fears that the UN will “spy” on them. OSINT’s nature makes it different from the espionage member states fear, but it will take a concerted effort, led not just by Western powers, to actually implement meaningful change.

B. UN INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

1. Political

On the political front, the success of JMACs in the field suggests that cooperation on intelligence issues, and trust in the UN to handle sensitive (though unclassified) operational data is a reality. John Otte, a member of the UN’s peace operations doctrine working group, sees some progress toward institutionalization of intelligence at UN

\[352\] Durch, “Running the Show: Planning and Implementation,” 60.
headquarters. UN peacekeeping doctrine is currently under development, but the fact that intelligence is on the agenda is a significant breakthrough.\textsuperscript{353} Great powers like the permanent five members of the Security Council are still likely to guard their intelligence superiority, but they may be convinced to allow the UN a systematic means (i.e., an OSINT system) to analyze the flood of data resident within the organization. Small and large states will likely continue to have concerns about sovereignty and trust in the UN organization, but effective implementation of OSINT practices can confront these issues.

2. **Bureaucratic**

The Secretariat’s officials may still be a significant obstacle. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s proposed reforms to the UN bureaucracy stalled since he had not first built political momentum for change, according to Maggie Farley.\textsuperscript{354} The OSINT structure described in this thesis does not directly address the concern of turf-conscious bureaucrats defending their own fiefdoms. On the other hand, if their home countries muster the political will to endorse intelligence reform, the bureaucrats may find they have the flexibility to adapt as well. Using OSINT as a means to overcome political opposition is an indirect approach to confronting the bureaucracy. As political will to improve peacekeeping intelligence coalesces and momentum for change builds, bureaucratic issues are likely to be easier to overcome.

3. **Structural**

A modification of the NATO OSINT doctrine to the UN context appears to offer a politically acceptable alternative to a traditional intelligence structure. The transparent nature of OSINT coupled with the fact that so much information is already in the UN system could provide a route toward successful reform. As it builds new peacekeeping doctrine, the UN could carefully define the scope of its analysis effort and explicitly rule

\textsuperscript{353} Otte interview.

\textsuperscript{354} Maggie Farley, “The World; New Secretary-General is Still Finding his Footing at the UN,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, April 9, 2007.
out the possibility of clandestine collection. Building on the record of established JMACs, the UN could form a headquarters-level intelligence analysis organization based on the NATO OSINT framework.

C. ADDRESSING THE CRITICS

Intelligence is a key ingredient in a successful peace operation, and the UN has made great strides in improving its fledgling intelligence capacity. Critics attack intelligence reform on the basis of necessity, sovereignty, and trust. Though these arguments are not without merit, sensible implementation of intelligence practices addresses the issues.

1. Why Intelligence?

The Brahimi Report is a comprehensive review of the difficulties associated with peacekeeping operations. Of 24 formal recommendations, only two directly address intelligence capabilities. The remainder of the recommendations deal with topics as diverse as logistics, doctrine, humanitarian efforts, and finance. Although this thesis focuses specifically on intelligence reforms, the UN understands that many problems confront PKOs. The organization has taken some steps toward fixing the non-intelligence issues raised in the Brahimi Report.

In late 2003, three years after the report’s publication, the Henry Stimson Center in Washington, DC published a comprehensive review of UN progress vis-à-vis Brahimi’s 24 recommendations. The study’s authors, Robert Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle, and Moira Shanahan, explicitly broke out subtasks from the proposals, for a total of 81 different action items, only two of which deal with intelligence. These two are: “Peacekeeping forces must have intelligence capabilities” and “better information gathering, analysis, and strategic planning (EISAS).” Both come directly from the Brahimi report.


Durch et al rated progress on each recommendation according to the requirements set forth in the Brahimi Report. They established a scale ranging from 0, “unimplemented,” to 5, “implementation exceeds report recommendations.”\textsuperscript{357} A full 27 percent of the Brahimi Report’s recommendations had been implemented to the report’s standard or higher.\textsuperscript{358} The two intelligence-related tasks did not meet this benchmark. Durch et al gave each a score of 2.5, meaning that the intelligence recommendations were less than “partly implemented” even if some actions had been proposed within the UN.\textsuperscript{359}

The Stimson Center released its report in 2003, prior to the 2005 stand-up of JMACs in various field missions. JMAC performance as described in Chapter III suggests that Durch et al could raise their assessment of the “Peacekeeping forces must have intelligence capabilities” task. The Brahimi Report’s EISAS recommendation still has not been implemented, suggesting an unchanged score may be warranted for that task. Given the significant progress Durch et al noted across the full spectrum of Brahimi Report recommendations, there is no evidence that addressing intelligence reform will come at the expense of other needed PKO improvements.

2. Sovereignty

At the mission level, the success of JMACs suggests that member states comprehend the need for UN forces to understand their operational environment. Taking to heart Brahimi’s recommendation, the UN has made a substantial effort to improve missions’ intelligence capability, though this capacity still has room to grow. The enhancement of intelligence at the mission level is evidence that member states are able to subordinate political sovereignty concerns for operational effectiveness.

At the strategic level, however, the UN has still not embraced the concept of an autonomous open source intelligence (OSINT) organization like Brahimi’s EISAS. John


\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., 118-121. Percentage based on author’s compilation of scores given in the text.

\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., 118. See tasks 2.41 and 3.1.
Otte believes actual implementation of such a capability is still years in the future. Encouraged by the success of JMACs, he believes that the potential for such a capacity is there, but it will take time for the politicians to work through the details to get to the implementation stage.\textsuperscript{360} An eventual EISAS-like organization is a distinct possibility, especially if the UN borrows an existing template, such as the NATO model, for OSINT effectiveness.

3. Dependence and Trust

Brahimi addresses the issue of information dependence, saying that “The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.”\textsuperscript{361} Here the report deals with the political acceptability of information, not strictly its analysis. Too often, according to Brahimi, the Secretariat estimates mission requirements based on political expediency.\textsuperscript{362} An OSINT arm such as EISAS would not by itself depoliticize the use of information. As Keohane says, knowledge is power in an international organization and large states are loath to surrender their advantage in this arena. The implementation of the EISAS recommendation would, however, enhance member state trust. This trust is essential to gain troop commitments for field operations.\textsuperscript{363} Additionally, trust in the decision-making process implies legitimacy—if not agreement—when the Security Council authorizes an operation. Therefore, building up UN headquarters’ analytical capacity would be a major political step toward enhancing the acceptability of UN forces in the field. States with an information monopoly, if serious about wanting an effective UN, will likely need to reduce their domination in this area. Their sacrifice of information dominance could be matched by smaller states’ willingness to bend on sovereignty. Large and small states could compromise to improve the UN’s capacity to successfully implement peace operations.

\textsuperscript{360} Otte interview.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{363} Otte interview.
D. THE ROAD AHEAD

Since the Brahimi Report, operational and tactical intelligence efforts have seen the most gains. Institutionalization of the JMAC concept is underway, and the ad hoc measures employed in MONUC may offer lessons for other operations. Efforts to improve strategic intelligence at UN headquarters still lag behind. The 24/7 Situation Centre is the closest thing to an intelligence organization, but, according to its own website, it is not tasked with an analytical function.\textsuperscript{364} The Brahimi Report correctly identified the need for intelligence in its EISAS recommendation. That particular program may be dead, but the requirement for intelligence has not gone away.

Too often, in Mercado’s view, decision makers in government overlook open source information and rely instead on secret intelligence. Mercado says secret information is preferred by those who confuse secrecy with accuracy or feel that clandestine sources are somehow preferable to open sources.\textsuperscript{365} While the relative worth of OSINT as compared to traditional classified intelligence may be subject to debate at the national level or within an alliance like NATO, the UN does not have this option. A 2002 RAND study showed that OSINT could help break down barriers to European intelligence cooperation; the same arguments could hold true for the UN as well.\textsuperscript{366}

Sometimes, the free availability of OSINT has an unfortunate cooling effect on military leaders. For instance, many NATO commanders ignored an unclassified 400-page report on Kosovo which included intelligence on politics, infrastructure, and military tactics.\textsuperscript{367} These same commanders accepted a later classified version, despite


\textsuperscript{366} Andrew Rathmell, “The Privatisation of Intelligence: A Way Forward for European Intelligence Cooperation – ‘Towards a European Intelligence Policy,’” in NATO OSINT Reader, 74.

\textsuperscript{367} Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 21.
the addition of only small details on weapons systems.\textsuperscript{368} Ironically, this obsession with “secret” information could prove to be a strength in the UN context. Since transparency is key in the UN’s politicized environment, the lack of classified intelligence may be a key diplomatic selling point—member states could reasonably expect that the UN, lacking “secrets,” does not have all the details of their internal state affairs. With so much information available in open sources, the actual difference between OSINT and secret intelligence may be little more than a semantic game in some cases. That said, a perceived difference between OSINT and classified intelligence may be enough to save face in the diplomatic realm.

Ironically, most of the information needed for peacekeeping operations is readily available to the UN. All this information begs for analysis, making the UN a prime candidate for the institutionalization of an OSINT capability. In many crises, particularly in the developing world, OSINT may be the only source of information available—even if a UN member state was willing to share its intelligence with the UN, the state may lack intelligence assets in the crisis area.\textsuperscript{369} With 1990s-type complex operations becoming the norm for the UN (for instance, continuing involvement in Congo, East Timor, Kosovo, etc), this information becomes critical. With some modification, the UN could use NATO’s OSINT framework to turn freely available data into useable intelligence and distribute that intelligence throughout the organization and out to the field.

This study has focused primarily on structural changes the UN could implement to improve its corporate ability to produce intelligence information. Given the political and bureaucratic obstacles to successful implementation, the road ahead is likely to be liberally strewn with pot holes threatening to wreck the process. Successful field employment of JMACs and the inclusion of intelligence in the ongoing development of peacekeeping doctrine suggest that intelligence reform may not be a matter of “if” but “when.” Political consensus to back the institutionalization of UN intelligence may take

\textsuperscript{368} Heide, Phillips, and Dumulon-Perreault, 21.

years to build. In the interim, the UN will continue to lack a systematic means to provide intelligence support to its already overextended peacekeepers in the field.

Having identified the NATO OSINT as a potential model for a UN intelligence organization, this study concedes that further research into UN intelligence functioning is still needed. Analysis of how JMACs actually function in the field is lacking. Existing documentation and JMAC performance studies are rare because the JMAC concept is relatively new. As the various JMACs mature and more information becomes available, it may be possible to correlate JMAC activity and analysis to the operational success or failure of peacekeeping missions. Another avenue for research is to study a NATO OSINT cell in comparison to a fielded JMAC. It is possible that NATO could learn from the UN experience.

The toughest step for intelligence reform will most likely be overcoming the political resistance to an institutionalized intelligence capability at UN headquarters. As force protection becomes more important to UN missions, potential troop contributing states may seek assurances that the organization will do everything in its power to protect peacekeepers. If members are unwilling to send troops, the UN will not be able to intervene anywhere. The link between force protection and troop contribution potentially makes a functioning intelligence system a necessary condition for the conduct of future UN operations.

UN peacekeeping has a mixed record ranging from relatively successful observation missions to failures like Bosnia and Somalia. The organization has accomplished this without a full-fledged intelligence capability. Though past performance is no guarantee of the future, it is likely the UN could continue to muddle through peace operations with existing ad hoc intelligence methods. A functioning OSINT system is an alternative to both a complete lack of intelligence and a clandestine espionage agency. The UN could adapt NATO’s existing model for OSINT production to meet the needs of the blue helmets peacekeepers in the field while simultaneously assuaging the political concerns of UN member states.
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