Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb

by Michael D. Pearlman

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FOREWORD

The calculations for bringing large-scale hostilities to an end and for establishing a favorable environment in which postcombat operations, including the occupation of the enemy's homeland, can take place involve high-level military officers in the analysis of a wide range of considerations, many of which fall well beyond what would be traditionally recognized as strictly military in nature.

In *Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb*, Dr. Michael Pearlman brings home this point through his shrewd assessment of the complex issues confronting U.S. officers as they debated the best course of action to follow in ending the war against Japan. Aside from the list of traditional concerns, such as the human cost of mounting an invasion of Japan, these officers had also to consider such intangibles as continued support for the war effort on the American home front. Thanks to Pearlman's research, the reader comes away with a deeper understanding of why these officers made the recommendations they did to the president and why the president decided to drop the atomic bomb to end World War II.

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JERRY D. MORELOCK
Colonel, Field Artillery
Director, Combat Studies Institute

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Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb

by Michael D. Pearlman

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352
God bless democracy! I approve of it highly but suffer from it extremely. This incidentally is not for quotation.¹

—George Catlett Marshall
CONTENTS

Illustrations ............................................................... vii
Text .............................................................................. 1
Notes .......................................................................... 25
ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps

1. Provisional Order of Battle for Invasion of Japan
   25(August 1945) .......................................................... 4
In one way or another, George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army’s Chief of Staff, had long been expecting a sharp reduction in military morale. He had witnessed, as aide-de-camp to General John J. Pershing, America’s mood after World War I. Once Germany asked for an armistice (and before it signed a surrender), Congress and the public had demanded a swift demobilization. This indelible memory of November 1918 shaped Marshall’s resolve to minimize military responsibilities after the Nazi capitulation. In Europe, this meant an end to operations in the eastern Mediterranean, where internal political conflicts and instabilities might require a large and long-term occupation by an army about to be drastically reduced in size. In the Pacific, the Japanese would have to be beaten into a position where their surrender would occur shortly after V-E Day. Otherwise, there might not be a capitulation at all, something Marshall predicted in 1943: “the collapse of Germany would impose partial demobilization and a growing impatience . . . throughout the United States.” This mood could lead to a compromise settlement along the lines the Japanese Army was hoping to obtain: that is, the retention of the core empire it still occupied (Formosa, Manchuria, and Korea) and no change in the political institutions of Japan. 2

America’s military timing was exceptionally good, considering the enormous perplexities of the war. When Germany surrendered in May, the United States had already made what Marshall called the “preparation for the final kill.” Its armed forces surrounded the home islands of Japan from the south and the east. It had also obtained from Russia a pledge to attack the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, thereby completing the ironclad blockade that the U.S. Navy once planned to execute alone. However, the denial of imports of strategic items, from oil to coal and protein, did not mean that a mere mop-up operation was in the works. Most of the U.S. military, especially the Army, conducted planning on the premise “that defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender.” Even before Japan strongly reinforced Kyushu, the first home island the United States would invade, the American military calculated that America would still have to conduct the toughest landings and follow-up battles seen in World War II—actions that would likely result in some 200,000 casualties and 50,000 fatalities. 3 Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate of the blockade strategy, would later complain that “the Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan.” The flaw in Leahy’s argument was that the Japanese Imperial Army refused to accept the fact that it had lost the war, at least by the
standard of unconditional surrender. That demand was completely unacceptable to an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.4

Leahy admitted, however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945. Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have
starved the Japanese into submission” (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American “political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]”. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am “afraid of unrest in the country,” said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen “the people in their present frame of mind.” Aside from reports about the “national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens” of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take “a great many years.”

Reasonably sane people like to avoid amphibious invasions against fortified beaches. Before they were attempted, Marshall would spend days in a cold sweat because of “the awfulness of the consequences that could occur should one of these go wrong.” (A failed river crossing constituted a “reverse”; a failed landing meant “disaster.”) Nonetheless, the different briefings Marshall received solidified his conviction that no “temporizing measure” could loosen the firm control of the militarists in Japan. Hence, he insisted on the need for an invasion, despite “the last ditch tactics of the suicidal Japanese.”

Ironically, the Japanese armed forces—and Emperor Hirohito—would welcome Marshall’s conclusion as an opportunity to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nation.” Although the Japanese home army (if not their civilians) was still a long way from starvation, the Japanese had lost the air and naval capacity to fight off a blockade. However, they had soldiers dug deeply into a well-protected and interconnected “mass of caves” on terrain the U.S. Army deemed “[un]suited for large scale mobile warfare.” Consequently, Japan felt able to inflict heavy casualties in “a decisive battle at the landing point” of an amphibious assault. “We would have succeeded in driving you off the beaches,” said one Japanese general. With this scenario quite plausible, the U.S. government should have modified the common meaning of “unconditional surrender” or substantially strengthened its military means to fight. The government did neither, aside from working on a secret bomb, yet to be tested in New Mexico.

Unconditional surrender was primarily a battle cry meant “to concentrate the attention of public opinion upon the winning of the war.” As a coherent statement of political objectives, it had two competing definitions, when it had any clear meaning at all. Definition number one, used in State
Department memoranda and within the Army's general staff, did "not mean absence of terms, but [that] whatever terms are imposed do not result from a bargain or a barter with the enemy." The victor laid down all conditions. For the vanquished, those conditions were unconditional. In definition number two, Japanese surrender was "not subject to conditions or limitations." In this case, the victor had absolute freedom over the vanquished because, as generals and diplomats put it, the enemy "is actually signing a 'blank check'; there are "no contractual elements whatever.""

The armed forces and career diplomats preferred definition number one, as did Republican politicians (former President Herbert Hoover and senators from the Midwest and Northeast states) and certain elite publications, such as The Christian Century. Other publications (from the Christian Science Monitor to mass circulation magazines) favored definition number two, as did political appointees in the State Department and Southern Democrats (identified below). As for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he appears to have done what he typically did whenever forced to choose one thing or the other. He chose both, then discarded the option least suited
to the specific problem at hand. For Germany, he preferred no specifications; for Japan, no negotiations. Since this differentiation was hardly popular—least of all, treating Japan more leniently—Roosevelt was opaque, as demonstrated by his reference to Grant’s conversation with Lee at the end of the Civil War: “Take the animals home and do the spring plowing. . . . That is what we mean by unconditional surrender.”

So-called clarifications, like this vague and pointless historical anecdote, must have mystified the Japanese as badly as it did most Americans. The Japanese, consequently, thought U.S. policy towards Germany foretold the position towards them (both policies were called “unconditional surrender”). Actually, U.S. policy did not clearly move in that direction until FDR died in April 1945.

According to Leahy’s notes at the Washington Conference (May 1943), “the grand strategy of the war remained fixed on achieving unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in Europe while [only?] maintaining pressure on Japan to secure positions from which her ultimate surrender could be forced.” At the Cairo Conference (November 1943), the communiqué drafted by Harry Hopkins, at Roosevelt’s instruction, made the obligatory demand for unconditional surrender. Then, it set specific stipulations, consistent with a series of position papers drafted by State Department professionals and Asia specialists. None of the points were draconian, at least compared to those imposed on Germany. Japan was to be “stripped of all” its overseas conquests, presumably to quarantine a nation that Roosevelt believed was genetically disposed towards acts of lawless violence. The president’s policy of isolating Japan from the rest of Asia may have smacked of political eugenics, but nothing was said about occupation, demilitarization, war trials, or the emperor of Japan. Nor was there any hint of the worst fear of one JCS intelligence officer: a bloody invasion of the home island that would destroy the imperial Japanese government before it could negotiate a peace.

The Cairo communiqué was certainly not good news in Tokyo. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo said it meant Japan was to be reduced to a third-rate state. But he said nothing about what other Japanese would dread: that unconditional surrender meant the destruction of the nation and the ruin of the Japanese race. These Japanese officials made a mistake in assuming that the communiqué was just American propaganda, not a serious statement of terms.

Specific conditions that the Cairo communiqué mentioned and omitted were not inadvertent. That November (1943), Roosevelt had asked
China to conduct the postwar occupation of Japan. Its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, wanted an Allied pledge to punish the Japanese as war criminals, yet he dodged responsibility for occupation duty, deferring it back to the United States. He and Roosevelt then agreed “that as soon as Japan’s military power has been broken, the Japanese in Japan proper would be permitted to work out their own destiny without outside direction.” In short, there would be no occupation, let alone transformation of a society, such as Roosevelt planned for Germany. There, a generation was to be fed from U.S. Army trucks so that they would learn how badly they had been beaten—a far cry from the plan for the Far East that Roosevelt and Stalin made at Teheran. The Allies would only control “islands in the vicinity of Japan,” hoping this would suffice to deter and prevent a renewed “course of aggression.”

Wise or foolish, that geographical objective was perfectly consistent with the U.S. military means available and emphasized in late 1943. Over objections from Admiral King and General Marshall, who still hoped for a major base in continental Asia, Roosevelt abandoned new operations in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater lest they divert soldiers and landing craft from the invasion of Europe in 1944. (“He was Commander-in-Chief,” wrote Leahy, “and that ended the argument.”) CBI, thereafter, became a backwater campaign, like the D-Day operation had relegated the Italian campaign in the European theater. With most ground forces now unequivocally committed to France, a reasonable military strategy was to win the war with Japan from the Pacific Ocean with sea and air power. This could force an “ultimate surrender”—provided terms were not too harsh. However, air and sea power were hardly sufficient for what Allied planners later called the “absolute military control of Japan” itself. It was no accident that the top brass of the Navy—Admirals Leahy, King, and Chester W. Nimitz—all spoke against unconditional surrender. That implied a protracted occupation that only the Army could provide.

After Franklin Roosevelt died on 12 April, the new president, Harry S. Truman, told his military advisers about his hopes “of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.” He probably overstated the danger, fearing the invasion could kill 500,000 Americans, “the flower of our young manhood.” This is not surprising when one remembers the last time the new commander in chief, a former Army captain, commanded anyone in battle. In the fall of 1918, the Germans, outnumbered but dug in, were supposedly tottering on the brink of defeat. Nonetheless, during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, they killed or wounded almost half the soldiers in Truman’s 35th Infantry Division. Twenty years later, he vividly recalled
a “pile of [dead] American soldiers in all sorts of ghastly positions and an old hard boiled sergeant” who yelled at Truman’s battery: “Now you sons of bitches, you’ll believe you’re in a war.”

To mitigate American casualties in Japan, the civilian leaders of the War Department recommended removing demands for unconditional surrender. The United States could accomplish “everything we want to accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of the term,” which would only inflict a humiliating “stigma” and “loss of face” on Japan’s ruling bodies. They advised Truman to settle for “the equivalent of unconditional surrender,” by which America could still fulfill its “vital war objective of preventing Japan from again becoming a menace to world peace.” This was reminiscent of Roosevelt in 1943. It also meant the transformation and retention of the emperor as “a constitutional monarch,” in the words of Henry Stimson, “a kindly minded Christian gentleman” who was the secretary of war. Like most other people in the government who did not want a fight to the finish, Stimson believed that Emperor Hirohito was a silent partner and a passive witness in a political system “under the complete dominance of the Japanese Army,” which allegedly ruled in the name of the “Emperor-God.”

Despite well-intentioned attempts to whitewash Hirohito, the emperor was an active participant in Japan’s military-political complex. Stimson and company, not knowing much about his complicity, petitioned Truman not to attempt governing the island “in any such matter as we are committed in Germany.” The War Department’s wish to govern Japan through the Japanese government now apparently got a renewed lease on life. When Truman made his first public demands on the enemy, he asked for “unconditional surrender” solely from the military. As for the American military, it already felt itself too involved in European government, reform, and relief; the United States did not appear to have the endurance to take on more political missions. Indeed, the War Department wondered if it had the perseverance to carry on the war. Since December 1944, Stimson bewailed “the curious characteristic of our noble people,” who are already failing quotas for scrap paper and victory gardens. “They have no more notion that they are in a war [where] sacrifices are needed—just so many children,” he told George Marshall. However, what Stimson sensed in the civilian population was nothing compared to what he observed in army units redeploying from Europe to the Pacific: “These men were weary in a way that no one merely reading reports could readily understand.”
Marshall's own recommendation about unconditional surrender was a bit more subtle than that of Stimson, his civilian boss. The general advised Stimson and the president to change its "precise terminology" into "something which might be psychologically more conducive to the earliest defeat of Japan." Nonetheless, he wanted to retain "the phraseology," implicit recognition that the slogan was primarily a war cry, not a policy. New words would send the wrong signals to America, the Soviet Union, and the enemy. U.S. soldiers and the public might abandon "the firm determination" to fight; the Russians might withhold military "cooperation against Japan"; and the enemy might get the "impression that we are growing soft." This last point, in particular, had to be avoided because it was absolutely true.\textsuperscript{21}

Marshall, the Army's civilian officials, and its general staff all wanted "a precise definition" of unconditional surrender, "which we all agree is difficult to define." It was hoped that a clarification of Allied intentions would encourage the enemy "to accept a rationalized version" of war termination before the end of 1945, something that the head of strategy and policy at the Department of the Army called a "form of negotiated unconditional surrender." This phrase might seem patently illogical; the policy, however, made sense, at least for the U.S. Army. It wanted to retain the emperor to ease the burdens it would have to assume in his absence.\textsuperscript{22} If Japan were not invaded and its home forces not completely destroyed, any occupation would have to depend on indigenous authority and "the good faith of the Japanese." An assault invasion, on the other hand, would destroy the central Japanese government and "normal administrative controls." Then, nothing would exist to "exercise firm authority over [still] undefeated military forces" and "lessen resistance by those Japanese who would accept Imperial commands." One military officer asked the joint war plans committee, "could we handle a situation in which the Japs have several million [men] under arms?"\textsuperscript{23}

Aside from occupation duty, Army officers had immediate concerns on their mind. As military men, they judiciously planned for the worst. Privy to intercepts from the enemy army, as well as propaganda in Japanese newspapers, they heard their opponent planning to bloody the "evil and ugly [American] plutocracy" so badly that it would not "continue an unprofitable war" and would accept the Japanese empire, at least in northeast Asia. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) leaned towards the distinct possibility that "increasing and cumulative devastation to be wrought by prospective military operations may engender a more desperate and bitter resistance" within Japan. According to Marshall: "We had to assume
that a force of 2.5 million Japanese would fight to the death as they did on all those islands we [already] attacked. . . . We felt this despite what [Army Air Force] generals with cigars in their mouths [an obvious reference to Curtis LeMay] had to say about bombing the Japanese into submission. We killed 100,000 Japanese in one raid in one night, but it didn’t mean a thing insofar as actually beating the Japanese.”

Japan’s Supreme War Council, like the U.S. Army, “did not believe that Japan could be defeated by air attack alone.” The U.S. Navy counted 5,000 kamikazes (the enemy actually had 12,725), who were expected to destroy 30 to 40 percent of the initial Allied assaulting force when it invaded the Japanese homeland. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army prepared to attack thousands of caves manned by “determined and fanatical [soldiers] whom we would have to exterminate, almost man by man.” To reduce casualties, Marshall was then in the process of arming his infantry with a host of old and new weapons—body armor, a “super flamethrower,” and poison gas. But, according to one Army study, it “was the single weapon [the atomic bomb] hitherto unused which assuredly can decrease the cost in American lives and should materially shorten the war.”

Before infantry could use any of these instruments on “those last pockets of resistance which had to be wiped out,” they would have to get safely ashore. To accomplish this, Marshall planned to use nuclear bombs (of “cosmic significance”) in a tactical role. They would be “a wonderful weapon [to] protect and prepare for landings” by hitting enemy communications and divisions in reserve. “Straight military objectives,” for atomic weapons, were morally preferable to other targets, such as cities, which had “primordial considerations.” The thought of bombing cities was so distressing to Marshall that he momentarily lost his legendary self-control. He went into the office of the assistant secretary of war rubbing his hands in nervous agitation and saying, “please don’t let them ask me whether or not we should drop the atomic bomb on Japan. That’s just not a military question.”

Along with assorted weapons, from new bombs to body armor, Marshall had one last military suggestion to avoid a “fight to the death.” American forces would by-pass strong points on the southern archipelago and attack less well-defended positions on the Tokyo plain. Thoroughly familiar with America’s tendency to avoid long-distance operations, the imperial army was “absolutely sure” the United States would make a shorter hop. Hence, Japan stripped Honshu of assets to build up Kyushu, where 900,000 soldiers (ten times as many as fought on Okinawa) were ready to
"inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan." Unlike the Germans in northwest Europe, who were deceived about Normandy in June 1944, the Japanese correctly predicted the exact landing locations and the approximate date of the attack shortly before the United States decided what to do itself. 27

The big by-pass operation Marshall suggested (with a ninety-six-page plan on 9 August) was less risky than his similar suggestion in mid-1944 to by-pass the Philippines and head straight towards Japan. In mid-1945, the Japanese Navy and Air Force were largely destroyed except for small suicide boats and planes manned by inexperienced crews. Thus, American bombers out of Okinawa could crater many of Japan’s fifty-five airfields on Kyushu, thereby degrading the kamikaze force by some 25 percent. Next, the U.S. Navy could fake an invasion there, which would have lured the enemy to respond simply because they believed an invasion was apparently occurring. When kamikazes took off on one-way sorties to ram troop transports, there would be nothing on the ocean but cruisers packed stem to stern with antiaircraft guns. After this “turkey shoot” of inexperienced flyers diving on the first target they ever saw, amphibious forces, supported by carriers and battleships, could land on any number of suitable beaches in Honshu. By then, there would not be much resistance from land-based enemy aircraft—or anything else in the face of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Nimitz, heretofore cautious about such undertakings, soon claimed he had gained “complete impunity [to] pound Japan at point-blank range.” 28

Marshall’s concern to by-pass Kyushu was triggered by figures of a massive Japanese build-up collected by Pacific Army intelligence, which predicted that “a very strong and ferocious defense will be interposed at the beaches.” However, Douglas MacArthur rejected Marshall’s suggestion, probably for two reasons. First, MacArthur was stuck on methods that he said “have proved so successful in Pacific campaigns.” Heretofore, he had leaped no farther than U.S. Army Air Force range to support landings and follow-on attacks. “There should not be the slightest thought,” he told Marshall, “of changing the Olympic [Kyushu] operation. Its fundamental purpose is to obtain air bases under cover of which we can deploy your forces to the northward into the industrial heart of Japan.” 29

MacArthur’s second reason for rejecting Marshall’s suggestion (a reason less susceptible to substantiation) is consistent with MacArthur’s behavior throughout his military career. The Inchon operation in Korea (September 1950) attests to his willingness to run risks far greater than the long leap to Honshu—provided the military objective furthered his political or
personal agenda. In World War II, MacArthur’s objective was the assumption of supreme command of all U.S. military forces in the entire Pacific theater. The Navy had not and never would consent to that appointment. But at least, as far as Kyushu was concerned, the JCS had given MacArthur an important concession consistent with his overall objective. For other invasions in the Central Pacific, the senior Army officer had assumed direction only when troops finally hit the ground. For Kyushu, MacArthur was given “primary responsibility for the conduct of [the] operation including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander.” Granted, it was not the supreme command of all forces that Eisenhower had had for Normandy. Nonetheless, it was still a leg up on Nimitz and the Navy and gave MacArthur ultimate authority of 1,300 ships (transports and cargo and landing craft). If the invasion of Kyushu were scrubbed in favor of Honshu, the issue of authority would be reopened, this time in an area of operations beyond the range of MacArthur’s land-based air force—2,800 planes. Then, aircraft carriers (launching some 1,800 planes) would have to provide virtually all close air support and interdiction over the beaches. This would give the Navy a new chance to gain control of the amphibious assault—the single most important (and dramatic) event in the military campaign for Japan.30

Whatever MacArthur’s reasons for insisting on the Kyushu operation, he certainly had not mystified the Japanese; they had already zeroed in on the right beaches. Certainly he was far more sanguine than his own G2 (intelligence). Major General Charles Willoughby had observed the enemy build-up on Kyushu (which the Army Air Force and the Navy had said they would interdict) and told the G3 (operations): “We are [now] in a race against time.” At the highest levels of the Army, Stimson already foresaw a “score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas” and “a suicidal last ditch defense” unless America abandoned its demand for unconditional surrender.31

Leahy would later claim that the effort to state terms that could nullify the need for the invasion was consistent with Roosevelt’s political objectives. Most career diplomats and East Asia experts would probably agree. Led by Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, a former ambassador to Japan, they opposed what they called “a strict” or “rigid interpretation” of unconditional surrender and had “no idea of interfering with the form of the government of Japan.” They wanted to state specific demands and retain the emperor as the “de jure sovereign.” Then, the Japanese people and office holders could be “induced to cooperate” with those specifications and obey the emperor’s directive to disarm. For cover from media
charges of appeasement and pandering to the dynasty, Grew was already hiding behind the Navy’s high command, associating his policy with that of Nimitz and King. Meanwhile, the Truman White House and the State Department’s political appointees had sought different cover of their own. They were more attuned to the rhetorical forms that embellished Roosevelt’s war aims, partly (but not entirely) because they were “fully aware of [what] would be politically acceptable to the American people.”

In July, Archibald MacLeish and Dean Acheson, the assistant secretaries of state for public affairs and Congressional relations, respectively, led the effort to create “a surrender policy for Japan consistent with [the] surrender policy for Germany.” The Pulitzer Prize winning poet and the prominent Washington lawyer both had joined the State Department in senior positions at Roosevelt’s personal initiative. It was ironic, but not unusual, that FDR’s political appointees would undermine his grand strategy. Kept largely in the dark by a president who ran strategy from the White House, neither man had a good idea what was on Roosevelt’s mind. If they had known, they still might not have cared. They exhibited, according to one career diplomat, “a violent reaction” to the idea of retaining the institution of the emperor, which MacLeish called “the basis for much of the beastly behavior of the Japanese.”

MacLeish, far more than the pragmatic president of the United States, was a zealous New Dealer and Wilsonian liberal in domestic and foreign policy. He had hoped to make World War II a crusade for various reforms, from public health delivery systems to world disarmament. Sorely disappointed, he bitterly complained (in 1944) about “the tragic outlook of all liberal proposals, the collapse of all liberal leadership, and the inevitable defeat of all liberal aims.” Conservative Republicans wanted to give Japan specific terms for surrender only slightly worse than the Cairo decree because they rejected the very idea of “teaching [the Japanese] a different form of Government.” For MacLeish, the opportunity to create a new type of Japanese government was a last chance to get the type of peace “which alone will justify this war.”

Acheson, although MacLeish’s oldest and closest personal friend, was not a fervent New Dealer and devotee of Woodrow Wilson. Nor was he the fervent opponent of the Soviet Union that he would become as secretary of state during the Cold War. In 1945, Acheson was a darling of liberal and left-wing publications, largely for fighting inside the State Department against a “soft” peace for Japan, “a totalitarian state.” He might have shared their hopes of reforming Japan’s political institution—but one thing is clear,
he had never made policy distinctions between the Axis powers, Japan and Germany. In mid-1941, Roosevelt, the State Department (especially Joe Grew), the Army, and the Navy had hoped to “reach a modus vivendi with Japan” in order to conduct a one-ocean, one-continent war against the primary threat, Nazi Germany. Acheson, then assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, disagreed and pushed the rest of the administration towards freezing all trade with all Axis nations. The oil embargo he initiated in August 1941 “caused the Japs to decide to go to war,” as he said in 1950. In mid-1945, arguing with Grew, the so-called “Prince of Appeasers,” Acheson said that if the emperor were not important to the militarists, why should “the military element in Japan be so insistent on retaining the Emperor.”

Approaching the same problem from slightly different angles, Acheson and MacLeish arrived at the same policy towards Japan. They were not content—as was Roosevelt and now Leahy and Grew—to maintain “unrestricted strategic control of the Japanese mandated islands” and “a string of additional bases across the Pacific.” Grew maintained that military defeat had already discredited the militarists. Now he merely wanted to allow the rest of Japan “to determine for themselves the nature of their future political structure.” Acheson and MacLeish, on the other hand, had faith in nothing short of long-term occupation “measures applied within Japan.” If the enemy’s domestic institutions were rehabilitated and democratized, MacLeish reasoned that America would not need forward military bases. The world could then move towards what he called “a people’s peace,” not a new balance of power. Acheson, while closer to Clausewitz than Woodrow Wilson, agreed with MacLeish on one major issue: the job of the armed forces was simply to fight for whatever policy the State Department gave it.

This lack of consensus within the American government led to no modification or redefinition in the concept of unconditional surrender that could have helped substantially the peace faction in the enemy’s diplomatic corps. Stimson told Truman that the latter represented “a large submerged class in Japan who did not favor the present war”; after all, it “is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics.” The peace faction was actually a small body of very wealthy men who lived in fear of destruction by American weapons, revolution by indigenous Communists, and assassination by the Japanese Imperial Army. Other U.S. officials, especially Acheson and MacLeish, believed that the peace faction was weak, isolated, and beleaguered in the face of their military masters. One message American intelligence intercepted showed they were “not clear [even] about the views
of the Government and of the Military with regard to the termination of the war."  

At a minimum, the peace faction would need to be able to convince the Japanese Army that they could avoid national humiliation by negotiating what the Army called "peace with honor." This phrase, later used by America in the Vietnam War, was defined by Japan as "the protection of the fundamental character of our government." At most, unnamed parties hinted through Sweden (indirect contacts that could be denied) that although discussions about "the Japanese constitution must be considered as excluded...

the Imperial power could be somewhat democratized" (Italics mine). Unfortunately, the constitution and the character of that government was highly disposed to, when not controlled by, the imperial army. Even Joe Grew, "hoodwinked" by Hirohito according to widely read newspapermen, took a firm public stance that unconditional surrender meant "termination of the influence of the military leaders" (which he communicated in words written for him by MacLeish). Under these general circumstances, according to Japanese officers and diplomats, "it was taboo for us to speak about the problem of peace," let alone compose serious terms "in any concrete form."  

Unconditional surrender, as an ill-defined slogan, did not foreclose any possibility, no matter how horrendous. A quick glance at American speeches, opinion polls, and movies would not reassure Japan. Thirteen percent of the respondents wanted to "kill all Japanese"; another 33 percent wanted to destroy the Japanese state. *Life* magazine showed photos of American war trophies sent home to loved ones in the form of hollowed out Japanese skulls. "This," responded Japan's most popular newspapers and writers, "is American Savagery Unveiled." "Barbarism is a conspicuous characteristic of their history." If Japan capitulates, they said, America will "inflict a general massacre and defile the purity of our blood." "All our men would be made into slaves and all our women would be prostitutes." ("It was a great relief," recalled one former teenager, "when the Americans came and no such things happened.") Less hyperbolic, the minister of foreign affairs wrote a subordinate in 1945: "The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender... Then our country and His Majesty would unanimously resolve to fight a war of resistance to the bitter end."  

The U.S. armed forces overheard all these diplomatic conversations, having broken the enemy's codes. Internal Japanese memos stated that "the Japanese believe that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent
of national extinction." But whatever the U.S. military thought about modifying the slogan, the public had a strong opinion of its own. From late February through June, polls that went directly to the White House, when not printed on the front page of the Washington Post, repeatedly stated that only 10 to 18 percent of Americans approved "working out peace terms" with Japan. The idea of governing through the present dynasty had support from only 3 percent of the public. Another 33 percent wanted to execute Hirohito, 11 percent wanted imprisonment, 9 percent wanted him banished, and 17 percent wanted him tried. Appropriate punishment, presumably, would be determined by the court.40

Public opinion could be confusing. As George Marshall wrote Dwight Eisenhower, "making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses." On the one hand, the nation forbade negotiations and wanted to dispose of Hirohito, with or without the rule of law. On the other hand, it gave so many signs of war weariness that the JCS wondered how to "forestall a Japanese offer of conditional surrender that may be politically and psychologically difficult to refuse." If that happened, America would stop short of the essential objective to "destroy Japanese capacity to start a new war."41

This complex political mosaic might have sent a strong warning to Franklin Roosevelt, who had modified his policy towards Germany in response to public and Congressional opinion about the Morgenthau Plan. One can imagine how public opinion struck Harry Truman, who took office at a most inauspicious time. Editorials in the Post were about the only thing in Washington that publicly challenged unconditional surrender. At the same time, these editorials attacked the Cairo communiqué for just paring down the Japanese empire "to its volcanic core" without "clearly recognizing the necessity of stamping out militarism in Japan." The Post agreed with the War Department's objectives (not the State Department's slogan). Could Truman's first major act as president, thanks to a cerebral hemorrhage, be the repudiation of the war cry of his predecessor who had been elected four times? Unlike the Post, the former vice president could hardly say: "What we are suggesting, to be sure, is conditional surrender. What of it?"42

Truman hung Roosevelt's picture on his White House office wall, like Roosevelt had hung one of Woodrow Wilson. He told one confidant, "I haven't been elected president. . . . I'm going to try to follow Roosevelt's policy as much as possible." Truman should have said that he would follow Roosevelt's policies as he best understood them because he privately admitted he never had a confidential conversation with the president "about
the war, or about foreign affairs, or what [Roosevelt] had in mind for peace after the war." When Truman entered the White House, a heated confrontation was in the making with Russia about the implementation of the negotiations concerning Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Truman spent days laboriously going over the complete record of the Yalta Conference, since every time he read the ambiguous accords he "found new meanings in them." One doubts Truman ever read the Cairo communiqué.

No one is more devoted to a dead president’s slogans than his former understudy. When Truman met the JCS and the service secretaries in June 1945, he said that “he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion” about unconditional surrender. He had already addressed a joint session of Congress three days after he took office, saying that “the vision of our departed Commander in Chief... must and will remain unchanged and unhampered!” (“Unconditional surrender” was the main applause line in the speech.) He had also been advised by his own and Roosevelt’s secretary of state, both of whom he thought were very close to FDR, that anything other than unconditional surrender would seem “too much like appeasement of Japan.” That would produce “terrible political repercussions in the United States” and lead to the “crucifixion of the President.”

Up until the Potsdam Conference between Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, the administration was still not committed “to any particular definition of unconditional surrender,” according to a civilian in the War Department that drafted the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945. In this document, Truman rejected the position of MacLeish and Senate Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley (Democrat, Kentucky), who said that the enemy’s propaganda ministry would use surrender terms to “stiffen the resistance of the Japanese people” by claiming that “war-weary” America was about “to call off the Japanese war.” The official government statement demanded unconditional surrender solely from “the Japanese armed forces,” as had Harry Truman (unofficially) since 8 May. The State Department, which lost the intraagency tug of war on this particular issue, would have included “the emperor, the government, and the people.”

The Potsdam Proclamation retained substantial ambiguity, to the consternation of the State Department, which warned that vague terms, under international law, are “interpreted favorably to the state which accepts them.” All in all, the proclamation represented a compromise position—too strong for America’s professional soldiers and career diplomats but too weak for the political appointees who controlled State Department policy. It was
also too harsh for the peace faction inside the Japanese government, which was too weak to do more “than explain our intention in an indirect way.” As for stipulations concerning the postwar occupation, they went beyond what the Pentagon supported but fell short of the State Department’s objectives: only “points in Japanese territory” (not the entire nation) were to be occupied. “The terms of the Cairo Declaration,” which limited “Japanese sovereignty” to its home islands, was officially superseded. Potsdam demanded “a new [political] order” ensured by a “stern justice [for] all war criminals.” However, those “war criminals” could simply be military men who broke “the laws of war” in the field of operations. If the enemy surrendered on these terms, the Allied occupation was to be withdrawn as soon as its objectives were obtained. If it did not—and “there are no alternatives” to the “objectives we are setting forth”—Japan would be “destroyed as a nation.”

Japanese officials immediately recognized that Potsdam was far more lenient than generally expected and softer than the terms imposed on Germany—which was never offered any terms at all. The Japanese peace faction tried to persuade the emperor that, ipso facto, the document meant the abandonment of unconditional surrender. The military faction considered the document proof that America’s will to fight had eroded and demanded its unequivocal rejection to solidify morale inside Japanese Army ranks. (“For the enemy [the Allies] to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force them also to end the war.”) Whatever way it was interpreted, the proclamation failed its function according to the JCS—that is, “to induce Japan’s surrender and thus avoid the heavy casualties implied in a fight to the finish.” Admittedly, the document said nothing about “the basic point on which acceptance of surrender terms will hinge, the disposition of the Emperor and his dynasty.” Paragraph 7 insisted that “the authority and influence of those who have misled the people of Japan ... must be eliminated for all time.” Whom they were was not specified: you might read the emperor in or out. The U.S. government was vague for a good reason; it had not made up its own mind. The State Department wanted to put Hirohito under “protective custody” and “take over the government of Japan.” The War Department merely wanted to influence “the political action of the enemy government,” which had to be retained to enable a small occupation army to manage the country after the war.

Although far tougher than Roosevelt had been, the Potsdam Proclamation was too soft for some powerful members of the Senate, especially Richard Russell, its strongest proponent of equivalent treatment for both Axis powers, no matter what policy the U.S. Army wanted. In 1864, Yankee
military units had destroyed the Russell family's textile factory when tramping through the South. Historical memory convinced the junior senator from Georgia that national security relied on the use of overwhelming force. He once told a Republican: "You'd be more military minded too if Sherman had crossed [through] North Dakota."

Sherman's march affected Russell in at least two ways. First, like many other Southerners, he carried a grudge against the Army but loved the Navy and Marines, whom he loyally supported on the Naval Affairs Committee. In 1945, when Russell noted that the War Department "has never taken [the] Pacific very seriously," he was not impressed by what was called a "high military authority" who petitioned Harry Truman to retain the emperor of Japan and forgo occupation of the island. Second, Russell wished to emulate Sherman's strategy and policy, making war unmitigated hell so that the vanquished would never challenge the victor again. Specifically, he opposed any terms "unless every Japanese is as firmly convinced as are the people of Germany that they have really lost this war completely." He told his fellow senators—and telegraphed Truman at Potsdam—that leniency would only repeat the mistake made in World War I, when "weak and half-hearted methods" cost America a "golden age of permanent peace." The country should now "carry the war to [Japan] until they beg us to accept their unconditional surrender." In short, they should be "brought groveling to their knees."

The American public backed Russell's hard-line policy with its words but not with its blood. On the one hand, it gave every indication that it insisted on fighting until it had "completely beaten [the enemy] on the Japanese homeland" (84 percent approval noted in a poll). On the other hand, it demanded release from economic rationing, as well as at least partial demobilization, beginning virtually the day Germany surrendered (72 percent approval); the rest wanted something greater than "partial" demobilization. Truman, who was worried about "adverse [military] morale," would later recall that "Congress and Mamma and Papa put such pressure on us that the discharges were much faster than they should have been." The War Department was forced to release 450,000 soldiers from ground combat units at a time when the Army was replacing the Navy as the primary instrument of military power in the Pacific theater. Experienced and decorated infantrymen, whom George Marshall called "the first team," were the first to be discharged; all Medal of Honor winners were released upon request. Next came the men who "make a unit dependable in battle"—the seasoned sergeants and the corporals who "make the wheels go."
The War Department, fearful for “future legislative needs” and a public backlash against the Army, devised this system for demobilization with maximum input from those to be demobilized. Marshall told legislators that thirty statisticians had been sampling opinion since 1943. The general staff told Congress that our “plan is based on the opinion of the soldiers themselves.” Meanwhile, Congress, saying that its “mail on the subject was growing daily,” demanded that the Army “reduce its size immediately by 1 million men.”

The actual system for demobilization was appropriate and proper in the light of common American values. Individuals “who have earned the right to leave [the Army] through long and dangerous service overseas” would have the “first chance at a civilian job,” no small reward considering the fear that peace would reintroduce the Great Depression only ended by mass expenditures for World War II. However, the 75 percent approval of this plan by the rank and file took place at the expense of military capability. The Army had begun to treat GIs as a constituency, not as a military means wherein their lives, let alone their convenience, were “nothing more than tools to be used in the accomplishment of the mission.” Demobilization occurred, as JCS planners feared it would, “regardless of the effect on the prosecution of the Japanese war.”

At best, as Marshall later put it, “demobilization could only be done with reasonable justice on the basis of the individual, and not on that of the units.” Whole divisions were consequently gutted and “made almost unfit for combat.” For example, the 45th Infantry Division, scheduled to invade the main island of Japan in 1946, lost its entire staff of artillery officers, save the artillery commander himself. Eisenhower, observing situations such as this, said it would take at least six more months of training for most European theater divisions designated for the Pacific to be ready to fight Japan.

Training was the least of the Army’s problems. Morale, an essential ingredient, was virtually spent in ETO divisions, including the elite airborne. General Maxwell Taylor tried “to stir up enthusiasm for new worlds to conquer” in the 101st, one of only two Army divisions to have won a Presidential Unit Citation. “We’ve licked the best that Hitler had in France and Holland and Germany. Now where do we want to go?” The heroes of Bastogne and Normandy all screamed: “Home.”

Truman, who gave these and another men thirty-day furloughs in America “to have the best time [they] know how,” wrote Marshall that there “is cause for disciplinary action” for protests over redeployment. Command-
ers in the United States spoke of “a very disturbing situation approaching open sedition” in their infantry divisions. Meanwhile, the War Department released 30,000 soldiers from the Pacific theater in June. It feared a major morale problem if veterans of Europe received preferential treatment vis-a-vis those who had fought longer in the Pacific, “while feeling that they were still being considered a relatively unimportant part of the world war.”

As for replacing savvy but tired veterans with the eager young men who make great marines, Congress proscribed assigning any eighteen-year-olds to army combat units until they received six more months of training. This edict virtually stopped new infantry from reconstituting old divisions. Douglas MacArthur emphatically protested the shortage in replacements to the Army chief of staff and said that if more combat veterans were released, he would have to delay the invasion of Kyushu (scheduled for 1 November) until the spring of 1946. Politically, this seemed a nightmare scenario for George Marshall, who feared military policy would become a partisan issue in an off-year election, thus repudiating the president and creating a divided government during a war. However, instead of fighting the flow of events, Marshall admitted he was desperately trying to keep “one step ahead of public opinion,” Congress, and the press. He did not have many options. In the American governmental system, a desperate appeal to preserve combat capability could not be kept confidential. It thereby would confirm the Japanese Army’s contention that it could still “stave off defeat” because of “war weariness in the United States.”

America’s goal had been “the early unconditional surrender of Japan” and a “rigid interpretation” of the declaration. Its methods ironically included demobilization of those combat soldiers competent to conduct intricate assaults against fortified positions. On more open terrain, inexperienced and mediocre infantry could call in artillery and close air support to clear away obstacles in its path. Now, more difficult and demanding methods would be required. Ground reconnaissance would precede suppressive fire from naval guns to light mortars, all working to get tanks and flamethrowers in position to shoot down the mouth and close up a cave. Each situation would be different, depending on everything from the enemy’s position on slopes to the precise gradients of hills. It hardly seemed the time or place for on-the-job military training.

America, like a Greek melodrama, needed a deus ex machina to solve its insoluble dilemma on open display before the Japanese. Enemy intelligence stated that partial demobilization and industrial reconversion already
aroused U.S. optimism “for an early termination of the war.” On the other hand, a protracting list of casualties would contribute “to decreased fighting morale among the [American] people and the military.” With U.S. resolve so brittle, the Japanese Army reasoned that a climactic battle on the beaches would force America to make a compromise peace. That was the strategic setting on 6 August, when one specially modified B-29 took off from the Marianas to test the JCS assumption that, individuals notwithstanding, Japan “as a whole is not pre-disposed toward national suicide.” The plane dropped a weapon on Hiroshima that, according to Japanese newspapers, “ignored basic human principles.”

On 10 August, after America dropped the only other atomic bomb in its arsenal—but warned of “a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth”—the emperor overruled the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese Army still had 2.35 million men under arms inside Japan, not having suffered the massive devastation that had been inflicted on the Japanese Air Force and Navy. In fact, the Japanese sneered at their erstwhile Axis ally for surrendering when only some 2.5 million Russians had fought their way through Berlin. The Germans lacked the “Bushido” tradition, commented the Japanese press. Now, the imperial armed forces pleaded for the chance to “find life in death.” “If we are prepared to sacrifice 20,000,000 Japanese lives in a special attack [kamikaze] effort, victory shall be ours!”
Ironically, Hiroshima turned out to be the military’s face-saving device, one more powerful than an American abrogation of unconditional surrender. The emperor could now annul the unwritten constitution and capitulate without challenging the valor of the Japanese Army. One member of the peace faction would confidentially tell an American interrogator that the atomic bomb “was a good excuse” for surrender. More typical citizens would still tell American reporters that the United States “would [never] have dared attempt a seaborne invasion.” On 15 August, Hirohito made his first and last radio broadcast to his nation: “The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage. [Military defeat, per se, was never mentioned.] Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.”

Lest the “whole nation be reduced to ashes” by the hundred atomic bombs America was thought to have, the imperial government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, “with the understanding that [it] does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” Actually, the Allied terms only offered “sovereignty” for the Japanese nation, not the dynasty per se. The rulers of the island were insisting (as one Japanese diplomat confirmed) that there would be no change in the political institutions of imperial Japan, even if no Japanese empire was left standing to rule. These men were accepting, twenty months too late, the sole demand of the Cairo Conference for the liquidation of all overseas possessions. By now this was “conditional surrender,” according to NBC radio news.

In reply to Japan’s offer, Truman issued a carefully drawn compromise position between the doves in the War Department, who thought “the Emperor was a minor matter,” and the hawks at State, who wanted his head. He did not demand Hirohito’s abdication nor expressly guarantee the existence of the throne. He did specify that “the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule that state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper” to fulfill the Potsdam Declaration. This was exactly what the War Department wanted—the chance to rule Japan through the Japanese—because it knew it would never have enough manpower to rule Japan on its own. Truman’s conditions were nonnegotiable, no matter how Hirohito saved face by proclaiming “the cessation of hostilities” (he never said “surrender”) and claiming he had “been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State.” Truman, for his part, could maintain
that there “is no qualification” and that “the war lords of Japan and the Japanese armed forces have surrendered unconditionally.” He probably crossed his fingers and hoped that the more hawkish elements in the government and the general public would agree. Up until the end, America had not yet decided exactly how to define unconditional surrender (whether, in the application of such a term, a verbal nicety such as “no contractual elements” was more important than one specifying “not subject to conditions” at all) and whether they should execute the emperor, even if he seemed willing to serve an occupation army.61

Whatever the rest of America felt, the president was happy to end the war on the basis of his verbal exchange with Japan. A proud former field artillery officer, Truman had no moral qualms about tactical nuclear weapons. They simply enhanced the combat power of his old military branch. “A half dozen batteries with atomic explosives can wipe out an entire front on the other side.” But “I never had a happy feeling,” he later confessed, “about killing non-combatants by dropping a bomb . . . That would have been murder.” Consequently, Truman fed himself a fable that Hiroshima was selected for “proper military purposes” and that “soldiers and sailors are the target, not women and children.” In fact, according to Stimson, the bomb was dropped to “administer a tremendous shock that would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire.” (If it could horrify George Marshall, the seasoned soldier who employed it, it should impress Hirohito, the cardboard warrior on the receiving end.) 62

According to the Potsdam Declaration, the destruction of Japan was not part of unconditional surrender. It certainly was implied in the atomic bomb that administered the shock Stimson stipulated—and faster than almost anyone expected. John McCloy, the assistant secretary of war, would call it “a bolt out of heaven” and the greatest military surprise “since the Trojan horse.” In Washington and the Philippines, American colonels and lieutenant generals admitted they were surprised; the government was stunned. Stimson was about to take a vacation when Japan surrendered. Truman had just requested formulation of a reconversion plan, due on his desk at the end of the month. Before he got it, he too was in a mild state of bomb shock. He complained of dreadful headaches as he mumbled that he desperately wanted to end the war: he could not stand wiping out more cities and killing “all those kids.”63

Elements of the U.S. government still insisted on hard-core versions of unconditional surrender. The American Embassy in Tokyo forwarded Hirohito’s name on a list of individuals facing military trial—that is, before
the War Department terminated the process and perhaps the unnamed State Department official responsible for the action. Richard Russell, trying to take the issue out of the hands of the executive branch, introduced a bill that would force the government to try the emperor as a war criminal. Unopposed on the Senate floor, it died in committee, apparently from general neglect. Historians have pondered how quickly the public’s hatred for Hirohito vanished after surrender. Most of the American people were simply too tired and too grateful for having avoided an invasion of Japan and the necessity for a hostile occupation to pay sustained attention to Hirohito’s retention. The possibility that the United States might not have won the war exactly as the president said it had was no longer a vital issue. Truman must have been relieved, for he had risked his political career. The JCS were not surprised. They had spent the war worrying that the public will would exhaust itself short of achieving the unconditional surrender of Japan. Perhaps it had, although no one would admit it.64
NOTES


3. Marshall, in Frank Capra’s movie for the Army, Two Down and One to Go (1945); Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Report to President and Prime Minister,” Memorandum by United States Chiefs of Staff, 29 June, Foreign Relations of the United States: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, 1:911 (hereafter referred to as FRUS); for casualty estimates, see the various government documents printed in the annex of Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race (New York: Knopf, 1975), esp. 342, 346–47, 357. In the recent public controversy around the Smithsonian exhibit on the atomic bomb (1995), some historians at press conferences and in political publications said that George Marshall estimated that it would cost America between 30,000 and 60,000 casualties for the conquest of the home islands. In scholarly journals, at least one of these historians admits that this figure only applied to the first thirty days of ground operations necessary just to conquer southern Kyushu at a time when there were some 350,000 enemy defenders there. These initial estimates assumed “effective surprise as to the point of the landing,” something America never really had. (As stated below, the Japanese anticipated the exact locations of the planned invasion.) When America dropped the atomic bomb on 6 August, almost 900,000 Japanese defenders were in Kyushu; see Edward Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 202, 222. Compare Barton J. Bernstein, “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs 74 (January-February 1955):149, with Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender...,” Diplomatic History (Spring 1995):232.


8. The quote is from a description of Franklin Roosevelt by Sumner Wells (his personal friend, Groton school classmate, and World War II undersecretary of state), as quoted in John L. Chase, "Unconditional Surrender Reconsidered," Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955):272–75. Although Americans have written numerous books that discussed "unconditional surrender," the only discussion of its different definitions is in Makoto Iokibe, "American Policy towards Japan's 'Unconditional Surrender,'" The Japanese Journal of American Studies 1 (1981):19–53. "Unconditional surrender," as a battle cry, was as meaningful a statement of war aims as "Remember the Maine" was in the Spanish-American War.


10. Major General George Strong, in Minutes of Special Meeting, JCS Post-War Committee, 10 March 1945, RG 165, Box 505; "Comparison of the Proclamation of July 26, 1945 with the Policy of the Department of State," attached to Minutes, Secretary's Staff Committee (hereafter referred to as SSC), 25 July 1945, State Department Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


15. Iriye, Culture and Power, 163; Premier Suzuki, 9 June 1945, quoted in Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender, 69; interrogation of 700 Japanese officials summarized in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War, 1946, 5.

16. FRUS: Cairo and Teheran, 323, 389, 532, 554, 864; John Patton Davies, Jr. (who attended the Cairo Conference as political adviser to the CBI theater commander), Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another (New York: Norton, 1972), 279–80; GCM Interviews, 326. One can only speculate whether Stalin was purposely trying to keep the United States out of Japan to ensure Soviet control of northeast Asia after World War II. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, thought “Stalin was afraid of Roosevelt. Whenever Roosevelt spoke, he sort of watched him with a certain awe”; see Harriman, quoted in Stikes, “The Good War”: An Oral History of World War II (New York: Ballantine, 1985), 328.

17. For American military disputes and the quote from Leahy, see Charles F. Brower, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and War with Japan,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1987, 194–97; Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, 259; FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 765–67, 810; FRUS, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, 1300; for the opinion of the admirals on unconditional surrender, see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 69–70. At the Teheran Conference, which divided the Cairo Conference into sessions 1 and 2, Roosevelt left maps of the Pacific theater on his desk while he, Churchill, and Stalin discussed the war in Europe.


19. Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, to Secretary Stimson, 28 May 1945, in Kai Bird, The Chairman, John J. McCloy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 243; and McCloy, “Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Subject: JCS 1340/1,” 20 May 1945, RG 165, Box 504; Stimson, Memorandum for President, 2 July 1945, Stimson Diary; Stimson’s description of himself in 1947, quoted in Stimson to Frankfurter, 12 December 1946, Stimson Papers; the final quote is from Joseph C. Grew (identified below), Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), 2:1426; for positions of Truman, Leahy, Stimson, and Marshall, discussed in this and subsequent paragraphs below, see minutes of White House meeting, 18 June 1945, and other documents reprinted in Sherwin, World Destroyed, 337, 355, 357–58, 361–62.


Library, Lexington, VA. Marshall essentially agreed with Cordell Hull, secretary of state until 1945, who said that after FDR stated unconditional surrender “so emphatically at Casablanca,” everyone had “to follow it at least in form,” although it still “required explanation”; see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1571.

22. For Marshall, Stimson, Brigadier General George A. Lincoln (chief of strategy and policy at the War Plans Division), Major General Craig (acting assistant chief of staff), and the JCS staff, all on changing the formula for unconditional surrender, State-War-Navy meeting, 12 June 1945, in Forrestal Diaries, 68-69; Brower, “Sophisticated Strategist,” 333–36; Brian L. Villa, “The U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and the Potsdam Proclamation,” Journal of American History 63 (June 1976): 82–83. Several very intelligent people in the War and State Departments performed verbal gymnastics attempting to avoid the invasion of Japan. Aside from General Lincoln’s proposal for two “negotiated unconditional surrenders,” Dr. Leo Paolovsky, head of special projects at State, tried to make a distinction between the “treatment” and the “terms” of unconditional surrender. Japan might not be granted special terms, but their treatment “would vary with the circumstances”; see Minutes, SSC Meeting, 19 July 1945.

23. Joint Intelligence Staff, 141/3, 14 April 1945, RG 165, Box 505; JCS, Memorandum for Information No. 390, “Unconditional Surrender of Japan,” 29 April 1945, RG 165, Box 505; “Memorandum of Comments on Ending the Japanese War,” n.d., RG 165, Box 166; and Craig to General Handy, 26 July 1945, RG 165, Box 505; Joint Intelligence Committee, 128th Meeting, 20 April 1945, RG 218, Box 63, Colonels Jacobs and Schmidt, general staff, “Informal Comments on JCS 1275/3,” 11 May 1945, RG 165, Box 260; JCS, Minutes of Joint Post-War Committee, 10 March 1945, RG 165, Box 505—all in the National Archives, Washington, DC; O. T. Pfeiffer, Comment on JWPC 253/2, 20 April 1945, World War II Strategic Plans Division, Box 163, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.


28. Newman, *Truman and Hiroshima Cult*, 20; Skates, *Invasion of Japan*, 191–203; Nimitz (25 January 1946), quoted in Louis Morton, “Decision to Use Atomic Bomb,” 517; for the effectiveness of an American invasion feint and the bombing of air bases on Kyushu, both during the invasion of Okinawa, see Roy E. Appleman, et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1948), 49, 74. The Navy was already planning a less-elaborate deception than the one this author outlines to get the kamikazes to attack a phantom invasion of Kyushu two weeks before the real invasion was to take place in November 1945; see letter from Commander (Ret.) Lewis Walker, in *Parameters* 25 (Spring 1995):116–17.


30. JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 25 May 1945, quoted in Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 706; Wayne A. Silket, “Downfall: The Invasion That Never Was,” *Parameters* 24 (Autumn 1994):113–14. Compare MacArthur’s response to the proposal to go directly to Honshu with his response to JCS critics who would say that Inchon was “the worst possible place ever selected for an amphibious landing.” MacArthur told them “the very arguments you have made as to the impracticabilities will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise”; for quotations, see Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 544, 555; and D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970–1985), 3:469. Surprise, so important at Inchon, would have been nonexistent at Kyushu.

31. Willoughby, 28 July 1945, quoted in Newman, *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult*, 56; Stimson, 10 August, quoted in Barton J. Bernstein, “The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb,” *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (February 1977):5; Stimson, Memorandum for President, 16 July 1945, *FRUS: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, 2:1265. Mid-1945 was not the last time MacArthur dismissed the cautions of Major General Willoughby. In mid-November 1950, Willoughby counted over 64,000 Communist Chinese soldiers in North Korea and growing daily. MacArthur thought there were 25,000 to 30,000 maximum. In two weeks, they would find out that there were over 300,000. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Philip B. Davidson worked for Willoughby in Korea as a thirty-five-year-old lieutenant colonel, briefed MacArthur directly, came to the conclusion that he (MacArthur) was his own J2, and was told by an officer who had briefed MacArthur in the Pacific that this was also true in World War II (Davidson interviewed by Pearlman, 23 August 1995).

32. Leahy, *I Was There*, 385; for quotations per different State Department positions, see Joseph Ballantine (director of Office of Far Eastern Affairs), “Treatment of Japan,” *SSC*, 1 January 1945, and Ballantine to Grew, 6 August 1945, *FRUS: Japan*, 6:587; for Grew’s views on Japan, his concern with media attacks on appeasement, and the notion of using the Navy for public support, see *SSC* Meetings, 19 February, 8 March, and 28 May 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC. Leon Sigal’s excellent book, *Fighting to a Finish*, postulates that political appointees—Archibald MacLeish, Dean Acheson, and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (all discussed below)—simply mirrored public opinion. This was probably true of Byrnes, who saw Truman as a caretaker and himself as a future president—provided he avoided some terrible political mistake that buried both of them. The hypothesis is far less true for MacLeish and Acheson, both of whom were looking forward to leaving the government at the time they argued vehemently against retaining the emperor.

33. MacLeish to Secretary of State, 6 July, *FRUS: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, 1:895–97, 901; Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: New American Library, 1970), 42, 46, 131; for their debates with career diplomats, see Iriye, *Power and Culture*, 255–56; Acheson and MacLeish, described by Eugene Dooman, as quoted in David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976), 52; MacLeish at *SSC* Meeting, 28 May 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC. When Averell
Harriman, another Roosevelt appointee, was a special assistant to Roosevelt's special assistant, Harry Hopkins, he was in the proverbial loop. Once "demoted" to ambassador to the Soviet Union, he became what Hopkins called a "cookie-pushing pansie" in the State Department. Then Harriman would have to go to the Russian foreign office to find out what was happening in Washington; see Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 756, 777.


38. For the various fears of the peace faction, see Newman, *Truman and Hiroshima Cult*, 43, 56; Imperial Adviser Koichi Kido and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, quoted in Butow, *Japan’s Decision to Surrender*, 114, 124; Minister of Sweden to Secretary of State, 6 April 1945, *FRUS: Japan, 1945*, 6:477; Drew Pearson, nationally syndicated newspaper columnist, on Grew in *Washington Post*, 18 August 1945, 20; Grew quoted in *New York Times*, 11 July 1945, 2; Minutes, SSC Meeting, 10 July 1945; how to respond to Pearson and similar attacks by Walter Winchell were subjects in State Department meetings, see SSC, 19 February and 10 July 1945; Japanese naval and foreign service officers, quoted in Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb,” 239, 242; and Bix, “Japan’s Delayed Surrender,” 224. Bernstein and Bix both believe, as does Butow, that Stimson strongly overstated the influence of the peace faction on Japanese policy.


42. When newspapers and Republicans criticized the Morgenthau Plan to dismantle German industry, FDR claimed that he had not endorsed the proposal and privately told Henry Stimson that “he had no idea how he could have initiated this.” Stimson replied: “Mr. President, I don’t like you to dissemble with me,” see Robert Dalleck, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 477; and Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867–1950 (New York: Knopf, 1990), 231; “Now Japan,” Washington Post, 9 May 1945, 10; along with an angry letter to the editor, the paper reiterated its hard conditions for a conditional surrender, in “Editor’s note,” 13 May 1945, 4B; I have never seen the Post repeat an editorial in space devoted to criticism of its editorial positions. Nationally syndicated newspaper columnist, Barnet Nover, “Unconditional Surrender or What,” in Washington Post, 12 July 1945, 12, made another explicit attack on the Cairo Declaration. Nover was particularly close to Truman, receiving the first exclusive interview the new president gave to a journalist—although it was not for the column on 12 July.


44. Truman, quoted at White House meeting reproduced in Sherwin, World Destroyed, 361; “Address to Congress,” 16 April 1945, Truman Public Papers, 1:3; and McCullough, Truman, 359; Truman’s political advice came from Cordell Hull (secretary of state, 1933 to 1945); see Memoirs, 1594, and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, as quoted in Bernstein, “Perils and Politics of Surrender,” 4–5. Truman seems to have appointed Byrnes because of his so-called knowledge of Yalta and FDR’s policies in general. In fact, Roosevelt kept both Byrnes and Hull in the dark but hoped to use these former senators to win Congressional approval for his treaties; see Gallicchio, Cold War Begins in Asia, 41.

45. Mark Howe, 28 June 1945, quoted in Newman, Truman and Hiroshima Cult, 68; Cline, Washington Command Post, 345; Barkley, quoted in New York Times, 13 July 1945, 3; MacLeish, in Minutes, SSC Meeting, 26 July 1945; “Comparison of Proclamation of July 26, 1945 with Policy of State Department,” SSC, 25 July 1945.


47. Japanese officials described and quoted, ibid., 263; Bix, “Japan’s Delayed Surrender,” 208; Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender, 148; Newman, Truman and Hiroshima Cult, 70–72; Major General
H. A. Craig, “Memorandum for General Handy, Subject: Status of Action on ‘Military Aspects of Unconditional Formula for Japan,”’ 13 July 1945, RG 165, Box 505; “Comparison of Proclamation of July 26 1945 with Policy of State Department,” 26 July 1945, SSC. Because the United States desperately needed the emperor as a figurehead if it were to occupy Japan with less than ninety divisions, Army prosecutors would later sanitize Hirohito’s actual record of active participation in the war; see Bix (above), 201.


49. For statements in movies and magazines similar to that of Russell, see Dower, War Without Mercy, 50, 56; public opinion polls, for 1 and 23 June 1945, in Sigal, Fighting to a Finish, 95, and Gallup, Gallup Poll, 1:510–11; for Truman on morale, see Marshall, Memorandum for Secretary of War, 1 August 1945, Marshall Research Library, Lexington, VA; Truman, discussion with Royse, 12 March 1945 [1954], Post-Presidential Files, Box 9, Truman Library, Independence, MO; War Department Demobilization Plan, n.d., attached to Acting Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to Congressman George B. Schwabe, 20 July 1945, Official File, Box 674, Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO; Marshall, “Remarks on Demobilization of the Army to Members of Congress, 20 Sept. 1945,” Papers of George C. Marshall: Selected World War II Correspondence, Reel 11 (microfilm series).

50. Chief of Army legislative and liaison division to Marshall, 29 April 1945, quoted in John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1952), 113; Marshall, “Remarks on Demobilization to Congress,” 4–5; for subsequent quotes in this and the following paragraph, see Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, 24 July 1945; Brigadier General R. W. Berry to Congressman Carl T. Durham, August 1945, and Major General Ray Porter, “Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 1 August 1945; all in RG 165 (GI Personnel), Boxes 555 and 556, National Archives, Washington, DC; Senators Edwin Johnson (Democrat-Colorado) and Homer Capehart (Republican-Indiana), as quoted (and others) cited in New York Times, 23 July 1945, 11.


54. “Special Message to Congress on Winning the War,” 1 June 1945, Truman Public Papers, 2:93–94; Truman to Marshall, 18 August 1945, President’s Secretary’s File, Box 157, Truman Library, Independence, MO; Major General Harry Twaddel, commander, 95th Infantry Division, quoted in Skates, Invasion of Japan, 69; Marshall, “Remarks on Demobilization to Congress,” 3, 7; the final quote is from Marshall Interview, 23 June 1947, Robert Sherwood MSS, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

56. JCS (30 June 1944), quoted in Ray Cline, *Washington Command Post*, 338; my estimate of what infantry battles would have been like on the home islands is based on the U.S. experience at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, as told in George Feifer, *Tennosan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992), passim, and in personal conversations with Colonel (Ret.) Leland Alexander, who got his battlefield commission at Iwo.


64. The list of names of alleged war criminals to face international trial was sent from Tokyo to the secretary of state, with an information copy going to the War Department as a standard procedure. The chief of the Operational Plans Division was on duty, contacted the secretary of war, and stopped the procedure, see General John Hull, *Oral History*, April 1974.

Nobody spoke against the Russell bill, which (while harsh) was consistent with Senate Democratic party policy enunciated by Majority Leader Barkley, as mentioned above. Those speaking
for the bill included Senators J. William Fulbright, who would later lead the Senate against the Vietnam War, and Glen Taylor, who would run for vice president against Truman on the Henry Wallace-Progressive party ticket in the 1948 election. A search of the National Archives revealed nothing about the Russell bill (S.J. Res. 94) after it was sent to committee, see Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Session, 8675–78. The contemporary American left seems to think that the hard-line stance against Japan was an excuse to use the atomic bomb to intimidate the Soviet Union. In point of fact, in 1945, many representatives of the American left—Taylor, McLeish, Alger Hiss, the Lawyer’s Guild, the American Veteran’s Committee, The Nation, The New Republic magazines, and the American Communist Party—all opposed any so-called appeasement of Japan, wanted to try Hirohito as a war criminal, and, in several cases, expressly approved the use of the atomic bomb; see Irey, Power and Culture, 167; Bernstein, “Perils and Politics of Surrender,” 6; Charles Bolte, “The Last War Front,” Nation 175 (25 August 1945):177; Bruce Bliven, “The Bomb and the Future,” New Republic 113 (20 August 1945):212; “Challenge to Humanity,” and “War Not Yet Over,” Daily Worker, 8 August 1945, 6 and 9 August 1945, 5. For comments (and wonder) about the rapid dissipation of public hatred for Hirohito, see Sigal, Fighting to a Finish, chapter 6.
Dr. Michael D. Pearlman has worked at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since 1986 and has taught history for the Combat Studies Institute since 1989. He has a doctorate in history from the University of Illinois and a master’s degree from the University of Chicago. Aside from CSI, he has taught at the Universities of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Nebraska. His first book, *To Make Democracy Safe for America*, was published in 1984. This present study on World War II is part of a manuscript on policy in American wars from the colonial period to Desert Storm that Pearlman has just completed.

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