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THESIS

NATO: FROM SHADOW TO SUBSTANCE - THE FORMATIVE YEARS—INSIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

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June 2007

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NATO: from Shadow to Substance - the Formative Years---Insights for the 21st Century

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Critics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have denigrated its purpose and scoffed at its principles of consensus and sharing the burdens of defense. To many, it has been flawed from the outset as concerns its American business principles, false promise of democracy, and claim to be a basis for durable peace in Europe. Yet NATO may be the most successful security institution in modern history, even as it wages war for the second time in a decade. This study assesses underlying causes for this success by examining NATO’s foundation, against the background of war and peace in 20th century Europe. Embracing the discipline of history as the ideal method of inquiry to discover the essence of this alliance as well as the fundamental issues of democracy and collective defense in the 21st century this study contains a thorough examination of NATO’s origins and general principles of same for the present. Covering NATO from its inception, well before the end of the 1939-1945 war, until the 1949 signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, this work contains an inventory of historical knowledge to provide a comprehensive history of NATO’s formation and a full appreciation of the conditions within which related decisions were made.
NATO: FROM SHADOW TO SUBSTANCE - THE FORMATIVE YEARS---INSIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

Critics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have denigrated its purpose and scoffed at its principles of consensus and sharing the burdens of defense. To many, it has been flawed from the outset as concerns its American business principles, false promise of democracy, and claim to be a basis for durable peace in Europe. Yet NATO may be the most successful security institution in modern history, even as it wages war for the second time in a decade. This study assesses underlying causes for this success by examining NATO’s foundation, against the background of war and peace in 20th century Europe. Embracing the discipline of history as the ideal method of inquiry to discover the essence of this alliance as well as the fundamental issues of democracy and collective defense in the 21st century this study contains a thorough examination of NATO’s origins and general principles of same for the present. Covering NATO from its inception, well before the end of the 1939-1945 war, until the 1949 signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, this work contains an inventory of historical knowledge to provide a comprehensive history of NATO’s formation and a full appreciation of the conditions within which related decisions were made.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

1. NATO the Organization, Implications for Grand Strategy and Policy

The story of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might well be the tale of those who have denigrated its purpose, and scoffed at its principles of consensus and sharing of the burdens of defense. In the eyes of its many critics, the organization has been flawed from the outset as concerns its American business principles, its false promise of democracy, and its claim to be something that it manifestly is not in the minds of such critics, namely a durable basis for peace in Europe. Yet NATO has flourished for almost sixty years amid its perpetual crises and in spite of its doubters’ endless barrage of scorn. The present study seeks to explain this phenomenon of contradiction through an examination of the foundation of the alliance as a means of explicating its core principles of values as applied to the methods of collective defense. In the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo operation, certain makers of US military policy decried formal alliances and their methods of operation, especially those of achieving consensus. Such was especially the case in the wake of the September 11, 2001 assaults in the initial U.S. riposte at arms. In particular, the critics of the recent past have put forward the unilateralist and tub-thumping ideal of the mission defining the coalition as a means to short-circuit what the critics see as unnecessary constraints on US power.

a. Contemporary View

NATO has endured into this century with two rounds of enlargement and new peace enforcement and security missions that represent a strategic and diplomatic revolution when compared to the tasks of the early 1980s. Indeed, NATO may well be the most successful security institution at promoting peace and economic well-being in modern history, even as it wages war for the second time in a decade. This study assesses underlying causes for this curious fact through an examination of NATO’s
organization and foundation, set against the background of war and peace in Europe in the 20th century. Other institutions of collective security, specifically the League of Nations (LoN) and the United Nations (UN), arose to prevent war in the wake of catastrophes, but neither has proven as effective in this regard as NATO. Here arises the question of collective defense versus collective security – why one has succeeded where the other failed. These ideals and the institutions that embody them have undergone an important transformation in the modern epoch, a process which is at the basis of security, defense, and military policy in the Euro-Atlantic realm.

The UN has subordinate elements that provide relief and assistance to states and people around the world. However, it does not have sufficient means and methods to form a policy of peace enforcement and then execute same with military force. Article 51 of the UN Charter made allowance for regional organizations for collective defense, an important clause which has been underappreciated in the 21st century. The Security Council depends on the world’s great powers, which seldom agree on matters of the limited application of military force to the ends of collective security, granted the conflicts between the members of the Security Council and beyond. Subsequent to NATO’s establishment, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded with peace in Europe as a priority. It has now evolved into the European Union (EU), but in its stage as the European Economic Community (EEC), and in partnership with NATO, it brought prosperity to Western Europe as a fundamental element of security there. European history is rife with conflict and was the battlefield for most of both world wars. There has not been a global war since 1945, but, unfortunately, there have been numerous regional conflicts and wars in later years. Yet, none of these has occurred in the area established for the North Atlantic Treaty. This work will explain why this is the case, answering the question: How did NATO come about? As a historical narrative, it will do so by exploring the reasons for the Treaty, incorporating the rationale for its creation, and the way the institution arose from the European uncertainty and despair of World War II.
b. Levels of Policy as Applied to the Individual

As a European Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) in the Marine Corps, this author expects to be called upon to conduct research and provide insight or recommendations that support the decision-making process of senior staff officers, a commander, or an ambassador in the execution of U.S. foreign, security and defense policy. This writer’s experience in preparing Marines to serve the United States’ national interests in Bosnia in 1995 and 1996 gave him an awareness that will serve him well as a European RAO in two ways. First, he gained a tremendous appreciation for the value of regional expertise. While he did not become well-versed in the culture or politics of former Yugoslavia, he did draw on a wide array of resources and individuals, thereby gaining an appreciation for the complexity of the relationships among the inhabitants of southeast Europe. As a RAO, understanding the way political, social and cultural groups relate to one another, and the factors that define these relationships, is imperative. Second, he became aware from the tactical level onwards of NATO’s role and capability relative to other political and social institutions in Europe and beyond. This enlightenment has resulted in his continuing desire to understand the dynamics involved in the Euro-Atlantic relationship, and his enrollment in a program through which he can explore that subject in great depth. This thesis emerged from this nexus of personal and professional experience. Amid this combination of field experience, at the very lowest level of policy, and the pleasure of advanced study, he has often discovered knowledge of factors and events beyond what are typically addressed within the common scope of how NATO as an organization works in theory and in fact. This knowledge has made him contemplate the influence of those now remote but nonetheless essential factors and events on the statesmen who established the alliance in the 1940s and developed the institution in the subsequent decade, and inspired this thesis. The study that follows reflects the attempt by this writer to answer questions about the essence of NATO the organization that go beyond the doubts and scorn of the critics of the alliance. The hope is that the higher insight of the statesmen and soldier diplomats who fashioned the alliance may have more to say to men and women at arms in the 21st century than certain
unilateralist journalists and members of the polarized chattering classes in this country or Europe would allow.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY FOR SERVING OFFICERS

1. History

The present study rests on the premise that the clearest manner to discover the essence of the alliance, as well as fundamental issues of democracy and collective defense, even in the 21st century, is through an examination its origins and the genesis of its operational code in the past. That is, this study eschews the cult of present-ism found in so many other studies written by this writer’s colleagues. Instead, it embraces the discipline of history as the ideal method of inquiry. An examination of NATO’s formation, it covers the alliance from its inception in the realm of ideas and practice, well before the end of the 1939-1945 war until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Further, this study considers the interests of the Soviet Union and, in doing so, includes influences of state politics and events beyond its own membership and the region it was chartered to serve. Thus, the present work provides a more comprehensive understanding of the issues related to NATO’s formation than other works on the subject, and it provides a historical format beneficial to other observers who may choose to follow this study with a similar examination from a more Soviet-oriented perspective. Additionally, as nation-states around the globe are increasingly developing their economic capabilities, they are forming regional economic associations and considering methods by which they can protect the successes borne by these regional enterprises. NATO has provided the world with a noteworthy example of regional peace through integrated economic and military capacity. It has endured as an alliance despite the fall of communism in Europe, and of the Soviet Union due, in part, “to the non-military utility of NATO and its capacity to act as a force for stability in an uncertain post-Cold War world.”

interest, this work on NATO’s formation can offer issues for statesmen to consider when establishing those newer regional institutions.

2. Lessons

The pre and early history of NATO, from 1944 to until 1950, signifies a remote period in the minds of young officers and defense civilians interested in the past and present of war and peace in Europe form the perspective of the early 21st century. In the view of many in the chattering classes in the first years of the present century, NATO has seemed, to many, like a tired, worn out thing, destined for the junk heap. These distant years are solely connected with the end of the Second World War and the rise of US-Soviet antagonism. Oddly enough, and in contrast to such a tendentious view, the alliance is now fully engaged in the 21st century at war and peace, and, as a consequence, the question must arise what insights about statecraft, diplomacy, and strategy can be gleaned from the origins of NATO, and what does this story have to say to the present, amid a world of proliferating chaos and war?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. History and Policy

The scholarship on NATO as it has evolved since the 1950s forms the basis for this work. Such scholarship in the realm of political science has been joined since the 1980s by the writing of contemporary historians, which forms the second pillar of this study. Numerous authorities have written on the subject of NATO’s formation and development with variation in depth, breadth, and focus. While each pays tribute to history in some way, most works begin coverage of the subject after the end of World War II. While this is an understandable point of departure for European history in general, the basic principle and concepts inherent within NATO existed well before its time, and much writing on this institution is too narrow in scope. Some authors address
NATO’s conceptual origins briefly, only as a foundation for their deeper exploration of its formation, or address the advent of NATO as background information for their various arguments.

Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, wrote a concise history of the alliance’s first five years. His first chapter touches on the institution’s historical background, but does so lightly. The remainder is written with an over-riding view on the institution’s development from a perspective internal to the alliance and among its members. It is a useful chronology and introduction to NATO and its development, but is limited in its detail of political events surrounding the alliance. Perhaps it was timely propaganda to celebrate the resolution of the German rearmament issue, which brought a great relief to member states after years of negotiations, debate, and frustration. However limited this contemporary work might have been, Ismay and his staff nonetheless highlighted the key facts and themes of the foundation of an organization to effectuate the ideals and values of the alliance.

Writers who focus on a specific aspect of the alliance’s development address its history only on a few points, and do cover them in depth. Examples include the process of engaging the United States in an enduring peacetime military treaty, the importance of Germany to Europe’s recovery, or how the alliance members interacted amongst themselves. In his book designed to “demonstrate the importance of traditional intra-European politics in shaping … the U.S. commitment to Europe,” Timothy Ireland explores the rationale for unprecedented U.S. foreign policy changes after World War II as exhibited by the United States’ role in NATO. As he does, Ireland criticizes the traditional view of U.S. involvement as merely a function of the Cold War, and asserts a dual-purpose motive. In the near term, he writes, the United States wanted to allow Europe to recover from the war without Soviet interference. The long-term US goal was to restore the balance of power in Europe through a unity of western nation-states

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3 Ibid.
offsetting the rising Soviet Union in a proactive way that would share that burden with Europe, instead of retracing the steps of history in which the United States reacted to European matters. He identifies the possibility of a renewed German threat to Europe as the central issue for initial U.S. involvement in the security of Western Europe after the war. Further, he recognizes that the differences among Allies over Germany’s future during the 1947 post-war treaty negotiations in Moscow signaled the turning point for US policy on Europe.

Ireland also covers the United States’ domestic debate over Germany’s future and the idea of an alliance with Europe in great detail, clearly illustrating the divergent outlooks of traditional isolationism and progressive engagement in European affairs. He is equally thorough in his description of the processes through which the treaty was created, ratified, and enacted, and the way that the organization itself matured. While Ireland explains that differences over Germany were being made known at the post-war peace conferences, he offers little insight into the circumstances surrounding those disagreements. These could not have been the turning point had not momentum already been building behind them. Among the three Western Allies, uncertainty of and confusion over the Soviet Union’s plans, actions, and motives provided inertia for their suspicion of it, which existed and was made known well before postwar negotiations with the USSR broke down in 1947.

Lawrence Kaplan views NATO as a unique institution of modern diplomacy, distinct from others designed to preserve peace that had come before. He considers the postwar reconstruction of Europe that began with the Marshall Plan to have been the basis for the alliance, takes the geo-political environment that surrounded the alliance formation into account. He addresses both aspects head-on, suggesting that “a divided Germany would be reunited under Soviet auspices.” Although he clearly presents the importance placed on the fate of Germany from the Western perspective, he does not go so far as to say that Germany’s revitalization was central to U.S foreign policy.

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5 Ireland, 4.
Adhering to conventional perspective of Brussels Treaty of 1948 as basis for North Atlantic Treaty, Kaplan portrays the Brussels pact as a mechanism for European statesmen to “manipulate the New World.” He describes the United States’ national debate as a two-side affair between those who favored working exclusively through the recently-founded UN and those who understood the rationale behind the Treaty. Further he explains the influence of that debate on the Treaty itself, and how similar debates among eventual member states made progress a slow process, but one that produced an organization that yielded impressive results. His final assessment of the alliance is a best available means for coordination and cooperation on issues related to Europe and the Atlantic community.

Authors of other important works on NATO that contain a historic perspective begin with the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1947. Thomas does this, as does Stanley Sloan. Since their viewpoints are internal, focused on the alliance’s creation and subsequent progress, little attention is paid to the broader environment surrounding the North Atlantic area. In making their points, these authors focus in on the events that address specific issues, but do not elaborate on them or include other events which occur beyond that realm, forcing one to look elsewhere in the body of 20th century history for a more global understanding of the context within which NATO was formed. Had not the Korean War been such a significant influence on the structural development of NATO as an institution, one may never conceive that events beyond the North Atlantic area had any influence on NATO.

Stephen Ambrose addresses the history of United States foreign policy from 1938 to 1985 in *Rise to Globalism*. In his view, the U.S. attitude toward peace changed during and after World War II. Economic changes in the postwar era left the United States at the apex of the international market, but exposed to foreign threats. As a result, the U.S.

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7 Kaplan, 2.
8 Thomas, 10.
needed to promote democracy in order to compete in foreign markets.\textsuperscript{10} He contends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an alliance with the Brussels Pact signatories, that the U.S. officially expressed its intention to join in 1948, and that these Western actions threatened the USSR’s security.\textsuperscript{11} While he does address the effect of international events after the war on U.S. policy to a degree, he only introduces NATO at the signing of the treaty, and offers minimal insight on how the economic, military, or political events that preceded the treaty affected or were related to the alliance’s formation.

Illuminating this area in his interpretation of postwar European history, Tony Judt recognizes that many elements of the Cold War existed well before V-E Day, and that “the Cold War began not after the Second World War but following the end of the First.”\textsuperscript{12} In fact, Judt characterizes the interwar period as an “interlude in an international struggle between Western democracies and Soviet totalitarianism,” and the mutual distrust between the two camps had ripened over time, resulting in ideological polarization at the end of WWII and subsequent realpolitik.\textsuperscript{13} He presents American and British foreign strategic priorities developed during the war, as well as details of Soviet intentions and actions throughout the war and the immediate postwar period, and how they contrasted as the “new era in Europe was being born” with “the schism between East and West; the contest between Communism and capitalism;” and other characteristics of the period described as “accidental outcomes of history.”\textsuperscript{14}

Like Judt, Marc Trachtenberg covers European history in the postwar era in \textit{A Constructed Peace}, but does so with a shorter timeline. As he explains “how peace came to the world of the great powers … during the period of 1945 to 1963,”\textsuperscript{15} he addresses several major issues, including the partition of Poland, the division of Germany and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 100-102.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Judt, 104-106.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 1-2.
\end{itemize}
challenges of German, as well as overall Western European, economic recovery. Providing a great degree of information on France’s role in the postwar era, Trachtenberg insightfully notes that “victory did not mean peace,” and that the postwar disagreements and conflicts that many people thought may result in a third world war instead were manifested in “what came to be called the Cold War.”

He makes the interesting assertion that “for … the French generally … the German threat could serve as a cover for arrangements that were really designed to deal with the Russian problem,” asserting that “the Soviet threat was the overriding concern” for the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty between France and Great Britain, the North Atlantic Treaty’s first postwar ancestor. Despite the commonly-held view that “the Dunkirk Treaty had been aimed expressly against a renewed German aggression.” While Judt and Trachtenberg address the broad postwar period, they limit their work to Europe and the United States. Ambrose’s work has a global scope, but lacks sufficient detail to provide readers a full understanding of events beyond the North Atlantic area on the formation and development of NATO.

One significant work of contemporary history on the origins of the cold war that avails itself of new, important sources is that of John Lewis Gaddis’ *We Now Know*, in which he presents a Soviet perspective on the events of the postwar era, as well as a Western one. Gaddis describes both the Soviet Union and United States as empires, covers both states from as early as World War I, and writes that “Stalin’s determination to create his empire preceded by some years the conditions that made it possible” at the war’s end in Europe. He describes Stalin’s mismanagement of his empire through it strained relationship with Yugoslavia, the failings of other European Communists, and the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan.

From the Western European perspective,
Gaddis contends that states “insisted that their security required a military shield as well as an economic jump start,” and the American “empire arose ... by invitation,” seemingly countering Ambrose’s proposal that the United States had intended to enter into an alliance with Brussels Pact states.

In addition to the many books addressing NATO and 20th century European history, there are a number of articles that cover specific aspects of NATO’s formation and development in its first decade that are relevant to this study. Significantly, the concept the American empire by invitation that Gaddis describes was explored by Gier Lundestad in relation to the U.S.’s expanding postwar role throughout the world. He addresses the nature of U.S. influence, the American prioritization of and involvement in Western Europe, and the role the U.S. took in the development of NATO’s institutional growth. In one of the most enlightening articles on the subject, Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman describe the treaty’s development “at the end of March 1948 in utmost secrecy between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada at the Pentagon.” The timing of these talks, just after the signing of the Brussels Pact and prior to the “preliminary talks which led to the North Atlantic Treaty ... between the State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and the Brussels Treaty Powers,” indicates that the idea of such an alliance had already been conceived and agreed upon.

Although each of these works addresses the period under examination by this paper, none of them addresses the subject from the emergence of the concepts upon which it founded after World War I through to the time when it became a functioning organization actually capable achieving its purpose following the initiation of the Korean War. While some of these texts address issues beyond the North Atlantic area, they do

22 Gaddis, 52.


not do so in a manner which accounts for the full spectrum of events that influenced the
decisions related to NATO’s formation.

2. Theories of International Politics, International Relations, and Cooperation

This question and these issues can adequately be covered in a study including
political theory and events of the period from 1945 to 1950. Relevant theories include
Neorealism, Political Idealism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism presented by Morgenthau,
Herz, and Keohane. A survey of historical works on the genesis of NATO addresses the
environment in which the alliance was created, from the geopolitical, military, and
economic situation in Europe to the postwar goals and policies of the victorious Allied
Powers; further, such works describe the efforts of the powers toward peace and future
security. As postwar negotiations were conducted, statesmen and policymakers in Great
Britain and the United States sensed a growing rift between their objectives and those of
the Soviet Union, and numerous governments of Eastern European countries were
converting to Communism, which held a presence in some Western European
governments, as well. Statesmen of Western European nations, ravaged by the war, were
cconcerned that they would also succumb to this expanding influence, and were relatively
helpless to prevent it. United States policymakers were also concerned, and steps were
taken on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to ensure that democracy was maintained in
Western Europe. Ultimately, NATO was created to ensure their collective defense
against the threat they perceived, and this is shown in Ireland’s and Thomas’ books, as
well as in Thies’ *Friendly Rivals*.

a. Realism

According to the realist theory of international politics, “statesmen think
and act in terms of interest as defined by power,” who will pursue “rational foreign
policy” that minimizes risks and maximizes benefits,” while recognizing that “political
action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context
within which foreign policy is formed.”^26 It holds that members of anarchic societies are “concerned about their security” and “are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others.” When units cooperate with one another to acquire power, they are still driven to the same ends, but do so at a collective level, and this will eventually cause conflict. Political Realism considers the “actual tendencies of international politics” that is characterized, at the extreme, by integral nationalism of “exclusive, aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic national policies.” In contrast, Political Idealism is typified by “equal, free, and self-determining nationalities, each organized into its own state, and all living peacefully side by side.”^27

b. Institutionalism

Neo liberal Institutionalism differs from neo realism in regard to “changes that result from shifts in relative state capabilities,”^28 because states do not always act “to prevent others from achieving advances” in them.^29 It introduces the concept of “complex interdependence” that “characterizes relationships among democratic industrialized countries,” wherein “power is an important element in relationships…but does not derive from the use or threat of force toward one another,”^30 as evidenced by “U.S. policy toward Europe or Japan for at least twenty years after World War II, or the relationships among members of the European Community.”^31 However, the two schools are in alignment on two other points. First, neoliberalism agrees with the Realist contention that states are the key elements in the international system and that context is an important factor in their behaviors, but that “formal and informal rules play a much larger role.” Additionally, it rests on the conditions that actors have “mutual interests;

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^29 Ibid., 10.

^30 Ibid., 9.

^31 Ibid., 10.
that is, they must potentially gain from their cooperation,” and that “variations in the
degree of institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behavior.” Therefore,
“cooperation is possible but depends in par on institutional arrangements,” which
include commonality, specificity, and autonomy. Second, neoliberalists and neorealists
also agree that states will act rationally, in that they “calculate the costs and benefits of
contemplated courses of action.” Thus, when states are able to maximize benefit and
minimize cost, or risk, by acting in concert with others who share a common interest,
they would be expected to cooperate, and this is where institutions are significant,
because they “make it possible for states to take actions that would otherwise be
inconceivable” and “affect the costs associated with alternatives that might have existed
independently.”

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

As the Cold War slipped into history at the end of the Twentieth Century, so did
many symbols, weapons, and institutions of security, war, and peace that had arisen in the
aftermath of World War II. The Soviets scrapped their SS20 missiles in 1987, the
Hungarians cut down the barbed wire along their Austrian border in May of 1989, the
Communists lost parliamentary control to the Solidarity movement in Poland in the same
season, and, soon thereafter, the Berlin Wall began to fall in November of 1989. In 1990,
the German Democratic Republic vanished and its states joined the Federal Republic of
Germany under Article 23 of the Basic Law. The following year, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) met its demise, as did the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
Despite the dissolution of many prominent Cold War entities, one has remained and has
grown in both size and scope since the Cold War’s end. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) proved its capability in the Balkans a decade ago, is currently
conducting military operations in Afghanistan, and its membership now includes ten

32 Keohane, 2-3.
33 Ibid., 4-5.
34 Ibid., 11.
former Communist and Soviet satellite states. That an alliance established in the aftermath of World War II to provide mutual defense for “the West” has endured and undergone such a significant shift in focus and broadened membership and focus that draws it ever farther to “the East,” it is appropriate to revisit the basis in diplomacy, strategy, and society upon which NATO was founded and ask, “Why and how was NATO created,” and what does this story suggest about the possible causes of such endurance over time?

To answer this broad question, it is helpful to break it down into two minor questions regarding the rationale for NATO and the process by which it was established. First, why was NATO formed? That is, what was the threat, and how did it manifest itself in the minds of makers of policy in the years 1947-1949? How did the Soviet Union transform from wartime ally of Western nation-states to peacetime adversary? What were the critical events that led to its emergence as such, and why was the UN unable to address the threat adequately? What were the underlying concepts for NATO, and when were they developed? Second, how was NATO formed? Specifically, what were the steps in alliance formation? What were the institutional structures of the alliance? How and when were those structures developed, and what were the critical events related to that end?

One can pose the following major debates about and/or approaches to the issue at hand. In the first instance, there is the question of collective defense versus collective security concepts in the formative years of the alliance. One can ask if NATO was a result of bargain between the US, who wanted Germany revitalized, and Western European powers, who wanted military and economic aid for their own postwar recovery and security. Further, there is the question if the Soviet Union, not Germany, was the threat against which the Dunkirk and Brussels treaties were designed. Moreover, did Stalin have an imperial postwar goal and a plan to achieve it? One can concisely suggest such major questions and arguments as follows – what forces beyond the period typically studied in NATO and postwar European history influenced NATO’s creation and structure?
In response to above catalog of questions, one can argue that NATO history has been too narrowly focused on the years 1948 and 1949. Chronologically, its story usually begins with the 1947 Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council in Berlin. While the events and decisions of these years are unarguable important, the decisions made by statesmen regarding the establishment of this alliance were influenced by ideas and events from earlier times. In the work at hand, the author wishes to reinterpret the historical influences on the North Atlantic Treaty and the character of NATO, the organization, as a kind of inventory of historical knowledge. Only with a chronological view of events from a broad perspective can we truly understand the full weight of the conditions under which NATO was formed and developed, and it is the object of this thesis to provide a comprehensive history of NATO’s formation in order for readers to fully appreciate the gravity of the environments within which those decisions were made.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The present study is a historical interpretation with a nod to the needs of the policy-maker who must operate according to the principles of collective defense and the ideals embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty. It will initially address the interwar period of the 20th century, focusing on collective interstate agreements that affected the Europe/North Atlantic region and color the region’s political landscape. Subsequently, a chronology of events occurring and ideas emerging prior to and during the Second World War that laid the foundation for postwar negotiations and the North Atlantic Treaty is presented. In both of these sections, the events will be presented chronologically.

In the 21st century, NATO has continued its adaptation to meet the challenges of transnational, non-state terrorism, and is currently conducting operations well beyond the area for which it was initially intended. NATO matters, and in this connection, the origins of the alliance have something to say about why the alliance has changed and endured into the violent and troubled present. The study that follows tries to speculate on the value of this pre and early history of NATO and of the explanatory power of these years in two instances. First, because such is important as history in and of itself. One does need to have a sophisticated knowledge of these transformative years in the age of
total war. Second, there are useful policy insights and generalizations that new members of NATO can glean from the essence and operation if the alliance in fact, the actual record of the past. It is to this agenda that the following study is devoted.

1. **Primary Sources**

   This study relies heavily on primary sources. Speeches given by Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and members of the United States and other allied governments are critical to understanding those leaders’ lines of thinking during the era. Telegrams, memoranda, interviews, reports, and other official documents will provide similar insights. The following sources are a few of those that will provide such information on the subject:
   - North Atlantic Treaty Organization On-line Library
   - The Avalon Project, Yale University
   - Truman Library
   - Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

2. **Secondary Sources**

   An abundance of secondary sources, including the aforementioned books and journal articles, are also drawn upon in this research to bring the pertinent issues to light. Books covering foreign policies of Western nation-states and the Soviet Union, and journal articles on various aspects of NATO’s formation, as well as other periodicals, such as NATO Update and NATO Review, offer such vital information
II. WHY NATO WAS FORMED

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

With the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the League of Nations was established and initially had forty-one members from across the globe. It grew in the succeeding years, and experienced a good deal of success through the hopeful period of the 1920s. It was, however, also marked by failures of preventing conflict beginning in 1931, and the outbreak of World War II signaled its ultimate demise. In the aftermath of that war, the United Nations was established in 1945, based upon conditions and concepts set in a series of meetings, conferences, and declarations between June 1941 and September 1945. Upon its ratification by Security Council members and a majority of the others, the UN Charter went into effect. At that time, Europe was in need of economic and industrial renewal as it transitioned from war to peace for the second time in the 20th century. As Western European and North American nation-states redeployed their forces on the continent, sent others home, and drew them down in size, the Soviet Union maintained and expanded its influence and presence in post-World War II Eastern Europe. Western European nation-states were concerned that they may be overtaken by this uncertain expansion, and banded together through the Brussels Treaty, but neither that, nor the United Nations, seemed sufficient to protect achieve their economic and emergent security interests. The United States’ postwar economic and military strength were seen as their bulwark against Soviet encroachment, and the NATO was created to provide for the collective defense of selected nation-states spanning the region.


1. Earlier Institutions

a. The League of Nations

Prior to the 1949 creation of NATO, there were two other international bodies designed to maintain peace and security in the world. At the conclusion of World War I, the concept of collective security was pursued with the establishment of the League of Nations, “to promote international cooperation, and to achieve peace and security.”38 Despite its numerous successful decisions, it was also marked by failures to prevent international conflict among its members. Japan and Italy violated terms of the League, in 1931 and 1935, respectively. Others failed to take sufficient measures to deter aggression and its membership dwindled. The League was eventually perceived as a powerless organization, and the outbreak of World War II signaled its ultimate demise.39

b. The United Nations

Despite the failure of the League, the dream of collective security endured, especially in the heat of total war. In June of 1945, the United Nations was chartered “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”40 Having learned from the weaknesses of the LoN, the UN had US membership and a Security Council to enforce its resolutions, with Great Britain, France, the USSR, the US, and China as permanent members.41 Upon ratification of the United Nations Charter, the organization became a reality. The provisions of this organization for the imposition of the ideas of collective security were given special significance in Article 51 of the UN Charter and the issue of compliance of the powers remained in late 1945, in the wake of the war’s end.


41 United Nations, “Members.”
2. Wartime Agreements and Rhetoric

Throughout the course of the war, there were numerous meetings and conferences among the Allied Powers regarding the course of the war and post-war security arrangements. In June of 1941 the governments of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and a representative of the Free French met at St. James’ Palace in London and signed a declaration that:

The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; ... It is our intention to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end.42

In August, Churchill and Roosevelt met and agreed upon a set of postwar national principles that included no territorial or other type of aggrandizement, no territorial changes that were not in line with the desires of people who would be affected by them, restoration of self-determined government and sovereign rights, establishment of peace that provided nations safety within their borders, freedom of the seas, disarmament of aggressive nations, equal access to trade and economic resources, and economic collaboration.43 These principles were set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and the following month, the European governments who met, along with the Soviet Union, at St. James’ Palace in London. All agreed to these principles and declared “their intention to cooperate to the best of their ability in giving effect to them” at London. Notably, the Soviet ambassador made the following statement:

The Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary for the better promotion of its economic and cultural prosperity.

He added that the Soviet Union advocated the necessity of collective action against aggressors and that “the Soviet Government proclaims its agreement with the fundamental principles of the declaration of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.”44

While these two events are integral to the creation of the UN, they also indicate that the governments of the USSR and Eastern European states were aligned with the west on these principles as early as 1942. During discussions for the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty, the USSR presented policy objectives for its borders to be restored to those of June 22, 1941, and for permitting only “‘friendly,’ anti-fascist’ regimes on her borders.” Those borders reflected those of the Russian Empire before the First World War, and would provide security against any future attacks from Western Europe.45 At Yalta in 1945, the “Big Three” agreed to “the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations” for Europe.46 Stalin surprising agreement to “‘free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot’ and also to ‘reorganize’ the Polish government by bringing in Poles from London” was encouraging to Roosevelt and Churchill. 47 In addition to the Europe’s future, topics at Yalta included Iran, the Black Sea Straits, Japan, and the United Nations organization.

Yalta was the last conference Roosevelt would attend with his allied contemporaries. Upon Roosevelt’s death, he was succeeded as President by Harry Truman who, as a Senator, had clearly offered his views regarding the Nazis and Russians, recently engaged in Operation Barbarossa, just two weeks after the 1941 Declaration at St. James Palace, stating:

If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many


47 Ambrose, 58.
as possible, although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances. Neither of them thinks anything of their pledged word.48

Four years later, in a telegram to Truman shortly after the German surrender, Churchill also expressed misgivings about the Soviets, who had taken control of Poland, the Baltic States, and parts of Finland during the course of the war. His comments were focused toward post-war Europe, in which he characterized Russia as a powerful and unrecognized threat:

… What is to happen about Russia? ... I feel deep anxiety because of … the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field. An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind... A broad band of many hundreds of miles will isolate us from Poland… Meanwhile, the attention of our peoples will be occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to advance, if they chose, to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic ....49

On 22 April at Washington, Truman told Molotov “that he wanted free elections in Poland.” Molotov acknowledged his position, but expressed that “Poland was ‘even more important for the Soviet Union’ “because of its neighboring location. The following day, Truman was more direct, and told Molotov to meet the Yalta agreements regarding Poland.50

3. Postwar Conditions

a. 1945

The fact that the Second World War was over did not mean peace had blanketed the globe. In Europe, two battles continued: at the southern extreme, the Greek Civil War between Communists and Greek Nationalists had been ongoing since

50 Ambrose, 61-63.
December 1944; to the north, the Baltic nations continued to resist the Soviets, who had re-occupied those states during the war. The Soviet Union also maintained a presence in the Iran, despite the requirement to remove troops six months after war ended, and were providing instructions to form a separatist movement in northern Iran as a means to access oil resources there. The Iranian government resisted demands to give Azerbaijan a greater degree of autonomy “for fear of augmenting Communist influence elsewhere in Iran.” In the Far East, the Chinese Civil War continued between U.S.-supported Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communist forces. Actions, words, and reactions to them would hamper the overall postwar peace process, and would eventually divide Europe itself, east from west.

After the German surrender in May of 1945, the “Big Three” met again in Potsdam to discuss the further issues of war termination and peace. Settling issues for Germany held center stage, but settling the war with the other Axis states in a manner which would establish conditions to prevent future war was also critical to the figures at hand. To do so, the leaders established a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), comprised of their along with those of France and China, to confer on a regular basis, and gave highest priority given to drafting “treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe.” They set forth the condition that peace treaties would be made “with recognized democratic governments in these States,” enabling their applications for UN membership and later, depending upon conditions, establish “diplomatic relations … to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.” As well, the CFM was charged with “the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany, to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a

51 Ambrose, 74.
government adequate for the purpose is established."\textsuperscript{54} The Potsdam Conference also included discussions beyond Europe, in which it became clear that “the Soviets wanted to participate with Turkey in the control of the Black Sea straits.” As an alternative, Truman made a proposal for an “international guarantee that the straits would be open to all nations at all times.”\textsuperscript{55}

Despite Germany’s unconditional surrender to both the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme High Command of the Red Army,\textsuperscript{56} the Allies’ determination to develop peace treaties with all former Axis states, and the establishment of the UN, European nations were still very concerned with Germany as a future military threat. It had been an aggressor in both World Wars and had been uncooperative with the victors’ attempts at economic reconstruction after the First. Leading up to and during the Second war, Germany had violated agreements made with other states across the continent, and other European countries were understandably determined to prevent Germany from accumulating the clout or capability to do any such thing again. In June of 1945, General Eisenhower issued a written declaration stating, “The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority.” This document addressed military issues, national borders, and the civilian issues of politics, administration, and economics. It called for the “complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany … for future peace and security,” specifying that the Allies “will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{55} Ambrose, 69.
\textsuperscript{56} “German Act of Military Surrender signed at Berlin on the 8th day of May, 1945.” http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/gs11.htm
Also in June, the Soviet government began developing and financing northern Iranian separatist movements in violation of the Big Three’s agreements on Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity made at Tehran in 1943.\(^{58}\) Intending to access to oil resources there, the Soviet efforts were designed to establish “a national autonomous Azerbaijan district … with broad powers within the Iranian state” and a national autonomous Kurdish district, and to influence Iran’s parliamentary elections.\(^{59}\)

In August, the Soviet Union dispatched geological survey teams, with instructions to begin drilling in September.\(^{60}\) In the fall, de Gaulle visited Truman in Washington and, as Churchill had done through his telegram in the spring, expressed his own concerns about the “the Red Army in Central Europe.” In turn, Truman assured him that the US would use the bomb to stop any aggression.”\(^{61}\)

At London, the first CFM convened in September to begin discussion on conditions for peace with European members of the Axis. These discussions also included the role of United Nations, specifically with regard to issues affecting Italy. There seemed to be widespread confidence among the Foreign Ministers of his new institution’s capability, as shown in US Secretary of State James Byrnes’ report, “… that Italy should rely on the United Nations for protection against aggression … and this view gained general acceptance.” However, the optimism for the U.N. expressed at this meeting was overshadowed by disagreement between the Soviet delegation and the others. In the Western view, the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria did not meet the conditions of self-determination agreed upon at Yalta, and specified as “democratic” at

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\(^{61}\) Ambrose, 71-72.
Potsdam, so the US and Britain had not recognized them diplomatically, and considered them ineligible for conclusion of peace treaties. Soviet adamancy for Western recognition of “the puppet governments in Eastern Europe before peace treaties could be written” was met by resistance from the others, and was the first of what would prove to be many differences between the Soviet and other delegations throughout the postwar peace treaty-development process. In response, the Soviet Delegation withdrew its agreement to the process by which the Council would develop peace treaties, which was based upon an agreement reached at Potsdam in May - and had been established only a week before. Essentially, this Soviet objection made continuation of the London CFM useless. In light of this impasse, the first CFM adjourned without significant progress on the treaties. As the delegations departed, they took with them Byrnes’ hopes to convene a 5-treaty peace conference by the end of the year. While this session was largely unsuccessful, Byrnes did note Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s apprehension about security issues in the Balkans, and he “suggested a twenty-five year four-power treaty, to keep Germany disarmed as a means of preventing any real threat to Soviet security,” which he developed and subsequently presented to his counterparts.

The United Nations Charter was ratified in October, and the global organization had become a reality. It was soon to face its first challenge over Soviet action in northern Iran where “Stalin wanted oil concessions.” The US had made efforts for all Allied forces to be removed from Iran by the New Year, but in December, while Britain and the U.S. were withdrawing their troops from Iran, “Communists announced the creation of a new government in Tabriz, capital of Iranian Azerbaijan,

63 Ambrose, 73.
64 Byrnes, “First Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 11 to October 2, 1945.”
66 Abrose, 74.
under Ja’far Pinshevari, a veteran Communist and Comintern agent.”67 Activists in the nearby province of Kordestan followed Azerbaijan’s lead, and “both autonomous republics enjoyed the support of the Soviets, and Soviet troops,” who “prevented government forces from entering Azerbaijan and Kordestan,”68 which was a clear violation of the Tehran agreements.69

In December, an interim CFM session was being held at Moscow. There, the impasse from London was overcome and, although issues on Germany were deferred, the conference made substantial progress. All UN members that fought against the European Axis powers were able to review the soon-to-be-developed treaties, paving the way for a peace conference to be held by May.70 In addition, the ministers agreed on Allied assistance to Eastern European governments for democratization, on the establishment of a UN commission to control atomic energy, and on the need for China to unify democratically, with Soviet and US troops being withdrawn from the country. Further, they decided to re-establish Korea as an independent state, with a Joint Commission, represented by the USSR in the north and the U.S. in the south, to aid Korean re-emergence.71 In a separate discussion while in Moscow, Byrnes proposed the treaty idea he had offered to Molotov at London regarding German disarmament treaty to Stalin, and received his endorsement of it.72

As 1945 drew to a close and the New Year dawned, there was much cause for optimism across the globe. The war of unprecedented scale and atrocity that had

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67 Rubinstein, 74-75.


raged since 1939 had ended. The victorious Allies had overcome a diplomatic impasse and were in now in accord on conditions for peace. All UN states that had been victimized by the Axis Powers were to be involved in the peace process, and a Peace Conference was within reach. Arrangements had been made for the military and civil occupation of Germany to restructure it into a peaceful and economically vital nation, and a similar plan for Japan was forthcoming. The United Nations was operational, and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were focusing on removing the economic conditions had been so integral to both world wars.

b. 1946

As 1946 dawned in Europe, it brought the continuing spread of communism. On 11 January, Albanian communists, who had “conquered governmental power and their national capital” two years earlier, eliminated the monarchy and replaced it with a people’s republic.73 Throughout the year, Communists would win parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia Bulgaria, and Rumania, where the king followed the elections with a royal declaration of “Soviet-oriented foreign policy, and take nearly half the parliament seats in France.74 Stalin’s goal for Soviet expansion was to “impose its own social system as far as its armies could reach.” Even before Germany’s defeat, he had focused in areas where organized resistance was low,75 and he would now turn toward the Middle East, where tensions would reach their “peak in Iran and Turkey” later in the year.76

The war of words spilled over into 1946. On 19 January, Iran appealed to the UN regarding the USSR’s failure to withdraw its troops and its backing of the uprisings in Northern Iran in an attempt to coerce the central government to grant oil

75 Gaddis, 30-33.
76 Ambrose, 74.
concessions. In February, Stalin gave a speech in Moscow critical of the West, blaming capitalism for World Wars I and II, and pledging to continue the USSR’s industrial development in order to guarantee that “our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies.” In addition to Stalin’s words, Soviet actions throughout the year would aggravate the West throughout the year. Stalin’s speech prompted the US Charge in Moscow, George Kennan, to send his “Long Telegram” to the State Department, cautioning that the Soviet Union was working on both official and unofficial levels to expand its influence and weaken non-communist systems, as it had been doing in the Baltic States and Iran.

A month later, in a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill presented his metaphor of an “Iron Curtain” in Europe to the public, noting that the Soviet sphere increasingly influenced or controlled much of Eastern Europe. Although he did not consider war to be an imminent possibility, he did warn the audience of the USSR’s desire for “indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.” Churchill called for the establishment of freedom and democracy in all countries, for settling the postwar peace, and for an understanding with Russia on all points. He emphasized that the key to lasting peace was maintaining an understanding with the Soviets, under the authority of the UN, and he identified the balance of power system as the cause of Europe’s wars. Declaring that system unsound, Churchill suggested that cooperation of US, British, and the English-speaking peoples of the Commonwealth in the fields of science, industry, and morals would establish an “overwhelming assurance of security,” eliminating the desire for a balance of power.

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The very next day, prompted by the USSR’s refusal to abide by its March deadline to withdraw troops from Iran, Byrnes sent a demand to Moscow that the Soviet troops be pulled out immediately.\(^{81}\) and the British also confronted Stalin on his intentions there.\(^{82}\) Less than a week later, in the face of this combined criticism, Stalin responded to Churchill’s speech, likening him to Hitler for promoting racial theory. Stalin suggested the English-speaking nations would seek to rule the world through war, and he emphasized the Soviet contribution to Europe’s liberation from Hitler and the Soviet losses taken in that endeavor. Countering Churchill’s assertion of Soviet expansionism, Stalin explained it merely as an attempt to ensure the USSR’s national security through loyal relationships with neighboring governments, and he explained the growth of communist influence in Eastern Europe as an understandable result of the fine example that communists had set while fighting fascism during the war.\(^{83}\)

While the rhetoric over Soviet expansion and English-speaking cooperation played out, the peace process trudged on. Having informed the other ministers that he wanted to discuss it, Byrnes was eager to capitalize on the positive responses to his treaty proposal for the demilitarization of Germany received from Stalin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin, and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. Yet, just as the western Allies had their concerns about the Soviet Union, the Soviets were also suspicious of their wartime partners. Despite Stalin’s personal assent a few months earlier, Molotov replied with a surprising revelation that there were serious Soviet objections to the disarmament proposal. He seemed to take that, and all other issues regarding Germany, quite lightly. He disagreed with the other Ministers on Italian reparations to the USSR, opposed them on the future or the Italy/Yugoslavia border region, and refused to even discuss a treaty for Austria.\(^{84}\)

\(^{81}\) Ambrose, 74.
\(^{82}\) Gaddis, 30.
\(^{84}\) Byrnes, “Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris (a) First Part, April 25 to May 16, 1946.”
This Soviet obstinacy was compounded by general disagreement on economic issues, with some Western delegations balking at treaty issues for Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Germany, and frustrating all involved. Thus, the Paris CFM was, initially, a fruitless affair. The overall dissonance delayed not only the Council’s development of peace treaties and any progress toward the political and economic reconstruction throughout much of the continent, but also affected the withdrawal of Allied troops from those regions, specifically in the Balkans and in Central Europe. As a result, the Council decided to take a “recess to allow a calm reexamination of our respective positions,”85 and delayed the convening of a peace conference from May until late July. Byrnes remained confident that the parties could reconcile their differences, and drew upon Churchill’s image in his report on the first part of the Paris CFM Byrnes, writing “there is no iron curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot penetrate.”86

That iron curtain soon became more than a clever allegory. In late May, elections were held in Czechoslovakia where Communists won thirty-eight percent of the vote and installed a Communist prime minister, Klement Gottwald.87 By the time the Foreign Ministers reconvened in June, Communists had won nearly half the seats in the French Parliament.88 At the second session of the Paris CFM, some differences did get resolved, but the USSR continued to shy away from draft treaties regarding Germany, specifically its de-Nazification, disarmament, and future government. Additional items pertaining to Germany, such as German reparations to the USSR and exclusion of the Saar region from centralized administration, were not even open for discussion with the Soviets. Capitalizing on their limited success, the Council deferred issues on which they still differed and agreed to convene Peace Conference in Paris the following month. Byrnes was uncertain if the Soviets recognized that their resistance to the progress of the peace negotiations raised questions among the other Allies, Molotov rejected the treaty

86 Ibid.
87 Ambrose, 95.
88 Smitha.
proposal regarding disarmament, and it occurred to Byrnes that German militarism might become “a pawn in a struggle between the East and the West….”89

The divide between the Soviet Union and other Allies, particularly the United States, became more pronounced during the Paris Peace Conference that began in July. With its seemingly arbitrary veto of proposals that the other Allies deemed acceptable, the Soviet delegation continued to thwart progress toward peace and reconstruction. Despite the USSR’s post-war European and Pacific territorial acquisitions, not to mention Stalin’s own assertion that the Soviet Union was in no danger of becoming encircled, the Soviet delegation asserted that the US was attempting to economically enslaving Europe. Byrnes was concerned with the “increasing tension between us and the Soviet Union,” evidenced by Soviet characterization of states friendly to the US as unfriendly to the USSR, and vice-versa, and in promotion of the inevitability of armed conflict that Stalin had introduced in his February speech.90

While the Peace Conference was underway, the Soviet Union again asserted itself in the Middle East. In August, Stalin demanded that Turkey allow the Soviets to share control of the Black Sea Straits. The US viewed that as a way to dominate Turkey, which had been overhauling its military and developing its economy. With Communism still looming in neighboring Greece, where it was believed that the Soviets were providing support, the US encouraged the Turks to decline the Soviet demand and followed that with a show of force, sending an aircraft carrier through the waterway.91 Once again, the Soviet Union “backed down” from its overtures.92

Shortly thereafter, the communist influence continued to spread through Europe. In September, the Bulgarian monarchy was abolished in favor of a people’s

91 Ambrose, 74-75.
92 Ibid., 75.
republic by a national referendum,\textsuperscript{93} and Bulgarian Communists won sixty percent of the National Assembly seats, with an additional nineteen percent going to their political coalition partners in an October election. The next month, as the CFM met at New York, Stalinist Georgi Dimitrov was elected Prime Minister of Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{94} As well, Romania’s “obviously rigged election”\textsuperscript{95} produced a communist-led coalition government there, with a communist majority winning nearly eighty-five percent of parliamentary seats. King Michael followed this in early December with a royal declaration of “Soviet-oriented foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{96} The next week, the CFM, incorporating recommendations from other parties at the Paris Peace Conference, finally completed treaties for peace with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.\textsuperscript{97} At the end of the month in Hungary, politicians from non-communist parties, who had not yet been removed from their posts, were arrested.\textsuperscript{4-43}

c. 1947

Clearly, the situation had shifted from one of Allies coordinating war efforts against the axis powers to one in which the Soviet Union apparently placed its own interests above those of the West, although such was plainly to have been predicted by the skeptics in 1942, and was, in fact, by Hitler and Goebbels – they were now quite departed from the scene.\textsuperscript{.} While Western European nations drew down their military forces from wartime strength and focused on recovery, non-European Allies redeployed or demobilized their forces. The Soviet Union, however, maintained its troop strength and high production of its armament industry, despite the war’s end. Internal and external strains among the wartime Allies ebbed and flowed as they worked to put World

\textsuperscript{93} Smitha.


War II to rest. As the Soviets consolidated their war spoils of territorial gains and influence, and in doing so drawing that Iron Curtain across Europe, those countries behind it were turning away from the West, either by choice or coercion, and becoming politically, economically, and militarily obligated to one another. Between 1943 and 1949, over twenty agreements were signed among the Soviet Union and Eastern European people’s democracies, and this period marked the decline and end of discussions between Western European powers and the Soviet Union as allies regarding World War II.

Nineteen forty-seven was a pivotal year in the effort to lay the war to rest and build a secure and economically stable future. In contrast to the diplomatic success achieved at the end of 1946 that enabled conclusion of peace issues for many European countries, fundamental differences on the issues that remained would ultimately cause it to fail as an Allied process. Suspicions of the USSR and the West strengthened between them, and the two would move closer to the bi-polar balance of power in Europe that existed until the end of the Twentieth Century. Western European leaders had to face the reality of Soviet Communist expansion, and they had to deal with it. As had been happening in the East, interstate agreements were initiated among the Western Allies to provide military and economic security, making those states interdependent upon one another as they pursued their common interests. In the end, the Iron Curtain drawn between the eastern and western wartime Allies would tighten and close, with the USSR on one side and the western powers on the other.

(1) The Truman Doctrine. As had the previous year, 1947 began with broadening communist domination over another European country as voters in Poland elected a Communist-dominated coalition to power in Parliament. In Greece, where Britain has been supporting the government fight against communist forces, the Nationalist Army and economy were in shambles as a result of the civil war. In January, Truman offered economic and advisory support to Greek Nationalists in their fight, and on 18 February he received a report that the communists were making a move toward

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victory. Three days later the British ambassador to the US announced that his country would be unable to continue providing assistance to Greece and Turkey beyond March. With the end of British economic aid to Greece and Turkey, Greece would be vulnerable to the Soviet-sponsored Communist expansion, with Turkey next in line. Undersecretary of State Acheson anticipated that Greece would fall to the communists, and that the Soviets would exploit the situation to pursue goals in the Straits that had been thwarted the previous year. He described the “domino theory,” that countries neighboring communist states would subsequently fall to communism, and expressed specific concern about France, Germany, and Italy.100

In response, on March 12 Truman articulated his view against such aggression, the “Truman Doctrine,” in a speech delivered to Congress, declaring “the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,”101 and that “wherever and whenever an anti-Communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure, the United States would supply political, economic, and … military aid.”102 He then asked Congress to provide funds and assistance to Greece and Turkey,103 thus picking up the support to those countries that Britain could no longer provide, and this request was approved on 22 May.

(2) The Marshall Plan. General George Marshall had resigned from the US Army and was appointed Secretary of State upon Byrnes’ resignation in January of 1947. He recognized that the present level of emergency aid to European states would not be enough to enable their recovery. Two months after the ‘Truman Doctrine’ was announced, Marshall made a speech in June of 1947 regarding the European economic situation and proposed that European states could collectively define their requirements and develop a program reconstruction, instead of each state rebuilding

100 Ambrose, 83.
102 Ambrose, 86.
103 Ireland, 25-26.
its economy individually. The “Marshall Plan” was available to every European country, and it was eagerly welcomed by most European states as a means to rebuild Europe in a manner that would alleviate economic tensions between countries that had led to wars in the past. Stalin was initially open to the idea and the Soviet Union attended the Paris meeting to discuss the proposal. After the Soviet ambassador to the US advised him that the plan was an American tool to form a “West European bloc,” Stalin decided not to participate. After a few days of discussions, representatives of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia agreed to reject the plan and Molotov walked out of the conference, essentially marking the end of East-West cooperation on European recovery.

After the Soviet Union’s denouncement of the Marshall Plan, “Russia retained her grip on East Europe; indeed, she strengthened it.” Following Molotov’s departure, Stalin accused “the Western powers of seeking to divide Europe into two hostile camps,” and directed countries within the Soviet sphere not to participate in it. Czechoslovakia and Poland had already announced their intentions to attend a subsequent meeting in July to draft details for implementing the Marshall Plan. Poland quickly withdrew its acceptance of the invitation, but Czechoslovakia did not follow Stalin’s directive quickly enough. Calling Polish and Czech leaders to Moscow, he directed that “there would be no East European participation in the Marshall Plan, or in any other American scheme for the rehabilitation of Europe.” Upon his return from Moscow, “Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk commented bitterly, ‘I went to Moscow as the Foreign Minister of an independent sovereign state, … I returned as a lackey of the Soviet Government.’” The rest of the year, and much of 1948, would be characterized by the entrenchment of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union

105 Gaddis, 41-42.
107 Ambrose, 93.
108 Smitha, "Timeline: 1947."
109 Gaddis, 42.
110 Gaddis, 42
continued to widen its presence, further violating agreements by rearming some of its new territories in Eastern Europe, and was flexing its authority on the UN Security Council in its own interests.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{111} Ismay, “Support from America,” Chap. 1.
III. HOW NATO WAS FORMED

It was against this backdrop that militarily weak Western leaders borrowed a concept from Marshall’s plan for economic recovery and decided that they should develop a security program from a “joint and combined” perspective. Britain and France had signed a treaty at Dunkirk in March of 1947 to stave off any renewed German aggression, which was seen by many thinkers about the future of Europe as the most likely threat to peace in a decade’s time, as had been the case in the period from 1919 until the early 1930s. This policy was seen by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin as an example of treaties that should be utilized throughout Western Europe to unify its states into one body, with the support of non-European allies. This idea would gain favor on both sides of the Atlantic, and become the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty. Supporters, however, needed to overcome the reluctance of the isolationist sentiment in the United States that had made it a late entrant into both World Wars, as well as the recent internationalism of those who put their faith in the United Nations.

A. THE BRUSSELS TREATY

Notions for an alliance in the West had been made since before the war’s end, when “Norwegian … Trygve Lie had pressed for an Atlantic alliance.”\(^{112}\) In his “Iron Curtain” speech, Churchill proposed that “if the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States, with all that such cooperation implies … there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.”\(^{113}\) In a speech at the UN in September of 1947, Canadian Louis St. Laurent “suggested … ‘an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.’”\(^{114}\) When the Soviets walked out of CFM discussions in December, Bevin proposed to Marshall “‘the


\(^{113}\) Churchill.

\(^{114}\) Wiebes, 353.
formation of some sort of union … in Western Europe backed by the United States and the Dominions.”\textsuperscript{115} Other European states agreed, with Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak arguing “that any defense arrangements which did not include the United States were without practical value. The Dutch favored the same line.”\textsuperscript{116}

 Marshall, aware of the differing domestic views in the United States that would come into play, was noncommittal, but Bevin was not dissuaded. He made his plans to arrange such an alliance with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg public in a speech to the House of Commons in January, and negotiations began early March. Bevin continued to engage the North Americans, and sent three versions of arrangements that would broaden the developing alliance to Canada and the US on 11 March. They were received warmly, and Bevin recommended beginning discussions on them at the earliest opportunity. The Treaty of Brussels, which required all parties to lend all available assistance any of them that was subject to an armed attack, was signed on 17 March.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{B. SECRET ATLANTIC NEGOTIATIONS}

The day the Brussels Treaty was signed, Truman addressed Congress, expressing his confidence that the “determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves.”\textsuperscript{118} Eight days later, the United States informed Britain that “We are prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system,”\textsuperscript{119} and Britain moved quickly. From 22 March to 1 April, delegations from Britain and Canada secretly met with US State and War Department officials at the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[115] Wiebes, 352.
\item[117] Wiebes, 353-354.
\item[118] Ibid., 354.
\item 63. Wiebes, 356-361.
\item 64. Lundestad, 265.
\item 65. Kaplan, 1
\end{footnotes}
Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., to explore options for an alliance including the Brussels Powers, Canada, and the US, and how to achieve it. The US viewed the Brussels Treaty as “too narrow to join,” and determined that “a larger ‘Atlantic’ organization would have to be devised to protect other countries in danger of Communist subversion or attack.” The first stage resulted in agreement to form a new “Western Mutual Defense Pact” and a draft joint paper with recommendations for fulfilling Truman’s declaration.

After six days of consultation with their governments, the delegations reconvened for second round of meetings to determine what items that the treaty forming the alliance should include, and created a draft called the Pentagon Paper. In the days that followed, they covered four topics: the mutual assistance pledge; indirect aggression; the territorial scope; and membership. It was agreed that members of the alliance would determine for themselves whether an armed attack occurred, and would take the steps it deemed necessary to address it. They also agreed that a party that felt its territorial integrity or independence was compromised by armed or indirect force would consult with its allies, and that the treaty would apply to Europe, North America, and North Atlantic islands. Invitations for membership would be extended to “Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Ireland … Portugal … Italy,” and that Switzerland would be informally advised that it could join. In addition, there was a strictly secret agreement that provided for West German and West Austrian membership. Consensus on the recommendations reached in these negotiations was formalized in the Pentagon Paper on 1 April, and a timeline was drafted to implement them. Open negotiations with all prospective parties, however, would have to wait until differing views of U.S. foreign policy were overcome through a process that merged “the old internationalism and the nationalism which had formed such a strong part of the isolationist tradition.”

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120 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 9.
121 Wiebes, 356-361.
122 Lundestad, 265.
C. THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

That isolationism was steeped in a US “tradition of political and military non-entanglement with Europe that stretched back to the termination of the Franco-American alliance of 1778.”123 Formally breaking away from that tradition, despite which it had entered into both World Wars, the United States committed itself to develop and associate itself with regional and collective-security agreements, and to the maintenance of peace when the Senate approved the Vandenberg Resolution in April.124 Senator Vandenberg was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he was a former isolationist who converted to internationalism and, viewing a military alliance as a return to the failed balance of power system, placed his hopes in the UN, even though he knew the USSR’s ability to cast a veto on the Security Council frustrated “hopes of creating a genuine collective security for the world.”125

Internationalists did not approve of the “European eagerness for military aid,” and the Senate was committed to retain the constitutional role to declare war. Aware of Internationalist views regarding the UN and foreign aid and the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty authors cited the UN Charter in most articles and included the principle of self-help that charged members with maintaining their ability to defend themselves as a means to overcome the Internationalist objections. Equally sensitive to the Isolationist sentiment to avoid a requirement contained in the Brussels Treaty for members to commit themselves to an ally in case it was attacked, they utilized wording developed by George Kennan for Article 5 of the treaty, similar to that of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio (the Rio Pact) in December of 1947, “that an attack against one would be considered and attack against all, but the measures taken by each member state would be ‘such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed

123 Kaplan, 1.
125 Kaplan, 4.
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” to satisfy them.\textsuperscript{126} Using much of the same language and reinforcing the American governmental procedures, Senator Vandenberg drafted a resolution establishing policy for the US to pursue international security and peace via conditions found in the North Atlantic Treaty, which passed a Senate vote in June, signaling “American acceptance of the entanglement.”\textsuperscript{127} The passing of “the Vandenberg Resolution cleared away most of the obstacles to ultimate acceptance of an American military alliance with Western Europe.”\textsuperscript{128}

\section*{D. FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS}

On 6 July, formal negotiations for an Atlantic alliance convened at Washington with Canada, the Brussels Powers, and the US.\textsuperscript{129} Language delineating US actions in case of an attack continued to be debated, as did the list of potential members. In September, results of the negotiations were contained in the Washington paper, which included verbiage that drew from both the Rio Pact and Brussels Treaty.\textsuperscript{130} The Washington paper also recommended that the treaty would exist within the construct of the United Nations treaty, recognizing and reinforcing the primacy of that organization; that it would define its effective area; that it would be more than simply military, in that it would promote welfare of the people in the member countries; and that it would have a mechanism for implementation. In October, Canada and all Brussels Powers agreed to join, and the work on drafting the treaty commenced on 10 December. On 10 March of 1949, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy were formally invited to join in the alliance. All accepted, and NATO was formed on 4 April, as the North Atlantic Treaty was signed at Washington.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{126} Kaplan, 4-5
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{129} Ismay, “Negotiating the Atlantic Treaty” Chap. 1.
\textsuperscript{130} Kaplan, 17.
\textsuperscript{131} Ismay, “Negotiating the Atlantic Treaty,” Chap. 1.
IV. CONCLUSION

NATO was formed in response to a perception by the Western Allies that the menace of Soviet Communism was encroaching from the east, even before the end of the war. In countries where the Red Army pushed Nazi forces out of Eastern Europe, Communist governments took root. As the postwar peace process advanced from 1945 to 1947, the Soviet Union’s interpretation of international agreements, its prioritization of issues, and its overall objectives for the future seemed to differ distinctly from those of her Allies. These differences or misunderstandings between East and West stalled the peace process repeatedly, fomented mutual mistrust, and enhanced the Western view of the Soviets as a threat.

A. LESSONS

The lessons to be drawn from NATO’s history are numerous. Of primary importance are in the realms of consultation among democracies, threat perception and economy as it relates to security.

1. Consultation

First, members of the World War II Alliance consulted with one another throughout the war to share views and rationales regarding their interests during and after the war. After the war, this continued via the peace process, allowing the USSR to determine that its goals were unlikely to be attained through further cooperation with the West, and the other members gained an understanding of the Soviet Union, in that it placed self-interest above those of Europe as a whole. Upon the Soviet departure from the peace process, and earlier rejection of the invitation to participate in the European Reconstruction Plan, western uncertainty of the USSR increased to such a degree that the USSR was seen as a threat. As an alliance, NATO reduces its members’ uncertainty. Internally, it does so by clarifying national goals for other members in a manner that does not raise suspicions or the specter of war among the others. The consultative nature of the alliance permits members to understand each others’ views and rationales on issues
vital to defense, and enables solutions to national problems to be developed collectively, and in a manner that maintains peace, rather than one that jeopardizes it.

Through the process of enlargement, NATO initially broadened its security umbrella to include West Germany, then farther south and east, over many former satellite states of the USSR. In doing so, NATO has increased the security of all members by expanding the number of states, and size of the area, that are committed to its principles. This has increased both the alliance’s information-sharing among all of them and the aggregate size of military forces available to defend them. With those forces under the civilian control of democratic governments, the potential for domestic instability, and, subsequently, regional uncertainty and insecurity are even further reduced.

2. **Threat Perception**

The second lesson is in regards to threat perception. The likelihood of Soviet expansion into Western Europe is questionable, but the perception of it as a threat by Western European states is understandable. Stalin and his representatives had continually provided two, seemingly contradictory, messages regarding the governments of states along its borders. Initially, during negotiations with the British in 1941, the Soviets expressed security as a primary interest, and declared that it wanted only friendly governments on its borders to prevent another invasion from the west. In September that year, the Soviet ambassador in London pledged to defend nations’ rights to independence, sovereignty, and governmental self-determination as he announced Soviet agreement with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. During the Yalta Conference in 1945, Stalin himself agreed with Churchill and Roosevelt that sovereignty and self-determination would be restored to nations overpowered by the Axis. Later in the year, at Potsdam, Stalin further agreed that postwar peace would be made with democratic governments. While the Soviet requirement for security did not necessarily contradict its dedication to national sovereignty and self-determination in states formerly subjected to the Axis, the spread of Soviet communism into Eastern European states after the war, and establishment of such friendly governments, indicates security was the higher priority.
In addition, at Potsdam Stalin also expressed interest in control of the Black Sea Straits. Soviet actions in Iran in late 1945 and toward Turkey in 1946 were addressed by the West outside the purview of the CFM. These were a better reflection of the USSR’s unique interests of security and economy than they were of the verbal and written agreements made earlier. With the expansion of communism in Eastern Europe, along with the difficulties that the western Allies experienced with the Soviets throughout the peace process and the competition of communist parties in several western governments, the western Allies became gravely concerned that Soviet communism would expand into their own states and subject them to the USSR’s growing dominance on the continent. As a result, France and Britain allied themselves with the Benelux states to protect themselves from that emerging threat with the Brussels Treaty in 1948.

3. Economy

The third lesson is of an economic nature. Military alliance achieved through the Brussels Treaty would not be enough to protect those states from the perceived Soviet threat. With economic recovery recognized to be imperative to future peace in Europe, and the European Recovery Plan was initiated. However, soon after it was implemented, it became apparent the Marshall Plan alone was not enough to attain the degree of economic and military strength required to successfully resist further Soviet expansion westward. Across Europe, national economies that had been ravaged by the war, and the military forces that had fought it, had not yet recovered by the time the Brussels Treaty was signed. As they had done economically, the western European states turned to the US for military assistance to provide a blanket of security that would allow economic initiatives to take root without interference from the east. With the investment in manpower, resources, and lives that the US had already made in fighting the war, the tradition of avoiding entangling alliance since 1800, and the establishment of the UN as a global body to prevent future wars, many figures in the US government were reluctant to become more deeply involved in what they deemed to be European affairs. However, Senator Vandenberg and others were quick enough to recognize the link between security in Europe and global peace, and the careful crafting of the North Atlantic Treaty’s
verbiage satisfied enough concerns to enable the United States to join with the Brussels Treaty members and other states of the Euro-Atlantic region and establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which aggression against one was considered aggression against all, and the US began providing military aid and collective defense for western Europe.

Throughout World War II, and up to 1947, the Soviet Union and the Western Powers made assumptions about the other, failed to validate them, even when the other’s actions indicated that the assumptions may be incorrect. The USSR stated its goals for security and insisted on friendly governments at its borders, and took action to achieve them. In response to those actions, the Western Powers would either directly address the actions individually, or sit by in bewilderment. Conversely, the Western Powers were focused on economic recovery and insisted on democratic, sovereign governments in former Axis states, and the Soviet Union agreed to those conditions, but felt that those governments were a compromise to its security. Both agreed to the others’ conditions in the wartime conferences, and both appear to have been surprised or upset as the tried to establish those conditions. It appears that the Western Powers were unwilling to allow another Munich and grant the Soviets a consensual security zone, while the Soviets recognized that they were not strong enough, military or otherwise, to pursue their goals transparently and then stand their ground. By 1947, the Allied Powers were no longer allies. They had come together to defeat a common enemy and, once that had been done, it is understandable that they would return pursuing their own interests, which had taken on a higher priority with the Axis defeat.

B. THEORY

By understanding the rich context in which NATO was formed, we can better understand the theories of international politics. The Soviet Union generally exhibited Political Realist qualities of security interest by having a buffer zone between itself and the west, seeking power and pursuing an imperialist goal to regain its 1941 borders. The Western Allies initially were more in line with Political Idealism, both by establishing the
UN to maintain peace and expecting to coexist with the Soviet Union, and by expecting newly formed democratic governments to exist peacefully at its borders.

The states that formed NATO certainly support Keohane’s Neoliberal Institutionalism assertion regarding state capabilities. Instead of preventing states from making progress NATO is based upon mutual assistance. In providing aid to others, states that did so enabled gains of others, and at a significant cost to themselves, lowering any relative capability advantage they had. NATO member states saw themselves as the actors within the system, and certainly shared mutual interests. None of them wanted another war, and they all wanted stability that would enable Western Europe to recover economically and be able to defend itself against a potential Soviet attack. Through cooperation, they gained security and minimized some costs – the Western European states would not have to financially and militarily fund their security all on their own, and North American states reduced their costs associated with war. All acted rationally, and maximized the benefits associated with peace in Europe, while minimizing both the risk that war would occur by balancing collectively against the power of the Soviet Union, and the costs to each of them, should such a war occur.

C. NATO – THE INSTITUTION

To be sure, NATO is a formal and exclusive institution. That is, it has established an organization of its own, with its own rules, procedures, and customs that demand a full understanding. In the years immediately following the war, from 1945 to 1947, the Soviet policy of Communist expansion into Eastern Europe was viewed by statesmen in the West as an imminent, unlimited, and unchecked threat. The Western European states, which were economically and militarily incapable of defense, sought some remedy in an enduring alliance structure. The raison d’etre for NATO was that the prospective members realized they would be more capable of defending themselves collectively, rather than individually, and, while individual members had unique interests, the costs involved in such collective defense were outweighed by that benefit for North American, North Atlantic, and Western European parties could accrue in a combined, joint effort. The North Atlantic Treaty was drafted in the favorable climate among its members, the
core of which were Allies during World War II, and all of which opposed the spread of communism into Western Europe.

Initially, NATO’s organizational structure was meager, as European members were focused on individual interests of economic and military recovery while relying upon their transatlantic allies to aid them in case of attack. The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 was the catalyst that compelled the European members to rapidly invest militarily and economically in the alliance. In doing so, NATO absorbed some of the institutional bodies of the Western Union Defense Organization that had been formed by the Brussels Pact in 1948, a year prior to the North Atlantic Treaty at Washington. To this foundation, the allies added structure, facilities, and mechanisms that increased the capability and enhanced the efficiency of the alliance over time, so that the western bloc of North Atlantic allies came to form a counterweight for Soviet power in Europe. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Soviet threat against which the NATO was formed dissolved, but NATO had never been merely an issue solely of the Soviet threat to the West. It had also been about the question of collective defense and collective security in Europe generally. Thus, the alliance lives on, in an altered form, having adapted itself to the needs of the post-Cold War at the end of the 20th century in ways that alliance hands would have poorly anticipated twenty-five years ago. By assisting former adversaries to develop their own capabilities as it continued to enlarge its membership, NATO has taken on an exogenous character, to a degree, since 1989.
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