UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND NORTH KOREA: LEVERAGING COMMON INTERESTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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United States National Security Interests and North Korea: Leveraging Common Interests

United States (US) policy towards North Korea has struggled to adequately address the US national security interests. Contrary to interests delineated in the US National Security Strategy, North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, demonstrates the propensity to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), destabilizes the Korean Peninsula with its military threat, violates the human rights and dignity of its citizens, and is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. This work identifies opportunities for cooperation with China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia to meet US security interests while exposing the challenges for the same. With the exception of terrorism, all countries share US interests related to North Korea. However, a significant divergence in ways and means complicates a coordinated approach. In general, the US and Japan support hard power, favoring all instruments of national power, while China, Russia, and South Korea favor a diplomatic approach to issues. In considering the positions of each country, the US should encourage a regional country to lead efforts in addressing common security interests through attractive diplomatic and economic means generally favored by China, Russia, and South Korea.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
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<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
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</tbody>
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   iii
ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND NORTH KOREA: LEVERAGING COMMON INTERESTS, by Robert F. Ogden, II, 114 pages.

United States (US) policy towards North Korea has struggled to adequately address the US national security interests. Contrary to interests delineated in the US National Security Strategy, North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, demonstrates the propensity to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), destabilizes the Korean Peninsula with its military threat, violates the human rights and dignity of its citizens, and is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. This work identifies opportunities for cooperation with China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia to meet US security interests while exposing the challenges for the same. With the exception of terrorism, all countries share US interests related to North Korea. However, a significant divergence in ways and means complicates a coordinated approach. In general, the US and Japan support hard power, favoring all instruments of national power, while China, Russia, and South Korea favor a diplomatic approach to issues. In considering the positions of each country, the US should encourage a regional country to lead efforts in addressing common security interests through attractive diplomatic and economic means generally favored by China, Russia, and South Korea.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ........... ii
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT ............................ iii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... v
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................... ix
TABLES ......................................................................................................................... x

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

- Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
- Key Terms ............................................................................................................. 3
- Assumptions ........................................................................................................... 3
- Limitations ............................................................................................................. 4
- Delimitations ......................................................................................................... 4
- Background .......................................................................................................... 5
  - The North Korean Threat .................................................................................... 6
  - Terrorism .......................................................................................................... 6
  - Nuclear Weapons Proliferation .......................................................................... 7
  - Missile Technology ............................................................................................ 9
  - Threat to Regional Stability .............................................................................. 10
  - Human Dignity .................................................................................................. 11
  - Economic Development .................................................................................. 12
  - National Security Interests .............................................................................. 16

## CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

- Resources Used ................................................................................................... 21
  - Books ................................................................................................................. 22
  - Professional Journals ....................................................................................... 22
  - Gray Literature .................................................................................................. 22
- Conservatism and Liberalism in Literature ......................................................... 23
  - Conservatism in Literature Review ................................................................. 24
  - Liberalism in Literature Review ...................................................................... 27
- Other Collections ............................................................................................... 31

## CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

- Determining US National Security Interests ....................................................... 34
- Determining National Security Interests of China, Japan, Russia and South Korea .... 35
### Determining DPRK National Security Interests

#### Comparing and Contrasting Approaches

#### Comparing US Interests to North Korean Interests

#### Summary

### CHAPTER. 4 ANALYSIS

#### National Security Interests of the United States

- **Terrorism**: Page 41
- **Nuclear Weapons**: Page 42
- **Human Dignity**: Page 43
- **Regional Stability**: Page 43
- **Economic Development**: Page 44
- **Missile and Missile Technology**: Page 45

#### National Security Interests of China

- **Terrorism**: Page 46
- **WMD Proliferation**: Page 47
- **Human Dignity**: Page 48
- **Regional Stability**: Page 50
- **Economic Development**: Page 50

#### National Security Interests of Japan

- **Terrorism**: Page 52
- **WMD Proliferation**: Page 52
- **Human Dignity**: Page 53
- **Regional Stability**: Page 54
- **Economic Development**: Page 54

#### National Security Interests of South Korea

- **Terrorism**: Page 56
- **WMD Proliferation**: Page 56
- **Human Dignity**: Page 57
- **Regional Stability**: Page 58
- **Economic Development**: Page 58

#### National Security Interests of Russia

- **Terrorism**: Page 59
- **WMD Proliferation**: Page 60
- **Human Dignity**: Page 60
- **Regional Stability**: Page 60
- **Economic Development**: Page 61

#### National Security Interests of the DPRK

- **Regime Survival**: Page 63
  - **Conventional Military**: Page 63
- **Nuclear Weapons**: Page 66
- **Economic Development**: Page 69
- **Reunification**: Page 71
- **State Security**: Page 72

#### Comparing US Interests to the Group of Four

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vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIA    Central Intelligence Agency
DIME   Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic Instruments of Power
DMZ    Demilitarized Zone
DPRK   Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
FPC    *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*
GDP    Gross Domestic Product
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM   Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JSDF   Japanese Self-Defense Force
KWP    Korean Workers’ Party
MTCR   Missile Technology Control Regime
NPT    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSC    *National Security Concept* (Russia)
ODA    Overseas Developmental Assistance
PSI    Proliferation Security Initiative
ROK    Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SPOT   State Sponsor of Terrorism list
WMD    Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO    World Trade Organization
TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Strategies on WMD Proliferation</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Strategies on Regional Stability</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Strategies on Human Dignity</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>National Strategies on Economic Development</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Complementary and Conflicting Means of Various Countries to US Means by Interest</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Complementary and Conflicting Means of Various Countries to US Means by Instrument of Power</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Perceived Compatibility of Interests</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>National Strategy Documents</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ways and Means of Six-Party Members</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Combined table of means of the Six-Party members</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Current US policy towards North Korea has failed to adequately meet the security interests of the United States. Contrary to the national security interests delineated in the 2006 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear weapon, continues to demonstrate the propensity to proliferate high-lethality weapons, threatens regional stability with these weapons and its aggressive military posture, and consistently violates the human rights and dignity of its own population. The possession of nuclear weapons undermines US efforts to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and places the technology in the hands of an unpredictable adversary, while continued military tensions on both sides along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) increases the chances of miscalculations that can result in a regional conflict. Finally, the ongoing economic instability in North Korea poses a potential humanitarian and economic crisis to the region and encourages illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and US currency counterfeiting, undermining general US national security interests.

This thesis examines national strategy documents of the United States and of Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia (Group of Four) to identify complementary and conflicting “means” to addressing shared interests with United States. Separately, North Korean interests are determined and compared to US interests to identify complementary and conflicting interests. Using these complementary and conflicting interests and an understanding of the means by which the United States can partner with the Group of Four, recommendations are provided for addressing US security interests. This process required answering the following questions:
1. What are the national security interests of each Six-Party member?

2. What are the means by which members intend to address the security interests?

3. How do these means of each country compare and contrast to the means of other members?

4. How can the United States best leverage the means to accomplish US national security interests?

Chapter 1 begins by introducing key terms, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. It follows with introducing the changing relations between the Six-Party Members, a brief historical perspective to the North Korean peninsula, the North Korean threat, and past negotiations and agreements with North Korea.

Chapter 2 provides a review of literature, divided into two political ideologies: conservatism and liberalism.

Chapter 3 is the research methodology. It discusses how the national security strategies were dissected to identify national security interests and the means of the Six-Party members and how the North Korean national security interests were determined.

Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the security interests of all Six-Party members, identifying the complementary and conflicting means between the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia in addressing these interests. This chapter also compares and contrasts US interests to North Korean interests and discusses its meaning to agreeable solutions.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and recommendations based on the findings. Specifically, a recommendation is provided for diplomatic and economic approaches to further US security goals.
Key Terms

North: North Korea

South: South Korea


Six-Party Members: United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia

Six-Party Talks: Talks attended by Six-Party Members to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Group of Four: Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia

Assumptions

This thesis assumes that the reader has a general familiarity with issues surrounding North Korea as they are presented in the media. It also assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of political science, which is essential to understanding the purpose of documents such as the national security strategies and the interaction of sovereign nations.

The national security strategies analyzed are the most current publicly available. These documents are unclassified. In some or all cases, the countries may maintain a classified portion of the security strategy, as in the US’s case. It is assumed that the unclassified portion accurately reflects the security interests and approaches of each nation. Furthermore, it is assumed that the nations will continue policymaking based on their most recent national security strategies. In those situations where security interests and means to accomplishing them have clearly diverged in relation to their national security strategy, it will be addressed in the appropriate chapter.
Limitations

The following limitations apply:

1. Only unclassified versions of national security strategies are analyzed in this thesis.

2. The North Korean strategy documents are not publicly available. Therefore, North Korea’s national security interests are developed using knowledge from open source information, including media reports and declarations and agreements.

3. First-hand knowledge of internal political and economic situation in North Korea is limited.

Delimitations

The following delimitations apply:

1. This thesis does not examine or debate the merits of the NSS or the security strategy of any other nation.

2. This thesis does not address the issue of reunification, though it is hoped that the policies proposed will support the eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula for the benefit of the Korean people. Indeed, any attempt to establish a productive and stable North Korea should lend itself well to the eventual peaceful unification of the peninsula.

3. This thesis does not consider the military instrument of power as a policy tool insofar that it reflects the offensive use of force. For example, the option of military strike is not within the purview of this thesis, whereas the use of the military to enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be considered appropriate within the bounds of the thesis.

4. In controlling the scope of this thesis, the influence of countries beyond members of the Six-Party Talks\(^1\) is not examined. This last delimitation is reasonable since the members of
the Six-Party Talks were selected based on having a direct interest in the stability of and influence on North Korea.

**Background**

Since the end of World War II, the United States has found itself heavily involved on the Korean Peninsula, first as a liberator from Japanese occupation, then as a defender of the South during the Korean War, and finally as a security guarantor from further North Korean hostile aggressions throughout the Cold War. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many analysts speculated that North Korea would soon follow suit, bringing to close over 40 years of US military presence on the peninsula. This prediction was bolstered by the death of the “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung in 1994.

More than a decade has passed since this prediction was made. Yet, the North Korean regime seems solidly in control, and changes on the peninsula have only worsened tensions between the US and North Korea, with the North more threatening to regional stability and world order today than at any other time since the end of the Korean War.

At the same time, the US has found itself with outdated security arrangements in a region with a vastly different politico-economic landscape than just 15 years ago. Economic dependence has unwittingly tied Japan, South Korea, China, and the US together, binding these nations together by trade. On the other hand several issues pull at the knot: South Korea has blossomed as an independent-thinking democracy and finds its relations cooling with the US as the two nations fail to find common ground over US troop deployment in the South and on policy towards the North; concern over expanding roles of the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) along with lingering reminders of Japan’s World War II atrocities continue to create uneasiness between Japan and both China and South Korea; and China’s military expansion and
modernization keep US analysts arguing on whether China should be considered a strategic competitor or strategic partner.

In the meantime, North Korea has established itself as a reclusive totalitarian Stalinist regime, isolating itself from the world community and making it the sole pariah of the region. China remains the stalwart ally of the North, but finds this relationship strained by its improving diplomatic and economic ties with South Korea (the North’s longtime adversary) and its hegemonic aspirations in which it must prove itself a responsible leader to gain regional acceptance.

The North Korean Threat

North Korea is one of the United States’ top security interests. Past actions have landed North Korea on the US State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, one of only five countries listed. The NSS, which singles out the following North Korean activities as contrary to our national security interests: nuclear weapons and missile proliferation; regional military threat; and human rights abuse. In addition, the NSS addresses economic freedom as a “moral imperative” making economic development germane to North Korea. A brief historical background of each security interest follows.

Terrorism

North Korea has a long record of involvement in terrorist activities ranging from providing safe haven for terrorists to orchestrating direct attacks. Specifically, in 1970, North Korea gave refuge to members of the Japanese Red Army, an organization committed to the overthrow of Japan’s democratic government, following an airplane hijacking. In 1983, the North Korea shifted from a nation harboring terrorists to one conducting terrorist attacks when it
was implicated in an attempted bombing assassination of South Korea’s president Chun Doo Hwan during a state visit to Burma.\textsuperscript{5} Just four years later, North Korea was implicated in the bombing of Korean Airlines flight 858 which took the lives of 115 people.\textsuperscript{6} Finally, over a two-decade period in the 1970’s and 1980’s, North Korea actively involved itself in abducting citizens from other countries, including Japan and South Korea, and smuggling them to the North.

Terrorist activities have seemed to disappear from North Korea’s modus operandi since the KAL 858 bombing. However, North Korea continues to harbor the Japanese Red Army members and has yet to resolve the issue of abductees, keeping the country on the State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism.

**Nuclear Weapons Proliferation**

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions can be traced back to 1964 when, following China’s successful nuclear weapons test, Kim Il Sung requested assistance from Mao Tse-tung in developing his own nuclear capabilities.\textsuperscript{7} Though Mao refused, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with a small research reactor the following year. This and subsequent reactor construction garnered little attention from the intelligence community due to the country’s lack of processing capability and the low plutonium production capacity of the research reactors.\textsuperscript{8} However, by 1985 the US became aware of construction of a nuclear power plant that would be capable of producing Plutonium.\textsuperscript{9} While concerns began to be voiced over North Korean intentions, CIA reports still indicated no evidence of intent to develop nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{10} On the contrary, North Korea seemingly had a legitimate need for nuclear power, lacking oil or gas resources.\textsuperscript{11} Temporarily allaying US concerns was North Korea’s agreement to become a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, a result of US diplomatic pressure on North Korea’s
closest ally, the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the North refused to sign the safeguards agreement that would have allowed the IAEA to monitor nuclear activities, a requirement under the NPT.

Changes in the Soviet Union made 1989 a watershed year for North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The previous year, Moscow had signaled to Pyongyang that they could no longer rely on continued economic support as in the past, placing Pyongyang on the sidelines as the Soviet Union underwent significant democratic and economic changes under the reform-minded Gorbachev. That same year, a CIA report noted that “North Korea [was] rapidly expanding its nuclear activities.” By the early 1990’s, after repeated attempts to conceal its clandestine nuclear activities and thwart its obligations for transparency under the NPT for IAEA inspections, North Korea was exposed—the US had collected convincing intelligence to confirm North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions, sparking US-DPRK bilateral talks. North Korea responded to accusations by threatening to withdraw from the NPT. In 1994, a flurry of diplomatic activity and military posturing resulted in an agreement between the US and North Korea which froze North Korean operations of its graphite moderated reactors and halted plans to reprocess spent fuel rods in exchange for energy concessions from the United States. Though the facilities remained frozen and the spent rods were kept in a secure storage facility for the next 8 years, evidence once again began to surface, this time of a clandestine program to enrich uranium from natural uranium ore. Unlike the crisis in the 1990’s, this time North Korea carried through on a promise to withdraw from the NPT and went further by withdrawing from the 1994 agreement, ejecting IAEA inspectors, resuming reactor operations, and removing the spent rods from their storage facility. With little diplomatic action on either side from 2002 to 2006, North Korea pursued its nuclear ambitions virtually unrestrained, culminating in a nuclear weapons test in October 2006.
Like their nuclear program, North Korea’s interest in missiles can be traced back to the 1960’s with the receipt of Soviet-made missiles.\textsuperscript{14} Missile design efforts continued for the next two decades with successful reverse engineering of SCUD-B missiles obtained from Egypt.\textsuperscript{15} By 1986, North Korea was manufacturing and supplying missiles to Iran and designing other variants of the SCUD. Later customers included Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, and Yemen.\textsuperscript{16}

North Korea gained greatest attention for their missile program with their subsequent development of the No Dong ballistic missile in 1990,\textsuperscript{17} a medium range missile capable of striking US bases in Japan. Purportedly capable of carrying nuclear payloads, the No Dong was ominously on a parallel development track with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

By 1996, North Korea had further advanced its ballistic missile technology, with prototypes of intermediate range Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2 missiles, threatening US bases along the US Pacific coast.\textsuperscript{18} Both missiles have since been tested with only partial success.

Since the 1990’s, the US has been engaging North Korea in talks over its missile development program, though such talks have typically taken second stage to the nuclear talks. In addition, the US has used the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important mechanism through which to influence other nations to deal with the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology. The overall aim of the MTCR is to stop the spread of missiles capable of being used for chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks by discouraging the sale or distribution of the missiles or the components and technologies that could otherwise be used to their development.\textsuperscript{19} North Korea has refused to join the MTCR and has made proliferation of missiles and missile technology a central part of their export trade.
Though solid figures are not available for the value of the missile trade, it is generally agreed by experts that North Korea’s weapons trade is a significant part of their export economy. In 2001, the State Department estimated North Korea’s weapons trade at US$ 560 million,\textsuperscript{20} significant for a country with a same-year GDP estimated at only $15.7 billion.\textsuperscript{21} However, recent pressure by the US and international community has made it hard for North Korea to sell its missiles. The loss of Pakistan and Libya as customers and the strengthening international relationships continue to make it more difficult for North Korea to do business. Nonetheless, North Korea’s willingness to sell both missiles and missile technology to anyone continues to make it a significant security interest of the United States.

\textbf{Threat to Regional Stability}

North Korea is estimated to spend as much as 40 percent of its GDP on its military\textsuperscript{22} and maintains the 5th largest military in the world in terms of active troop numbers. While most of their equipment is old and assessed to be in poor shape, North Korea maintains a sizable special operations force, and its proximity to the South Korean capitol is such that Seoul is within easy striking range of North Korean artillery and short-range missiles. One estimate provides that in a conventional attack on the South Korean capitol, North Korea is capable of delivering 500,000 rounds of artillery per hour in the first few hours of the attack,\textsuperscript{23} a sobering statistic for Seoul’s 14 million residents and a grave concern for US military planners.

Recent military engagements on the peninsula have fed the military tensions and highlight the precarious peace that exists between the North and South countries. At sea, North-South naval clashes in 1999 and twice again in 2002 in the China Sea resulted in deaths on both sides.\textsuperscript{24} More recently, in August 2006, North and South Korean ground troops along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) exchanged gunfire allegedly when the North fired upon a South
Korean guard post, an example one of the all-too-frequent exchanges of gunfire across the DMZ.25

Though many experts consider an attack beyond such minor skirmishes by North Korea as highly improbable, stating that such action would be tantamount to regime suicide, others point to the risky choice thesis, arguing that deteriorating conditions inside the regime itself may lead to a decision to “roll the dice” when there is little to lose and much to gain.26 Regardless, the lack of transparency of North Korea’s intentions increases the chance of a grave miscalculation.

Human Dignity

Of all the security interests, North Korea’s human rights issues are the most difficult to both evaluate and address. This fact stems from the country’s tight societal control, lack of free movement to foreigners (including allied foreign diplomats and NGO staff), a closed and tightly guarded media, and an overall general ignorance by the North Korean population of “normal” conditions in the outside world. Because of these difficulties, reports on human rights conditions often rely on corroborating reports of individuals with similar experiences vice first-hand observation. What is known with reasonable certainty is that North Korea: operates a political prison camp with an inmate population of an estimated 200,000 prisoners, maintaining unusually harsh conditions and metering out draconian punishment;27 abducted both Japanese and South Korean citizens dating back to at least the 1970s, a fact to which it readily admitted in 2002 in the cases of several Japanese abductees;28 incarcerates repatriated economic refugees;29 denies religious freedom; and infuses radical ideology into the minds of its citizens to promote a religious commitment to the regime and its leaders.30

These and other human rights violations received significant attention during the famine in the 1990s and again have received increasing scrutiny in the international community in the
past few years. In 2004, possibly noting the lack of progress and the severity of human rights abuses in North Korea, the United Nations appointed a “Special Rapporteur” to examine the human rights situation in North Korea. The findings of the Special Rapporteur published in a 2005 report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights found a “variety of discrepancies and transgressions--several of an egregious nature--in the implementation of human rights in the country, calling for immediate action to prevent abuses and to provide redress.” The US followed suit in 2005, appointing a “special envoy” to promote human rights in North Korea and authorizing the use of $22 million per year to further human rights interests under the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004.

Though progress has been slow, North Korea has taken a few steps to address some of the more egregious laws, most notably significantly reducing the number of offenses that carry the death penalty. Nonetheless, North Korea’s abysmal human rights record assures its place on the international stage for years to come.

**Economic Development**

Because of the regime’s secrecy, scholars have long struggled on the one hand to gauge the extent and accuracy of many of the previously mentioned issues, creating significant debate. On the other hand, the economic difficulties facing North Korea are clear for the world to see. Night images above the Korean peninsula contrast a dark and almost lifeless North Korean economy against a heavily light-speckled China to the North a bright and vibrant South Korea to the South.

North Korea’s economic instability is relatively recent, though its origins extend to the birth of the nation. Following World War II, North Korea emerged as a strong communist state with a centrally planned economy and a large industrial base with the associated skilled labor
developed under the Japanese rule, totaling 95 percent of the peninsula’s steel capacity, 90 percent of the hydroelectric capacity and 85 percent of the chemical production, while the South emerged with approximately two-thirds of the population and the preponderance of agriculture and consumer products. However, the aftermath of the Korean War, left eighteen of twenty-two major North Korean cities at least half destroyed, with figures for many industrial cities varying from 75 percent to 100 percent destruction. From the end of the war until the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea would depend on China and USSR for substantial economic and military support to help rebuild its economy and maintain a viable military defense on the DMZ, while trade with the West would be restricted by various US-led sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Further complicating economic development was North Korea’s defense expenditure. Defense spending rose from an estimated 15 percent of GDP in the 1960s to an estimated 25 percent in the 1990s and 40 percent today.

From 1989 to 1991, the Soviet empire crumbled, and North Korea lost key trade partners as many former Soviet block countries sought to align themselves with the West. Two years later, possibly upset by the North’s unwillingness or inability to pay its debts, China halted shipments on credit, requiring cash or trade for future goods. These two historical events left North Korea without any major economic donors for the first time in its history. By 1994, the economic crisis was evident. The loss of energy assistance brought about a collapse in industry and distribution capacity, denying critical resources to the agricultural industry and hard currency from trade. Floods decimated what little agricultural production there was, leading to massive food shortages and starvation resulting in as many as 1 million or more deaths. This cycle would be repeated for the next several years, only to be mitigated by assistance from
international economic donors. Ironically, besides China, the largest donors of food aid from 1996 to 2004 included Japan, South Korea, and the US.42

In 2002, inspired by successes of China’s economy and needing to restore the nation’s economic viability following the famine of the 1990s, North Korea instituted significant economic changes, devaluing state currency, instituting market reforms, and opening an international tourist zone, special industrial zone, and a special administrative area.43 Today, the economic picture is a split frame. On one side, progress continues to be made, including talks to reopen a railway connecting South Korea to Russia. On the other side is the reversal of some market reforms, either in an attempt to reassert state power over North Korean society or due to lack of confidence that such reforms will succeed. Even if North Korea is committed to long-term to market reform, the road ahead will continue to be plagued by trade restrictions, a poor credit rating, an inflexible centrally planned economy that contributes to unpredictability and indecisiveness, and continuing food shortages.

Little economic impact has been felt outside the North as a result of its internal problems. However, complete collapse of the system would likely result in a flood of economic refugees to China, Russia, and South Korea (and even Japan), and rebuilding could cost the world community as much as $3 trillion over ten years.44

North Korea’s economic troubles have contributed to two other issues: narcotics trafficking and currency counterfeiting. Both of these activities appear to have government endorsement.

Narcotics trafficking is estimated to be North Korea’s largest source of income, topping that of its legitimate trade.45 With the loss of the Soviet Union as a major economic aid donor and because of the North’s poor credit rating, North Korea does not have easy access to capital,
making them dependent on international economic aid. Furthermore, North Korea is denied access to other international financial institutions such as the IMF and The World Bank because of its lack of transparency. With little credit worthiness and over US$ 1 billion trade deficit,\textsuperscript{46} it is little surprise that North Korea has turned to criminal activities to fund its regime.

Little doubt exists of official North Korean government complicit involvement in narcotics trafficking. Involvement by diplomatic, military, and other public officials has been confirmed, and Western intelligence agencies have identified large-scale opium facilities within North Korea.\textsuperscript{47} According to congressional testimony by a State Department official, since 1974, there have been “at least 50 arrests or drug seizures involving North Korean party and government officials in more than 20 countries around the world.”\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, according to a high-ranking North Korean defector, the North Korean government established a Bureau, referred to as Bureau 39, which is responsible for the production and selling of narcotics and other illicit activities to increase the state budget.\textsuperscript{49} Government involvement in this and other illicit activities have led some to aptly term North Korea the “Sopranos State,” referring to the way the government operates as a well-organized crime enterprise.

Currency counterfeiting efforts date back to the 1950s where counterfeit South Korean bills are on display in a South Korean museum.\textsuperscript{50} In the early 1990s North Korea purchased a high-quality printing press from Italy, similar to the ones used by the US mint. US Government estimates place the value of currency production at $15-25 million per year.\textsuperscript{51} Though the quantity is arguably insignificant, North Korea is the only known state to sponsor the production of counterfeit currency. To take action to stop the counterfeiting, the US Treasury placed restrictions on a Macau bank in September 2005 for allegedly laundering money for North Korean interests.
National Security Interests

A nation’s security interests are derived from its national security strategy or strategy documents when available. Identifying security interests and comparing the means in which nations intend to realize these interests provides a foundation for evaluating and developing solutions that meet the needs of all interested parties while avoiding extraneous issues that might otherwise prove counterproductive. Chapter 3 will discuss in detail how the national security strategies will be used to identify these national security interests.52

1 Six-Party Talks are specifically aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. However, parties of the Six-Party Talks have an equal security interest in other aspects of stability of the Korean peninsula based on their geographic proximity. Six Party members include Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, and US.


5 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader (New York: Thomas Dune Books, 2006), 323.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


20 Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, Budget, and International Security, *North Korea’s Connection to International Trade in Drugs,*

21 Ibid


30 Martin, Under The Loving Care Of The Fatherly Leader, 596-603.


32 Ibid.


39 Ibid.


45 Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, Budget, and International Security, *North Korea’s Connection to International Trade in Drugs*, 19

46 US State Department, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: North Korea (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 28, 2006); available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm; internet; accessed 15 February 2007. Site shows Imports in 2005 was 2.72B and exports was 1.34B.


49 Ibid


51 Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the publicly available literature on North Korea including books, journals, and gray literature, and present the breadth of views entailed therein. Government strategy documents of China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and North Korea are addressed separately in chapter four as part of the analysis process.

A wealth of information exists on North Korea in a variety of forms since the early 1990’s, with the overwhelming majority of attention focused around the nuclear weapons program. While books, professional journals, and gray literature all contribute greatly to the collection of information available, nearly all of this information reflects the perspective of regional experts from outside North Korea. Conspicuously absent is “insider” information concerning decision-making and policies in North Korea. The difficulty in getting such information is highlighted by former Vice President Walter Mondale who said, “Anyone who calls themselves [sic] an expert on North Korea is either a liar or a fool.”¹ Indeed, the inaccessibility to inside information limits research from a North Korean’s perspective to sparse information contained in official DPRK statements, the DPRK official newspaper, or testimonies by defectors or displaced persons. In the latter case, their testimonies provide us the only insights into the general conditions in the North that can be used to help substantiate other evidence and assist in developing US policy.
Resources Used

Books

Since the early 1990s, books related to North Korea have focused mostly on the nuclear issue. Hence, a flurry of publishing activity exists around times of major international interest and diplomatic activity between the West and North Korea. In particular, much was published around 1994 during the nuclear crisis that led to the Agreed Framework of 1994, and again around 2002 when North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the NPT. A review of selected books is covered in section three of this chapter.

Professional Journals


Gray Literature

Gray literature reviewed includes government documents, and published and unpublished articles from well-known think tanks. Strategy documents used to define the security interests of countries are addressed in chapter four under the respective country discussion. Other government documents that significantly contributed to the development of this thesis included Congressional Research Service documents, multinational and bilateral agreements, official statements, congressional hearings, published articles from security and policy think tanks, and others.
The various policy and security think tanks providing valuable gray literature information include: The Heritage Foundation (conservative); American Enterprise Institute (conservative); Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (liberal); Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Center For Int’l Security and Cooperation (academic); the London-based Int’l Institute for Strategic Studies (nonpartisan) which publishes the *Adelphi Papers* monograph series; Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (academic), the Tokyo-based Institute for International Policy Studies, a nonprofit and independent research institute; and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (nonpartisan), a nonprofit organization located in Washington, DC; and CATO Institute (libertarian). While the information gathered from gray literature is not “scholarly journal” material, the material is written by specialists in their field, whom often have significant past involvement in governmental and influential nongovernmental organizations. In addition, the variety of opinions that can be garnered from these groups, especially from think tanks of other countries, is of enormous value in gaining the broadest perspective.

Except for government strategy documents, a review of selected gray literature is found in section three of this chapter.

**Conservatism and Liberalism in Literature**

The literature review is divided, based on the authors’ views, into two political ideologies: conservatism and liberalism. As various sources will define each term differently, each will be discussed briefly to establish the context for this thesis.

Conservatism is most often associated with realism and the Republican Party policies. Conservatives believe in a strong military and sovereign decision making. They tend to shun international organizations, preferring a unilateral approach, except when those organizations can
further their interests. Examples of conservative presidential administrations include the Reagan administration and the current Bush administration.

Liberalism is most often associated with the Democratic Party policies. Liberals believe in the strength of institutions and thus are more likely to turn to international bodies to resolve disputes. European negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue are examples of liberalism at work. On the cuff of liberalism is Libertarianism (classical liberalism), which proposes a laissez faire attitude of limited government involvement, with a slant towards isolationism.

Conservatism in Literature Review

Material reviewed from conservatives included the book *Nuclear North Korea* by Victor Cha and David Kang, journal articles including “The Six-Party Talks: A Critical Assessment and Implications for South Korea’s Policy Toward North Korea” by Dr. Bon-hak Koo, and gray literature including a speech given by Dr. David L. Asher, entitled “How to Approach the China–North Korea Relationship.”

*Nuclear North Korea* is co-authored by Dr. Victor Cha and Dr. David Kang. This book takes a novel approach to debating the North Korean issue, with each co-author presenting their ideas in sequential chapters followed by rebuttal of each other’s views in subsequent chapters. Cha’s views are conservative and will be presented here, whereas Kang’s views, which are liberal, will be presented later in the “Liberalism in Literature Review” section.

An associate professor in International Relations at Georgetown University, Cha took public service leave in 2005 to join the Bush Administration as Director for Asian Affairs for the National Security Council. Cha is considered “hawkish,” representing the conservative views of many Republicans toward dealing with North Korea. In this book, Cha argues that North Korea
has engaged in “coercive bargaining,” extorting concessions from the West through bad behavior. Furthermore, consistent US appeasement has encouraged such behavior, allowing North Korea to become skilled at its art of coercive bargaining. Cha proposes “hawkish engagement” to include a combination of containment and engagement policies. His seemingly “liberal” recommendation of engagement in dealing with North Korea is at its core conservative. Cha theorizes that if pushed too hard, “Pyongyang could calculate hostility as a “rational” course of action even if victory were impossible.” Cha’s conclusion is based on what he terms the “double or nothing” logic, where a gambler on his last chips becomes more likely to throw them all in on one hand when he sees his future prospects for a win as dim. Therefore, it is clearly in US interest not to push too hard. Cha’s recruitment to the Bush Administration was likely precipitated by the growing international attention garnered by North Korea’s self-proclamation as a nuclear power earlier in that same year. Cha’s views are expected to complement the hard-line stance of the Bush Administration while introducing new ideas for limited engagement.

Dr. Bon-hak Koo is a professor at Hanrim Graduate School of International Studies in South Korea. Regarded as a conservative, he has published several articles in the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KJDA). KJDA is a quarterly journal published by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, a Korean government funded agency touted as the “premier defense think-tank in Korea.” In a 2006 article published in the KJDA titled “The Six-Party Talks: A Critical Assessment and Implications for South Korea’s Policy Toward North Korea,” Koo addresses the challenges of ongoing Six-Party Talks, stating that the September 2005 Joint Statement which provided a framework for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is ineffective in that, while accurately identifying all critical issues, it lacks a concrete roadmap to implementation.
Specifically, the timeline for freezing and dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, supplying oil, constructing light water reactors, and normalizing diplomatic relations between North Korea and other members of the Six-Party Talks is not addressed. In addition, despite the North’s proposed phased process for implementing the joint statement, Koo is pessimistic of North Korea’s intentions, stating that some of the demands put forth at the following Six-Party Talk shows North Korea’s intentions to “make implementation of the joint statement difficult and to secure more concessions from the other countries involved in the talks.” Koo concludes by providing advice for South Korean policy makers, stating that more cooperation is needed with the US, identifying that any support to the North should be linked to their reciprocal actions, and indicating that South Korea’s economic and humanitarian assistance to the North is counterproductive to US efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

Dr. David L. Asher is a Senior Associate in the Asia Studies Center at Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank in Washington, DC. Dr. Asher was a Senior Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in the first term of the Bush Administration and participated in Six-Party Talks. In a speech delivered in September 2006 titled “How to Approach the China–North Korea Relationship,” Dr. Asher expresses his view that China is the essential element in resolving security issues regarding North Korea. However, China has opted to take a sideline roll, acting as a neutral facilitator to negotiations rather than an active partner. Dr. Asher speculates that China is not so concerned with having a nuclear-armed neighbor with missiles capable of reaching Japan or the US as much as they are concerned with getting North Korea to act responsibly and maintain internal stability, and thus are unlikely to apply significant pressure to the North. To this end, he argues that, “the process of holding the [Six-Party] talks has become less a means to an end and more an end in itself.” In order to advance progress on North Korean
issues of weapons proliferation and illicit activities, Dr. Asher suggests multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral actions aimed at forcing China to confront the issues where their interests are at stake as well. Asher provides the example where unilateral action by the US Treasury to place sanctions on a Macau Bank for money-laundering for North Korea forced China to take action against the bank and other violators in order to protect the reputation of Chinese financial institutions.

Liberalism in Literature Review

Material reviewed from liberalists included the books *Nuclear North Korea* by Victor Cha and David Kang, and *The Korean Conundrum* authored by Ted Carpenter and Doug Bandow. Articles from scholarly journals include *US-Russian Relations and the North Korean Crisis* by James Clay Moltz. Gray literature reviewed includes an article by Bruce Cumings titled “Wrong Again. Bruce Cumings writes about US policy on North Korea.”

Dr. David Kang co-authored *Nuclear North Korea* with conservative author Dr. Victor Cha. Kang is an Adjunct Associate Professor of Business Administration in International Business at Dartmouth University. Taking a liberalist approach to North Korean policy, Kang sees the US’ current diplomatic disengagement from North Korea as damaging to our overall future regional interests, arguing that dialogue is necessary in order for the US to take a proactive role in shaping the future of the region. Kang explains North Korea’s behavior as predictable based on the loss of its Soviet ally and the Bush Administration’s persistent threats toward Pyongyang, pointing out a senior US official quoted as saying, “First is regime change. It need not necessarily be military, but it could lead to that.” Kang considers the threat from North Korea’s nuclear program, missile technology, and terrorism over-exaggerated, arguing that the North’s nuclear power program, even if fully developed would only be defensive since any
offensive use would guarantee the regime’s demise. Missile technology, he argues, is too nascent and, regardless, is the North’s legitimate sovereign right. Finally, Kang points out that North Korea has not conducted terrorist attacks since 1987, and calculably will not engage in further acts, since doing so would alienate them from China and their growing support base in South Korea.

Kang’s most compelling argument for why North Korea does not pose a significant threat is his economic analysis of the country. Describing an economy that is less than 5 percent of South Korea and defense spending that has precipitously fallen behind the South since 1985, Kang concludes that it is illogical for a country that didn’t attack when it was on par with its adversary would attack after it had fallen far behind. His views are markedly different from the hawkish stance of current US policies towards North Korea. According to Kang, the US will do best to recognize North Korea’s behavior as a reflection of their legitimate security concerns and with significant patience and diplomacy and with significant time and patience, “North Korea can be brought into the community of nations.”

*The Korean Conundrum*, by Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow provides a libertarian opinion to policy. Carpenter is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute, a libertarian think-tank in Washington, D.C. (Libertarianism is a unique form of liberalism that sometimes referred to as “classical liberalism.” While recognizing that institutions are necessary evils, non-interference in personal choices is highly regarded, leading proponents to seek to minimize the role of state, both nationally and internationally. Bandow was senior fellow at the CATO Institute, but left in 2005 when it was revealed that he received payoffs for publishing intentionally biased articles for Jack Abramoff’s clients in the Abramoff Scandal.
Despite the loss of credibility of one of the authors, the book contains information that is worthy of consideration.

The authors of *The Korean Conundrum* strongly endorse a complete revised strategy for East Asia. Unlike many East Asian experts who argue over different balances of the instruments of the DIME to influence North Korea, Carpenter and Bandow believe that the US should limit involvement, arguing that regional countries such as Japan, China, and South Korea should take the lead to solve problems in their own backyard. Current US presence and protection, they argue, only encourages “irresponsible behavior on the part of security clients.”

To that extent, Carpenter and Bandow say “the United States should inform Japan and South Korea that it intends to withdraw its forces from both countries within the next few years and…terminate the “mutual” security treaties.” In doing so, the authors see China and Japan as the future hegemons of the region. Regarding the North Korean nuclear threat, the authors contend that a nuclear armed South Korea and Japan are a viable option to maintaining a military balance in the region, should North Korea not give up its nuclear weapons program. The end state would be an East Asia where the US influence is diminished and the US has the ability to make choices rather than being forced into decision because of presence.

Bruce Cumings is a Professor of History at the University of Chicago. He is a well-recognized historian on North Korea whose works can readily be characterized as scathing indictments of a hypocritical West bullying a weak North Korea and represents a strongly liberal view. In his most recent book, *North Korea: Another Country* Dr. Cumings argues that social and economic ailments suffered in North Korea are an ongoing result of US policies towards the country. He sees US policies as failing to recognize North Korea’s legitimate security concerns stemming from the psychological impact of the brutal slaughter of civilians during the Korean
War, extending through the Cold War with the nuclear threat posed by the US nuclear arsenal in South Korea and continuing today with the Bush Administration’s verbal antagonism and hostile policies.

In resolving crises on the peninsula, Cummings believes that North Korea can be “bought off” pointing to the many overt “goodwill” attempts North Korea has made in the recent past, including acknowledgement and apologies for past abductions of Japanese citizens, development of free economic zones, and improvement of relations with the South Korea under Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” the policy of using soft power. He acknowledges that most changes have been brought about out of necessity but also addresses Kim Jong Il’s recognition of the need for change saying, “Things are not what they used to be in the 1960s. So no one should follow the way people used to do things in the past.”

In “Wrong Again. Bruce Cumings writes about US policy on North Korea,” Cumings seems to overlook the idea that nations, including the US, are led by national self-interest, and regional countries feel North Korea’s antagonistic rhetoric combined with its reclusive behavior as threatening. His constant assault on the US Government distracts from his arguments and likely reduces his credibility among policy makers. Most disappointing in Cumings’ writing is the lack of detailed and insightful advice to policy makers, instead focusing his efforts to expose US hypocrisy. His arguments are inconsistent, at one point arguing that the US “see[s] no other country whose sovereignty they feel bound to respect” while arguing just a paragraph later that the US “looked the other way when Park Chung Hee . . . made himself president for life.”

Cumings’ solution to the problem is appeasement, believing that the North would “give up its nukes and missiles in return for a formal end to the Korean War, a termination of mutual
hostility, the lifting of numerous economic and technological embargoes, diplomatic recognition, and direct or indirect compensation for giving up expensive programmes.”

“US-Russian Relations and the North Korean Crisis” is an article published in the Asian Survey, a scholarly journal of international relations related to Asia and published by the University of California press. The author of the article, Dr. James Clay Moltz, is the Deputy Director for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. In the article, Moltz describes Russia as an underutilized actor in the Six-Party Talks, pointing to the past high-level political and economic links Russian officials have had with North Korea and the energy incentives Russia negotiators can bring to the table. Furthermore, he points to the country’s common economic interests and growing economic ties with Japan, South Korea, and China including an economic initiative to connect the Siberian railroad line to the South Korean line through North Korea. Moltz refers to Russia’s eagerness to actively participate in talks and advises that the US must be willing to play a supportive role when appropriate.

Other Collections

*Korea’s Future and the Great Powers* edited by Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard Ellings, *The U.S. and the Two Koreas* edited by Tong Whan Park, and *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond*, edited by Philip Yun and Gi-Wook Shin are essay compilations written by various authors that provided a good synopsis of opinions and thoughts on a broad range of issues related to North Korea, and was a good source from which to launch more in-depth research. Prolific contributors include Victor Cha, Nicholas Eberstadt, David Kang, Marcus Noland, and Robert Scalapino among others.

Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and, as a recognized expert on North Korea, has provided testimony to
Congress. Eberstadt sees North Korea as a state whose political construct is “specially and particularly built for three entwined purposes: to conduct a war, to settle a historical grievance, and to fulfill a grand ideological vision.” To this end, he argues that North Korea is most diplomatically pliable through concessions of economic aid. This argument is further supported in some of his writings concerning North Korea’s challenges in expanding exports with countries that do not hold trade restrictions with the regime and its inability to attract foreign investment capital.

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Ibid.

Prepared statement from Nicholas Eberstadt speaking on 17 February 2005 on *North Korea’s WMD Program: Purposes and Implications* for the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In chapter 1, five US security interests related to North Korea were identified: terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology; regional stability; human rights; and economic development. Section one of this chapter discusses the methodology used to select these US security interests and the ways and means to address them. Section two examines the methodology used to select the security interests of Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia that complement or conflict with US security interests related to North Korea. Section three identifies the methodology to determine North Korea’s security interests. Section four explains the methodology used to assess the compatibility in the security strategies of the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China. Compatibility is essential in determining the recommendations for future US policy and sets the foundation for chapter five.

Determining US National Security Interests

Determining the national security interests of the United States is relatively straightforward compared to the other five countries considered in this thesis. Since the United States has a formal and published national security strategy, this document is the primary resource for identifying national security interests. However, other materials referenced include Presidential speeches and Department of State documents when amplifying information clarifies or modifies current strategy.

The methodology entails drawing from the NSS those interests directly related to North Korea. In several instances, North Korea is explicitly identified, making this determination easy. In other cases security interests are introduced in a generic manner, identifying no or only
representative countries, thus leaving the reader to determine target countries. In such situations, factors such as North Korea’s social, political, economic, a military environment are taken into consideration to determine applicability.

Even with a relatively straightforward national security strategy, a little work is needed to identify those interests that are of real importance to the United States. To do this, key word phrases that connote a magnitude of severity are looked for. Examples include: grave threat; serious challenge; serious threat; notable threat; urgent issue, etc.

The “key word phrase” methodology is applied to the NSS to identify security interests. Once these security interests are determined, the “ways” or “means” are drawn out using either explicit or implicit references in the NSS.

This methodology does have shortcomings. The most important shortcoming is that it does not weigh the importance of national interests in relation to each other. This importance is significant in negotiations as the United States invariably selects issues to concede in order to push forward higher interests.

Determining National Security Interests of China, Japan, Russia and South Korea

National security interests for China, Japan, Russia and South Korea are determined and matched to US interests in the following process:

1. A template of US national security interests is first established.

2. National strategy documents of China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea are carefully examined to identify those interests that match US interests.

3. The ways and means of each country’s security interests are identified.
It should be noted from above that not all security interests for each country are addressed. This omission is intentional, as the intent is to focus on the US interests. Hence, only shared interests are identified to determine the ways and means that complement or conflict with US interests. On the other hand, this methodology ignores the priorities of security interests for other countries, which may complicate US efforts in reaching its own interests. For example, consider three interests, A, B and C. A and B are interests of the United States. A, B, and C are interests of Japan. While both A and B are shared interests, Japan considers C as a vital interest that must be resolved before A and B can be addressed. Consideration for this fact is given when researching interests and developing recommendations.

When available, the national security strategies are used to determine the interests of each of the countries above. In addition, defense white papers and official government foreign policy papers are used to provide greater detail for determining the interests and ways and means. For China, the defense white paper and foreign policy papers are used exclusively for determining security interests since no national security strategy is publicly available. Regardless of the resources used, these interests for all countries are identified using the same “key word phrase” methodology used to determine US security interests.

Occasionally, the ways and/or means for certain security interests are not clearly defined in the documents. In such circumstances, an inference is made if the documents suggest recent past methods with which the interest has been addressed and there is a clear pattern in the national documents to support the assumption that such methods will continue.

An apparent shortcoming of this methodology is that it doesn’t fully consider the security interests of each country, focusing instead on only those that are directly related to US security interests. This omission is intentional. While interests of other countries come into play, the goal
is to address US interests and thus focus on only those interests that complement or conflict with those of the United States.

**Determining DPRK National Security Interests**

The methodology used to determine North Korea’s national security interests is unique from the methodology for the other countries. First, US security interests are not used as a template when identifying the North’s interests. Second, because of the lack of transparency in the North Korean system, the process involves the use of nonstrategy documents in determining interests and requires assumptions be drawn from these documents. Misinterpretation is possible through either a faulty understanding of reality within the reclusive regime or by a deliberate attempt to mislead adversaries as exhibited by North Korea’s duplicity in past agreements. Misinterpretation is avoided as much as possible by asking three questions:

1. Does it benefit North Korea?
2. Is it supported by action?
3. Is it rational from the historical and ideological viewpoint of North Korea?

Even then, not all interests must answer in the affirmative to the questions above, providing instead an assistive tool.

**Comparing and Contrasting Approaches**

With the interests identified and the means determined for each of the Group of Four, thematic means are drawn out and the information is tabulated. Each table represents a specific interest. Within the table the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia are listed vertically in a column and the thematic means are represented horizontally in a row. For each
country and the thematic mean, a “Yes” or “No” value is inserted in the table cell. With all of the information entered, the table can be easily read to determine common means.

To expand on the functionality of the table, two figures are created to give a more visual depiction of complementary and conflicting means. In one figure, two columns are labeled “complementary” and “conflicting.” Along the columns are specific US interests and the associated means. A country flag is placed in the column that best represents that country’s means in relation to US means. For example, a country that shares the US approach of regional diplomacy in addressing regional stability would have a country flag placed in the “complementary” column. This figure allows a quick view of how each country stands in supporting specific US interests. In the second figure, information is grouped by the means instead of the interest. Therefore, the diplomatic means for all interests can be seen side by side. This figure shows patterns of preference for each country for various instruments of power.

Comparing US Interests to North Korean Interests

US Interests are compared to North Korean interests to determine potential areas of mutual benefit. Knowing where the greatest difficulties lie and where the greatest opportunities exist helps allocate resources and indicates the amount of energy that may need to be expended with other members to see get results.

In comparing interests, information is tabulated. US interests are listed vertically and North Korean interests are listed horizontally. Based on assessed outcomes of meeting US interest, an effect is predicted on North Korea. If the effect supports the North Korean interest then a “Yes” value is assigned. If the effect is contrary to a North Korean interest, then a “No” value is assigned. If negligible effect is likely to result, then the US interest is considered not applicable to the North, and “N/A” is placed in the table cell.
Summary

The research methodologies used to determine country interests vary modestly and can be grouped into three categories: the methodology for determining US national security interests, the methodology for determining national security interests of China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, and the methodology for determining DPRK national security interests. In addition, a research methodology to determine compatibility of the five member countries is also used.

The research methodology for US national security interests is separated from the others since US interests in general define the interests to be considered from the other countries. These interests are determined using key word phrases, and associated ways and means are drawn from the strategy documents. These interests establish the template for interests to be considered from the strategy documents of China, Japan, South Korea and Russia and a key word phrase methodology is repeated.

The research methodology for DPRK was much less rigorous than that for the other countries. While key word phrases were used to identify interests for other countries, North Korea’s interests were determined by interests expressed in past declarations and agreements, official statements, published ideological doctrine, and a view to the historical perspective of the country. Because of the lack of transparency in the DPRK, these resources were the best available to which the methodology could be applied. Nonetheless, past declarations and agreements should provide a high degree of accuracy to estimations of the DPRK’s interests.

Finally, information collected from the Group of Four is tabulated to identify complementary and conflicting means to resolving US security interests. Similarly, North Korea’s security interests are tabulated and compared against US security interests to identify opportunities and challenges.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one analyzes the NSS to determine the US national security interests and associated ways and means. Section two analyzes various national strategy and policy documents of China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to determine national interests that correlate to US security interests and each country’s ways and means for addressing them. Section three analyzes open source information, declarations, and agreements associated with North Korea to determine the North’s national security interests. Finally, section four analyzes the compatibility of the ways and means of the four parties to the ways and means of the United States in order to provide a foundation for developing recommendations in chapter 5.

The first three sections include a brief introduction of the documents that were analyzed to develop the findings. The introduction to the documents in this chapter instead chapter 2 (Literature Review) is intentional; these documents are analyzed in detail in this chapter, and a presence in chapter 2 would be redundant. Table 1 in Appendix A provides a list of the documents used for each respective country in identifying security interests. Table 2 in Appendix A summarizes the security interests and ways and means, and table 3 in Appendix A provides a side-by-side comparison of the means of each country.

National Security Interests of the United States

In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them.

2006 U.S. National Security Strategy
The requirement for a NSS was established in 1986 under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Under this law, the President is required to submit a national security strategy to Congress annually, which defines the “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security.” Furthermore, the law requires that the foreign policy and the uses of elements of diplomatic, information, military, and economic power (DIME) necessary to achieve these goals and objectives be provided for in the document. Such information yields the ends (goals and objectives), ways (foreign policy), and means (elements of the DIME) toward our national security strategy.

The ends in the NSS are succinctly stated in the President’s foreword message in the document: “to protect the security of the American people.” The security interests of the United States are those objectives that collectively contribute to this “end.” These objectives are extracted by studying the essential tasks laid out in the NSS. They are: halting terrorism, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons; promoting regional stability; encouraging economic development; and promoting human dignity. In addition, though not considering a significant national security interest under the current administration, missile and missile technology proliferation is addressed based on the interest of other party nations.

Terrorism

“America is at war.” So starts the President’s Forward to the NSS, referring to the global war on terrorism. The NSS describes the “grave challenge” of terrorism as a battle between both the terrorists and their ideology. This ongoing war and the threat of terrorism have shaped the US security posture since 2001 and places defeating terrorism as a national security interest.

The United States has committed itself to a four-pronged approach as the way to accomplishing this interest: “preventing attacks . . . before they occur;” denying “WMD to rogue
states and to terrorist allies;” denying terrorists sanctuary in rogue states; and denying terrorists control of nations for basing operations. The means include taking the fight to the enemy by the use of “military force and other instruments of national power” in a lead effort with partner nations.

Though the DPRK is not mentioned as a terrorism concern in the NSS, North Korea remains on the State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism. This dubious distinction is the result of past involvement in terrorist activities and harboring terrorists. Despite inactivity from terrorist activities since 1987, North Korea remains on the list. The development of WMD that can be sold to terrorists or other state sponsors of terrorism likely contributes to their continued presence on the list, though the Bush Administration has indicated a recent willingness to remove North Korea’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism as a concession at Six-Party Talks.

Nuclear Weapons

The NSS places the proliferation of nuclear weapons as “the greatest threat to our national security” and specifically labels North Korea as a “serious nuclear proliferation challenge.” Furthermore, the NSS acknowledges the pursuit of WMD by terrorists “in order to inflict even more catastrophic attacks on us.” With the North’s development of nuclear weapons, it is yet unclear whether they will attempt to sell that technology or weapons in exchange for much-needed cash or other resources. However, North Korea is known to have sold sophisticated military hardware in the past to rogue states that have supported terrorists, such as Syria and Iran, portending the possible future disposition of their nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons makes it a national security interest to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NSS states that the way to prevent proliferation
is to deny rogue states or terrorists the legitimate ability to produce fissile material and to prevent states with this capability from transferring fissile material to these actors (ways).\textsuperscript{12} Accomplishment is through closing loopholes in the NPT, international diplomacy, improving “security at vulnerable nuclear sites worldwide and bolster[ing] the ability of states to detect, disrupt, and respond to terrorist activity involving WMD (means),” and use of force.\textsuperscript{13} These means will likely require the support of IAEA to secure nuclear sites and support of allied nations to block or interdict WMD shipments.

Human Dignity

The NSS states that the “survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad”\textsuperscript{14} while recognizing that the greatest challenges to liberty worldwide are from those countries that tyrannically rule over their subjects through brutality and suppression. The DPRK is explicitly listed in the NSS as one of these tyrannies. Hence, it is a national security interest of the United States to stop human rights abuses in the DPRK. To meet this interest, the NSS establishes a goal of ending tyranny and promoting democracy (ways) through a “full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools”\textsuperscript{15} (means). Some of the tools mentioned include sanctions, support of reformers, and partnering with other democratic nations to bring pressure to bear.

Regional Stability

The NSS states that “if left unaddressed, [regional conflicts can lead to] failed states, humanitarian disasters, and . . . safe havens for terrorists.”\textsuperscript{16} Inexplicably, despite the United States military’s fifty-seven-year presence on the peninsula to maintain peace and stability, the Korean peninsula is not among the numerous countries specifically mentioned in this section of
the NSS. Nevertheless, conditions on the peninsula meet the criteria of the NSS for potential future regional conflict, including poor governance and competing claims (such as waters in the Yellow Sea). Therefore, it is a security interest of the US to promote regional stability.

To stabilize the region, the United States has established conflict prevention and resolution as a key element (way). The NSS identifies the promotion of democracy is the “most effective long-term measure.” However, in the short term, using “free nations” of good rapport in order to assist with short-term resolutions with a preference towards regional players and addressing the problems in a “wider regional context” are the preferred methods (means).

Economic Development

The NSS defines economic freedom as a “moral imperative.” The United States views countries lacking economic freedom as inclined to violate intellectual property rights, suffer from poverty, encourage black markets and involve themselves in other illicit activities including money counterfeiting and narcotics trafficking. Illicit trade in turn “undermines effective governance; facilitates the illicit transfer of WMD and advanced conventional weapons technology; and compromises traditional security and law enforcement” which “if left unaddressed can threaten national security.” Furthermore, the NSS recognizes impoverished states as “not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals.” These matters make North Korea’s economic development a national security interest of the United States. Again, the NSS does not name North Korea directly, but the concerns expressed in the NSS for developing countries, such as corruption, poverty, and illicit trade, are applicable to North Korea. In meeting the ways and means, the NSS states that the US will assist the world’s poor to enter the global economy (ways) through various programs, including providing foreign assistance
through existing regional and international organizations and initiatives, “creating external incentives for governments to reform themselves,” and promoting regional initiatives to disrupt illicit activities (means).

Missile and Missile Technology

Though the proliferation of missiles is alluded to in several references in the NSS, the US NSS does not reflect a focused interest in preventing missile and missile technology proliferation. This omission may be either due to the recognition of the difficulties associated with striking the United States from abroad, the development of an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) shield, a reliance on MTCR, PSI and other regimes, a combination of any of these, or an unfortunate oversight in national security planning. However, this lack of attention paid in the NSS may be somewhat misleading. While the Bush Administration has not been as active in diplomatically pursuing missile proliferation interests as the Clinton Administration had been, the Administration has actively sought to develop the BMD shield, implemented PSI, and worked to strengthen the MTCR. For this reason, preventing the proliferation of missile and missile technology is included as a national security interest of the United States.

National Security Interests of China

Countries should resolve their disputes and conflicts peacefully through consultations and not resort to the use or threat of force. Nor should they interfere in others’ internal affairs under any pretext. China never imposes its social system and ideology on others.

*China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, 2003*

China’s national security interests are derived from the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2006,” foreign policy papers, and other selected policy white papers. The
State Council Information Office published the most recent defense white paper in December 2006. Foreign policy papers, consisting of six short papers, were published in 2003 by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and each addresses specific policy issues.

In addition to the above-mentioned documents, “China’s Peaceful Development Road” (sometimes referred to as “China’s Peaceful Rise”) and “China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation” help to round out pertinent policy papers addressing topics related to US security interests relative to North Korea. These papers are influenced by China’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” Originally introduced in the 1950’s, these principles have been reaffirmed throughout the years, including in the most recent defense white paper. The five principles are:

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Mutual nonaggression
3. Noninterference in other nations’ internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence

Combined, these numerous documents provide the basis for China’s national security strategy and from which interests with the US may be compared.

Terrorism

China’s defense white paper states, “The threat of terrorism remains serious” while a diplomatic policy paper adds, “China is firmly opposed to all forms of terrorism.” “China’s Peaceful Development Road” identifies the need for cooperation between countries to defeat terrorism in order to “stamp out both the symptoms and root causes.” China’s defense white paper provides several examples in which the country has involved itself in confronting
terrorism, including the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS), an anti-terrorism body set up between China and several central Asian countries along China’s northwest border that has been included information sharing as well as military and civilian exercises.\textsuperscript{31} China has also addressed terrorism in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

As an ally of North Korea and based on information contained in China’s various strategy and policy documents, China does not perceive North Korea as a terrorist nation. Based on the US’s own ambiguous stance regarding North Korea’s connection with terrorism as indicated by the willingness to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, it is highly unlikely that the United States would be able to gain Chinese support for anti-terrorism actions against the North.

**WMD Proliferation**

China regards the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation as “grave and complex”\textsuperscript{32} and officially holds that it is “firmly opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.”\textsuperscript{33} This stance extends to the Korean Peninsula, where China shares the common goal of a nuclear-free peninsula with the United States.\textsuperscript{34}

In consonance with its five principles, China contends that, “The issue of non-proliferation should be dealt with by political and diplomatic means within the framework of international law [which] should be maintained, further strengthened and improved.”\textsuperscript{35} Supporting this position, China has routinely rejected other means, including the US-backed PSI.\textsuperscript{36}

Current policy notwithstanding, China has a strong incentive as an aspiring regional leader to bring pressure to bear on North Korea. First, the nuclear test has reopened discussions in Japan over its own moratorium on nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{37} Despite the current Japanese
administration’s strong commitment to its own ban on nuclear weapons, the debate demonstrates the corrosive effect a nuclear North Korea has on the liberal will of a nation. Furthermore, the race for nuclear weapons in any of China’s more Western-minded democratic neighbors has a direct bearing on China’s own security interests.

Second, the development of nuclear weapons in the North strengthens the pro-West conservative position in South Korea. Conservatives in South Korea have long contended that the liberal engagement policies enacted by Kim Dae Jung and carried on by his successor, No Moo-Hyun, have only aided in supporting the North’s military and its nuclear program by allowing funds to be diverted from economic to military projects. Such actions can tip the South Korean presidential elections in 2008 in favor of the staunchly pro-West conservatives and set back years of progress China has made in gaining political favor in the South, contrary to China’s regional political interests.

Human Dignity

Regarding human rights, China states that the “government has attached importance to human rights” in its foreign affairs, adding that “[China] should actively promote and guarantee human rights to ensure that everyone enjoys equal opportunities and right to pursue overall development.” China’s growing awareness towards human rights is reflected in a provision added to their constitution in 2003 that says “the state respects and safeguards human rights.”

Based on China’s preference for international diplomacy and its involvement in numerous human rights conventions, China can be expected to use these tools for pushing its interests. However, there are two significant challenges in aligning China’s human rights
interests with those of the United States: China’s definition of human rights and China’s policy of non-interference.

Probably the greatest challenge to aligning China’s support for human rights with US interests is how each defines human rights. The US view of human rights focuses on individual liberties and political expression, while China’s human rights are centered on collective rights and maintaining the social structure. In other words, China pursues those human rights that favor social harmony over political discord, measuring success in terms of social economic wellbeing, health care, and basic subsistence.\textsuperscript{43} On the other hand, individual freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of religion are often curbed since a strong civil society challenges the state control.\textsuperscript{44}

The second challenge posed is China’s policy of non-interference. China’s foreign policy paper states that China will “never impose [a] social system and ideology on others.”\textsuperscript{45} This policy of non-interference is reflected in numerous other official Chinese government documents as well and has been a cornerstone of national policy since the 1950s.

China has little self-interest in North Korea’s human rights. Unlike South Korea and Japan who both have unresolved human rights claims against North Korea such as abductees and POW cases, China has neither. Furthermore, since both countries are run under communist ideology with an unstated premise of maintaining social harmony for the benefit of the state, China’s human rights views align closer to North Korea’s than the American position. Success in addressing human rights may best be approached by convincing China that helping to resolve outstanding issues will enhance their position as a power broker and valuable partner to Japan and South Korea.
Regional Stability

China acknowledges the growing interdependence of nations by economic globalization and the need for cooperation in an international security environment. In addition, the defense white paper recognizes the 2006 nuclear test and missile launches as factors that have made the situation in Northeast Asia “more complex and challenging.”

In resolving the issue of regional stability, China looks to “establish fraternal relations with surrounding regions and promote cooperation in maintaining regional security.” To this end, China has actively participated in regional-level organizations including through ASEAN+3.

China’s concern for regional stability in regards to North Korea can mostly be addressed in resolving the nuclear row. Beyond that, China’s greatest concerns for regional stability focus on the Taiwan-US relationship and the evolving and outward-looking role of Japan’s SDF and the missile defense cooperation between Japan and the United States that they argue will “bring new unstable factors to international and regional peace and security.”

Economic Development

China recognizes that “some countries face growing internal problems caused by social and economic transition” and suggests that, “address[ing] development and security issues through coordination, cooperation and multilateral mechanism is the preferred approach of the international community.” In line with South Korea’s stance on economic development, China holds that “developed countries should shoulder the responsibility to…increase development aid [and] help relevant countries shake off the troubling financial crisis and enhance cooperation with developing countries.”
National Security Interests of Japan

Japan will continue to ensure deterrence against any movement that might destabilize the Asia-Pacific region by maintaining the Japan-US Security Arrangements.

Diplomatic Bluebook 2006

Japan’s national security interests are drawn from three documents: the defense white paper “Defense of Japan 2006;” the foreign policy document “Diplomatic Bluebook 2006”; and the policy paper “National Defense Program Guidelines.” These three documents form the nexus of Japan’s security interests. Also of worthy mention is “The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report,” an official government assessment providing recommendations for Japan’s national security strategy. Many of the recommendations were incorporated into the most recent “National Defense Program Guidelines.” However, a formal national security strategy is yet to be published.

As a longtime US ally whose democratic institutions, capitalist market system, and national defense have been significantly influenced and shaped by direct US involvement, Japan shares many common security interests with the United States. Yet, Japan’s options of addressing these interests are considerably hampered by its own constitutional limits and an imperial past that has produced lingering suspicion by surrounding nations of any Japanese lead role in the region. Hence, Japan’s ways and means require a carefully considered balance of diplomatic and economic instruments of power and a healthy reliance on a continuing and active US role to provide the necessary pressure to address common international and regional security issues. This approach is evident in the Japanese national strategy documents. The defense white paper states that in order to meet its security objectives, Japan will:

1. Support UN security initiatives
2. Strengthen ties with the United States under the Japan-US Security Arrangement

3. Develop “cooperative relations” with other countries through diplomacy

4. Develop the military

5. Ensure political stability at home

Terrorism

For Japan, “activities of international terrorist organizations…pose a serious threat” to the economic welfare and safety of all Japanese citizens. Hence, “Japan regards counter-terrorism as its own security issue.” In addressing terrorism, Japan intends to “strengthen vigorously counter-terrorism measures in cooperation with the international community in a wide range of areas including the provision of assistance to other countries and reinforcement of the international legal framework.” Past means have included logistical support of military operations in the War on Terror, inclusion in international, regional, and bilateral agreements aimed at disrupting terrorist networks, and technical and financial assistance to poor countries to assist in counter-terrorism capacity-building.

Japan acknowledges that North Korea has not been linked to terrorism in the past two decades. However, Japan’s National Police Agency labels North Korea as a terrorism concern and the government continues to encourage the United States maintain North Korea’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism.

WMD Proliferation

Japan’s defense white paper ranks alongside terrorism the proliferation of nuclear weapons and “ballistic missiles that serve as a means of delivery for these weapons,” adding that “halting WMD proliferation has become an urgent issue.” This statement draws in line
Japan’s national security interest of stopping nuclear and missile proliferation with the US interest.

Japan has remained active in supporting international efforts to block nuclear weapons proliferation through a mechanism Japan terms as “dialogue and pressure.” (“Dialogue” includes multilateral talks and governmental consultations. “Pressure” has been through the use of soft power, ranging from decrees by the UN to general awareness of Japan’s allies.) In addition, Japan “considers that the maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as one of its major foreign policy objectives.” In halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Japan intends to use diplomatic efforts to actively encourage nations to support and strengthen existing regimes while physically involving itself in the enforcement of those regimes through cooperative efforts such as Proliferations Security Initiative.

Japan has addressed the threat of missiles issue by teaming with the US to build a ballistic missile defense system. Furthermore, Japan considers international cooperation in numerous nonproliferation regimes (including the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Missile Technology Control Regime) as essential.

Human Dignity

Japan shares many of the same values concerning human rights as does the US. However, concerning North Korea, Japan’s interest is predominantly focused around Japanese abductees, which Japan considers a “very grave problem” to the safety and security of Japanese citizens and “of the highest priority” of numerous issues it seeks to resolve in its bilateral Comprehensive Talks. Japan’s actions to resolve this issue include: Japan-North Korea bilateral talks; support for international efforts to increase awareness such as the 2006 UN resolution titled “Situation of
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;” and appointment of an ambassador for human rights to address this and other human rights issues. These efforts form Japan’s “dialogue and pressure” to human rights.

In the Six-Party agreement reached in February 2007, Japan stated that it would not assist in providing energy aid to North Korea until the North made progress in resolving the issue of abductees. North Korea, for its part, considers the case resolved with the repatriation of five Japanese citizens in 2002, claiming that the remaining eight in question are now deceased.

Regional Stability

Referring to the North-South military standoff, Japan’s defense white paper states, “Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia,” while noting, “a more stable international security environment has become a common interest of all states.” In maintaining stability, Japan expresses its ways and means straightforwardly:

“Japan regards the improvement and strengthening of multilayer frameworks for bilateral and multilateral dialogue while securing the presence and engagement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region to be a realistic and appropriate way to develop a stable security environment surrounding Japan and to ensure peace and stability in the region.”

These ways and means reflect the limits Japan faces in achieving its own interests independently as a result of sensitive relations with neighbors due to its wartime past.

Economic Development

Japan is a major ODA contributor to Asian nations, contributing over 2.5 billion dollars in aid in 2004. Japan’s contributions reflect awareness that “Asia…has a major influence on
Japan’s security and prosperity.” Despite this fact, North Korea is not a beneficiary of Japan’s ODA contributions. Instead, most economic assistance from Japan to North Korea has come through economic aid packages directly from Japan or indirectly through the World Food Bank. In addition, remittances from Koreans living in Japan have provided significant cash to the North. However, with the current row over abductees, the July 2006 missile launch, and the October 2006 nuclear test, Japan has restricted food and energy aid and cash remittances to the North.

National Security Interests of South Korea

South Korea is “pursuing the realization of a comprehensive security [that includes] not only military issues but also non-military issues pertinent to politics, economy, society, environment and so on.”

2004 Defense White Paper

The South Korean national security interests, ways, and means are described in the country’s 2004 national security strategy, titled *Peace, Prosperity, and National Security*, the defense white paper titled “2004 Defense White Paper” and the following Korean government policy papers: President’s “Top 12 Policy Goals” and Key Diplomatic Tasks.

The national security strategy reveals several principles that guide South Korea’s ways and means:

1. Opposition to any war and support for peaceful conflict resolution
2. Mutual recognition, mutual trust, and reciprocity
3. International resolution of issues of the Korean Peninsula with recognition that North and South Korea are the central parties
4. Public approval of government initiatives
These principles show that South Korea’s “realization of a comprehensive security” will come through a soft approach in contrast to US policies. It should also be noted that these principles tend to align the South’s ways and means more closely with China than with the United States.

Terrorism

The defense white paper states that “unpredictable threats of terrorism posed by non-state rogue organizations or forces have been recognized as an important aspect of national security,” requiring international cooperation and information sharing. Though little else is provided regarding the ways and means for addressing terrorism, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in a speech identified the containment and eventual eradication of terrorism as the ultimate goal. South Korea has been an active partner in both Afghanistan and Iraq in maintaining peace and reconstruction.

WMD Proliferation

For South Korea, the North Korean nuclear impasse “has emerged as the paramount threat to national security.” South Korea sees the resolution of the nuclear issue as a diplomatic challenge that needs to be addressed through a combination of Six-Party Talks and inter-Korean dialogue that offers “significant assistance” to North Korea for abandoning its program.

South Korea has pursued a policy of positive engagement with North Korea since 1998, favoring soft diplomacy and economic assistance to foster positive behavior. This policy, referred to as the “Sunshine Policy,” was instituted by Kim Dae Jung in 1998 and lives on in the current administration under the banner, “Policy of Peace and Prosperity.” The Sunshine policy shunned coercive diplomacy in favor of “cooperative engagement,” even in the face of
adversity.\textsuperscript{82} This path has run counter to the US attempts to pressure North Korea into abandoning its nuclear program and has been criticized by conservatives as indirectly propping up the regime and allowing the North to continue its nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{83} However, proponents of the Sunshine Policy argue that the US’ antagonistic policies increase military tensions across the DMZ and increase the probability of suffocation and subsequent collapse of the North Korean regime which would be exorbitantly costly to the South.\textsuperscript{84}

In regards to missiles, South Korea’s defense white paper states that, “Along with nuclear and biochemical weapons, the proliferation of missiles or the delivery means of those weapons, [sic] has emerged as a fresh threat posing a stumbling block to international and regional stability.”\textsuperscript{85} ROK has worked in the past to coordinate diplomatic efforts with the United States and other countries to resolve outstanding missile issues, indicating that such an approach is likely to continue.\textsuperscript{86} However, more active participation such as PSI has been avoided to prevent confrontations with the North.

Human Dignity

South Korea establishes the “promotion of liberal democracy and human rights”\textsuperscript{87} as one of the national security interests. For South Korea, the main human rights issues of concern include abductees and un-repatriated POWs.\textsuperscript{88} South Korea has sought inter-Korean dialogue to resolve these human rights issues.\textsuperscript{89} More broadly, South Korea commits itself to actively supporting international efforts to advance human rights.\textsuperscript{90}

The South Korean government has come under criticism on several occasions by human rights organizations and its own population for ignoring human rights issues in favor of improving relations with the North.\textsuperscript{91} However, South Korea continues to delicately approach the issue for fear of derailing current progress on other issues.
Regional Stability

South Korea “has placed the ‘establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula [sic] as a top policy task.’”\(^\text{92}\) South Korea has taken significant steps in cooperation with North Korea to maintain stability in the region, including establishing a system to prevent at-sea confrontations and seeking participation in “various cooperative security programs.”\(^\text{93}\) South Korea seeks to “win support of the international community for its Policy for Peace and Prosperity,” while working to improve inter-Korean cooperation and “increase international assistance” for ongoing North Korean reforms.\(^\text{94}\) For South Korea, the North-South issues (excluding the nuclear and missile issues) are first and foremost a matter that must be resolved by the two sides.\(^\text{95}\)

Economic Development

South Korea identifies the “Common prosperity of South and North Korea and Northeast Asia” as an objective to meet South Korea’s national security interests.\(^\text{96}\) In engaging the North in economic development, South Korea has stated that it will develop projects “that will mutually benefit South and North Korea.”\(^\text{97}\) To this end, South Korea has made notable attempts to move the North along in economic development, including development of the Kaeseong Industrial Complex, Mt. Kumgang tourist destination, and direct financial assistance.\(^\text{98}\)

National Security Interests of Russia

Attempts to ignore Russia's interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations.

\(^{2000}\) National Security Concept
Russia’s national security interests are described in three documents: the *National Security Concept (NSC)*, which “outlines a systematic approach to providing security for the individual, society and state against possible internal or external threats;”99 the *Russian Federation Military Doctrine*, a defense white paper that “identifies the key political, strategic and economic factors essential to ensuring Russia’s military security;”100 and the *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (FPC)*, which “provides for a systematic approach to the content and direction of Russian foreign policy.”101 These documents collectively provide a basis from which Russian interests can be compared to US interests.

Russia’s national security interests are significantly shaped by three factors: social and economic problems associated with the transition to a free market economy; the diminishing role and influence of Russia in the international community; and transnational crime and terrorism inside and along its borders in former Russian states. These factors have fundamentally narrowed the expansive national interests of the Soviet Union to a regional focus. Nonetheless, Russia still shares some critical interests with the United States concerning North Korea, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles.

**Terrorism**

The *NSC* states, “Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.”102 Russia identifies the development of international cooperation to fight terrorism as one of its policy goals. Specifically, Russia suggests international agreements and “collaboration with foreign states and their law-enforcement and special agencies, and also with international organizations tasked with fighting terrorism” to counter terrorism.103
WMD Proliferation

The NSC lists the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles as one of the “fundamental threats in the international sphere”\(^\text{104}\) and specifically commits the country to an “unswerving course toward strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles”\(^\text{105}\) as a principal task. To confront this challenge and strengthen the regime, The FPC states that Russia will work “jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons . . . and means of their delivery.”\(^\text{106}\)

Human Dignity

Russia does not address the problem of human rights in North Korea. However, more broadly, the NSC defines two general goals: “to seek respect for human rights and freedoms the world over on the basis of respecting the norms of international law;”\(^\text{107}\) and “to expand participation in international conventions and agreements in the human rights area.”\(^\text{108}\)

Regional Stability

Regarding Asia, the FPC states that, “the greatest concern is the situation in the Korean Peninsula.”\(^\text{109}\) Despite this clear indication of the importance of the Korean Peninsula to regional stability, the issues of the peninsula are not further addressed. For dealing with regional stability, the FPC states that, “The emphasis will be on the invigoration of Russia's participation in the main integration structures of the Asia-Pacific Region - the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, [and] the regional forum on security of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).”\(^\text{110}\)
Economic Development

The NSC states, “It is an important priority of state policy to ensure national interests and uphold the country's economic interests.” To accomplish the economic interests, Russia seeks “to expand markets for Russian products.” The FPC adds, “Russia must be prepared to utilize all its available economic levers and resources for upholding its national interests.” While Russia’s strategy documents do not directly address North Korea in its economic strategy, the shared border with Russia and possible railway access to South Korea make North Korean economic wellbeing an important aspect for Russian national and economic security.

National Security Interests of the DPRK

The main tasks of the Government of the Republic are to achieve the total socialism in North Korea and get the peaceful unification with South Korea rejecting the external forces.

North Korea has neither a publicly available national security strategy nor other national strategy documents from which to derive the nation’s security interests. Therefore, interests are derived from open sources including published statements from high-ranking North Korean government officials, interests expressed through bilateral and multilateral talks, and historical references.

Determining North Korea’s national security interests is a unique challenge. A consistent pattern of deception and bad faith dealings with other nations is one complicating factor. Contributing to this is North Korea’s state controlled media, which operates as a propaganda machine, effectively spewing out a steady stream of anti-American and anti-capitalist rhetoric while extolling the virtues of socialism. At the same time, North Korea has entered bilateral and multilateral agreements with various nations even when these agreements have been contrary to
actual interests. This behavior for a communist state is not unique. George Kennan, the “father of containment” succinctly explained this behavior in his famous “X” article in 1947. Describing socialist Russia’s behavior, Kennan wrote that committing to agreements without the intent to abide by them is considered acceptable since it is viewed as “a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor).”¹¹³

Keeping Kennan’s thoughts in mind and recognizing North Korea to be a socialist country of similar ilk to the former Soviet Union with its own peculiarities introduced by Kim Il Sung, it is clear that analysis of North Korea’s national security interests would be incomplete without a solid understanding of the ideology which leads the country. To establish this baseline knowledge, various ideological works by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il were studied.

Armed with a reasonable understanding of the ideology, interests expressed in negotiated agreements, open source information, and a historical perspective of the peninsula, information can be collected and analyzed to determine the security interests. Due caution was taken when gathering information from the state controlled media, Korea Central News Agency to ensure that propaganda was supported by actions or interests expressed in negotiations.

As may be recalled from the NSS, America’s end is “to protect the security of the people.” One may analogously conclude that the ends of any communist state would be “to protect the security of the State.” However, for North Korea, such an application would be an oversimplification, as the challenges facing North Korea are unique, even for a communist regime. First and foremost, perceived external threats have made regime survival an end. Second, security of the state in its ideological identity is an end. (In this research, regime survival refers to protecting the sovereign control of the state against outside forces whereas the security of the state focuses on protecting the political ideology of the state against internal forces.)
Finally, reunification, though overshadowed by regime survival and state security for the foreseeable future, remains a persistent end.

Regime Survival

Regime survival is an objective that extends to the Korean War era, but its prominence has been thrust to the forefront by various changes in the security environment including the collapse of the Soviet Union and increased belligerence toward the regime exhibited by US policies. Among these policies are stricter arms controls, tighter monetary control in international financial transactions, and increased attention to human rights.¹¹⁴

Efforts to ensure regime survival are evident in North Korea’s repeated attempts to receive assurances against the use of force from the United States during bilateral and multilateral talks. These talks help highlight three avenues North Korea has pursued for ensuring its survival: a large conventional military, nuclear weapons, and economic development.

Conventional Military

North Korea maintains the fourth largest military in the world in terms of troop strength.¹¹⁵ A large number of these troops and their artillery are positioned near the DMZ. Originally regarded as a tool for reunification, there is little evidence to support this continued focus in the current environment. On the other hand, there is a clear reason to believe that the military now serves in the national interest of deterrence and defense. This conclusion is based on five premises:

1. North Korea faces a credible opponent along the DMZ.
2. Rhetoric from North Korea has maintained that the troops are for defense.
3. North Korea has worked with the South to defuse cross-DMZ conflicts.
4. The balance of military power and likely outcome of a war favors South Korea.

5. The political environment in the South is no longer conducive to forced reunification.

First, the large US and South Korean military contingent along the DMZ compels the North to maintain a sizable military presence to defend against the possibility of attack. North Korea’s insecurity along the DMZ is further justified by antagonistic statements from the Bush Administration that have distinguished North Korea as a member of the axis of evil and one to which the President has taken a personal disliking: “I loathe Kim Jong Il.” North Korea is all too aware of the fate of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, also one of the axes of evil. These statements and actions along with the pre-emptive option the United States denotes in the National Security Strategy have encouraged an ongoing sense of insecurity in the North Korean regime.

Second, the use of the military as a defensive tool against outside aggressors has been a consistent thread in the North’s habitual and aggressive blustering, with articles in the state-run media routinely praising the military for its role in defending socialism and sovereignty. The importance of this role is succinctly captured in the following in a 10 January 2007 KCNA article: “The practical experience gained by the DPRK proves that a country can prevent a war and protect its sovereignty and peace only when it attaches importance to the military affairs and bolster [sic] its self-reliant defence capability.” The defensive role of the military is also defined in North Korea’s constitution: “The mission of the armed forces of the DPRK is to safeguard the interests of the working people, to defend the socialist system and the gains of the revolution from aggression and to protect the freedom, independence and peace of the country.

Third, North Korea has taken steps to reduce military tensions along the DMZ. Though occasional unpredictable behavior is seen from the North, efforts seem to have produced some
results. Pointing to North-South meetings and economic relations and describing the situation along the DMZ in the fall of 2006, one US Army captain stated that the situation was “the calmest it has ever been,” an assessment supported by Swedish Major General Sture who described the attitude on his visit to the north side of the DMZ as “more relaxed.”\textsuperscript{119} Indeed, though North Korea’s motives cannot fully be known, the North has in general made a good faith effort to reduce tensions along the DMZ through military talks. These talks have met with limited success, leading to an elimination of propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ and the establishment of a hotline to reduce the potential for naval clashes at sea.\textsuperscript{120}

Fourth, the balance of power on the peninsula favors the South. Some experts argue that the North’s disproportionately larger troop strength and higher heavy equipment count favor in the North. However, even with the North’s numerical advantages, the military balance on the peninsula debatably favors the South. Specifically,

1. Much of North Korea’s equipment is old, with nearly all major weapons systems of 1960s vintage or older.\textsuperscript{121}
2. Maintenance is questionable since much of the parts and equipment came from former allies whose regimes are no longer in power.\textsuperscript{122}
3. Training has suffered through the economic slowdown (despite the “military first” policy).\textsuperscript{123}

Even without the US military commitment, South Korea’s rapidly modernizing military is qualitatively far ahead of North Korea, while training and modernization continue to be fueled by an economy that is 20 times larger than the North’s.\textsuperscript{124}

Finally, North Korea lacks support for military action. Unlike his father who had fought against Japanese colonialism in Manchuria, Kim Jong Il does not enjoy the close personal and
historical relations with China’s leaders,\textsuperscript{125} and, despite the mutual defense treaty, China has indicated that it would not provide support if the North were to run itself into trouble,\textsuperscript{126} a decision likely influenced by China’s close economic ties with the South and its need to maintain the perception of “peaceful development.” With the former Soviet Union, close security ties have been replaced by modest diplomatic relations focused on mutual economic interests.

If North Korea’s regime survival could somehow be guaranteed, one might conclude that the DMZ could be disestablished. However, there is another role the military could be perceived as playing along the border: immigration enforcement and ideological preservation. Conventional forces along the border act to keep South Korean culture out and the North Korean population in.

**Nuclear Weapons**

North Korea has consistently stated its desire for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. This interest has been repeated both under Kim Il Sung and the current Kim Jong Il regime in various agreements and statements. North Korea first signed a declaration with South Korea in 1991, agreeing in principle to a nuclear-free peninsula and has agreed to the same in nearly every subsequent security agreement.\textsuperscript{127} This agreement was preceded by a unilateral good faith gesture from the United States announcing the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to pave the way for successful talks.\textsuperscript{128} Even during North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, North Korea stated, “we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{129} Yet, the evidence available unequivocally indicates that North Korea is committed to the development of nuclear weapons as a tool for regime survival, contrary to their publicly stated policy.
Biding its time under each new agreement, North Korea has deliberately and secretively pursued nuclear weapons. Agreements to halt its program have not dampened the North’s appetite for the bomb. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to IAEA monitoring of plutonium nuclear facilities in exchange for various economic concessions. It should be noted that, even with generous concessions, North Korea didn’t consent to the agreement of its own free will. Only under an ultimatum of force in which the United States revealed its intent to strike nuclear facilities did the North capitulate. Unable to continue on its current path for nuclear weapons development, North Korea responded by turning its attention to a covert uranium enrichment program, acquiring centrifuges and technical assistance with the aid of Pakistani nuclear physicist, Dr. A. Q. Khan\textsuperscript{130} from 1997 through 2001.

In an official statement in February 2005, North Korea announced that it had nuclear weapons, stating that it had “‘manufactured nukes for self-defence.’”\textsuperscript{131} This statement was followed up 18 months later with North Korea’s first nuclear test. In announcing the successful test, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry stated that the nuclear test was “entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure.”\textsuperscript{132} North Korea has gained a sympathetic ear in Russia and China, where the governments have placed blame on US policies for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{133} With weapons in hand, North Korea now states that “‘The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [was Kim Il Sung’s] dying wish.’”\textsuperscript{134}

It is hard to say that North Korea has missed a heartbeat in pushing ahead nuclear weapons development. Actions clearly contradictory to its statements provide sufficient evidence that North Korea is committed to possessing nuclear weapons. What remains to be answered is: Can there be another reasonable argument other than regime survival for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons?
There are three possible reasons that stand out as to why North Korea would pursue nuclear weapons. The first, involves guaranteeing regime survival, which is addressed above. The second is to use its nuclear program as a bargaining tool to gain US attention and draw economic and diplomatic concessions. The third is as a tool for reunification.

Many liberal pundits have argued that North Korea’s nuclear program is a call for help—a means of drawing the United States to the negotiating table for improved relations or economic assistance. This argument fails to recognize that the nuclear program dates back as early as the 1960s. Furthermore, it does not explain why, following the 1994 Agreed Framework in which the United States offered improved relations and economic aid, North Korea duplicitously pursued an alternative covert weapons program. More aptly, North Korea’s trade of its plutonium program for economic and diplomatic concessions from the United States can be explained as a necessity rather than an intentional effort on the part of the North. Kim Jong II increasingly felt pressured by US rhetoric and military posturing as the United States privately announced its intentions to the North to strike nuclear facilities should the nuclear program continue. Backing up the threat was the deployment of strike fighter aircraft and an enhanced naval presence to South Korea. Therefore, the “call for help” theory is not supported by the facts.

Regarding unification as an objective for its program, the rational choice theory would rule out a nuclear attack. North Korea would be virtually guaranteed a swift military response from the international community, including China. However, one conservative proposes a case in which military action could be perceived as rational. Using a “double-or-nothing” logic, if a rational North Korea were to feel it had nothing left to lose, it may take the gamble. While theoretically possible, it is hard to see a “double-or-nothing” situation grave enough beyond a
pre-emptive strike by the United States that would lead North Korea to take such a gamble. Of course, that would lead us back to regime survival.

**Economic Development**

Economic development is at the core of regime survival. North Korea views US economic policy towards them as an attempt to collapse the government and, therefore, looks to economic self-reliance as one means through which North Korea can “frustrat[e] the vicious sanctions and blockade of the imperialists and reactionaries and achiev[e] a victory in the offensive for the building of an economic power.”

Ideologically, North Korea desires a national economic model based on self-reliance. Economic dependence is viewed as a weakness: “To try to build national economy through the introduction of unreliable foreign capital is little short of giving [a] trump card to capital investors.” However, the realities of the economic situation have made North Korea dependent on donor nations for its survival. The loss of Soviet donor support and unreliable support from China has created economic hardships for North Korea. These economic problems have been compounded by internal food shortages and the recent US crackdown on North Korean financial transactions in the international banking system. Finally, Japanese government control over trade and cash remittances from Japanese-Koreans add to North’s economic woes.

Internally, the economic plight has caused the military to assume a central role in economic development. A KCNA article published in February 23, 2004 and titled “Implementation of Line of Economic Construction Called for” reads, “Economic construction by the *Songun* political mode means putting forward the People's Army as a core and main force and carrying out economic construction by the concerted efforts of the army and people.” *Songun*, or the “Military First” policy as it is commonly known, conceptually postulates that
regime survival can only be guaranteed by developing and giving priority to a strong military force. Softening the military to divert funds to other activities would lead to an eventual collapse of the system. Though the idea of using the military for economic development did not appear in the earliest mentions of Songun, North Korea appears to have realized economic viability cannot be sustained with the “Military First” policy as it stands. Therefore, as described in the above quote, North Korea has tasked the military with carrying out or directing various agricultural and industrial tasks to build economic capacity.

North Korea’s response to external efforts to use economic leverage to draw down the regime has been mixed. On one hand, North Korea has been forced to reach out to international investment, contrary to its own ideology. Some of the most significant economic forays include:

1. Opened Mt. Kumgang as a tourist resort in cooperation with the South

2. Opened a large industrial park in Kaesong, also a joint project with South Korea. Once fully completed in 2012, it is expected to employ a half million North Koreans

3. Opened Najin-Sonbong economic zone in cooperation with China to test market economics

4. In talks with Russia and South Korea to reopen the railroad connections

On the other hand, North Korea has increased its attention to its own strengths to draw in capital: illicit activities and military hardware sales. Illicit activities have included drug trading, counterfeiting and money laundering. North Korea negatively reacted to US accusations of money laundering stalling Six-Party Talks from September 2005 until December 2006 after the US Treasury Department acted against the Banco Delta Macau.
Not surprisingly, in Six-Party Talks and bilateral negotiations, in conjunction with its demands for a security guarantee, North Korea has consistently pushed for three main economic concessions: energy, food and fertilizer. These demands reflect the dire economic situation in North Korea and along with the above economic activities are designed to keep the regime alive.

Reunification

Reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a long-stated goal of the North Korean government. As early as 1948, the constitution had designated Seoul, not Pyongyang, as the capital, followed shortly after by an attempt to reunify the country by force. Since then, various indirect attempts have been made to subvert the government of the South to bring about reunification, including the 1983 assassination attempt of then-president Chun Doo Hwan.

In 1993, Kim Il Sung published a reunification roadmap titled “10 Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country” which outlined a “one country, two systems” policy and called on both sides to put aside differences for the realization of reunification. Beyond a public relations coup to gain a receptive audience in the South, it is not clear what North Korea had hoped to gain from this roadmap since, by the North’s own account, the two systems are inherently contradictory and incompatible, described as a difference “between revolution and counterrevolution.”

In 1998, a new constitution was approved stating, “The DPRK shall strive to…reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity,” repeating the theme of past constitutions. Adding to this, the official website of the DPRK describes the government’s main task as “to achieve total socialism in North Korea and get the peaceful unification of South Korea rejecting the external forces.”
Based on the above information and actions, there is ample evidence to indicate that reunification remains a national interest of the North. However, North Korea shows no intent of giving up its system of government to facilitate unification. North Korea also lacks the international legitimacy and military capability for reunification by force. Therefore, reunification for the time being has been relegated to an intensive information operations campaign against the South Korean government and pro-US elements in the South, with the focus of this campaign targeted at the economically poor, the idealistic youth, and the politically disenfranchised population of the South by exhorting the values of the North Korean system and promoting and encouraging anti-US and anti-conservative activities. To this end, the KCNA regularly publishes articles identifying “corrupt” politics in the South, denigrating the economic policies, and praising the “nationalistic spirit” of the young generation.  

State Security

External forces are not the only forces with which North Korea must contend. Even if external threats were to vanish overnight, the regime would have to continue to manage its own population. North Korea invests heavily in maintaining a structured internal environment, with ideological control as its primary tool.

It is difficult to exaggerate the role ideology plays in North Korean politics and society. According to Kim Jong Il, “The ideological transformation for all the members of society…is the most important of tasks and should be carried out as a matter of priority in defending and completing the cause of socialism.” The relation of ideology to state security is highlighted in many of Kim Jong Il’s published writings. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kim Jong Il wrote, “Slighting ideological work when building socialism amounts to overlooking the key to socialism,” adding that the state must “give priority to ideological work over everything else.”
Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union was merely an example of the failure of the communist regime in preparing the masses ideologically and allowing “imperialist” culture to corrupt:

The former Soviet Union and east European socialist countries collapsed not because their military and economic potentials were weak and the level of their cultural development was low. It was entirely because they opened the door wide for the imperialist ideological and cultural poisoning.\(^{152}\)

North Korea has been known to take extreme measures to enforce ideological behaviors, incarcerating its people in re-education camps for seemingly minor infractions.\(^{153}\) Such actions reflect the importance North Korea gives to enforcing ideology to maintain state security.

On occasion, North Korea has found it necessary for humanitarian or other reasons to deviate from its own ideological principles. The mass starvation in the mid-1990s was one such example. However, when the crisis subsided, North Korea quickly moved to push out aid workers to prevent ideological corruption even despite aid workers insistence that continued aid was necessary. This seemingly contrary behavior should not come as a surprise from a socialist country. Describing socialism in Russia, George Kennan in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” wrote, “When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background.” For North Korea, these actions are designed to prevent the ideological dilution of society.

Comparing US Interests to the Group of Four

Terrorism

All countries analyzed share a common interest in combating terrorism and agree on the need for international cooperation and information. However, a significant divide appears when determining whether North Korea is a terrorist state. South Korea, China, and Russia contend
that North Korea is not. On the other hand, the United States and Japan classifies North Korea as a terrorist concern, seeming to indicate an insurmountable difference barring a drastic shift in policy. However, further evaluation of information reveals ambiguity in the United States and Japan’s positions.

The continued presence of North Korea on the Department of State’s state sponsor of terrorism (SPOT) list is linked in part to the Japanese abductee issue and at Japan’s insistence. Actively seeking support from the United States, Japan contends that removal from this list should not occur until this issue is resolved. Yet, simultaneously, Japan officially acknowledges that there has been no record of terrorist involvement by North Korea since 1987.\textsuperscript{154}

Also contributing to North Korea’s presence on the SPOT list is the North’s transfer of missile technology to other countries identified as SPOTs and to its continued harboring of airline hijackers from the 1987 incident.\textsuperscript{155} Even on these issues, the US position has been shaky in recent years. On several occasions over the past decade the United States has expressed a willingness to commence removal of North Korea from the list as a concession to progress in Six-Party Talks on nuclear weapons, reigning in efforts when talks fail to progress.\textsuperscript{156} Therefore, it is more apt that the continued inclusion of North Korea on the SPOT list is only slightly more than a bargaining chip at the WMD negotiating table.

\textbf{WMD Proliferation}

A clear pattern exists in the strategies various countries take to address WMD proliferation, as seen in Table 1. The Group of Four unanimously agree that WMD should be approached from a multilateral cooperative effort that includes information sharing and all but one indicates a preference for tightening of existing arms control regimes. Though not specifically addressed in ROK strategy documents, having consistently supported the
implementation of arms control regimes in the past it is unlikely that South Korea would be opposed any action to strengthen the regime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Strategies on WMD Proliferation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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</table>

The more contentious issues in addressing WMD proliferation are in the use of economic and military instruments of power. Following the October 9th nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 condemning the test and authorizing sanctions against the North. Among the many guidelines, the resolution stipulates that states should take action necessary to prevent the shipment of restricted goods into and out of North Korea. Japan and the United States have showed a significant commitment to enforcing the articles favoring aggressive enforcement of existing arms control regimes and participation in initiatives to prevent the proliferation of WMD such as PSI. China and Russia have both indicated that they would not participate in the interdiction of aircraft or shipping to enforce the sanctions on North Korea, and South Korea has similarly expressed a strong unwillingness to participate.157

Beyond the Security Council resolution, South Korea, China, and Russia have shown general opposition to actions that apply economic and financial pressure to North Korea, while
the United States and Japan have favored such pressures. South Korea’s unwillingness stems from an interest not to undo progress made separately in inter-Korean Talks. China’s motivation is arguably driven by a desire to avoid a flood of economic refugees that would likely result from a tightening of financial and economic sanctions. Some strategists also argue that China is concerned actions that may lead to a collapse of the North could ultimately lead to a peninsula unified under pro-Western South Korea, thus opening up a another front in a future US-China conflict. This point, though somewhat valid, is exaggerated since China and South Korea have become economically connected with South Korea being China’s fifth largest export destination and second largest import source. Turned around, China is South Korea’s largest trade partner, both in exports and imports. It also neglects that South Korean sentiment towards China is the same as that towards the United States.

Regional Stability

Attaining regional stability follows a fairly congruous effort between the five parties, as seen in table 2. All nations indicate a strong desire for a multilateral regional approach to addressing the problem in lieu of bilateral or international efforts. Not surprisingly, South Korea, faced with a military threat on the DMZ and a simultaneous desire to socially unite its people of common history and ancestry, also finds bilateral cooperation to be central to stability of the peninsula, a position not favored by any of the other actors.

Both Japan and South Korea view economic assistance as playing a critical role in the stabilization of northeast Asia. However, despite the seeming commonality between the two, Japan has shown little commitment to economic assistance when it comes to North Korea, instead focusing developmental assistance in more friendly countries. One the other hand, South Korea’s economic assistance to the North has been reasonably steadfast considering the bad faith...
North Korea has displayed in negotiations which has often resulted in a backlash from conservatives in the South. The remarkable success in continuing this assistance results from a desire to prevent snags in negotiations from unduly hindering progress in the development of inter-Korean relations. Recognizing the progress made through inter-Korean dialogue, South Korea announced intentions to continue its economic relations with the North regardless of the progress on denuclearization.¹⁶⁰

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diplomatic</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Diplomacy</td>
<td>International Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

South Korea is China’s fifth largest export destination and second largest import source. Turned around, China is South Korea’s largest trade partner, both in exports and imports.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, opinions of the South Korean public have also been much more favorable toward the Chinese than toward the United States.

Human Dignity

Addressing human dignity is a unique challenge. Though countries may agree in principle on the means to address infringement on human dignity, ideological and cultural differences create different interpretations of human rights. Furthermore, efforts to promote
human rights are often sidelined by more pressing and palpable self-interests. In table 3, the complexity of the issue only begins to surface.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diplomatic</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Diplomatic Pressure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

Consider first diplomatic pressure. While the United States, Japan, South Korea and Russia find common ground in supporting diplomatic pressure to North Korea, in practice each country has acted variedly. South Korea is inconspicuous in applying diplomatic pressure as to avoid potential detrimental consequences to inter-Korean relations. Similarly, Russia’s commitment to diplomatic pressure has also yet to be proven. With its socialist history and own economic problems and social ills, Russia sees little interest in promoting idealistic goals of advancing human dignity abroad. Indeed, the two remaining countries willing to apply diplomatic pressure are also the two democracies that propose partnering with other democracies.

Japan and South Korea have both shown willingness for bilateral talks over human rights issues with North Korea. In general, these talks are narrowly focused to address the issue of abductees or ROK POWs. While their means diverges with the US approach, it is unlikely a
substantive concern to the United States and is probably welcomed as a means in supporting overall diplomatic pressure.

A clear divide exists in the use of informational and economic instruments of power. South Korea, China and Russia do not include either as a national strategy, whereas the United States and Japan have both indicated such in the national strategies and have implemented them. Both the United States and Japan launched an aggressive awareness campaign aimed at exposing North Korea’s human rights abuses to the international community.

**Economic Development**

With the exception of Russia, all countries place economic development of poor nations as one of their national strategies (Table 4). The United States, Japan, China, and South Korea all support coordination of development assistance through established multilateral and international institutions such as APEC or the United Nations Development Program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diplomatic Coordination with Multilateral Institutions</th>
<th>Economic Assistance</th>
<th>Military Disrupt Illicit Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes(1)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Yes(2)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Not addressed</td>
<td>Not Addressed</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note 1. US economic assistance is contingent upon “good behavior.”
Note 2. Economic assistance from Japan to North Korea is dependent on the satisfactory resolution of the of Japanese abductees issue.
Though US and Japan both provide for economic assistance in their strategies, each have placed conditions that the North must meet before economic development assistance can take place. For the United States, this condition is “good behavior” whereas Japan refuses to provide any aid until North Korea resolves the abductee issue.

South Korea and China have approached the North with comparatively “unconditional” economic development assistance. South Korea has pushed inter-Korean development assistance to create interdependence between the two countries as part of the comprehensive effort to build confidence and reduce tensions on the peninsula. China, too, has pushed bilateral economic development on the peninsula, possibly to reduce the number of economic refugees, tap into North Korea’s natural resources, or reach the cheap, educated labor force.

As part of the US’ economic development strategy the United States seeks to disrupt illicit activities that are deemed counter to effective economic growth. This position is incongruous with priorities for the other nations and poses challenges for developing support for the US position in poorer economies such as China and Russia.

Combining means in a visual depiction of flags in tables 5 and 6 readily shows that Japan is the United States’ strongest partner. Separately, Russia and China can be grouped as nations with means complementary to each other, while South Korea is caught in between, finding itself general siding with China and Russia in means.

Table 5 shows that Japan can play a role as a key partner in addressing any US interest. In general, China and Russia can play a significant role in addressing both regional stability and WMD proliferation, but are poor partners in addressing human dignity. South Korea is also a poor partner in addressing human dignity, and does not well support the US approach to regional stability.
### Table 5. Complementary and Conflicting Means of Various Countries to US Means by Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Complementary</th>
<th>Conflicting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proliferation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Multilateral Cooperation</td>
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<td>Arms Control Regimes</td>
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<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic Sanctions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Financial Restrictions</td>
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<td>Information</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
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<td>Physical Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilateral Cooperation</td>
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<td>Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>Awareness Campaign</td>
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<td>Coordination w/Institutions</td>
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<td>Economic Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Disrupt Illicit Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the instruments of national power to address North Korea, Table 6 shows there is a general agreement on the way diplomacy should be used, whereas a cooperative
approach to interests using the economic instrument of power would be difficult. Finally, the military instrument of power is generally lacking of support from regional partners.

Table 6. Complementary and Conflicting Means of Various Countries to US Means by Instrument of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Complementary</th>
<th>Conflicting</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Diplomatic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation</td>
<td>Multilateral Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Control Regimes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>Regional Diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>International Diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral Cooperation</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>Diplomatic Pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partner with Democracies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Coordinate w/Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation</td>
<td>Economic Sanctions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Restrictions</td>
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<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>Economic Sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Econ. Development</td>
<td>Economic Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Awareness Campaign</td>
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<td>Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
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<td>Proliferation</td>
<td>Physical Enforcement</td>
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<td>Regional Stability</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Disrupt Illicit Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82
Comparing US Interests to North Korean Interests

By comparing US interests to North Korean interests, interests can be dividing into those that complement each other and those that conflict as shown in table 7. Though not a tool in resolving issues, the knowledge of mutual benefits provides an indication on which interests have the greatest potential for success with the least resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Interests</th>
<th>North Korean Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Survival</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Security</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunification</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD Proliferation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>Complement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Complement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proliferation of WMD is arguably the United States foremost interest on the Korean peninsula as indicated by the time and effort put forward to addressing it. North Korea sees the possession of nuclear weapons as inherent to the long-term survival of the regime. Thus, resolution, if possible, will require guaranteeing regime survival in a manner that is difficult to retract through changes in US administrations.

Regional stability can directly contribute to regime survival by reducing the perceived threats to the North while setting the proper atmosphere for eventual reunification. The challenge in addressing regional stability is the context in which it is viewed. From a militarization
standpoint along the DMZ, regional stability is attainable with confidence-building initiatives and a reduction of forces on both sides. However, when intertwining with nuclear-armed missiles pointed at the North’s neighbors, regional stability and resolving WMD proliferation become somewhat inseparable.

Human dignity as defined by the United States contrasts with both regime survival and state security. The promotion of human dignity is equivalent to the ending of communist socialism and the establishment of democracy, thus conflicting with regime survival. Internally, North Korea finds it a necessary part of the socialist fabric to “re-educate” dissenters or even those who attempt to leave the North for economic reasons. Promoting human dignity would equate to a direct challenge to state security by opening up the government to scrutiny.

Economic Development would enhance regime survival by expanding the legitimate business practices and contributions of North Korea in the global community. Adding to this, economic development would reduce poverty and the subsequent disaffection of the public. The unique challenge for the North would be in maintaining its ideological control over the population (keep out “corrupt” Western values) while promoting greater international involvement in its economy. Finally, economic development would contribute to closing the economic gap between the North and South, and necessary precursor to smooth reunification.

3 Ibid, Forward.
5 Ibid, 12.

6 Ibid, 9.


10 Ibid, 9.


14 Ibid, 3.

15 Ibid, 6.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid, 27.


21 Ibid, 47.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid, 33.

24 Ibid.

26 Ibid, 21.


39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace*.


42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Independent Foreign Policy of Peace*.


45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace*.


48 Ibid.


50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China), “Participating in and Promoting International Arms Control and Disarmament Process,” *China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*


52 Ibid


56 Ibid.


60 Ibid.


62 Ibid, 162.


65 Ibid, 22.

66 Ibid.


Ibid, 195.

Ibid.


Ibid, 4.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (South Korea). *Key Diplomatic Tasks*. www.mofat.go.kr/me/me_a003/meb010/me03_02.jsp.; internet; accessed 8 November 2006.


86 Ibid, 145.

87 Ibid, 52.

88 Ibid, 161.

89 Ibid, 162.

90 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Key Diplomatic Tasks*.


94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Key Diplomatic Tasks*.


100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.


103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.


Ibid.

President of the Russian Federation, *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Yonhap News, “Two Koreas to resume high-level military talks next week,” *Yonhap News*, 23 February 2006; available from
121 Speech by Mack Lee on Gavan McCormack’s article, “Difficult Neighbors: Japan, North Korea and the Quest for a New East Asian Order” in the Modern Asia Series, Harvard University Asia Center (Australia, 3 May 2004); available from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/Archive%20Files/McCormack%20MAS%20MAY%202004.pdf; internet; accessed 11 April 2007.


123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.


141 Klingner, North Korean economic reforms a non-starter. *Asia Times*.


144 Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader*, 343.


A plethora of articles aimed at undermining US-South Korea relations are available through the KCNA on any given day. The KCNA website may be visited through http://www.kcna.co.jp.


Ibid.


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Constructive engagement with US partners on various common security interests related to North Korea is extremely challenging. Addressing terrorism cooperatively with partners has no hope of progress with the weak explanation the US provides of North Korean terrorism concerns. Secondly, addressing human dignity holds little hope for immediate progress, as it is complicated by different definitions of human rights between partners and a general lack of willingness of many countries to involve themselves in the affairs of other sovereign states. Thirdly, progress on addressing WMD proliferation, though of great interest to all partners, will not come until basic trust in other areas is established with North Korea. Finally, regional stability and economic development, though complicated by the divergent means of Six-Party Members, hold the greatest opportunities for progress and can provide a foundation from which to build upon for addressing human dignity and WMD proliferation.

Complicating cooperative efforts is the division of partners into two groups. South Korea, China, and Russia insist on addressing security interests through diplomatic channels, and have shown a preference for soft power. The US and Japan have favored hard power, using economic sanctions and physical enforcement of policies.

Despite the challenges in addressing the common security interests, the US must align its means with regional partners. Without strong coordination and cooperation, US means may be countered by the means of its partners, such as tightening US economic restrictions while China and South Korea are expanding trade and economic relations with North Korea. Synchronizing
US means with those of other countries will require that the US subordinate some of its own means, at least temporarily.

Because of the unwillingness of many countries to embrace the aggressive means the US calls for, the US should support the most promising efforts by other countries. In doing so, the US should give the lead to a regional player that has common interests and can be both trusted and influenced. South Korea has made considerable progress in addressing some of the common security interests through soft diplomatic and economic means. Though costly, this approach has shown positive results in opening up the North. In addition, South Korea is a democratic state and a close US ally with a strong vested interest on the peninsula. Therefore, the US should give the lead to South Korea in addressing common security interests.

With the lead handed to South Korea, the US should provide its full support to promote the South Korean approach which aligns closely with that of China and Russia, recognizing that immediate progress on WMD proliferation and human dignity will not likely occur until progress is made in economic development and regional stabilization. At the same time, the US should use its influence on South Korea to ensure that adequate attention is paid to those areas of interest where South Korea has typically shown a lesser concern, such as promoting human dignity in the North.

Recommendations

It would be rather easy to provide recommendations for addressing US interests if each interest could be separated from the others. Unfortunately, many issues are intrinsically interlinked, and success in addressing one may fall incumbent on progress in another. For example, WMD proliferation weighs heavily on regional stability; regional stability can only flourish with economic stability; and economic stability is difficult to develop in a country where
the basic elements of human dignity such as the sharing ideas and the ability to move freely are not protected.

The challenges and opportunities in addressing US interests further expand with each new country added to the problem-solving process. Each country introduces a set of unique interests and, sometimes, divergent means and ulterior motives that can end up complicating efforts. On the other hand, the opportunity for mutual support and cooperation can lead to unprecedented leveraging of instruments of power and burden sharing, enhancing likelihood of a desirable outcome. Therefore, the challenge is aligning efforts in such a manner that addressing one problem synergistically supports efforts in addressing another.

Terrorism

North Korea’s continued presence on the state sponsors of terrorism list is intrinsically linked to the Japanese abductee issue and WMD negotiations vice terrorism in its own right. This contention is supported by the absence of mention of North Korea in the terrorism chapter of the NSS. Defensibly, one can argue that the US position on terrorism as it relates to North Korea is not far off from China, Russia and South Korea in that North Korea does not pose a terrorist threat, a position to which all three countries will hold steadfast. Hence, attempts to encourage cooperative engagement with the three countries in the framework of combating the North Korean terrorist threat will be for naught. Indeed, even the United States has shown no real interest in addressing North Korean terrorism in its own right.

Based on the weak premise under which North Korea is listed as a sponsor of terrorism, serious attempts to address this interest directly will falter. North Korea’s continued presence on the state sponsor of terrorism list is more aptly a political tool to use as leverage in addressing
other interests, and the removal from the list will follow accordingly when diplomatically expedient. Therefore, addressing terrorism in its own right is not necessary.

WMD Proliferation

By far the most contentious issue facing the United States is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Unlike terrorism, in the context of North Korea all parties recognize the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an issue that must be addressed. However, it is at this point of agreement that views rapidly diverge. The countries are polarized into two groups, with China, Russia, and South Korea staunchly supporting diplomatic efforts for addressing nuclear weapons proliferation, and the United States and Japan favoring a full array of diplomatic, economic, and police-enforcement efforts to resolve the problem.

China’s policy reflects a longstanding commitment to non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other states in accordance with the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. Furthermore, China is likely averse to actions that might aggravate the already precarious economic situation in the North, which could lead precipitate an economic crisis with a flood of economic refugees crossing the Yalu River into China. Then there is the prospect of a unified peninsula, allied with the West, along the Chinese border.

South Korea maintains a non-interference policy analogous to China’s national policy. This policy is reinforced by the South’s Sunshine Policy toward the North. South Korea also shares China’s concern that an economic collapse in the North would be costly. Furthermore, excessive coercion would threaten to undo the goodwill South Korea has worked ten years to build—efforts that have led to the reconnection of a railway across the DMZ, and the establishment of a tourism zone and an industrial park in the North.
Russia has steadfastly argued that only a diplomatic solution can solve the North Korean problem and has placed the blame on US international aggression for North Korea’s behavior. Based on Russian attitudes, Russian policy will continue to fall in line with the policies of China and South Korea.

Not surprisingly, history has also shown that resolution of WMD proliferation will not be simple. Despite attempts to resolve the issue and improve relations in the 1990s, North Korea continued to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, ignoring the interest and hoping the problem will fade away is not a choice. The stakes are too high. North Korea has already developed long-range missiles that could potentially place nuclear weapons on US soil and the continued relevance of the NPT has come into question by North Korea’s actions.

Facing unlikely support from China, Russia, and South Korea for a hard line approach and recognizing the conflicting interests WMD represents to the United States and North Korea, proliferation would best be addressed in conjunction with other interests.

Regional Stability

Regional stability is divided into three issues. The first is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles and is a major issue. This issue, though weighing heavily in this category is addressed in its own section. The second is the economic situation, which will be discussed in the “economic development” section. The third issue, which will be the focus of this section, is the military threat North Korea poses by its million-man army along the DMZ.

Based on the mutual benefits to be gained by the United States and North Korea and by the alignment of means of the Group of Four with the United States toward a regional diplomatic approach in addressing stability on the peninsula there is a great opportunity for cooperation in addressing the military threat on the peninsula. This is not meant to oversimplify the problem of
greater regional stability. Beyond the issues addressed in this thesis, BMD, Taiwan-China relations, and Japan’s wartime past all provide challenges to cooperation. Nonetheless, on the peninsula itself, DMZ has become both a deterrence against US and South Korean troops stationed to the South and an immigration border for the North, keeping South Korean culture from polluting North Korean ideology and preventing the mass migration of poverty-stricken North Koreans to the wealthy South. The North has shown significant restraint along the DMZ in preventing an escalation of tensions, even following isolated firefights, despite the antagonistic rhetoric that follows. In addressing the role the conventional military threat has on regional stability, the United States should leverage regional players in a lead role on reducing tensions on the peninsula proper. In addition, regional stability should be a cornerstone for addressing other US national security interests.

Human Dignity

Human Dignity is the most difficult interest to address. US attempts to promote human dignity are in conflict with both regime stability and state security. Adding to this problem is the varying definitions of human dignity that different nations share. There is little one country can do to force another country to comply. Quite often, the reverse effect is had, with the country hardening its position and closing up, inadvertently decreasing regional stability and deepening human rights abuses.

The United States’ strategy is to use of economic sanctions to pressure North Korea into improving human rights. However, sanctions run counter to the United States’ economic development interests and, when ineffective as they have been in North Korea, are counterintuitive to the goal of improving regional stability. In addressing North Korea’s human
rights problem the United States should seek to address it in conjunction with interests complementary to North Korea.

Economic Development

Economic development is a bright spot for future success. Economic development is complementary North Korean interests contributing to regime stability and state security and is viewed as mutually beneficial by China, Japan, and South Korea. China and Japan have both taken a bilateral approach to development, making inroads that have been impossible with the use of hard power.

Recognizing the success and the need to carry on with economic engagement, South Korea announced intentions to continue its economic relations with the North regardless of the progress on denuclearization. The interaction with North Korea in economic development has increased contact with North Koreans that will, over time, loosen the ideological grip the North has on its people. Therefore, the United States should encourage and support South Korea’s investment into North Korea and make economic development and a second cornerstone in a broader approach to addressing US national security interests.

Finally, in addressing all of the above security interests, the United States should encourage regional players to take a lead role. South Korea, sharing a common history and ancestry with the North, and given its successes in economic engagement and military talks at reducing tensions, would be well suited to lead. With South Korea as the lead nation and in cooperation with China, Russia, and Japan, the United States should encourage and promote economic development in North Korea. This action would include, under South Korean suggestions, conceding the use of economic sanctions as a means for promoting human dignity as well as financial and economic sanctions emplaced to combat WMD proliferation, while
keeping in place initiatives to intercept material used in the development of WMD. Such action may also include the removal of North Korea from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. Efforts to promote economic develop will be welcomed by North Korea since it is a complementary interest.

Simultaneously with economic development, the United States should support South Korea’s lead efforts to reduce tensions between the conventional forces along the DMZ. Economic development and talks for regional stability will become more and more interdependent as the need to transfer raw materials and finished products back and forth across the DMZ increases.

Recognizing that South Korea and China have historically shown little interest in pressuring the North on human rights issues, the United States should demand a greater priority be given to this interest in exchange for the economic and financial concessions mentioned above. At the same time, in support of lead nation efforts, the United States must be willing to postpone the hard power steps taken in implementing the *North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004*.

As trust is developed between the North and the other five members of the Six-Party Talks, tensions will reduce on the peninsula. As North Korea becomes economically secure, North Korea’s fear for “regime survival” will dissipate, allowing for progress in resolving WMD proliferation.
## APPENDIX A. TABLES

### Table 8. National Strategy Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strategy Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>• National Security Strategy</td>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>White House</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>• National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
<td>Dec 2004</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Defense of Japan 2006</td>
<td>1 Aug 2006</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 2006 Diplomatic Bluebook</td>
<td>Apr 2006</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>• China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation</td>
<td>7 Sep 2005</td>
<td>Information Office of the State Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• China’s National Defense in 2006</td>
<td>Dec 2006</td>
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<td>• Foreign Policy Papers (note 1)</td>
<td>Aug 2003</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</td>
<td>1954</td>
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<td>• China’s Peaceful Development Road</td>
<td>27 Dec 2005</td>
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<td>• Peace, Prosperity, and National Security (NSS)</td>
<td>1 May 2004</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
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<td>• Key Diplomatic Tasks</td>
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<td>28 Jun 2000</td>
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<td>• Russian Federation Military Doctrine</td>
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<td>• Open Source Center</td>
<td>6 Apr 1993</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 10-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3 May 1983</td>
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<td>• Giving Priority to the Ideological Work is Essential for Accomplishing Socialism</td>
<td>19 June 1997</td>
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<td>• On Preserving the Juche Character and National Character of the Revolution and</td>
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<td>Construction</td>
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<td>• Declarations and Agreements (note 2)</td>
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**Note 1.** China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace; China's Views on the Current International Situation; China's Views on the Development of Multi-polarization; China's Position on Establishing a New International Political and Economic Order; China's Views on the Current World Economic Situation, China's Stand on South-South Cooperation.

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<tr>
<th>US Interests</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>• “Stamp out” symptoms and root causes</td>
<td>• Containment and eradication</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International and regional cooperation</td>
<td>• International support and cooperation in counter-terrorist efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint efforts in information sharing and operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation</td>
<td>• Actively push the cause of arms control and non-proliferation regimes</td>
<td>• Establish peaceful resolution to North Korean nuclear issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strengthen existing nuclear non-proliferation regimes</td>
<td>• Prevent proliferation of WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political and diplomatic means within framework of international law</td>
<td>• Resolve nuclear issue through Six-Party Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperation with Japan and ROK</td>
<td>• Actively participate in multilateral/int’l efforts against WMD proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperation with Japan and ROK</td>
<td>• Inter-Korean dialogue</td>
</tr>
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<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>• Promote human rights</td>
<td>• Promote human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Participation in various human rights conventions</td>
<td>• Active international effort</td>
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<td>Regional Stabilization</td>
<td>• Defuse regional conflict</td>
<td>• Establish peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula</td>
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<td>• Political solutions through the UN</td>
<td>• Promote “Policy for Peace &amp; Prosperity”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Fraternal relations and cooperation with neighbors in multilateral forums to address problems</td>
<td>• Resolve issues through inter-Korean cooperation including military confidence-building efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperation with Japan and ROK</td>
<td>• Increase international assistance to the North for reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>• Develop trade based on “equality and mutual benefit”</td>
<td>• Promote economic prosperity in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preserve stable financial markets and economic stability</td>
<td>• Increase “inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>• Preventing and eradicating</td>
<td>• Develop political will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>terrorism</td>
<td>• Cooperation to strengthen and build counter-terrorism efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>including:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Logistical support of military ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– International, regional, and bilateral agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Capacity-building assistance to weak countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons and Missile</td>
<td>• Promote non-proliferation of</td>
<td>• “Dialogue and pressure” in arms control and non-proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation</td>
<td>nuclear weapons and missiles</td>
<td>• Patrol and surveillance ops to support PSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Export controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Info sharing with allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>• Resolve status of abductees</td>
<td>• “Dialogue and pressure” concept to resolve abductee issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote human rights</td>
<td>– Bilateral talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Int’l organizations (e.g. UNHCR) to create international awareness and pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stabilization</td>
<td>• Seek peaceful resolution to</td>
<td>• Strong relations and cooperation with other regional countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korean issues</td>
<td>• US-Japan alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure stability and prosperity</td>
<td>• Regional economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>• Economic development in the</td>
<td>• Financial and development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>region</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security Interest</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Ways</td>
<td>Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prevent attacks</td>
<td>• Preemptive force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deny WMD to terrorists and rogue states</td>
<td>• All elements of the DIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deny sanctuary in rogue states</td>
<td>• Strengthen cooperation and recruit partners in the international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deny terrorists control of states for basing</td>
<td>• Take a lead effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Dignity</td>
<td>Ways</td>
<td>Means</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                            | • End tyranny                      | • All elements of the DIME, including: | • Fair and equal treatment of its citizens | "North Korea claims their country is free from human rights violations."
|                            | • Promote democracy                | - Sanctions                           |      |      |
|                            |                                           - International pressure |      |      |
|                            |                                           - Supporting reformers |      |      |
| Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation | Ways | Means | Ways | Means |
|                            | • Deny terrorists and rogue states legal ability to produce fissile material | • Partner with allies to block shipments and financial resources | • Protect against direct foreign aggression | • Advance nuclear weapons program |
|                            | • Prevent transfer of fissile material to rogue states and terrorists. | • Close NPT loophole. |      | • Advance missile technology |
|                            |                                           • Improve security at vulnerable nuclear sites |      |      |
|                            |                                           • International diplomacy |      |      |
|                            |                                           • Use of force |      |      |
| Regional Stability         | Ways | Means | Ways | Means |
|                            | • Conflict prevention and resolution | • Use of “free nations of ‘good offices’” | • Reduce military threat on Korean peninsula | • Create division in US-South Korean relations |
|                            |                                           • Priority on regional leadership |      | • Eliminate US presence from peninsula |
|                            |                                           • Address the problem in a “wider regional context” |      |      |
| Economic Development       | Ways | Means | Ways | Means |
|                            | • Assist poor countries in developing economic prosperity | • Create external incentives to help governments transform themselves | • Promote economic self-reliance based on the Juche policy | • Economic aid from donor countries |
|                            |                                           • Promote regional initiatives to disrupt illicit activities |      |      |
Table 10. Combined table of means of the Six-Party members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Terrorism** | • Partner with allies to block shipments and financial resources  
• Close NPT loophole  
• Improve security at vulnerable nuclear sites  
• International diplomacy  
• Use of force  
• “Dialogue and Pressure”  
• Tighten existing control regimes  
• Active support for arms control regimes such as PSI  
• Financial restrictions  
• Economic sanctions  
• Constrained by own constitution and negative response by neighbors | • International support and cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts  
• Does not specifically recognize DPRK as terrorist state  
* Does not recognize DPRK as terrorist state | • International cooperation to fight terrorism  
• International agreements  
• Information sharing Coordination of operations  
• Does not recognize DPRK as terrorist state | • International and regional cooperation  
• Joint efforts in information sharing and operations  
• Does not recognize DPRK as terrorist state | |
| **WMD Proliferation** | • Preemptive force  
• International cooperation and recruitment of partners  
• Develop political will for international, regional, and bilateral agreements  
• Nation assistance for capacity-building  
• Logistical support for military ops  
• Constrained by own constitution and response by neighbors | • Resolve nuclear issue at Six-Party Talks  
• Actively participate in multilateral and international efforts against WMD proliferation  
• Inter-Korean dialogue  
Has avoided participation in enforcement regimes deemed targeted at North to avoid upsetting inter-Korean progress | • Tighten existing control regimes  
• Partnering with other states to support control mechanisms | • Tighten existing control regimes  
• Political and diplomatic means within framework of international law  
• Cooperation with Japan and Korea | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Stability</strong></td>
<td>Use of “free nations of good offices”’”</td>
<td>“Policy of Peace &amp; Prosperity”</td>
<td>Diplomatic efforts via regional forums (ASEAN and APEC)</td>
<td>Political solutions through UN</td>
<td>Multilateral cooperation to promote prosperity and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priority on regional leadership</td>
<td>Inter-Korean cooperation</td>
<td>Fraternal relations and cooperation with neighbors in multilateral forums</td>
<td>Fraternal relations and cooperation with neighbors in multilateral forums</td>
<td>Multilateral cooperation to promote prosperity and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Addressing the problem in a “wider regional context”</td>
<td>International assistance for DPRK reform</td>
<td>Build international cooperation for peace efforts on peninsula</td>
<td>Build international cooperation for peace efforts on peninsula</td>
<td>Build international cooperation for peace efforts on peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Dignity</strong></td>
<td>All elements of the DIME, including:</td>
<td>“Dialogue and Pressure”</td>
<td>Active international effort</td>
<td>Promote respect for international norms of law</td>
<td>Participation in human rights conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sanctions</td>
<td>Bilateral talks</td>
<td>Inter-Korean dialogue</td>
<td>Has tended to downplay human rights concerns in order not to hurt relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International pressure</td>
<td>International awareness through HR organizations</td>
<td>Has tended to downplay human rights concerns in order not to hurt relations</td>
<td>Has tended to downplay human rights concerns in order not to hurt relations</td>
<td>Has tended to downplay human rights concerns in order not to hurt relations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Supporting reformers</td>
<td>Economic sanctions</td>
<td>Focused on abduction issue</td>
<td>Focused on abduction issue</td>
<td>Focused on abduction issue</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Focus on sanctions</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>* Sanctions</td>
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<td>* International awareness through HR organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Human rights awareness through HR organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Policy of Peace &amp; Prosperity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Inter-Korean cooperation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Build international cooperation for peace efforts on peninsula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Support reformers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Downplay human rights concerns in order not to hurt relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Development</strong></td>
<td>Create external incentives to help governments transform themselves</td>
<td>Financial and development assistance</td>
<td>Inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation</td>
<td>* Not addressed</td>
<td>Multilateral cooperation to promote prosperity and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote regional initiatives to disrupt illicit activities</td>
<td>* Currently, future assistance is incumbent on satisfactory resolution of abduction issue</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination with Bilateral and Multilateral Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Does not directly address DPRK</td>
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<th>Page(s)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
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