FOLLOW AND ASSUME: THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE IN SECURITY, STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND TRANSITION OPERATIONS

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Strategy

by
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Follow and assume: the operational reserve in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations.

Due to the current size of the U.S. Army and operational tempo, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been moved from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. This thesis attempts to answer the following question: What is the best use of the operational reserve in Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition (SSRT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. To arrive at this answer, selected historical case studies are used to gain insight into the best practices for SSRT and COIN. Several themes stand out. These include the primacy establishing and maintaining a secure environment, the historic failure of the Army to sufficiently plan for the transition from combat to SSRT operations, the commonality between SSRT and COIN, and lack of planned capability for SSRT and COIN skill sets in either the Active or Reserve component. This study further looks at how the Operational Reserve can be used to address these shortcomings. In conclusion, several recommendations are made on missions and focus for the Operational Reserve in order to support Army full-spectrum operations.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Prologue

In modern combat there is an ever-increasing time gap between the American Army’s ability to defeat the enemy in major combat operations and the ability of the United States to declare strategic victory. This has been especially true since the Philippine War forward because the United States has chosen to occupy enemy territory until both the defeated government and its military have been transformed to such an extent that they no longer represent a future threat to U.S. interests. The success of a campaign is not just measured in how quickly the enemy is defeated militarily, but in terms of how quickly the postwar environment is stabilized and U.S. troops are withdrawn.

Since the mid-1980s, in part due to the consequences of the Army’s Total Force Policy, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have increasingly become an operational force, conducting routine humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and peacekeeping across the globe. After the attacks of 9/11, this trend has accelerated. In addition to fulfilling their traditional role of participation in major combat operations as part of the Total Force, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were given responsibility for operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai.
Thesis Statement

The purpose of this study is to answer the following question: What is the best use of the Operational Reserve in Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition operations?

The focus on the period between major combat operations and transition operations is relevant from a historical point of view. A review of U.S. military operations since the founding of the country shows that the military has spent more time conducting stability operations than combat operations.¹ This question of transition to a stable government is even more pressing now due to the U.S. military’s present efficiency in maneuver warfare. Currently, the ratio of forces required to defeat countries militarily are much smaller than the historical ratio suggested by the last two hundred years of warfare. Thus, it is possible that the force available at the end of major combat operations may be insufficient in number or lack the requisite skills to help stabilize and reconstruct the defeated nation.

Key Terms and Definitions

Key terms used throughout this thesis include:

Guerrilla, Insurgent, or Partisan. For the purpose of this paper, and due to the various sources reviewed, the terms guerrilla, insurgent, or partisan will convey the same meaning: that of a member or members of an armed uprising, revolt, or insurrection against a civil, military, or political authority.²

Major Combat Operations. Often referred to as Phase III operations. Although this term is often used in contemporary military literature and discussion, an actual doctrinal description of major combat operations was unavailable in Army doctrine. For
the purpose of this paper, the following description found in the *Joint Operating Concept* (September 2004) is used: “The use of military force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations; at all points of action necessary; and creates in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous perception of our actions—all to compel the enemy to accede to our will.”

**Operational Reserve.** Includes the definition of the Reserve Component while specifically indicating an active operational role as opposed to a strategic wartime reserve.

**Reserve Component.** Elements of the U.S. Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The definition includes both forces unless one particular entity is specified.

**Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition Operations.** Often referred to as Phase IV and Phase V Operations (Phase V being Transition operations). This is a nebulous group of operations that previous literature has called occupation, peacekeeping, stability and reconstruction operations, and postconflict operations. So amorphous were these operations that by the mid 1990s, they were simply grouped under the heading “Operations Other Than War.” In November of 2005, the Department of Defense issued Directive number 3000.05, entitled *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. In this directive, it defined stability operations as, “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” It further defined Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations as those “which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.” During the course of research, it became clear that there was a definite sequence to these operations. Therefore, for the
purpose of this research Phase IV and V operations will be referred to as Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition Operations.

The American Way of Postwar

While it may be argued that the purpose of military forces, particularly the Army, is war fighting, the United States way of war, going back to the Mexican War of 1846, is to defeat the enemy, occupy his territory, encourage the growth of civil government and public institutions, distribute food, improve sanitation, and conduct constabulary duties.7

Those that doubt this only have to look at the National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq in order to see that the eight strategic objectives8 that have been established for Iraq, while not directly equivalent (see table 1), generally correlate with the simple occupation policies, devised by General Winfield Scott, for the Mexican War of 1846.9 Indeed, the standing question running through U.S. Army’s involvement in Mexico in 1846, to Reconstruction, to WWII, to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), is not if the U.S. Army will be conducting stability and reconstruction operations after major combat operations, but how long will the Army be conducting them.

Secondly, it is important to understand that upon completion of major combat operations, the defeated element, be it government, ruling class, religious group, or a combination of these, or any other, will seek to challenge the military asymmetrically, usually adopting the tactics of a guerrilla’s insurgent organization. Table 2 shows several stability and reconstruction operations that included some level of armed activity against U.S. military interests. While this list does not include all U.S. military actions in the last
200 years, it does show that it is common for the military to contend with an active insurgency after major combat operations.\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Stability Policy Comparison</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Security Strategy for Victory In Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition Iraq to security self-reliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help Iraqis Forge a national compact for democratic government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help Iraq Strengthen its economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase International Support for Iraq</td>
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<td>Strengthen public understanding of coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents</td>
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<th>Table 2. Postconflict Insurgency</th>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexican War, 1846-1848</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil War, 1861-1865</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstruction, 1865-1877</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines, 1899-1913</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti, 1915-1934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic, 1916-1924</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua, 1927-1933</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea, 1945-1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, 1955-1973</td>
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<td>Latin America, 1960-1989</td>
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Further, U.S. efforts to disrupt and quell insurgent activities tend to focus on stability operation-like methods. The current draft of Joint Publication 3.0 Joint Operations, describes stability operations as follows: “An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services.”11

Although not always clear, there may be a link between successful stability and reconstruction operations and counterinsurgency. Mao Tse-tung compared “guerrillas to fish and the people to the water in which they swim. If the political temperature is right, the fish, however few in number, will thrive and proliferate.”12 Thus, in the battle against the insurgent, winning is about creating a social-political environment where he cannot flourish. Like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs,13 if a military force, upon the defeat of the enemy, can provide food, shelter, safety, and security to the population, that force has deprived the “fish” of a friendly environment, since the insurgent will utilize the lack of any or all of these items in order to de-legitimize the occupation force and or its follow on civilian government in order to gain a foothold among the population.

The key question is the speed with which security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations can provide an appropriate environment so that an insurgent movement may not gain traction. The velocity of this effort is important in that once a guerrilla movement has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant portion of the population (15-25 percent historically) it is very difficult to dislodge it.14

Another significant factor complicating the transition to security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is that military planning for Phase III and Phase
IV and V operations have generally been compartmentalized, not integrated. This results from a number of factors. First, the view among military professionals is that major combat operations and security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations are separate activities. While this view may be changing as a result of the Army’s experience in OEF and OIF, it was prevalent as recently as Operation Just Cause in 1989. Second, due to the concerns of ensuring that major combat operations are successful, priorities of planning, force allocation, and resources for major combat operations receive a higher priority than those for security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. Finally, due to the push for a more lethal, deployable, militarily efficient Army, the Phase III force may not have the sufficient, personnel or equipment in order to transition quickly to Phases IV and V.

Thus, the United States Army will most likely conduct security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations after major combat. The transition to, and success of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition activities can positively or negatively affect the ability of insurgencies to gain a foothold in the occupied area. This then affects the ultimate goal of turning the occupied area back to local civil authorities.

Assumptions and Limitations

The main assumptions for research during this thesis include: Reserve forces will continue to be organized and trained like regular army units. Presidential call-up authority will remain the same. Reserve forces will maintain a mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The Army will continue to resource and deploy Reserve forces in future conflicts. The Army will continue to implement the five year reserve force Army Force Generation Model (ARFOGEN) model. Significant
revisions in the doctrine for major combat operations or stability and reconstruction operations will not occur. The U.S. will continue to conduct stability and reconstruction operations.

This study will be limited by certain external factors. Current doctrine will be used when available. Current transformation force structure of Active and Reserve forces will be used. When possible, multiple studies of stability, reconstruction, or counter insurgency operations will be used to compare and contrast, rather than trying to develop new patterns and themes based on primary sources.

Delimitations of this study include several areas. In general, this thesis will address reoccurring themes and patterns of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, or counter insurgency operations, rather than specific tactical-level details. This study will not attempt to correlate the time between the end of Phase III and the start of Phase IV operations with success of the mission. While OEF and OIF will be considered as historical studies as much as they can, it is not the intent of this thesis to declare the success or failure of these operations, nor place praise or blame upon any organization or individual. Time will provide the necessary perspective.

**Review of Literature**

The literature review in chapter 2 will focus on three major areas. The first area of concentration is a review of secondary sources that have conducted case studies of previous U.S. military occupations. The purpose of this review is to compare and contrast these studies’ conclusions in order to identify patterns and trends in how the United States conducts stability and reconstruction operations.
The second area of focus is a review of counterinsurgency literature. Given the United States’ experience since 11 September 2001, there is a wealth of literature concerning this topic. Again, the intention is to look for patterns and themes in literature that address multiple insurgencies.

The third area of focus of the literature review will be on the subject of the current capabilities of U.S. Army National Guard and Reserve forces. For clarification, the term current capabilities include those after the forces undergo transformation. Additionally, a review of the Reserve Component’s mission, particularly in the area of Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities will be conducted. Current thought on the “Abrams Doctrine” will be briefly surveyed.

**Research Method, Analysis, and Conclusion**

The research design of this thesis will attempt to follow a logical progression concerning the relationship (or lack thereof) between security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, counter insurgency operations, and capabilities of the Reserve Component. Trends in stability and counterinsurgency operations will be identified and compared to the capabilities and attributes of the Reserve Component.

This research method will provide the foundation for chapter 4, “Analysis and Interpretation.” Based upon this analysis, in chapter 5, “Conclusions and Recommendations,” the research will develop and suggest courses of action in order to speed the transitional period between major combat operations and security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, thus better ensuring the ability to secure victory and withdraw military forces after defeating the enemy and stabilizing the country.


6Ibid.


10Cuba, Japan, and Germany being notable exceptions. In Cuba, insurrection was defused through adroit policies. The completeness of the defeat of the Japan as well as the co-opting the Emperor by MacArthur eradicated any chance of rebellion. The completeness of Germany’s defeat limited most Werewolf actions to some assassinations prior to the Nazi surrender and then sporadic individual actions up through 1947.


16Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

The literature review will first focus on a historical review of past U.S. conflicts and the roles of stability and reconstruction operations in them. Second, it will focus on the United State’s experience in counterinsurgency, often within the same conflicts. Other counterinsurgency experiences and theories will also be examined. Areas in which stability and reconstruction operations and counterinsurgency correlate will be noted, but analysis will be conducted in chapter 4. The final focus for the literature review will be an examination of the capabilities, aptitude, and regulatory guidance surrounding the use of National Guard and Reserve forces, particularly in riot control, disaster relief, and other operations consistent with support to American or international civil government.


Although many resources were consulted, the research on stability operations coalesced around four primary surveys of historical U.S. involvement in postconflict operations. The first work, *The US experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, is by Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, of the Combat Studies Institute of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In this work, Dr. Yates focuses upon 28 case scenarios ranging from the second Seminole war, to the Mexican War, Reconstruction, the “small wars” of the early twentieth century, and ending with US involvement in the Balkans.

The second work reviewed, America’s Role in Nation-building : from Germany to Iraq, by a team from the RAND institution, sought to analyze best practices in nation
building by the United States in the post-World War II period. The title is somewhat misleading, as the final chapter on Iraq has not yet been written, especially since the study was published in late 2003. Thus, the relevant portion of the study covers security and reconstruction operations (nation building) from Germany to the ongoing operation in Afghanistan. In particular, this study attempts to identify successful practices “in terms of democratization and the creation of vibrant economies, and draw implications for future U.S. nation building operations.”¹ Taking the point of view that U.S. reconstruction operations in Germany and Japan in set the standard for postconflict nation building, the study looks at those two nations, as well as five additional case studies including Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

The final two books reviewed *The Savage Wars of Peace* by Max Boot and *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, by Andrew J. Birtle bridge the gap between security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations and counterinsurgency operations. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, covers much the same ground as *Savage Wars* except in greater detail. However, since *Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine* covers the U.S. Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Indian wars and *Savage Wars* does not, conclusions from those events were drawn from Birtle’s work. Additionally, while Birtle draws conclusions, they are aimed at an examination of Army doctrine, not as indictment of U.S. foreign policy as in some of Boot’s conclusions.

It is in Birtle’s and Boot’s books in particular that you get the sense that security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations and counterinsurgency operations are two sides of the same coin. Even more so, these operations often occur simultaneously
within the same area of operation. However, to bring definition to the separate subjects, security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations in both volumes will be reviewed first, followed by a review of counterinsurgency operations as represented by both authors.

**Defining the Operation**

All of the authors of the works reviewed were compelled first to define “stability operations.” In *The US experience in Stability Operations*, Dr. Yates’ definition comes from a draft of an Army field manual (most likely a draft of FM 3.0). Additionally, he notes that other types of operations categorized as “Peace operations, Foreign Internal Defense (to include counterinsurgency), Security assistance, Humanitarian and civic assistance, as well as others “have fallen under the rubric of stability operations.”

In *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, Birtle finds it necessary to provide definitions to delineate what is counterinsurgency and what are contingency operations. While he concedes that contingency operations is a wide category, for the purposes of his book he limits his definition to “operations of intervention in which the Army seeks to alter the political behavior of another country, either by restoring order, quelling an insurrection, imposing punitive measures, recasting institutions, or enforcing change in government.” More narrowly, what Birtle is really dealing with is “pacification” which he defines as being “military operations against irregulars and civilian operations.”
The Task at Hand

A major theme of stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is that they are complex operations that deal in both the military and political realm. Yates validates the complexity of stability operations noting that “US forces conducting stability operations will perform many and diverse tasks.” In particular, they will include fields not normally associated with military operations such as political, economic, financial, social, and humanitarian tasks. More profoundly, inherent in these tasks is that “Stability operations often involve military officers in a variety of “political and diplomatic roles.” Third, Yates acknowledges the importance of political sensibilities in stability operations, noting the “Black Hawk Down” effect on operations in Somalia. Finally, Dr. Yates addresses the fact that stability operations often are conducted in a complex and ambiguous way. As part of this environment, U.S. forces will interact with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local governments, and members of the diplomatic community. As a result, and due to the fact that stability operations will most likely occur in areas that differ greatly from the United States, cultural awareness will be key.

Historically, it appears that both political and humanitarian desires motivate U.S. involvement in such operations. During the U.S intervention in Haiti in 1915, U.S. intentions were twofold. Although the secondary intent was to prevent a “foreign power to obtain a foothold” in what America considered its “back yard,” the primary intent was Woodrow Wilson’s desire “to terminate the appalling conditions of anarchy, savagery, and oppression.” Thus, the first humanitarian intervention by the United States was born.
This humanitarian line of thought is also evident in earlier conflicts. During the Indian Wars, due to the general sweep of progressivism of the era, a sort of “road to civilization” philosophy took hold among Army officers as they realized that, as LTC Elwell, S. Otis stated in his 1878 book, *The Indian Question*, “It would be naïve to expect that the Indians would be able to transition into the ‘white man’s’ world over night.” Describing a sociological view of civilized development where each stage must be completed before the next began; they felt that any attempt to push the Indians into modernity was doomed to failure unless it was conducted gradually.

An additional theme of stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is that the military, often forced into a role of governance, finds itself the focal point of any domestic political controversy concerning the implementation of U.S. government policy. During the Indian Wars, the Army found itself not only policing the West, but conducting the business of the Indian Bureau when it was too inept to accomplish the task. Thus, officers served as agents, conducted negotiations, disbursed monies, and wrote treaties. Most officers believed the government’s Indian policy to be a miserable failure due to the schizophrenic policies emanating from Washington. This was largely due not to the politician’s deliberate ineptness, but instead to deep divisions among the American people as to what the policies should be. Unsurprisingly, this division was along East-West lines. Therefore, any action that the Army took could be assured of being roundly criticized by at least one half of the country.

The Army’s reaction to being at the center of this vortex resulted in it perusing one of two policies. The first was the attempt to separate itself from political constraints by seeking complete control of the operation. As an example, during the Philippine
campaign, particularly during the Moro War, General Otis, based upon his experience in the Indian Wars, urged that complete control of the Moro pacification effort be given to the Army. The second reaction, and by far the most common one, was the Army’s attempt to avoid any and all security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations.

Based upon the above discussion, it is clear that security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations are by their very nature, political in both context and execution.

Security Operations

The primacy of security in stability operations is a common thread. In *The Savage Wars of Peace*, Boot opines that “successful state building starts with the rule of law, “as a precondition for economic development and the eventual emergence of democracy.”

During the discussion on the Vietnam War, he notes that “while development and aid could make the people more friendly to the U.S. side, that was a long term project. The most immediate need was to provide villagers with security against guerrillas.” Thus, he is especially laudatory of the marine’s CAP (Combined Action Program) which placed small groups of marines directly in villages where they developed local militias for security.

In addition to placing military forces among the population in order to secure them, the U.S. has sought to hand over security operations to some form of local force. In the Philippines, this took the form of the Philippine Scouts. During operations in Haiti in the early 1900s, the U.S. set up a native constabulary force, functioning as both an army and a police force, officered by Americans, who were appointed by the Haitian government (under the suggestion of the marines) as officers in the Gendarmerie d’Haiti. Recruits tended to be uneducated but loyal, coming from the previously
disenfranchised sectors of Haitian society. However, the combat effectiveness of these forces was poor in the early years. One effect of this is that the longer it takes the local force to stand up, the longer U.S. forces must remain due to the fact that, as Yates notes, “Combat operations of a limited or irregular nature may be necessary at some point after stability operations are well under way.”

“Attraction” and “Chastisement” Operations

One of the most interesting themes is that the American Army will first attempt to be your friend, fix things, and generally try to buy you off with good works. Failing this (and it always failed by itself), the Army will attempt some form of negative coercion against the population. This is very much the “carrot and stick” approach. Historically, the Army has always been very quick with the carrot and not so quick with the stick. For example, during Scott’s campaign in Mexico, he respected individual rights, property, and culture, to the extent that he had his soldiers salute the local Catholic priests. Food was distributed to the poor, natives were employed to improve sanitation, and public institutions such as schools, hospitals, and municipal buildings were improved. Despite instructions to the contrary, he did not “live off of the land” and instead paid for his supplies in order to not turn the locals against him. A young Ulysses S. Grant wondered about General Scott’s beneficence, “I question that a great majority of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming.” Yet, reconciliation alone was not enough to stop significant guerrilla resistance against him. Thus, both reconciliation and retribution became the twin policies that governed the Mexican War.
During the Civil War, the Army again found it necessary to administer occupied regions. Run under the auspices of a local provost marshal, civil administration took its cue from General Scott’s experience as well as Lincoln’s political desire to “restore the good will of the south.” Disloyal officials were removed, and new police and judicial authorities were appointed as needed. Wherever possible, local civilians were relied upon to conduct the affairs of government. When not, the Army stepped in and provided services such as supervising elections; collecting taxes; feeding, clothing, and sheltering the destitute, and regulating commerce. In New Orleans, strict sanitation controls were emplaced and the poor were paid to maintain public works. Throughout the South, similar concerns for health and sanitation were emplaced, to include inoculations for smallpox. But again, benevolent pacification mostly failed to achieve its objective.

After the Civil War, Americans viewed the Army as a “jack of all trades” organization. During Reconstruction, the Army again found itself maintaining order, suppressing banditry, and generally administering government, usually with locals in the lead when possible. Following wartime precedents, most commanders fed the destitute, enforced sanitary regulations, and organized schools. Under the newly created War Department (1865), the “bureau provided vital medical, educational, legal, social, and political services to tens of thousands of destitute Southerners, black and white.”

In the Boxer Rebellion, after short but intense combat operations as part of a multinational force, the U.S. was given a zone of occupation within Peking. Administration of each country’s zone varied widely. However, within the American zone, “troops enforced sanitary regulations to stop epidemics, opened charities and hospitals, set up a court run by the Chinese, created schools, policed opium dens and
gambling houses.”24 The effects of these efforts were that “people flocked there from other parts of the city.”25

However, perhaps the most representative example is the Army’s experience during the Philippine War of 1899-1902 and their policy of “Attraction” and “Chastisement.”26 Best explained in modern terms as lethal and non-lethal operations respectively, this good cop - bad cop dichotomy gets to the heart of the complications of occupation while dealing with a restive or even insurgent population. Partly from political pressure from the Taft administration, and partly from the desire of the generals to win the “hearts and minds” on the ground, the policy of attraction was finally emphasized. “Soldiers built schools, ran sanitation campaigns, vaccinated people, collected customs duties, set up courts run by natives, supervised municipal elections, and generally administered governmental functions efficiently and honestly.”27 Although many of these programs were from the beginning part of the Army’s occupation’s strategy, they were enhanced as “idealistic young American civilians even journeyed to the Philippines to teach school in a precursor to the Peace Corps.”28

During the Moro pacification portion of the Philippine campaign, the Army tapped into traditional Moro culture by co-opting the powerful tribal datos and brought them into the local level of government. Additionally, they cleaned the streets (where there were streets), improved local sanitation, provided medical care, established schools, and went about the regular business of establishing a government bureaucracy. Uniquely, in the case of the Moros, much more emphasis was placed upon economic development, most likely due to General Otis’s belief in cultural evolution. Roads and harbors were built. Agricultural diversification and modernization was conducted. Land was
redistributed in order to provide a “farmer” class within society. Finally, systematic
marketplaces were developed. These markets became “islands of security” and greatly
enhanced the pacification efforts. In the end, after 13 years, the Army was able to pacify
the Moros. However, they were much less successful in westernizing them.

All of these efforts later paid off as the “Philippines became the first Asian state
to establish a national legislature” and had, upon their independence in 1946, a public
school system, freedom of press, an independent judiciary, democratic government, and
the appropriate modern bureaucracy to keep it all running. The good will generated by
these efforts no doubt helped defeat the insurgency; although anti U.S. feelings remain to
this day. The Philippine perspective on their relationship to the legacy of the United
States’ occupation is probably best summed up by a placard demanding the closing of
Subic Bay naval base in 1991 – “Yankee Go Home – And Take Me With You.”

This is in contrast to Vietnam. The “The Savage Wars of Peace” criticizes
Westmorland’s “policy of chastisement” and his focus on major combat operations and
search and destroy missions. Mr. Boot is much more favorable towards the “policy of
attraction” via the Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) joint
civil military program. However, in the author’s view, the solution was implemented
too late, as the military’s “policy of chastisement” had so poisoned the political
atmosphere back in the U.S. that the “policy of attraction” was never given enough time
to achieve its desired effect. The effect of the failure of Vietnam to the military, as
embodied by the Powell doctrine, would have continued political and military
ramifications.
Transition Operations

At the end of major combat operations, one of the first questions, from the Civil War to the present, is when are the “boys are coming home”? Historically, the U.S.’s transition operations, while successful in the short term (i.e. U.S. forces come home), often are unsuccessful long term. In the U.S.’s first intervention into Haiti, the American State Department did try to reestablish the Haitian government (although on clearly favorable terms to the Americans). Between the State Department’s efforts to promote a U.S. written constitution and the Marine’s administering of the election, civilian control was turned back over to the Haitians some three years after the intervention. However, the quality of this dramatic turn around was somewhat in doubt as one marine wrote “I blush at the transparent maneuvers to which we resorted to make it appear that the Haitians were accomplishing their own regeneration in accordance with democratic principles as understood in the United States.”

Often, domestic politics have ramifications in transition operations. Reconstruction for a few years was a relative success. Yet, as it entered a new phase in 1867, a radical Republican Congress abolished the majority southern civilian government, restored military rule, and generally attempted to impose a political and social revolution on the south. It again fell to the Army to try to implement the intent of the politicians, although now with an alienated mass of Southern whites.

This attempt to impose social revolution failed by 1872. Chief among the reasons were that Army manpower reductions and the requirements to the Indian Wars had reduced federal occupation forces in the former Confederacy (excluding Texas) to around 3500 men. This force was not enough to control the rise of paramilitary groups such as...
the Ku Klux Klan. More importantly was the fact that while the military was able to keep the peace and maintain the government, tools to correct the underlying political, social, and economic problems suffered by the freed slaves were never developed or implemented.

**Force Ratio and Duration**

Given that the U.S. public’s support of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations appears to be inversely proportional to the time it takes to achieve results, RAND’s study on nation building is illustrative. Taking the point of view that the post-World War II occupation experience set the standard for post-conflict nation building, the RAND study seeks to quantify the effects of inputs and outputs in each of seven case studies: Japan, Germany, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. On the input side, the following statistics were collected:

1. Military presence
2. Police presence
3. Total external assistance in constant 2001 dollars
4. Per capita external assistance in constant 2001 dollars
5. External assistance as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)\(^36\)

The output side included statistics on:

1. Post-conflict combat deaths
2. Timing of elections
3. Changes in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) over time
4. Changes in per capita GDP over time\(^37\)
The study attempts to quantify and compare measures of nation-building input to outputs in order to draw qualitative lessons. For example: troops, time, and economic assistance (input) are compared to democratic elections and increases in per capita GDP (output) in order to discover any interrelationships.

RAND’s study does acknowledge that under certain initial conditions some countries are predisposed to less resource intensive nation building operation in the terms of time, troops, and money. Both Germany and Japan were socially cohesive societies, and highly developed and “Westernized” in an economic sense before WWII. Additionally, both suffered total defeat in an attritional war. In contrast, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan are divided ethically, socioeconomically, or tribally. They are economically underdeveloped and were not “defeated” in any manner remotely consistent with a WWII model.

Tellingly, the strongest two inputs that correlated to desired outcomes were military presence, in numbers of troops to population as well as length of presence, and per capita assistance to the occupied country. While a long stay “does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure.”38 “To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.”39

Some of the conclusions of the study were40:

1. Many factors influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building: prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and national homogeneity. However, among the controllable factors, the most important determinant seems to be the level of effort--measured in time, manpower, and money.
2. There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.

3. Neighboring states can exert significant influence on the success of failure of these. It is nearly impossible to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors try to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support.

4. There is no quick route to nation building. Five years seems to be the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy.

RAND’s study is supported by historical case studies. For both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the effects of occupation quickly wore off. Domestic improvements (financed by local customs revenues, not U.S. taxpayers) decayed after the marines left and thugs again took control of the governments. The Haitian occupation (19 years) and the Dominican occupations (8 years) were clearly not long enough to change their respective societies. This is in contrast to the relatively stable Philippine government, although this occurred only after nearly forty six years of U.S. administration.

Boot summarizes it best: “Short-term (or even medium-term) occupations . . . are unlikely to fundamentally alter the nature of a society.” Thus, given even decades worth of time, “nation building” may be too big of a task. However, given enough forces and a reasonable amount of time, “state building” may be realistic. What Mr. Boot suggests is that to truly change a society, you have to change its culture. However, this is a long term proposition and may take decades to be even moderately successful. But, if the goal is to reestablish a stable country, then focusing on rebuilding those institutions that enable societal stability is achievable in a more politically feasible time frame.
Lessons Learned

If those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them, then security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations are the Army’s Sisyphean task.

The Army does recognize stability and reconstruction operation as a core mission with full spectrum operations. However, in “The US experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005,” Dr. Yates argues that the Army has an institutional bias towards “real” or conventional war, defined as “large scale sustained combat operations against the regular armed forces of an enemy state.” He further concluded that the “Traditionally, the US military has not regarded stability operations as a “core mission” with a priority approaching that accorded to combat operations.” Yet, Yates quickly establishes that of the major operations involving the Army, only eleven of them were primarily conventional in nature. Even among those eleven, all entailed some form of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operation upon its conclusion. In the Savage Wars of Peace the author concludes that, “Occupation duty is generally necessary after a big war in order to impose the victor’s will on the vanquished.” Even Birtle notes in his forward to U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine that “People, places, and events may change, but the fundamental questions . . . remain surprisingly constant.” For example, during the Mexican Vera Cruz incident of 1914, Brigadier General Fredrick Funston’s soldiers “found themselves performing routine humanitarian, governmental, economic, social, judicial, penal, and security tasks similar to those carried out by their predecessors in Cuba and the Philippines 15 years earlier.”
What accounts for this institutional bias against security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations? It is often argued that “peace” operations diminish wartime capability. Yet, small war operations do not diminish individual soldier and small unit proficiency, and may in fact improve them.49

In Dr. Yates’ view, the military, and by extension the Army as its primary land component, view tasks other than conventional conflict as “someone else’s job.”50 This is not a uniquely modern view. Following the Civil War, most officers, including Sherman, considered Reconstruction a folly and an aberration and thus the Army made no attempt to collect “lessons learned.” Indeed, from an Army perspective, “Reconstruction’s primary impact was to reinforce the officer’s corps’ traditional aversion for political involvement of any type.”51

Despite the military’s aversion to security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, sometimes history intervenes. Boot, in the Savage Wars of Peace notes that the collective wisdom of almost half century of experience in small contingencies is embodied in the Marine’s Small Wars Manual. However, this collective memory was erased by the ferment of WWII and pressures of the Cold War. Ruefully, this amnesia would haunt the U.S. in Vietnam just as the lessons learned from reconstruction would have to be learned again some 30 years later in the Philippines.

Planning

While history does not always portend the future, most literature concludes that security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations will continue to occur and that the Army can expect to play a critical role in conducting these operations, to include planning and preparation.52 This is in part since “Most (wars) are fought for a
combination of causes, moral, strategic, and economic."\textsuperscript{53} Boot concludes that if the U.S.
wants to continue to spread its ideals, then it must be prepared to conduct small wars. To
this effect, he invokes “Vegetius’s advice, \textit{Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum} (Let
him who desires peace, prepare for war).”\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Counterinsurgency Operations and Doctrine}

The literature review of best practices in counterinsurgency operations took two
forms. First, was a review of the patterns of successful counterinsurgency practices from
history. To this extent \textit{The Savage Wars of Peace} by Max Boot, and \textit{U.S. Army
Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941}, by Andrew J.
Birtle were used. Second, literature on the concept of guerrilla or insurgent warfare was
reviewed. Primary among these sources were \textit{On Guerrilla Warfare}, by Mao Tse-tung, as
translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II, U.S.M.C. (ret.), and David
Galula’s \textit{Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice}.

\textbf{Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned}

In Boot’s \textit{Savage Wars} and Birtle’s \textit{Counterinsurgency and Contingency
Operations Doctrine}, the following lessons emerge.

\textbf{Intelligence}

The guerrillas have the advantage in intelligence and knowledge of the lay of the
land. However this can be overcome through local intelligence, most often when the
occupying force leaves its barracks and integrates itself into the communities either by
living there, and or setting up some form of local gendarme and/or native scout
organizations.
1. Spies, clandestine operations, and infiltration of guerrilla groups are effective in destroying insurgents. Examples are Funston’s ruse in the Philippines or Hanneken’s operation in Haiti.55

2. Registering and identifying local citizens disrupts guerrilla efforts.

Security

1. The concept of “protected zones” “concentration” and “reservations” are important in separating the insurgents from the population base.

2. Only when the locals feel secure will they take up arms against the guerrillas.

3. Successful control of the borders is needed. In the Philippines, U.S. control of the sea effectively shut off the ability of the Insurrectos from receiving foreign arms, supplies, or reinforcement from other islands. In the Civil War, the ebb and flow of battle lines and lack of troops to conduct occupation duties meant that partisans such as Moseby’s Rangers could continue to wreak havoc upon Union rear areas.

4. A newly established government will be incapable of defending itself alone. It will need continued supplies, training, or military support. The legacy of Vietnam, Haiti, and the Reconstruction South were sealed when the U.S. ceased to provide support to these governments. Conversely, America’s military presence in the Philippines remained long after the government was turned back over to local civilian authorities. This was critical to its success.
The Primacy of the Political

1. U.S. political forces, diplomatic maneuverings, etcetera, will act independently of the military situation on the ground, and as such influence the conduct of military operations.

2. Insurrections will inevitably follow occupation as the previously empowered are disenfranchised and form resistance movements. This is true whether it is a Philippine Insurrecto, Haitian Cacos, those who thrive on anarchy such as the Dominican gavilleros (highwaymen), or the Ku Klux Klan of the Reconstruction who sought to restore white rule to the south.

3. Information operations can backfire. When the marines in Haiti circulated pictures to prove the death of a rebel leader (who was tied to a door for transportation purposes), the gesture backfired because the picture gave the impression that he had been crucified; turning him into a martyr.

The Carrot vs. the Stick

1. Insurgencies can only be defeated in the short term by military means.

2. Hearts and minds are important, yet without the stick, the carrot alone will fail.

3. Without provisions for the economic welfare of the people, the stick alone will fail.

4. The relationship between the occupier and the occupied is an unwritten contract which sets the context for the carrot or the stick. The stick does not have to mean killings or burning of housing and food stores. Monetary fines sometimes work also.

5. U.S. and International legal precedence proscribe much harsher penalties for punishing guerrillas than the U.S. military usually adopts.
6. The Army’s approach to pacification (the “stick”) is “influenced by broader trends in American society as a whole.”

Public scrutiny affects operations.

Organization, Training, and Tactics

1. Lack of sufficient troops in general will doom pacification campaigns.

2. The best counterinsurgency fighters blend the advantages of irregular forces (often learned from the locals or by co-opting the local guerrillas’ methods) with the discipline, organization, and firepower of conventional forces.

3. Actions launched “off season” pit the superior logistics of regular forces against the guerrilla’s need to live off the land.

4. Acculturation, acclimatization, and persistence are very helpful in the counterinsurgency fight.

5. Select equipment suitable for local environmental conditions.

6. Special counterinsurgency units must be supported by conventional forces or they will usually be targeted and wiped out.

7. Lessons learned from counterinsurgency operations will be immediately ignored at the end of operations as the Army sighs with relief that it can get back to fighting “normal” wars.

Guerrilla and Insurgent Theory

Mao Tse-tung’s *On Guerrilla Warfare* is one of the most influential books on guerrilla warfare. Melding classic guerrilla warfare with communist revolutionary ideology, Mao’s “revolutionary warfare” has served as the basis for all communist insurgencies, wars of national liberation, and almost all other insurgencies as well in the
past fifty years. Translated by Samuel Griffith, former Marine General and Ph.D. in Chinese history, On Guerrilla Warfare is relatively small (70 pages) but it is packed with ideas that resonate beyond the mere text. Equally valuable is Griffith’s lengthy introduction in which he analyzes Mao’s work in light of revolutionary movements that occurred around the time that the translation was published in 1961. For the purpose of keeping up with the current vernacular, the term “guerrilla” and “insurgent” will be substituted for “revolutionary.”

Griffith starts off by noting that a potential guerrilla situation exists where the “government fails in its obligation to ensure at least a minimally decent standard of life.” If there exists in that country a nucleus of an anti-establishment movement that can supply doctrine (ideology) and organization, then the only thing missing to start an insurgency is violence. Further, the core of these movements are most often frustrated, intellectual youth, who, lacking a legitimate outlet for their grievances, proceed toward violent insurgency. When considering the society in question as a whole, if Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is not being met, then the people will most likely support the insurgency over the status quo or at least be indifferent to it and not get in its way. “Mao has aptly compared guerrillas to fish, and the people to the water in which they swim. If the political temperature is right, the fish however few in number, will thrive and multiply. It is therefore the principal concern of all guerrilla leaders to get the water to the right temperature and to keep it there.”

Mao’s campaign in China began centered around the question of land reform for the many Chinese peasants. Splitting from his Moscow sponsors, Mao saw the potential for the revolution of the peasant, the multitude of poor Chinese farmer, as opposed to the
proletariat, the industrialized urban worker, who were too few in number and did not have the appropriate level of grievance (cause) to support the revolution.

As Mao’s organization grew, the nationalists sought to destroy it. At one point, the nationalists had evacuated all villages and towns in Mao’s area and had developed effective siege lines consisting of hundreds of fortified block houses. Isolated from the peasants that they, the communists, had so laboriously propagandized, and from the food and information that the villages provided, Mao had to flee.59 The Nationalists had conducted a successful counterinsurgency campaign, and most likely would have finished Mao off eventually, had it not been for the invasion by the Japanese.

Mao viewed guerrilla action as a series of phases. Phase I is organization, consolidation, and preservation. Phase II is progressive expansion, and Phase III is destruction of the enemy. Intelligence is critical in all three phases especially that provided by the local population. Another requirement is preserving one’s strength until decisive action could be brought about.

In Griffith’s conclusions, he notes that the differentiating factor between common partisan resistance and true guerrilla movements is that the “first usually lacks the ideological content that always distinguishes the second.”60 Comparing the revolutionary movements in Cuba and Vietnam (as of 1961), he notes that “there is little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived Phase I”61 and gained the support of 15 to 25 percent of the people. Finally, Griffith provides some maxims for counterinsurgency warfare.62

1. There are no mechanical panaceas (technology).

2. The timing and scope of third party involvement is critical.
3. The timing of aid is often critical. It must be delivered while it is still possible to isolate and eradicate the movement.

4. Antiguerrilla operations can be summed up in three words: Location, Isolation, and Eradication.

5. The tactics of guerrillas must be used against the guerrillas themselves.

6. Imaginative, intelligent and bold leadership is absolutely essential.

7. Military measures alone will not suffice.

Selected notes from Mao’s *On Guerrilla Warfare*:

1. Guerrilla warfare will fail if its political objective does not coincide with the aspirations of the people.

2. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership.

3. Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory.

4. Bandits may be useful as a type of guerrilla organization.

5. The fundamental axiom of guerrilla warfare is conservation of one’s own strength, and destruction of the enemy’s strength.

6. Bases can be established seasonally or temporarily, even in areas not satisfactory for guerrilla operations, when the enemy simply does not have the manpower to occupy all of the areas.

**Guerrilla and Insurgent Practice**

Another perspective on guerrilla operations is provided by David Galula in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Published in 1964, Galula reflects upon his experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria. Although implied in the above previously reviewed works, Galula’s key point is that the object of power for
the insurgent is the population. When you disassociate the population from the insurgent, the insurgent has no power. Likewise, to gain power the insurgent will promote disorder and attack the security that the government provides in order to disassociate the population from the government. Insurgent groups must have an ideology to maintain and attract others to the insurgency, and propaganda is the means of spreading this ideology.

In the view of *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, the prerequisite for insurgency is the “problem.” The problem can take many forms but it is basically that which separates the people from the government or de-legitimizes the government. The problem can be preexisting and thus exploited, or the insurgency can create and exploit the problem, thus turning the problem into the “cause.” Galula notes that the “importance of the cause . . . decreases progressively as the insurgent acquires strength.”

Galula also looks at the mix of forces required to conduct counterinsurgency and emphasizes the primacy of the political nature of counterinsurgency operations as: “A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political.” He also notes the need to arm the counterinsurgent with a competing cause or “counter cause.”

The author also provides prescriptive methods for combating the insurgent, most of which were represented in some form in the previous literature. However, more so than the others, Galula emphasizes propaganda (or what the Army would call information operations) at every step as the essential element for paving the way to success.

### The Operational Reserve

In conducting security and reconstruction operations, counterinsurgency operations, or some combination of the two, it is important to have forces that can work within this spectrum of operations. If National Guard and Reserve forces are to assist the
active duty in this environment, as part of the “operational reserve,” did they have the aptitude, capabilities, and appropriate policies in which to successfully conduct these operations? To determine this, the researcher will look at the role of the National Guard and the Reserves, both domestically and internationally in situations similar to those that would be encountered in the Phase IV spectrum of operations.

First, it is important to define the difference between capabilities and aptitude. For the purpose of this thesis, capabilities are defined as the organization’s capacity, in terms of unit structure, composition, equipment, manning, and training. In other words, capacity is something that can be numerically defined or is regulatory in nature. Aptitude is defined as an acquired or learned capacity leading to special fitness for a situation, over its constituted capacity.

**Capabilities**

The organizations of the Army’s operational reserve, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, are manned, organized, and equipped in a similar manner to Active Duty forces. The 2007 National Guard Posture Statement states:

> Seventy-four percent of the Army National Guard’s units are impacted by the U.S. Army’s conversion to a modular force structure. These units are identical in structure to those in the active component . . . component, and, when resourced like their active counterparts, will allow a seamless transition between active and reserve forces in combat with minimal time required for train up.\(^6^6\)

Similarly, the Army Reserve’s capability is also directed by Department of the Army policies. By the end of 2006, the Army Reserve had “Aligned 80 percent of Army Reserve forces, to include 58 modular combat support/combat service support brigades and 8 civil affairs brigades into ARFORGEN.”\(^6^7\)
Aptitude: Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities

Although the constituted capability of the operational reserve is to conduct tactical missions, they also serve as the Defense Department’s primary instrument of Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities

Military Support to Civil Authorities

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) generally consists of support during natural disasters, special security events, or man-made incidents for which the governor of a state or the president issues an emergency declaration.68 The most prominent recent example is the response to Hurricane Katrina, where the National Guard mobilized “50,087 Soldiers and Airmen and 146 Guard rotary-wing aircraft deployed to the impact zone, and thousands more provided coordination and logistical support from numerous locations.”69 Missions included restoring utilities; repairing government buildings and infrastructure; clearing debris; providing security, food, water, and other essential services; and providing aerial mobility over degraded lines of communication.
In this author’s experience, in addition to providing soldiers and equipment, a key attribute of Operational Reserve forces is in assisting, with civilian authorities in the lead, with the planning and execution of disaster relief and other operations. For example, Operational Reserve forces played a key role in planning and executing National Special Security Events (NSSE) such as the Winter Olympics held in Utah in 2002 and with the G-8 Summit Conference held in Georgia in 2004.

In general, Operational Reserve forces, particularly the National Guard, can support State and National Command authorities with the following capabilities:  

1. Aviation Support
2. Engineering Support
3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE) detection and response
4. Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection and assessment
5. Medical Support
6. Transportation Support
7. Maintenance Support
8. Logistics Support
9. Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
10. Reception, Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI). While these are also capabilities of the Active Army, the Operational Reserve attribute is that it coordinates and practices these capabilities in subordination to civilian lead agencies in response to civilian, not military, needs.
Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies

Operational Reserve forces provide support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies in several ways. One that operates in all fifty-states is the Counter Drug Program. This program provides forces to assist in Joint and Interagency planning, and in particular, it provides intelligence analysts in support of law enforcement intelligence operations. In 2004-2005, Operational Reserve forces provided border security during Operation Winter Freeze in support of Homeland Security and most recently with three state lead task forces assisting the U.S. Border Patrol in California, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS) is a traditional role of the National Guard. From the labor strife of 1877; to enforcing state-wide veterinary orders, to the racial and social unrest in the 1960s and 70s, the National Guard has assisted law enforcement. Domestically, possibly the largest event that represents a loss and reestablishment of a security environment is the Los Angeles riots of 1992 where the intensity and destruction were unparalleled in U.S. history.

The book *Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots*, by Major General James D. Delk (ret.), describes the events. The battles were waged over a five day period between the National Guardsmen and law enforcement on one side and the over one-hundred-thousand gang members in central Los Angeles on the other. General Delk could be considered the subject matter expert on this as he served as the field commander for the California National Guard and was privy to materials and discussions that few other participants had access to. Patterns that emerge from *Fires and Furies* are very similarly...
to those experienced in the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)\textsuperscript{75} or those that the Marines experience during their “small wars.” Among them are the following:

1. Subordination of military plans and operations to political requirements

2. Difficulty controlling information operations, especially between military and civilian leaders

3. Vague or contradictory Rules for the Use of Forces (RUF) and arming orders often placing Guardsmen at a tactical disadvantage

4. Good coordination between law enforcement and military

5. Fire discipline: Guardsmen received over 69 directed shootings, and several rock and bottle attacks, and two attempted run down by autos. Fire returned was 22 rounds, killing one and injuring another.

6. Intelligence culture: Military intelligence is predictive while law enforcement intelligence is event oriented (i.e. reactive).

7. Cultural sensitivity: Guardsmen throughout the operation had to quickly learn how to react to aspects of the gang culture such as “throwing down”\textsuperscript{76} and baiting and heckling accompanied by “weapons flashing.”\textsuperscript{77}

**Role of the Operational Reserve Prior to 9/11**

Before the attacks of 11 September, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve played an increasingly active role in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. Starting in the 1970s, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have conducted engineering projects (road building, renovating schools, well drilling) as well as medical training exercises that treated host nation nationals.\textsuperscript{78} This was considered a win-win on all sides. For the Reserve Forces, this provided needed and practical
experience. More importantly, it provided relevance for the Reserve Forces, which translated into continued funding and resourcing. For the Active force, it allowed them to focus on training for the conventional fight while still utilizing military forces to support U.S. national strategy. This program was so successful that a body of literature developed in the 80s and 90s specifically touting the suitability of the Operational Reserve in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations due to their unique attributes including individual skills, maturity, and links to civilian organizations.79

The switch from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve truly took place when the 49th Armored Division, Texas National Guard assumed control of Multi-National Division North in Bosnia in March of 2000.80 Their performance drew “rave reviews from many civilian administrators who like the different attitudes those units bring to Phase IV operations.”81 “One National Guard officer noted, perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, that the police blotter in Houston had more incidents in a day than all of Bosnia in a month.”82

Finally, prior to 9/11, in addition to “peacekeeping” missions, the now “Operational Reserve” supported security operations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait guarding Patriot missile batteries.

Role of the Operational Reserve after 9/11

More than 360,000 National Guard and 167,000 Reserve members have been mobilized to perform active duty since 9/11.83 In addition to supporting major combat operations for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Operational Reserve took responsibility for the Multi-National Force Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai, Operations in Bosnia (SFOR) and Operations in Kosovo (KFOR).
State-to-State Partnership

Begun in 1992, the State Partnership for Peace program (PFP) links U.S. states and their National Guard with other nations. Originally, this program was targeted to assist emerging democracies following the Cold War with “building democratic military institutions with peacetime functions in support of civilian authorities.” Currently it has expanded to all geographic combatant commanders (COCOMs) with the mission to “link National Guard states and territories with partner countries for the purpose of fostering mutual interests and establishing habitual long-term relationships across all levels of society.” As of 2006, there were fifty-one state-to-state partnerships and two bilateral relationships.

Total Force Policy

Finally, no review of the literature of the subject of the Operational Reserve would be complete without discussing the role of the “Abrams Doctrine.” More officially known as the Laird Total Force Policy, this policy has fulfilled several roles. First, it provided a way to transition to an all-volunteer force by providing substantial Reserve component capabilities. “The additional costs of recruiting and retaining volunteers and the simultaneous pressure to reduce defense spending made reliance on Reserves a virtual prerequisite. Unless mobilized, Reserves cost only a fraction of the expense of maintaining Active forces.” Second, it provided an affordable way for Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams to increase the size of the Army to 16 Active divisions in order to provide a sufficient conventional force to meet the Soviet threat. Abrams reduced each Active division to two brigades and assigned a Reserve Component brigade and substantial support forces to “round out” the 16-division force structure, which fit
well within existing Defense Department Total. The reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard were likewise supportive of the Total Force Policy as it gave them relevancy, and most importantly, funding. This continued a trend, starting with the Dick Act of 1903, in which the Army National Guard traded independence for resources.

Abrams’s vigorous implementation of the Laird Total Force Policy was viewed by some as an effort to integrate the Active and Reserve Components so closely that the President would never again send the Army to war without full involvement of the American people. In essence, the “Abrams Doctrine” was an expression of the will of the armed forces to put a break upon presidential power in the wake of the Army’s turbulent Vietnam experience. General Vessey, later Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, stated that, “It was (General Abrams’) lesson from Viet Nam.”

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1James Dobbins and others, eds. America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (RAND, 2003), xiii.


4Ibid.


6Ibid.

7Ibid., 27.

8Ibid., 28.

9Ibid., 30.

10Ibid., 34.

12 Ibid.


14 Ibid., 79.


16 Ibid., 306.

17 Ibid., 165.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 26.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 56.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 99.

27 Ibid., 115.

28 Ibid.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
33Ibid., 304.
34Ibid., 318.
35Ibid., 167.
36Dobbins and others, eds., America's Role in Nation-Building, xvi.
37Ibid.
38Ibid., xxiv.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., xxv-xxvi.
41Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 345.
42U.S. Department of the Army, FM 1, The Army (Washington, DC, 2005).
44Ibid., 21.
46Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 338.
54Ibid., 351.
55In both cases, Funston and Hanneken infiltrated guerrilla groups and at a great risk to their own lives, successfully killed insurgent leaders.

56Ibid., 91.


58Ibid., 8.

59Ibid., 18.

60Ibid., 27.

61Ibid.

62Ibid., 32-33.


64Ibid., 89.

65Ibid., 101-106.


70Ibid., 11.


73Ibid., 9.

741LT Stephen N. Kallestad, *The Iowa Guard in the Inter-War Period (Part II)* *The 1930s: Times of Unrest, History of The Iowa National Guard*, available from

75 Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, Handbook No. 02-8: Operation Enduring Freedom TTP (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2002), Chapter 1.


77 Ibid., 136.


80 Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 137.


82 Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia, 137.


85 Chief, J5 International Affair Division, National Guard Bureau, National Guard Security Cooperation and State Partnership Program (Briefing, National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC, 2006).


87 Ibid., 3.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Method

The main research method for this thesis will focus on a qualitative assessment, based upon a review of case studies, of past U.S. stability and support operations and counterinsurgency operations.

First, the best practices successful security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations based upon historical examples will be defined. This will be primarily formed from patterns of U.S. military conduct following major combat operations. Additionally, this research will look at the eventual force ratio of the occupation forces compared to the population and size of the occupied area in order to define any patterns. Second, the patterns of successful counter-insurgency operations will be developed based upon the literature review. Additionally, the research will attempt do define a common “root” of insurgencies. Based upon the best practices common to both security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations and counterinsurgency operations, the research will attempt to define congruence between the two.

Next, key aptitude and capabilities of the Reserve Component that apply to the congruence of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations and counterinsurgency operations will be identified.

Inductive concepts will be developed from the information rather than limiting the research to preconceived hypotheses or theories. Once resulting research questions are identified, the research will attempt to verify or qualify the finding.\(^1\)
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Approach

Given the wide array of material covered, the case study method provides maximum flexibility for the researcher to explore and reach conclusions based upon the preponderance of evidence discovered. By sampling information oriented on existing studies of the same subject, this previous research will narrow the focus to commonly discerned outcomes. Rather than seeking to deeply understand any particular case, this approach will avoid extrapolation based upon one extreme case.

The main weakness of the case study approach is its inherent subjectivity. Its lack of empirical precision may lead to conscious or unconscious biases in analyzing and interpreting date. Results will tend to be more generalized than specific.

Bias

Bias is one of the inherent problems of the use of qualitative data, and any analysis or attempt to quantify it. The first bias being that of the case study upon which it is based, as case studies tend to generalize outcomes. Also, the author of the case study may have a bias or outcome he intends to lead you to. Second, is the bias of the researcher, as current information (Iraq) may tend to place emphasis on some issues, thus causing the researcher to accentuate some datum while ignoring others. While this type of (often unconscious) bias is hard to screen out, review of data by outside sources, such as subject matter experts, will be sought. The final bias is that of the origin of sample. The majority of information will come from military sources or publishers, often by writers with prior military experience, written from a military perspective. As the thesis topic is specifically military in nature, this bias is accepted.
Triangulation: Addressing Subjectivity and Bias

The use of several multiple event studies and authors will tend to dampen both subjectivity and bias. As an example, Dr. Yates takes and analyzes patterns and recurring themes from over a dozen cases, while the RAND document chooses to deal with only seven cases, many of them being the same as Yates. In this work, four primary surveys of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations were used. Of those four, two were used in case studies on counterinsurgency as well as two additional books on insurgent theory and practice. Multiple sources of information concerning the capabilities and aptitude of the reserve component were used.

In analyzing and interpreting the information, the research will look for confirmability, the intersubjective agreement in conclusions utilizing similar case study methodology. Finally, given the disparate nature of the three areas of primary research, transferability, connoting the generalization, and transposing one set of findings to another applicable situation, will be used to draw conclusions and recommendations.

\[\text{\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{1LTC Kenneth D. Plowman, USAR, Qualitative Methods for CGSC Theses (1996 & 2004), 2.} \\
\text{2Ibid., 14.} \\
\text{3Ibid., 14.}
\end{tabular}}\]
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The Patterns of Successful Stability Operations

In the historical review of stability operations, several best practices stand out. First, the decisive operation in a stability operation is establishing a secure environment. Security allows normal economic and social activities to resume, which are the foundation of a stable society. As an example, during the Moro Campaign in the Philippines, economic markets and road networks “greatly enhanced the pacification of the province.”

This may be attributed to the stationing of troops in these areas to protect markets and roads. Dr. Richard Stewart, Chief, Histories Division, US Army Center of Military History, in a presentation in August of 2003, put it most succinctly. “The most essential task is public security--everything else flows from that.”

Security does not have to be provided solely by U.S. forces to be successful. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia lacked the forces to keep the warlords under control while distributing food and other needed supplies to the population. As part of the operations, “[United Nations’ Unified Task Force] UNITAF forces helped rebuild the Somali police force, politically empowered traditional leaders at the local and regional levels.” The operation successfully achieved its objective of security, the distribution of relief supplies, and formally ended on 4 May 1993.

However, until the establishment of an effective indigenous security organization, U.S. commanders would do well to remember that the establishment of a secure environment is not only a good idea, it is a requirement. As stated in the Law of Land Warfare, “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.\textsuperscript{4}

The second theme that emerged was that “boots on the ground” is the key enabler with which to establish security. More specifically, the force required to conduct successful stability operations is in direct proportion to the size of the population. One historical study concluded that, as a planning factor, one soldier is needed per approximately every 100 inhabitants in order to conduct a successful occupation.\textsuperscript{5} To put it in broader terms, one Brigade equivalent is required for every 400,000 to 500,000 inhabitants, depending on the situation.\textsuperscript{6} Significantly, the author concluded that of that number, 30 percent of the Brigade equivalent force must be dedicated to police operations. By Dr. Stewart’s calculations, based upon 16 case studies of successful security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations from the Philippines to Kosovo, the ratio of troops to inhabitants rests somewhere around 1:200.\textsuperscript{7} These ratios are largely influenced by initial conditions and the state of existing infrastructure. Yet, the lower the ratio, the greater the likelihood that U.S. forces will not be able to control events, only influence them. This lack of control has the potential to lengthen America’s involvement in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. Conversely, the higher the ratio of troops, the more control the forces are likely to have over the situation and the more quickly the mission will accomplished.

A third premise that arises from past security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is that of the duration of the operations. Bluntly, success takes time. In RAND’s work, of the six case studies conducted, no successful effort took less than
five years. In Yate’s selected case studies, the average lengths of stability operations, both successful and unsuccessful, were approximately 6.5 years. These general guidelines are important for military planners. This is especially true since the American public has been conditioned to think that a successful war should last no more than four years base upon America’s “major” wars, the Civil War, WWI, and WWII.

The case studies also show that it behooves military planners to work with political leadership to define two concepts before operations commence: (1) what does success look like, and (2) how long it will take to achieve it. If the goal is to install a stable democratic government in place, a short or even medium duration operation will not likely change the culture of the society and upon withdrawal of forces, it will return to its previous state. Examples of this include Veracruz, Haiti, and Nicaragua. However, if the goal is limited such as pacification, stability, or the protection of life and property, short-duration operations, such as those conducted in Grenada and Panama, may succeed. Therefore, if time is a factor, as discussed in chapter 2 “nation building” may be too ambitious of a task. However, “state building” may be realistic. Additionally, stability does not guarantee complete withdrawal. Germany, Japan, and South Korea demonstrate that substantial U.S. forces may be involved long term in providing external security.

The cases studies of historical stability operations also show a clear pattern of U.S. military conduct following major combat operations. With the possible exception of operations in post-World War II Germany and Japan, U.S. forces do not sufficiently plan for the transition from combat to security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. Even when coordination between phase III and phase IV planners have occurred, “requirements for combat operations have tended to override those for stability
Another trend is that, while conducting these operations, military leaders normally focused their efforts into security tasks, infrastructure and economic development tasks, and political-governmental tasks (see table 3).

Notably absent from this list are social-cultural tasks, which are significant if the intent of the operation is “Nation Building” as opposed to “State Building.” Also, while not a specific security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operation, it should be observed that there is usually a group of diplomatic and information Operation tasks supporting all of the above efforts.

One of the most surprising and consistent trends is the Army’s rejection of any lessons learned from past security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. After Reconstruction, the “Army spent little effort on analyzing the counterinsurgency and pacification aspects of the war.” Yet, during the Philippine War, the War Department used the Union’s pacification techniques as justification for operations against Filipino guerrillas. During the Constabulary years from 1865 to 1898, there were many individual writings on the “Indian Wars.” However, Leavenworth’s School of Application for Infantry and Calvary curriculum focused largely upon conventional subjects. Upon the completion of the Philippine campaign, the Army did not even to publish its own official history of the operation.

Some officers did take notice of these operations. LTC Robert Bullard published an article entitled “Military Pacification” in 1910 that was very influential in the development of detailed operation plans for intervention in Mexico that reflected a two-phase military-civil campaign.
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate guerrillas and punish civilians supporting them.</td>
<td>Defeat Guerrillas</td>
<td>Maintain civil law and order</td>
<td>Defeat Security Threats: Taliban, Al Qaeda, Narcotics</td>
<td>Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide 400 soldiers to augment the native police force</td>
<td>Establish Philippine Constabulary Scouts</td>
<td>Support UNMIK &amp; Kosovo Police Services</td>
<td>Train Afghan Security Forces: Army - Police</td>
<td>Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govern through Native Officials and Maintain public institutions</td>
<td>Facilitate Filipino Political Autonomy</td>
<td>Pillar I: Police &amp; Justice</td>
<td>Disarmament and Weapons Collection</td>
<td>Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow local elections</td>
<td>Empower local officials (datos)</td>
<td>Perform basic civilian administrative functions</td>
<td>Promoted Democracy &amp; Justice</td>
<td>Help Iraqis Forge a National Compact for Democratic Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve public sanitation</td>
<td>Run schools, hospital sanitation programs, and other charitable works</td>
<td>Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building</td>
<td>Assist in Governance</td>
<td>Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect property rights</td>
<td>Distribute public land to homesteaders</td>
<td>Promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo</td>
<td>Infrastructure, Energy &amp; Development</td>
<td>Help Iraq Strengthen Its Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure through proclamations and other forms of communication that the US meant the Mexicans no harm and posed no threat to their customs and religion</td>
<td>Soldiers ordered to respect the people and their customs. Forbid looting and wanton destruction</td>
<td>Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status</td>
<td>Support Regional Relations</td>
<td>Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief</td>
<td>Refugee Return</td>
<td>Increase International Support for Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support the reconstruction of key infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Post-Phase IV Patterns
Yet, after tribulations of the interventions in Cuba, the Philippines, China, and Vera Cruz, the Army’s main lessons learned from these operations were that they should be avoided as they were “messy, trying, and institutionally unrewarding.”

The Patterns of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations

It is unsurprising given the Army’s reluctance to institutionalize lessons from “messy, trying, and institutionally unrewarding” military operations that FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was published almost four years into Operation Iraqi Freedom. This was the first revision in Army counterinsurgency doctrine since 1986. It is comprehensive and based upon this author’s study of historical counterinsurgency cases, covers the majority of lessons learned that such studies suggest. Indeed, this knowledge is distilled into table 4 from the first chapter of the manual.

The Roots of Insurgency

Although insurgencies pass through predictable stages, most often corresponding to Mao’s theory of protracted war,\textsuperscript{20} it is important to understand why insurgencies tend to develop, especially in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations.

After Reconstruction, the Army found itself protecting the newly integrated governments. This included operations such as putting down race riots and uprisings by the former southern aristocracy. Soon, it also had to deal with the rise of terrorist organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan. In Haiti, the Marines landed at President Wilson’s request in order provide stability to a nation that had almost institutionalized anarchy. Yet, the “Cacos,” the bandit-racketeers that usually arbitrated power, clashed with an American force in less than one month of the Marine’s landing.\textsuperscript{21}
Table 4. Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Operational Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful Practices</th>
<th>Unsuccessful Practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasize Intelligence</td>
<td>• Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on the population, its needs, and its security.</td>
<td>• Conduct large-scale operations as the norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish and expand secure areas.</td>
<td>• Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Isolate insurgents from the populace (population control)</td>
<td>• Focus Special Forces primarily on raiding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct effective, pervasive, and continuous information operations.</td>
<td>• Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to host-nation forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government.</td>
<td>• Build and train host-nation security forces in the U.S. military’s image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security</td>
<td>• Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation permits.</td>
<td>• Allow open boarders, airspace, and coastlines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expand and diversify the host-nation police force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Embed quality advisors and Special Forces with host-nation forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deny sanctuary to insurgents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secure host-nation borders.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Protect key infrastructure.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


In Somalia, relief operations were blocked by the warlords. Their ability to control food distribution was part of their power. Not until the arrival of UNITAF and the propping up of Somali police forces was the operation successful.\(^{22}\)

While each of the above cases is culturally unique, they all show that the intervention of military force tends to displace the empowered elite. This newly disempowered element will react first by organizing, and then by attacking the new power structure. These attacks, usually violent, attempt to de-legitimize the new power structure by causing the loss of civil security. This suggests that in any transition to a
security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operation, U.S. forces have a limited window in which to establish security and control over the population while the former leadership is reorganizing.


An examination of best practices in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations and counterinsurgency operations brings several things into focus (see figure 2). The result is that the majority of the factors that enable successful security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations are also found in counterinsurgency operations. As security, stability, reconstruction, and transition are the wider of the two types of operations in scope, it can be considered that counter-insurgency is nothing more than a specialized type of security operation. Furthermore, the preponderance of tasks tends to be in the areas of infrastructure and economic development Tasks. This balance of tasks is problematic looking at the elements of national power. The Military element of national power is most effective in security operations, and at best, provides a stop gap measure in assisting the government as reorganizes. It can train security forces, but that training will tend to have a definite military flavor to it as opposed to police training. This may conflict with some of the successful counter-insurgency tenets concerning host-nation police forces (see figure 3).

The military can provide essential services in an emergency, but it is not task organized to do so on a countrywide or long-term basis. While in direct control, an occupation force can provide effective governance.
Figure 2. Successful Practices for Security, Stability, Reconstruction, Transition, and Counterinsurgency Operations
But, this is problematic in that it de-legitimizes the host nation government and gives a focal point by which the displaced elite can rally the populace too. Additionally, the military is not trained nor constituted to be a government. Indeed, America’s tradition of civilian control of the military and general suspicion of military power would prevent using the military in any long-term government role. Finally, any military contribution to a functioning economy would be ancillary at best, usually in the realm of providing a security environment or infrastructure such as roads. Indeed, America’s tradition of civilian control of the military and general suspicion of military power would prevent using the military in any long-term government role. Finally, any military contribution to a functioning economy would be ancillary at best, usually in the realm of providing a security environment or infrastructure such as roads.
Thus, the military’s conventional effectiveness in contributing to security, stability, reconstruction, and transition is largely limited to establishing security. Everything else is conducting triage, hoping that once the “patient” stabilizes enough, the military can leave. However, given that no other element of national power is effectively organized or resourced to pick up where the military leaves off in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, and given the guidance of Department of Defense directive 3000.05 that security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations are “a core U.S. military mission.”

What fills the gap?

Capabilities of the Operational Reserve

The Operational Reserve is organized, equipped, and trained in the same manner as active duty forces. Thus, the Operational Reserve is no different in its capability to conduct security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations than Active forces. Although it is true that all of the Civil Affairs Brigades and the majority of Combat Service and Combat Service support units are located in the Operational Reserve, since 9/11 these units have been mobilized and have provided general support for Phase III and Phase IV operations conducted by active duty units, not as a specific force constituted for phase IV operations.

Aptitude of the Operational Reserve

The aptitude of the Operational Reserve comes from two sources. First, is the make up of the Operational Reserve. As citizen soldiers, the Operational Reserve represents a cross section of American society. While these soldier’s civilian job acquired skill do not always match up with their military occupational specialty, each soldier
brings individual skills and experiences not normally found in the Active component, such as banking, running a small business, farming, government, etcetera.

While this individual experience cannot be dismissed, the Operational Reserves collective operational experience is overlooked. In terms of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, this would include Military Assistance to Civilian Authority tasks, such as establishing a security environment, providing essential services, and coordinating with civilian authorities.

Establishing a Security Environment

The Operational Reserve has several collective operational experiences that qualify them for this role due to their function as the Defense Department’s primary instrument of Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities (see figure 1).

During disaster relief operations ranging from local disasters to Hurricane Katrina, the Operational Reserve routinely conducted security operations in support of local law enforcement agencies. Similarly security operations were planned and conducted during National Special Security Events (NSSEs) such as the 2002 Winter Olympics, the G-8 summit, national political conventions in 2004, and airports after 9/11.24 Border security operations included Winter Freeze in 2004 and Operation Jump Start at the South West Border that began in 2006. Additionally, Operational Reserve forces are trained to conduct less than lethal civil disturbance missions in support of local authority such as the LA Riots.25 This type of collective experience translates well into security, stability, reconstruction, and transition environments such as Kosovo. As an example, elements of the Army National Guard’s 34th ID successfully defeated the
largest ethnically motivated riots in Kosovo since 1999 without resorting to lethal means.\(^{26}\)

**Providing Essential Services**

Constituted with the capability (training and equipment) to conduct logistical operations in austere environments, the Operational Reserve’s experience in providing essential logistics and services during disaster operations while operating under civilian leadership is also an attribute. While any military logistics organization can conduct relief operations, such as the Navy’s efforts following the Christmas tsunami of 2005, the Operational Reserves operations and training exercises in this arena make them the military’s subject matter experts.

**Coordination with Civilian Authorities**

One of the key aptitudes of the operational reserve is their understanding that military forces are an element of last resort once civilian capabilities have been exhausted. Also, that these military forces are the first to leave once the situation has stabilized. In essence, the goal of the operational reserve at the beginning of any assistance to Civilian Authorities mission is to transition the operation back to their hands. Another aspect of coordination with civilian authorities is that of the military capability of planning. Military planning is proactive and predictive. It tries to answer “what if” questions. Governmental planning tends to be reactive. It tries to answer “what happened and how do I fix it now.”\(^{27}\) Thus, during operations to reestablish essential services, civilian agencies often defer to the Operational Reserve’s planning expertise until such time as the situation is stabilized. In the author’s experience, the deferment of
planning to the Operational Reserve is not just limited to the employment of military forces, but to multiple aspects of the operations. Therefore, while planning may be a general military capability, given the Operational Reserve’s role in assistance to civilian authorities, civil-military planning has become one of its aptitudes.

In both areas, providing essential services and coordinating with civil authorities, the Operational Reserves experience with missions in Central America as well as in the Partnership for Peace program have helped develop an aptitude in foreign assistance.

Although conclusions about the best use of the operational reserve in Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition operations are addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis, table 5 shows the suitability of the Operational Reserve in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations.
Table 5. Comparison of Operational Reserve to SSRT Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Capability (organization, equipment, manning, and training)</th>
<th>Aptitude (acquired or learned capacity via MACA)</th>
<th>Civilian Acquired Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political-Governmental</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gov't Liaison</td>
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<tr>
<td>• POLAD</td>
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<td>• Ministries</td>
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<td>• UN LNO</td>
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<td>• CG, DCG</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>• NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• PVOs</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intl. Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Tasks</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border Security</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Repel Aggression</td>
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<td>X</td>
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8James Dobbins, and others, eds., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (RAND, 2003), xxiv.


11Ibid., 346.


14Ibid., Chapter 1.


16United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo


19. Ibid., 182.


26. Author’s personal experience.

27. Author’s experience in working with Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Agencies.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

In the previous chapters, this work has identified, based upon historical case studies, the best practices of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations and counterinsurgency operations. This was done in part to answer a general question of how to decrease the time gap between the Army’s ability to win major combat operations and stabilize the postconflict environment, in order to secure strategic victory and withdraw troops. Additionally, given the implications of the Army’s Total Force Policy of the 70s and 80s, and the continuing operationalization of the Army’s Reserve components, several conclusions can be reached as to the best use of the Operational Reserve in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations.

Establishing Security

This research has shown that the key factor in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is establishing and maintaining a secure environment. In order to do this, the Army must have a sufficient ratio of forces on the ground because these types of operations require the ability to control the terrain and the population. Finally, the success of the operation is often predicated not only upon effort, but upon the duration of the operation.

Since the Operational Reserve, currently constituted with the same conventional capability as the active forces, it would logically have the same ability to impose a secure environment as an active force and therefore serve the same purpose. Aside from its
constituted capability, the attributes of the Operational Reserve, particularly in its role in Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities, potentially make it a better force for providing security in Phase IV operations than the active component. It has the capability to conduct combat operations, particularly at company level and below as well as the capability and experience to conduct border security, which is vital to both stability and counterinsurgency operations.

Additionally, as this study has shown, another crucial factor in establishing a secure environment is the establishment of local security forces that will assume responsibility for civil security. The Operational Reserve, because of its nature as a “militia” type force, is well attuned to challenges and requirements of creating effective military formations with limited time and resources, and its citizen-soldiers understand both the military and civilian environments and culture. Also, since the host nation security force will often function, at least initially, in both a military and a police role, the Operational Reserve may have an advantage over the active component in providing training for this dual mission. Due to their state mission, the Operational Reserve has experience in coordinating with civilian authorities as well as expertise in military intelligence and law enforcement intelligence operations.

There is an additional capability however, even beyond the capabilities and attributes of the Operational Reserve in establishing a security environment. If one of the keys to success is achieving a critical “boots on the ground” force ratio, then the Operational Reserve can be used as a reserve in order to achieve that needed force ratio. This is even more important now that, given the Army’s tactical proficiency; the ratio of forces needed to accomplish Phase III may be much smaller than that needed to
successfully accomplish Phase IV. This use of the Operational Reserve as a major component of any Phase IV force would be a key strategic advantage to the United States in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. It would relieve the Phase III forces of follow on duty, allowing them to redeploy and refit, and require that less active duty forces for Phase IV.

The use of the Operational Reserve may also have a positive effect upon the duration of the security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. One of the key concepts of the “Abrams Doctrine” was that by integrating the Active and Reserve Components, the Army would not be sent to war without the consent of the American people. A corollary of this is that if the American people accept the deployment of the Reserve Component, they are therefore more committed to the operation. By acquiescing to the uses of the Operational Reserve in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations, political support of the operation may extend the political support “half-life” and therefore extend the duration of the operation, increasing its chance for success. this may be particularly true in smaller, long security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations such as those in Central America, where the U.S.’s intent was more akin to Nation-Building” than to “State-Building.”

**Planning and Institutional Learning**

One of the themes that developed from the case study was that the Army does not sufficiently plan for the transition from combat to security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. Even when coordination between phase III and phase IV planners has occurred, the resources (in terms of planning, men, and material) have focused disproportionately on major combat operations. This is unsurprising since the Army as an
institution places a premium on tactical proficiency in battle. Furthermore, this is due to
the Army’s desire to avoid “messy, trying, and institutionally unrewarding” military
operations. The results of this are evidenced by the fact that while there are a multitude of
centers within the army focusing on combat related operations, there is only one center
focused on security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations: the U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) located at the U.S. War
College in Carlisle, PA. Even then, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
only focuses on the Strategic and Operational levels of security, stability, reconstruction,
and transition operations.

The Operational Reserve could easily fill this gap in planning and institutional
learning. The Operational Reserve already has the knowledge to conduct this planning by
virtue of its inherent capabilities in military staff planning, and its expertise in civil-
military planning and role in assistance to civilian authorities. In addition, due to the
Operational Reserve’s involvement in programs such as the State Partnership for Peace,
they may have an advantage in political, security, economic, and cultural awareness as
compared to active duty forces.

Aligning the Operational Reserve’s divisions and brigades to specific regions of
the world, with planning priority toward security, stability, reconstruction, and transition
operations, would fill a critical gap in the Army’s capabilities. This would be especially
astute if the Army viewed the Operational Reserve as a key component in Phase IV
operations. Moreover, the Operational Reserve, in conjunction with the active Army,
could stand up a security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operation Center of
Excellence. This center would not only be the repository for lessons learned for those
“messy, trying, and institutionally unrewarding” operations, but also provide focus, exercises, and training in the tactical and operational levels of Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition operations.

State Building

It is highly likely that the Army will be involved in some form of state building operation in the future, either as postcombat operations or as shaping operations to deter war. Given this prospect, what skills does the Army need to specifically possess to be successful?

Table 5 in chapter 4 (Operational Reserve to Security, Stability, Reconstruction, And Transition task Matrix) is illustrative. It shows that both the active Army and the Operational Reserve have significant gaps in their ability to conduct political-governmental and economic-infrastructure tasks. Even within security tasks, there exists a clear gap in organizing and training police forces. While some of these gaps are mitigated by civilian acquired skills, unless the Army moves to stand up reserve component units based solely upon those skills, civilian acquired skills are a hit or miss proposition. Even then, while skills such as law enforcement are more easily transferable, being a farmer is not analogous to the skills needed to assist a country in setting up and managing its commodities program.

A better proposal would be to build up skills within the Operational Reserve’s divisions and brigades to cover those gaps. This could be done through sponsored scholarships or funded postgraduate education, as well as sponsored two-to-three-year Title 10 or Title 32 tours working in specific government and economic areas. The subsequent idea would be particularly useful in supporting civilian authorities at the state
and local level. To extend this thought further, the difference in conducting security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations in New Orleans versus Mosul is only a matter of location and cultural context.

Another aspect of having a force with the skills to support state building would be to use it to conduct shaping operations to deter war, especially insurgencies. If the implied task of moving to stage II of an insurgency is the de-legitimization of the host nation government, then any state building skills that would provide effective governance would slow or atrophy the development of the insurgency. Much like the State Partnership for Peace program and the Reserve Components efforts in Central America in the 80s and 90s, a force that could conduct Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition operations could avoid Phase IV by shaping the environment.

Maintaining a Strategic Reserve

A word of caution should be added about the use of the Operational Reserve as the primary security, stability, reconstruction, and transition force. The Army has historically underfunded and underequipped the Reserve Forces even when they were part of the strategic reserve. The temptation, given the active Army’s propensity to focus on conventional operations, would be to specialize the Operational Reserve as only a security, stability, reconstruction, and transition force in order to achieve budgetary efficiencies.

This is not what the researcher suggests, and in light of historical precedents, would be folly. Although the pattern of U.S. conflict places the predominance of time spent in operations in the stability operations category, the Civil War, Spanish American War, WWII, and many others have shown that a Reserve Component that can be
mobilized and deployed to conduct a conventional fight is needed. The Army may be accepting risk by operationalizing the Reserve Component without reconstituting a strategic reserve. Also, the skills that make current Operational Reserve so effective in Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities, such as planning skills, small unit leadership, and crisis response, are tied to the Reserve Components conventional capabilities and are dependent upon continued combat focused-training.

Further Research

Although the Operational Reserve can fulfill both its state and federal roles, as well as serve as an essential Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition force as currently constituted, some form of reorganization could assist in this endeavor. Although not in the purview of this document, further research as to reorganization into Motorized Brigade Combat Teams, similar in organization and capability to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, would be warranted. This would give civilian authorities a force that would be highly mobile with the ability to maintain a common operation picture in an austere environment. The greater size of such a Motorized Brigade Combat Team (an additional battalion) as opposed to an Infantry or Heavy Brigade Combat Team would better serve in time of disaster. Task organized with additional horizontal and vertical engineer and civil affairs elements, you would have a highly capable formation for a catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina, or to conduct Security, Stability, Reconstruction, and Transition operation in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere else.

A final area of research would be to study the attitudes of active field grade officers towards the Operational Reserve. While there has been a traditional animosity toward the Reserve Component from the active force, operations in OEF and OIF have
brought the active and reserve forces closer together more than at any other time since WWII. If perception reflects reality, the experience of these future general officers will have more to do with the role of the Operational Reserve than any study will.

Conclusions

The best use of the Operational Reserve in security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations is to be the reserve. That is, to be available to provide decisive action in order to obtain victory.

The Operational Reserve has the capability to be that decisive force. It has unique attributes that make it potentially a better force for security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations than the active Army. It has the requisite capability and several additional attributes that make it proficient in providing the essential task of security. Furthermore, its ability to deploy forces in order to relieve the active force and achieve a proper force ratio is fundamental to the Army’s success in Phase IV operations. Its use may even positively affect the duration of operations. If properly resourced, the Operational Reserve could also fulfill the Army’s traditional gap in the planning of security, stability, reconstruction, and transition operations. These skills will not only be needed for the postconflict environment, but could be used to prevent future conflict. However, these missions should not be the only roles assigned to the Operational Reserve. It must be prepared to continue to fulfill its conventional role. Nevertheless, with proper use, the Operational Reserve can decrease that time gap between the Army’s ability to defeat the enemy in major combat operations and the ability of the United States to secure strategic victory.

2Ibid.

3Since the Operational Reserve’s capability is aligned to the active Army’s capability, column two of the matrix is valid for either force.
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