THE ROLE OF THE ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL
IN PREPARING THE NATIONAL GUARD AND
RESERVE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

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Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Army Reserve Components’ Approach to resetting the Force: A comparative Analysis of Reserve Component Posture Statements relative to Army Force Generation Model

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Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, The Army and Reserve Components have to react to entirely new paradigm. The U.S. Army not only had to fight a new kind of war, it has to rethink the entire future of armed conflict and reassess and re-evaluate how to engage the enemies of this nation.

In order to meet these new challenges the U.S. Army has been forced to look upon the National Guard and Reserve as part of the operational reserve force. This is a significant shift from the past practice of utilizing the Reserve Component Forces as part of the nation’s “strategic reserve”. As part of the U.S. Army operational reserve, Reserve Component forces will be called upon on a regular basis to actively participate along-side active duty units. In order to accomplish this paradigm shift, the U.S. Army has created a force management model called ARFORGEN, Army Force Generation Model. This model is to create a system that provides units in a predictable and reliable manner to support on going operations.

The question of this thesis is whether or not the ARFORGEN model is an appropriate model for the reserve component forces. The model is designed for both active duty and reserve component forces. The findings of this study are that the ARFORGEN model is a good starting point for the transformation of the U.S. Army and Reserve Components. There are long term implications that may or may not need to be addressed in the future, especially with regard to equipping, manning and rebalancing the forces. There are many variables, such as funding, recruiting, soldier retention, training, equipping and future operations that have yet come into effect that may impact the ARFORGEN model and the transformation of the reserve component forces into a truly sustainable operational force.

Transformation, ARFORGEN, Army Force Generation Model, Future of the National Guard and Reserves
Name of Candidate: Major William O. Woodring

Thesis Title: The Role of the Army Force Generation Model in Preparing the National Guard and Reserve for Future Operations

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
ABSTRACT

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS’ APPROACH TO RESETTING THE FORCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESERVE COMPONENT POSTURE STATEMENTS RELATIVE TO ARMY FORCE GENERATION MODEL, by Major William O. Woodring, 188 pages

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I want to thank my committee for their patience and support throughout this process.

I waited a long time to get the opportunity to attend Command and General Staff College. It took me years to finally get the opportunity to attend this course. I want to thank those that made it happen.

After serving one year in Afghanistan as part of the Embedded Training Teams with the Afghan Army, I was looking forward to the academic environment at Ft Leavenworth.

This year started quickly and the academic pace was constant. In September, my fiancée’s daughter needed to have a heart transplant. She then was ill for several months.

During the holidays my fiancée and my father both fell seriously ill. In January, I ended up in the hospital as well. Medically, it was a hard year. But things worked out.

Health problems over shadowed everything else that was going on.

I want to thank God, my family, and fiancée for supporting me through this very trying year.

Who ever reads this, I want them to gain strength from the fact that even when times are hard, persevere.

I also know that my faith kept me going and I was able to complete this program.

To those that follow and who may read this. Take care of your health, take care of your family and never quit when times get hard.
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<td>Army Force Generation Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active duty</td>
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<td>AC/RC</td>
<td>Active Component/Reserve Component</td>
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<td>ADSW</td>
<td>Active Duty Special Work</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>BOG</td>
<td>Boots on Ground</td>
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<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Support Force</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>CSTC</td>
<td>Combat Support Training Centers</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>E-Brigades</td>
<td>Enhanced Brigades</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FCS</td>
<td>Future Combat Systems</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<td>FTM</td>
<td>Full-Time Manning</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accounting Office</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<td>IRT</td>
<td>Innovative Readiness Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MUTA</td>
<td>Monthly Unit Training Assembly</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operations Tempo</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<td>SWEAT-MS</td>
<td>Security, Water, Electric, Academics, Transportation, Medical, Sanitation</td>
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<td>Task Force</td>
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<td>US Army Reserve Component</td>
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<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>US Northern Command</td>
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<td>WAREX</td>
<td>Warrior Exercise</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The National Guard and Reserve forces are in the process of changing their force modeling to better reflect the changes imposed since the 9/11 attacks launched the nation into the Global War on Terror. During the Cold War, the National Guard and Reserve, collectively known as the RC (Reserve Component) were viewed as the nation’s strategic reserve forces. The structure of the National Guard and Reserve was designed around a part-time force with a few, often less than 2 percent, full-time members. Training was based on two weeks a year and one weekend per month. Most of the resources required by the National Guard and Reserve were funded and supplied by the US Army. In general terms, each state provided Guard facilities and manpower and the federal government provided states with funding and equipment. For the Reserve, the U.S. Army provided everything as the AR is a subcomponent of the army. The National Guard has more autonomy. Each state provides recruits and facilities for the National Guard while the U.S. Army generally provides equipment and funding.

After 9/11, the nation engaged in multiple conflicts, two full-scale combat operations, one in Afghanistan, one in Iraq, as well as a worldwide war on terrorism from the Philippines to Somalia, Djibouti, and elsewhere. The plan was to prosecute quick short wars, but nation building requirements have put extreme pressure on the US Army. This new war on terror has evolved and changed and now is a much more complicated process that requires in-depth planning and long-term force commitments. In the past, the reserve component (RC) forces had been considered a “Strategic Reserve” and treated
accordingly, yet currently the force has become an operational reserve/tactical component of the active army. This has a variety of implications that are being felt at all levels. How will this long war affect national security policy for the Reserve Component forces?

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have become part of the operational forces. As such they are being activated and used more and more frequently to take over missions that had been traditionally done by the active component.

To address this, the Army has developed a plan to include the active component, National Guard and Reserve into a comprehensive plan to use all forces in an integrated rotational methodology to meet operational needs. The Army plan is called ARFORGEN-Army Force Generation Model. Much has been written about this new model. However, even as the Reserve Components begin to implement ARFORGEN, the question remains. Will this model be able to produce adequate forces in a straight forward, planned, methodical manner, and in what ways will the Reserve and National Guard forces need to transform to accommodate ARFORGEN over the long term? This study will investigate the issues and implications regarding implementation of the ARFORGEN model and whether it is an appropriate model to use to transform the RC forces.

Statement of the Problem

Under the concept of the Army transformation process, the RC forces are to use the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to transform to meet the new requirements of an operational reserve force. However, the National Guard and Reserve have different missions. Unlike the Active Army, both the Reserve and National Guard have many other issues that need to be addressed, such as budget, training, equipping, manning, mobilizing, recruiting and retention, and related policies, which may mean the
ARFORGEN model will need to be modified for both the National Guard and Reserve. Besides the need to transform and to be relevant as an operational reserve, the Army is trying to transform while fighting two wars. Is transformation under such circumstances practical or even possible? This study also examines two additional issues:

1. The impact the Global War on Terror has on the National Guard and Reserve and transformation.

2. The impact of shortfalls in budgeting, equipping, manning, training, policies, practices and procedures supporting transformation?

The Purpose of the Study

This study investigates the changes brought about by the current wars with relation to the National Guard and Reserve forces. It explores the impact of the current wars on the National Guard and Reserve with regard to funding, training, manning, policies, mobilization, deployments, and recruiting and retention and examines past, present and future policies pertaining to the US Army, National Guard and Reserve Soldier issues. In doing so, it will focus on what effects this current war is having on the reserve forces. Recently in the news, the commanders in the Regular Army as well as the Reserve and National Guard have indicated that the forces are overextended. By some accounts, including the retiring Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, the forces will break.¹

The National Guard and the Reserve may have to change policies and deploy more often to the combat zone. Currently, the National Guard/Reserve and the Active Army are having difficulty just meeting recruiting goals. Without lowering the standards as these wars go on, how much longer can the forces sustain current operations tempo.
without causing severe and irreparable damage to this same force in the future? This raises the question of whether there might be a need to call up additional Reserve component forces in the Individual Ready Reserve or even a limited draft.

Other important questions are whether a long conflict will have a detrimental effect on the Guard and Reserve components. Will soldiers in the National Guard or Reserve opt to get out instead of going on multiple deployments? Will RC (Reserve Component) forces have to create benefits that offset the Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO)? RC policies, such as leaving students in school instead of deploying with units, could have a significant impact on morale and well being of the students, as well as the units they are assigned. Some have suggested that RC forces may need to look at incentives to offset the burden soldiers and families have endured over the last five years. Current DoD policies regarding deployments overseas have very different impacts on RC forces versus active duty forces. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s policy of one year “BOG” boots on the ground means that soldiers deploy overseas for a minimum of one year.² Active duty soldiers understand that this is part of their profession. To RC soldiers, one year “BOG” means one year deployed plus addition time mobilizing and demobilizing. This can mean RC soldiers are away from their families and jobs for well over a year.

Background of the Problem

Reserve and National Guard units that were configured as strategic Reserve for the Cold War are now being used as operational forces. The policies, budgets, mobilization plans, and training regarding such units, may need to be modified in order to go from a strategic reserve to an operational force. There was a large surge of National
Guard and Reserve forces for the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Ever since, the Guard and Reserve have been called upon to accept more missions in support the active Army. Most of these missions were stability operations of limited duration. The current wars are much longer than expected or planned. All of the military forces are stretched to the breaking point. According to a 16 April 2007 article in the New York Times, “It is no small irony that today’s U.S. Army finds itself under the greatest strain in a generation.”

The RC forces are being tapped to fill many short falls. National Public Radio announced on 27 April 2007 that four National Guard Brigades were returning to Iraq after having already been gone for up to 18 months serving tours in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Most of these soldiers are returning to Iraq after less than three years. Units from Oklahoma, Ohio, Indiana, and Arkansas are being sent on their second tours. This is completely contrary to the ARFORGEN model which states that RC units would only be tapped for deployments once every five or six years depending on component.

Calling upon RC forces for an unprecedented second tour means the active duty does not have enough manpower to fulfill its current commitments. The active army is asking the Guard and Reserve to pick up more operational missions due to the current operations tempo that is pushing the active forces to the breaking point. There are several possible issues under the current situation that need to be addressed, including mobilization, length of deployments, training, budget, force structure, and manning. These issues are not the direct focus of this paper, but their impact on the ARFORGEN model will need to be considered.

Another question pertains to deployments. How long should these deployments be with regard to the RC forces? Do the same policies that are used by the active duty forces
apply to the RC forces? This study reviews current doctrine, policy, procedures, and field manuals to review the employment of RC forces.

Since 1991, RC forces have been used more frequently in support of active duty missions. The Army National Guard and Reserve have become part of the operational forces. As such they are being activated and used more and more frequently to take over missions that had traditionally been done by the active components. The US Army’s policies regarding the RC forces are still based on the RC forces being a strategic reserve not an operational reserve. The policies and regulations pertaining to the RC forces need to be modified based on the current realities unless of course the active component plans to keep the current policies even after a drawdown from Iraq.

The Army has developed a plan to include the active component, National Guard, and Reserve into a comprehensive plan to use all forces in an integrated methodology to meet operational needs. This plan is called ARFORGEN model. The problem is that the ARFORGEN model might not produce adequate forces in a straight forward, planned, methodical manner without forcing or necessitating changes to the overall way that the RC forces have been used in the past and how they will be used in the future. The ARFORGEN model needs to address the RC forces strengths and weaknesses and it should address future needs of the military and the nation.

The active army is asking the RC forces to pick up more operational missions due to an OPTEMPO that is pushing the active forces to the breaking point since the 9/11 attacks. There are several possible issues under the current situation that need to be addressed, including mobilization, length of deployments, training, budget, force structure, and manning.
The current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are affecting the readiness of the reserve component forces. Will these conflicts have a long-term negative impact on the RC force that will cause changes in the Army’s personnel management systems?

This new war on terror has evolved and changed and now is a much more involved and complicated process that requires in-depth planning and long-term force commitments. This long war will affect dramatically national security pertaining to the RC forces, budget, personnel manning, training, recruiting and retention not to mention future missions.

Assumptions in the Study

The following assumptions are formulated for the study:

1. National Guard and Reserve (NG/R) policies are dictated from National Security Strategies.

2. Current strategies and all associated follow-on documents will continue to dictate NG/R policies. The Secretary of Defense has the power to interpret and change policies that affect the National Guard and Reserve. Changes in his interpretation of policies may impact implementation of the ARFORGEN model.

3. With the departure of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the arrival of his successor, Robert Gates, the National Guard/Reserve policies may be changed. The ARFORGEN model may even be subject to change.

4. The nation will remain in conflict for several years to come. The National Guard and Reserve will be called upon in the foreseeable future to contribute in support of the global war on terror.
5. Past examples of actions during the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq are predictive of the suitability and feasibility of the way the National Guard/Reserve (NG/R) have been deployed or may be employed in the future.

6. The nation will support whatever actions the military takes to defeat the enemy.

7. The nation must have the will to continue. The National Guard/Reserve must also be flexible and adaptable to the constant stress of conflict and able to react when necessary.

**Definition of Terms**

- Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) Model used to transform US Military National Guard/Reserve (NG/R)
- OPTEMPO- Operations Tempo
- Reserve Component (RC)-National Guard and Army Reserve
- UTA- Unit Training Assemblies
- (M)UTA- Monthly Unit Training Assemblies
- Force XXI--Force 21, Army modeling tool for 2000-2010

**Limitations Imposed on the Research Question**

Currently, the ARFORGEN model is under consideration for revision of some of its components. As such, this study may not address all adaptations and changes made after 1 January 2007. Second, there is a restriction on the availability and access to information/data. All information obtained and used for research for this paper is open source information; classified information was not used for this research paper. Lastly,
changes to policies made since Secretary of Defense Gates assumption of his duties will not negate the results of this study.


CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

The military, and in particular, the US Army, is undergoing some of the most drastic changes under taken in decades. Since 9/11, President Bush told the public to prepare for a long war. Six years after 9/11, the US Army finds itself in the middle of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, an active worldwide war against terrorism, and the biggest transformation in decades.

The 1990s were shaped by the Force XXI model. During the 1990s the Army was reevaluating its position in the world and readjusting its mission after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The 1990s produced the force XXI model, which did not really address the reserve forces. The RC forces were to continue to be equipped, trained, and budgeted at levels that had been established decades before. The Force XXI model was supposed to be enacted between 2000 and 2010. This model also was supposed to increase the Army’s reliance on digitization. This model did not address the RC forces in any depth, except to say that reliance on RC forces would increase during this era.¹

Funding for the RC forces did not increase during the 1990s. The RC forces were generally capped at 70 percent of authorization.² Units were also tiered; meaning units were given assets based on what level of the tiered system they rated. For example, Enhanced Brigades (E-Brigades) received more assets than other units because they were expected to deploy sooner in any future conflict. There were general four levels of the Tier system. Tier 4 units, for example, were often classified C4 which meant not mission
capable. This meant that these units were equipped and funded last or were lowest in
priority. Decisions on funding, manning and equipping units were based on which units
had priority over others. The 1990s did not improve the situation for the RC forces. The
RC forces entered the Global War on Terror with the same funding and policies that
existed during the 1990s.

In 1999, the US Army was committed to stability and support operations in the
former state of Yugoslavia in response to widespread ethnic cleansing between multiple
factions. In one of these operations a unit known as Task Force Hawk was deployed to
Kosovo and Albania. The Army pulled together an ad hoc organization from various
divisions that had never trained together. The command and control cell was unable to
conduct joint operations. The real test came when a requirement to deploy Apache
helicopters from Germany to Albania was not done in an efficient or timely manner.
Once deployed, the unit was basically unable to conduct combat operations.

After the TF Hawk situation, Army intellectuals started debating the direction that
the Army should go. This happened eight years after Operation Desert Storm and ten
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Army was dealing with the so called “peace
dividend” reducing from 18 divisions to 10 during the 1990s. The Army, however, still
trained as if it were going to fight a Soviet style military. For the most part, all the
military planners recognized that the Army needed to change and look forward.
Unfortunately, no one really knew how the Army should change. In 1997, Colonel
Douglas A. Macgregor wrote the book, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Land
Power in the Twenty-First Century*. This book and the TF Hawk situation sparked much
needed intellectual debate about the future of the Army.
In 2001, the new Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, introduced the concept of “Transformation and “Future Combat Systems-FCS.” The Army now had a way forward. General Shinseki and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were in agreement that the Army needed to change. Then, unexpectedly, the 11 September attacks happened. Overnight, the military had to look at war differently. This new war wasn’t going to be like the Cold War or the first Gulf War. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wanted to use a highly trained, technologically focused, yet, small military to prosecute this new Global War on Terror. During the Cold War, major combat operations were focused around divisions. Divisions were composed of roughly 10,000 to 16,000 soldiers. The Army Transformation plan sought to increase the combat power of brigades. One component of transformation was to have brigades be the focus of future combat operations. Brigades consist of roughly 3,500 soldiers. Combat Brigades would be more deployable and be stand-alone units known as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These BCTs would be tailor made for whatever their particular mission requirements dictated. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pushed hard for “transformation.” The resulting model after much discussion and refinement was called ARFORGEN.

Normally the transformation under peacetime conditions would be manageable, but after 9/11, the army is now trying to transform while fighting two wars. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was planned for roughly 150,000 soldiers. General Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, stated the force required should be at least 300,000. Secretary Rumsfeld refused to implement the larger force. There was no consensus between the Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff. The Iraq War, instead of being short and decisive
became long and drawn out forcing long-term troop commitments that taxed the ability of the army to meet its commitments. The RC components were going to suffer from this decision.

After the 9/11 attacks, all states put together units for Operation Noble Eagle, authorized by a presidential partial mobilization. This would have implications on units trying to mobilize and go to either Iraq or Afghanistan. RC units deploying overseas were cobbled together with volunteers to reach 100 percent of authorization. This meant soldiers were being taken away from other units. This had long-term impacts because of the presidential partial mobilization rules that stated soldiers could only be mobilized for 24 consecutive months. If the Army subsequently mobilized the soldier’s original unit, many members of those units had by now exceeded their 24-month obligation, creating additional vacancies and inefficiencies. This would have very severe consequences to unit readiness. Another major issue was equipping the force. Equipment was being cross-leveled from one state to another, from one unit to another. Returning units were also leaving equipment behind for follow-on units to use. This trend is thus denying the parent unit the use of this equipment. Units were being decimated in order to get other units ready for deployments. This is just an indication that RC and active duty policies and procedures were not keeping up with the realities of fighting very intense wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, an estimated 40 percent of the forces in Iraq are made up of RC forces. Over 500,000 RC soldiers have been mobilized to fight in the global war on terror.5

As the Army has decided to transform to the Brigade Combat Teams-BCT concept while fighting two wars, the RC forces have yet to be see increases in funding or
changes to current policies. It is estimated that RC forces will require $15.6 billion between FY 2004 and FY 2011 to transform. This money has yet to be approved.⁶

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are having a detrimental impact on the U.S. Army. This will help identify possible issues that will need to be addressed by the ARFORGEN to ensure successful transformation. In December 2006, General Peter Schoomaker, The Army Chief of Staff, recognized the strain on the Army. He said, "Over the last five years, the sustained strategic demand . . . is placing a strain on the Army’s all-volunteer force."⁷

Equipping

The RC forces have been significantly impacted by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many units that have deployed have had to leave their equipment behind. Units that have not deployed have had to cross-level equipment to other states to support deploying units. This will have long term impact on the readiness of the RC force. The NG has local hometown missions, such as disaster relief or other emergencies. When these units returned home without their authorized equipment, they may not be able to support their communities if there are disasters. These units will not be able to help anyone if they leave their equipment in Iraq or Afghanistan. The AC does not see these issues or if they do they are lower on the priority list.

RC units had been equipped at 70 percent of authorization for a long time. For the most part NG units during peacetime had adequate equipment to carry out home town missions. As units were mobilized and deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan, units were leaving behind their equipment for follow on units. Units thus returned home without their equipment. Once units got back to home station, they did not have the equipment
required to fulfill their hometown missions or to train for future missions. As this problem snowballs, more and more units are without their equipment. It is estimated that in order for the RC forces to be reset with equipment it will take an estimated $12.0 to 20 billion dollars. National Guard units have local missions and federal defense missions. Communities expect that these units be ready and available when called upon during times of natural disasters to respond rapidly and assist as required. If units do not have equipment, their ability to support local missions will be jeopardized.8

Mobilizing

The Army is stretched to the breaking point. The former Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker wanted to loosen policies regarding the call up of Reserve and National Guard forces.

He said that building the Army by increasing the authorized strength by 30,000 soldiers would take a while. He stated the Army could add 6,000-7,000 soldiers per year. In the meantime Schoomaker is pushing to allow a relaxation of the Presidential partial mobilization order which limits soldiers to being on active duty for no more than 24 months under the current mobilization order. This has caused the Guard and Reserve to cross-level units which has decimated National Guard and Reserve units. The trend has been to piecemeal units together because many guardsmen and reservist have hit their mandatory 24 month limit. Thus units are not deploying as complete units. This lack of cohesion dramatically impacts units’ readiness, training, and effectiveness on the ground.9

Figure 1 shows the number of man-days accumulated from before 11 September 2001 through fiscal year (FY) 2003. FY-2003 deployments show 62.8 million man duty
days for Reserve Component forces. By comparison during FY 1986, there were only 0.9 million duty days. This figure has grown significantly since the First Gulf War in 1991. The significance is that the use of RC forces has grown five to six times the use of the RC since FY 1986. The Reserve Component forces have been used for many peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Kosovo, Sinai, and many others. This trend shows that the active duty forces need a significant Reserve Component force trained and available at any given time. This trend makes the Guard and Reserve a truly operational force, not only the strategic reserves as they had been designed for during the Cold War.

Figure 1. Reserve Component Support to Total Force Missions

Manning

Composition of the forces is another important issue. The active and reserve components have troop strengths set by the U.S. Congress. The active duty was set at 480,000 with and the reserve components making up another 500,000. This shows that a huge portion of the Army, more than one-half the force, is made up of RC forces.

Table 1 shows the size of the Army and RC forces in FY 2005. The size of the active duty was 512,000. The National Guard and Reserve combined totaled about 555,000. The RC forces make up a significant portion of the Army’s total military forces. The reliance on the RC forces will continue unless the size of the active duty increases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2005</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Mobilized</th>
<th>Guard</th>
<th>Selected Reserves</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>512,400</td>
<td>148,442</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>218,000</td>
<td>1,285,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* FY 2004 Supplemental for Guard & Reserve called to active duty, Non-Add
** Does not include non-drilling Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)


During the Cold War, RC units were considered a strategic force. It was believed that they would only be called upon during a national crisis. According to a April 2004, GAO report, The National Guard was only authorized 59 percent of full-time manning requirements as of FY 2003. The Guard plans to increase full-time manning to 71 percent by 2012. As the RC forces become more operational, full-time manning (FTM) will remain a significant issue.
Since 1991, the RC forces have been called upon to pick up more and more active duty missions. RC forces have been deployed in the Balkans to conduct stability and support operations. The active forces have gained confidence in the RC forces and have allowed the RC forces to pick up more and more active duty missions. The RC forces have become part of the operational force. With the attacks on 9/11, the RC forces were immediately called upon to conduct operation Noble Eagle which was to help protect Americans with combat air patrols and deployment of RC soldiers to airports and other facilities. As the global war on terror increased in scope, the active components did not have enough forces available to meet mission requirements. The RC forces were now being called upon to create ad hoc units to deploy overseas. An issue that hasn’t been really addressed or discussed is how the RC forces are being utilized in Iraq or Afghanistan. RC units very rarely are being deployed as complete BCTs. The present application of the RC forces in combat operations should be an indicator as to how these forces will be used in the future. The most recent estimates suggest that there are five BCT’s worth of RC soldiers deployed all over Iraq as security forces. The size of these units typically is battalion size or less. This is worth evaluating in the future. RC forces were being called upon to fight, support and train in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as continue supporting the Stability and Support operations in the Balkans and other places. The RC forces are even the lead element at Guantanamo Bay.

Another issue is multiple overseas deployments. Deployments are demanding but even more so on RC soldiers. With active duty soldiers, it is understood that deployments occur. RC soldiers when deployed have to step away from their lives and families and careers. This disruption in their lives is significant. Multiple deployments may negatively
affect the RC force. Remember that RC soldiers for the most part are volunteers. Some may have reserve or active obligations to finish. If the RC forces, however, are put under more stress or strain there is a chance the force will break. Many soldiers are severely impacted by multiple mobilizations and RC soldiers are being forced to make difficult choices.

Many reservists did not join to be part of an “operational reserve.” Some reservists have to make a choice between staying on duty and quitting to preserve civilian careers. Soldiers are also upset that they are being deployed while many active duty soldiers have yet to be deployed. Many RC soldiers feel that the RC force should not be called upon until all the active duty forces have been deployed. There is another issue with the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). What should the role of the IRR be, and how is the IRR being managed? Along with personnel issues, the RC forces will need to rebalance during the transformation process. The Army and the RC components will need to decide what the right mix of forces should be. The National Guard wants to retain its combat power while some in the active army want to convert the National Guard into combat support units, such as military police and engineers, as opposed to infantry or other combat units.

Regardless of the mix, the forces need to be rebalanced. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Honorable Thomas Hall on a trip to the Middle East in 2005 made the following observations regarding rebalancing the RC forces. Hall states that while 46 percent of the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are made up of Guard and Reserve personnel. Only 35 percent of National Guard forces are being used. This means
that 65 percent of the National Guard is underutilized. The National Guard needs to rebalance.\textsuperscript{11}

The charts below shows the composition of forces called upon to support the Global War on Terror-GWOT. The table shows the reliance of the active duty on the National Guard and Reserve to fight the nation’s current wars. It also highlights the fact that many active duty soldiers have yet to be deployed. According to \textit{Army Times} 11 December 2006, there have been over two million deployments since the 9/11 attacks. Table 2 shows the number of active duty, National Guard, and Reserve Component forces deployed since the 11 September 2001 attacks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deployed Once</th>
<th>Deployed twice or more</th>
<th>Total Ever deployed</th>
<th>Currently deployed 30 Sep 2006</th>
<th>Total Number of deployments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active duty Army</td>
<td>289,497</td>
<td>124,597</td>
<td>414,094</td>
<td>131,771</td>
<td>572,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>147,507</td>
<td>22,654</td>
<td>170,161</td>
<td>37,019</td>
<td>197,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>82,427</td>
<td>16,698</td>
<td>99,125</td>
<td>20,189</td>
<td>119,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>519,431</td>
<td>163,949</td>
<td>683,380</td>
<td>188,979</td>
<td>889,426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: \textit{Army Times}, 11 December 2006.

As a percentage, the Army National Guard represented 22 percent of the total Army deployed forces and the Army Reserve deployed 13 percent of the total Army forces as of 2006. Combined, this comprised 35 percent of the total deployed Army
forces. The reliance on the Guard and Reserve is evident by these percentages. This is highly significant because the National Guard and Reserve have not been employed in significant numbers since World War II.

Along with deploying as part of combat forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, the RC forces are also used for many other operations across the world. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are conducting humanitarian missions, peace keeping operations, drug interdiction and border security, which are part of their homeland defense and homeland security missions. They are also deployed overseas in support of stability and support operations. Currently, the active components cannot function without the RC forces.

Even though the Active Components forces (AC) have come to rely on the RC forces, there still is a sense that RC forces are inferior and as such do not deserve some of the benefits of the AC forces. This has caused resentment and problems in the past between the AC and RC. The bottom line is that the active components will have to treat the reserve components better than they have in the past. The RC forces as well need to improve incentives and policies to treat their personnel better and encourage continuing volunteerism.

Congress has approved an increase in the authorization of the active component and reserve components by roughly 65,000 soldiers, approximately 30,000 for the active component and 35,000 for the reserve components. This, however, will take years to reach. The active component can only access into the force 6,000-7,000 soldiers per year, as noted by General Schoomaker in December 2006. Though he did not give an exact
number, the Army Chief of Staff said that it would take significant time and commitment by the nation, noting some 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers could be added per year.¹²

**Training**

Currently, RC forces train based on existing laws. Normally, RC units train based on Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs). One UTA is a four-hour period of time. On a normal drill weekend, a soldier gets four UTAs.

Each weekend drill for a Saturday and Sunday is four UTAs. In a normal year a soldier has scheduled forty-eight UTAs. This equates to one drill weekend per month. In addition to these scheduled (M)UTAs, a RC soldier also has fourteen or fifteen days scheduled annual training depending upon component. The Reserve schedules fourteen days of annual training while the National Guard is scheduled for fifteen days.

In order for a RC soldier to have a “good” year, which means time toward retirement, that soldier needs fifty UTAs per year. If a soldier attends his or her annual training and all scheduled drills he or she can have seventy-six UTAs. These seventy-six points now are figured into any possible future retirement. This only happens if the soldier has at least fifty UTAs; however, if he or she does not have at least fifty points per year, he or she is not given credit for that year. In addition to gaining points for retirement each year, a soldier must have twenty years of validated federal service. If a soldier does not have a good year then he or she needs to repeat that year until he or she has twenty years of active federal service.

Under the current training model, units are responsible for their own training which is usually approved by their higher headquarters and usually stops somewhere within the state chain of command for the National Guard and at the Regional Commands
for the reserves. This training is highly subjective and not uniform throughout the RC forces. If there is not a uniform training model, how do commanders know that units in state or regional command receive the same quality training? The training should be based on METL tasks but should be uniform among similar units. If units are going to go through a five-year training model, the training gates for each year should be similar.

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, the Army Reserve Commander, has stated that the current training guidance will need to change. One weekend a month and two weeks a year of annual training is not sufficient. Additional training will be required during years three and four of the ARFORGEN cycle. This also means soldiers will have to miss additional days of work. This in turns means employers will be impacted even more by employees missing work to fulfill additional training days. This will not be a positive development and will further strain the relationship between employers and employees and the National Guard and Reserve. General Stultz wants to increase the amount of training in years three through five of the ARFORGEN training cycle. With ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve’s five-year training cycle will increase unit annual-training requirements from fourteen days in the first and second years to twenty-one days in year three, and to twenty-nine days in year four. More annual training days better prepare units to conduct premobilization training and to participate in collective training events, such as National Training Center exercises.”

As units are preparing for combat, the disparity between the levels of training units receive may be extensive. Prior to reporting to the mobilization station, soldiers spend days or weeks at home station preparing to deploy. Training for units actually deploying overseas is done primarily at the mobilization station. This training is a
methodical check list of tasks that units and individuals must accomplish before they will be allowed to deploy overseas. The time it takes to mobilize and train soldiers is an issue that needs to be addressed in the future. The ARFORGEN model does address that this is an issue but details need to be worked out and policies need to be employed for the future to determine which tasks need to be at home station and what needs to be done at the mobilization site. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board released a report dated October 2003 called *A Summary of Significant Issues, Recommendations and Actions Toward Mobilization Reform*. In the report one recommendation regarding mobilization was that the process needs to be fixed; “Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.”

**Budget**

Along with the other items discussed, the budget probably has the greatest impact on the RC forces. The active army funds much of the RC forces. Funding and equipment come primarily from the active components. The RC component generally provides soldiers and facilities. As with most organizations, if funds are not available, a variety of mission essential activities will go undone or go unfunded. Six years after the 9/11 attacks the RC and AC are spending billions of dollars for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The budgets for the RC forces have not significantly changed since 9/11. There remain shortfalls in equipping and funding the RC forces. These issues have yet to be addressed adequately.
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimates RC forces need anywhere from $12.0 to $20 billion to reequip the forces. The larger issue is where will this money come from? If money is procured to reequip the RC forces, how long will it take to fully reequip the RC units?\(^{15}\)

Policies

The policies that were created decades ago during the Cold War have not kept up with the rapidly changing requirements of today. Changes to current policy need to be done quickly and have relevance. Some of the current issues deal with mobilization, length of deployments, health care for families, and use of the reserves in time of local emergencies or disasters. Not making changes to policies will only hinder the RC forces.

Partial presidential mobilizations of twenty-four months do not meet the needs of today’s commitments. The policy of one year boots on the ground--that is twelve months actually deployed in a combat zone--only puts more strain on the RC forces. RC soldiers typically are older than their active duty counterparts. One year boots on the ground means soldiers are away from their civilian lives from 12 to 18 months. Not just the 12 months deployed. In today’s environment, policy makers need to be understanding and realistic about the impact deployments will have on RC soldiers. The vast majority of Americans are not involved in the current wars. The burden of fighting these wars needs to be shared across a wider spectrum of AC, RC, and Individual Ready Reserve soldiers but we need to be aware of the sacrifices of the RC forces and listen to their requirements and needs.

One policy that was sharply brought into focus was the use of the Army Reserve during times of disaster. After Hurricane Katrina, most of the Louisiana National Guard
was deployed overseas. They were unavailable to help their home towns. Who else was available? State governors routinely called upon their National Guard units in times of emergencies. Who can the governors call upon if their National Guard units are deployed? The reserves do not work for the governors but rather belong to regional commands. The regional commands need to work with the state governors and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (OSD) so that during times of emergencies, the reserves can be called upon to help local communities.\footnote{Unfortunately, because of \textit{US Code}, Title 10 and Title 32, Army Reserve forces are under active US Army command structures and are not available to be called upon by state governors. National Guard soldiers, under Title 32 rules, are strictly under the control of state governors until called into federal service. If states ask the federal government for assistance during times of emergencies, they must get permission from the Secretary of Defense to release Army Reserve forces.}

Lastly, the nation has gone from the Cold War to a new war. The bureaucracy has not kept up with the demands of this new war. What does the future hold for the RC forces? What should the future role of the RC forces be? The policy makers need to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the RC forces. The ARFORGEN model should address capabilities versus requirements.

\textbf{Army Force Generation Model}

So what is the ARFORGEN Model? This is the method that the Army plans to implement to change the army to become a more responsive, deadly and relevant force. The following extract from the Army Game Plan outlines the goal of the ARFORGEN Model. The U.S. Army under ARFORGEN expects to field seventy Brigade Combat Teams and more than two-hundred support brigades of various types. The force structure
will be a combination of active and reserve forces. The active duty plans on fielding forty-two BCTs and seventy-five support brigades. The National Guard will maintain 106 brigades, between 28 and 34 BCTs and 78 support brigades. The Army Reserve will maintain fifty-eight support brigades.\textsuperscript{17}

What is the purpose of the ARFORGEN model? LTC Joseph Whitlock of the USAR explains what the ARFORGEN Model tries to accomplish. The ARFORGEN model applies to both the active and reserve forces. All units go through three successive phases: reset-train, ready, and available. Early in phase I, missions are identified; units are task organized as either deployment expeditionary force, ready force, or contingency force. Active duty goes through this process in three years. The National Guard and Reserves go through at five years and six years, respectively. Some high-demand, low-density units may not follow the model due to current operations.\textsuperscript{18}

Figure 2 pictorially explains the ARFORGEN model. This model applies to both active duty and reserve component forces. The first phase of the model is the reset phase. This is the first phase after a unit has returned from a deployment or assignment. This time is used to start rebuilding a unit, allowing for individual training, schooling, leave and other administrative functions. For the active duty this phase is one year. For the RC forces this phase is between one and two years.

Phase II, the ready phase, is the start of unit collective training and exercises. For the active duty this phase is again one year, while the RC forces takes place between years three and four. Phase III, the available pool, occurs in year three for the Active duty, year five for the Reserve and year six for the National Guard. During this phase,
units are available for deployments, while the National Guard could be utilized at home for homeland defense or security missions.

Figure 2. Army Force Generation Model
Source: Addendum H; 2007 Army Posture Statement

Figure 3 explains the force flow of the strategic, operational, and tactical operations in support of the ARFORGEN model. This explains the process of developing the required forces for operational requirements. At the operational level, the division headquarters tailors the forces as required and attaches them to the appropriate headquarters. At the tactical level, the units are organized based on mission.
This model separates the active duty forces on the right and reserve components on the left depicting the ARFORGEN Model.

In figure 4, the U.S. Army is pictorially showing the ARFORGEN model for both AC and RC forces. This model highlights the relationship at the macro level identifying how AC units would be deployed once every three years. The RC forces will deploy once every five years for the Reserve and six years for the National Guard.
The issues are many and complex. The nation is at war. Can the nation transform the military while fighting two wars? Does the nation have a choice but to transform while at war? This study examines some of the issues relating to the ARFORGEN model to see if this is an appropriate tool to increase the readiness of the active and reserve components of the Army.

Table 3 outlines the planned transformation of Army Combat Brigades. It highlights the fact that most of the US Army combat power is composed of National Guard and Reserve.
### Table 3. Number of BCT’s transformed by ARFORGEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration FY 2004</th>
<th>Post Transformation Configuration predicted FY 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of BCT’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Duty BCT’s</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Combat BCT</td>
<td>43 Combat BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Support BCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Guard BCT’s</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Brigade Combat Teams</td>
<td>28-34 Combat BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78 Support BCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Reserve BCTs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater/Corps Support Units</td>
<td>58 or 59 Support BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-77 Combat BCT</td>
<td>212 Support BCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation from CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, Updated May 5, 2006; Andrew Feickert

Table 3 identifies the desired end state of the transformation process which the Army would like to accomplish by the year 2011.

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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

This chapter will contain a look at four major areas of the information gathered in doing research on this topic. All documents are open source. This chapter will contain a description of the items to be analyzed. This portion of the study will develop the procedures that will be used for the analysis. Methods of analysis will be identified and discussed for use in the following chapters. Lastly, a review of possible threats to validity will be part of the analysis process.

Description of Items to Be Analyzed

The primary sources of information to be analyzed are the Army Reserve and National Guard 2006 posture statements. These posture statements are written annually and generally indicate the direction the particular component will focus during the coming year. A side-by-side comparison of the two posture statements will be conducted to see how they compare to the ARFORGEN model. The posture statements are fairly general in nature. They highlight the priorities of their respective component. The focus in these posture statements are goal oriented activities that address new priorities from year to year. The ARFORGEN model is the method with which the U.S. Army will create forces available to support Army operations worldwide. Due to the reliance on reserve component forces, the Army will use the ARFORGEN model to bring a predictable number of RC forces into the operational force flow. Other documents will be reviewed as support for or against the use of the ARFORGEN model. These documents will be other official publications or open-source documents from private organizations.
The RC forces posture statements will be analyzed next to the ARFORGEN model to see if the ARFORGEN model is the appropriate model for the RC forces.

**Procedures**

During the analysis of this work the primary method will be a side-by-side comparison of the two posture statements. A review of the National Guard and Reserve posture statements will be done and an analysis of how they either support or do not support the ARFORGEN model. An analysis of the source documents will be examined to see whether the documents are valid and either support or do not support the thesis. The two posture statements will be framed in such a manner as to make a side-by-side comparison in a tabular formation. The major subject headings of the analysis will be themes that are carried out between both posture statements. These topics are History, Strategy, Organization, Leadership, Management, Budget, Manning, Equipment, Training, Force Protection, War Fighting, Homeland Defense, Modernization-Transformation, Family Support, Employer-Employee Relations, Facilities, Readiness, Civil Support, Environment, Recruiting and Retention, Information Operations and Technology, and Counterdrug.

**Methods of Analysis**

The two most usual methods of analysis are the qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative promotes depth of analysis while the quantitative method uses more statistical or numeric analysis. The qualitative being the primary method used in this analysis of this thesis.
The quantitative method will be used when employing tables and other numeric data. The qualitative method is preferred and will be used to analyze source documents for accuracy and legitimacy. The method of analysis used to compare the RC posture statements was a side-by-side comparison of issues that were shared in common between the National Guard and Reserve. After reviewing the similarities and differences of the posture statements, a further review compares whether the RC posture statements support the ARFORGEN model.

The most important part of the analysis process will be a side-by-side comparison on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve posture statements. The comparison will look at several major categories. These categories are manning, equipping, training, mobilizing, recruiting and retention and budget.

Threats to Validity Challenged

Most articles have a bias. No matter how fair or impartial an author attempts to be, everyone has some sort of bias that will be reflected in the written work. Information can be bias in its depth and breadth and based on either omitted information or incomplete information to promote a policy or point of view. These must be taken into account when reviewing any source and make judgments as to the worth or value of the gathered information.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, this study analyzed whether the ARFORGEN model is an appropriate system for force management of the reserve component. To review, the purpose of the ARFORGEN model is to prepare active duty and reserve component forces to create a predictable, reliable model that generates a trained force able to meet U.S. Army operational requirements. Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Army finds itself stretched beyond its inherent capabilities.

The Reserve Components (RCs) are now fully vested with taskings that were once done by the active duty army. Thus, does the ARFORGEN model address the differences between active duty forces and reserve component forces? Another purpose of the ARFORGEN model is to transform the U.S. Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve into a fully integrated U.S. Army.

This study analyzed the ARFORGEN model by comparing the posture statements of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. After comparing the two posture statements, this study reviewed the results and made a comparison with the ARFORGEN model to see if the RC components meet or fit the requirements of the ARFORGEN model.

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard posture statements are a yearly overview as to what each respective component did to detail its accomplishments during the past year, as well as laying out the road ahead to support the National Military Strategies in the future.
For purposes of continuity, this study will compare the 2006 Posture statements for the National Guard and Army Reserves. Along with posture statements, specific areas of common importance will be analyzed to make similar comparisons of each statement. These categories are manning, equipping, training, and recruiting and retention. Posture statement comparison

An initial review of the posture statements shows that the National Guard and Army Reserve have differences and similarities as well as different focuses on what needs to be accomplished during the current year. The focus in 2006 of the Army Reserve posture statement will be managing change, providing trained and ready units, equipping the force and manning the force.¹ The National Guard 2006 posture statement priorities will focus on supporting the war fight, defend the homeland, and transformation for the future.²

Many items in previous posture statements carry over to the current year and are not addressed in the current year’s posture statement. To get a complete picture of tasks the RC forces are involved with, previous posture statements need to be reviewed.

The National Guard and Army Reserve have similar yet different missions. They are both designed to help defend the United States. The way they are to accomplish this mission is different. The Army Reserve mission is to provide combat support and combat service support forces for the active duty. Specifically, based on the Army Reserve Posture statement the Army Reserve (AR) mission is as follows, “USARC’s mission is to provide trained and ready units and individuals to mobilize and deploy in support of the national military strategy.”³
The mission of the National Guard is a more diverse. The National Guard has two missions: One mission is to defend the homeland, and the other is to provide forces in support of the national military strategies outside of the United States.

This chapter analyzed the similarities and differences of the posture statements. After reviewing the Reserve and National Guard posture statements, table 4 will show the major items that are in the Reserve and National Guard posture statements to highlight what the National Guard and Reserve share in common. The posture statements are very important as indicators of what the RC forces are doing or have done. What is more dramatic is that posture statements can vary from year to year. If someone does not review past posture statements, important information may be overlooked with regard to past accomplishments or future programs.

The other interesting aspect of the posture statements is that the National Guard carries the same theme from year to year with adjustments made. Though the topic titles are different, the base document covers the same major themes from year to year. To compare the posture statements, terminology needs to be used that is common between the two posture statements.

Table 4 makes an equal comparison of the 2006 posture statements between the National Guard and Army Reserve. The legend assigned in table 4 will be used to analyze the posture statements for both the National Guard and Army Reserve. This allows a straightforward comparison between the posture statements.

The major topic in the left hand column is used to compare the posture statements. The items marked with an X indication were addressed in the 2006 posture statements of either the Army Reserve or National Guard.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Topic</th>
<th>Abbreviated Code</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>H</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>Management</td>
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<td>Budget</td>
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<td>Manning</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Equipment</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>FP</td>
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<tr>
<td>War fighting</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Homeland Defense</td>
<td>HD</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modernization/Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Support</td>
<td>FS</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employer/Employee Relations</td>
<td>EE</td>
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<td>Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Readiness</td>
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<td>Civil Support</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>EN</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruiting and Retention</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Information Operations and Technology</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Counter Drug</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managing Risk</td>
<td>MR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation from Army National Guard and Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statements.

Table 5 specifically highlights the Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statement taken directly from the index. This highlights what is specifically discussed in the posture statement.
Table 5. 2006 Army Reserve Posture Statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TODAY’S ARMY RESERVE</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY RESERVE HISTORY</td>
<td>H</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC OVER VIEW</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANAGING CHANGE</td>
<td>MG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focused, Efficient Management:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Reserve Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing the Operational Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved Facilities and Training Support:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Realignment and Closure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Streamlining Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing the Civil Affairs and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations Assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving Business Practices</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVIDING TRAINED AND READY UNITS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>MG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Support</td>
<td>CS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Reserve Training Strategy</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Premiere Training: Warrior Exercise (WAREX)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced-Based Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhancing Mobilization</td>
<td>MT</td>
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<tr>
<th>EQUIPPING THE FORCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>New Equipment Strategy — How It Works</td>
<td>E</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANNING THE FORCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture Change</td>
<td>MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting</td>
<td>RR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selected Reserve Incentive Program</td>
<td>RR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Initiatives</td>
<td>RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention</td>
<td>RR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full-Time Support</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of Life and Well-Being of Soldiers and Family Members</td>
<td>FS</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>THE WAY AHEAD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statement.

Table 6 displays a summary of the major items highlighted in the 2006 National Guard Posture statement.
Table 6. 2006 National Guard Posture Statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support the Warfight Anytime, Anywhere</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Citizen-Soldier: Defending the Nation</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipping the Force</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Readiness Training</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training the Nation’s Warfighter</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homeland Defense: Here and Abroad for over 368 Years

| Prepared and Ready | MG |
| Full-Time Support | M |
| Training to Protect the Homeland | HD |
| Protecting Those Who Protect America | FP |
| Keeping the Force Strong: Recruiting and Retention | RR |
| Environmental Programs | RR |

Transformation for the 21st Century:

| Ready Reliable, | R |
| Essential and Accessible | MG |
| Ground-based Midcourse Defense | HD |
| Logistics and Equipment | E |
| Personnel Transformation | M |
| Aviation Transformation and Modernization | MT |
| Training in “One Army” | T |

Source: 2006 Army National Guard Posture Statement

Similarities

A comparison of the National Guard and Reserve posture statements shows similarities. Both posture statements address the following areas, organizational changes, training, equipment, compelling needs, full-time manning, mobilization, and civil support.
Organization

One area which the National Guard (NG) and Army Reserve (AR) have to address is its organization. In 2005 the NG addressed this issue and is creating a quick reaction force to respond within five to thirty days due to the requirement to be more responsive following the Katrina Hurricane disaster. Each state and territory will create an immediate quick reaction force and a rapid response force which can deliver a battalion size force, trained and ready in less than 24 hours. Most can deliver a company size unit in less than four hours anywhere in their state or territory.4

The Air National Guard already practices this and the idea is spreading to the Army National Guard as well. The Army National Guard wants to be as responsive as the Air National Guard. Other organizational changes for the AR have to deal with facilities. The AR are inactivating or disestablishing ten regional readiness commands. They will establish four regional readiness sustainment commands to provide base operations and administrative support within geographic regions.5

The Reserve is also reorganizing as Brigade Combat Support Teams. The AR will create two functional deployable commands. One command will be the Military Intelligence Command and the other will be the Army Reserve Medical Command. The AR will also increase their civil affairs units by 904 soldiers and increase their Psychological operations units by 1228 soldiers without increasing the overall size of the overall reserve force.6

Training

Another important issue to both the Army Reserve and National Guard is training. Both organizations are concerned that funding will not be available to fully train units or
individuals as required. The AR following the ARFORGEN model will conduct individual training during years one and two of the cycle. Years three and four will be collective training, culminating in an exercise called WAREX that stresses units and ensures that they meet readiness requirements for possible deployments during year five of the ARFORGEN cycle.

The National Guard will rely on technology to create training opportunities, such as laser-marksmanship training and electronic skills trainers to train soldiers on military occupational skills (MOS). “The National Guard will rely on technology to help train soldiers. The Army National Guard’s unique condition of limited training time, limited training dollars and, in some cases, difficult access to training ranges, demands an increased reliance on low-cost, small-footprint training technologies.”

The Reserve had many training initiatives in 2006 to address immediate training requirements such as; convoy training, counter improvised explosive device training, senior leader training and mobile training teams highlighting lessons learned overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Reserve is investing in training centers to provide realistic timely training for units that may deploy. One combat support training center will be at Ft Hunter Liggett in California. The other center to be established is the Joint Mobilization Training Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Like the Army Reserve, the National Guard identified the need to create two joint interagency training centers, one in West Virginia and one in California. “The mission of the centers is to provide a joint training environment that focuses on the detection, prevention and deterrence of the terrorist cycle over the near-term and supports the transformation of the armed forces for the long-term to win the global war on terrorism.”
In addition to these training centers the National Guard has recognized the value of training at the various national training centers throughout the nation and will use these facilities when viable. Because of the increase in the NG units deploying on operations, the NG has stated in the 2006 posture statement that the highest quality training be utilized whenever possible at any of the nations military training centers.

Equipment

Both the National Guard and Reserve have issues with equipment. Many RC units deploying overseas are leaving equipment behind in theater for use by other units. This was highlighted with the Tennessee National Guard. Senator Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senator of Tennessee writes in January 2007, “Re-equipping the National Guard is one of the biggest challenges we face in funding the Defense Department,” Sen. Alexander wrote. "Guard units have been equipped to do their jobs in combat overseas, only to come home and find that what equipment was not destroyed in combat had to be left behind for others to use."9

Because of shortages in equipment, the AR will position equipment at four nodes: home station, individual training sites, collective training sites, and strategic deployment sites.33

The bottom line is that the RC forces face serious equipment challenges. The National Guard’s focus is to organize and equip current and new modularized units with the most modern equipment available. The force will use the Rapid Fielding Initiative to equip soldiers with the latest force protection items available.10

The NG and AR have severe equipment shortages as previously highlighted. If the U.S. Congress does not fund the RC equipment needs, the RC forces will have to use
its equipment much more efficiently. The NG, unlike the AR, has a mission to support local communities in times of disaster or need. In both posture statements, the AR and NG highlight the need to be reequipped. The AR immediate solution is to position equipment at nodes. The NG answer is to use the Rapid Field Initiative to meet immediate needs of deploying soldiers. Without its equipment, the National Guard will be challenged to complete its homeland defense mission.

Compelling Needs

To meet the needs of transforming from a strategic reserve force to an operational force, the National Guard and Army Reserve forces must modernize. The RC forces must have, train and use the same equipment as the active army. The RC forces have a list of equipment that each component feels is compelling and must have to be mission capable and compatible with their active duty counterparts. The Army Reserve list the following as compelling needs: night vision systems, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive, (CBRNE) alarm systems, medical equipment, light-medium trucks, and medium tractors.\(^{11}\)

The National Guard also has compelling requirements. Just like the Army Reserve, the National Guard needs to replace obsolete equipment with modern equipment to allow interoperability with the active duty. The National Guard’s priority for equipment is high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, single-channel ground and airborne radios, UH-60 helicopters, night vision devices, and small arms. The compelling needs of the RC forces are indicative that equipment shortages are indicative of emerging problems.\(^{36}\)
Full-Time Manning

The RC components consist of a small full time staff and a larger part time force. The full time staff for both the National Guard and Army Reserve has never been manned at 100 percent of authorizations, which are only a small fraction of the total RC size. The remainder of the RC force is comprised of traditional part time soldiers. These part time soldiers usually spend one weekend per month and two weekends per year fulfilling their annual RC commitments. As the RC forces are being used to supplement the active duty, the RC forces have stated their needs are to be manned at 90 to 100 percent. They state these full-time positions are a vital part of unit readiness. These positions are responsible for much of the day-to-day operations of the units. The Reserve need to increase full-time manning (FTM) from 11.6 percent to 12 percent of its total force by the year 2010. The National Guard was only authorized 59 percent of full-time manning requirements as of FY 2003. The Guard plans to increase full time manning to 71 percent by 2012.

Mobilization

Both the National Guard and Reserve (RC) have a myriad of mobilization issues. Both components will utilize the ARFORGEN model to provide forces for future requirements. The Reserve wants to use a phased model to mobilize. This would require select personnel to mobilize at intervals prior to unit mobilization which in turn would allow the unit leadership to train and plan for full unit mobilization. The National Guard wants to conduct premobilization at home station to take care of premobilization issues, so that such issues need not be completed at the mobilization station. Time at the mobilization station should focus on unit training, while individual training should be completed at home station if possible.
Civil Support

Both the National Guard and Reserve are heavily vested in support of the homeland. The Army Reserve and National Guard have critical capabilities that may be needed in the future. The Katrina Hurricane catastrophe in 2005 highlighted that in times of catastrophe emergencies when states cannot handle an extreme situation DOD and especially the RC forces have capabilities that can assist other first responders. The posture statements of the NG and Reserve recognize that this needs to be a core task of both the Reserve and the National Guard. In the Reserve posture statement, critical capabilities are highlighted that can be used to support future homeland defense and security missions. “These capabilities include skilled medical professionals who can practice anywhere in the United States, hazardous materials reconnaissance, casualty extraction from inside a combat zone, mass casualty decontamination, critical medical care, engineering support and water purification.”

Though not the first responders in an emergency, the Reserve can be released at the Secretary of Defense level during a declared emergency to assist if need be. The National Guard on the other hand works directly for state governors and as such can be called upon immediately to assist local communities during emergencies. The National Guard of course will provide assets as required during emergencies. In the 2005 posture statement the National Guard focused on the Ground Based Midcourse Missile Defense program. This program is being strictly manned by the National Guard. Also in 2005, The National Guard Bureau created quick reaction forces throughout all 54 states and territories. This program is supposed to provide a battalion-sized force able to respond to
any situation within 24 hours. This is a carryover from the 2005 National Guard Posture Statement.\textsuperscript{16}

This is relevant because they tie into the activities highlighted in the 2006 NG posture statement. The 2006 NG posture statement is to provide maximum support to civil authority.\textsuperscript{17} These forces would be in alignment with the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. This is a continuation of the 2005 National Guard posture statements.\textsuperscript{18}

**Transformation**

The Reserve and National Guard are undergoing very dramatic changes. The Reserve is making drastic cuts during this current year. Under the current Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC), the Reserve is going to close 176 facilities and realign units to 125 new armed forces reserve centers. The Army Chief of Staff has transferred reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological operations from the US Special Operations command to the Army Reserve command.\textsuperscript{19}

The National Guard is also transforming its personnel system. The National Guard will utilize a web-based Personnel Electronic Records Management System. This new system will help mobilization and personnel readiness.\textsuperscript{20}

Another big transformation affecting the National Guard is its aviation fleet. As quoted here from the National Guard posture statement, “We are reconfiguring our aviation units into modularized units of action and units of employment to align with Army plans.”\textsuperscript{21} The Army National Guard provides almost one-half of the Active duty’s aviation structure. As such, much of the infrastructure and support needed to maintain the
helicopter fleet needs to be upgraded. This program will be expensive and take years to transform.22

Recruiting, Retention, and Incentive Programs

A good Recruiting and Retention (R&R) program in both the Army Reserve and National Guard is paramount to the continued health of each organization. Each year the National Guard and Reserve analyze whether they are losing or gaining personnel. In 2005 the Reserve accessions fell 16.2 percent, though reenlistments achieved 101.5 percent of goals. The number of new enlistments is decreasing, while soldiers already in the service are staying in. To improve recruiting and retention the Army Reserve has come up with a number of programs to maintain numbers. The Reserve is increasing financial incentives to soldiers reenlisting or joining the Army Reserve. Other key bonuses include lump sum payments options for reenlistment bonuses with tax free payments to soldiers in a combat zone.23

The National Guard is implementing a variety of programs to improve retention and recruiting. Some of the initiatives identified in the posture statement are an advertising campaign, a dynamic R&R program highlighting the benefits of the National Guard, soldier and family member feedback, post mobilization surveys, postmobilization “Freedom Salute,” develop recruit sustainment programs, attrition management/retention, resource allocation that optimizes the effectiveness of strength maintenance philosophy, and selective reserve incentives program.24

Both the Army and RC are hypersensitive to maintaining an all-volunteer force. The Reserve is also heavily investing in recruiting, retention, and incentives. Accessions in the Reserve fell short by 16.2 percent of its goal in 2005. The Reserve plans to increase
bonus incentives to soldiers reenlisting and joining the Army Reserve, expanding eligibility years for reenlistment bonuses, officer accession, affiliation, and the specialty conversion bonuses added to the SRIP, lump sum payment options for reenlistment bonuses with tax-free payments to soldiers in the combat zone. Other initiatives include increased enlisted affiliation bonuses, addition of the “High Grad” Bonus, used to attract those candidates with at least thirty or more semester hours of college credit, establishment of the Active Guard and Reserve selective reenlistment bonus.25

Differences

Although the Army Reserve and National Guard have similarities both organizations have somewhat different missions and thus address different issues. The Reserve addresses the following issues that are not addressed in the National Guard posture statement. The 2006 Reserve posture statement includes incentive program, quality of life issues, support for wounded soldiers, other support programs, and the “way ahead,” that is, future plans. The 2006 National Guard posture statement addresses issues that are not addressed by the Reserve in its posture statement. The National Guard focuses on the Innovative Readiness Training Program, and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training, Environment, Medical and Dental Readiness, Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense and Force Protection.

The Army Reserve 2006 posture statement addresses many soldier issues that are not addressed in the National Guard posture statement. The Reserve Quality of Life programs are an important part of providing support to soldiers and their families. The Quality of Life programs includes the “Welcome Home Warrior Citizen program.” Other
programs are the Well-being Advisory Council, Army Reserve Child and Youth Services Program, and Educational benefits.  

Another Reserve Program that supports soldiers is the “Support for Wounded Soldiers.” This important program provides information about family travel to soldiers’ bedsides. Also available is invitational travel orders for family members of seriously ill patients. Soldiers also are helped with pay issues, assistance with medical and physical evaluation board processes, as well as options to remain on active duty. 

Lastly, the Reserve is trying to enhance base operations and care for professional development and provide more efficient management of officer promotions.

The Way Ahead

For the way ahead, the AR has two priorities. The first priority is financial support and the second priority is legislative support. The AR needs adequate funding to support changes in personnel incentives programs to continue attracting qualified prospects. The other financial requirement is the need to support AR Expeditionary Force training, equipping, and maintenance strategies. The AR requires the legislature to provide support to review possible changes to policies that will support recruiting efforts, personnel management, and mobilization. 

The National Guard’s dual role of protecting the homeland, as well as supporting the US Army for contingencies operations, addresses these additional issues in the National Guard posture statement. The National Guard’s 2006 posture statement includes the Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) program and (MOS) training.

As part of the National Guard’s mission to support and defend local communities, the National Guard has the IRT program. This program allows Guard units opportunities
to conduct wartime training while supporting communities. Some of these projects are Task Force Alaska, whose project is to build a road on Annette Island for the Metlakatla Indian community. In Clarksburg, West Virginia, the program focuses on expanding the Benedum Airport. Task Force Grizzly and Task Force Douglas, in California, are improving the road networks along the US-Mexico border. Rolling Thunder in Oregon provides a positive presence in Oregon communities that promote public awareness of the Army National Guard. The South Carolina National Guard instituted REEFEX utilizing decommissioned vehicles to create an artificial reef off of the Atlantic coast.29

An important issue in 2006 for the NG was military qualifications. All enlisted soldiers in the active army and RC components must have a military occupational specialty. All enlisted soldiers must be qualified in their military occupational specialty. This is a very important measure of performance. The 2006 National Guard posture statement highlights this topic. “For the second year, the Army National Guard met or exceeded the Secretary of Defense’s duty military occupational skill qualification training goals.”30

The Army National Guard achieved 83.08 percent. Another important training goal for the National Guard is to meet the requirements of the contemporary operating environment. In order to meet contemporary operating needs, the Army National Guard plans to establish “training for urban operations.”31

Summary of Comparison of Posture Statements

A comparison of the posture statements of the NG and AR shows a similarity between the NG and AR in focusing on organizational issues, training, equipment, compelling needs, full-time manning, mobilization recruiting and retention, and civil
support. The NG and AR are having very similar issues based on the current situation in the world. Even though they share similarities, the NG and AR do have differences. These differences are a result of the differences in missions and force structure between the NG and AR. The AR primary mission is to support the active duty with combat support and combat service support units. The NG has the same mission of supporting the active duty as the AR, but the NG also must support states during disasters and be prepared for homeland defense. Because of some differences in missions, each component’s posture statement highlights differences in missions. The larger issues of equipment, manning, training, recruiting, and retention are common between the two components.

**Comparison of Posture Statement to ARFORGEN Model**

This study analyzed whether the ARFORGEN model is appropriate for the Reserve component. If the posture statements are to be examined to see if they support the ARFORGEN model, there are two ways of looking at this subject. If the ARFORGEN model is to be viewed as an instrument just to produce forces and the RC forces are responsible for fulfilling this need, then it is a probably and appropriate model. If the ARFORGEN model is used to completely transform the active duty and RC into a Total Army force, the study suggests that the differences in posture statements show that the National Guard and Reserve are transforming based on their own component’s goals, but there is not a coordinated effort to transform as a part of a larger total army force.

In order to transform, the NG and Reserve must be supported by the Army. The Army must allocate resources in order for the ARFORGEN model to work. Each year the posture statements address what was accomplished and the direction the force will be
taking the upcoming year. In order to see if the posture statements are valid, one must go
back year by year to see what was stated in previous years and what was accomplished.
Because the posture statements are year by year, they are fairly generic in scope or depth.
Looking at the National Guard and Reserve posture statements from 2005 to 2007, they
appear similar with regard to major common issues. There are differences in the
statements. Some important issues are discussed in one year’s statement, such as NG
Rapid Reaction Force in the 2005 posture statement but not discussed in the 2006 posture
statement.

While analyzing source documents, an issue that will challenge the validity of the
posture statements is, How will the RC forces change to support the ARFORGEN model
and become a viable force in the future? The peripheral issues that cannot be ignored are
the budget, force structure, mobilization, manning, training, recruiting, and retention.
They have to be addressed in some form or fashion in the context that they are the details
that will make the ARFORGEN model successful or not successful.

Equipping

Equipping the Force. Will the RC forces have the equipment they require during
years three through five of the training cycle in order to complete their training and be
ready for deployments? Equipping the force has become a contentious issue recently. The
RC forces have yet to receive a comprehensive guide or plan as to how to reequip the
force. The RC forces have cross-leveled to other units much of their equipment or have
left behind equipment units had deployed with overseas.

Mackenzie M. Eaglen, a Senior Policy Analyst for National Security in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, states that in the November
2006 *Backgrounder*, per DOD regulations, the active duty is to transfer equipment back to the RC component within ninety days. According to the Backgrounder, the following is occurring reference equipment.

Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, ‘Equipping the Reserve Forces,’ requires that replacement equipment be delivered to Guard and Reserve units for equipment transferred to the active Army for longer than 90 days. Many equipment transfers were never accounted for properly, and as of June 2006, few plans to replace equipment had been drawn up by the Army, and even fewer had been approved.³²

As of the publication of this study, the RC forces have a significant shortfall in equipment. General Blum, the Chief of the National Guard, even states that there are serious financial repercussions with the lack of equipment. General Blum highlights the possible costs for reequipping the National Guard. “The Chief, National Guard Bureau has identified $20B to reduce these shortfalls in Army equipment levels, along with $5.0B to alleviate Air National Guard.”³³

The possible long-term implication is that units will not have the required equipment to train with or to accomplish assigned missions. This may impact the ARFORGEN models ability to provide forces in a predictable reliable fashion.

**Mobilization**

Mobilization issues still plague the RC forces. The RC components need to review and revise policies that govern mobilization and deployments. Time spent at home station and at mobilization stations is redundant. One of SECDEF Rumsfeld’s mandates was to find a way to improve the readiness of the RC forces and make it more responsive when called upon for federal service.

One of Secretary Rumsfeld’s key mandates to the Services is to find ways to make the National Guard more ready and accessible in its federal war fighting
role. Working in conjunction with the other Army Components and Joint Forces Command, ARNG seeks to dramatically improve the current mobilization and demobilization process. Under current guidelines, it can take several weeks to months to prepare an ARNG unit to mobilize and deploy, compared to the Air Guard model that enables units to deploy in a matter of hours or days. The ARNG must study and adapt the Air Guard model where possible.34

The one year boots on the ground policy is another issue particularly for the RC components. One year boots on the ground really means more than one year away from home for RC forces. There are pros and cons either way. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports that longer deployments could hurt RC personnel. Shorter tours could hurt the AC. The following sums up the quandary regarding mobilization and the one-year boots-on-the-ground issue.

Under DOD's policy, the Army may use reserve members for a total of 24 cumulative months. Therefore, by the time reservists are deactivated after 18 months of mobilization, they have only 6 months of deployment eligibility remaining under DOD's policy--not enough to remobilize and re-deploy for another yearlong overseas assignment. If the amount of "boots-on-the-ground" time was lengthened, from the current 12 months to 18 months, the Army could more fully use reserve personnel under the partial mobilization authority. A key advantage of this option would be that a longer deployment period would permit forces to be in theater longer and provide more force stability and continuity, but individuals could be adversely affected by longer tours of duty. In addition, a slower rotational pace would provide force planners, such as the Army Forces Command, more time to identify available personnel and decide which personnel will best meet requirements for the next rotation. However, lengthening "boots-on-the-ground" time could have negative consequences for individuals. If reservists were away from their civilian careers and families for longer time frames, individual morale could erode, and DOD could face challenges in recruiting and retaining skilled personnel.35

As highlighted in the GAO report, deployments and length of deployments have both positive and negative implications. Where is the balance between the needs of the Army and the needs of the individual RC Soldier? As long as the military relies on an all-volunteer force, the Army will have to find the balance between mission requirements and capabilities without breaking the RC force.
Manning

One of the looming issues will be manning. How will the ARFORGEN model deal with the outstanding manning issues? The military needs to rebalance the force. Many soldiers, for example, with the Field Artillery military occupational specialty, were deployed overseas to Iraq and given security missions, such as security forces and route security. This is just one example of forces being used for purposes other than what they were trained. They never were even assigned artillery tasks. Along with the Army, the RC will have to rebalance the force.36

The Army has already put together plans to restructure 100,000 positions. The Army also wants to include privatizing many tasks to increase Army end strength by 30,000 and reorganizing MOS to put more people in war fighting functions and combat support and combat service support. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas Hall states in March 2005 that only 35 percent of the RC forces are being used in the current conflicts. The RC forces need to rebalance to be more operational.37

Training

Focusing on training, the current RC training policies will have to be adjusted and change to allow the RC force to become a truly an operational reserve. Will the National Guard Bureau and Army Reserve come to a standardize five year training program that would follow the ARFORGEN model? Will the RC forces be able to change their training policies for years three and four, collective training, of the ARFORGEN model, to allow for more training than the customary one weekend per month and two weeks per year.
RC leaders state they need more training days during the collective training periods in order to be ready for years four and five of the ARFORGEN training cycles. Will employers allow soldiers more days off to attend military training at the expense of their civilian careers and their relationship with their employers?

Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, states that the old training paradigm is out. The Reserve will follow a new training schedule. In the December 2006, ROA brief, he states the following,

“In the past, Army Reserve units trained during two-day monthly battle assemblies and during the fourteen day annual training event. With ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve’s five-year training cycle will increase unit annual-training requirements from fourteen days in the first and second years to twenty one days in year three, and to twenty nine days in year four. More annual training days better prepare units to conduct pre-mobilization training and to participate in collective training events, such as National Training Center exercises.”

Conversely, this new training paradigm for the reserves may have a negative impact on the retention.

Are National Guard/Reserve units better utilized at BN level and not as Brigade Combat Teams? It takes a very long time to train units. The larger the unit, the longer it takes for that unit to be trained. Squads need to be trained before platoons. Platoons need to be trained before companies. Companies need to be trained before battalions; battalions need to be trained before brigades. The point is that it takes a long time to train brigades. What is the cost benefit analysis of training units and how long will it take to train companies or battalions versus brigades?

There is internal discussion amongst the Army and National Guard about the future role of the National Guard in combat. There seems to be differences between the National Guard and Army as to what role the National Guard should play in the future.
The National Guard wants to preserve its war fighting capability while there are some in the Army that feel the Guard is better suited for combat support roles such as military police and engineers. “Some active-duty soldiers argue the most capable guardsmen have served in combat support units--military police companies or engineering battalions. In these units, Guard members often had civilian skills that complemented their military training and made them more adept, knowledgeable and flexible than active duty counterparts.”

To continue in this vein, some in the Army say that the RC forces do not get enough training. Five years of full-time training does not compare to getting trained one weekend a month and two weeks per year. "Iraq showed what we have really always known, that the more complex combined arms operations that take extensive training and considerable experience are more difficult for units that get two weeks of training a year," said one Army general, who spoke on condition of anonymity because publicly criticizing the Guard is frowned on in the military. “We need to be honest with ourselves. Six months of preparation does not provide the same foundation as five, ten, fifteen years of full-time experience.”

Since the Army controls the ARFORGEN model it will have a lot of say about how units are transformed. On the other hand, the state governors have a lot of influence and power with Congress, and the governors will use this influence to determine force composition. The quotation from Michele A. Flournoy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies makes the following assessment: “It was unlikely that the Army would use the Guard for major combat operations in the future because training simply takes too long. Instead, they would be most likely used for stability and peacekeeping
operations--like the Guard's current deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sinai peninsula.\textsuperscript{41}

When looking at the ARFORGEN model, it is important to visualize what missions the RC forces need to be prepared for in the future. Historically, the RC forces have been employed overseas to places such as the former Yugoslavia to provide assistance and peacekeeping.

Recruiting and Retention

Retention and recruiting is another possible issue. The AC force can only assess 7,000 per year. In order to reach the increased authorization of 30,000, the AC will need at least four years. This does not even include replacing those that leave the service. The Army will, in the interim, be required to rely on the RC forces until the Army can increase its additional authorization levels.

In terms of recruiting and retention, the Reserve and Active components are having a very hard time reaching recruiting goals. The Army has actually raised the minimum age for new recruits in the last four years, at least three times from 38 to 39 to 40 and now 42. If the military cannot reach recruiting and retention goals now, this will have a huge impact in five years. Currently, the FY 2006 end strength for National Guard was 337,000, but they are authorized 350,000. The National Guard is on track to meet recruitment goals.

There is another issue that has scarcely been discussed is the RC employer and Employee relationship. According to Dale McFeatters, writer for the Scripps Howard News service, in March 2007, Reservists and Guardsmen are finding their jobs gone

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when they return from Iraq or Afghanistan. There are roughly 12,400 job related complaints filed each year. The trend appears to be on the rise.42

Lastly, under ARFORGEN when units are in the reset phase, what will states do if there are emergencies and the National Guard units are not available or ready to complete their state missions?

The active duty needs to understand the National Guard has the dual mission of defense of the homeland and a federal mission. In comparing the posture statements of both the National Guard and Reserve, it appears that both address major issues that affect their transformation. Both statements address manning, equipment, training, war fighting, transformation, recruiting, and retention. These issues reflect the challenges the RC forces face transforming from the strategic reserve to an operational force. The NG of course has its own inherent issues, such as homeland defense, while the Reserve is having organization challenges.

In the final analysis of the RC posture statements and the ARFORGEN model, there appears to be issues with force structure between the active duty Army and the RC as to the proportion of combat units that the National Guard should field. The actual transformation of the forces is an issue between the National Guard and the active duty. State governors want combat type forces. The National Guard is adamant about keeping combat units. The active duty wants the National Guard to be manned more in line with combat support and service support type units. These units would highlight military police, engineers, and support units. Another important issue is whether the Army can meet its manning recruitments. Congress had authorized the U.S. Army to increase by thirty-thousand soldiers. The U.S. Army can only assess approximately six thousand to
seven thousand soldiers per year. At this rate, it will take the Army four to five years to reach its end strength goals. In the interim the National Guard will be required to fill the void. In fact, the National Guard and Reserve will be called upon continuously to fulfill the operational needs of the U.S. Army. The final analysis of the ARFORGEN model highlights strengths and weaknesses which will be discussed in the conclusion.

Summary

Similarities

The NG and AR forces have similarities primarily that both are Reserve Components of the Total Army. They have similar war fighting missions in support of the active army.

The National Guard has a major role in homeland defense that is not shared by the Army Reserve. The table below summarizes the comparison of the 2006 Army National Guard and Army Reserve Posture statements.

Table 7. Comparison of National Guard and Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Topic</th>
<th>Abbreviated Code</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War fighting</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization/Transformation</td>
<td>MT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting and Retention</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Summary of similarities between Army National Guard and Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statements
The similarities between the National Guard and Reserve highlighted the significant issues that both the National Guard and Reserve share. The issues affecting both components dealt with manning, equipping, training, war fighting, modernization/transformation, recruiting, and retention. These major issues are significant in that the RC forces are transforming from a strategic reserve to an operational force and these issues must be addressed to allow for a greater chance of success.

Differences

As there are similarities between the RC forces there are also differences. The table below shows the differences. The differences display the focus of the individual components. For 2006, the AR seems to focus on reorganizing, leadership, management, family support, facilities, and civil support. The National Guard’s focus is force protection, homeland defense, environment and information/technology.
Table 8. Comparison of National Guard and Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Topic</th>
<th>Abbreviated Code</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Organization</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Homeland Defense</td>
<td>HD</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Support</td>
<td>FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer/Employer Relations</td>
<td>EE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Readiness</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Support</td>
<td>CS</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>EN</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Operations and</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Drug</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Managing Risk</td>
<td>MR</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**ARFORGEN**

The posture statements address the issues that are relevant to the ARFORGEN model. The purpose of the ARFORGEN model is to provide troops in support of operational requirements in a predictable, reliable manner. The posture statements reflect the goals of transforming into an operational force in support of the ARFORGEN model. The weakness of the posture statements is that they are only published on an annual basis. Therefore the details are lacking on any actual plans to transform. The posture statements do project goals for the items they do control. Whether these goals support the ARFORGEN model is a topic for additional research. The bottom line is that the posture
statements support the intent of the ARFORGEN model, to provide forces in a predictable, reliable manner.


6Ibid.


8Helmly, “Posture Statement,” 16.


15Ibid., 19.


21Ibid., 7.

22Ibid., 6.


26Ibid., 24.


29Schultz, “Posture Statement,” 2.

30Ibid., 4.

31Ibid.


33NGB Office of Legislative Liaison, National Guard Equipment Requirements, 22 September 2005, 15.


36Christine Wormuth, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Future of the National Guard and Reserves, July 2006, 9.

37Terri Lukach, American Forces Press Service, Reserves and National Guard to Rebalance, Mar 21, 2005, 1.
38General Stultz, Reserve Officer Associations, One Weekend a Month, Two Weeks in Summer No Longer Meets Nation’s Needs, Dec 2006, 24; www.roa.org.


41Christine Wormuth, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Future of the National Guard and Reserves, July 2006, 9.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The focus of this study was to examine whether the ARFORGEN model was appropriate for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to transform. A secondary issue was whether or not the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would significantly impact the transformation process which is a part of the ARFORGEN model. In order to make this analysis the RC forces posture statements were compared against each other and with the ARFORGEN model.

This chapter focused on a review and summary of the findings in chapter 4. The study will draw meaning from the results, draw implications, explain unexpected findings and make recommendations. Secondary issues in the conclusion will be to make recommendations for further study and discuss issues that could have been approached or handled differently. Lastly, the final conclusion and recommendations will be made.

Brief Summary of Findings from Chapter 4

In chapter 4, an analysis compared the Army National Guard and Army Reserve Posture Statements to each other and to the ARFORGEN model. The ARFORGEN model is a systems approach for providing the U.S. Army combat and support units that are trained, equipped and ready to fulfill the operational requirements of the Army. The RC forces have now migrated from a strategic reserve to become an operational component of the Army. This change has long-term implications for the RC forces and the way the U.S. Army will conduct business in the future. The RC forces posture statements explain how each component is going to use the ARFORGEN model to meet
the operational needs of the U.S. Army. A secondary issue is the fact that the U.S. is fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, concurrently. Are these wars affecting the ARFORGEN model and its ability to provide units in a predictable manner?

A review of the 2006 posture statements identified overall annual objectives and goals as well as past accomplishments. These statements, however, lack some of the detail as to how the reserve components are going to actually transform. Many of the items in the posture statements identify issues that need to be addressed. Unfortunately some issues are beyond the direct control of the RC leadership. The posture statements do address issues that will affect transformation as well as laying out plans to meet the requirements of the ARFORGEN model. The posture statements acknowledge issues such as a lack of equipment, training limitations, recruiting and retention concerns, and the need to rebalance the force. Each component independently explains what actions are being taken to mitigate these issues.

There are issues that are beyond the direct control of the National Guard and Reserve. Some issues require congressional action or policy changes at either or both the highest levels of the military and Executive Branch in order for this process to work

What Do the Results Mean?

The results indicate that there are gaps or seams between the active component and reserve component. This is more so with the National Guard than with the Army Reserve. This is more evident because one of the National Guard’s mission is homeland defense-security, while the US Army is more concerned with foreign threats. The US Army is fighting two wars which are taking resources that are now unavailable to the National Guard. The US Army has responsibility for equipping the RC forces. The US
Army views the National Guard as a supplemental force to allow the Army time for units to recover between deployments. Other possible seams between the RC and the Army revolve around force structure U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). USNORTHCOM has the responsibility for the security of the continental US. It is responsible for determining the forces’ requirements.

The National Guard also is responsible for homeland defense. What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and the National Guard and will they need to work more closely to provide a comprehensive coherent plan that makes sense and does not squander resources? Along the lines of force structure, it appears that only 35 percent of National Guard forces are being used overseas. According to the US Army Undersecretary of Reserve Affairs, the Honorable Thomas Hall, 65 percent of the National Guard forces are being underutilized. On the other hand, 98 percent of Reserve units have deployed overseas to support the worldwide commitments.¹

**Things That Could Have Been Approached or Done Differently**

This study would have delved more deeply into the actual transformation process if time permitted. Along these lines, a deeper comparison of the U.S. Army with the RC forces would have allowed a study of the ARFORGEN process and the problems or issues between the two RC components that affect the implementation of the ARFORGEN model. Another important issue would have been to study the National Military Strategies to see how the RC forces interpret and implement this strategy.

This study could have reviewed the actual use of the RC forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. What has their performance been like in these conflicts? Lastly, what are
the concerns of RC soldiers? How do they feel about multiple deployments, mobilization, training, and other RC-related issues?

Summary and Conclusions

A review of literature highlighted many concerns about a variety of issues with regard to the ARFORGEN model. The RC forces have highlighted areas of concern in their posture statements. There are also concerns among many organizations to include the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, and private organizations and, of course, the military. The prominent issues are equipping, training, manning, force structure, recruiting, retention, and mobilization. There are many articles and studies regarding the RC forces. This study will highlight many of these concerns and then make independent conclusions based on independent research.

Manning

One issue that affects the health of the military is manning. An indicator that an organization is doing well is its ability to meet recruiting goals. Sustaining numbers will ensure the organization will have manpower to meet requirements. If the U.S. Army does not meet recruiting goals, it will require more use of RC forces for future operations. The length and frequency of deployments is another symptom of the health of the U.S. Army. An indicator that the military is currently having problems is the reliance on the RC forces to return to Iraq for multiple tours. Some RC units are being activated for a second tour in Iraq. This is contrary to past Army policies and especially the ARFORGEN model which states that units are only to be activated once every five or six years.²
Another problem is the Army’s inability to meet recruiting goals. From April 2004 through April 2005, the US Army had a net loss of 5,252 personnel leaving the service. This is based on a congressional report on recruiting and retention for FY 2004 through FY 2005.

In April, 2004, there were 411,224 enlisted personnel in the Army. This number increased to a high of 414,438 by September, 2004, but has since declined to 405,972 as of April, 2005.³

The Army is also falling short of its retention goals. If the Army continues to lose soldiers leaving the service and as well as failing to meet recruiting goals, this will seriously impact the RC forces. “In FY 2004, the Army only achieved 85 percent of recruiting goals.”⁴

The April 2007 announcements that all Army units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan will have tours extended to 15 months by Secretary of Defense Gates highlight the continued stress that the U.S. Army is under.⁵

**Equipping**

Another sign of stress on the RC force is its readiness status pertaining to equipment. Major General Roger Schultz, Director of the Army National Guard, stated back in 2003 that the NG was having challenges equipping the force.

Overall, the high operations tempo coupled with transformation efforts has limited some programs and discontinued others, which the NGB reports will keep the Army Guard behind in overall equipment procurement at least until 2009. According to the same equipment report from the NGB, the Army Guard is experiencing its largest deployment—at home and abroad—since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm beginning in late 1990. Although meeting these mobilization obstacles, the Army Guard continues to struggle meeting equipment requirements and receiving cascaded equipment from the active-duty Army, a direct result of the high operations tempo of every branch of the armed services.⁶
To transform the RC forces into BCTs, units need to be properly equipped. Will the RC forces have the equipment they require during years three through five of the ARFORGEN model to be ready to complete their training and preparing for deployments, as well as complete transforming into brigade combat teams?

Equipping the force has become a contentious issue recently. The RC forces have yet to receive a comprehensive guide or plan as to how to reequip the force. The RC forces have cross-leveled to other units much of their equipment or have left much of their unit equipment overseas upon redeployment back to the U.S. According to Mackenzie M. Eaglen, the active army simply is unable to reequip the National Guard and Reserve as is directed by DoD directive 1225.6. This directive requires the active duty replace equipment within ninety days of acquisition. This is currently not taking place.7

Training

Even though all the AC/RC forces are being reorganized as BCTs, what is the reality on the ground with regard to the RC forces? The RC forces have not been employed overseas as BCTs in any great numbers. For the most part, RC forces are being deployed as company to battalion sized units, and many are used mostly as security forces SECFOR). Are NG/Reserve units better utilized at BN level and not as Brigade Combat Teams? It takes time to train units. The larger the unit, the longer it takes for that unit to be trained. Squads need to be trained before platoons. Platoons need to be trained before companies. Companies need to be trained before battalions; battalions need to be trained before brigades. The point is that it takes a long time to train brigades.
To enlighten the lay person, the basic unit for all U.S. Army units starts at the squad level, which is roughly nine soldiers. Four squads make one platoon, three platoons make a company, three to five companies create battalions, three to five battalions create brigades. It takes months to train brigades. Along with the combat units, each BCT has support units which usually have very specialized training.

Under the ARFORGEN model, there will be three basic maneuver brigades. These units are composed of either infantry, armor or mechanized, and Stryker units. There are also specialized BCTs, such as airborne or air assault, but those are few in number.

Figure 5 highlights the three types of Brigade Combat Teams that the U.S. Army is transforming from its current division structures. The three types of brigades are the heavy brigade consisting of armor units, the Stryker units which are a highly mobile semi-armored force and infantry, which are foot soldiers. In addition, there are specialized battalions, such as artillery and support units. The U.S. Army also has special BCTs, such as airborne and air assault units.

There is an internal discussion among the Army and National Guard about the future role of the National Guard in combat. There seems to be differences between the National Guard and Army as to what role the National Guard should play in the future.

The National Guard wants to preserve its war-fighting capability while there are some in the U.S. Army that feel the Guard is better suited for combat support roles such as military police and engineers. There still is an issue between the active duty and the reserve components. The active duty feels that guard units are more capable in support
roles. RC units especially engineers, military police, civil affairs have been highly successful. 

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**Figure 5.** Modularity Guide to Brigade Combat Teams  
*Source: Army Modularity Guide, Figure 1-8.*  

The training received during mobilization does not equate equally to units that fully train together for years on a full time basis. The RC forces have under the current situation in Iraq do not get the time required to train. They may at most get six months of training, but usually it is less than this. The National Guard and Army will express this but the Army currently is trending to not use the RC forces in combat roles as BCTs.
Michele A. Flournoy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies makes the following assessment: “It was unlikely that the Army would use the Guard for major combat operations in the future because training simply takes too long. Instead, they would be most likely used for stability and peacekeeping operations--like the Guard's current deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sinai peninsula.”

Lieutenant General Blum, the current Chief of the National Guard Bureau, holds the contrary view that the National Guard wants to retain its role in combat. “I committed to the governors, our state Commanders-in-Chief that the National Guard Bureau would provide each of them with sufficient capabilities under state control, and an appropriate mix of forces, to allow them to respond to domestic emergencies. I also promised to provide a more predictable rotation model for the deployment of their Army Guard soldiers, along the lines already in place for Air Guard units participating in the Air and Space Expeditionary Force deployments.”

Training policies will also have to be adjusted and changed to allow the RC force to become a truly operational reserve. Should the National Guard and Army Reserve create a standardize five- or six-year training program that would follow the ARFORGEN model? Will the RC forces be able to change their training policies for the collective training phases of the ARFORGEN model, to allow for more training than the customary one weekend per month and two weeks per year? RC leaders state that they need more training days during the collective training periods in order to be ready for years four and five of the ARFORGEN training cycles.
Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, states that the old training paradigm is inadequate. In the December 2006, ROA brief, LTG Stulz stated the following,

In the past, Army Reserve units trained during two-day monthly battle assemblies and during the fourteen day annual training event. With ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve’s five-year training cycle will increase unit annual-training requirements from fourteen days in the first and second years to twenty-one days in year three, and to twenty-nine days in year four. More annual training days better prepare units to conduct pre-mobilization training and to participate in collective training events, such as National Training Center exercises.12

This new training paradigm for the reserves may have a negative impact on the retention. Will existing laws need to be changed to allow soldiers to attend this additional training? How will this new training plan possibly affect employers?

Recruiting and Retention

As discussed previously, recruiting is a key to the success of the Army and RC forces. Much emphasis has been placed on recruiting by the RC forces. This is evident in the RC 2006 posture statements.

The National Guard achieved 99 percent of retention goals and exceeded attrition goals for 2004. Funding constraints limited the Army National Guard’s ability to maintain a presence on school campuses to attract non-prior service candidates. This caused a drop in recruiting from high school and college campuses. The National Guard is also losing soldiers upon completion of soldiers’ enlistments. In 2004 the rate of soldiers getting out of the National Guard was 11.3 percent. The average loss rate is normally 18 percent. The year 2004 may be an exception, rather than the norm. The trend in recruiting is that the active duty and Army Reserve are not meeting recruiting goals
while the National Guard is. To reach more possibly eligible recruits, the Army and RC
forces have raised the age of potential new recruits.

    The Army raised the active-duty age limit to 40 in January as an interim step
while it worked out the additional medical screening requirements for recruits
ages 40 to 42. Before January, an applicant could not have reached his or her 35th
birthday. The Army Reserve age limit was raised from 35 to 40 in March 2005.13

    The AC force can only assess 7,000 new soldiers per year. The AC will need at
least four years to reach the new authorization of 30,000 additional soldiers. This does
not address those soldiers that leave the service. The active duty Army needs the RC
forces at least in the interim until the Army can reach its additional authorization levels.14

    If the military cannot reach recruiting and retention goals now, this will continue
putting pressure on the RC forces to fill any voids the Army is suffering. Currently, the
FY 2006 end strength for National Guard was 337,000, but it is authorized 350,000. The
National Guard is on track to meet recruitment goals, but is still suffering from a
personnel shortage. The Army may face budgetary constraints which could cause the
Army to cut back on personnel to make up possible funding shortages in other areas.15
This will again place more burden on the RC forces.

    Force Structure

    One of the looming issues with the RC forces will be force structure. How will the
ARFORGEN model deal with the outstanding force structure issues? The military needs
to rebalance the force. For example, many RC soldiers with the Field Artillery military
occupational specialty were deployed overseas to Iraq and given security tasks and route
security, while their primary military specialty was to support operations, not security.
This is just one example of forces being used for roles other than what they had been trained.  

To start addressing the issues regarding the RC forces, Congress sponsored legislation to address the RC issues with the *The National Guard Empowerment Act* of May 2006. The proponents of the legislation are trying to change the structure of the RC components. The old Cold War policies need to be changed to acknowledge the new requirements to be placed on the RC forces for the future. *The National Guard Empowerment Act* has three areas of concern that need to be addressed. They are highlighted below:

The Department of Defense and the parent services of the National Guard have not adapted to the significant role of the National Guard in the post-9/11 security environment.

Decision-making processes within the Department of Defense do not adequately consider the interests of the National Guard and do not always include National Guard participation and input at the appropriate level.

DOD’s failure to appropriately consider National Guard needs and funding requirements has produced a National Guard that is not fully ready to meet current and emerging missions.  

This act highlights some areas of concern that have been addressed throughout this study. There appears to be a disconnect between the RC forces and the Active Army. Another independent report views challenges pertaining to future force structure issues. Overall, the current Congress tends to believe there are not enough forces, while the Executive Branch feels force structure is adequate. According to Ronald O’Rourke, who wrote a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for Congress called *Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress*. The report states:

Some observers believe that the Administration’s transformation plan calls for a force that is too small to meet the various demands being placed on it, and that the
size of the force, and particularly the Army, needs to be increased to reduce the strain being placed on individual soldiers. The Administration argues that the planned size of the force is adequate, particularly, since DOD, as part of its transformation effort, is undertaking numerous actions that will make more efficient use of unformed personnel.

Lastly, to highlight the disconnect between the AC and RC, the Government Accounting Office in April 2004 highlighted a key factor in determining force structure. US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is responsible for organizing the RC forces to respond to defending the homeland without USNORTHCOM providing guidance to the states. The report makes the following assertion:

National Guard Units will be unprepared for defense of the homeland. It is difficult to assess the Guard’s preparedness for the full range of homeland security missions because requirements for these missions are not yet well defined. Moreover, DOD has not yet established readiness standards and measures for homeland defense or civil support missions. DOD generally organizes, trains, and equips the National Guard for only the federal missions it leads. DOD’s U.S. Northern Command, which is charged with planning, organizing, and executing DOD-led homeland defense and with supporting homeland security missions led by civilian authorities, has not yet finalized its plans that would identify forces and resources for the homeland missions it may lead or support. In some cases, Northern Command is awaiting further guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As a result, National Guard forces that may have to take on homeland security missions are not organized, trained, or equipped specifically for these missions.

Employer-Employee Relationships

An issue that has scarcely been discussed is the RC employer and employee relationship. As more and more RC units are being utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan, the relationship between employers and employees will continue to be strained. This strain will possibly result in more and more RC soldiers coming back to face employment issues. There seems to be a trend that more and more soldiers are losing their jobs upon returning from deployments.
RC soldiers are having to increasingly make choices between civilian careers or military careers. Employers are stressed at having to keep jobs for RC soldiers who are deployed. Deployments will continue to strain this relationship. The impact will be soldiers having to make choices of whether or not to remain in the RC.

Budget

Though not directly in the control of the RC forces, budget issues may have the most serious implications to success or failure of the transformation process. If the RC forces do not get appropriate funding, transformation may not happen. Congress, as the instrument of government that controls the purse strings, has the responsibility of funding the Army. The Army in turn has the responsibility to equip the RC forces. It will be up to the U.S. Congress to fund any plans to transform. According to a GOA report, there appears to be a $15 billion shortfall for reequipping the RC forces and converting them into BCTs.21

Mobilization

Mobilization of the RC forces had become such an issue that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had a study done in October 2003 to review significant issues, make recommendations and possible actions toward the mobilization process. The following quotation from Mobilization Reform: A Compilation of Significant Issues, Lessons Learned and Studies Developed since September 11, 2001 highlights the issues related to RC mobilization.

While current processes get the job done, they are far from efficient in an environment where processes need to [be] rapid, flexible, and visible. The mobilization timeline begins with the identification of a force requirement and extends until individuals and units deployed to meet these requirements. While
the current process works to a large degree, it is inefficient, it takes too long, and it is not as responsive as the current environment demands.\textsuperscript{22}

The RC and DOD need to work together to create a smooth transition for RC forces to mobilize, train, and deploy without wasting time and maximizing training time. Mobilization issues still plague the RC forces. The RC needs to review and revise policies that govern mobilization and deployments. Time spent at home station and at mobilization stations is often redundant. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld knew mobilization issues are a very large problem with the RC forces. The current system works, but it is inefficient. The model needs to be streamlined and more in line with the Air National Guard model.\textsuperscript{23}

The other major issue regarding the RC forces is the length of deployments. The one-year boots-on-the-ground policy is an issue for both the RC and AC. There are pros and cons either way. The Government Accounting Office reports that longer deployments could hurt RC personnel, while shorter tours could hurt the AC. The following sums up the quandary regarding mobilization and the one-year deployment issue.

Longer tours up to 18 months could more fully utilize the RC forces due to the partial mobilization rules currently employed. Longer deployments would provide more force stability and require fewer forces. The RC wants tours to be no more than one year from mobilization to deployment to return to home. Shorter tours would lessen the burden on families, soldiers, and employers.\textsuperscript{24}

**Civil Support**

Under the ARFORGEN model, there are three phases. During the first phase, called reset, units are combat ineffective. If they are combat ineffective they are not
available for other missions. When units are in the reset phase, what will states do if there are emergencies and the National Guard units are not available or ready to respond?\textsuperscript{25}

The active duty Army needs to work with the National Guard to allow these units to fulfill both state and federal missions. The Louisiana National Guard was deployed to Iraq in 2005 when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast. Louisiana had no organic National Guard units to immediately help with the aftermath of this disaster. The U.S. Army had to respond by sending in the 82nd Airborne Division, active duty Army troops. The point being, the National Guard is away performing its federal mission to the detriment of supporting local communities.

Future of the Guard and Reserve

There have been many studies regarding the National Guard and Reserve. The Center for Strategic and International Studies published findings in July 2006 that address many future challenges for the RC forces. The summary of the publication is important to include in this study because it addresses many issues that affect the ARFORGEN model. This study will highlight some of the suggestions that lend credence to the findings of this study. The nineteen points below are points that support this report’s conclusion and suggestions. The high points are that the RC needs to be fully trained, but competence should focus on combat support and service support missions. The Army needs to increase in size. A joint panel should be convened to study manpower requirements for the RC. Equipment shortfalls need to be addressed by the Army. A review of support brigades needs to be conducted to see if the current design is sufficient. To fulfill the requirements of the ARFORGEN model, the Army needs to increasing training opportunities, as well as increase funding to promote a training model that supports the
ARFORGEN model. The RC need to promote policies and programs that allow recruiting and retention that will man units at 100 percent strength. DOD needs a new set of mobilization rules and regulations that will properly utilize the RC force. The DOD needs to accept civil support as part of their core mission. The leadership of the RC needs to have more input into future decision making, and it needs to be elevated to the role of advisor to Secretary of Homeland Security, as well as serving as deputy commander to NORTHCOM. The RC needs to revitalize the IRR program. The RC should limit mobilizations. Mobilizations should only be one year in length. Health benefits need to be expanded for RC soldiers in lieu of other benefits. The list below highlights the items that support the findings of this study. The CSIS report made 43 recommendations. Nineteen of those recommendations support the findings of this study:

3. The Guard and Reserves need to remain multi-mission capable, but put less emphasis on conventional campaigns.

4. DoD should increase the size of the Total Army by creating 43 active BCTs and 34 ARNG BCTs in the near term, with the long-term goal of creating 48 active BCTs total.

5. An outside panel of expert[s sic] should conduct a detailed, comprehensive, cross-Service review of Active and Reserve Component manpower requirements.

6. The Department of Defense and the Army need to address the substantial equipment funding shortfalls facing the Army’s reserve components.

7. The Army should closely monitor the multifunctional support brigades to determine whether the existing design is sufficient, whether there are sufficient numbers of support brigades to support deployed combat forces, and whether equipment and manning levels are sufficient.

8. The Army should either increase the training levels envisioned under ARFORGEN, or make explicit that additional post-mobilization training will continue to be required and adjust deployment lengths accordingly. Additional funding is also needed to ensure the ARFORGEN training strategy can succeed.
9. Man and fund units in the two years preceding the potential deployment year at 105 percent or more so that units can deploy under ARFORGEN without having to undergo cross-leveling.

10. Establish recruiting and retention programs and policies that will enable the Army reserve components to man their units at sufficient strength.

11. The Department of Defense needs to propose a new set of mobilization authorities to Congress to enable routine but judicious use of the Reserve Component as part of the operational force.

17. DoD needs to accept civil support as a central mission and act accordingly.

18. Leverage the National Guard to form the backbone of regional Civil Support Forces.

19. The Department of Defense should nominate a National Guard general officer to serve as Deputy Commander at NORTHCOM.

20. Designate the Chief, National Guard Bureau as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters concerning the role of the National Guard in homeland security, homeland defense and civil support missions.

21. Revise the charter for the NGB to recognize its role as the joint force manager for the National Guard’s role in homeland defense and civil support.

22. The military services should give priority to developing a much broader range of programs to implement the continuum of service concept.

23. The Army, Navy, and Air Force should revitalize their IRR programs.

33. Enhance the predictability of mobilizations.

34. Keep the average length of mobilization to no more than a year.

40. Focus efforts on improving access to health care benefits in lieu of further expansion of the existing benefits.²⁶

Conclusion

There is a great deal of information regarding the Army Force Generation Model. Much of this information is changing and complex due to the dynamics that the U.S. is
fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wars that are having a huge impact on the way the Army does business now and in the future.

Overview

When looking at the ARFORGEN model, it is important to visualize what missions will the RC forces must to be prepared for in the future. In recent history, the RC forces have been employed overseas to places such as the former Yugoslavia to provide assistance and peacekeeping. The RC forces have also been used effectively in stability and support operations. What missions are the RC forces best suited?

How will the RC forces change to support the ARFORGEN model and become a viable force in the future? There are issues that can not be overlooked that will have a direct impact on the ARFORGEN process. These issues are the equipping, mobilization, manning, training, recruiting and retention, force structure, and budget. They have to be addressed in some form or fashion in the context that they are the details that will make the ARFORGEN model successful or not successful.

This study concurs with the majority of the findings from the CSIS report regarding the future of the National Guard and Reserves. There are many worthwhile areas of concern that need to be addressed for the future success of the RC forces. The leadership of the RC have oversight of the RC forces and must act according to their organizations best interests as well as those of the U.S.

Posture Statements

The posture statements of the RC forces address issues that are controlled by the RC. Many issues, such as equipment, force structure, manning, and training, are
influenced at levels above the RC leadership. The RC can only deal with issues within its control. As this is the case, the RC forces must capitalize on their strengths and minimize the weaknesses.

Along with understanding strengths and weaknesses, the RC forces must have a vision as to what roles they will play in future conflicts. The RC forces should understand what their capabilities will be in the future as well. In comparing the posture statements of both the National Guard and Reserve, both address major issues that affect their transformation. Both statements address manning, equipment, training, war fighting, transformation, recruiting, and retention. These issues reflect the challenges the RC forces face transforming from the strategic reserve to an operational force. The NG, of course, has its own inherent issues, such as homeland defense while the Reserve are having organizational challenges.

The posture statements of the RC forces are adequate for the short term. They only address issues one year at a time. Perhaps a five- or six-year plan would be more in line with the five- or six-year ARFORGEN model. The National Guard and Army Reserve are on different cycles. The NG is under a six-year ARFORGEN model while the Army Reserve is under a five-year model.

Additional findings are that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have put incredible strain on the armed forces of the U.S. and particularly the U.S. Army. The actual transformation of the RC forces has been scheduled to take place no earlier than 2011 and some predictions are even longer. The wars are having dire effects on the U.S. Army. The RC must transform to be more effective and efficient.
Currently, the RC forces face lower readiness as the wars continue. The nation is at risk that readiness will suffer for future operations at home and abroad if transformation is not done completely and thoroughly to address all the outstanding issues that threaten the transformation process.

ARFORGEN Model

Andrew Krepinevich, a retired military officer who is executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a nonprofit policy research institute, has concluded that the military is becoming a thin green line that could snap unless relief comes soon.\textsuperscript{27}

With all the challenges addressed in this study, the ARFORGEN model is still found to be an appropriate model to transform the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. It provides predictable forces to meet the operational needs of the Army for the short term.

There are many variables involved with changing the way the military conducts business. The ARFORGEN model is an engine of change. It, however, is only one part of the transformation process. The ARFORGEN model by itself does not guarantee success. The National Guard and Reserve are attempting to be part of the Total Army by embracing the ARFORGEN model. Each component’s posture statement addresses the ends, ways, and means to create a force that utilizes the ARFORGEN model to transform and be a credible force with real-world missions.

ARFORGEN claims to offer predictability, a uniform training model and be an engine of change-transformation. The model does have limitations. The ARFORGEN does not address budget issues, equipment issues, manning issues, or training issues.
Those issues not addressed by the ARFORGEN model need to addressed in the future at the component and Army level. The Army needs to have a consolidated view of the total force and implement changes that address the needs of the nation.

What Are the Implications?

There are many variables that will affect whether the ARFORGEN model is a viable model to transform the RC forces. Currently, it is a good starting point. The long-term success relies on further refinement and cooperation of many organizations. Equipment shortages, non-uniform training between organizations, possible long-term drop in personnel numbers, and budget shortfalls will be variables that need to be addressed in order for the ARFORGEN model to work. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are having impacts on the RC forces. The longer these wars continue, the longer it will take to transform the RC forces. If issues that affect transformation are not addressed in a coherent National Military Strategy, there will be more issues that will require even more drastic solutions in the future.

The ARFORGEN model is a good starting point for the transformation of the National Guard and Army Reserve. There needs to be a strong connection between the active force and the reserve components. The RC relies on the active duty to organize, fund, and equip the reserve components. If money is not available to pay for the RC forces to transform, then many items associated with the transformation are less likely to occur. This study found serious shortages in equipment for the RC forces. Equipment shortages are having an immediate impact on the National Guard’s ability to fulfill its hometown missions to provide for homeland defense and emergency assistance.
Another finding was that training under the ARFORGEN model is different for the Army Reserve and National Guard. The Army Reserve plan on a five-year ARFORGEN model, while the National Guard plans to implement a six-year plan. There appear to be different training plans for the NG and AR. Whether the five-year or six-year model is used, what are the implications for the part-time soldiers?

Another implication for the long term is that the current conflicts may be going on for years. What will be the impact of these wars on the RC forces in the future? What will be the threats in the future? Are the Army or RC forces looking at these threats and preparing accordingly?

Were There Any Unexpected Findings?

Some findings that were unexpected were the appearance that there is no coordinating body that governs the interaction between the AC and RC. This explains apparent seams or gaps between the AC and RC.

The second interesting finding is that the National Guard has really only utilized 35 percent of its forces overseas. The Reserve on the other hand has deployed 98 percent of its forces. This appears to be an unbalanced effort between the National Guard and Reserve in supporting the military efforts overseas.

Recommendations

This study concurs with the recommendations of the CSIS report, dated July 2006, “Future of the National Guard and Reserve.”28 Along with those recommendations, this study advances more findings to be studied or reviewed for further action.
This study recommends that the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and the Reserve Components implement a cohesive and comprehensive plan to adjust to the current situation and plan the way ahead for the future. The Army needs to resource the RC components as if they were part of the active duty force.

The Army must consider the primary needs of the RC force. If it works with the RC forces to promote the strengths of both forces, this may ease pressures on the Army as well as the RC to concentrate on the missions that each does best.

This will allow the RC forces to assist the active component when necessary, as well as allowing the RC to focus on its primary mission when required. The Army and RC must complete a comprehensive plan on force structure requirements and implementation.

With probable shortages of equipment, personnel, and funding, forces need to be consolidated and plans created that will reflect possible shortages in equipment and personnel.

ARFORGEN

The ARFORGEN model needs to be implemented and more detailed to expand on the five-year or six-year training cycle. Each similar unit should have similar training over the course of the model. Units in year one should send soldiers to courses or advanced schooling. Year two would be individual training. Year three would be squad, platoon, and company collective training on METL tasks. Year four would be validation of battalion training, and year five consists of validation of mission requirements.
Equipment

The National Guard needs to have the equipment it needs to complete local missions. The National Guard is called upon frequently to assist local communities during times of disaster. If equipment is not available, the National Guard should create equipment nodes in each state for use by quick reaction forces to be used during times of need.

At a minimum, National Guard units should have personnel weapons at home station. Equipment should also be located in each state’s collective training sites to allow units to conduct collective training.

Training

The NG and AR need to work together to for the purpose of having coordinated training program, use of facilities, and use of forces for homeland defense and homeland security. The NG and RC should have the same training cycles under the ARFORGEN model, to allow for a more unified training program for RC forces.

The RC forces should have similar five- or six-year training programs that follow the ARFORGEN model and that can be implemented by all units in all states. Training in all areas of full-spectrum operations for the active duty and National Guard seems to be a duplication of effort. Is this the best use of resource and time? There appears to be a prevailing attitude that the Army and Reserve Components must be everything to everyone. The jack of all trades, master at none seems to be the model currently being prescribing too.
Manning

The RC must be creative with personnel policies to increase the quality of service for those who decide to serve in a volunteer capacity. The RC must allow for more creativity to meet the needs of its soldiers, as well as solving soldiers’ problems. The RC full-time manned should be at 100 percent.

The IRR needs to be integrated along with other semimilitary forces into homeland defense. Soldiers should be classified into groups, and units should be filled based on classification and mission. There are many qualified people who would love to serve in the NG. Unfortunately, current policy prohibits the use of these willing volunteers.

Class A units would be combat units, combat support units, or combat service support units. These units are deployable overseas. Missions would be similar to active duty missions. Missions preferably would be Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)

Class B units would be responsible for homeland defense missions, such as site security, firefighting, border security, disaster relief and emergency assistance, and homeland defense. These are traditional National Guard missions.

Class C units would be available for emergency response, site security, and disaster relief. These units would most likely be augmentees assisting on a person-by-person basis. They would be eligible for pay. If the National Guard needs to be augmented with additional people, they will need to be compensated.

The RC can further streamline this process by identifying all soldiers with classifications A, B, and C. Class A soldiers are fully deployable. Class B soldiers are
deployable with waivers. Class C soldiers are not deployable but able bodied enough for homeland defense missions, such as site security.

As recommended earlier in this chapter, to maintain an all-volunteer force, the RC forces need to provide incentives to retain qualified persons in uniform. Augmentees should be brought on orders for two weeks a year and allowed to qualify with a weapon and trained on particular mission requirements. Any qualified person wanting to be a part of the military should be allowed to join up until age 55. As seen in table 9, persons joining the military would be compensated based on time in service. Table 9 creates a possible compensation plan that might entice more qualified people to join the RC forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 Years of Federal Military Service</td>
<td>10% Full Military Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 Years of Federal Military service</td>
<td>15% Full Military Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 Years of Federal Military Service</td>
<td>25% Full Military Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 Years of Federal Military Service</td>
<td>50% Full Military Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25 Years of Federal Military Service</td>
<td>75% Full Military Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30 Years of Federal Military Service</td>
<td>100% Full Military Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All members must retire at age 60</td>
<td>Start receiving benefits at age 60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army Reserve would only have Class A or B soldiers perhaps augmented by Class C soldiers, like IRR soldiers. These soldiers would perform similarly to the missions described above like the National Guard for both overseas missions and homeland defense. IRR soldiers could also be selected individually to support PRT missions or staff functions as need and as individual skills dictate.
Figure 6 offers to increase the manpower pool if recruiting and retention efforts do not keep up with demand. Class A and B soldiers would be traditional National Guard and Reserve soldiers currently serving. Class C soldiers would be augmentees, such as IRR soldiers or other auxiliary forces.

The two models above are almost identical to better support missions, training, and equipment and facilitate better use of personnel across the total army, cross leveling if necessary. The only slight difference is that the Army Reserve will most likely not have auxiliary personnel except perhaps for individual soldiers from the Individual Ready Reserve.
Force Structure

To enhance homeland defense capabilities the RC forces need to be more responsive. Each component should create quick reaction forces for both the Reserve and National Guard to support homeland defense mission. The National Guard has already addressed creating a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This force is called the Rapid Response Force (RRF) which consists of one Battalion Headquarters at each FEMA region. Each state would have one company of soldiers available within four hours of emergencies. Units can cross state lines to assist other states during times of emergencies. This study recommends that these units should be on one year orders. When not actively involved with an emergency, these units can be in a training status focusing on traditional NG missions.

These units can assist first responders during emergencies; help secure infrastructure; guard facilities; help with firefighting; assist with border security; and provide help with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) situations and with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) defense.

There have also been suggestions that the Reserve create a QRF to allow the Army Reserve to be integrated into defense of homeland. The Army Reserve are considering creation of the Civil Support Forces (CSF) to assist during times of emergencies. This study suggests that these CSF units should be available to assist with homeland emergencies with the request of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within 24 hours.
Figure 7 highlights the ten FEMA regions. The RC units that have created quick reaction forces would be aligned to these areas. This would increase responsiveness during times of crisis as well as allow use of units beyond traditional state boundaries.

Figure 7. FEMA REGIONS
Source: FEMA Homepage world Wide Web; FEMA Regions; http://www.fema.gov/about/contact/regions.shtm.

FEMA Regions

FEMA has ten regional offices and two area offices. Each region serves several states, and regional staff work directly with the states to help plan for disasters, develop mitigation programs, and meet needs when major disasters occur.

Figure 8 highlights the concept of utilizing Civil Support Forces. These units are a combination of units across the FEMA region. This study recommends, these units would be identified and on duty for a period of one year. They would be on 24-hour recall. This study concurs with the RC recommendation to implement CST units for the AR. Figure 8 highlights the concept behind using the AR to support homeland defense missions.
Table 9 offers a proposed system including two tracks to meet the future needs of the U.S. Army for the defense of the homeland as well as for missions overseas. The assumption being the RC will have to provide soldiers for the short term over the next five years.
For the sake of estimating, the study will use the following scenario for the prediction of forces required. Currently, the National Guard is authorized 380,000 troops, with a present for duty strength of roughly 337,000. For purposes of estimating, this study assumes roughly 300,000 soldiers are available deployable forces based on soldiers in school, or non-deployable for whatever reason. This means roughly 50,000 soldiers would be available each year for mission requirements based on over the six year ARFORGEN cycle.

If the Army required 30,000 soldiers per year for overseas missions, this would leave 20,000 soldiers for homeland defense per year. This number can be augmented with IRR, state militias, and state defense forces.
Figure 10 highlights the two tracks units in the RC would take to maximize use of facilities, equipment, training and personnel. Under the five- or six-year ARFORGEN model, units would be identified in year zero as to future roles and missions. They then would have five or six years to prepare for those missions. Units in years three or four would have access to equipment with which to train collectively. Equipment would be positioned at training sites to allow maximum utilization. Units would be increased to reach 105 percent personnel strength. Units given the homeland defense mission know that they would not be deployed for at least one ARFORGEN training cycles or five or six years. The benefit of this approach is that soldiers would be home longer between possible overseas deployments, employers would have more access to employees and families would stay together for longer periods of time. Soldiers in units that have the homeland defense mission would not be fully mobilized during this period, unless they are part of the CSF or RRF in which case they would be on call for a one-year period with some soldiers brought on ADSW orders.

They may receive longer training cycles during years four, five, or six of the ARFORGEN model, but they would not need to be fully deployed to fulfill this mission unless they were part of the states QRF. Soldiers assigned to the company-sized Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) would have access to equipment immediately to support emergencies. These company sized units would come on orders for a period of one year at a time under Title 32 authority for active duty special work. They would not be considered mobilized. Equipment for the homeland defense mission would go to support the rapid reaction forces or CSF forces. These missions would support homeland defense, border security, fire fighting, disaster assistance, and related missions.
Figure 11 integrates the IRR, state defense forces, and state militias into homeland defense plans. The RC should attempt to bring auxiliary units on orders for two weeks annual training for basic skills and identify possible missions for these personnel, using civilian skill sets that may be valuable.

This model creates efficiencies by consolidating forces into two tracks. One track is homeland defense, the other track is for overseas missions. This allows for more dwell time for soldiers. It also allows older soldiers to participate in possible missions that are currently unavailable to troops not allowed to enter the service because of age.
This study recognizes the importance of the National Guard and Reserve are an integral part of the total army. The strength of the Army combined with the strength of the reserve components can create a symbiotic relationship that benefits the Army as a whole. The strength of the Army is its combat power. The strength of the National Guard is its experience in conducting peace keeping and SSTR operations.

The recommended model (figure 12) suggests four operational phases for full-spectrum operations that capitalizes on the strengths of the active and reserve components. Proposed phasing of active duty with National Guard to fulfill full-spectrum operations. Phase I is an offensive phase where the active army conducts offensive
operations to clear a nominal district of enemy combatants. Phase II is a security operation in which active duty units provide security until a Forward Operating Base (FOB) can be constructed to become a security, training and logistic base for the newly liberated district. This district will be turned over to a National Guard unit once major combat operations have concluded. During this phase plans will be made to train local police and militia to provide security for the designated area. The area will be under the control of a military consul.

Phase III is the Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) phase. During this phase, the National Guard will provide security. The State Department will
create a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to assist the local populace with rebuilding their economy, reconstitute local police forces, and help provide essential services security, water, electric, academics, transportation, medical, sanitation (SWEAT-MS). IRR soldiers may be called upon to augment the PRTs. National Guard units will start training local forces to take over security.

Phase IV would be the transition from military occupation to appointed or elected local leadership and or host-nation control. This would allow a peaceful transition from military occupation to full civilian control without jeopardizing security. This model may be similar to what is currently being employed the difference being a delineation of duties and responsibilities between active army units and reserve component units.

**Recruiting and Retention**

This study recommends soldiers be allowed to enter RC units as old as fifty-five if they are fit for duty. Soldiers currently in a duty status can serve until age sixty. It also recommends that soldiers that reach twenty years of Federal active service be allowed to remain on duty until they reach thirty years of Federal Active Service if they are qualified to continue after they reach their twentieth year of service. The RC should find creative incentives to keep junior enlisted and junior officers from leaving the service.

**Mobilization**

Mobilization needs to be streamlined. For reasons of retention and the effects on the civilian economy, citizen soldiers should not be deployed away from home station for more than one year except in the case of a general mobilization.
Miscellaneous Recommendations

The study recommends that the National Guard and Reserve streamline operations to be mutually supporting. To accomplish this both organizations would share resources and align units to meet both homeland defense and overseas requirements. Good ideas from one organization should be shared between both. The leadership should have annual meetings to coordinate policies, procedures and activities that will benefit the RC forces as a whole. Those areas that are beyond the control of the either the National Guard or the Army Reserve should be reviewed at a joint level to address any RC issues in a more efficient and effective manner. This study also recommends a joint National Guard and Army Reserve implementation board be created from the major subordinate staffs to coordinate mutually supporting activities.

Future entanglements as evidenced in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be short affairs. The initial military involvement may be short and decisive but the follow on military activities may be long and manpower intensive. The military may want to wish the problem away but it appears to be the same reality of past conflicts. Soldiers must occupy the ground for long periods of time to plant the seeds of success. This mission in the future will be handled more and more by the citizens-soldiers of today and tomorrow.

Questions for Further Study

Some recommendations that were not directly addressed in this study but have implications deal with many aspects of RC readiness. It also requires policy makers to be open to ideas that they perhaps have not considered before.

The first set of recommendations for further study has to do with an assessment of the RC forces. The Army should complete an assessment of current and probable threats
in the future. What capabilities do we have to address these threats and what capabilities will we need in the future? What is the difference or gap between our capabilities and our requirements? What role will the RC forces play in the overall National Military Defense Strategy?

Do we have a governing body responsible for implementing possible changes in policy that cover manning, equipping, funding and training all the U.S. Army and the RC? Do we need to reassess the correct force structure of the AC and RC forces? Do we want to make the RC forces an operational reserve or should we leave fighting contingency and other limited wars strictly to the active duty and homeland defense to the RC forces?

If RC forces are going to continue to function as an operational force do they have the training and ability to do what they are asked? Should RC forces be more specialized in missions that capitalize on their strengths or should they be mirror copies of the AC responsible for full spectrum operations? Should the RC forces, because of time constraints, be deployed as battalion size units or below or should they be deployed as BCT’s? Should the RC forces create units that have more specialized missions, one for homeland defense and the other for overseas expeditionary roles? Should the RC forces do away with combat arms units like infantry and armor all together and only create combat support units such as engineers, military police and civil affairs? What role should the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), state militias, state defense forces, and other quasi-military groups have regarding our National Military Strategy?

Should the RC forces look at increasing the age of entry into the forces to fifty-five years of age with a benefit system based on time in service? This would allow many
more people to serve in the RC forces. Should RC soldiers be given classifications of A, B, or C which would determine to which forces they could belong. For example, fully fit soldiers could be part of the National Guard and Reserve. Class B soldiers would become part of a civil defense force for homeland security missions only, unless granted waivers to join class A units. Class C soldiers would be soldiers that would be called upon only in times of emergencies, disaster assistance, or national emergency. Class C soldiers would get two weeks of annual training per year to take an Army physical fitness test, qualify on their individual weapon and go over plans and training for missions they may be assigned such as guarding infrastructure and roles during emergencies.

To entice more people to join the RC force, a flexible benefit system needs to be created. This will especially be true if the military fails to meet recruiting goals and soldiers attrite. Soldiers currently can serve until they are sixty years old. Why not look at increasing the allowable entry age of service? If service entry age were to be fifty-five years old, perhaps more patriotic people would serve. The benefits would have to be adjusted accordingly. Something similar to time in service might be a draw for more people. A graduated benefits system associated with their time in the military might be something to look at in the future, especially if the U.S. Army continues the all-volunteer force. This would greatly increase the pool of possible soldiers. This may be important if the military recruiting efforts can not keep up with the demand. The National Guard is the only service whose recruiting efforts are keeping up with the demands. Why is this so?

Should the National Guard and Reserve be on the same training cycles? Should they work together to maximize the use of training facilities and training programs? Should the National Guard and Reserve have similar policies that work in concert with
each other offering maximum benefit to both organizations? Should the Army Reserve be part of homeland defense/security plans as well as providing assistance during times of local or national emergencies? Should civilian skills be incorporated into military skill sets to better assist with current mission requirements?

These are just some of the issues this study raised that should be possibly be addressed as the Army is forced to relook at itself and the conflicts of the future and what is available to ensure success.


4Kapp, “CRS Report for Congress,” 5.


6Roger Schultz, Equipping the Army and Air National Guard, September 2003, 2;http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3731/is_200309/ai_n9253404/pg_2.


9Ibid.

10Ibid., 4.


15 Ibid., 19.

16 Ibid., 9.


“Serving a Nation at War: At Home and Abroad”

Message from the Director

The Army National Guard is an integral and vital component of the United States Army. The Guard is organized, trained and resourced to support the president and Congress of the United States. Since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard has provided trained and ready units across the entire nation and the globe. The Army National Guard commits to continued support of the Global War on Terrorism both at home and abroad.

In 2004, the Army National Guard supported ongoing combat service in Iraq and Afghanistan, emergency service and reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of Florida’s record number of hurricanes and enduring missions to the Balkans and Sinai Peninsula. The Army National Guard met the challenge of balancing our federal and state missions. Our Soldiers, families and employers deserve credit for a job well done in the face of strained resources.

This Posture Statement presents an opportunity to lay out in detail the Army National Guard actions to ensure our nation’s defense, meet our strategic and legislative goals and transform to meet tomorrow’s challenges. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau established our fiscal year 2006 priorities to Support the Warfight, Defend the Homeland and Transformation for the Future.

The Army National Guard balances its status as an integral element of the United States Army with its readiness to serve state governors and the people of our communities. Our Citizen-Soldiers represent thousands of communities across America. Our Soldiers bring with them real-world experience and provide capabilities to address both domestic disasters and foreign conflicts.

The Army National Guard remains committed to transform into an Operational Force that continues to be capable of its dual role to support the Global War on Terrorism and the state governors. The Army National Guard’s commitment to domestic and foreign affairs will remain at a consistent pace for the coming years. We are able to keep this commitment because of the continued dedication of our Soldiers, support from the families and the resources provided by Congress.
Support the Warfight Anytime, Anywhere
The Citizen-Soldier: Defending the Nation

The Army National Guard demonstrates it is a full partner of the Total Army Force. The Army National Guard provided ready units in support of a variety of overseas missions throughout fiscal year 2004. The Army National Guard mobilized and deployed more than 95,000 Soldiers to war in support of Operation Noble Eagle (America’s Homeland Defense), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq). The Army National Guard conducts operations ranging from combat to peacekeeping and force protection to national missile defense missions. The Army National Guard meets operational requirements in conjunction with training activities in 84 countries. The Army National Guard balances missions with continued support to state and local authorities during natural and manmade disasters, Homeland Defense and Homeland Security. The Army National Guard fortified its success with a long-term leadership role in the Balkans, supporting Peacekeeping Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Army National Guard units received assignment as Multi-National Force Observers in the Sinai Peninsula. The Active Component previously supported each of these operations. The Army National Guard will conduct these missions in the future.

Equipping the Force

The Army National Guard established funding priorities based on the Army Chief of Staff’s vision for modernizing the total force core competencies. These competencies include training, equipping Soldiers, growing capable leaders and maintaining a relevant and ready land power. The Army National Guard focus is to organize and equip current and new modularized units with the most modern equipment available. This modernization ensures our ability to continue support of deployments, homeland security and defense efforts while maintaining our highest war-fighting readiness. This requires the Rapid Fielding Initiative to equip our Soldiers with the latest force protection items, such as body armor with Small Arms Protective Insert Plates, Night Vision Devices and small weapons.

Intelligence Operations

Army National Guard Soldiers assigned to Military Intelligence play a vital role in the Global War on Terrorism and National Security. The Army National Guard deployed these Soldiers worldwide to support intelligence operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. During 2004, Army National Guard Military Intelligence units supported combatant commanders deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Djibouti, Guantanamo Bay and to Continental United States locations. Army National Guard linguists and analysts provided capabilities for government agencies such as the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and elements of the State, Treasury and Justice Departments. At all levels of operation,
Soldiers participate in sanctioned activities including imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, document exploitation, counter-drug and analysis-based intelligence. Our Soldiers engage in intelligence activities concurrently with training to improve their readiness and ability to remain a key asset in the defense of our nation.

Information Operations

The Army National Guard continues to provide Full Spectrum Information Operation Teams to support a broad range of Army missions. The Army National Guard Information Operations Field Support Teams provide tactical planning capabilities at all echelons. Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams are deployed to theater with information operation cells that provide planning support to each level.

Innovative Readiness Training

The Innovative Readiness Training program highlights the Citizen-Soldier’s role in support of eligible civilian organizations. By combining required wartime training with community support projects, Soldiers obtain the training they need and communities receive needed assistance in completing various projects. Community benefits usually come in the form of construction projects or medical improvements. More than 7,000 Soldiers and Airmen from across the United States and its territories participate annually in Innovative Readiness Training sponsored projects. Army National Guard missions include:

- Task Force Alaska leadership of a joint, multiyear engineering project to construct a 15-mile road on Annette Island, normally accessible only by boat;
- In Clarksburg, West Virginia, Army National Guard engineers continue efforts to expand and improve the Benedum Airport infrastructure;
- Task Force Grizzly and Task Force Douglas improved existing road networks in support of United States Border Patrol in California and Arizona;
- Rolling Thunder is a series of Oregon Army and Air National Guard projects designed to enhance military skills while adding value to local communities. Rolling Thunder provides a positive presence in Oregon communities and promotes public awareness of the Army National Guard; and
- The South Carolina Army National Guard instituted the REEFEX project. REEFEX utilizes decommissioned Army vehicles to create artificial reefs in the Atlantic Ocean off the coasts of New England and South Carolina.

Training the Nation’s Warfighter

The Army National Guard’s unique condition of limited training time, limited training dollars and, in some cases, difficult access to training ranges, demands an increased reliance on low-cost, small-footprint training technologies. Quick response by the Army National Guard to our nation’s missions requires a training strategy that reduces post-mobilization training time. New virtual technologies and simulators therefore become critical tools to help Army National Guard maintain a ready Operational Force.

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle is the primary weapon system of the United States Army Mechanized Infantry and a critical system to the United States Army Cavalry. The Advanced Bradley Full Crew Interactive Skills Trainer virtual gunnery training
system is a low cost, deployable training system that attaches directly to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and supports home station training in advance of a live fire event.

The Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer provides training for combat convoys under realistic conditions that simulate the streets of Baghdad and other areas. This resource trains Soldiers to anticipate ambushes and other insurgent actions from all possible directions by allowing the crew to observe, maneuver and fire their weapons in a full, 360-degree circumference. These systems train mobilizing Soldiers in tactics, techniques and procedures for convoy operations within the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

The Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 simulates weapon-training events. This trainer provides initial and sustainment marksmanship training, static unit collective gunnery tactical training and rapid identity friend-or-foe training. Soldiers utilize this trainer primarily for multipurpose, multi-lane, small arms, crew-served and individual anti-tank training simulation. The trainer simulates day and night, as well as Nuclear, Biological and Chemical marksmanship and tactical training.

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The Laser Marksmanship Training System simulates weapons training events that lead to live-fire qualifications for individual and crew-served weapons. This system is similar to the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000, but it weighs less, is transportable, uses batteries and requires no fixed facilities to maintain. This system allows the Soldier to use personal weapons to conduct individual and sustainment marksmanship training using Nuclear, Biological and Chemical equipment.

The Joint Training and Experimentation Program is a California National Guard training initiative. This program develops the technology that links the Live, Virtual and Constructive training environments into an architecture, which permits fully integrated exercises at the brigade level and below.

Information Technology

The Army National Guard successfully increased the bandwidth and provided a secure data link to the Joint Force Headquarters in each of the 50 states, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, two U.S. Territories and the District of Columbia. The Army National Guard synchronizes its transformation efforts with the Department of the Army. The Army National Guard’s modern wide-area network provides improved redundancy and increased network security. The Army National Guard G-6 will continue to support the Joint Warfighter by enhancing collaboration among the Total Force and leveraging superior Knowledge Management strategies in fiscal year 2006.
Homeland Defense: Here and Abroad for over 368 Years
Prepared and Ready

The national investment in Army National Guard training and readiness programs continues to pay strong dividends. Congressional attention and support directly enables the Guard’s ability to robustly defend the homeland and provide trained and ready units to Combatant Commanders waging the War on Terror and engaging enemies abroad.

The Army and Army National Guard transformation is a process critical to meeting the challenges of today and the future. At the same time, the Army National Guard advances with proven readiness and training programs that are critical to our current successes and essential for those in the future.

The Army National Guard prepares to transform at an unprecedented pace while continuing the Warfight. National and state leaders can rest assured the Army National Guard remains committed to the responsibilities of its dual role.

The Army National Guard commits itself to continued and immediate support of local civilian authorities while maintaining Relevant and Ready Forces in support of the Nation.

Full-Time Support

Fighting the Global War on Terrorism highlights the vital role Full-Time Support personnel serve in preparing Army National Guard units for a multitude of missions both at home and abroad. Full-Time Support is a critical component for achieving Soldier and Unit-Level Readiness. Full-Time Guard members are responsible for organizing, administering, instructing, training and recruiting new personnel. They maintain supplies, equipment and aircraft. Full-Time Support personnel are imperative to the successful transition from peace to war and have critical links to the integration of the Army’s components. To meet readiness requirements, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in concert with the Adjutants General, increased Full-Time Support authorizations as a priority for the Army National Guard.

While the Army National Guard made progress in recent years to increase Full-Time Support, obstacles remain in obtaining acceptable Full-Time Support levels. It is critical that Full-Time Manning increase in the near term to a minimum 90 percent of the total requirement to help ensure the highest readiness level, C1.

Training to Protect the Homeland

The training priority for the Army National Guard is preparation of combat-ready Soldiers that limits lengthy post-mobilization periods. The requirements for missions at home and abroad direct the training emphasis of the Army National Guard in contemporary operating environments. As a result, Army National Guard units remain fully prepared, equipped, trained and ready to operationally deploy and swiftly mobilize to meet regional and territorial responsibilities.

For a second consecutive year, the Army National Guard met or exceeded the
Secretary of Defense’s Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification training goals. In fiscal year 2004, the Army National Guard achieved 83.08 percent qualification status. This specific training goal increases to 85 percent in fiscal year 2005. The Army National Guard added training schools to meet the needs of our Soldiers for operational missions at home and abroad. These efforts resulted in 7,000 additional Soldiers now meeting deployment standards. In an effort to respond to the contemporary training needs of units and Soldiers, the Army National Guard plans to establish “Training for Urban Operations” at our facilities. We currently operate one entire suite and two Mobile Military Operation Urban Terrain sites. Additional facility construction programmed over the next five years at four National Guard Training Centers will better support mobilizations. A future construction plan targets four more sites.

Protecting Those Who Protect America
The Army National Guard adheres to the Army’s new Safety Campaign Plan and incorporates it into the Army National Guard’s Safety and Occupational Health regulation. The Army National Guard will continue to emphasize the Defensive Driving Course in the coming years. The Army National Guard Safety and Occupational Health Office is a partner with adjacent and higher level safety organizations to identify and implement successful methods of combating all our safety related problems.

Keeping the Force Strong: Recruiting and Retention
The Army National Guard ended fiscal year 2004 by achieving 99 percent of our retention objectives and exceeding attrition goals. This accomplishment falls 7,082 Soldiers short of our End Strength goal of 350,000 Soldiers. To meet this same End Strength goal in fiscal year 2005, the Army National Guard’s enlisted accession mission is 63,000 Soldiers funded at a 50/50 Non-Prior Service/Prior Service ratio. The Active Component End Strength increase, high operational tempo and reduced propensity of prior service Soldiers to join the Army National Guard prove a challenge to our recruiting mission. The reduction in Active Component members transitioning into a reserve capacity requires the Army National Guard to increase accession of Non-Prior Service candidates. Funding constraints limit the Army National Guard’s ability to maintain a presence on school campuses to attract Non-Prior Service candidates. As a result, we witnessed a drop in recruits from the high school and college graduate pool. The Army National Guard currently works with the Army Personnel leadership to identify funding requirements in the Recruiting Action Plan.

The Army National Guard implemented retention and attrition programs and is developing new initiatives to minimize projected attrition impacts of the 12-18 month mobilization cycle. To date, recent operations have not significantly affected loss rates of units returning from deployment. Our current loss rate of Soldiers demobilized through December 2004 is 11.3 percent of the entire demobilized Soldier population since 9/11. This loss rate is well below our current overall Army National Guard loss rate of 18.8 percent with the Army National Guard goal being 18 percent losses. We remain cautiously optimistic that developing Army National Guard retention programs, initiatives and enhancements based on Unit Post Mobilization Survey data will preempt the
kind of high loss rates resulting from the Operation Desert Storm/Shield era. The Army National Guard launched an aggressive new marketing campaign, “American Soldier,” targeting Non-Prior Service candidates. This comprehensive campaign reaches prospective Guardsmen through radio, television, college marketing, internet media, event marketing and point-of-sale materials, promotional items, print media and mass mailings. This marketing tool enables the Army National Guard to effectively execute its mission and recruit quality Soldiers. Supplemental funding identified as required in our Recruiting Action Plan is critical to continue “American Soldier” through Fiscal Year 2005. The Army National Guard is taking several steps to ensure we achieve fiscal year 2005 objectives. These objectives include introduction of a comprehensive Recruiting and Retention Non-commissioned Officer Sustainment Training program with internal Mobile Training Teams. Enhancements to the “YOU CAN” school programs and educational seminars include six new and 24 updated school presentations. These programs provide Army National Guard recruiters entry into the secondary school markets. We emphasize access to the secondary schools at regional and state-level educational seminars and work with professional educators to facilitate direct marketing of the Army National Guard programs. Initiatives to strengthen Commissioned Officer levels in fiscal year 2005 include a dedicated Officer Recruiting blitz. This concentrated effort involves a coordinated campaign amongst national, regional and state officer recruiting personnel. Additional support focused on Army Medical, Chaplain, Warrant Officer and Basic Branch recruiting complement our overall Officer Recruitment campaign.

Recruiting and retaining Soldiers for the Army National Guard proves to be challenging during wartime. In fiscal year 2005, the Army National Guard increased the accession mission from 56,000 to 63,000 to compensate for fiscal year 2004 shortfalls. The Army National Guard trained 971 new recruiting and retention non-commissioned officers through December 2004 and will add 1,400 more in 2005. This addition will increase our ability to recover from current End Strength and accession shortfalls. The assistance outlined above, coupled with successful implementation of key initiatives, is imperative to attaining the End Strength mission.

Environmental Programs

The Army National Guard continues implementation and full utilization of initiatives consistent with the new Army Strategy for the Environment and Installation Sustainability. Begun in fiscal year 2002, the Training Center Sustainment Initiative reduces mission impacts through identification and prioritization of environmental vulnerabilities. Range sustainment initiatives ensure maximum continuous use of Army National Guard training lands for our Soldiers. This comprehensive, web-based tool provides sustainability analysis on our training lands and valuable analytical decision-making tools for Army National Guard leaders. The Training Center Sustainment Initiative, in conjunction with Environmental Management Systems implementation and continued Geographical Information Systems integration, greatly supports active stewardship of the environment.
Transformation for the 21st Century: Ready, Reliable, Essential and Accessible
Ground-based Midcourse Defense

Defending against ballistic missile attack is a key component of the National Security Strategy for Homeland Security. In the initial defensive operations phase, the Army National Guard will play a major role in this mission as the force provider for the Ground-based Missile Defense system. We requested a fiscal year 2005 funding increase in the Active Guard Reserve manpower authorization in the President’s Budget Request to support this new role. The Ballistic Missile Defense program is dynamic—undergoing constant refinement and often late-breaking changes and decisions. The Army National Guard, as the force provider, may require last-minute changes in Active Guard Reserve manpower authorizations and related funding for missile defense decisions. Timely congressional support of these requests is imperative for the Army National Guard to provide the necessary manpower resources to the vital Homeland Defense mission. Soldiers serve in two statuses: 1) Title 32 Active Guard Reserve status performing duty consistent with the core functions by 10 USC 1019d)(6): organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing or training other members of the reserve components; 2) Title 10 Active Guard Reserve status performing the Federal Ground-based Missile Defense operational mission duties (for the duration of those duties). To support these manpower resources, Soldiers performing operational missions function in Title 10 status. Soldiers performing non-operational missions remain in Title 32 status.

Logistics and Equipment

The Army National Guard continues modernization to the digital force with the emerging technologies that will dramatically improve logistical support for these systems, substantially reduce repair times, increase operational readiness rates and eliminate obsolete and unsustainable test equipment. Use of these technologies allows the Army National Guard to operate heavy equipment at a higher operational rate while reducing the overall costs for these systems. The Army National Guard currently retains a significant portion of the Army’s maintenance infrastructure. This Cold War infrastructure is expensive and redundant. Under the Army’s new maintenance strategy, the Army National Guard and other Army elements continue consolidation of maintenance systems. This initiative enhances the maintenance system and improves efficiency. Army maintenance personnel effectively diagnose and maintain equipment by reducing maintenance tasks to two levels instead of four.
Personnel Transformation

Critical "paperless" Personnel Transformation innovations are underway within the Army National Guard. Our web-based Personnel Electronic Records Management System utilizes digital imagery to store and retrieve personnel records. This state-of-the-art technology provides seamless records management capability throughout the Total Army. The system enhances both mobilization and personnel readiness. With over 320,000 Soldiers deployed in over 120 countries, the necessity for a Total Army Records Management solution is paramount.

Aviation Transformation and Modernization

The Army National Guard's aviation transformation supports efforts to transform for the future. Aviation transformation and modernization increases our ability to support a joint warfight while enhancing our responsiveness for Homeland Defense. We are reconfiguring our aviation units into modularized units of action and units of employment to align with Army plans. Reduction of the UH-1 Huey fleet to 100 aircraft should occur by the end of 1st Quarter Fiscal Year 2005. We will complete aircraft reallocations within the National Guard system, turn in aircraft legacy systems and transfer remaining aircraft from active component units.

The Army National Guard provides almost half of the Army's aviation structure. The rate of modernization, planned quantities of most aircraft and current funding levels influence the ability to maintain combat-ready status. Aging and obsolete rotary wing assets average over twenty years of service life. Fixed wing assets also show signs of age. The Army National Guard started removing Utility C-26 aircraft from service and retiring utility C-12 aircraft. C-23 cargo aircraft offer marginal capabilities for wartime cargo movement requirements. Current plans provide no alternative replacement for our fixed wing assets. The active Army cascaded significant quantities of UH-60 Blackhawk, CH-47 Chinook and AH-64 Apache aircraft to the Army National Guard. This procurement still leaves us permanently short of adequate combat rotary wing systems. The Army National Guard anticipates receiving only 174 of the required 220 AH-64 Apaches, 131 of the required 159 CH-47 Chinooks and 662 of the required 710 UH-60 Blackhawks. Acquisition of AH-64 Apaches will consist of only 60 of the modernized AH-64D “Longbow” model.

Modernized aircraft require modern facilities to support them. Upgraded and updated facilities ensure our ability to logistically support modernized systems once in place. Fielding equipment (tool set, tool kits, test equipment and parts) necessary to support new aircraft failed to keep pace with transformation. We
fund the majority of support items by diverting funds from other Army National Guard programs. Training demands for transitioning units cause further stress for already overburdened training sites. While the Army National Guard meets these challenges, eventually we will exceed our capacity to respond and adapt. We need to obtain necessary logistical support and infrastructure to sustain our aviation structure in accordance with Army readiness standards. Without increased funding, the Army National Guard Aviation Force risks lower readiness rates, reduced capability and obsolescence.

Training in “One Army”

Training centers support our ability to conduct performance-oriented training under real-world conditions. The Army National Guard modernizes and restructures in accordance with transformation needs for Future Force ranges and maneuver areas that effectively meet evolving warfighting requirements. Ranges and training land provide live fire experience. We face a number of continuing challenges in sustaining Power Support Platforms and modernizing Army National Guard live-fire ranges and range operations for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The Army National Guard will consolidate range and training land investment documentation under the Sustainable Range Program. The Army National Guard achieves training excellence by leveraging the Distributed Learning construct. Distributed Learning improves unit and Soldier readiness through increasing access to training resources and reducing unnecessary time away from the home station. Interactive Multimedia Instruction courseware, Satellite programming and distance learning offer needed instruction for Soldiers and units. Current Distributed Learning addresses training priorities such as Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification reclassification and other professional military and functional training.

The Army National Guard engages in a full spectrum of civil-military operations. Our Soldiers represent every state, territory and sector of society. Today they represent their nation serving honorably throughout the world. In these critical times, the Army National Guard must maintain readiness. A vital part of the Army’s force structure, the Army Guard remains a community-based force committed to engage in overseas missions while protecting and serving our cities and towns. The Army National Guard has proven itself capable of carrying out its goals of supporting the Warfight, defending the Homeland and transforming into a ready, reliable, essential and accessible force for the 21st century.
A statement on the
Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2006

by

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly
Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command

Presented to
The Committees and Subcommittees
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
and the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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The annual Army Reserve Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army Reserve roles, missions, accomplishments, plans and programs.

Designed to reinforce the Chief, Army Reserve’s posture and budget testimony before Congress, the Army Reserve Posture Statement serves a broad audience as a basic reference on the state of the Army Reserve.

This document is available on the Army Reserve Web site at
www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/home
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE POSTURE STATEMENT

The 2006 Army Reserve Posture Statement (ARPS) provides an overview of the Army Reserve. It details accomplishments of the past year, as the Army Reserve continued to implement profound changes while simultaneously fighting the Global War on Terrorism. The Army Reserve understands its vital role in The Army Plan. This plan, endorsed by the Secretary of the Army in the 2005 and 2006 Army Posture Statements, centers around four overarching, interrelated strategies. The Army Reserve best supports The Army Plan by complementing the joint force with skill-rich capabilities. The Army Reserve programs, initiatives and requirements are designed to provide this additional support and are best described in the following strategies: 1. managing change; 2. providing trained and ready units; 3. equipping the force; and 4. manning the force. These strategies ensure that the Army Reserve, as an integral component of the Army, continues to meet its non-negotiable contract with the American public, to fight and win our Nation's wars.
Chapter 1: Today's Army Reserve

Chapter 2: Army Reserve History

Chapter 3: Strategic Overview

Chapter 4: Managing Change
- Focused, Efficient Management:
- Army Reserve Expeditionary Force
- Increasing the Operational Force
- Improved Facilities and Training Support:
- Realignment and Closure
- Streamlining Command and Control
- Increasing the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Assets
- Improving Business Practices

Chapter 5: Providing Trained and Ready Units
- Operations
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AMERICA REMAINS A NATION AT WAR, FIGHTING A GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM THAT DEMANDS THE SKILL, COMMITMENT, DEDICATION AND READINESS OF ALL ITS ARMED SERVICES. OUR ADVERSARY IS INTELLIGENT, TENACIOUS, ELUSIVE AND ADAPTIVE — A VIABLE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES’ NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM.
By law, the purpose of the Army Reserve — to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require” — is a reminder that while the methods, tactics and approaches we face in the Global War on Terrorism are drastically changed from that which we prepared for in the past, our Nation’s dependence on the Army Reserve has not changed.

Today’s Army Reserve is no longer a strategic reserve, it is a complementary, expeditionary force, a strategic reserve force that can fulfill the unique requirements of the Global War on Terrorism and the operational demands of the 21st century. It has evolved from a technologically focused, reserve component to a mobile, deployable organization that provides trained and capable forces, trained to fight, for the United States military and available for active service, as and when the hour and day they would be called. This fundamental shift provides a significant capability to our nation.

As an effective but limited resource to achieve higher readiness and continuity to current high-quality standards and sustaining a high tempo of operations are among the most significant challenges.

As a fully integrated member of our Nation’s defense establishment, the Army Reserve deploys on the resources as requested in the President’s budget. These funds allow the Army Reserve to retain, train, maintain and deploy forces to prepare for present and future missions. As detailed later in this document, the Army Reserve is simultaneously undergoing deep and profound change in how it organizes, trains, tests, deploys, and utilizes forces and enhancing the force. We are reorganizing the force to provide relevant and timely abilities within a streamlined command and control structure. We are committed to ensuring every program, policy and procedure is changing from the past to fit the needs of the 21st century, as opposed to extending those from the past. We will remain good stewards at the heart of the America we serve.

The Army Reserve’s future — an essential component of the world’s best Army, complementing the joint force with skills, capabilities, and professional bonds derived from our Soldiers’ service, esprit de corps, and readiness are truly more a current reality than a future one. Every initiative, concept and program is shaped to serve — to make the United States Army Reserve a viable and integral part of the Army, the preeminent force on earth — the ultimate embodiment of national resolve — that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex 21st century security environment.

The Army Reserve Soldier has always answered our country’s call to duty — and we always will.

Chief Army Reserve
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ARMY RESERVE
HISTORY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TODAY
The Army Reserve is an institution with a long tradition of adapting to the changing security needs of the Nation. The profound changes currently underway today, with more than 40,000 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized in support of the Global War on Terrorism, are an accelerated continuation of that tradition.

1908: The official predecessor of the Army Reserve was created in 1908 as the Medical Reserve Corps and subsequently titled the Organized Reserve Corps. It was a peacetime pool of trained officers and enlisted men that the Army mobilized as individual replacements for units in the world wars of the 20th century. Today, the Army Reserve makes up 67 percent of the Army’s total medical force with physicians, dentists, nurses, and technicians bringing their civilian skills and experience to Soldiers on the battlefield.

1916: Using its constitutional authority to “raise and support armies,” Congress passed the National Defense Act in 1916 that created the Officers’ Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. The Army mobilized 89,500 Reserve officers for World War I (1917-1918), one-third of whom were physicians. Currently, more than 25,000 students at 1,100 colleges and universities are enrolled in Army ROTC.

1940: In preparation for World War II, the Army began calling Army Reserve officers to active duty in June 1940. In the year that followed, the number of Reserve officers on active duty rose from less than 1,000 to more than 67,000.

1920: After the war, the separate Reserve corps for officers and enlisted men were combined into the Organized Reserve Corps, a name that lasted into the 1950s. Today, the Army’s Title 10 force is known as the Army Reserve.
1941-1945: During World War II (1941-1945), the Army mobilized 26 Reserve (designated) Infantry divisions. Approximately a quarter of all Army officers who served were from the Reserve, including over 130,000 Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates. More than 200,000 Reserve Soldiers served in the war.

1950-1953: The Korean War (1950-1953) saw more than 70 units and 240,000 Army Reserve Soldiers called to active duty. While the Korean conflict was still underway, Congress began making significant changes to the structure and role of the Reserve. These changes transformed the Organized Reserve into the United States Army Reserve.

1970s: By the 1970s, the Army Reserve was increasingly structured for combat support and combat service support. The end of the draft coincided with announcement of the Total Force Policy in 1973. The effect of an all-volunteer force and the Total Force Policy was a shift of some responsibilities and resources to the Army Reserve. Today, in the spirit of the Total Force policy, when America’s Army goes to war, the Army Reserve goes to war.

1985: Army Reserve Soldiers were among the first reserve component personnel called to active duty for operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and were among the last to leave the desert. More than 84,000 Army Reserve Soldiers provided combat support and combat service support to the United Nations forces fighting in the Persian Gulf and site support to United States forces elsewhere in the world.

1993: In the post-Cold War era, the Army restructured its reserve components. Reduction in active-component end strength made the Army even more reliant on the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. A 1993 agreement among all three components called for rebalancing the proportion of reserve component combat formations in the Army National Guard, while the Army Reserve would principally focus on combat support and combat service support. Today, the Army Reserve provides 30 percent of the Army’s combat support and 45 percent of its combat service support capabilities.

1995: Since 1995, Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized continuously. For Bosnia and Kosovo, 20,000 Army Reserve Soldiers were mobilized.

2005: As of February 2005, more than 147,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized in support of the Global War on Terrorism, with more than 40,000 still serving on active duty.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

TODAY’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IS VOLATILE, UNCERTAIN, COMPLEX AND AMBIGUOUS. THE ELEMENTS OF THAT ENVIRONMENT OFTEN INTERACT RANDOMLY AND WITHOUT SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME TO DEVELOP A DELIBERATE RESPONSE. THE NEED FOR ARMY RESERVE SOLDIERS AND UNITS TO BE FULLY PREPARED TO RESPOND, PRIOR TO MOBILIZATION, IS PARAMOUNT.
WORLD CONDITIONS REVEAL A VARIETY OF EMERGING CHALLENGES TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS:

- WIDER RANGE OF ADVERSARIES
- WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
- ROGUE STATE ARMIES
- CYBER NETWORK ATTACKS
- WORLDWIDE TERRORISM
- THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

NATIONAL CONDITIONS PRESENT ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES:

- PROTRACTED WAR
- HOMELAND DEFENSE
- BUDGET PRESSURES
- PUBLIC FOCUS
- GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT)
- DISASTER RESPONSE / RELIEF
- DECLINING MANUFACTURING BASE
- PROPENSITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE

Within such an environment, the Army Reserve is changing from a strategic reserve to an inactive-duty force of skill-rich capabilities with enhanced responsiveness to complement the Army’s transformation to a more lethal, agile and capabilities-based modular force. The Army Reserve’s force structure is no longer planned as a force in reserve — a “supplementary force,” rather, it is a force that complements the Army and joint forces. Today’s units are to be prepared and available to deploy with their full complement of trained Soldiers and equipment when the Nation calls.

This transformation will progress as the Army Reserve continues to meet the ongoing operational challenges of the Global War on Terrorism, while simultaneously supporting other missions around the globe.
MANAGING CHANGE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Since the beginning of 2005, the Army Reserve has:

- Developed and deployed a cyclic readiness and force management model, currently called Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Applied the ARFORGEN logic to how Army Reserve units are scheduled and measured for deployment. In 2005, about 75 percent of the Army Reserve mobilized units came from the ARFORGEN model.
- Programmed inactivation of 18 general officer non-warfighting headquarters.
- Awarded 11 military construction contracts in 2005 to construct nine new Army Reserve training centers that will support more than 3,500 Army Reserve Soldiers in Kansas, Florida, Utah, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey and Colorado.
- Awarded two major range improvement project contracts for Fort McCoy, WI.
- Actuated two functional commands, the Military Intelligence Readiness Command and Army Reserve Medical Command, providing focused training and force management for medical and military intelligence Army Reserve forces.
- Began realignment of command and control of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces from Special Operations Command to the U.S. Army Reserve Command to improve training and force management.
- Initiated action to close or realign 176 Army Reserve facilities under BRAC, a higher percentage than any other component of any service, moving Army Reserve Soldiers into 125 more modern facilities.
- Began applying Lean Six Sigma business management techniques to improve supporting business processes and methods.
- Provide improved facilities and more effective training to Army Reserve Soldiers.
- Streamline the command and control of Army Reserve forces.
- Increase the number of Soldiers in specialties needed to support the GWOT.
- Improve the Army Reserve business, resource and acquisition processes.

Transforming to meet today's demand for Army Reserve forces has led to the development of a host of initiatives. When implemented, these initiatives will accomplish the following:
- Ensure more focused and efficient management, increasing units' and Soldiers' readiness.
- Increase the number of Army Reserve Soldiers in deployable units.

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FOCUSED, EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT: ARMY RESERVE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The foundation for Army Reserve support to future contingencies is the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). Incorporating a strategy for cyclically managing Army Reserve force readiness, AREF directly supports the Army’s Force Generation model. AREF applies Army rotational force doctrine to decisions regarding training, equipping, and leader deployment. The management system applies packaged and cyclic resourceing of capabilities instead of the outmoded, tiered resourceing model, which supported a now obsolete, time-phased force deployment list against prescriptive operational plans. AREF provides a more focused, efficient support to units about to deploy by developing packages that can be called to duty as needed. The system also capitalizes on constrained resources to best utilize equipping and readiness dollars.

Under AREF, most Army Reserve units are assigned to one of the expeditionary force packages. The packages move through a rotational cycle of readiness levels, ranging from reconstitution to validation and employment. The units in each package will have a one-year “availability” period during which they will be “on call” or deployed. AREF enables the Army Reserve to achieve a high level of readiness in planned, deliberate time periods and provides a means to program and manage resources in advance. This planning strategy also ensures that deploying units are trained individually and collectively on the most modern equipment and have that equipment available when needed.

When fully implemented, the AREF strategy will add rotational depth to the force, spread the operational tempo more evenly throughout the Army Reserve, and add predictability to the processes that support combatant commanders, Soldiers, families, and employers.

Increasing the Operational Force

In 2005, the Army Reserve began divesting itself of force structure that exceeded its congressionally authorized end strength of 205,000. The Army Reserve also began reducing the number of spaces in non-deploying units. These actions allow more Soldiers to be assigned to deployable units and to be fully prepared for mobilization. This process requires a substantial “shaping out” of our training base and support headquarters, while carefully maintaining high quality training and support services. As an example of training base efficiencies, in fiscal year 2005, the Army Reserve continued to develop the new 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command that resulted from the merger of the 84th Training Division and the 84th Division (Institutional Training). This consolidation improved the Army Reserve’s individual training and leader education capabilities while creating leaner training support command and control structures. Reducing the number of units and focusing efforts to get more Soldiers into deployable units will allow more effective and cost-efficient management.

Improved Facilities and Training Support

Alignment and Closure

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 enables the Army Reserve to restructure its force and command, control and management headquarters, improving readiness while realizing significant cost reductions.

The BRAC 2005 recommendations became law in November 2005. BRAC provides the Army Reserve the opportunity to station forces in the most modern, up-to-date facilities possible and to redesign a Cold-War structure that no longer reflects current requirements. Under BRAC, the Army Reserve will close or realign 176 of its current facilities. This is a higher percentage than any other military component. Army Reserve units from these old centers and facilities will move into 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRCs) that are shared with at least one other reserve component, helping to support “jointness” and efficiency. This construction will eliminate duplication of facilities within the same geographical areas served by different components of our Armed Forces. Some of these moves have already begun. The new AFRCs will have high-tech, distance learning, and video teleconferencing capabilities, fitness centers, family readiness centers, and
enhanced maintenance and equipment storage facilities. These dramatic changes, closely coordinated among Army Reserve planners and the BRAC agencies, were synchronized with the Army Reserve's overall effort to reduce its organizational structure and allow more deployable forces.

**STREAMLINE COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Assisted by BRAC, the executive restructuring of Army Reserve forces creates a more streamlined command, control, and support structure, develops future force units and redefines non-deploying force structure into deploying units. The Army Reserve will disestablish the current 10 regional readiness commands (RRCs) that provide command and control, training, and readiness oversight to most of the Army Reserve units in the continental United States, and will reduce the number of general-officer commands.

Simultaneously, four regional readiness sustainment commands (RRSCs) will be established. These RRSCs, which will be fully operational by the end of fiscal year 2009, will provide base operations and administrative support to units and Army Reserve Soldiers within geographic regions. For the first time, all of the Army Reserve operational, deployable forces will be commanded by operational, deployable command headquarters.

Some of the future force brigade-level units will include support brigades (e.g., maneuver enhancement brigades, sustainment brigades, engineer, combat support, chemical and military police brigades).

Two functional, deployable commands were converted in 2005. The Army Reserve activated the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC) at Fort Belvoir, VA, and the Army Reserve Medical Command (AR-MEDCOM) at Pinellas Park, FL. The MIRC is integrated with the Army Intelligence and Security Command, and the AR-MEDCOM is integrated with the Army Medical Command. The AR-MEDCOM will eventually be further converted to a medical deployment support command and will be deployable. Aviation and military police commands are two additional functional commands being activated.

The result of the reshaping of the Army Reserve forces will be a more streamlined command and control structure and an increase in ready, deployable assets to support the Global War on Terrorism.

**INCREASING CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ASSETS**

The skills required today to assist civil governments gain their footing are not inherently military. It is in the ranks of the Army Reserve where city managers, bankers, public health directors...
and other such specialists vital to stability and support operations are found. For example, 96 percent of the Army's current Civil Affairs Soldiers are Army Reserve Soldiers; two of the three Psychological Operations groups — with their valued skills — are in the Army Reserve.

Over the next five years, the Army Reserve will add 304 Civil Affairs Soldiers and 1,228 Psychological Operations Soldiers to its inventory. The addition of these critical skills to the Army Reserve comes without additional Congressional funding; the positions will be transferred from the existing force.

Additionally, the Chief of Staff of the Army has approved the transfer of Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces from the U.S. Special Operations Command to the U.S. Army Reserve Command. This will fully integrate Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations elements into the conventional force, providing dedicated support to conventional operations.

**IMPROVING BUSINESS PRACTICES**

The Army Reserve is aggressively incorporating Lean Six Sigma concepts and practices into its business processes. Six Sigma is a problem-solving methodology that uses data and statistical analysis to create breakthrough performance within organizations.

The Army Reserve is embracing this program not only as an efficiency tool, but also as the very foundation for change. To demonstrate this commitment, the Army Reserve has stepped forward as a front-runner in Lean Six Sigma implementation within the Army. The Chief, Army Reserve, has mandated Army Reserve leaders to constantly question and review current business processes within the Army Reserve to assess their value to readiness and to seek ways to improve responsiveness.

In conjunction with the Secretary of the Army's business transformation order, the Army Reserve began development of its deployment plan and completed classroom training of five Six Sigma "green belts" (coach-facilitators), who are currently working their first projects. In addition, 40 senior leaders received two-day executive level business transformation training.

The continuation of training is planned with a goal of institutionalizing the Army Reserve program fully by achieving the highest level Six Sigma certification within the Army staff. The organizational structure to support the program is being defined and established to ensure top-level support.

**COMPPELLING NEEDS**

- Continued support of Army Reserve Expeditionary Force and other programs associated with Army Force Generation
- Steady funding lines for BMDC-generated changes for Army Reserve facilities
5 PROVIDING TRAINED AND READY UNITS

THE ARMY RESERVE WAS ON THE LEADING EDGE IN TRAINING IRAQI FORCES. THEIR CONTINUING EFFORTS WILL ENABLE THE IRAQI MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN SECURITY AND THE EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM IRAQ.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Since 9-11:
• As of February 2005, the Army Reserve had mobilized more than 147,000 Soldiers, more than 25,000 of those Soldiers served on multiple deployments
• 98 percent of Army Reserve units have provided support to current operations

Fiscal Year 2005 and beyond:
• Provided more than 1,000 unit mobilizations in fiscal year 2005
• Provided a CH-47 Chinook aviation company to support Pakistan earthquake relief efforts, transporting victims, relocating refugees and delivering supplies
• Provided relief support in response to Hurricane Katrina, delivering water, food, medical supplies, and other needed items

OPERATIONS
In December of 2005, more than 40,000 Army Reserve Soldiers were serving on active duty in 18 countries around the world. This is a much-changed world from the one the Army Reserve operated in less than a decade ago.

The Army Reserve is on the leading edge in training Iraqi forces. More than 750 soldiers from the Army Reserve’s 98th Division (Training), Rochester, N.Y., and other Army Reserve units returned from Iraq after spending a year training Iraqi military and security forces. Soldiers from the 88th Division (Training), Richmond, Va., replaced the 98th and continue this critical mission today. Their continuing efforts, in conjunction with other coalition forces, will enable the Iraqis to increasingly provide their own security, thus hastening the eventual withdrawal of Iraq’s fledgling democracy. From supporting all military branches, running truck convoys of food, ammunition, fuel and various other items, to responding to ambushes and deadly engaging the enemy, the Army Reserve has been an integral element of
the U.S. military and coalition efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

CIVIL SUPPORT

In September 2005, the Army Reserve deployed emergency preparedness liaison officers, CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters, military history detachments and truck companies to assist in the federal disaster response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

During the mission, the Army Reserve made available three Army Reserve centers to house National Guard Soldiers responding from other states. Additionally, the centers provided operating space for the Federal Emergency Management Agency and first responder representatives.

The Army Reserve also provided desperately needed fuel for the American Red Cross in order to sustain refrigeration of perishable food for the evacuees.

As recent missions make clear, the Army Reserve has significant numbers of potentially critical capabilities that may be needed in future homeland defense and security missions. These capabilities include skilled medical professionals who can practice anywhere in the United States, hazardous materials reconnaissance, casualty extraction from inside a combat zone, mass casualty decontamination, critical medical care, engineering support and water purification.

As of September 2005, the Army Reserve, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania State Fire Academy, had trained and certified more than 350 Army Reserve chemical Soldiers to the federal standard, and trained more than 2,400 chemical and medical Soldiers to perform mass casualty decontamination.

Twenty-five Army Reserve chemical defense units are fielded with specialized weapons of mass destruction-response equipment for hazardous material and mass casualty decontamination operations. However, sustaining and upgrading these robust capabilities is not achievable under current funding levels.

ARMY RESERVE TRAINING STRATEGY

As the world and its threats have changed, so have the ways the Army Reserve approaches preparing and training its members to fight the nation’s battles and protect its vital interests. The Army Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS) is the strategic training vision, establishing the fundamental concepts to implement the train-alert-deploy model for Army Reserve Soldiers. ARTS creates progressive training and readiness cycles, which provides priorities for resources, managed readiness levels and predictable training. Today’s environment does not accommodate yesterday’s “mobilize-train-deploy” model. Today’s Army Reserve Soldiers must be trained and ready prior to mobilization as if they knew the day and hour they would be called. ARTS is a critical element of the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force, which supports the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. As units advance through a series of cumulative and progressively complex training events, each training phase improves the level of unit readiness.

- During the reset/train phase of ARFORGEN, Army Reserve units begin reconstitution as Soldiers complete needed professional education and other skill-related training. The focus and priority is on individual training. The culminating event for the reset/train phase of ARFORGEN is the WARRIOR exercise, a multi-functional, multi-echelon, multi-component, joint and coalition event that improves unit proficiency at the company/platoon level.

- Units in the second year of the Reset/Train force pool will concentrate on perfecting their collective mission tasks by participating in functional exercises at the squad/crew level. The Army Reserve conducts a wide range of functional exercises throughout the United States providing skill specific training for Soldiers and units under field conditions. For example, the Quartermaster Liquid Logistics Exercise provides a challenging collective training venue for water purification, water production, and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) units. Other functional exercises are conducted for military police, transportation, maintenance and medical units.

The readiness and training goals for Army Reserve forces are the same as those for the Active component and in every instance the Army Reserve has provided trained and ready Soldiers. While the standards are the same, the conditions under which the Army Reserve prepares for its missions are significantly different. The limited training time for Army Reserve Soldiers competes with numerous civilian career priorities and must be used effectively and efficiently.

PREMIER TRAINING: WARRIOR EXERCISE (WAREX)

Warrior exercises are combined arms "combat training center-like" exercises. These exercises include opposing forces, observer-controlers and structured after-action reviews. They provide branch/functional training for combat support/combat service support units in a field environment. Future warrior exercises will also serve as the capstone, externally evaluated, collective training event to move Army Reserve units from the Reset/Train Pool of AREF into the Ready Pool. The 90th Regional Readiness Command conducted the first Warrior
Exercise in June 2005 at Fort Bliss, Texas, training more than 3,500 Soldiers.

EXPERIENCE-BASED TRAINING

Capitalizing on recent experiences in the Global War on Terrorism and lessons learned, Army Reserve training continues to adapt to meet changing battlefield conditions and an agile, thinking enemy.

Counter Improvised Explosive Device

Train-the-Trainer (T3) Course

Initially unsophisticated and relatively easy to detect as a roadside bomb, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become more complex in design and increasingly lethal over time. The purpose of the Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) Train-the-Trainer (T3) Course is to train trainers in countering IED threats, with the first priority being those troops mobilizing and deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The goal is to close the tactical performance gap between unit pre-mobilization training tasks, conditions, standards, and the actual tactical environment and mission expectations in theater.

The 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command at Ft. McCoy, WI, trained 360 Soldiers during several five-day CIED T3 courses in fiscal year 2005. These trainers have returned to their home stations to integrate CIED training into their training programs. CIED training provides the knowledge, skills and ability to provide expert advice to their unit commanders as they develop a training strategy that incorporates CIED tactics into multi-echelon, pre-mobilization training.

Convey training

Convoys are new combat patrols. Recognizing the dangers of convoy operations, the Army Reserve has developed and implemented a convoy training program. In addition to counterattack methods, the training familiarizes Soldiers with the driving characteristics of armored vehicles. The program focuses on three specific areas:

- Counter Improvised Explosive Device train-the-trainer skills
- Integration of live fire into convoy operations training
- Development of a combat driver training program that will progressively develop individual driver skills and unit convoy capabilities as units migrate through the ARFORGEN cycle. An initial, individual skills development program employing High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) with kits installed to replicate the driving characteristics of up-armed HMMWVs was initiated in 2005.

The priority of training is to units that are scheduled for deployment.

Combat Support Training Centers

The Army Reserve plans, after BRAC implementation, to establish two combat support training centers (CSTCs) — the CSTC at Fort Hunter Liggett, CA, and the Joint Mobilization Training Center at Fort Dix, NJ. These will provide much-needed training and maneuver space for technical and field training in austere environments, more rigorous and realistic weapons qualifications, classroom training, and capability to conduct Army Reserve unit collective training as well as support the Warrior Exercise program described earlier. Both training centers will also support joint, multi-component, interagency, and convoy training; up to brigade level at Fort Hunter-Liggett, and up to battalion level at Fort Dix.

Units in the Army Reserve must experience a combat training center (CTC) or combat training center-like event to validate training and readiness levels prior to mobilization. The Army Reserve continues to partner with Forces Command to incorporate its combat support and combat service support in the combat training center rotations. Additionally, the Army Reserve will assist in the development of the concept for exportable CTC capability for reserve component units unable to access training at the National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center. CTC and/or exportable training are essential, not only for unit preparation for mobilization and deployment, but also for the longer term leader development impacts such training experiences provide.

Center for Lessons Learned Mobile Training Team Seminar

The Army Reserve collaborated with the Army's Center for Lessons Learned (CaLL) in 2005, deploying mobile training teams (MTTs) which conducted four regional seminars to unit leadership teams, with a specific focus on those units identified for mobilization in 2006. These CaLL/MTTs provided orientation on the Islamic and Iraqi culture, the most recent lessons-learned emerging from theater, highlights of units after action reports, and the most effective combat tactics, techniques and procedures. The MTT discussion topics also include a current Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom operations overview highlighting challenges units can expect during the mobilization and deployment process.
The Army Reserve Leadership Development Campaign Plan
The Army Reserve Leadership Development Campaign Plan, updated and operationalized in 2005, establishes requirements and integrates programs unique to the Army Reserve. Two of the more significant components are:

**The Senior Leader Training Program** focuses on general officer and colonel-level leaders with seminars focused on organizational change, Army transformation and ethics-based leadership. All major subordinate commands of the Army Reserve Command as well as the 7th Army Reserve Command (Europe), 9th Regional Readiness Command (Hawaii), and the Army Reserve Staff have undergone this training.

**The Army Reserve Brigade and Battalion Pre-Command Course** has been upgraded to better prepare field grade commanders and command sergeants major to lead Army Reserve Soldiers. In addition, a company pre-command course for commanders, Army Reserve company command teams (commanders, first sergeants, and unit administrators) participate in a new company-team leader development course to better prepare unit command teams for the challenges of leadership at the crucial company level.

**Enhancing Mobilization**
In order to enhance the readiness of mobilizing units, the Army Reserve is successfully using a process called phased mobilization. The goal of phased mobilization is to minimize unit personnel reassignments, enhance Soldier medical and dental readiness and skill training, improve unit leadership, and enhance individual skill and unit collective training prior to unit deployments.

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Under the phased mobilization concept, selected units personnel mobilize in increments prior to the entire unit’s mobilization so that they may perform Soldier leader training, Soldier skill training, and unit collective training. Phased mobilization allows selected Soldiers to receive individual training according to a planned and phased schedule that ensures they are fully trained and mission ready for timely mission execution. Additional funding will be required to support this crucial program.

**Compelling Needs**
- Increase fiscal year 2007 Reserve Personnel, Army Reserve funding levels.
- To resource Army Force Generation–phased training requirements including non-equipment training, improved collective training, Warrior Exercises, leader education and mission environment familiarization training.
- Increase fiscal year 2007 Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve funding levels.
- For increased emphasis and additional operating tempo for warfighter task and drill training, skill reclassification training, convoy live fire training and additional support.
- Training equipment sets to support Army Reserve training centers.
- For dedicated equipment training sets at controlled locations and training equipment sets for schools and deployable units.
- To replace Army Reserve-owned Slow Motion Equipment left in Southwest Asia.
- For Modular Force equipment needed for unit level collective training in a field environment and to support designated individual and collective training locations.
- Establishment of Combat Support Training Centers.
- To establish and resource combat support training centers at a minimum of two of the Army Reserve’s four primary installations.
EQUIPPING
THE FORCE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Since 9-11:
- Mobilized virtually entire Army Reserve deployable strength without a single unit being rejected for logistics readiness - more than 250,000 items (50,000 transactions) cross-leveled among Army Reserve units
- Developed and fielded a variety of logistics information management programs to improve situational awareness and support decision making
- Developed and implemented innovative, effective, and economical methods to improve logistics readiness - 500 medium tactical trucks were withdrawn from prepositioned stocks; used depot maintenance to upgrade older medium tractors; return MIMMVs withdrawn from direct reporting maintenance organizations

Fiscal Year 2005:
- All Army Reserve units in Operation Iraqi Freedom rotation in Fiscal year 2005 mobilized at deployment criteria
- Developed Army Reserve equipping strategy to make most effective and efficient use of available equipment
- Delivered more than 3,000 M4s and 1,000 Squad Automatic Weapons Replacing M16A1 rifles and M60 machine gun
- Reduced Army Reserve logistics reconstitution backlog from a daily average of nearly 15,000 items in Fiscal Year 2004 to just over 7,500 in Fiscal Year 2005

NEW EQUIPMENT STRATEGY — HOW IT WORKS
The Army Reserve has developed a new strategy to make the most effective and efficient use of its equipment. The strategy includes maintaining equipment at four main areas: home station, strategic deployment sites, individual training sites, and collective training sites. The new strategy supports the Army Force Generation and the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) management systems. It ensures the best available equipment is provided to Army Reserve Soldiers where and when they need it, as they move through the pre-mobilization training phase of the AREF cycle to mobilization and deployment.

While individual equipment, such as weapons and masks, will continue to be maintained at unit home stations, only enough of a unit’s major items — trucks, forklifts, etc. — to allow for effective training and to support homeland defense requirements will also be there. The system allows remaining major items to be positioned at various other key training and positioning sites.
THE NEW STRATEGY ENSURES THAT THE BEST AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT IS PROVIDED TO ARMY RESERVE SOLDIERS WHERE AND WHEN THEY NEED IT.

In the new model, units will be moved to the equipment located at the training sites, rather than moving equipment to the units. Creating centrally located equipment pools to support directed and focused training will enable the Army Reserve to harvest efficiencies in resourcing and maintaining its equipment.

**Individual Training Sites**
Some of the equipment will be consolidated in individual training sites. In a site established for individual training, Soldiers qualify on their individual skills — specified, job-related skills (e.g., nurses are tested in medication procedures; lawyers, in international law). This is the first phase of the training cycle, followed by training at unit home stations.

**Collective Training Sites**
Another pool of consolidated equipment will be kept at collective training sites. Following home station unit training, units progress to collective training. Successful participation in exercises at these sites validates units as ready to conduct their wartime mission.

**Strategic Deployment Sites**
Some of the major end items are consolidated at Strategic Deployment Sites (SDSs). After inspection and assembly into unit sets, major equipment items are placed in controlled humidity storage at the SDSs. After units are validated through individual and collective training cycles and called to deploy, equipment at these sites will be shipped directly to theater.

Progressing through individual training, home station training and then participating in larger exercise-driven collective training is the normal training cycle to prepare for a deployment. Pre-positioning equipment at these sites is a cost-efficient system of support.

**COMPELLING NEEDS**
Procurement of equipment to support modularity
- Night vision systems
- Chemical/biological/radiological detection/alarm systems
- Medical Equipment
- Light-medium trucks (75 percent do not support single-fleet policy, integral to training and operational efficiency)
- Medium tractors (50 percent do not support single-fleet policy, integral to training and operational efficiency)

Sustainment
- Sustainment of depot maintenance levels
- Recapitalization of tactical truck inventory
- Army Reserve tactical maintenance contract labor to reduce mobilization and training equipment backlogs
MANNING THE FORCE

The Soldier has always been and remains the centerpiece of the Army. The Army Reserve is committed to making the best use of our most valuable resource and is intent that those programs that affect Soldiers and families will be our top priority. First, Soldiers and their families need to know what to expect up front. The expectation of service in the Reserve is much changed from a decade ago. Army Reserve Soldiers and incoming recruits need to know that today’s advertising and communications reflect the reality of the contemporary operating environment and the culture that surrounds this proud institution. The Army Reserve will not lower its standards, but will instead use a host of incentives and changed policies to access the best candidates for Army Reserve service.

Additionally, the Army Reserve will strive to ensure that the best quality of care for our Soldiers and their families is provided while constantly working to improve the quality of life for Soldiers, civilians, and their families. Future personnel plans will assure we can maintain both personnel strength and readiness. The Army Reserve leadership will manage personnel through accession and assignment, reassignment, training, and retaining or reclassification. Additionally, leadership will manage relocation in adherence to the ARES and its integration into the ARFORGEN model.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

- As of February 2006, 147,000 Army Reserve Soldiers had mobilized in support of OIF, OEF, and OCN.
- Developed and refined several information technology management systems encompassing accountability and business processes.
- Reduced attrition from 24.7 percent in 2001 to 22.5 percent in fiscal year 2005.
- Established an Army Reserve casualty affairs program and office to care for Soldiers and their grieving families.

Fiscal Year 2005:

- Fully implemented the Trinities, Transients, Holdovers, and Students (TTHS) Account—a personnel accounting practice that enhances the readiness of Army Reserve units
- Initiated a family programs Web portal to provide information: www.army.gov/tps.
- Created and fully staffed 53 mobilization/deployment assistant positions in communities throughout the country.
- Recognized Soldiers’ sacrifices by presenting nearly 26,000 awards in the Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Program.
- Realigned and enhanced incentives and benefits for Army Reserve Soldiers and families.
- Established an employer relations program that is building positive and enduring relationships with employers.
- Revised several personnel policies under the Chief, Army Reserve, to better lead and manage Army Reserve assets.

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CULTURE CHANGE
A critical element to support profound change in the Army Reserve is the cultural shift now occurring. Continuous reinforcement of Army Values, the expectation of deployment, the ability to think innovatively and leader development are all part of that cultural shift. While past Army Reserve advertising messages focused on benefits, downplaying the effort required for service, “Honor is never off duty” is now our touchstone. The Soldiers Creed and the Warrior Ethos are the bedrock of our force.

RECRUITING
While accessioning fell short by 16.2 percent of its goal in 2005, a variety of initiatives and improvements, such as those listed below, are underway to achieve our recruiting goals in 2006 to meet the needs of both personnel strength and readiness. Leaders can now access, assign or reassign, train, re-train or reclassify Soldiers into the Army Reserve more efficiently, responsively and effectively.

SELECTED RESERVE INCENTIVE PROGRAM
The Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) was crucial in 2005. It enhanced the recruiting of Soldiers in critical specialties to meet the Army Reserve readiness needs. Continued Congressional support listed below will be just as crucial in the upcoming years:
- Increased bonus incentives to Soldiers reenlisting and joining the Army Reserve
- Expanding eligibility years for Reenlistment Bonuses
- Officer Accession, Affiliation, and the Specialty Conversion bonuses added to the SRIP
- Lump sum payment options for reenlistment bonuses with tax-free payments to Soldiers in the combat zone.

OTHER INITIATIVES
- Increased Enlisted Affiliation Bonuses
- Addition of the “High Grad” Bonus, used to attract those candidates with at least 30 or more semester hours of college credit
- Establishment of the Active Guard and Reserve Selective Reenlistment Bonus

RETAINTION
By taking care of Soldiers during the current pace of operations and war, retention goals in the Army Reserve were met. In fiscal year 2005, the Army Reserve achieved 101.5 percent of its annual reenlistment goal.

FULL TIME SUPPORT
The Army Reserve’s highest priority continues to be dedicated support to our war-fighting Soldiers. The Global War on Terrorism continues to place a high demand on the Army Reserve’s war fighting formations and their ability to mobilize in a highly trained state. Among the most important resources that we have in ensuring mobilization readiness of the 21st Century Army Reserve are our Full Time Support (FTS) personnel. Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers (AGR), Department of the Army civilians and our military technicians (MiTechs). Congress has historically recognized the paramount importance of adequate FTS levels for unit mobilization readiness.

The Army Reserve continues to maintain the maximum effective use of our FTS personnel to meet unit readiness requirements prior to arrival at the mobilization station.

Historically, the Army Reserve has had the lowest FTS percentage of any DoD Reserve component.
- In fiscal year 2005, DoD average FTS manning level was 21 percent of end strength, while the fiscal year 2005 total for the Army Reserve was 11.3 percent.
- The projected increase for Army Reserve FTS in fiscal year 2006 takes the level only to 11.6 percent.
- Congress and the Army continue to support the goal of 12 percent FTS by fiscal year 2010 in order for the Army Reserve to meet minimum essential readiness levels as proposed by Headquarters, Department of the Army, in fiscal year 2000.

In fiscal year 2005, the Army Reserve was tasked with FTS mission requirements above and beyond programmed requirements, including:
- Replacing 78 Active component training advisers to the Reserve components who will be reassigned to support Active component missions.
- Providing U.S. Army Recruiting Command 734 additional recruiters for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.

These un-programmed requirements placed an additional demand on our already burdened FTS resources.
QUALITY OF LIFE AND WELL-BEING OF SOLDIERS AND FAMILY MEMBERS

Quality of life issues continue to be high on the list of things that directly affect retention of Soldiers in the Army Reserve. The Secretary of the Army has stated:

"My top priority will be the well-being of Soldiers and their families. There is no more important aspect of our effort to win the Global War on Terrorism than taking care of our people."

The Army Reserve continues to improve its well-being efforts in the myriad of programs, policies and initiatives in its purview. Family programs remain a top priority.

Welcome Home Warrior Citizen Award Program

With congressional support, the Army Reserve was able to recognize nearly 26,000 Army Reserve Soldiers with the Army Reserve Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Award in fiscal year 2005. The program ensures that returning Warrior-Citizens understand that their contributions to the mission and making our homeland more secure for all our citizens are recognized and appreciated by the Nation and the Army. The response to the program has been overwhelmingly positive in supporting efforts to retain Soldiers, thus increasing unit readiness. With continued congressional support, the Army Reserve will continue this program into the ongoing fiscal year and beyond.

Well-Being Advisory Council

This new and very dynamic structure supports all five Army Reserve constituent groups: Soldiers, families, civilians, retirees and veterans. The needs of each of these constituencies are growing, our programs continue to expand to meet these needs. The membership of the council will include a variety of individuals from the commands and organizations throughout the Army Reserve, including family member volunteers. The council will meet twice each year to consider and recommend disposition of well-being issues to the Chief, Army Reserve.

The council is our integral link to the Army Family Action Plan.

Army Reserve Child and Youth Services Program

The Army Reserve now has a Child and Youth Services (CYS) Directorate staff to provide services that support the readiness and well-being of families, including those families that are geographically dispersed. CYS programs and initiatives are designed to reduce the conflict between parental responsibilities and Soldier mission requirements. The Army Reserve CYS homepage is at www.mrfp.org/cys.

Educational Benefits

The Army Reserve Voluntary Education Services Program is a priority of the Chief, Army Reserve. Continuance of these services is necessary as an essential incentive we provide the Soldiers of the Army Reserve. Army Reserve Voluntary Education Services is a DoD-mandated commander program that promotes lifelong opportunities for Selected Reserve Soldiers through voluntary education services that enhance recruiting, retention and readiness of Army Reserve Soldiers.

The Army Reserve Voluntary Education Services have continuously provided an array of education programs since their inception. Recent changes have decentralized the execution of the tuition assistance program to allow for management decisions to be made closer to where the Soldiers live and work. This also allows for tighter fiscal controls and better coordination between Soldiers and colleges.

Other educational programs are listed below:

- Montgomery GI Bill
- Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support Testing Program (DANTES)
- Student Guide to Success
- Credit for Military Experience
- Army/American Council on Education Registry Transcript System (AARTS)
Support to Wounded Soldiers
The Army Reserve is dedicated to treating its Soldiers with the care and respect they have earned. Supporting Soldiers wounded in service to the country is one example of that commitment. The Disabled Soldier Support System was renamed the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program (Army W2) in November 2005. It continues to provide personal support, advocacy, and follow-up for these heroes. The Army W2 facilitates assistance from initial casualty notification through the Soldier’s assimilation into civilian communities’ services (for up to five years after medical retirement). Assistance includes:
• Information about family travel to the Soldiers’ bedside
• Invitational travel orders for family members of seriously ill patients
• Pay issues
• Options for continuing on active duty
• Assistance with Medical Evaluation and Physical Evaluation Board processes

Soldiers with 30 percent or greater disability ratings and in a special category of injuries or illness — amputees, severe burns, head injuries or loss of eyesight — are assessed for enrollment in the program. Army W2 brings the wounded Soldiers and the organizations that stand ready to assist these Soldiers and families together. The Veterans’ Administration and other similar veterans’ service organizations participate in the program.

Some of these Soldiers may be in the process of medical retirements, pending other dispositions, such as being extended on active duty, or enrollment in the Community Based Healthcare Initiative, which allows selected reserve component Soldiers to return to their homes and receive medical care in their community.

Base Operations Support
The Army Reserve is committed to providing better quality of life services and critical support to Soldiers, their families and the civilian workforce. The increase in base operations support for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 will greatly assist this effort, allowing for better engineering support, safety programs, law enforcement, and force protection, to name only a few areas.

More Efficient Management of Officer Promotions
Specific policy changes that were effected by the Chief, Army Reserve, improved our personnel management capability. By creating three separate reserve component competitive promotion categories, the Army Reserve can retain and better manage its officers. Another change enabled the Army Reserve to select officers based upon unique force structure requirements. That change will provide business efficiencies to better meet the growing requirements in all categories of the Selected Reserve, producing greater predictability and equity among all considered officers. The revised competitive categories meet the intent of Congress to match the number of officers selected for promotion by a mandatory promotion board to officers needed in the related categories.

Enhanced Care for Professional Development
Regional Personnel Service Centers (RPSCs), the Army Reserve military personnel management offices, will provide active personnel management for all Army Reserve Soldiers. Implementation of four RPSCs, in support of the Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces model, will provide standardized life-cycle management support to Army Reserve Soldiers regardless of where they may be in the command. This initiative relies on increased communication, interaction and involvement by commanders and their Soldiers to assure trained and ready Soldiers.

COMPPELLING NEEDS
• Continued funding for enlistment, accession, affiliation, convention, and retention incentives and bonuses to meet readiness requirements
• Attain minimum essential full time support level of 12 percent of end strength by fiscal year 2010
• Strengthened medical and health services for Army Reserve Soldiers
• Continuation funding for Army Reserve Soldier educational services and opportunities (e.g., tuition assistance and scholarships)
• Continuance of the Army Reserve Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Award Program
THE WAY AHEAD

The changed conditions of warfare have greatly affected our armed services, including and especially the reserve components. We are now engaged in a global war that will last a long time. We are in an asymmetric, rather than a linear battlefield. We are in a protracted war, not one with a defined beginning and end.

The constant threat of attacks on our homeland, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, places a premium on readiness and responsiveness. Because of these changing conditions, the Army Reserve has implemented a host of initiatives that are creating deep, lasting and profound change.

Today, the deployment of our Army and Army Reserve, is no longer the exception, rather it is the rule. The Army Reserve is meeting the energy and urgency of Army transformation and the demands of the Global War on Terrorism to change. We are changing our organization in deep and profound ways, from a technically focused force-in-reserve to a learning organization that provides trained, ready "inactive duty" Citizen-Soldiers, ready and available for active service, now as ready as if they knew the hour and day they would be called.

To that end, the Army Reserve will require:

- Continued funding to support changes in personnel incentives
- Adequate funding to support Army Reserve expeditionary force training, equipping and maintenance strategies
- Support for legislative and policy changes to support recruiting efforts, personnel management and mobilization
THE SOLDIER’S CREED

I AM AN AMERICAN SOLDIER.

I AM A WARRIOR AND A MEMBER OF A TEAM. I SERVE THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND LIVE THE ARMY VALUES.

I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THE MISSION FIRST.
I WILL NEVER ACCEPT DEFEAT.
I WILL NEVER QUIT.
I WILL NEVER LEAVE A FALLEN COMRADE.

I AM DISCIPLINED, PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY TOUGH,
TRAINED AND PROFICIENT IN MY WARRIOR TASKS AND DRILLS.
I ALWAYS MAINTAIN MY ARMS, MY EQUIPMENT AND MYSELF.
I AM AN EXPERT AND I AM A PROFESSIONAL.
I STAND READY TO DEPLOY, ENGAGE, AND DESTROY THE ENEMIES
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CLOSE COMBAT.
I AM A GUARDIAN OF FREEDOM AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE.
I AM AN AMERICAN SOLDIER.

ARMY RESERVE
APPENDIX C

SUMMARY FROM REPORT FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE

The following summary is from Christine Wormuth, Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Future of the National Guard and Reserves*, July 2006

1. Demand for U.S. military forces in the future will remain high.

   Employing RC forces as part of the operational force is a requirement, not a choice.

3. The Guard and Reserves need to remain multi-mission capable, but put less emphasis on conventional campaigns

4. DoD should increase the size of the Total Army by creating 43 active BCTs and 34 ARNG BCTs in the near term, with the long-term goal of creating 48 active BCTs total.

5. An outside panel of expert[s sic] should conduct a detailed, comprehensive, cross-Service review of Active and Reserve Component manpower requirements.

6. The Department of Defense and the Army need to address the substantial equipment funding shortfalls facing the Army’s reserve components.

7. The Army should closely monitor the multifunctional support brigades to determine whether the existing design is sufficient, whether there are sufficient numbers of support brigades to support deployed combat forces, and whether equipment and manning levels are sufficient.

8. The Army should either increase the training levels envisioned under ARFORGEN, or make explicit that additional post-mobilization training will continue to be required and adjust deployment lengths accordingly. Additional funding is also needed to ensure the ARFORGEN training strategy can succeed.

9. Man and fund units in the two years preceding the potential deployment year at 105 percent or more so that units can deploy under ARFORGEN without having to undergo cross-leveling.

10. Establish recruiting and retention programs and policies that will enable the Army reserve components to man their units at sufficient strength.

11. The Department of Defense needs to propose a new set of mobilization authorities to Congress to enable routine but judicious use of the Reserve Component as part of the operational force.
12. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau should remain a three-star general and continue to report to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force on all matters except those concerning the National Guard’s role in homeland defense and civil support.

13. DoD should conduct the comprehensive personnel audit recommended by the Defense Science Board and use it to identify opportunities to use technology to reduce personnel requirements.

14. DoD should place more trained contracting technical representatives in theater and provide other oversight mechanisms to ensure cost effective and efficient implementation of support contracts.

15. DoD should aggressively pursue the sponsored reserve concept to expand the number of contractors who can deploy into theater as reservists subject to UCMJ.

16. The Department of Defense should seek to use contractors in lieu of combat service support personnel to provide support services in future operations when the security environment permits.

17. DoD needs to accept civil support as a central mission and act accordingly.

18. Leverage the National Guard to form the backbone of regional Civil Support Forces.

19. The Department of Defense should nominate a National Guard general officer to serve as Deputy Commander at NORTHCOM.

20. Designate the Chief, National Guard Bureau as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters concerning the role of the National Guard in homeland security, homeland defense and civil support missions.

21. Revise the charter for the NGB to recognize its role as the joint force manager for the National Guard’s role in homeland defense and civil support.

22. The military services should give priority to developing a much broader range of programs to implement the continuum of service concept.

23. The Army, Navy, and Air Force should revitalize their IRR programs.

24. The Services should enhance lateral entry opportunities to attract more mid-career recruits in priority specialties.
25. Each Service should create and implement a fully integrated personnel and pay system by 2008.

26. Reduce and rationalize the number of Duty Status subcategories.

27. Authorize the Service Secretaries to offer flexible compensation schemes in support of Continuum of Service initiatives.

28. Shield prior service personnel from deployments for a two year period upon joining the National Guard or Reserves.

29. Make service in the National Guard and Reserves a path to accelerated U.S. citizenship for legal immigrants.

30. Allow Guard and Reserve recruits to attend college without risk of activation in exchange for a longer period of service.

31. Target compensation on needed skills and capabilities instead of using “fair share” driven resource allocation schemes.

32. The President and other national leaders should issue calls to national service.

33. Enhance the predictability of mobilizations.

34. Keep the average length of mobilization to no more than a year.

35. Avoid using reservists as garrison replacements at active duty installations in the United States.

36. Reduce transition costs for Guard and reserve members and their families.

37. Allow reservists to transfer educational benefits to spouses.

38. Reestablish Retention NCOs in all Guard and reserve units.

39. Retain the current Reserve Component health care benefit without further expansion.

40. Focus efforts on improving access to health care benefits in lieu of further expansion of the existing benefits.

41. Retain the current reserve retirement system which provides for an annuity at age 60.

42. Institutionalize Reserve Component family support infrastructure at the deploying unit level.
43. The Department of Defense should establish and fund the systematic collection of personnel, medical, and dental care data related to the needs and behavior of Reserve Component personnel and their families to support the development of cost effective personnel, health care, and compensation policies and programs tailored to this unique population.
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