AN ARMY WITHOUT DOCTRINE: THE EVOLUTION OF US ARMY TACTICS IN THE ABSENCE OF DOCTRINE, 1779 TO 1847

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

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B.A., California State University, Fresno, CA, 1989

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This thesis examines how the United States (US) Army conducted operations and adapted their tactics during the Indian wars of 1779, through the Second Seminole War, and ending in 1847. During this period, the US Army lacked a comprehensive written doctrine that captured how the Army fought its wars, so those skills and techniques could be passed down for subsequent conflicts against Native Americans. This caused the US Army to rely on the experiences gathered from past Indian conflicts as well as the existing texts and publications from contemporary military theorists, such as Henri Jomini and Dennis Hart Mahan. The thesis examines three periods to prove the thesis: the colonial period from 1620 through 1794, the establishment of Indian policies from 1794 through 1831, and the Second Seminole War, which lasted from 1835 to 1842. The scope of the thesis concludes with Dennis Hart Mahan’s publication of *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops With the Essential Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics*. Mahan’s textbook became de facto doctrine due to its combination of military theory, inclusion of past US Army experiences in Indian warfare and its acceptance as a training text for US Army officers at the US Military Academy at West Point. This text is the end result of over one-hundred years of American military experience and evolution under fire, proving that the US Army can, and did, succeed against its enemies without formal doctrine.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

AN ARMY WITHOUT DOCTRINE: THE EVOLUTION OF US ARMY TACTICS IN THE ABSENCE OF DOCTRINE, 1779 TO 1847, by Major Conrad E. Harvey, 102 pages.

This thesis examines how the United States (US) Army conducted operations and adapted their tactics during the Indian wars of 1779, through the Second Seminole War, and ending in 1847. During this period, the US Army lacked a comprehensive written doctrine that captured how the Army fought its wars, so those skills and techniques could be passed down for subsequent conflicts against Native Americans. This caused the US Army to rely on the experiences gathered from past Indian conflicts as well as the existing texts and publications from contemporary military theorists, such as Henri Jomini and Dennis Hart Mahan. The thesis examines three periods to prove the thesis: the colonial period from 1620 through 1794, the establishment of Indian policies from 1794 through 1831, and the Second Seminole War, which lasted from 1835 to 1842. The scope of the thesis concludes with Dennis Hart Mahan’s publication of *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops With the Essential Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics*. Mahan’s textbook became de facto doctrine due to its combination of military theory, inclusion of past US Army experiences in Indian warfare and its acceptance as a training text for US Army officers at the US Military Academy at West Point. This text is the end result of over one-hundred years of American military experience and evolution under fire, proving that the US Army can, and did, succeed against its enemies without formal doctrine.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

During the early American period, the United States (US) Army possessed no written doctrine addressing how to fight Native Americans; therefore, the Army relied on experiences gained during earlier campaigns that allowed them to successfully prosecute conflicts with Native Americans all the way through the Second Seminole War. This reliance on unwritten guidance on how to fight Native Americans led to unnecessary hardship and expense, both human and monetary. Military defeats, due to failures to understand the dynamics of Indian warfare in the American Northeast and to properly train and equip the Western force for Indian warfare, permeated the early colonial period. These defeats led North American military theorists to analyze the culture and fighting tactics of the North American Indian and to come up with a solution that allowed Western armies to contend with this new, nondoctrinal threat. These theorists, such as Henry Bouquet, contributed written works and insights that were quickly adopted by Western armies operating in North America, but no formal written doctrine addressing Indian warfare was ever developed by the US government until 1860. This forced early American military leaders to rely on the experience of others, as well as the written works of the military theorists of the day (De Saxe, Bouquet, and others) to form their own tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter the methods of Indian warfare.

Native Americans generally relied on surprise to defeat colonial and European forces operating against them. The Western forces responded with superior firepower and adaptive tactics, with mixed results. While Indians relied primarily on firearms and surprise to defeat their enemies, Western forces had advantages in discipline, artillery,
and the bayonet. Additionally, Western forces developed adaptive tactics to attempt to counter the Indians ability to surprise and ambush. Some commanders, such as Colonel Henry Bouquet, General John Sullivan, and Major General “Mad” Anthony Wayne, demonstrated an ability to adapt their force and tactics that successfully marginalized the Indians surprise tactics. Others, such as General Arthur St. Clair and Brigadier General Josiah Harmar, were less successful. The Indians could not adapt to overcome Western strengths and thus had to continue to rely on the increasingly unsuccessful surprise tactics they had used for over a century.

Native Americans began to transition from bows and arrows to firearms when Europeans introduced smoothbore trade guns in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Prior to this, Native Americans used bows, arrows, and hand weapons: such as knives, tomahawks, and war clubs for both combat and hunting. The musket provided the Indians with a weapon capable of matching those found in Western militaries in both firepower and accuracy. There were three trade-offs for the new weapon: first, the smoke and blast from the musket gave away the warrior’s position where the bow and arrow was a silent weapon; second, the increased use of the musket led to increased reliance on foreign (usually French or British) sources for lead and powder; and third, there is some evidence of the reliance on the musket led to the atrophying of the skills necessary to use bows hand weapons when closing with the enemy. Though the Native Americans did not have the capability to produce lead or gunpowder to any real extent, they maintained the ability to trade easily for these items. Both the British and French traded freely with all of the native tribes in the region and often supplied allied tribes outright through the period. Virtually every reference describes how the various factions (American, British,
and French) supplied Native Americans before and after the American Revolution in an attempt to curry favor. Although not a new or surprising concept, it does show one important fact: the Native American tribes, particularly those in conflict with American, British, and French interests, had many opportunities for resupply with powder and lead through either trade or supply. This symbiotic relationship with the various nonnative factions furthered their reliance on the firearm as the primary weapon for both hunting and warfare and began their role, as the pawns of the Western forces in the frontier fighting that will characterize the colonial period.

Native Americans had relied on one tried-and-true tactic since before Europeans arrived on North American shores, the use of surprise. Historian John K. Mahon writes that the reason for this is that the Native Americans lacked the social organization to form more refined tactics, such as maneuver warfare. This may be the case, but regardless of their social structure, surprise is clearly the base tactic of the Native Americans. Surprise is evident in nearly every engagement whether it is between other warring tribes or westerners. Native Americans followed three primary methods of fighting: fight in nonlinear scattered formations, try to envelop or surround at every opportunity, and withdraw if the pressure became too great. The standard attack by Native Americans consisted of moving to an assault position during the night surrounding the objective and assaulting at first light. This tactic of surprise and envelopment was used regularly to attack formations of troops, native villages, isolated farms, and nearly any other static objective that lent itself to this form of attack. Examples of Native Americans using this form of attack are common to every native tribe researched with little variation. The ability to envelop Western military forces produced especially destructive effects when
applied to militia troops. If a Native American force managed to cut off parts of a larger Western force, it usually resulted in destruction of the Western force unless the Western force possessed the discipline to maintain unit integrity and fight as a whole. Militia normally did not possess this discipline and normally fell apart quickly, allowing the Native Americans to close and destroy them before reinforcing troops could come to the rescue. St. Clair demonstrated this during his campaign. Brigadier General Arthur St. Clair led a force of American Colonials and militia in a punitive raid against the Shawnee in 1791. St. Clair had a portion of his militia on picket duty in order to protect his main encampment. Shawnee’s and their allies attacked St. Clair at first light, quickly enveloping the militia pickets. The militia managed to fire one volley before breaking. This utter failure of discipline resulted in hundreds of American Soldiers killed before the Continentals regained a coherent front and managed a rout instead of a massacre.6

Native Americans tended to not deliberately attack a fortified position or blockhouse. The reasons for this were obvious. Native Americans did not possess or use artillery in any form (cannon, mortars, or rockets) and did not normally have the ability to mass enough combat power to overcome a fortified position without taking heavy loss. Native American culture did not cultivate a need to waste life in order to carry a position or battle. If the odds for success shifted against the attacker, the Native American attacker withdrew. Native Americans were risk adverse for two main reasons: their culture did not demand that they uselessly expend life and the Native Americans had a hard time replacing losses. No Army Force Generation model or replacement system existed for the Native American. He depended on reproduction and integration of captives into the tribe in order to increase numbers.7 Simply put, Native Americans could not replace losses as
rapidly as Western forces could. In the event that a Native American force (usually prompted by an allied Western officer) attempted to overrun a fortified position, the Native Americans would try to use a variation of their surprise tactics to overcome their lack of artillery. In 1711, the Tuscarora tribe managed to nearly wipeout several North Carolina settlements using surprise to enter fortified villages and blockhouses. The Tuscaroras used effective operational security to approach the settlements and appear friendly. They arrived with their women and no colonist suspected their true intention until the Natives sprung their ambush. Another example of surprise entry into a fortified position occurred during Pontiac’s War in 1763, at Fort Michilimackinac. Colonists and Natives interacted on good terms. When the Native Americans saw that the garrison guarding the fort was relaxed around them, the natives struck. Squaws smuggled weapons into the fort while the warriors played lacrosse outside the gate. Once the squaws were in position, a warrior knocked the ball into the fort. The warriors rushed in past the guard who thought the game was continuing, secured the weapons smuggled in by the squaws, and attacked. The colonists were slaughtered.  

The logical target of an attack by Native Americans, based on their reluctance to attack a fortified position and dependence on surprise and envelopment for success, consisted of mainly outlaying farms and villages. These lent themselves to surprise because of their isolation from military forces. Native Americans could approach quietly and unobserved through the forests, strike the isolated farm at first light, and leave by the time the local militia responded. Besides being a soft target for the risk-adverse Native Americans, there was a second benefit; it tended to drive the remaining colonists to their local blockhouse or fortified village. These depopulated the area even further and allowed
the Native Americans to burn, and destroy with even less risk and expenditure of powder and lead.

The Native American methods of warfare had several advantages, as well as disadvantages. The one advantage over Western forces was fear. Fear of being ambushed, fear of being attacked by a howling mob of savages, and fear of your family being massacred while away from the farm. Fear also allowed discipline to break down quickly under fire (as in the case of St. Clair). Another advantage was tactical simplicity. The Native Americans did not use any complicated maneuvers. Use stealth to gain a position where the opposing force could be surprised, envelop the force, and destroy it. If the Western force proved too strong; withdraw, regroup, and seek another opportunity to gain surprise and attack again. No complicated training for this method of warfare is required. No need to “grow” leaders that understood complex maneuver and drill. Another advantage to this method of warfare is the reduced amounts of powder and lead used in their surprise attacks. Surprise attacks, by their very nature, do not require volley after volley of massed fires to break a line. This reduces the need for resupply and reliance on foreign powder and lead. The nonlinear, scattered nature of Native American attacks also reduced their vulnerability to the massed fires favored by Western infantry.

Arguably, the biggest disadvantage of the methods of Native American warfare was their predictability. Every Western Soldier, from the commander to the lowest private, knew quickly that the Native American wanted to fight him from ambush. This drove Western tactics to counter this. This included the development of light infantry, Rangers, and rifle companies (Soldiers armed with rifles as opposed to a smoothbore musket) to clear potential ambush locations, target individual Native Americans from a
distance (up to 300 yards using a rifle), and to take advantage of the Native American’s disposition to avoiding risk by securing the main body, preventing ambush and forcing the Natives to mass.

The lack of discipline on the part of many Native Americans also proved to be a disadvantage. An example of this occurred during the Sullivan Campaign in 1794. General John Sullivan closed with a British force consisting of mainly Iroquois Indians and a company of British Regulars in Pennsylvania. Sullivan’s reconnaissance efforts provided him with the location of the main resistance point, an ambush. The lack of discipline on the part of the Iroquois, specifically firing at a deer and building cooking fires, alerted Sullivan to the position allowing him to envelop the ambush and force the withdrawal of the British and Iroquois force after a sharp battle.\(^9\)

The last disadvantage involved the firearms the Native Americans possessed. The trade guns were mainly smoothbore muskets, .69 to .71 caliber and had an effective range of no more than about 80 yards. Although comparable to the range and rate of fire of the British Brown Bess musket, it was less than the primary Continental musket, the French Charleville. This musket, also a smoothbore, had an effective range of about 100 yards. The most effective Western weapon was the rifle. The most famous rifle was the Pennsylvania rifles, although some European countries also manufactured rifles for their rifle corps (the most notable being the Jaeger rifle). The rifle had spiral grooves cut into the barrel causing the round lead ball to spin during flight. This added velocity, range, and accuracy. A skillful rifleman could easily hit a man-sized target out to 300 yards regularly.\(^{10}\) This firepower and range disparity forced to Native Americans to continue to rely on surprise since they could not outrange nor out-maneuver their Western opponents.
The Western forces had their own, distinct methods of warfare. Early in Native American-Western conflict, the westerners found that the best way to a good offense was the best defense. Western forces found that the most effective way to force a fight with Native Americans was to attack their tribal lands, drops, and families. This evolved into a common tactic that has been extensively documented. In addition to an offensive into tribal areas, the Western forces also used the Native American tactic of surprise in order to defeat their Native American enemies. Native Americans had lax security at night, which enabled Western forces to approach to assault range of an encampment or village. As in the case of the Native Americans, the westerners attacked at first light. By attacking Native American families and food sources, the Native Americans were forced to fight. This allowed the Western forces to bring their true military strengths to bear their superior firepower and discipline.

The rank and file Soldier came armed with a smoothbore flintlock musket (between .69 and .71 caliber) fitted with the triangular socket bayonet (about 14 inches to 16 inches long). This bayonet attached to the end of the muzzle by means of a small lug at the bottom of the barrel near the muzzle. This allowed the infantryman of the period to close with the enemy and continue to pose a threat despite not having a loaded musket. Just about anyone could use a musket from a distance, but it took discipline in the ranks to make the bayonet effective. This is because by maintaining a solid, linear formation with fixed bayonets, the formation could deliver massive shock effect. The triangular bayonet was not intended to be a personal defense weapon as it is today. The bayonet at the time constituted the primary shock weapon for the infantry regiment. The regiment would use direct fire to break up an opposing line of infantry, and then close with the
bayonet to break the line and force a withdrawal. This same principle applied to Native American formations as well, particularly if they could be forced to mass.

Western forces also dominated the use of artillery. Historian Joseph Fischer describes the painstaking efforts used during the Sullivan Campaign to muscle cannon artillery, as well as small coehorn mortars to a firing point and describes their effectiveness against Native Americans. There is no evidence of the use of artillery by Native Americans. There is no doubt that European military forces supported Native American attacks with artillery, but Native Americans themselves did not use artillery. Western forces seemed to be almost compelled to employ artillery during their campaigns despite their often-dubious advantage against Native Americans. In virtually every case, the Western force took some artillery with them on campaign and found a way to employ it, usually to great effect; as in the Battle of Newtown under Sullivan. If Western forces could make a Native American force to mass, as Sullivan did, then artillery could be used decisively. The same tree the Iroquois warrior could use for protection against a .69 caliber musket ball would not even slow down a full dose of grape shot, spherical case or solid shot. Recall the risk adverse nature of the Native Americans. The sound and sight of cannon firing combined with the shock effect of solid shot destroying everything it bounces into would have been too great to bear. Although there is considerable evidence that the effort involved with bringing artillery along on campaign nearly broke the physical and logistic abilities to get the artillery to the battlefield, there is little doubt that once employed, the effect could be impressive and immediate.

The other significant weapon used by the Western forces was the rifle. Identical to the musket in operation; the difference involved spiral grooves cut inside the barrel called
rifling. Rifling enabled the round ball fired from the weapon to engage the grooves causing it to spin. This spin increased the accuracy and range of the ball. The tighter fit of the ball in the barrel also increased the velocity of the round adding to the accuracy and lethality of the ball. In the hands of a skilled marksman, a rifleman could hit a seven-inch target at over 250 yards. This is an incredible improvement over the smoothbore musket that had an effective range of only about 80 to 100 yards.13 The use of rifle companies mixed with regular line infantry significantly enhanced the lethality of the Western formations. Riflemen could be used to fix Native American forces from beyond the effective range of the trade musket in order to allow the line infantry to envelop the flanks of the Native Americans. This technique was used to great effect by Sullivan and Bouquet. The rifle had two disadvantages: first it could not accept a bayonet during the colonial period (the first American rifle capable of fitting a bayonet would be the model 1855 Springfield); and second it took longer to load than a musket. This drove the tactics for rifle companies. Rifle companies could not integrate with line infantry because they did not have the ability to close with the bayonet. They could not match the firepower of the musket either (the musket could be loaded and fired about three times faster than a rifle). Rifle companies were best used on the flanks of the line or supporting a fixing effort during envelopment. Much like the designated marksman of contemporary infantry units, the rifleman preferred to target exposed single warriors or exposed European officers.

The final aspect of Western methods of warfare was the discipline of the Western regular troops. Discipline constituted the key to the Western method of warfare for the period. Without discipline, the Western armies faced three possibilities in battle. First, the
shock and surprise of Native American tactics would throw the undisciplined force into disarray, as happened in the case of Harmar and St. Clair. Second, without march discipline and focus on clearing of potential ambush points, the Native Americans could isolate troop serials through surprise, envelop the isolated part, and destroy it. The third and final element required discipline to maximize the shock effect for a bayonet assault. Few Western armies could stand a bayonet assault, let alone a Native American group of unarmored warriors fighting in open-order formations.

When Western forces began to fight Native Americans, they quickly realized that their linear tactics were not effective much of the time and their militia lacked both the discipline and experience to adapt their tactics. The early colonials solved their problems temporarily by hiring professional Soldiers to lead their militia and by building fortifications around their towns. This solution is clearly not a permanent one. Western forces had to adapt their tactics in order to defeat the new Native American threat. The most successful adaptation to the Native American tactics was the creation of the Light Infantry force. Light infantry formations combined the firepower and shock effect of standard infantry (using muskets, the bayonet, and artillery), rifle companies for long-range precision fires, and light cavalry. Light infantry could also be augmented with Rangers (light, dismounted scouts usually recruited from back country areas and integrated into the regular forces in order to enforce discipline) and or allied Native Americans for additional, specialized, scouting missions.

The first westerner to promote the revised structure and refined organization of light infantry (based on his North American experiences fighting Indians) was Colonel Henry Bouquet. His book titled, Reflections on the War with the Savages, called for an
organization formed around a small corps of 1,800 officers and men, divided into two battalions of foot (450 men each), one battalion of riflemen (500 men), two troops of light horse (50 men each), one company of artillery (20 men), and a train of drivers and wagoners (280 men). Bouquet stressed hard training based on physical fitness, open order formations, rapid movement, and aimed fire. Bouquet organized his own command along these lines and demonstrated considerable success against Native Americans in 1764.15

The pinnacle of light infantry organization for American forces was the Legion of the United States, formed in December 1792. The commander of the Legion was Brigadier General “Mad” Anthony Wayne. Wayne adopted the same training strategy advocated by Bouquet, but changed the organization slightly. The Legion structure centered on four sublegions tailored for independent action. These sublegions contained the following organization: two infantry battalions of four companies each (798 officers and men total), one rifle battalion of four companies (399 officers and men), one troop of light dragoons (83 officers and men), and one company of artillery (63 officers and men). Additionally, each sublegion contained a staff of five officers. With four sublegions, the Legion contained 5,334 officers, noncommissioned officers and men.16 The Legion, under Wayne, would demonstrate its full capability when it fought the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. Wayne quickly and decisively defeated the Miami Indians, significantly degrading the influence of British power in North America.17

Despite the organization or weapons, the primary shaping operation for the Western forces remained the targeting of Native American families, villages, and crops. Due to the sedentary nature of many of the North American forest tribes, the Native American infrastructure remained a critical vulnerability. By threatening these, Western
forces could force Native Americans to mass, thus exposing them to overwhelming Western firepower. If the Native Americans ignored (or failed to stop) the attacks against their families, crops, and villages, the result was usually famine and irreparable depopulation of the tribe.

The Western methods of warfare, like the Native American methods, had their advantages and disadvantages. The advantages centered on firepower, military organization, discipline, and a willingness to match the violence of frontier fighting. The disadvantages were a dependence on logistics to sustain a campaign and a requirement to protect a much larger area of territory with more civilians than their Native American counterparts were. The firepower advantages have already been addressed. The Native Americans possessed smoothbore, flintlock muskets that could not accept a bayonet. Western forces possessed muskets that could accept a bayonet. Western forces also employed riflemen capable of engaging Native Americans beyond the range of any musket, and the use of artillery could cause considerable damage to Native Americans attempting to make a stand. Discipline has also been addressed as being the key to preventing ambush and making the shock effect of the bayonet assault feasible. The last advantage is the willingness to match the level of violence often seen on the frontier. In order to force a major confrontation with Native American tribes, one had to burn every village, every crop, and kill or displace every Native American man, woman, and child. This would not have been possible within European decorum in a white-dominated area and ran counter to the ethics of the majority of the Europeans and colonial Americans.18

The dependence on a logistic system hampered Western military operations. There were two main reasons for this. First, the frontier was a wilderness, both literally
and figuratively. Road networks might not exist or required considerable work in order to be operable. This led to St. Clair’s disaster. St. Clair’s men had been cutting a new road in order to support his construction of blockhouses. Their fatigue had to have been a factor in their breakdown in discipline that resulted in their near annihilation by the Shawnees and their allies. The only other options if roads could not be used were rivers. A logistics system also called for an appropriate number of wagons and or pack animals to haul the supplies necessary to sustain the force. The immediate requirement for this was funding to pay for the equipment (boats, wagons, animals, and harnesses) and then the supplies themselves. This constituted a drain on the resources of the frontier (mainly foodstuffs) and due to the lack of industry during the colonial period, could prevent a campaign from starting on time for lack of necessary equipment that had to be hand made or impressed. An example of this occurred during the Sullivan campaign when the campaign had to be delayed due to a lack of necessary wagons and harness.19 The lack of funding for equipment remains a challenge today just as it was then.

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3 Mahon, “Methods of Indian Warfare,” 259.

4 Ibid., 260.

5 Ibid., 259.


Fischer, 86-93.

Mahon, “Methods of Indian Warfare,” 256.

Ibid., 264.

Fischer, 90-91.


Ibid.


Ferling, 35-38.

Fischer, 110-116.
CHAPTER 2

THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Western forces relied on past Indian fighting experiences and word of mouth in order to adapt their warfighting methods during the colonial period. Examination of the key Indian campaigns during this period reveals what went wrong as well as those that showed success. This demonstrates how Western forces identified strengths and weaknesses and transferred that information (both verbally as well as in personal writing) in order to educate the next generation of military leaders. By examining these campaigns chronologically, the pattern of tactics, techniques, and procedures learned during each campaign in the absence of written doctrine, demonstrated how commanders performed and how effective verbal communication substitutes for written doctrine. The five key campaigns shaped the way the US Army faced irregular warfare in the colonial period. These include: (1) Colonel Henry Bouquet’s campaigns during and after his defense of Fort Pitt from 1763 to 1764, (2) Major General John Sullivan’s campaign against the Iroquois in 1779, (3) Brigadier General Josiah Harmar’s punitive expedition against the Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware Indians in 1790, (4) Brigadier General Arthur St. Clair’s attempt to defeat against the same enemy in 1791, and (5) Major General “Mad” Anthony Wayne’s campaign against the Miami Indians, culminating with the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 (see figure 1). An analysis of these campaigns shows that leaders of the colonial period possessed the ability to analyze their Native American enemies’ tactics and culture, identify critical vulnerabilities, and exploit those vulnerabilities by adapting their organization, tactics, and weapons to defeat them. The proof to thesis is that when these Western leaders made the proper adaptation and followed the established
guidelines, they tended to be successful. Those that did not adhere to the guidelines suffered defeat.

Figure 1. Map of Fallen Timbers
Colonel Henry Bouquet served in the Dutch Army from 1736 to 1756 before transferring to the British Army and served from 1756 until his death in September 1765, of Yellow Fever. Bouquet served in North America from 1756 including campaigns against Native Americans from 1758 through 1764. Bouquet had six years to study Native American tactics and culture first hand. In 1763, British General Jeffery Amherst ordered Bouquet to lead a regiment consisting of the remnants of the 42nd and 77th regiments to reinforce Fort Pitt in order to prevent further destruction during Pontiac’s Rebellion. Shawnee and allied tribes attacked Bouquet while en route to Fort Pitt. Bouquet adopted a defensive stance and erected a rectangular breastwork to protect his regiment. After two days of defense, Bouquet formed a counterattack force of two companies. Bouquet shaped the counterattack by deliberately weakening a portion of his line by feigning retreat, enticing the Shawnee to attack that point. After the Shawnees committed to the attack, Bouquet counterattacked by sending his force from his own flanks and enveloping the Shawnee position. This broke the Shawnee attack, causing them to withdraw. Bouquet continued on and successfully reinforced Fort Pitt, ending the Native American threat to the area.

In 1764, Bouquet conducted a punitive raid against the Shawnees and their allies in the Ohio country. Bouquet had now analyzed his previous experiences with Native Americans and reorganized his force for movement through hostile territory. Bouquet used Soldiers to scout ahead of his column and to protect his flanks, providing all round security. Bouquet also spaced his companies far enough apart so that they could support each other if attacked, but not so far that they could become isolated from the main column. This organization prevented any Native Americans from attacking him until he
reached his objective area, the Shawnee heartland in the Ohio country. Bouquet now threatened the families and croplands of the Shawnees and their allies, forcing them to agree to Bouquet’s peace offering that called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return of their white captives. The most important aspect of this punitive raid was not the success of the raid but the fact that it was successful without fighting a single battle. This is due to Bouquet’s new method of organization, training, and movement, documented in detail in his *Reflections on the War with the Savages of North America*.

In *Reflections*, Bouquet advocates peace with the Native Americans, but if conflict is necessary, to fight using a light corps specially trained to fight in the wildernesses of North America. Reflecting on the experiences of Caesar and Crassus against the Numidians and other light troops, Bouquet analyzed the adaptations of the Romans (as well as the Marshal De Saxe, an eighteenth-century military theorist) and envisioned his own light corps flexible enough to respond to another light organization, specifically, North American Indian tribes. Bouquet identified three key principles used by the Indians and three counters that drove his light corps concept. The three Indian principles were: (1) to surround the enemy, (2) to fight “scattered” and not as a compact unit, and (3) to never stand one’s ground, but retreat as necessary and carry on the attack when the conditions are favorable. The three principles Bouquet advocated to counter the Indian principles were: (1) troops must be lightly clothed, armed, and accoutered, (2) do not operate in close order, but use cover and concealment instead, and (3) do everything quickly, which requires Soldiers to be physically fit. Bouquet’s three principles focused the individual Soldier to be able to travel light and quickly, maximizing stealth, and his ability to blend in to the foliage of the forests. These traits provided the basis (at the
individual Soldier level) for the success of Bouquet’s tactics of security during movement and envelopment during the attack. Both tactics depend on individual Soldiers being quick and unseen until ready to strike.

To support these principles, Bouquet describes the clothing for troops as being:

A short coat, of brown cloth, lapelled, and without plaits; a strong tanned shirt, short trowsers [sic], leggins [sic], mokawsons [sic] or shoe packs, a sailor’s hat, a blanket, a knapsack for provisions, and an oiled surtout [a kind of oilcloth sleepshirt] against the rain. To this might be added, in winter quarters or time of peace, three white shirts and stocks, with a flannel waistcoat.6

These clothes are significantly different from standard light infantry clothing of the time in three areas: (1) the absence of a colorful uniform, (2) the lack of heavy accoutrements and knapsack filled with necessary, but not all together useful equipment, and (3) the specialized nature of some of the clothing is specific for extended periods in the wilderness. The uniforms of the three major combatants in North America during the colonial period were colorful. The British wore a long red coat and white trousers, the French wore a long grey and white coat with blue trim and white trousers, and the Americans wore a long royal blue coat with white trousers. The bright colors contributed to better command and control, but hardly enabled the Soldier to blend in with the greens and browns of the North American wilderness, like the brown cloth jacket advocated by Bouquet. Bouquet’s Soldiers also traveled without the heavy, sometimes cumbersome, accoutrements of his regular light infantry counterpart. Bouquet stressed the bare necessities: a blanket, a knapsack for his provisions (more of a haversack than the large knapsack strapped to a Soldier’s back), and an oilcloth jacket to keep the Soldier dry and warm. His regular light infantry counterpart carried leather cross-hangers for a cartridge box and bayonet scabbard, waist belt, rigid-frame knapsack carried on the back
containing extra equipment, shoes, clothing, personal effects, and others, and a blanket rolled and strapped to the top, a haversack, and a canteen. The whole lot could weigh quite a bit and hardly conducive to quick, stealthy movement through the wilderness. Finally, the oilcloth shirt is an item specifically tailored for Bouquet’s Soldiers so that they could operate in the wilderness for a prolonged period. The oilcloth shirt helped a Soldier remain dry and warm in wet conditions. This also led to a healthier Soldier, less prone to coughs (that hampered noise discipline) and less likely to fall out of the march from illness. The carefully tailored breeches and coat also facilitated movement through the undergrowth and the moccasins enabled the Soldier to move quickly and quietly. The standard light infantry Soldier did not carry any equipment specially designed for the wilderness.

Arms should be light, consisting of a musket or fusil, a bayonet that can double as a knife, a powder horn and shot pouch, hatchet, and a small leather water bottle. Bouquet’s philosophy on physical fitness is not unlike today’s military physical fitness programs. Bouquet expected Soldiers to remain clean and retain their soldierly appearance. He also required Soldiers to be able to run (beginning with walking, then improving to formation runs, and conducting drill while at a run), to carry heavy burdens, and to be able to jump small hurdles such as logs. Once Soldiers were proficient with their exercises, they had to do them with their weapons and accoutrements, to include loading and firing on the run. Bouquet stated that Soldiers should be able to, “load and fire very quick, standing, kneeling, or lying on the ground. They are to fire at a mark without a rest, and not suffered to be too long in taking aim.” This is an early reflexive fire technique used today by troops in combat and considered a critical skill for pre-
combat training. Bouquet used swimming to improve the fitness of his troops and to develop their ability to swim small streams. Bouquet also required them to know how to erect field fortifications, bridges, roads, huts, and ovens anticipating a lack of those items in the wilderness. Finally, Bouquet believed that by training in the wilderness (away from the distractions of a town) and teaching his Soldiers and officers to live off the land, his troops could conceivably sustain themselves without the need for a formal supply system or supply train. In short, Bouquet expected his troops to be master light infantrymen capable of operating independently of supporting troops or supply points.

As part of his organization, Bouquet stressed the need to incorporate two troops (50 officers and men each) of light horse and some bloodhounds for tracking purposes into the light corps. Bouquet believed that his corps should remain small in order to reduce the requirement for a supply train, yet large enough for offensive operations. Bouquet’s proposed corps organization contained no more than the following: two regiments of foot (900 men total), one battalion if hunters (500 men total), two troops of light horse (100 men total), one company of artificers (skilled workers) (20 men total), and drivers and necessary followers (280 total), for a total strength of 1,800 men.9

In addition to the structure and training of the corps, Bouquet proposed his, “four plans,” really drills, while on campaign. These four plans were for Encampments, Line of March, Defiles, and General Attack. The plan for an encampment involved the establishment of a rectangular breastwork using the boxes and barrels of provisions and carts for protection. In addition to the breastworks, sentries and pickets established posts forward on all sides of the breastworks. These pickets and sentries were to use existing natural cover and concealment while on guard. Lastly, local security patrols
reconnoitered the bivouac site and verified communication between the pickets, sentry posts, and main encampment. The plan for the Line of March called for the hunters to organize into small patrols of five to six men and scout forward of the main body for the enemy. A party of artificers and axemen to cut a trail for the baggage train follows this. The regulars then formed a square-shaped march formation. One hundred and fifty, in two ranks, formed the front of the square. Five-hundred regulars formed two ranks of two hundred and fifty each to make the left and right sides. Another one hundred and fifty regulars, in two ranks, formed the rear. The reserve consisted of one hundred regulars in two columns, the remainder of the hunters and the light horse. Details of light horse guard the flanks and act as scouting parties with a small party of hunters, following at a distance, act as a rear guard. The baggage travels in between the regulars on the sides of the formation. The plan for Defiles called for the entire square to halt until hunters and scouts reconnoiter the entire area and take positions over watching the defile. The entire square then proceeds through the defile. The plan for General Attack called for the hunters and light horse and dogs to fan out and scout the enemy location. The regulars attack from two lines and penetrate the enemy circle (anticipating a scattered defense and not a linear defense). The regulars then sought a flank. Once the flank was found, platoons and companies wheeled in order to assault the flank with the intent of shattering the enemy.¹⁰

Bouquet clearly understood both the qualities and limitations of Native American warfare. His theories proved successful in the field and his Reflections was read by both professional and irregular officers through the American Revolution. Although new for the period, Bouquet’s methods for training and tactical movement remain as germane
today as they were in 1764, and began a trend toward improving Western performance against the Native Americans. There is little to suggest that Henry Bouquet failed in any aspect of his *Reflections*.

The first American officer to undertake a major punitive expedition against Indians fell on the shoulders of Major General John Sullivan. Sullivan, despite a lack of prior military experience, demonstrated considerable skill in training and maneuvering his force against the Iroquois during a punitive raid into Iroquoia (the Iroquois homelands) in the fall of 1779. Sullivan’s success stemmed from his ability to apply many of the same principles discussed by Bouquet and combined those principles with his own organization and his striving for exacting levels of detail, no doubt a carry-over from his days as a lawyer. Sullivan’s force integrated riflemen into the overall light infantry force, enhancing its scouting and security abilities. Sullivan also relied primarily on regular forces to accomplish the raid. The regulars enabled Sullivan to maintain the discipline needed to secure the movement for the entire time of the raid, thus preventing Indian ambushes against Sullivan’s force.

Major General John Sullivan had no military experience before the American Revolution, working as a lawyer before accepting a commission in the Continental Army. Sullivan conducted a punitive raid into Iroquoia in the fall of 1779. The purpose of the raid was to punish the Iroquois Indians for supporting British interests during the revolution. Sullivan organized his force along similar lines as Bouquet in that he used regulars exclusively for any decisive operation (like Bouquet), believing that militia would hamper the effort. Militia had a reputation for poor discipline and a low threshold for holding up under the pressures of combat. This reputation was not unfounded. Militia
had performed poorly since their inception in the early seventeenth century; hence the need for professionals to bolster their ranks and to provide leadership, as in the case of the early Plymouth Colony. There is evidence that even some of the counties of North America did not have a high opinion of their own local militia. One settler’s committee wrote to New York Governor George Clinton regarding their opinion of the militia:

Woeful Experience teaches us militia are by no means a Defense for any part of the Country. Strange as it may appear to your Excellancy, it is no less true, that our Militia by Desertion to the Enemy and by Enlistments into our Service, are reduced to no less than seven hundred Men. Indeed if these 700 would do their Duty and act like men, we might perhaps give the enemy a Check, so as to give Time to the Militia from below to come up, but, sir, they are actuated by such an ungovernable Spirit that it is out of the Power of any Officer in this County to command them without any Credit to himself-for notwithstanding the utmost Exertion the officers have nothing but Blame in return.11

Sullivan’s force consisted of three infantry brigades, augmented with rifle companies, cavalry, and artillery. Sullivan’s first brigade (Brigadier General Edward Hand) composed of three regiments of infantry and Daniel Morgan’s rifle companies that served as the advance guard of the force. His second brigade (Brigadier General William Maxwell) and third (Brigadier General Enoch Poor) consisted of four regiments of infantry and followed Hand’s brigade. Each of the second and third brigades contributed their light infantry companies (one hundred men each) to serve as flank guards for the force. The advance guard moved ahead of the main column scouting for enemy. The advance guard had enough force to envelop and overcome any small enemy force encountered and to provide security, to include artillery for over watching fires, while crossing linear obstacles (like rivers and streams) or clearing defiles.

Sullivan moved by land from Pennsylvania into the Iroquoia, burning every Iroquois village, crop, and house he could find. By adhering to his highly disciplined
march routine, strictly clearing each potential ambush point (such as the river crossing and defiles), and entrenching his bivouac sites each night, Sullivan prevented any ambush by the Iroquois or their Tory advisors. The combination of disciplined movement and the threat to the Iroquois homelands forced the Iroquois and their British allies (including a company of regular infantry and Tory Rangers) to mass their forces in an attempt to stop Sullivan near the village of Newtown. The British and Iroquois attempted to ambush Sullivan from behind an ambuscade south of Newtown. Sullivan’s riflemen discovered the position while patrolling the area ahead of the main body and alerted Sullivan.

Sullivan maneuvered his force so that his riflemen and artillery could fix the ambuscade from a small hill while his brigades enveloped the position. Unfortunately, the artillery fire proved to be more robust than Sullivan expected and instead of fixing the position, it caused the Iroquois to withdraw, leaving the British to face over 5,000 Continental Regulars. The British withdrew before the brigades could envelop the position (they had been slowed due to poor trafficability along their approach routes) which led to a running firefight until the British could finally break contact well north of the ambuscade.

Sullivan’s raid was tactically and operationally successful for three main reasons: (1) He trained his leaders to identify and clear potential ambush points ahead of the main column; (2) He expanded the role of the riflemen (instead of Bouquet’s hunters) as well as their numbers within the brigades; and (3) He constituted a significant threat to the Iroquois by burning their crops, villages, and homes forcing a battle instead of fighting a series of ambushes. Sullivan also had a strong grasp of the logistics requirements for the raid. Sullivan did have some setbacks during the raid. The most notable was his decision to dismount his light cavalry and use them as infantry. This added to his ground
combat power, but reduced his operational reach and mobility by not using them as mounted reconnaissance. He also lost an opportunity to destroy the platoon of British regulars and white, Tory advisors at Newtown due to a lack of mobility. Fleeing infantry in the open is the goal of mounted cavalry. If Sullivan had retained his mounted arm as a reserve, he could have used them to exploit his success and move to a pursuit and destruction of the British force instead of a dismounted pursuit and eventual break in contact.

Despite the strategic failure of Sullivan’s raid, Sullivan applied several of the principles initially presented by Bouquet, including the adherence to security both on the march and in bivouac. Sullivan used his riflemen to conduct reconnaissance forward of the main column in order to either assault small enemy parties or identify a stronger force. This was also one of Bouquet’s principles. Lastly, Sullivan used his infantry to attack vulnerable flanks in order to destroy the enemy. The only significant difference in this case was that Sullivan used precision fires from his riflemen and artillery to fix the enemy and his infantry to envelop the flanks of the ambuscade; whereas Bouquet advocated the use of infantry to attack and penetrate a position first before maneuvering on a flank.

A good example of the result of failure to adhere to the experiences of others and contemporary tactical books is Brigadier General Josiah Harmar’s 1790 expedition against the Shawnee and Miami Indians. The expedition demonstrated how Native Americans could defeat a Western force if the Western force failed to maintain security and discipline. Harmar’s defeat had its origins in three shortfalls present in his small army. First, with little regular army infantry available, he was forced to rely on ill-trained
militia. Second, the poor quality of the militia’s equipment (including inoperable weapons and a shortage of quality axes) constituted a significant shortfall, potentially hampering his expedition if it had not ended so quickly. Third, his troops lacked cohesion. The army existed in an ad hoc force organized for a purpose but never trained for the said purpose. General Harmar had his own failings. He possessed little understanding of how his foe fought and lacked the moral courage necessary to block the desires of politicians who favored haste over preparation.

Like Sullivan, Josiah Harmar began his military career with the Continental Army in 1778, serving as a Captain in the First Pennsylvania Regiment. By 1783, Harmar, promoted to Colonel, commanded the First US Regiment. In 1787, Harmar, now brevetted to Brigadier General, accepted a post in the northwest (primarily consisting of the region of today’s Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois) and eventually rose to become Commanding General from 1789 through 1792. Until Harmar assumed his post in the northwest, he did not have any experience fighting Indians. Despite this lack of experience, the Secretary of War, General Henry Knox, sent Harmar on a punitive expedition to stop the Shawnee’s from raiding white settlers along the Wabash River, Southern Ohio and Northern Kentucky (then part of Virginia). To this end, Harmar had the authority to call up an additional one thousand militia from Virginia, and five hundred from Pennsylvania, in addition to the four hundred regulars already under Harmar’s control. Harmar immediately began to call up his militia.

Eventually, three hundred Virginia militiamen mustered at Fort Steuben. The remaining seven hundred Virginia and five hundred Pennsylvania militiamen mustered at Fort Washington. The intent was for the three hundred Virginia militiamen to attack all of
the Indian villages along the Wabash River. The twelve-hundred remaining militia, led by Harmar and his four-hundred regulars, planned to attack from Fort Washington North into the Shawnee and Miami territories with the intent of destroying as many settlements with the hopes of drawing the Shawnees and their allies into a battle.

Neither Pennsylvania nor Virginia dispatched their best troops. Accounts depicted the units as, “old infirm men, and young boys” with weapons in disrepair. Units lacked camp equipage, such as kettles and axes. Little suggested that Harmar’s militia would contribute much. Despite these problems, Harmar set out on his mission on 26 September 1790. Harmar used a movement formation that was not much different from that employed by Sullivan and Bouquet. Harmar employed a force of “spies and guides” in advance of his main body, followed by an advance guard consisting of a militia light infantry company. Behind this, followed a company of pioneers with the task of clearing a road for the baggage train and artillery. A battalion of militia followed the pioneers in a formation of three columns of company, abreast of each other. Behind this, the regular artillery followed with the regular cavalry on its flanks. The baggage train occupied the middle of the formation with a battalion of militia on each flank marching in columns of companies (company front). The livestock followed the baggage train in front of a battalion of militia again in three columns of company, abreast of each other. The rear guard consisted of a militia infantry company. During long halts, Harmar adopted a square formation, but did not fortify his position. The sides consisted of his forces alone, and they posted sentries forward of their position. His supplies remained in the center of the square.
Harmar spent the next twenty days marching and destroying Indian villages and crops encountered along his line of march. On the eighteenth of October, Harmar fought a party of Miami Indians, led by Little Turtle, at the village of Kekionga. The Miami’s waited until the militia began to ransack their village before striking. Security elements were evidently not present because the militia broke immediately without firing a shot, many simply dropping their weapons and ran for the main body, located about two miles away. The regulars did stand and fight but suffered heavy casualties. In total, Harmar lost about one hundred men in the attack and consolidated his force about two miles from the village. Harmar decided to attack the village again on 21 October. He directed a force (consisting of a militia battalion, the regular cavalry squadron, and the two regular infantry battalion) to cross the Maumee River in order to get into the rear of Little Turtle’s position. Harmar then sent two wings (consisting of the remainder of his militia, about two battalions assigned to each wing) to envelop the position. The force crossing the Maumee simply forded the river without scouting the far side or setting up an over watch position to cover the crossing. Little Turtle detected the crossing and attacked it. When the leaders fell, the militia broke. The remainder of the Indians skirmished with the two enveloping forces until the Western force saw that the regulars and militia, assigned to mission of attacking the rear of the Indian position, had broken. This caused the remainder of the militia to break and return to the camp two miles away. Harmar now recognized that he could not rely on the militia and marched the force back to Fort Washington. Harmar arrived on the fourth of November having suffered a total of 183 three killed and 37 wounded.
Harmar’s performance proved to be mixed. Harmar began by using the standard Western tactics of threatening Indian villages and crops in order to bring them to battle. Harmar also adopted a sound movement formation that provided all around security and protected his supplies. Harmar had the ability to realize that his poorly motivated, disciplined, and equipped militia was not up to the task and returned before further damaging his command. In the end, Harmar declared success because he had burned and destroyed several Indian crops and villages in addition to killing some warriors during the expedition. What Harmar did poorly resulted in heavy casualties to his command. Harmar failed to identify the severe lack of discipline in his militia before allowing them to operate semi-independently. Harmar did try to mitigate this by augmenting them with companies of regulars and placing them under the leadership of a regular officer, but he failed to see the second order effect either if the militia broke completely under fire or if the regulars were defeated. In both cases, the result was a rout on the part of the militia. Harmar failed to task organize his force beyond augmenting the militia with regulars. He failed to allocate his cavalry to conduct reconnaissance in support of his attacking units and did not use his artillery to support their movement with fires. Little Turtle presented a superb target and could have been hurt, if not defeated, if Harmar had been able to integrate his artillery and cavalry in supporting the initial attack on the Miami village, Kekionga, on the eighteenth of October. Instead, these assets remained unused and his unit defeated with heavy casualties. Harmar’s final mistake involved the river crossing during the second attack on the Miami village of Kekionga. The force simply forded the river without conducting any reconnaissance or emplacing a force to over watch the crossing (such as the artillery); both strongly advocated by Bouquet and strictly adhered
to by Sullivan less than eleven years before. This inexcusable breach of security and
discipline resulted in their detection by Little Turtle and subsequent attack. Little Turtle
could achieve surprise in this case because of the lack of reconnaissance.

There were two important lessons relearned during this expedition: Maintain
security at all times and militia, if not properly trained and equipped, will not perform
well. Harmar had proper security measures in place during movement, but due to a lack
of discipline on the part of his militia, he did not maintain security in the attack. Despite
his attempt to mitigate this with regulars, they did not have enough strength and
leadership to rally the militia when they broke. The second lesson learned is that if militia
(or any troops) did not receive proper training and equipment, they are vulnerable to
deception by Native Americans attempting to surprise them. The expedition example of
the lack of training is from the first attack on the Miami village of Kekionga. When the
Western forces initially entered the village to destroy it, the militia began to ransack the
village. At this time, a party of Indians approached and then ran away. This enticed
several militiamen to give chase. This classic ruse would not have worked on any of
either Bouquet’s or Sullivan’s trained men. It worked in Harmar’s case because the
militiamen had no idea that this was a classic Indian ruse designed to isolate them from
the rest of the force.

The militia arrived carrying equipment in disrepair and in need of basic camp
items. Bouquet stressed the need for equipment suited for hard campaign, even if it had to
be specially procured or altered. Sullivan delayed his campaign until the government
replaced any equipment unfit for the expedition. Harmar chose expediency over quality
of preparation and paid the price. The Shawnees, Miamis, and their allies continued to
attack the white settlements in the area. Frustrated, President George Washington appointed St. Clair, a Major General, and directed him to renew the expedition in the summer of 1791. St. Clair, a veteran general officer and Governor of the Northwest Territory, provided an obvious choice for command due to his military experience and proximity to the area of operation.

Major General Arthur St. Clair’s mission was to finish what Harmar had started. Unfortunately, St. Clair failed to gather the necessary intelligence about his enemy and failed to grasp the full importance of security before beginning his expedition. These failures resulted in his defeat at the hands of the Shawnees and their allies within days of the expedition’s beginning. The lack of intelligence and experiences passed on from Harmar’s expedition proved to be a crucial mistake. There was evidence that St. Clair’s own officers and Soldiers had the information he needed to succeed and did not pass it on, a critical vulnerability in the absence of written doctrine. Most damming of all, St. Clair’s predecessor (and the person he covered for following his defeat the year before), Josiah Harmar, deliberately did not pass on his own experiences. Harmar only spoke to Major Ebenezer Denny about the incident.14 Ebenezer Denny describes the atmosphere of the camp as sullen and that the army was, “perfectly ignorant” of the numbers and intention of the enemy.15 This apathy led to the disregard of even the most rudimentary security practices. While in bivouac, the Indians attacked because of the encampment remained unfortified and because the sentries allowed the Indians to get within assault distance. This provided the element of surprise necessary for Native Americans and guaranteed their success.
President Washington appointed St. Clair to command the expedition and provided him the rank of Major General. Washington cautioned St. Clair, warning him about the Indians’ propensity for surprise tactics and admonishing him by saying, “You know how the Indians fight us.” Secretary of War Knox directed St. Clair to erect a series of forts to prevent further Indian raids in Ohio, to include a fort at the site of the Miami village of Kekionga where Harmar met his defeat. To this end, St. Clair reorganized a force of about 2,000 men, consisting of both regular forces, as well as the remainder of Harmar’s militiamen from Virginia and Pennsylvania. St. Clair made his preparations and departed for the Wabash in September 1791. After constructing Fort Hamilton, twenty miles from Fort Washington, and Fort Jefferson, forty-five miles further from Fort Hamilton, St. Clair stopped for the night at a small hilltop near the Maumee River. St. Clair established his encampment in the form of a rectangle with security in the form of militia units covering all four sides. The regulars remained in the rectangle, forming a reserve. The artillery faced out, directed towards the two long sides of the encampment. By the twenty-fourth of October, desertion had reduced St. Clair’s force to 1,400 officers and men. Hard physical labor, poor food, and cold had taken its toll, and the men were both fatigued and sullen. The Indians attacked just before dawn.

An estimated 1,000 Indians, attempting to envelop the position, attacked furiously. The militia sentries fired one round before fleeing back to the main encampment. Ebenezer Denny, also present for St. Clair’s expedition, described the fight as:

The savages seemed not to fear anything we could do. They could skip out of reach of bayonet and return, as they pleased. The ground was literally covered with the dead. . . . It appeared as if the officers had been singled out, as a very
great proportion fell. The men being thus left with few officers, became fearful, despaired of success, gave up the fight.\textsuperscript{17}

The panic caused by the militia caused the entire position to fold. The regulars tried to hold the line with the bayonet and courage, but the militia completely failed. The panic was so severe, that the Western force abandoned all of their baggage in the encampment and fled all the way to Fort Jefferson, some forty-five miles from the battlefield by the evening following the battle. St. Clair then reformed the force (now consisting of only 700 officers and men) and continued the retreated to Fort Washington.

St. Clair had the experience and advice from his higher leadership to fulfill his mission, but lacked the personal leadership to draw the best from his demoralized officers and men. The Virginia and Pennsylvania militia had the recent experience against the same enemy on the same terrain. St. Clair’s officers had the institutional knowledge, to include a copy of Bouquet’s \textit{Reflections} and sketches of his \textit{Plans}, but this knowledge went unused.\textsuperscript{18} St. Clair seemed to simply go through the motions of fighting Indians without regard for those around him. He displayed personal courage during the fight, but failed to attend to the soldier level care necessary to lead a successful campaign. St. Clair failed to take enough skilled laborers to construct the forts, using his own Soldiers instead. St. Clair pushed his men hard, building two forts and marching over sixty miles in six days during an unseasonably cold late fall. He pushed his men too far, too hard, and still expected them to perform in battle. They simply did not have the training and physical fitness to withstand the demands placed on them. When they finally arrived at what became the final encampment of the expedition, his Soldiers were exhausted. They did not have the training and discipline to patrol the area for the enemy before retiring for the night. Their sentries did not resist long enough to provide any significant early
warning, allowing the Indians to overrun the encampment before establishing a viable
defense. Lastly, although the artillery pointed outwards, the muzzles were unable to be
depressed in order to bring fire upon the attacking Indians. This is the final indicator
that although he knew better, as did his officers. The bottom line is that St. Clair gave
security a mere hand wave and did not enforce security measures with his subordinates.
St. Clair did provide the Army and the civilian leadership (including President
Washington and Congress) with the one positive result of the expedition: the realization
for the absolute need to send a properly trained, equipped, and led force to fight Native
Americans. The country could not afford another back-to-back Harmar and or St. Clair
series of defeats.

Following the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair, Secretary of War Knox pressed
Congress to both reorganize the Army and to increase its end strength to 5,168
noncommissioned officers and men. The new Army organization consisted of four
regiments of infantry (composed of three, four company battalions each), one rifle
regiment (also composed of three, four company battalions), one battalion of artillery
(composed of four companies), and one squadron of cavalry (composed of four troops).
Despite congressional reluctance to abandon their republican roots, they conceded and
approved the additions to the Army. Knox organized the Army into the Legion.

Knox intended the Legion to overcome the shortcomings of a force consisting of
part regulars and part militia, such as those which had failed previously. Knox and
Washington realized that a force mix more along the lines of what Sullivan used should
prove to be sufficient based on previous Western military successes. The organization of
the Legion closely mirrored Sullivan’s composition regarding a force mix of infantry,
artillery, rifle, and light horse; however, the new Legion contained four sublegions intended to allow for independent operations and to enhance operational flexibility. Each sublegion contained two infantry battalions of four companies each (798 officers and men), one rifle battalion of four companies (399 officers and men), one artillery company (63 officers and men), one light dragoon troop (83 officers and men), and a staff of 5 officers for a total of 1,348 officers and men. Four identical sublegions made up the Legion (for a total of 5,344 officers and men). This is the force that Knox and Washington turned over to Major General “Mad” Anthony Wayne to train and prepare to take back up into Ohio, in order to establish military forts intended to subdue the Shawnees, Miamis, and their allies.

Major General Anthony Wayne received the same orders given to Harmar and St. Clair; end the Indian raids in the northwest by defeating them in battle and establishing a series of forts into what is today Ohio and Indiana. Given the newly organized and trained Legion, consisting of regular army Soldiers, Wayne had the instrument in which to accomplish this mission. In the fall of 1793, Wayne moved his Legion and 1,500 Virginia (mustered from Kentucky, then part of Virginia) militia up the Wabash to Fort Jefferson (established by St. Clair two years before). Wayne then moved north into Ohio, burning villages and crops, and attempting to force the Indians to mass in order to defend their homelands. His movement formations made maximum use of the rifle companies and light dragoons for both scouting and security, preventing Indian ambush along the way. Wayne successfully forced the Shawnees, Miamis, and their allies to try to defend against Wayne at Fallen Timbers, located just south of modern Toledo, Ohio. The Native Americans used the timber scattered on the ground from a tornado as an ambuscade.
Wayne used his riflemen to scout the Indian position and knew their locations before attacking. Wayne then used his riflemen to fix the Indians with precision fires and to report as soon as the Indians began to withdraw from their ambuscade. As soon as the riflemen reported the Indian withdrawal, Wayne sent in his light dragoons to envelop the left while the infantry (with bayonets fixed) enveloped the right. This caused the Indians to flee to the British strongpoint of Fort Miami. When the British refused to aid their former allies, the Native Americans sued for peace. Wayne negotiated the Treaty of Greenville, temporarily ending formal Native American hostilities in the northwest and any hopes of a British resurgence of power in the region.21

Wayne succeeded in Ohio where Harmar and St. Clair failed because he: (1) paid careful attention to security, (2) populated his force mainly with regulars, and (3) had the time to implement a training program that prepared his army for the demands of the campaign. While on the march and at halts, Wayne used methods very similar to those pioneered by Bouquet. He adhered to strict reconnaissance discipline and security focused on preventing ambush. By doing this, Wayne prevented surprise attacks before he choose to do battle against a massed Indian force. By properly identifying critical intelligence requirements and conveying his intent and specific intelligence requirements to his scouts, Wayne had information to support his attack. Wayne also used his regulars to attack the ambuscade and conduct security operations to protect the force on the march. He had militia in the ranks, but did not use them in battle due to their previous performance in battle. Their roles consisted of garrisoning forts, labor, and assisting regulars. By relegating the militia to a support role, Wayne enabled his regulars to take control of a fight, thus increasing the odds for success. Finally, Wayne had the support
from both his civilian and military higher leadership to train and prepare his force to defeat the Native American tribes in Ohio. This training allowed his officers to understand Native American tactics and methods of warfare as well as to pass this information to their troops. This training enabled his troops to maintain their discipline and solidify their confidence in victory.

By the time of Harmar’s expedition, the only doctrinal manual the US Army had was its drill manual produced by General Freidrich Von Steuben (and would continue to be the standard drill manual until 1812). This publication contained more than simple drill evolutions, it also contained instruction for officers and noncommissioned officers leadership, care and training of Soldiers and plate pictures of every formation, bivouac lay-out and positions for Soldiers (loading, movements, and others) for those with little formal military education. This allowed nonprofessional officers, such as Harmar, St. Clair, and Sullivan, the ability to educate themselves on the requirements of leading troops both in garrison and in battle against a conventional foe. Von Steuben’s drill manual was truly a phenomenal publication for a time when the US Army possessed few professional officers, but did not address the nuances of warfare against Native Americans. No formal doctrine existed that addressed warfare against the Native Americans. Civilian works, such as Bouquet’s Reflections, circulated among both militia and professional officers (as discussed by Ebenezer Denny during the St. Clair expedition). Verbal instructions and experiences also contributed to the experience base of the officers, noncommissioned officers and Soldiers of the US Army. Examples of these verbal instructions range from President Washington counseling of St. Clair and Sullivan’s instructions to his Soldiers during training to the personal experiences
experienced by those poor souls who had the bad luck to be with the Virginia militia for the Harmar and St. Clair expeditions. This knowledge, passed on through tradition, personal letters, and oral reports, led to highly effective results, peaking with the Legion and the Battle of Fallen Timbers. What it did not immediately produce was a formal, written, doctrine addressing how to fight Native Americans.

1They arrived in New York from the West Indies ravaged with disease.

2William Smith, Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition against the Ohio Indians in 1764 (Cincinnati, OH: 1868), 22-25.

3Ibid., 40-44.


5Ibid., 102-106.

6Ibid., 110-112.

7Ibid., 114.

8Ibid.

9Ibid., 123.

10Ibid., 126-135.

11Fischer, 29.

12Sullivan attempted to meet all of his logistics requirements prior to departure, but he could not due to production problems and transport requirements, especially centered on the water levels of some waterways, critical to the movement of Sullivan’s heavier supplies and equipment. The pre-mature departure forced Sullivan’s men to subsist on captured Indian vegetables and grains.

14Eid, 72.
15Ibid.
16Ibid., 73.
18Eid, 75.
19Ibid., 73.
20Birtle, Origins of the Legion, 1256.
21The Indians of the region would refrain from significant warfare until the Black Hawk War in the summer of 1832.
22Von Steuben had no experience in fighting Indians. His focus remained in training the Continental Army to stand against British regulars
CHAPTER 3
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY

The development of a formal federal Indian policy changed the way the military approached Indian warfare. By eventually recognizing Indian tribes as special political entities, the US government now had to address Indian needs and analyze how their roles could support each other’s needs and interests. This, however, did not mean that the role of the military had changed; it had not. The role of the military remained as the instrument of national political policy. The changes in Indian relations forced the military to adapt to changing political and public demands while conducting operations to fulfill the wishes of the American people.

US Indian policy began with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, a law encompassing all of the states (including states not yet in existence) within the US. The Northwest Ordinance stated, In effect:

The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.¹

Written in 1787, this policy clearly provided guidance regarding America and Indian interactions, but has little actual power for two reasons. First, the ordinance is nonpunitive for any territory violating the provisions prescribed in the ordinance. By making the ordinance nonpunitive, there were no consequences for violating it. Second, it states that Indian lands “shall never be invaded or disturbed unless authorized by Congress.” Since the Northwest Ordinance, written and ratified during the period of the
Articles of Confederation, the central government could leverage little power over the states. It is true that the central government could wage war, but it could not levy taxes. Without the ability to fund a war, the ability to declare war was weak. The ordinance improved in 1788, with the adoption of the Constitution (and subsequent increase of power for the central government) because this enabled the central US government to enforce aspects of the Northwest Ordinance and to finance the means of its enforcement, be it by bureaucratic oversight or through force.

The first challenge to the authority of the Northwest Ordinance came in 1829, with Georgia attempting to remove the Cherokee Indian nation from Georgia. Georgia desired to remove the Cherokees from their tribal lands in order to make room for a growing white settlement population and in response to a gold strike in the mountains near Dahlonega, Georgia. Georgia attempted to bypass Section 3 of the Northwest Ordinance by nullifying the established Cherokee Constitution and attempting to force their removal from Georgia. The Cherokee Nation appealed to the US Supreme Court on the basis that the Cherokee Nation constituted an independent, foreign nation and thus entitled to consideration before the court. Following a careful legal examination of the case, the Supreme Court denied the Cherokee injunction against Georgia because the Supreme Court did not have authority over the case. Chief Justice John Marshall’s majority opinion stated that the Supreme Court could not find for the Cherokee Nation because it could not dictate actions to the State of Georgia and that because the Cherokee Nation was not a separate, foreign nation; and therefore could not be heard in this case. However, the Supreme Court did concede that the Cherokee Nation did have a special relationship with the US based on previous treaties. The wording of the treaties and the
considerations given to the Cherokees, such as representation before Congress, exclusive trade agreements and protection by the US set the Cherokee Nation apart from other Indian tribes and gave them special consideration, but not foreign power status. The Supreme Court decision prompted the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The Indian Removal Act added the punitive provisions the Northwest Ordinance lacked by making forced removal illegal. If Indians freely agreed to relocation, they had to be compensated and protected. Andrew Jackson did not share this view of Indian relations. Jackson believed that Indians had no rights or diplomatic status as either a nation or as citizens of the US. This brought to light a fundamental gap between two different schools of thought regarding Native Americans and their role in American society; a Jeffersonian approach led by President Thomas Jefferson and the beliefs promoted by President Andrew Jackson. The conflict between the two, and more importantly the beliefs of Jackson, impacted the political climate at the time of the Second Seminole War as well as the tactics of the US Army in dealing with the forced relocation of the Seminoles.

Jeffersonian policy promoted the idea of the “noble savage,” destined to become a yeoman farmer; republican and fully integrated in to the American economy. There are three key aspects to understanding Jeffersonian Indian policy: Scrutinizing the relationships between the Indian and natural law, how Jefferson used the Bible to account for the Indians being in America, and understanding the political and psychological stake Jefferson had in their conversion in to his “yeoman farmer.” Jackson’s school of thought saw the Indian as a commodity, an exploitable resource, and little more than a nuisance to westward expansion. Jefferson saw the relationship between the Indian and natural law as close and pure. Despite disliking the Indian’s pre-disposition for retaliation, Jefferson
liked the Indian ability to conduct himself within his own tribal political structure; especially how the Indian ability to thrive without a formal, empowered central government. By being able to exercise political power without a central government, Jefferson saw the Indian as using the “natural ascendancy of mind.” This placed the Indian ahead of any barbaric tribal grouping and into the evolutionary level of the democratic-republican independent thinker. This instinct for a republican form of government separated the Indian from the uncivilized nomad and placed him on the same plane of what Jefferson thought he should be.

Jefferson determined that an acceptable way to articulate how the Indian could ascend to this level of thought involved linking the American Indian to the lost Hebrew tribes. Jefferson met physiocrats in France and became well read in Enlightenment theory, especially the works of Locke, Pufendorf, Grotius, Tyrell, Kames, and Vattel. This belief in natural right held that God approved of the cultivation and appropriation of land and thus separated the organized farmer from the hunter-gatherer. Jefferson differentiated between the lazy hunter-gatherer and the enlightened farmer. Jefferson identified the Indian male as the lazy hunter-gatherer because he was responsible for hunting meat for the tribal unit and little else. The females and children, who farmed small plots of land, were the bridge between the hunter-gatherer and republican enlightened yeoman farmer. Jefferson believed the Indians needed to cross this bridge into enlightenment together in order to fulfill his vision of their potential. Additionally, Jefferson considered the possibility that due to the Indians farming of corn and other sustenance-focused crops (as did Noah); they might be descended from the lost tribes of Israel.
Jefferson’s Indian policy as president focused on the encouragement of transition from a hunter-gatherer limited farming economy to a complete agrarian subsistence. This policy began with President Washington and Jefferson invigorated it. Jefferson believed that by converting completely to an agrarian society, the Indian would not only continue to refine the natural transition towards a republican society, but would also cease hostilities and revert to a peaceful society dominated by the US. Jefferson’s message identified the Indians as his, “children” and that the role of the whites, “intended to help Indians to learn, ‘the culture of the earth’.” This became the center of Jefferson’s philosophy toward the Indian.

Jefferson, President of the American Philosophical Society, promoted the platform of educating the Indians on the benefits of civil law and republican economics. Jefferson pursued the creation of a university in Virginia that allowed for both student and teacher to embrace a “father and son” relationship that Jefferson believed would bring out the natural desire to improve, be the student savage or civil. The key to Jefferson’s integration of whites and the soon-to-be-yeoman republican Indians was the Louisiana Purchase. The Louisiana Purchase provided for a stable, new environment where Indians could progress into an agrarian society and increase their populations decimated by disease and contact with whites. Reality soon set in and Jefferson had to release more land for white settlement than for Indian farming due to political pressure. Jefferson began moving marginal Indian cultures off their lands by force or bribery in order to secure those lands for white settlement. The secondary effect of this policy resulted in forcing various Indian cultures to intermingle and dilute each other’s culture in order to survive.
Jackson did not believe in Enlightenment Theory. Jackson’s career military experience led him to adopt a policy that regarded the Indians as an exploitable resource. Jackson, an Indian fighter, did not show any inclination towards Indian education or integration. Jackson’s economic focus in the 1820 election fixated on white American economic strengthening and not supporting the Indians as they farmed their way towards a republican utopia. It is difficult to shape Jackson’s policies towards the Indians because Jackson did not develop a strategic policy regarding Indian policy. Abernethy described Jackson as an “opportunist” and believed that Jackson saw economic opportunity in Indian lands. Jackson had no specific hatred towards Indians; they were simply a resource and roadblock to white American prosperity. President Andrew Jackson’s goals regarding the Seminoles consisted of removing them to reservations located near the Arkansas and Oklahoma border in order to allow for white settlers to have uninterrupted access to the interior of Florida. This is consistent with Jackson’s other efforts to relocate Indians (such as the Creeks); however, the difference in this case is that the Seminoles did not pose a threat to white settlers in Florida, Georgia, or Alabama beyond the occasional theft of livestock. Despite this, Jackson was determined to remove the Seminoles from Florida and stated that the states had the sovereign right to control their lands and inhabitants. Indian relocation became a, “foregone conclusion.” The difference between Jefferson and Jackson involved the difference in strategic goals for the Indians: Jefferson saw them as a burgeoning addition to the American economy (at least in stated philosophy), and Jackson saw them as a hindrance, valued only for their lands. Unfortunately, for the Seminoles, the Jacksonian influence mattered since Jackson was the sitting President at the time of the war.
The Northwest Ordinance outlined how all future states would be organized and governed. Although the focus is on westward expansion, the key is the section (Section 3) covering the conduct towards the integration between westward expanding Americans and the Indians living in the areas concerned. This demonstrates an attempt on the part of the federal government to control how people interact with natives. There had been no previous American written policy or doctrine that specifically addressed this issue. It also specifically addresses their property, rights, and liberty. This is important because now the federal government acknowledges the fact that all Native Americans have the legal ability to possess property, and are entitled to rights and liberties. The ordinance’s language clearly identifies this as a “us-them” relationship, but generally follows the 1831 Supreme Court ruling regarding the Seminoles, in that although not a separate nation, a special relationship existed between America and the natives. Natives are entitled to courtesy and respect, although not specifically protection. The ordinance is an important initial step in addressing the issue of co-habitation with the Indians and sets the conditions for the later Supreme Court decisions. It is somewhat Jeffersonian, but generally fair. There simply was no ability for punitive action if ignored. It does have some limitations, especially in that it does not address the case of self-defense on the part of the settlers. The ability to wage war against the Indians is reserved at the federal level.16

Despite the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Indian Removal Act of 1830, Congress (under the control of Andrew Jackson) extended additional control over the Indians by authorizing the Indian Affairs Office to manage Indian affairs. This enabled Jackson to begin using the new Indian Affairs Office to aggressively push for relocation
of Indians west of the Mississippi River. The preferred method of Indian removal called for direct payments of annuities with the military providing the means to effect this relocation; all in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Removal Act of 1830. At this time, only the military possessed the ability to secure the Indians and their goods to the new reservations as well as transport whatever was necessary. This forced the Army leadership to expand their mission role to something more akin to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions familiar to the contemporary, twenty-first century military professional. The negative aspect of this policy is that the Indian Affairs Office initially fell under the auspices of the US Army. Although seemingly logical, placing the ways and means together, the Army’s budget did not support the new office. This enabled the government to fluctuate their fiscal support for the program depending on the tribe and how the government viewed the tribe at the time, to include reducing funding at critical times (such as winter when funding for rood was critical) and backing away to allow the military to deal with the problem. This “bait and switch” resulted in several Indian conflicts, most notably the impending Second Seminole War.

By the 1830s, the combination of Jeffersonian-inspired Indian rights and Jackson’s efforts to strip those rights away resulted in Indian nations aware of their rights under US law, but also fully aware that those rights depended on a US government dedicated to their fair enforcement. Despite the Cherokee’s legal victory, no Indian nation could expect a US government led by Andrew Jackson to impartially support their needs or treat them with any level of respect. Jackson’s stated policy and goals did not support an empowered Native American at any level. The broker for the Indians, the US Army, now had to attempt to provide for the Indians under their control within the legal
guidelines of the standing laws and case law while simultaneously accomplishing their mission of enforcing the nation’s political decisions with force. This tug-o-war of ideals now began to influence the decisions and tactics of the Army despite the lack of written doctrine. The proof of this occurs during the Second Seminole War when, on different occasions, general officers were able to entice Seminole tribes into surrender by offering supplies, clothing and the opportunity to try to talk resisting tribes into surrender in return for delaying their own relocations. During prior conflicts, the Army attempted to control Indian actions with force. Now, the Army has shifted towards intent-based decision making due to the expanded role they must perform in Indian relations. The intent of the Second Seminole War was to effect the relocation of the Seminole Indians by force, not to destroy them. This decision making based on the intent of the president drove the tactics of the Second Seminole War, requiring a more holistic approach to the problem at hand as opposed to the Army’s past practices of destruction in order to gain the desired effect. By adopting a holistic approach to the Seminole problem, the Army broadened its tactics to encompass both traditional Indian fighting techniques (such as the use of scouts, reconnaissance, security, and destruction of crops to force Indians to mass for a battle) and newer tactics focused around counterinsurgency principles pioneered by General Louis Suchet during his counterinsurgency in Aragon, Spain.

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1Federal Indian Policies, 4; and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787; available from http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/5.htm; Internet; accessed on 20 May 2007.


4Ibid., 526-527.
5Ibid., 527.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 533.
8Ibid., 534.
9Ibid., 541.
10Ibid.
11Ibid., 543.
12Ibid., 545.
13Ibid., 546-547.
17Sarkesian, 25.
The US Army faced a difficult tactical problem during the Second Seminole War. The Army faced a compulsory relocation policy the President of the United States and Congress established. This policy had to be enforced within the constraints of existing Indian laws, while protecting American interests in Florida, and fighting an insurgency centered on defying the relocation policy. This problem diverges from the past problems the Army faced because it demanded more of a nonlethal, holistic approach opposed to the destruction-oriented methods of the past. Now, the Army had to relook its tactics and try to find new methods of gaining compliance beyond the destruction of Seminole infrastructure and warfighting ability. During the Second Seminole War, the Army faced two distinct groups of Seminoles: those who wished relocation and those fighting relocation. President Jackson’s mission for the Army called for the relocation of the Seminoles and not specifically their destruction. The Indian laws on the books (The Northwest Ordinance and the Indian Removal Act of 1830) demanded that the government treat the Indians fairly, compensate them if removed, and protect those Indians undergoing relocation. The laws do not address the current (or any) military situation, thus the Army (as the responsible agency handling the issue of relocation) remained obligated to abide by the existing laws, which call for the compensation and protection of all Indians under military control during the relocation process regardless of their status (insurgent or compliant Seminole) prior to capture. Additionally, the relocation mission called for only relocation and not destruction of the Seminoles. This prompted the US Army leaders in Florida to examine different methods for gaining
compliance including deception, lethal operations against their warriors, destruction
operations against crops, villages, and livestock and even psychological operations
intended to bring about compliance. These obstacles blocked the Army’s efforts. The
Seminoles themselves differed from other Indian cultures the Army encountered for three
reasons: First, the Seminoles remained in remote areas. They did not normally contact
white settlers except to trade. The Seminoles also faced forced relocation. This differs
from other tribes (such as the Iroquois, Miamis, Mohawks, and others) who had conflicts
with the US but the conflicts were limited to punitive raids. The US (and other Western
forces) had no plans to expel any Native American tribe permanently from their
homelands before this period. Second, the Seminoles had the ability to match US
firepower. The Seminoles had effective flintlock firearms equaling the caliber and range
of the US Army’s primary firearm, the Model 1816 Musket. Until the Army could
overcome this firepower parity, they could not achieve success in battle without a marked
advantage, such as initial surprise or overwhelming numbers. The final hurdle for the
Army was the ability for the Seminoles to grow crops in the fertile northern parts of
Florida while using the central and southern parts as a safe haven. This allowed the
Seminoles to continue to eat while simultaneously protecting their families and villages
in terrain difficult for the Army to penetrate. This reduced the effectiveness of the
traditional American tactic of destroying Indian infrastructure in order to force the
Indians to defend a key location and defeating them with mobility and superior firepower,
as they had at The Battle of Fallen Timbers. To counter these challenges, the Army had to
develop tactics that centered on the critical vulnerabilities of the Seminoles (crops,
outside trade, and the diverse nature of their tribal structure), which forced the Seminoles
to accept relocation. In order to accomplish this, the Army had to negate the firepower parity issue, eliminate or separate the Seminoles from their crops, and stop the importation of firearms from Spanish traders in the Caribbean (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Second Seminole War Map

The Seminoles shared many of the same traits as other Indian cultures, such as the Iroquois, Miamis, and others. These included an agrarian-based economy, hunting for the majority of their meat and well-established trade with European benefactors. The Seminole external economy centered on trade, primarily with whites and Spanish traders.
in Cuba and the Bahamas. The Seminoles traded deer and otter pelts for guns, black powder, lead, and whatever else they needed.\textsuperscript{1} Internally, they existed using an agrarian and hunter-gatherer-based economy. The Seminoles planted crops in open lands throughout their territory, as well as hammocks cleared enough for agriculture. They primarily planted corn, pumpkins, and squashes. They also gathered \textit{coontie} (Zamia Pumila or Florida arrowroot, which was made into flour and baked into bread) and whatever wild plants, fruits (including citrus and bananas), and vegetables that they could find. The Seminoles hunted wild game, primarily deer (used for meat and trading their skins), and turkeys. They also fished using bows and arrows for fish and turtles.\textsuperscript{2} The Seminoles did keep domesticated cattle for food. US forces would often capture Seminole cattle herds during campaigns and there are also several references to Seminoles raiding Florida ranches and settlers for their cattle.\textsuperscript{3} As US forces forced the Seminoles from their villages to become more mobile, they were not able to remain in an area long enough to raise a crop. This forced them to return to more of a hunter-gatherer existence and subsist on wild game, native fruits and plants, and especially \textit{coontie}. The Seminoles shared common warfighting tactics with other Indian nations, including the use of firearms, reliance on surprise to initiate contact, the extensive use of reconnaissance before attacking, and the avoidance of contact if they did not feel that they could overcome the strengths of their enemies.

The terrain they lived on sets the Seminoles apart from other Indian tribes outside of Florida. The past Indian conflicts confined them primarily to the frontier northwest, consisting of Western Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Indiana. The rolling hills, forests, and fairly temperate climate did not adversely affect operations
except during the high winter months. Florida consisted of a low, swampy interior with extensive inland waterways, lakes, creeks, and hammocks. Hammocks are small islands of dry land that are slightly above the water level and covered with a tangled variety of trees, palmettos, and scrub brush. Hammocks provide excellent cover and concealment for both the insurgent as well as the counterinsurgent. Southern Florida contains two major swamps: the Everglades and Big Cypress Swamp. These two waterways cover the majority of the area of southern Florida all the way to the southern keys. The climate is oppressively hot and humid during the late spring through early fall months and is a perfect environment for malaria. The environment took a severe toll on equipment as well as men, deteriorating leather harness and shoes at a rapid rate. This is well documented by Jacob Motte, a surgeon assigned to the Second Dragoons. Motte described several expeditions conducted by the Second Dragoons ended prematurely because the shoes worn by the troopers became tattered from the moisture, humidity, and palmettos encountered in the region. Following these expeditions, the troopers waited in their forts until supplies of shoes and boots arrived to the forts allowing the troopers to return to the field and conduct their missions.4

No established non-Seminole settlements existed in central and southern Florida. This, combined with the Seminoles’ previously established trade partnerships with Spanish merchants, reduced contact between the Seminoles and American settlers. There two main reasons for the lack of settlements beyond the coasts of Florida. One, the original Spanish settlements had existed on the coasts in order to support Spanish trade routes in the Caribbean and Atlantic Ocean, and adequate lands for habitation and trade existed in abundance along these coastlines. There had been no need for extensive
settlement in the interior of Florida, thus, it did not become settled. The second reason is because the interior of central and southern Florida does not contain any viable resources, such as large tracts of land, commercially productive hardwood forests or mineral deposits. Between the abundance of arable lands in northern Florida and the coastlines, population centers capable of supporting the existing population and lack of any exploitable resource in the central and southern portions of Florida, there was no reason for settlers to have much contact. This reclusive nature of the Seminoles also promoted tribes to exist independently of each other. This lack of unity will later allow the US Army to isolate smaller tribes and use them against the other tribes. The remote and reclusive nature of the Seminoles meant that white settlers and the military had little knowledge of or experience with the Seminoles as a people. This lack of experience and knowledge is a bad combination for a military depending on both of these (due to a lack of a written doctrine) in order to fight the nations wars and proves to be true in the opening months of the Second Seminole War.

The Seminoles had the ability to match the firepower of the US Army during the initial two years of the Second Seminole War. There are three examples of Seminole firepower shown during the three major conflicts of the war, The Dade “Massacre” (The Dade Massacre is a massacre because at the end of the battle, several US Soldiers attempted to surrender when the Seminole Negro allies killed them), the Second Battle of Withlacoochee, and the Battle of Okeechobee. During these battles, the Seminoles maintained either fire superiority or parity until ending the battle. In the case of the Dade Massacre, the Seminoles even managed to overcome the firepower provided by cannon in order to defeat the American force. The allies also finished off the wounded Americans
despite the Seminoles themselves refusing to participate in the atrocity. Public outcry originating in Seminole raids on white settlements prompted the ill-fated Dade expedition. Major General Duncan Clinch, the ranking US Army officer in Florida, responded by reinforcing the existing forts in Florida and establishing one new fort, Fort Drane, adjacent to his plantation. Clinch established Fort Drane in order to defend the largest logistics center in the area, colocated with his plantation. In order to staff the new fort, Clinch used the majority of the garrison of Fort King; reducing its garrison to one company of regulars. This increased the risk to Fort King and prompted Clinch’s decision to dispatch a relief column consisting of C Company 2nd Artillery and B Company 3rd Artillery under Major Francis Dade. The artillerists, converted to infantry, retained one six pound cannon, taking it with them on the march to Fort King. On 28 December 1835 (the third day of the march, about halfway between Fort Brooke and Fort King), Seminoles attacked Dade as he began the days march. Dade rode forward in order to establish his scout screen prior to the main body departing their encampment. Just as he and the advance guard of scouts were about one hundred yards away from the encampment, the Seminoles opened fire on the advance guard, including Dade. Dade went down in the first Seminole shots and the remainder of the column defended from the small, triangular breastwork the Soldiers had erected the day before. The Seminoles attempted to encircle the encampment, but the defenders kept the Seminoles at bay by using the cannon. However, the cannon had been taken out of the breastwork in preparation for the movement. The crew did not have the time to bring the cannon back into the breastwork before the attack and fought outside the breastwork, taking heavy casualties before running out of ammunition. Once the cannon ran out of ammunition
(sometime in the late afternoon), the Seminoles assaulted the breastwork. As soon as the position became untenable, Lieutenant W. E. Bassinger attempted to surrender the few remaining survivors. The Seminoles ignored the survivors, preferring to dump the cannon into a small nearby pond; however, the Seminole’s Negro allies did not restrain themselves, killing both those Soldiers who had surrendered as well as the wounded with the exception of Private Ransome Clarke. Despite five gunshot wounds to his body, Clarke managed to survive and walked for three days back to Fort Brooke to tell his story. The report of the, “Dade Massacre” sparked immediate action on the part of Congress and the War Department and fear on the part of the citizens of Florida. People began to flow into the cities, such as Tallahassee and Tampa, from the outlying areas, demanding protection and action from Clinch.

   Dade led a force of 121 Soldiers, including one cannon. The Seminoles attacked with approximately 300 warriors and allies. Despite the personal firearms being equal, the Seminoles managed to maintain firepower parity with Dade’s command through surprise, numbers and the use of cover and concealment. By attacking from the cover of the thickets, the Seminoles move without drawing the concentrated volley fire of the regulars and their cannon. The Seminoles also reduced the concentration of US firepower by surrounding the position, forcing the US Army to defend in all directions. Once the cannon ran out of ammunition, the Seminoles gained fire superiority. This enabled them to quickly overcome Dade’s defense and win the battle.

   The Second Battle of Withlacoochee is another example of how the Seminoles managed to equal American firepower in battle. The events leading up to the battle centered on the planning of the new commander in Florida and Eastern US District
Commander, Major General Winfield Scott. Scott’s objective involved driving the Seminoles into the northern part of Florida so the militia, massed mainly in the northern parts of the territory, could destroy them. Scott would have to maneuver his regular forces well to the south in order to get below the Seminole stronghold on the Withlacoochee River in order to dislodge the Seminoles. Scott’s intent was to form the army into three “grand columns” which would converge at the Seminole stronghold area at the same time in order to mass his army. Scott intended the columns be close enough to prevent any Seminole bands from slipping past and escaping the target area. Scott organized the columns into three wings: The right wing, Major General Clinch, had orders to move from Fort Drane to the objective area. The center wing, Colonel William Lindsay, had orders to move from Fort Brooke to the objective area, and the left wing, Brigadier General Abraham Eustis, had orders to move from St. Augustine to the objective area.

Both Secretary of War Cass and President Jackson disliked Scott’s plan but allowed it to go forward. Their apprehension centered mainly on the perception that Scott had poor knowledge of the area and lacked a detailed plan on the employment of militia. This combined with inexperience in fighting Seminole Indians compounded Jackson and Cass’s mistrust. While Scott was preparing for his campaign, Major General Edmund Gaines, the Western US District Commander, received word of the problems going on in Florida, half of which was in his Western Department. He immediately made ready to move to Florida to sort out the situation. Gaines was 59 years old at this time and earned his position and rank during the War of 1812. Gaines’ most prominent characteristic entailed his being frank in manner and not sparing criticism, regardless of the subject of
the criticism. Many people disliked Gaines, including Winfield Scott and President Jackson who insured that he was kept as far from Washington, DC, as possible. Gaines was happy with the arrangement, preferring the frontier to the finery of the flagpole.9

On 15 January 1836, Gaines moved his force (consisting of the 4th Infantry Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Davis Twiggs, two companies of the artillery reorganized as infantry, and the Louisiana militia regiment from New Orleans) to Pensacola, Florida. While Gaines was en-route to Pensacola, Scott requested a district boundary change through Secretary of War Cass. The purpose of this request was to insure that there were no command and control issues between his command and Gaines. Unfortunately, Scott did not notify Gaines of his request before Gaines departed New Orleans.10 Gaines arrived in Florida on 4 February 1836, and Cass’s order adjusting the boundary and a new mission ordering Gaines to defend Texas from the Seminoles (clearly an attempt to keep the unpopular Gaines West of the Mississippi) did not reach him until his arrival at Fort Brooke on the 9th of February.11 Despite the clear order to defend Texas and stay out of Florida, Gaines decided to disregard the order because Scott was not yet in Florida (he would not arrive until the end of February), and the Louisiana militia stated that they would return to New Orleans if Gaines did not lead them. Gaines proceeded to move to Tampa Bay and there took control of the Florida militia in Tampa Bay as well. Gaines formed his troops into a brigade of 980 men and the Florida militia into their own brigade. Gaines then moved on Fort King, leading both brigades, believing that Clinch might need assistance there.12

When Gaines arrived at Fort King, he found that none of the supplies that Scott had ordered had arrived. His own troops were out of rations, so Gaines sent a packhorse
train to Fort Drane to secure 12,000 rations from Clinch before returning to Fort Brooke.

Gaines then decided to assault the Seminoles as he passed Clinch’s old battlefield (the
First Battle of Withlacoochee) on the Withlacoochee River while en-route back. Gaines
moved in three columns with the intent to converge on the battlefield at the same time.
When he arrived, the Seminoles immediately ambushed Gaines entire force from the far
side of the Withlacooche River. Gaines attempted to attack the Seminole ambush but
could not find a crossing site until the next day. When Gaines tried to force a crossing the
next day, the Seminoles were able to hold Gaines’ attack at the ford site. Gaines fought
from 9:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. (without success) before retreating across the
Withlacoochee and establishing a square breastwork in order to defend against any
further Seminole attacks. Gaines then sent a runner to Clinch, stating that he (Gaines) was
holding before a massed group of Seminoles and that Clinch should come to support him
by attacking the Seminoles’ flank.13 The Seminoles attacked Gaines the next day from
three sides. Gaines’ casualties totaled one killed and thirty-two wounded, and he
estimated that he faced 1,100 Seminoles.14 Gaines, running out of rations, began to
slaughter his pack animals and horses to feed his troops. He did not attempt to either
break out or counterattack because he believed that Clinch would come to deliver the
decisive blow per the Napoleonic model.15

Clinch, however, was not enroute. Scott, incensed at Gaines’ refusal to obey the
boundary change and injecting himself into Scott’s fight without coordination or
permission, refused to allow Clinch to move to support Gaines. Clinch, despite being 30
miles away, could hear the cannon firing from the area of the battlefield and knew that
Gaines needed help. Clinch thought over the situation and decided to assist Gaines
despite Scott’s orders. However, Clinch does not defy Scott’s order to not issue rations to Gaines, so Clinch drew rations from his own plantation next to Fort Drane. At this time, Scott changed his mind and decided to allow Clinch to assist Gaines.16

Gaines defended for eight days and had casualties totaling five killed and forty-six wounded; including himself. While directing troops, Gaines was hit in the mouth with a musket ball, knocking out two of his teeth. Gaines spit the ball (and two teeth) and stated, “It’s mean of the redskins to knock out my teeth when I have so few.”17 Clinch finally arrived on the battlefield on 9 March, driving the Seminoles from the battlefield, ending the fight. Gaines immediately turned over his command to Clinch and left Florida, never to return. Following the battle, Scott decided to delay his campaign because he felt that the troops that Gaines had left now required rest before they could be effective. When Scott did finally attack, he attacked per his original plan (minus Clinch who is already there) and at the same place. This time, the Seminoles allowed the US forces to cross the river, waiting to attack the rear guard before they could cross. Scott ended the affair by ordering a bayonet charge, forcing the Seminoles to break contact.18 Instead of clearing the area (an obvious Seminole stronghold), Scott declared victory and returned to Fort Brooke. As he was marching back, the columns had a break in contact. The Seminoles ambushed and harassed the separated columns all the way back to Fort King.19

The Seminoles initiated the ambush against Gaines and this time had firepower superiority from the beginning. The numbers of Seminoles and US forces were nearly equal (1,100 Seminoles versus 980 Soldiers under Gaines plus the Florida militia (numbers are unknown). The significant difference between this battle and the Dade action was that Gaines did not have artillery support. The Seminoles maintained an
advantage, but not enough to overcome near equal numbers against a US force behind breastworks. Once Clinch arrived on the field, the Seminoles recognized that they no longer held the advantage and withdrew across the Withlacoochee River. It would take Scott’s entire force (some 3,700 men and artillery) to dislodge the Seminoles from their defensive positions along the river. However, once Scott split his forces into their respective columns and began to withdrawal from the battlefield, the Seminoles returned to reclaim the area and harass Scott’s forces as they returned to Fort King.

The final example of cases where the Seminoles either had superior or equal firepower against the US Army is during the Battle of Okeechobee. This battle took place during the fall 1837 campaign, organized and led by the new commander of the Army of the South (the name for the US Army operating in Florida), Major General Thomas Jesup. In preparation for the fall campaign, Jesup asked for and received reinforcements from the Secretary of War, totaling 4,636 Regular Army soldiers, 4,078 militia (from various states), and 170 Marines. Jesup’s operational goal was to spread his forces throughout the countryside and force the Seminoles to battle. Jesup did this by reorganizing his command into seven columns that could operate independently, but with specific objectives. One of these columns, led by Colonel Zachary Taylor, had orders to move to the area of Pease Creek and drive a band of Seminoles North into Jesup’s main formation. Taylor’s column consisted of 1,400 men (the 1st Infantry Regiment, 5 companies from the 4th and 6th Infantry Regiments, 180 Missouri Volunteers, and 70 Delaware and Shawnee scouts).

On 24 December 1837, Taylor arrived in the Pease Creek area and used his Native American scouts to locate the Seminole encampment. Taylor’s scouts found a
band of approximately 400 Seminole warriors hidden in a hammock. The scouts returned to Taylor who decided to attack the position at first light. During the night, Taylor prepared a plan calling for his Missouri militia to attack the position as skirmishers. Once the militia made contact with the Seminoles and prevented them from being able to move from the hammock, Taylor would lead a bayonet assault against the hammock with his regulars. Taylor planned on the shock effect of the bayonet charge to force the Seminoles from the hammock and into the area where Jesup could destroy them or force their surrender. The next morning, the 25th of December, Taylor attacked. The Seminoles used the defensive cover of the hammock to shield themselves from Taylor’s musket fire, preventing serious casualties despite their numerical inferiority. The Seminoles managed to maintain their position against the militia, but could not stand against the regulars and their bayonet charge. Despite the shock effect created by the bayonet, the Seminoles managed to kill 26 soldiers and wound an additional 112 before fleeing the battlefield, suffering only 11 killed and 14 wounded.20

The Battle of Okeechobee showed that the Seminoles could still maintain firepower parity against like numbers. True, the Seminole warriors outnumbered the 180 militiamen skirmishing against them, but the Seminoles still fought despite being surprised. This shows that the Seminoles felt enough confidence in their strength, firepower, and position to continue to defend against the militia. The 1,100 regulars following the militia was a different thing all together and the Seminoles wisely withdrew to fight another day. In this case, Taylor had significantly more troops than the Seminoles, but yet again, US forces lacked artillery. If Taylor had encountered a force of Seminoles comparable to those mustered against Gaines, the situation might have turned
out differently because the Seminoles would have had firepower parity. After these three battles, the US Army decided that it needed to insure that their forces must have firepower dominance before attacking the Seminoles in order to prevent a defeat and to show the Seminoles that they could not win militarily. The ability to show the Seminoles US military superiority now became a tactic to use against separated tribes to demonstrate the futility of resistance and the practicality of accepting relocation.

The third aspect of the Seminoles that gave them a marked advantage was their ability to farm the fertile northern parts of Florida and retreat into the central and southern swamps and hammock for defense. The Seminoles planted crops and allowed their cattle to pasture in the north in the spring. Once the US Army began their spring campaign, the Seminoles left the crops to fend for themselves and drove their now fattened cattle into their strongholds, relatively safe from US military intervention. Since the settlers had relocated to the coastal cities and forts, the threat to the Seminoles was low. Once the crops ripened in the late summer and fall, the Seminoles returned to the north, harvested, then returned to their strongholds. US Army operations in central and southern Florida encountered Seminole crops and destroyed them on-site, but not enough to coerce Seminole resistance to stop. The fact that the US Army still encountered large numbers of Seminole warriors (from 300 to 1,100) all the way through the spring of 1838, proves the thesis. In order to prevent the use of those northern fields, the US Army would have to interdict the Seminoles as they moved back and forth between their strongholds and the northern fields.

The US Army countered these Seminole strengths by identifying their weaknesses and focusing power against them. These weaknesses included the isolation of the various
Seminole tribes and the poor productivity of the Seminole farms in the central and southern parts of Florida. The Army would also have to somehow counter the Seminoles ability to match Army firepower. The US Army planned to do this by employing three separate methods: a series of forts spread across the middle of Florida to isolate the Seminoles in their strongholds from the fertile farms in the North, interdicting the arms trade into Florida from the Spanish Bahamas and Cuba, and by enticing the Seminoles into surrender and relocation. This last method called for the Army to abandon laws of warfare normally reserved for European military forces and capture Seminoles under the cover of a white flag and conducting what today are psychological operations. These psychological operations attempted to convince the Seminoles that resistance was futile and that cooperation benefited them as a tribe. Two of these operations included a demonstration of the Colts repeating rifle and pistol in front of a Seminole delegation and the use of explosive Congreve rockets in battle.

The standard firearm for the regular Soldier, Sailor, and Marine organized for infantry remained the Model 1816 smoothbore musket, effectively comparable to the trade muskets in the hands of their Seminole antagonists. The Army decided to upgrade the firepower of the Second Dragoons with Colts revolving carbines. In order to enhance the effect of the increased firepower, the Army made sure that when Samuel Colt personally tested the carbine for the Second Dragoons, the Dragoons demonstrated the new weapon in front of a crowd of Seminoles, much to their amazement. Following the demonstration, the Seminoles were released to spread the news about the new weapon. These carbines, based on the Colt-Patterson model, came in various calibers with the most common being .54 calibur. Firepower increased because once the firer
loaded the 6-shot cylinder, all that was necessary to fire the weapon was to pull the hammer back with the firer’s thumb and pull the trigger. This enabled the firer to shoot six rounds in less than one minute, increasing the rate of fire from three rounds a minute with a musket to six. The carbine did have some drawbacks. One major concern was the possibility of a chain fire (or “rear fire” in the vernacular of the time). Chain-fire was when all of the rounds in the cylinder fired at the same time instead of only one. To hedge against the possibility of severe injury, the firer could support the weapon by holding the carbine with both hands where the comb of the stock and the firing cylinder meet. This adequately supported the weapon while preventing any accidental loss of appendage in the event of a chain fire. The revolving carbine was essentially a carbine version of the Colt-Patterson pistol, but with a one-piece shoulder stock with straight comb and a carbine length barrel. There was no wooden fore stock, just the metal barrel. The cylinder did hold six .54-caliber rounds and fired in the single-action only mode (cock the hammer; pull the trigger each time to fire). This weapon significantly increased the rate of fire for the Dragoon over the single-shot muzzle loading flintlock dragoon carbine he was already issued. The Colt revolving carbine was a huge technological leap in firearms technology for the period and that came with a cost of $50 per carbine (high for the time). Despite the undisputed advantage of the new weapon, one finds neither mention in any reference to its effectiveness in battle nor any reference that supported the Colt revolving rifle as a positive adaptation, especially for the high cost. Attacks by the Seminoles against the Dragoons did decrease, indicating potential effectiveness of that aspect of the psychological operations campaign.
At about the same time, Samuel Colt introduced the Colt-Patterson revolver. The government did not mass-purchased these pistols, but many officers and dragoons purchased them on an individual basis. There is no doubt that the Colt pistol is significantly more effective than the issued pistol at the time, the US Model in .54-caliber smoothbore. The US model used a muzzle loading, flintlock system, and fired only one shot at a time. The Colt-Patterson pistol does closely resemble the Colt revolving carbine and may further influence Seminoles coming into contact with them, reminding them of the demonstration of the Colt carbine.

The third attempt to upgrade the firepower of the units in the field and psychologically assault the Seminoles was the used Congreve Rockets. Recall that due to the poor trafficability of the interior of Florida, the use of standard field guns common to the US Artillery Regiments was impracticable. Congreve Rockets had improved trafficability because mules carried them to the launch site. Crews then fired them from an A-frame. Below is a description of the Congreve Rocket system:

The original rocket design had the guide pole side-mounted on the warhead; this was improved in 1815 with a base plate with a threaded hole. They could be fired up to two miles (3 km)--the range being set by the degree of elevation of the launching frame--although at any range they were fairly inaccurate and had a tendency for premature explosion. They were as much a psychological weapon as a physical one, for they were rarely or never used except alongside other types of artillery. Congreve designed several different warhead sizes from 3 to 24 pounds (1 to 10 kg). The 24 pound (10 kg) type with a fifteen foot (5 m) guide pole was the most widely used variant.\(^{26}\) The Congreve Rocket’s design created a strong psychological impact, especially when using the incendiary warheads. No references exist showing casualties directly caused by Congreve Rockets, but that does not mean they did not encourage US forces in the attack and discouraging Seminoles in the defense.\(^{27}\) The use of Congreve rockets supports a
thesis that the US Army deliberately identified certain weapons for both their usefulness as well as their psychological impact against the Seminoles. It was also a good attempt to decrease the requirements of artillery, a hardship in past Indian conflicts. Sullivan used extraordinary effort to haul his artillery to a location where it could be effective. The idea to use Congreve Rockets, though limited in their effectiveness, was sound.

Another frequent effort to shape the thoughts of the Seminoles was the use of captured Seminoles to influence Seminoles still in the field. Jesup, Taylor, and Armistead all made extensive use of this tactic. First, the US Army commander approaches the leaders of a tribe who had surrendered. The US officer then told the tribal leader that the Army would delay their removal to the West if they agree to meet with other Seminole tribes still resisting. The leaders were to tell the other tribes that relocation is good for the tribe and that the Army is treating them all well. This attempt to separate the tribes and influence their decision to surrender is a hallmark of modern day psychological operations. All three before mentioned US Army officers used this tactic successfully, relocating hundreds of Seminoles without a single casualty. 28

Another hurdle for the US Army was the interdiction of the arms trade between the Seminoles and the Spanish merchants in the Bahamas and Cuba. These merchants provided the Seminoles with modern muskets comparable to those issued to regular US forces. This interdiction of the arms trade fell to the US Navy, under the control of the Army commander in Florida. The initial effort fell to the West Indies Fleet, under the command of Commodore Alexander Dallas, and consisted of one Frigate (flagship) and four sloops of war. This feeble force had the mission to conduct a blockade of the entire Florida coastline, from Pensacola to the border with South Carolina. Eventually Army
commanders such as Jesup, Taylor, and Armistead managed to increase the size of the blockade force and included three purpose-built barges specifically designed to interdict Seminole canoes conducting trade with the Spanish. By the end of the war, the West Indies Fleet conducting the blockade consisted of three lines: the first covering the bays and inlets with oared barges, the second covering the reef line with the Schooners *Wave* and *Otsego* and the Cutter *Campbell*, and the third covering the open sea with the Sloops of War *Boston* and *Ontario*. The last vessel added was the seagoing Steamer *Pointsett*, joining the squadron in 1839.29 The record does not show any specific cargo seizures on the part of the squadron; however, the blockade is successful by 1840, because of the key indicator; the lack of firearms used against US forces in Florida.

The final hurdle for the US Army was the separation of the Seminole people in central and southern Florida from their crops in northern Florida. The Army’s solution was the “squares plan.” The squares plan called for a line of strong points from New Smyrna to Fort Brooke. These strong points would be approximately 20 miles apart; connected by a road network for logistics and command and control, and set within a grid of boxes formed 20 miles square each. Each strongpoint contained a platoon of approximately 20 Soldiers, commanded by an officer. One-half of these soldiers had mounts for rapid response to any Seminole activity. In addition to garrisoning the strong points, the Soldiers grew crops with government issued seed and patrolled their square. Their purpose was to prevent the Seminoles from growing crops and to starve them into relocation.30 The solution was squares plan, a variation of a plan used by General Louis Suchet during Napoleon’s Spanish insurgency. Brigadier General Zachary Taylor enacted the squares plan, but could not have conceived the plan by himself. Taylor’s background
consisted of practical, hands-on Indian fighting experience and lacked a formal military education. A backwoodsman, the probability of Taylor being able to acquire a copy of a text examining Suchet’s tactics, let alone his being able to read enough French to understand it, is low. It is likely that one of his West Point trained officers elaborated to Taylor on the tactic. West Point cadets had the level of exposure to Napoleonic tactics and theory, as well as the French language skills to understand them. This is because during the period between the First and Second Seminole Wars, the US Army had nearly fully transitioned into a professional organization. The two key events leading the Army into this level of professionalism were the creation of the US Military Academy and the evolution of Napoleonic tactics and theory. With the advent of the US Military Academy producing professionally trained officers beginning in 1802, the Regular Army had almost two generations of professionally trained officers within its officer corps by 1835. Those officers who had not received their educations at West Point had proven their qualities in the line, with the majority of the senior officers having combat experience in the War of 1812 and small wars, such as the Black Hawk War and the First Seminole War. The curriculum of the US Military Academy did not teach counterinsurgency or adaptive tactical thought. The curriculum consisted of a program of instruction focused on producing military engineers. The curriculums of various years from the West Point archives show a program of mathematics, engineering, and those skills designed to support those, such as French and sketching. Although Cadets did not receive any formal education in counterinsurgency or Napoleonic tactics, they did receive exposure through informal tactics clubs popular with many cadets. These clubs studied
contemporary military theorists, such as Baron Henri Jomini. One of the faculty chairs for the tactics club was Dennis Hart Mahan.

Mahan, the first American military theorist advocating formal methods of warfare against Indians, began his West Point career as an engineering and mathematics instructor. Despite his position in the mathematics and engineering department, Mahan began teaching methods of Indian warfare as early as 1835. However, it would not be until 1847, when he completed his work, \textit{An Elementary Treatise on Advanced Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops With the Essential Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics}. After Mahan began teaching Military Arts and Science following the US Civil War, his text began to gather more attention due to its use as a part of the curriculum of the US Military Academy. Mahan’s instruction identified the needs for combined-arms (infantry and cavalry) reconnaissance, security, and skirmishing in order to counterinsurgents as well as Native Americans during conflicts.\textsuperscript{32} Mahan also stresses the use of surprise to the advantage of US forces, stating:

\begin{quote}
Winter and bad weather are most favorable [for launching a surprise attack], as the enemy’s sentinels and outposts will then, in all probability, be less on alert. . . . The best positions are those where the enemy is inclosed in a defile, or village, and has not taken the proper precautions to secure himself from an attack. By seizing the outlets of the defile by infantry, in such cases, and making an impetuous charge of cavalry into it, the enemy may be completely routed.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Although not new, Mahan’s instruction is important because it leads towards official recognition by the Army of counterinsurgency and counter-Indian doctrine. By authorizing the use of Mahan’s text and teaching plans, the Army adopted his methods of warfare officially, despite the lack of a formal, structured doctrine manual on counterinsurgency and fighting Native Americans. Unfortunately, Mahan’s theory and methodologies would not be available until after the US fought its first real-prolonged
counterinsurgency against a Native American tribe in the Second Seminole War, therefore; the US Army once again had to rely on experience and the assimilation of foreign methods of warfare in order to fight an Indian conflict. Mahan did expose his students to the methods of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose training methods and tactics had relevance to the Army officer sent to fight Indians.

Bonaparte taught simplicity of drill because this proved to produce effective troops in a much shorter period of time (three months). Bonaparte’s drill called for the column transitioning quickly to a linear formation for combat with musketry and the bayonet. He also trained skirmishers to fright from cover and concealment ahead of the main line. A secondary effect of this open skirmish order was that the skirmish lines provided better reconnaissance than before. Simple drill, the use of light troops to operate as skirmishers (providing security for the main body) and infantry attacking in open order were all hallmarks of those tactics used effectively against Native Americans in America, taking those methods advocated by Bouquet to combat all enemies, not just Indians. Bonaparte’s tactics and training methods were ideally suited to the newly professionalized American Army that still relied on large numbers of militia to bolster its ranks in time of conflict. One key Napoleonic campaign, the Spanish insurgency, demonstrated how a small group of dedicated insurgents could fight a major power (France) to a standstill. The French, under General Louis Gabriel Suchet, managed to counter this insurgency in the Aragon province using new methods of warfare designed to separate the insurgents from their bases of supply and their population bases. The methods used by Suchet to successfully counter the Spanish insurgency could be adapted by the US Army to counter the Seminoles.
Suchet was a senior commander under Napoleon during the Spanish insurgency. In 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte conquered Portugal and then Spain in 1808. This led to strong anti-French sentiment within those two countries by the urban merchants, the Catholics, and the people themselves. The merchants did not show motivation towards the French theme of individual liberties and equality. They felt that those ideals degraded their power base. The Catholics detested the atheism of the French and the people actually liked the monarchy and its institutions. They did not want the freedoms that the French brought with them. Spain had few fortified towns and the insurgents used the rugged terrain as their main defense areas. The Spanish insurgents also had the following attributes:

1. Good intelligence from local inhabitants,
2. Good weapons and mobility,
3. Could blend in easily with the population,
4. Could displace then re-emerge to concentrate against French magazines, troop concentrations, and others, and
5. Could not have the French both guard all of the lines of communications, strong points, magazines and garrison towns as well as muster the strength to pursue insurgents following an attack.

Additionally, French troops themselves contributed to the problems they faced. A French General stated,

[An] operation that was to exterminate a band of partisans had failed, leaving the guerrillas strengthened by the infuriated inhabitants who have had to leave their homes owing to the pillage which troops have committed.
The result of the French failure to quickly defeat the insurgents resulted in the increase of their troop levels dedicated to guarding lines of communications; increasing to 90,000 out of 230,000 committed to the Spanish front.

General Louis Gabriel Suchet, commanding in the Aragon Province, showed success against the Spanish insurgents. Suchet’s strategy was of, “relentless activity” against the partisans; including burning their supplies and fanning out across the area to find and destroy insurgents. Eventually, the Spanish insurgents withdrew from the province in order to find sanctuary. Other successful French tactics included the use of multiple columns of six battalions each and conducting clearing operations to find and destroy insurgents in the countryside. Suchet garrisoned the territory he cleared with large numbers of posts of 100 troops or less. Suchet concluded that if one had high enough force to space ratio, one would be successful. Conversely, if one reduced the force to space ratio, one would not be successful.

The lessons learned from Suchet’s successful counterinsurgency are:

1. High-force-to-space ratios will be successful.
2. Columns should be used in the attack as opposed to lines.
3. Garrison should clear territory with large numbers of small posts.
4. Reduction of forces will result in increased insurgent successes.
5. Failure to separate insurgents from their “superpower” supporters (in this case Britain) will result in failure.
6. Destruction of insurgent supplies is critical to success.
7. Control of the “populated” countryside will result in loss of support, food, and tax income for the insurgent.
8. One cannot allow the insurgents to mass against any outpost or garrison. Strong points must be allowed the ability to maneuver and not always be on the defensive.

9. Insurgents will be successful when allowed to mass, attack, and then disperse quickly.

The squares plan incorporated all of these principles and had the added benefit of enhancing the security of northern Florida, enabling settlement of the productive farmlands by Americans. This denied the Seminoles the ability to harvest crops there and forced them to subsist on the far less productive plots hidden in the deep hammocks of central and southern Florida. It also allowed Taylor and his successors the ability to use the less proficient militia for garrison duty and patrolling while the regulars were available for campaigns. A secondary effect of the squares plan enabled the settlers to begin to leave the coastal cities and forts and repopulate the northern parts of Florida. Due to the extended period of the conflict, hundreds of white males had served in the Florida militia, thus extending the numbers of military trained across that part of Florida, further enhancing its security. The squares plan forced the Seminoles to seek out arable land for cultivation within the hammocks. By increasing the numbers of plots, this increased the probability of their discovery by US Army patrols. This was indeed the case, and the number of crops destroyed increased, eventually forcing Seminole tribes to begin peace talks with the Army due to starvation. These peace talks usually involved the tribal leaders, with the main body of the tribe staying away from the fort. The leaders usually asked for food in which to feed their tribe. The Army officer handling the talks would acquiesce, but with a provision; the entire tribe had to come in and camp next to the fort. Once the tribe agreed to this, the Army would feed them and begin the talks until
they were sure that everyone had come in who was coming in. At that time, a force (usually cavalry) would capture the tribe and process them for resettlement. Of course, if the leaders were willing to entice others to surrender, their own resettlement might be delayed; the psychological operations cycle continued with increased effectiveness. This was due to the success of the Army methods of adapting to target the critical vulnerabilities of the Seminoles: their food sources, their trade for firearms, and the isolated nature of their tribes. The Army’s transition from warfighting focused on destruction to a more holistic approach centered on gaining an effect which drives towards a goal proved to be highly effective in concluding the Second Seminole War and set the base of experience and methodology for the Army to draw from in order to fight future insurgencies until written doctrine could be produced.


2Ibid.


5American permanent settlements in to the deep interior of Florida would not occur until the turn of the nineteenth century, mainly for the reasons listed. This led to re-contact with some Seminole tribes still living in the deep hammocks and swamps in fear of American military reprisal. They also maintained their tribal heritage and practices unchanged by time, to include slavery.


8Ibid., 143.

9Ibid., 143-144.


12Ibid., 146. There is no reason for Gaines to believe that Clinch needed any assistance anywhere. Clinch had a clear understanding of his chain of command and knew very well that Gaines was not part of it, therefore he would have requested reinforcement through Scott if he felt the need for assistance and not Gaines. In any case, no record of any request for assistance from anyone to Gaines exists. This is simply a reason for him to involve himself without going through the proper military channels, which would have likely denied his request.


14Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War*, 147. The casualty figures are as reported and appear to be low considering the numbers of combatants involved. This may be due to two reasons. First, Gaines’ report on the actual numbers of Seminoles is inaccurate. The second reason could be due to the Seminole method of loading their firearms. The Seminoles had a practice of loading their firearms with the first shot patched, thus insuring minimal gas leakage, higher velocities and a generally more accurate shot. Subsequent shots involved the Seminole warrior holding several lead balls in his mouth, then spitting one down the barrel after pouring an unmeasured amount of powder down the barrel. The warrior then fired the round and repeated the same unmeasured loading procedure. This practice leads to lower velocities and reduced accuracy and thus a reduced number of casualties.

15Potter, 146.

16Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War*, 148. Clinch’s decision to draw rations from his own plantation may initially sound odd, since he is violating orders anyway. However, a later court of inquiry would have a hard time sentencing Clinch for violating orders in order to help a senior US Army officer under known attack by Seminoles. It would be much harder to be acquitted of misappropriation of rations. Also, recall that Clinch is continuing to supply the Army with subsistence at a profit. If he is admonished for assisting Gaines, then he helped a brother officer. If his actions are praised, he can bill the Army Subsistence Department for the rations.
17 Ibid., 149.
18 Ibid., 152.
19 Ibid., 154.
20 Ibid., 197-214.
21 Ibid., 237.
22 Motte; and Jesup to Colt, 11 March 1838.
23 Motte, 240
24 Jesup to Colt, 11 March 1838.
25 Collectors Firearms, Welcome to Collectors Firearms; available from www.collectorsfirearms.com; Internet; accessed on 1 March 2007; and civilwarguns.com, Webpage; Available from civilwarguns.com; Internet; accessed on 1 March 2007.
27 Motte, 194.
29 Buker, 79.
30 Bauer, 85; and Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War, 253.
31 Course curriculums of 1821, 1832, 1825, and 1832 courtesy of the United States Military Academy, West Point New York, archives.
33 Ibid., 61.
34 Ibid., 329.
35 Ibid., 350.
36 Ibid., 359.
37 Albeit only in Suchet’s sector. His peers had less success, eventually leading to Napoleon’s withdrawal from Spain all together

39 Ibid., 361.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The US Army has demonstrated the ability to adapt their tactics to various Native American enemies in order to defeat them, despite the lack of written doctrine. Because the US Army would not have a written doctrine until the US Marine Corps produced the Small Wars Manual in 1940, the Army had to rely on their institutional experience, contemporary texts, publications, and trial and error in order to defeat the Native American tribes they faced on the battlefield.

The first settlers in North America arrived dependent on professional Soldiers to lead their militia units. These professionals, such as Miles Standish in the case of the Plymouth Colony, passed on their experience and training to their client militia units who faced hostile Native American tribes. These militia units, the forerunners of US Army militia units, gained experience slowly because their roles did not call for their full-time attention to military preparedness. They did gain enough experience and capabilities to accomplish their primary mission of defending the towns and villages within the colony (and later their states). By the early eighteenth century, these militia units produced some talented backwoodsmen capable of more than just defending their home colony. These men, recruited by the regular British Army, became the master light infantrymen known as rangers. Despite all of the collective experience gained from over one hundred years of organized militias in contact with Native Americans, not one single document that could be identified as doctrine existed in either the British Army of the American Colonies.

Some written texts and publication began to appear following the creation of light infantry units by the British Army in the American Northwest in the mid-eighteenth
century. The most prominent of these publications was Colonel Henry Bouquet’s *Reflections on the War with the Savages of North America*. *Reflections* was based on Bouquet’s experiences fighting Native Americans in the 1760’s. Bouquet’s philosophy called for coexistence with the Native American tribes, however; if conflict became necessary, to fight using a specially recruited and trained light corps consisting of a mix of especially trained scouts (Bouquet called them “hunters’), infantry, riflemen, artillery, and light horse. Bouquet proofed his concept during his successful 1764 expedition against the Shawnee tribe in Ohio. Bouquet used his scouts and riflemen to provide reconnaissance all around his formation and insured that any dangerous situation, such as clearing a defile or crossing a river, had adequate over watching forces in place before the main body went through. The most important aspect of Bouquet’s tactics was how he captured them in writing for the broad base of semi-professional officers to read and learn. Besides the small numbers of professional British Army officers serving in North America, the majority of the military units remained militia, all led by either former professional or semi-professional officers. Bouquet’s *Reflections* provided a better, more comprehensive method of passing along effective experiences to those without experience or those wishing to expand their knowledge. Many of the American Army officers serving under George Washington during the American Revolution had copies of Bouquet’s *Reflections* and other military manuals on their person, which they studied regularly. Some of these officers, such as St. Clair and Harmar, failed to apply Bouquet’s lessons adequately in the field against Native Americans, resulting in their defeat. The most effective American adaptation of Bouquet’s concept was seen in the Legion. The Legion, created by Secretary of War Henry Knox and led by Major General “Mad”
Anthony Wayne, applied most of Bouquet’s principles. The only prominent exception was the decision to maintain the wear of a standard uniform. Bouquet called for light brown clothing styled around the individual comfort and utility of the wearer. The Legion remained in the standard American uniform of blue and white wool-based garments. Wayne trained and organized the Legion to the same high standards Bouquet advocated (although Wayne conducted different training regimens based on his specific needs and the mission) which resulted in Wayne’s decisive victory over the Shawnee at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Although the US Army achieved a decisive victory, using a unit specifically designed and optimized to fight Native Americans, the Army did not produce any doctrine to insure the successes of the legion could be replicated throughout the Army without having to rely on word of mouth.

By the time of the Second Seminole War in 1835, the US Army had the experience of fighting several Native American tribes, including the Creeks, and Seminoles; but also an additional dynamic entered the decision process for the Army: political pressures that drove tactics development. The Army reorganized the Legion years before, returning to the standard regimental system. This return to an organization that was not designed to fight Indians, combined with a lack of doctrine addressing the specifics of Indian warfare, resulted in the US Army suffering one major defeat (the Dade expedition) and one near defeat (Gaines’ fight) at the hands of the Seminole Indians in Florida. Fortunately for the US Army in Florida, the base knowledge, training, and discipline of the officers and Soldiers of the regular army carried them through, eventually defeating the Seminoles after seven years of war. Army officers developed several methods to address specific Seminole critical vulnerabilities based on past tactics.
and methods, such as Bouquet’s organization and techniques and a method of counterinsurgency pioneered by General Louis Suchet, a General under Napoleon Bonaparte serving in Aragon, Spain. Suchet developed an innovative method to counter the successes of the Spanish insurgents in Aragon. Suchet theorized that if he increased the ratios of Soldiers to insurgents, eliminated the insurgent support base by securing the countryside and established a series of forts throughout his sector to provide a secure base for patrols, he would defeat the insurgents. Suchet reorganized his sector, adopting these methods and was successful. Brigadier General Zachary Taylor adopted a similar method called the “squares plan” in Florida with success. The result of Napoleon’s (and Suchet as well) successes was the large amount of written material, and proliferation of military theorists. One of the most prominent of these theorists was Baron Henri Jomini. Jomini’s theories carried over to the US, inspiring many military instructors and officers. West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan supported many of Jomini’s theories and transferred these to his students. Initially, Mahan taught engineering and mathematics, but also chaired military science clubs at West Point before transferring to the Military Science Department in the mid-1840s. Through these clubs, students discussed both historical as well as contemporary tactics and warfare. By 1847, Mahan began to write texts on military art and science. These publications are the closest products to doctrine the US Army will have at hand through the period of the Indian Wars. The Army now had to integrate political pressures to their tactics development. The addition of Jomini’s and Mahan’s texts assisted the Army leadership to develop these new tactics by introducing the concepts of simplicity of drill, training and integrating political objectives into tactical theory and practice. This combination of tactical theory and experience is the basis for
the development of doctrine. At the time of the beginning of the Indian Wars, doctrine had not yet been developed, but the basis was in place and Army officers were using these concepts to develop tactics to win the nation’s wars and achieve national goals as established by the President and Congress.
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