SHARING THE BURDEN: HOW EFFECTIVE IS A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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**14. ABSTRACT**

The emerging world order has degraded and has established the requirement for nations to join efforts into unified action in the conduct of peace enforcement operations. In responding to circumstances requiring a multinational response, a nation decides if and where it will expend national blood, and in every case, its decision to take part is a calculated political decision. The nature of such national decision influences the structure of the multinational force and its inherent effectiveness in dealing with increasingly complex scenarios. The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of multinational operations in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Nations band together in interventions in alliances or coalitions, and interventions are either sponsored or sanctioned by the United Nations. NATO, as well as coalitions of the willing of combat ready forces, has taken a very active role in peace support missions in the last decade. Through a comparative case study, this thesis concludes that peace enforcement is beyond the United Nation’s capacity. Furthermore, a coalition of Allies and like-minded partners, including compatible regional partners, possessing robust tools and minimal debilitating national caveats, is the most promising and effective military arrangement.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

Effectiveness, multinational, coalition, alliance, metrics, Chapter VII, peace enforcement, COE, MINUSTAH, INTERFET, ISAF.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

SHARING THE BURDEN: HOW EFFECTIVE IS A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, by LCol Dany Fortin, 79 pages.

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<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Land Component Command</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contemporary Operational Environment</td>
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<td>COH</td>
<td>Coalition Operations Handbook</td>
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<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
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<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan</td>
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<td>KMNB</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>QSTAG</td>
<td>Quadripartite Standardization Agreement</td>
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<td>Regional Command (South), ISAF, Afghanistan</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners. (2006, 37)

Georges W. Bush, The National Security Strategy

Going Alone

The emerging world order has degraded over the last decade and has demonstrated the necessity for nations to conduct coalition operations, as rarely can one nation go it alone. The aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of multinational operations in the contemporary operational environment (COE).

The United States (US) possesses exceptional influence and a military without peer when it comes to warfighting ability and absolute power. Its military is mandated to remain the strongest, expeditionary power in the world, able to generate decisive effects in any contingency. Neither NATO, nor Russia or China can match America’s ability to project power across the globe. The environment of the foreseeable future is therefore characterized by the dominance of America, and there is little that others could contribute to further enhance its combat power. Although unilateral operations have and continue to occur as they, on the surface, appear to be much simpler, it has become clear that the US cannot achieve its defense objectives alone (Rumsfeld 2005, 10).

The destruction of an enemy’s military forces is only a portion of the entire spectrum of conflict; the occupation, pacification, and reconstruction also require a
significant commitment of resources (Ramotowski 2003, 2). In a world characterized by ambiguous political situations, globalization and unprecedented public scrutiny, the US, traditional Allies, and other like-minded countries will face numerous challenges.

While it may operate unilaterally to defend or protect national interests, the US military recognizes that there are marked advantages in getting acceptance, support, and participation in the overall effort from multinational partners. In “The Foundation of Effective Coalition Operations”, Michael Smith argues that when it senses its involvement is required, the US will, as a matter of policy, normally seek assistance. “Most of the countries and regional organizations of the world have arrived at the same conclusion regarding the importance of regional coalitions” (Smith 1997, 72).

_The National Security Strategy of the United States of America_ reveals that it will implement its strategies by organizing broad coalitions of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, I-2). Clearly, the price of unilateral action is and will continue to be very steep; legitimacy, finite resources, strenuous commitments and increasing numbers of theatres of operation fuel the need for coalition building. Multinational operations can be difficult and perhaps frustrating, yet they have become the desirable method, as opposed to a unilateral effort, by which the international community can respond to rising global security threats. In spite of all the complexities inherent to multilateralism, leveraging capabilities of multinational partners to address security challenges is desirable and increasingly important (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005, 9) and must not appear as a simple disguised unilateralism. Multinational operations will remain the preferred and generally the most military effective means of ensuring future collective security.
The Coalition Imperative

Alliances and coalitions have been a long-standing theme throughout the history of warfare as nations have banded together, for various underlying reasons, as a method of collective defense or in order to defeat an opposing threat superior in one way or another. Nations have come together within a structure of either an alliance or a coalition. Alliances denote the existence of formal agreements and long-standing relationships between like-minded nations. They are in fact coalitions that have formalized their common objectives into multilateral institutions, like the United Nations (UN), the NATO, the European Union, or the African Union. In contrast, coalitions differ in that they consist of partners who may join together for a specific purpose and for a set time or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest, without prior formal agreement and common procedures (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, ix). They do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances (ABCA 2005, ix) as they consist, by definition, of ad-hoc arrangements. But efforts can be made to achieve increased interoperability. Modern experiences have shown that it may, in effect be quite an incorrect statement.

Recent events are indicative of a period of sustained and dramatic changes to the global security context, and it calls for cooperation and burden sharing among nation states of a magnitude not seen before. Although the overall number of conflicts may have declined (Human Security Centre 2005, 1), their levels of violence and complexity have evolved over the last decade; and as trends indicate that conflicts will be more persistent and volatile, the fact that nations will continue to conduct military operations with
partners is given. What that means for the US though, is that it must be prepared to accept compromises and limitations on its actions.

The COE increasingly requires partners with similar international political views and interests and compatible military procedures to combine efforts into a capable military organization in defeating a threat to the world or keeping the peace. The Global War on Terror, a strenuous campaign, requires partners to take on the difficult task to not only continue to conduct peace support operations around the world but to take active part in defeating adversaries determined to destroy the values many stand for and to undermine efforts to install peace. Nations must be prepared to be successful in what may be an endless series of small wars, complex peace-support operations, noncombatant evacuations, counterinsurgencies, and humanitarian missions. This new reality affects the integrity of existing alliances--NATO has dramatically expanded its area of operations--and challenges individual nation’s objectives and force structure. In fact, NATO is being put to the test in its first ground offensive since its inception.

The requirement for US military to anticipate working closely with partners is demonstrated by the numerous multinational operations that have taken place in the last decade. It will attempt to fight in concert with strong allies and friends, habitually in a leading role. The world needs credible and legitimate multinational coalitions that can effectively deal with the emerging threats. In anticipation of more multinational operations, the US has recently developed joint multinational doctrine (JP 3-16, \textit{Multinational Operations}, and JP 4-08, \textit{Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations}) and joint publications make reference to multinational partnership. NATO and ABCA keystone manuals have also recently been revamped.
There are sound military and strategic reasons to operate with a durable coalition of allies and like-minded countries, instead of an ad-hoc, temporary in nature, and largely political one. A multinational force (MNF) proves to be successful and advantageous over the unilateral efforts of a single country as it increases the size of the force and it provides enhanced combat power which may in turn lead to a more rapid and favorable outcome to a conflict. It also enables countries to share the costs of the undertaking among them. Lastly and most importantly, by contributing directly or indirectly, multinational efforts offer political legitimacy and universal acceptance for sponsored measures. The combination of often disparate nations into a coalition will provide legitimacy to the force which would otherwise be frowned upon, if not condemned, by the world community. Legitimacy is, incidentally, perceived to be enhanced when a world-recognized organization, such as the UN or NATO, supports the political and military objectives. It is therefore important that planners at all levels and of all nations understand how the underlying factors which affect multinational force mechanics.

The range of multinational operations types has expanded and in the past decade, a new and complex level of warfare has arisen. As Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have shown, coalition fighting has become the norm and there will likely be more of that in future theatres. The latter was preceded by a significant effort by the US to gain international participation. Whether this was done for political legitimacy or military necessity, the fact of the matter is that the coalition is providing vital support to the US effort.

Steve Bowman and Martha Maurer, among others, have argued that there are common friction points and considerations that apply to coalition building and its
command and control (1997, 2-12; 1994, 29-84). There are different factors involved in a coalition, making it effective and relevant in the COE, just as there are also factors that impede on the overall effectiveness and relevance of a coalition conducting operations throughout the full spectrum of operations.

Recent operations, like Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Medusa (ISAF in southern Afghanistan in 2006), have demonstrated that there is divergence in opinion and interests among Allies when it comes to the use of force. The expanded NATO is stretched thin with missions around the globe—Afghanistan, Darfur, Katrina relief; and yet it is considering enlarging globally and extending its membership and missions well beyond Europe. NATO may be struggling to reach a consensus about its actions as it can hardly afford to take on global responsibilities with its plate already full, according to some scholars (Kupchan 2006). An inner core of members is, on behalf of the Alliance, taking the brunt of the fighting against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan and NATO members, and like-minded nations participate in the stabilization effort in Iraq. Coalitions may then include countries not represented in a formal alliance or new alliance members and like-minded nations which join together for the operation, for necessity or for other reasons. As a result, there may be a profound divide among member countries, in the domains of interoperability and objectives. In his study on the evolution of coalition operations, the academic Alan Ryan contends that so-called “coalitions of the willing” will represent the way of waging major operations in the future (Ryan 2000a, 14). In fact, Seyom Brown asserts that in the past decade, the US fall-back response to the divisions within NATO has been to put together, on an ad hoc basis, coalitions of the willing (Brown 2006, 35). For coalitions to be effective in the COE though, they must be robust
and composed of highly capable forces with shared interests if there is to be any degree of success. Without these key elements, an ad-hoc organization will not be in a suitable and acceptable posture to successfully defeat adversaries.

**Thesis Intent and Primary Research Question**

Allied states and like-minded nations join together into a coalition of the willing for common action, but not always for the same reasons or goals. This thesis examines what influences coalition operations using the NATO and US principles of joint doctrine as a foundation along with key considerations and friction points. The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the effectiveness of multinational operations in the COE. The primary question of this study is: Are coalitions effective in dealing with the complex situations of the COE? To answer this question, several secondary questions need to be addressed. First, is the doctrine comprehensive and sufficient? Second, what key factors and considerations influence multinational forces from the building phase to mission completion? Third, what are the capabilities of established multinational military force institutions, like NATO and the UN? Fourth, what are the specific peace enforcement military tasks that are found in today’s environment? Fifth, what are the capabilities requirements for ground forces conducting these military tasks? And finally, how can the operational effectiveness of a multinational force in the COE be assessed?

**Assumptions**

The main assumption is that both conflicts and the international community will increasingly demand for a more robust force for peace support operations than what has been provided in some theatres of conflict in past decade. Peace support has evidently
evolved in recent years and 11 September has changed the paradigm. Although not every situation requires a peace support force capable of undertaking some degree of offensive action to restore or ensure peace, the majority of present and future theatres of conflict will require a force prepared to take on various military tasks up to and including offensive operations to detain terrorists or criminals.

As NATO expands, it will turn into a truly global alliance by progressively adding distant countries to its ranks. It will continue to remain the world’s premier multinational military organization, notwithstanding major transformation challenges. In spite of its particular limitations and its own growing pains, NATO is uniquely suited to meet the demands of the COE and offers the command and control structure required for complex alliance and coalition operations. In contrast, the UN and its revamped structure and capabilities can undertake significant peacekeeping missions, but it remains limited in command and control of more complex peace support missions under Chapter VI of its Charter, and is incapable of undertaking challenging missions under its Chapter VII.

What has definitely changed is the expectation for coalition members to do more, to take more risk than ever before, and to contribute to facing and defeating threats rather than simply keeping a fragile peace by not making waves.

**Definitions**

For the purpose of clarity it is necessary to include the definition of key terms.

Multinational operations describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually taken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006b, 359). A coalition is an ad-hoc arrangement between two or more sovereign nations for common action. In contrast, an alliance is the result of formal agreements
between two or more sovereign nations for broad, long-term objectives that further their common interests. A coalition action can then be termed as a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for a single occasion, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, GL-5, 6).

The COE consists of the overall operational setting that exists today and for the foreseeable future characterized by operations conducted across the full spectrum of conflict in this new world disorder of multiple threats. Within the COE, forces conduct full-spectrum operations; the full complement of military missions from peacekeeping to peace enforcing to conventional combat.

Lastly, national caveats are restrictions placed by the nation on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation (NATO 2005a).

Limitations

There are many operations conducted in the COE. In the author’s opinion, the vast majority of the complex operations conducted in today’s environment require capable forces with robust tools and robust mandates. Consequently, this study focuses on peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.

This study centers its attention on the last decade and recent multinational operations as they are on 1 January 2007. Three relevant multinational operations were selected to illustrate the effectiveness of a coalition. The study includes the Intervention Force in East-Timor (INTERFET) mission, also called Operation Stabilise, in 1999; the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission during the period of 2004 to 2006, with attention on the resurgence of fighting in southern Afghanistan in the summer and fall of 2006 and its impact on ISAF expansion. Lastly, it covers the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2005 and 2006. The author’s experience in conducting original research is limited to acting as the chief of operations of the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) of ISAF in 2004 as well as interviews with members of MINUSTAH and INTERFET.

Scope and Delimitations

This thesis remains unclassified through the gathering of open source material. It does not discuss the political dimension of authorizing coalition or alliance missions. The political realm is discussed only as it serves to argue the practical effect of coalition building. It is limited to coalitions that pertain to land-based operations and will not discuss naval and air coalitions.

When discussing command and control, the intent is to cover the overall process and not cover the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) domain and related technologies as the focus is not so much on technological disparity but on the human aspect and its intricacies in the context of interoperability.

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are not part of the comparative case studies as US-led coalitions do not serve the purpose of this study. Finally, key lessons from postoperation reports or from ongoing operations are mostly classified and will not be included in this study.

Significance of the Study

The results of this study will contribute to raise the general understanding of the intricacies of coalition operations and will help military planners assess the operational effectiveness of a potential coalition in the COE. The study will assist military planners
in realizing that forming and maintaining a coalition is a dynamic process marked with set-backs and successes. Planners should recognize that coalitions come together in different forms. Different countries are willing and able to take on leadership roles and specific tasks in the COE. Together they can achieve the unity of effort required to conduct offensive operations. This study offers metrics to assess the effectiveness of such organization. The results should make common friction points and characteristics apparent, and it should assist planners in resolving differences in coalition operations.

Chapter Summary and Conclusion

Nations band together in a coalition of the willing to face the world’s threats. “In today’s joint, multinational, and, interagency operational environment, it is impossible to accurately view the contributions of any individual organization, capability, or the domains in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006c, IV-28).

The operational effectiveness of a multinational force in the COE is a measure of principles and factors. Scholars and military leaders have identified timeless factors and considerations; arguably, as newly edited publications indicate, there are many dynamics which warrant attention in this complex environment. The next chapter, chapter 2, summarizes comprehensively and evaluates succinctly the existing literature on multinational operations with a particular emphasis on what has recently been written in light of the Global War on Terror coalitions.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

All too many countries have decided not to show up, while some who have dared to send contingents have added caveats regarding the employment of their troops by the NATO commander. Restrictions such as “no night operations” and “no combat” make a joke of the NATO article that states that an attack against one member is an attack against all. (2006, A15)

MGen (Ret.) Lewis Mackenzie, *The Globe and Mail*

The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of multinational operations in the COE. The primary question is: Are coalitions effective in dealing with the complex situations of the COE?

From chapter 1, the necessity of multinational operations, despite policy and capability challenges, should be apparent. Unilateral operations have and continue to occur but rarely can one nation go it alone. Consequently, coalitions are formed in an attempt to allow the sharing of the burden among players, reduce costs, and convey legitimacy (Barabé 1999, 7). Emphasis is placed on regional arrangements where the minor nation may be a critical player because of “its location, knowledge, ability to mediate, and influence” (Maurer 1994, 32).

This chapter comprehensively summarizes the existing pertinent literature on multinational operations and makes relevant observations. It contains six main sections: governing statutes, doctrinal publications, scholarly articles, studies and theses, after-action reviews, and open-press articles that are pertinent to the case studies. This review will permit a significant portion of the available information to address the secondary questions.
Statutes

Multinational operations are largely governed by two internationally recognized statutes. They consist of the Charter of the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty. Although there are other emerging multinational military organizations sponsored by the African Union, the European Union, and others, the UN and NATO are most prominent.

The Charter of the United Nations

Signed by 192 Members (UN 2006a), the Charter is a treaty based on the principle of sovereign equality of its constituents, and all are bound by its articles. Its first purpose is to maintain international peace and security by taking “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (UN 1945). Three chapters are pertinent to this study: chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), and VIII (Regional Arrangements).

While peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned, the legal basis for the deployment of all UN peacekeeping operations is found in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VI articles imply that the parties to any dispute shall first seek a solution by peaceful means including negotiations, mediations and similar actions and that the Security Council shall decide whether to take action or recommend terms of a settlement (UN 1945). Accordingly, traditional peacekeeping operation is dependent on obtaining the consent from all factions, and the use of force is limited to self-defense.

Should the Security Council (UNSC) judge measures inadequate, article 42 of chapter VII permits such military action other than pacific action to restore international
peace and security. Perhaps overlooked, article 43 (1) in fact compels Members to act. It stipulates that Members “undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” Article 45 goes further by mentioning that “in order to enable the [UN] to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action.” Consequently, operations sanctioned under Chapter VII necessitate forces capable of imposing order where security has broken, through peace enforcement. Members possess the tools to meet such demands through articles 42 and 45, both indicating that peace enforcement does not require the consent of the parties. An important limitation is however found in article 46 where plans (and therefore decision) for the application of armed force shall be made by the UNSC. Requiring the concurring vote of at least the five Permanent Members (article 27), it is not surprising that the UNSC has often been unable to enact a meaningful resolution. Their mandate however, constitutes the legal basis or all UN peacekeeping activity.

Article 51 consents to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense until the UNSC has taken necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. Article 53 of Chapter VIII stresses the importance of regional arrangements and states that the UNSC shall, where appropriate, “utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” It adds that no such action shall be taken without the authorization of the UNSC. Accordingly, Chapter VIII articles recognize the existence of multinational arrangements for dealing with matters of
international peace and security, provided that their actions are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (UN 1945).

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are at the core of peacekeeping mandates. UNSCR 1707, the most recent resolution on Afghanistan, extends the authorization of ISAF to 13 October 2007. UNSCR 1702 pertains to Haiti and extends the authorization of the mission (MINUSTAH) to 15 February 2007. It also modifies the mandate and calls for MINUSTAH to “reorient its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts" toward a community violence-reduction program. Likewise, UNSCR 1264 authorized the deployment of a MNF in East Timor, the INTERFET, under the auspices of Chapter VII.

UN’s biggest setback is inflexible. It lies in the powerful five permanent members of the UNSC. The UN’s failures in the 1990s and in Darfur today are stemmed largely from the inability for the permanent fives to agree on a meaningful course of action.


NATO is the strongest military alliance in existence and unites the largest, most modern and efficient military capabilities and resources. One of the antecedents to its founding treaty is article 51 of the Charter of the UN which conveys legitimacy for collective defense. Right in the first sentence of the 14 article Treaty, the Parties accept to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN thereby insuring a solid degree of legitimacy in protecting their territory. Seeking to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, the Parties are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense (NATO 1949).
The core of NATO is Article V of the Treaty. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that in such occurrence, each of them, in agreement with article 51 of the Charter of the UN, “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith…such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO 1949). Article V was invoked once, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, giving legitimacy to both Operation Enduring Freedom, and to the creation of ISAF.

Since the Alliance’s inception however, the world order has changed significantly resulting in a series of subsequent formal declarations, resolutions, and policy documents. In Prague, NATO decided to enlarge, “to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century” inviting partners, streamlining military command arrangements as well as creating the NATO Response Force—the NRF (NATO 2002). In Istanbul, it renewed its commitment to collective defense and approved the expansion of ISAF in stages. It remained committed to the cause of Afghanistan, and pledged to contribute to ISAF the forces necessary for successful completion of the mission (NATO 2004). At the Summit in Riga, NATO reaffirmed that contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is the Alliance’s key priority, announced that the NRF had reached full operational capability, and emphasized current efforts to broaden the collective security including non-article V crisis response operations and global security (NATO 2006a).

The Riga Summit had limited success in gaining more support to ISAF. Under pressure, Allied leaders “agreed to remove national caveats on how, when and where forces can be used to further strengthen the effectiveness of [ISAF]” (NATO 2006b), as
urged in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 336, which insisted on eliminating the use of undeclared caveats, minimizing the use of declared caveats, and reconsidering the specific caveats to determine which can be eliminated (NATO 2005A). Meager progress thus far seems to indicate that the summit represented a political failure.

As NATO expands and contributes to missions well beyond Europe’s heartland, there is no doubt that article 53 of the Charter of the UN, which suggests legitimacy and freedom of action to the Alliance and coalitions to conduct interventions in the name of “international peace and security,” is more applicable than ever before. The simple classifications of peace operations used in the past have in fact limited value in the COE (Ryan 2002, 3). Recent interventions demonstrate that the UN entrusts more resourced and resolute multinational organizations like NATO, regional arrangements or lead-nation coalitions to act under its authority in locations where a UN-led peacekeeping force cannot dare operate into.

**Doctrine**

The execution of multinational operations is enhanced with the use of common doctrinal concepts acceptable to all nations involved. Doctrine is authoritative guidance, and a review of the most relevant doctrinal publications is in order.

In his thesis, Lunde Bjornar points out that these publications are “developed from the perspective of a dominant power reflecting the military dominance and resources of the US Armed Forces” and consequently, the multinational aspects are to “some extent limited to a lead nation role” (Bjornar 2004, 10). US joint doctrine consists of a broad hierarchy of manuals that guide activities across the full spectrum of conflict.
Recently revised US joint publications validate Bjornar’s argument, but they remain an absolute must, although on occasion less applicable to smaller partners.

The JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, serves as the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine. As such, it sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. Chapter VII covers the fundamentals of multinational operations and constitutes the core of JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. It underlines that the US Armed Forces adhere to US joint, and ratified multinational doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000, I-5) and should “be prepared to operate under other-than-US leadership” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000, VII-3). In addition, it emphasizes that “when forces have disparate capabilities, mission assignments should optimize force effectiveness” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2000, VII-6). It is complemented by the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) which incorporates lessons learned from ongoing operations, and states that multinational partners may find the CCJO useful to assess potential integration requirements and opportunities” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005).

The new JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, remains the keystone publication for joint operations. Recognizing the need to synchronize all instruments of national and multinational power into unified action, it provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in joint (and often multinational) operations. The fundamentals and principles contained in JP 3-0 provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute operations, and, because the multinational and interagency aspects are widely integrated throughout joint operations, it is indeed very much applicable to partners of the United States. It establishes three additional principles to the time-tested principles of war
(restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy), which may assist in assessing operational effectiveness (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006d, A-3). It also underscores that unity of command may not be possible in multinational operations and unity of effort--coordination through cooperation and common interests--is what really matters, and is critical to mission success (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006d, A-2).

Chapter IV covers assessment as a “process to measure progress of the joint force towards mission accomplishment” in terms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs), tied to the attainment of an end state or an objective, and measures of performance (MOPs), used to assess friendly actions in task accomplishments (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006d, GL-22). The assessment process should be “relevant, measurable, responsive and resourced” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006d, IV-33), but fails to derive actual assessment measures to determine the operational effectiveness or the performance of a multinational force.

Nested under Operations, JP 3-16, largely inspired by the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, expands chapter VII of JP 1, mostly from the perspective of US Armed Forces operating as part of a MNF. The first chapter indicates that such operation rests on tenets--respect, rapport, knowledge of partners and patience--which, if ignored, will result in a lack of unity of effort (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a I-4). It mentions that commanders and staffs must account for differences in national laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion and language. Furthermore, considerations involved in the planning and conducting operations are “affected by the international situation, perspectives, motives, and values or the organization’s members” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, I-2). Each operation is unique because of converging interests, capabilities, and specific skill sets and it highlights the
importance of rationalization, standardization and interoperability (RSI). In fact, the most important areas for interoperability may actually be language, communications, doctrine, training and information exchange (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, I-8).

The second chapter discusses the three basic command and coordination structures--lead nation, parallel or integrated command--ultimately heavily influenced by political considerations. The lead nation option exists when all participants place their forces under the control of one that in most instances is the largest contributor (US in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Australia in INTERFET). The parallel command option is obtained when two or more multinational headquarters exist with their respective subordinated coalition forces, partners retain control of their own forces, and command responsibilities are shared (US and Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Storm). Lastly, the integrated command structure, probably offers the most political advantages and unity of effort. This is best exemplified by NATO headquarters permanently composed of representatives of the Allied. Another case is the makeup advocated by UN force headquarters with personnel from troop contributing nations, although showing striking variations in robustness and efficacy due to a more bureaucratic approach. It reviews the considerations for selecting the most suitable option (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, II-7). The last chapter discusses planning and execution considerations, and operational concerns. Several factors influence the capabilities of nations: national interests and will, domestic politics, legal issues, objectives, culture, sovereignty issues, doctrine, organization, training leader development, equipment, history and defense budget (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, III-2). These are also thoroughly described in several theses.
NATO doctrine is developed within the context of the Alliance. It serves as the basis of multinational operations doctrine for most members and partners, and the influence of NATO doctrine among many of its members is significant. Another aspect of NATO doctrine is that the United States, as a dominant member, affects the Alliance’s doctrine development. “US and NATO publications are thereby to some extent complementary” (Bjornar 2004, 11). As a matter of comparison, it is the policy of both the UK and Canada that national doctrine be consistent with NATO doctrine. United Kingdom’s JDP 01, Joint Operations, is coherent with the ideas of NATO’s AJP-01(B) and AJP-3(A) manuals (UK 2004, iii). “When participating in a NATO operation, NATO doctrine normally will take precedence over Canadian joint doctrine, which is itself influenced by US joint doctrine” (Canada 2005, 9-6).

The AJP-3(A), Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations describes the “fundamental operational aspects of joint operations and provides guidance on joint operations at the operational level.” It is intended for use primarily at the operational level. It consists of four chapters: Context, Forming the Force, Campaign Execution and Coordination and Synchronization (NATO 2005b, ix). This keystone NATO manual lists measures of effectiveness in the security, governance and economics domains of a particular mission, but does not address the performance of a force in operation. While it acknowledges that constraints may be placed on the use of national force components and supporting national assets (NATO 2005b, 2-2), AJP-3(A) contends that “the effectiveness of [joint force] and their ability to maximize synergy and leverage on joint operations is dependent on their fighting power. ‘Quality control’ of the way military forces operate is difficult to
achieve, but one of the most reliable measures must be their performance on operations” (NATO 2005b, 3-41).

The ABCA Program is not an alliance and its purpose is to promote coalition interoperability among its five nation members: US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook (COH)* is designed to assist its members when they serve together in a coalition. The *COH* provides general information on important topics for coalition operations, and is reference for fundamentals issues and interfaces that must be addressed to promote a successful coalition operation (ABCA 2005, i). Indeed, ABCA has achieved standardization in some domains. This publication incorporates selected information for the Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) and Advisory Publications (QAPs). It does not repeat staff planning procedures but highlights some differences in doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to reduce operational friction (ABCA 2005, ii) and provides a helpful checklist in every domain and warfighting function. It therefore greatly assists in bridging the gap in doctrinal differences between coalition partners. It is coherent with NATO concepts and avoids discussing measures of effectiveness.

The last publication that merits a review is the UN Peacekeeping Capstone Doctrine, now in its second draft. So far, the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations has been guided by unwritten principles and peacekeepers’ experiences. “Recognising the need for a clearer articulation of the doctrinal foundation of UN peacekeeping, [it] aims to define the nature and scope of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations, and describe their limitations as an instrument for conflict management” (UN 2006b, 3). It is a solid document, intended to develop a clearer appreciation of the appropriate uses, and
the limits, of UN-led peacekeeping operations. “It will also form the apex of a wider effort at building a doctrinal basis for [UN] peacekeeping . . . and constitutes the highest-level in the policy and guidance framework” of the DPKO. It draws on the analysis of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) as well as past experiences (UN 2006b, 4).

While Chapter VII is sometimes invoked in the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations, “there is a clear distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action, as envisaged under Article 42 of Chapter VII, which does not require the consent of the main parties to the conflict. In this regard, the Security Council has tended to entrust such action to ad hoc coalitions of willing Member States” (UN 2006b, 9).

UN peacekeepers should only be deployed where there is a peace to keep and experience has shown that the existence of “an agreement on paper does not necessarily translate into a viable peace process or a bona fide commitment from the parties”. If that is such the case, the doctrine acknowledges that once a force is committed, the international community “may need to consider using the threat of withdrawal to encourage compliance if other means of applying international pressure are having no effect” (UN 2006b, 20). Such action results in a loss of credibility, a key contemporary peacekeeping operations principle, and recognizes the limitations of UN-led missions.

The bottom line of this review of doctrine is that readily and up-to-date doctrine pertaining to multinational operations is inclusive and albeit often written from a US perspective, adequately accommodates for allies and partners.
Scholarly Articles

Seven scholarly articles merit consideration. In his assessment called *Multilateral Constraints on the Use of Force: A Reassessment*, Seyom Brown asserts that the constraints placed on US use of force in a multinational setting justifies a reassessment of the benefits and costs of multinational operations and that the solution may lie in a “modular multilateralism” (Brown 2006, v-vii). He contends that alliances are weakening, and that even in NATO, it is very difficult to generate a consensus (Brown 2006, 33). He questions the value of seeking use of force approval from the UN Security Council, and suggests that Article 51 allows preemption. Nonetheless, Brown identifies benefits from multinational commitments, relevant to this study: legitimacy, burden sharing and access to the battlefield and to more intelligence. As well, he identifies possible costs: shared authority with those who may not share one’s priority, inhibition of timely and efficient action, and loss of secrecy—in so doing the effectiveness that comes with surprise (Brown 2006, 2-14).

Four of his proposals are pertinent to this study: First, the US should recognize “in both declaratory policy and actions” that NATO has evolved in a coalition of coalitions and a much looser association. Second, “legitimize and elaborate ‘modular’ structures.” Third, “endorse devolutions of authority and operational autonomy on a case-by-case basis to modular sub coalitions that have the capability and the will to respond.” Lastly, insist that the actual conduct of operations is by those subgroups that can operate with sufficient command and control, “minus debilitating national caveats” (Brown 2006, vii). His examination his insightful, but conclusions like “the incentives for acquiring the military wherewithal to go it alone are all the greater” are erroneous and idealistic
Alan Ryan wrote several valuable papers. *Multinational Forces and UN Operation* examines some of the issues that characterize multinational operations, making the distinction between operations sponsored by the UN and UN sanctioned coalitions of the willing. He argues that peace operations involving a broad spectrum of violence and degrees of local acceptance will continue to occupy international militaries for several generations (Ryan 2002, 2). Referring to article 43, he contends that it is often forgotten that key to effective peace enforcement is already to be found within the pages of the UN Charter (Ryan 2002, 13). But because of their composition, UN run operations are commanded by heterogeneous international headquarters and “...are invariably less efficient and often less effective than coalitions that deploy under a strong lead model” (Ryan 2002, 2). Military interventions under the auspices of the UN have changed significantly over the last decade, and NATO has taken a very active role in the conduct of peace support missions, a situation which depicts a significant paradigm shift that profoundly impacted on peacekeeping. According to his theory, “third generation peace operations see both UN sponsored and UN sanctioned forces deployed with robust mandates and are prepared to move to peace enforcement if necessary” (Ryan 2002, 2). These new missions require strong leadership, domestic political support and proper training for the complex task of peace enforcement; the UN mission in Lebanon today, UNIFIL II, and MINUSTAH, in Haiti, are examples of this shift. For that reason, the classifications that have been attributed to peace operations in the past have perhaps limited validity in the COE and, as Ryan puts it, the mission creep seen with “the over-
used concept of Chapter Six-and-a-half operations does not help much either” (Ryan 2002, 4).

Ryan makes the case that for multinational operations to be successful, they require more robust tools and would benefit if supplemented by alliance and cooperative partnerships. Nations “are increasingly disinclined to contribute to operations that are inefficient, subject to mission creep and liable to failure.” Those with the best trained and equipped forces are progressively more reticent to commit them to UN-led operations, and when they do, they prefer to stay outside the UN command structure (Ryan 2002, 6).

Many of the arrangements that will benefit future UN sanctioned operations are also found in the Brahimi Report.¹ It proposes more robust rules of engagement (ROE), an on-call list of military planning teams, a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment, and the need for a common standard in training and equipment (Ryan 2002, 14). The latter undoubtedly sparked the writing of the UN capstone doctrine manual. Furthermore, Ryan underlines that “the Brahimi Report called for the creation of several brigade-sized forces on the SHIRBRIG model, but resiled from stipulating that they be capable of conducting peace enforcement missions.” Consequently, the sixteen member states have the option not to participate in a particular mission, and the Brigade is only structured and committed to six-month long Chapter VI missions (Ryan 2002, 14), though members are prepared to examine more robust actions on a case-by-case basis (SHIRBRIG 2006).

Ryan makes useful observations on the INTERFET. First, the speed of the deployment was achievable because the force was not UN-led but “subcontracted” under a UN mandate to Australia, unusual for a middle power, thereby realizing a strong lead
nation model with a robust command and control structure. Second, the coalition consisted of countries possessing a high level of interoperability at the command level. Third, the distribution of tasks reflected the capabilities of the different contributing nations, caveats placed on their use, and it considered cultural differences. Lastly, he acknowledges that Operation Stabilise did result in an effective coalition of willing, though undoubtedly disparate, and that “further serious study of the factors that make peace enforcement coalitions effective is required” (Ryan 2002, 7-12).

In his study paper entitled “From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and ‘New Age’ Coalition Operation”, he argues that the key to success for future coalition operations is that force-contributing nations need to design their forces accordingly and produce commanders with cross-cultural skills, participate in training programs, and develop shared doctrine. He noted that many were willing to participate in this short-notice deployment despite imperfections in the command and control and interoperability (Ryan 2000a, 23). In “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor,” he examines Australia’s experience as the lead nation for the INTERFET. He argues that the operation demonstrated the need for Australia, as a future lead nation, to develop the ability to integrate capabilities held by partners and providing complementary support to them. Multinational forces require layers of international cooperation and commitment, and Ryan outlines quite forcefully the futility and risk of having potential contributors offering personnel and materiel that are not militarily suitable or competent, whatever the political imperatives behind such offers (Ryan 2000b, 55). Furthermore, he indicates that
specific doctrine for coalition operations must be developed as well as more integrated training with potential partners (Ryan 2000b, xi).

In the recently published article “Global NATO”, Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier contend that as NATO’s geographic range has expanded, so has the scope of its operations--so-called nonarticle V missions--although article V must remain at the core of the Alliance. They propose that NATO now extends its membership to any like-minded democratic state and that only a truly global alliance can address today’s global challenges. An Alliance with partners does not permit the same degree of joint planning, training and fighting, thus they argue that “broadening membership is preferable to creating ad-hoc coalitions.” The authors believe that an enlarged Alliance would not undermine the UN and would rather remain able to obtain consensus and act swiftly, although it remains open to question. They contend that NATO remains uniquely suited to meeting the emerging demands of international peace and security (Daalder and Goldgeir 2006). Sustaining somewhat this argument, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall argues in “The Case for Alliance” that less formal structures do not supplant the more formal arrangements that represent alliances. The success of such informal undertakings, in her opinion, will largely depend on the vitality and durability of ties the US maintains and cultivates. She asserts that NATO, which has already transformed and yet must increasingly be functionally oriented, should pursue a greater degree of interface and potential formal coordination with other nations and organizations. She recognizes that some of this is taking place through various initiatives with multinational mechanisms and “in discussions of expanded linkages with Australia, Israel, and Japan and in structured partnerships with Russia and Ukraine” (2006, 58).
Lastly, a study written in 2005 by Harvard Law Students was used in the case study as it critiques the performance of the MINUSTAH, a few months into its mandate. The study argues that although the mandate provides ample ground for a robust approach to security in Haiti, the force continues to interpret its mandate with complacency and narrowness unfit for the situation on the ground. It contends that MINUSTAH failed to comply with either the letter or spirit of its mandate, as prescribed in UNSCR 1542 (Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights 2005, 1).

**Studies and Theses**

Several theses examine factors and considerations that influence the command and control of multinational operations; others offer different perspectives on coalition operations, however none adequately discusses their degree of effectiveness.

Martha Maurer examines the factors that influence command and control of multinational operations. She separated them into four major categories, recognizing that factors interact and affect one another: first are external influences (dynamics economic, political, cultural, philosophical and religious issues) that can influence virtually every aspect of a multinational operation and form the environment within which the force operates (Maurer 1994, xii). Second is the subject of “people,” factors that influence the interpersonal relations and decisions. Third are operational factors (planning, intelligence sharing, logistics and communications). The fourth concerns the multiple aspects of interoperability (Maurer 1994, 29), what she believes to be the biggest challenge with ad-hoc coalitions (Maurer 1994, xiii). She also argues that if the military is not prepared to operate effectively and flexibly in a coalition, with appropriate thought-out doctrine,
there may be ramifications, such as inability to act when desired; conversely, unresolved diplomatic issues may affect the operation throughout (Maurer 1994, 32).

Steve Bowman covers ten “points of friction” common to all past coalition operations. His points of friction consist of the determination of goal(s), logistics, capabilities, training, equipment, doctrines, language, intelligence, leadership and cultural differences. He contends that there will be differences in terms of religion, class and gender customs, cultural tolerance, work ethics, standards of living and national traditions, which must all be considered during the building and sustainment of multinational operations. Diplomacy and multinational operations are interdependent. “Coalition politics override coalition military logic--a factor future coalition leaders must clearly understand” (Bowman 1997, 2-12).

Thomas Durell-Young argues that achieving unity of command “consistently presents itself as a difficult aspect (Durell-Young 1997, 23), and that commanders require a greater level of command authority. “The highly-integrated NATO, unable to overcome certain command difficulties illustrates the inherent difficulty of alliance or coalition command,” suggesting that command structures will be highly dependent upon decisions made at the political level (Durell-Young 1997, 32). This issue has been codified in doctrine where the purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006d, A-2), similarly carried in the Coalition Operations Handbook (ABCA 2005, 1-1). Christian Barabé consents that the principle of unity of command remains the most contentious issue to be resolved (Barabé 1999, 8), where Bowman is of the opinion that unity of effort is the best a coalition commander can hope for (Bowman 1997, 8).
In *Coalition and Alliance Operations in the Twenty First Century: A Continuing Need for the NATO Alliance*, G.D. Switzer provides a good summary of alliance organizations that have or can provide forces to coalitions operations. He demonstrates that NATO is the only multinational organization which possesses the construct necessary to conduct complex operations.

Finally, the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) released a paper in 2000 with interesting observations on interoperability. It contends that requirements go beyond simple questions of equipment and commonality and compatibility. Interoperability requires consideration of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people and facilities, and planning for and achieving maximum interoperability “in the non-materiel aspects” can and should be “a key focus of multinational cooperation initiatives” (MIC 2000, 19).

Bottom line: Multinational dynamics are affected by a wide range of factors and, although authors have thus far avoided candidly identifying metrics, or measures of performance or of operational effectiveness, these factors will be extrapolated into criteria in the next chapters. Other theses were examined, some of which are quoted in the first chapter. However, their findings do not relate to the primary and secondary questions of this thesis and are therefore not covered in this review.

**After-Action Reviews (AARs)**

AARs are valuable compendiums of lessons identified. The unclassified character of this thesis, however, makes including any significant information difficult, more so in the case of ongoing operations. However, information found on the latest UN fact sheets is worth summarizing here. In October 2006, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) coordinated sixteen peacekeeping operations around the world, representing over 76,000 uniformed personnel from 110 countries (UN 2006c). While most mandates were under Chapter VI in the 1990s, newly created missions are undertaken with stronger support, under the provisions of Chapter VII; six of the eleven current UN operations involving peacekeeping troops (vice observers) possess a Chapter VII mandate (UN 2006c). Providing the international legitimacy and thereby, the sponsorship required, the UN works alongside partner organizations such as NATO (Afghanistan, Kosovo), the European Union (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the African Union (Sudan, Somalia). “UN peacekeeping provides an impartial and widely-accepted vehicle for both burden-sharing and effective action” and represents the largest multilateral contributor to post-conflict stabilization worldwide, only to be surpassed in numbers by the US. DPKO cites criteria for successful nation-building operations as restoration of basic services, capacity to muster peacekeepers, status of rule of law and security (UN 2006d, 1).

Open-Press Articles

The vast majority of recent articles, pertinent to this study, pertain to ISAF: its achievements and its difficulties in gaining support and principally, combat forces, in the expansion effort. Not only is ISAF and Afghanistan in a difficult situation, “NATO’s own credibility is on the line--yet it hasn't deployed the political, economic and military resources to win”, argues General (retired) Wesley Clark. He believes that NATO is at crossroads in Afghanistan (Clark 2006).

Indeed, as NATO was engaged in the first extended ground battle in its history, in the summer of 2006, the unexpected intensity of the combat raised domestic pressure on
the Canadian, British and Dutch governments. Although supported by the US and a select few, these nations make up the bulk of the NATO-led force in southern Afghanistan (Regional Command South), where Taliban fighters have re-established strongholds. Operation Medusa, held in summer 2006 in the south, resulted in an estimated 1,500 Taliban killed (CBC 2006) and ISAF foresees an upsurge of combat in the summer of 2007. The Washington Post reported at the end of the operation that other NATO partners “are failing to commit their own soldiers as reinforcements; even worse, governments that already have troops in Afghanistan, such as Germany, are refusing to consider transferring some of them to the south from the relatively peaceful bases they occupy” (The Washington Post 2006, A-18). Conversely, SACEUR, General James Jones, believes that ISAF is a capable force, recognizing that “a major test was passed in Medusa…a lot of people out there said, ‘Will they fight? Won’t they fight?’ all eight countries have done a remarkable job” (Jones 2006).

Meanwhile, during the fall 2006 and prior to the Riga Summit, the Canadian leadership, including General Rick Hillier, seemed to lead the effort to persuade some Allies to contribute more soldiers to the mission or to allow their troops already in Afghanistan to be moved to danger zones (The Ottawa Citizen, 18 October 2006), while the Canadian Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor asked NATO allies repeatedly about "sharing the burden" and dropping national caveats on their troops (CBC 2006a). Canada dropped many caveats it previously had on other missions.

Chapter Summary and Conclusion

The literature examined in this chapter is comprehensive, pertinent and focused. Multinational operations are largely UN-led or UN-sanctioned, as it will continue to
provide authority for most peace operations. As the COE is volatile, forces must possess more robust tools than in the past, starting with a clear mandate, a common doctrinal base, and a common purpose. The material covered in the six sections above (governing statutes, relevant doctrine, scholarly articles, studies and theses, AARs and open-press articles) will be the bedrock of the answers to the secondary questions in the next chapters. In fact, this literature review has permitted to identify some of the key factors which influence multinational forces, one of the secondary questions.

Furthermore, the review has not permitted to clearly identify criteria to measure the operational effectiveness; however, additional principles for joint operations can be used as a starting point for metrics (legitimacy, perseverance, restraint) and it will perhaps be possible to draw others from recurring themes throughout the literature--unity of effort, credibility, interoperability. These criteria will serve to examine the three selected case studies.

The next chapter, chapter three will consist of the research methodology used to draw conclusions in this study. It will introduce the criteria used for the comparative case studies used as a vehicle to discuss effectiveness of multinational forces. These operations will be covered and compared in chapter four.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used to answer the primary question: Are coalitions effective in dealing with the complex situations of the COE?

The thesis used a quantitative research method. The problem identified however lead to the collection of information that could hardly, for the most part, be dissected and explained through empirical approaches. The sources of information included first the Charter of the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty with related resolutions and formal documents, referred to as governing statutes in chapter two. Then, relevant joint doctrinal publications, theses, and articles were examined and summarized.

Qualitative research relies on reasons and indicators of behavior that defy quantification. However, it has the disadvantage of possibly producing inconclusive and out-of-context information which may leave room for much more subjectivity as opposed to a quantitative method using empirical data. For that reason, every effort was made to figure out a quantitative analysis method. In the absence of clearly defined metrics throughout the literature reviewed, the author identified elements which contributed to identify criteria to measure the effectiveness of a MNF in the context of its assigned mandate and mission. Furthermore, the key factors and considerations in building and maintaining a MNF examined in chapter two contributed to coming up with such metrics.

The research adhered to the steps of a systematic structural process. The steps include the identification of a problem; the development of a hypothesis; the collection of
evidence from various sources; the discussion, interpretation and analysis of the evidence through a comparative case study; and lastly, the formulation of conclusions and recommendations for further study.

The primary question queries whether coalitions, as opposed to established durable alliances and institutions, are effective in the COE. To address the primary question, it was necessary to formulate secondary questions to provide partial answers, which in turn, provided building blocks to answer fully and objectively the primary question. The secondary questions are:

1. Is the multinational operations doctrine comprehensive and sufficient?
2. What key factors and considerations influence multinational forces?
3. What capabilities do multinational military force institutions have?
4. What are the specific military tasks found in peace enforcement in the COE?
5. What are the capabilities requirements for forces conducting these tasks?
6. How can the operational effectiveness of a MNF in the COE be assessed?

The nature and sequence of these questions were chosen to allow a systematic approach for addressing the primary question. The order reflects a logical progression in which answers to previous questions became the building block for the next.

The analysis was twofold. The first part was an analysis of both doctrinal concepts and theory on multinational operations, and as such, answered the first four questions. The study recognized the preference for multinational arrangements as opposed to unilateral action in chapter one and demystified coalition from alliance. In the last chapter, the literature reviewed examined current doctrine on multinational operations from the US, UN, NATO and ABCA perspectives, and a review of various
authors’ views on factors and considerations influencing both the building and the command and control of a MNF. In the absence of clear metrics for measuring the effectiveness of a coalition, these factors and considerations formed the basis upon which the operational effectiveness of a coalition could be assessed in chapter four. Chapter two also highlighted the capabilities and limitations that bodies like NATO and the UN have. It permitted to deduce the critical specific military tasks characteristic of multinational land-based peace enforcement operations in the COE.

The second part answered the last two questions through the use of a comparative case study. Chapter two introduced three pertinent and recent multinational operations which were further analyzed in chapter four.

Because both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are largely dominated by the US, and as illustrated in chapter two, doctrine is developed from the perspective of a dominant power reflecting the military dominance and resources of the US military in multinational operations, such operation would not have served the purpose of this study. The interest rather turned to other arrangements, supplemented by appropriate traditional alliance and cooperative partnerships.

Case Studies

The case studies used are the UN-led MINUSTAH in Haiti (2005 to present), the INTERFET in East Timor with Australia as a lead nation (1999), and the ISAF in Afghanistan under the auspices of NATO (2003 to present). Their selection was based upon the point that they represent a wide variety of missions in different operational environments, characteristic of the COE, as well as that they cover different MNF structures, scope and mandates. They boast different capabilities, and are involved a
broad spectrum of violence, characteristic of the COE. They all possess a UN Chapter VII mandate and best demonstrate full-spectrum operations: peace enforcement and combat. The ongoing nature of two of these operations makes final success or failure difficult to measure; however, open-sourced materials from these operations provided ample information within the scope of this thesis.

The analysis rests on information retrieved in the literature review and from conducting interviews with officers who served with INTERFET and MINUSTAH; an infantry officer from Australia for the first one, and a former force chief of staff from Canada for the latter. A substantial portion of the information pertaining to ISAF and INTERFET came from scholarly articles and open-press. The chief assumption was that the information found in open sources captured the most significant elements of authenticity. The vast majority of the necessary information on MINUSTAH came from the interview.

**Determining Metrics**

The challenge for the author in attempting to measure the effectiveness of a coalition was to define criteria. Multinational operations are marked to various degrees with accommodation and compromise and, as Ryan emphasizes, “[y]ou will make no friends examining what it takes to become a successful participant in a contemporary international coalition” (Ryan 2002, 5). He also concedes that further study of the factors that make peace enforcement MNF effective is required.

Throughout the existing literature, as shown in chapter two, there is an apparent lack of prescribed measures of effectiveness or performance to be used in determining the effectiveness of a MNF. JP 5-0 states that while a measure of effectiveness (MOE)
assesses changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment, a measure of performance (MOP) then assesses friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment at all levels of war (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006c, III-60). In other words, MOPs generally measure performance of the task while MOEs generally measure accomplishment of the purpose. Accordingly, the draft Guidebook for Joint Force Land Component Commanders highlights that MOEs do not measure task accomplishment or performance by friendly organizations or forces--that is the role of the MOPs (JFLCC Course Staff 2006, 7-10).

Well-devised MOPs could then potentially serve to assess the operational effectiveness of a MNF. Faced with this problem, the author created metrics which are as unbiased as possible, based on principles of joint operations (restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) and factors that influence multinational operations. Regardless whether they are called MOEs or MOPs, these metrics serve a unique purpose: to assess the effectiveness of a MNF in the conduct of its assigned mandate. It is by creating a comprehensive list that an adequate comparative case study can be made possible. These metrics must be relevant to the COE, and measurable, qualitatively or quantitatively.

This study therefore used the seven following metrics: restraint in the use of force, perseverance, legitimacy, credibility, unity of effort, interoperability, and the availability and the efficient use of resources. Each metric is clearly defined in chapter four. The intent was to conduct a comparative case study with the three operations and graphically represent the results (see table 1).
Table 1. Case Study Analysis Format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>MINUSTAH</th>
<th>INTERFET</th>
<th>ISAF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restraint in the Use of Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perseverance</td>
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<td>Interoperability</td>
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<td>Availability and the Efficient Use of Resources</td>
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Chapter Summary and Conclusion

The research methodology consisted of a qualitative analysis in so far as partially answering most of the secondary questions in the literature review. A comparative case study consisting of three multinational peace enforcement operations offering a wide range of characteristics found in the COE was then conducted in chapter four. This method allowed best answering the latter secondary questions, and highlighting key considerations in building and maintaining coalitions. In this systematic process, the primary question was then answered as objectively as possible given the challenge of obtaining quantitative measures. Conclusions and recommendations for further research are found in the final chapter of the study.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The real lesson to be learned from Rwanda is that no one gives a damn. The missing ingredient isn’t a special force or better communications—it’s political will, courage, morality. (2001,115)

Carol Off, *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle*

The intent of this study is to examine the effectiveness of multinational operations in the COE. The primary question is: Are coalitions effective in dealing with the complex situations of the COE?

Chapter 2 summarized the relevant literature. The review of statutes, doctrine, articles, and studies provided the information required to address the secondary questions of this thesis. This chapter will analyze the information presented, answer secondary questions, and through a comparative case study, demonstrate that like-minded nations, be they from established alliances or not, having certain common characteristics, and forming so-called coalitions of the willing, are more effective than ad-hoc and regional coalitions of disparate nations compelled to come together. The three case studies—MINUSTAH, INTERFET, and ISAF—serve as a basis to determine this outcome.

**Doctrine: an Analysis**

If doctrine consists of the set of principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives, joint and multinational doctrine should, in theory, address the operational considerations the commander and staff of a MNF ought to think
about during the planning and execution of operations. Additionally, it should continuously evolve, and provide guidance regarding the conduct of operations.

According to AJP-3(A), doctrine should be followed except when in judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. It is essential as it serves as the keystone upon which operational concepts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) are based. As US doctrine is generally developed from the perspective of a dominant power normally assuming lead-nation role, it may not be entirely fitting to smaller troop contributing nations (TCN). Nevertheless, all societies now share similar security concerns and ought to come together when appropriate, regardless of the command structure, in a MNF that uses agreed upon fundamental principles usually brought into being in US joint and multinational doctrine.

However a force is organized, multi-nationality poses challenges whose resolution is crucial to military effectiveness (NATO 2005b, 1-11). The nature of multinational operations requires a common platform to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort. In fact, NATO doctrine indicates that successful integration will rely on common doctrine, standardized equipment and procedures. Consequently, widely accepted doctrine, as is the case with manuals like the new draft of AJP-3(A) *Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations*, the ABCA *Coalition Operations Handbook*, or the draft *Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, all of which similar to some extent to US joint and multinational doctrine, serve as solid doctrinal bases for allies and partners alike, regardless of their capabilities. Understanding the capabilities of each participant, liaison and coordination are crucial to achieve synchronized actions and unity of effort. Joint publications correctly point out the major concerns in building and
maintaining a multinational force: command relationships, unity of effort, liaison requirements, intelligence and information sharing, integration of forces, interoperability of equipment, doctrine and procedures, language and cultural considerations, mission assignment, areas of operations, ROE, logistic readiness and capabilities, and national direction (JFLCC Course Staff 2006, 2-13).

Doctrinal publications must remain living documents and must be amended regularly. As such, countless publications have recently been reedited. The UN will, at last, publish peace operations doctrine.

Complex multinational missions in the COE, of magnitude akin the ISAF mission, demonstrate the need for an effective multinational and multi-agency approach, hence the need to develop comprehensive and widely accepted doctrine. US and NATO made significant efforts to meet this objective, and doctrine--published or in draft form--addresses key challenges whose resolution is crucial to military effectiveness. Although broad and valuable, joint and multinational doctrine has been unsuccessful thus far in revealing universally accepted criteria to quantify or qualify the effectiveness of a MNF.

Factors and Considerations: Building and Maintaining a MNF

Each member brings unique experiences and capabilities and the key is to maximize their synchronized effect. In forming and maintaining a coalition, all must understand each nation’s goals, strengths and weaknesses. Multinational command requires an attitude of mind that is international in perspective, and whilst some of the factors and characteristics may appear self evident, the literature reviewed recognized these main ones:
1. National Will and Interests. Common goal and mutual interest are often subjective to national interests. Geographical location, domestic politics, and past experiences influence a nation’s degree of acceptance, courage, resilience, and tolerance to risk. Political agendas affect coalitions. However, now that the international scene is considerably more multipolar, nations’ interests are matching more than ever before.

2. Cultural Differences. “Culture shapes a nation’s doctrine and method of conducting military operations” (Switzer 2001, 11). A member’s unique cultural identity presents inhibitors to cooperative understanding--language presents the most immediate challenge--and there are various friction points like religion, cultural tolerance, work ethics, and morality. There can be sharp differences in culture among participants.

3. Military Capabilities. The size, organization, equipment, and training level of the military and the defense budget influence a nation’s ability to project forces. Some have inadequate equipment and training and rely on the UN to equip their contingent.

4. Interoperability--People and Technologies. Ensuring interoperability is the biggest challenge, especially in the case of ad-hoc coalitions. Some participants appear with personnel and equipment that are not military suitable or competent. Technological differences offer added challenges to interoperability, but, as JP 3-16 points out, the most important areas for interoperability may actually include language, communications, doctrine, training and exchanges of information (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, I-8).

5. Doctrine. Interoperability goes beyond the use of common technologies as the key is to function together in a challenging environment through the use of common doctrine and standardized procedures in planning, intelligence and logistics.
Metrics Defined

As established in the previous chapter, the challenge for the author was to define criteria to measure the effectiveness of a coalition. As there are no prescribed metrics to be used in assessing the effectiveness of a MNF, in doctrine or elsewhere, creating universally accepted metrics could provide quantitative measures of its performance. As a result, this study uses the seven following metrics: restraint, perseverance, legitimacy, credibility, unity of effort, interoperability, and the use of resources.

Restraint in the Use of Force

Its purpose is to limit collateral damage and to ensure the measured and proportionate application of force (NATO 2005b, 1-4). Judicious force being necessary, use of force is influenced by coalition or allied ROE. Furthermore, since domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive concerning the use of force than permitted under the force ROE, national caveats, both declared and undeclared, will affect the overall performance. Undue restraint in complex peace enforcement operations is unconstructive. In fact, ROE must be sufficiently robust to prevent the force’s loss of initiative. Hence, this criterion poses the following questions:

1. Are national ROE more restrictive than force ROE?
2. Is the member prepared and trained to carry out its tasks?
3. Are there national caveats to use of force?

Perseverance

It intends to ensure the commitment necessary to achieve the strategic end state. Some operations may require years to reach the termination criteria and as a result,
partners must agree to what constitutes mission success and exit criteria. Members must remain patient, resolute, and show unwavering commitment to the pursuit of objectives, as well as tolerance to risk and casualties facing adversity. Thus, perseverance merits these questions:

1. Are the mission’s and the national objectives compatible?
2. Is there agreement on what determines mission success?
3. What is each nation’s degree of tolerance to risk and casualties?

Legitimacy

It is based on the overarching legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken. Multinational operations gain legitimacy through the broad-based participation of other nations, in a response deemed appropriate to a threat or an aggression, in compliance with international laws governing armed conflict. This legitimacy is further enhanced when an international body such as the UN supports the political and military objectives, or more explicitly, authorizes the military action. Frequently a decisive element, it may depend on the adherence to objectives agreed upon by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and the display of fairness in dealing with the various parties. Legitimacy then, merits the following questions:

1. Does the force have a widely recognized and accepted mandate?
2. In the absence of a UNSCR, what is the international community’s degree of acceptance and support to the actions of the force?
3. What are the criteria for success and mission termination?
Credibility

“[MNFs] deployed in a volatile environment are likely to be tested for weakness. The early establishment of a mission’s credibility is vital. To be credible, a mission must be professional, maintain a confident posture and earn the respect of the parties and the population” (UN 2006b, 29). The force must be perceived as believable and trustworthy by all parties involved, through the actions, the capacities and the resolve of its members. “The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties’ assessment of the force’s capability to accomplish the mission” (NATO 2005b, 1-4). Caution should be used when dealing with unlawful or illegitimate organizations to avoid unintentionally legitimizing those (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006d, A-4). Hence, credibility poses these questions:

1. Do the contributing nations possess the capabilities and assets necessary to execute the mission of the MNF?

2. Is the force UN-led, is it a regional coalition under a lead nation model?

3. What are the perceptions of the population in the force’s actions and resolve?

Unity of Effort

Because nations contributing to multinational operations do so for reasons that are viewed as nationally advantageous in political and military terms, a successful coalition must establish at least unity of effort. Given agreement on the objectives, partners must unite their efforts to achieve the desired end state. Cohesion depends on their cooperation, and unity of effort depends on personal relationships (NATO 2005b, 1-2). Unity of effort depends on cooperation in order to coordinate the activities to achieve maximal effect. It includes conducting shaping efforts by way of supporting another member, through the synergetic effect of combined capabilities, and by sharing all
relevant and pertinent intelligence, consistent with national disclosure policies, and coordinated logistic operations. Differing languages present a challenge to unity of effort and mechanisms to mitigate linguistic and cultural differences are required. “The success of a coalition operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces” (ABCA 2005, 1-1). Unity of effort spurs questions like these:

1. What processes are in place to deal with issues that rise from the command arrangement?

2. What processes are in place, if any, to mitigate cultural barriers?

3. How do national caveats impact the force freedom of action?

**Interoperability**

For the purpose of this study, interoperability consists of the ability for the members of the force to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks (NATO 2006c, 2-I-6). It is the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems. Most importantly, a common doctrinal foundation among members is a means to operational effectiveness. Interoperability goes beyond the use of common technologies as the key is to function together in a challenging environment through the use of common doctrine and standardized TTPs in planning, intelligence and logistics. NATO nations, and those trained to a NATO standard, possess a greater level of interoperability and training than regional coalition partners unaccustomed to its standard. The same prevails with ABCA.

1. To what degree do members use common doctrine and TTPs?

2. What procedures and elements are in place to enhance interoperability?

3. What are the C4I design and arrangements in the force?
Availability and Efficient Use of Resources

The lack of resources or the inefficient use of available resources may exacerbate the operational effectiveness of the force. The lack of tactical airlift, night capable fighting forces, the reliance and the efficient coordination of host nation support exemplify this metric. The execution of multinational logistics must be a collective responsibility of the members. However, participating members each have a different approach to service support and national support is usually done in isolation from other partners. It is less the case with NATO where common funding and agreements are in place. In the lead nation concept, a nation accepts responsibility to provide one or more logistic functions in support of the force (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006a, III-35).

The reliance on another nation’s capabilities to complement and reinforce one’s effect is interdependence. It cuts redundancy without adversely affecting effectiveness. Despite limited resources available, building and maintaining a MNF must emphasize effectiveness and responsiveness in the support over efficiency or providing the most cost-effective support to accomplish the mission.

1. Are the military forces properly equipped and supported for the task?
2. How are key force enablers controlled and apportioned?
3. What is the multinational logistical arrangement?
4. What is the degree of interdependence achieved?

Case Study One: MINUSTAH

Overview

The MINUSTAH was established on June 1st, 2004 and succeeding to the US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) deployed three months earlier. MIF was established to
quell civil unrest in Port-au-Prince, reestablish security throughout Haiti, and hand-off to a follow-on UN peacekeeping force. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNSCR 1542 authorized the MINUSTAH, a UN-led mission, empowered with a strong mandate in providing a secure and stable environment, particularly through disarmament. The force, authorized to 6,700 troops, was required to assist the Transitional Government in three areas: monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police (HNP), assisting the HNP with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs for all armed groups, and assisting with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti though operational support to HNP (UN 2004).

The MINUSTAH mandate has been extended six times through successive UNSCRs--again recently, until October 15, 2007. Despite the presence of UN troops, the security situation had improved only marginally. Because MINUSTAH was required to assist the Transitional Government and the national police, inherently corrupt, the mandate as described in UNSCR 1542 was deemed insufficient. UNSCR 1702, voted August 15, 2006, authorizes MINUSTAH to a larger military component of up to 7,200 troops and a police component of up to 1,951 officers. Furthermore, it calls on the force to reorient its DDR efforts in Haiti toward a community violence-reduction program (UN 2006e). According to former force chief of staff colonel Michel Duhamel,¹ UNSCR 1702 was necessary; the previous limitation on the DDR program had been tied to the return of individual weapons when, arguably, a program oriented on initiatives to provide employment opportunities to former criminal gang members would be more effective. It
also permits to better meet the desired effects and enables MINUSTAH to target gangs more effectively.

On January 31, 2007, the MINUSTAH remained under authorized strength at 6,782 troops from 19 countries. Contributors are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, US, and Uruguay.

Analysis

Restraint in the Use of Force

Several caveats were placed on troops, and differing interpretations of ROEs have led to significant problems. Had the mandate been written differently, former mission chief of staff Colonel Michel Duhamel argues that it would have clarified expectations for TCNs with regards to force generation for peace enforcement tasks. It would no doubt have reduced the complacency shown by the few comfortable with a weaker mandate. When making the decision to commit to the mission, TCNs agreed to established contingents’ boundaries, locations of camps, billets in the HQ and so on. These are not decisions that a contingent commander can change once in theatre without the approval of his government and the UN HQ. In MINUSTAH, some TCNs placed caveats on force employment and deployment limiting the force commander’s flexibility.

Prior to elections, the TCN providing the Force Commander Reserve refused to deploy its contingent into Cité-Soleil--where the majority of the security problems were. The force did not therefore have freedom of movement in the capital for its reserve. This role was later assigned to another member. Sri Lanka does not have such restriction as its troops often reinforced in that quarter. Brazil, originally reluctant and unprepared to use
force as prescribed by a Chapter VII mandate, adjusted the training of its troops, as well as, perhaps its mindset, to produce a battalion prepared for peace enforcement within the parameters set by the mandate. Brazil took ownership of the mission, providing the commander, and competent, combat ready troops by 2005.

Because contributing nations have agreed to certain things prior to commitment to the force, any planning for night operations and direct actions turned out to be a slow process which hinged on the willingness, capability and training level of the troops. The situation improved over time for some members as they became more familiar with the variables of the environment.

Perseverance

TCNs understand the protracted nature of MINUSTAH. Some like Brazil have elected to train and equip their forces to the level required by the mandate and the situation. UN peacekeeping missions usually persevere but some TCNs may take a different course. In fact, some have avoided placing troops under UN command perceived as incapable of commanding peace enforcement missions. The efforts of a select few, like Brazil, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Chili and Peru and their willingness to accept risk and casualties, contributed to reduce the overall level of criminal activities, prolonging other nations’ willingness to remain part of the force. The nature of the adversary makes protracted operations in Haiti possible for those who do not possess the expertise and equipment to participate in more prominent peace enforcement operations elsewhere.
**Legitimacy**

UN-led operations are widely seen as legitimate and MINUSTAH is no exception. MINUSTAH was mandated to work with Haitian institutions, like the HNP. However, the latter was not mandated to cooperate with the UN. The mandate was too lenient to existing institutions and trusted that the presence of the international community and the UN supported by a significant UN Police and military force authorized under Chapter VII, would change the behavior of the populace. As a result, the UN lacked the tools required to clean up the corrupt police force and other government institutions, all of which, reluctant to deal effectively with criminal gangs in the dangerous places like the strategic area of Cité-Soleil. The mandate should have been to enforce the peace unilaterally (which was the mandate of the MIF) rather than in support of corrupt institutions, until such time that a credible, well trained police and/or security force was established. Unfortunately, it would have been an unacceptable option for both the Transitional Government and the international community. In contrast with Kosovo, MINUSTAH did not take charge but supported the transitional government in the pillars of security, governance and economic and social development. MINUSTAH managed to convince the government to appoint a non-corrupt police chief and commit to assist him in training and equipping the HNP; however, MINUSTAH could not impose, only suggest changes to HNP.

**Credibility**

MINUSTAH has a handful of staff officers from NATO Allies: Canada, France and the US and no US military support. The half-hearted commitment of some to the peace enforcement effort affects the credibility of the force. The heterogeneous character
of MINUSTAH (and UN-led forces for that matter) is such that it is not possible to share intelligence--information is more appropriate--a capability which would be absolutely essential to effectively conduct targeting--another forbidden word in UN operations. MINUSTAH, and other UN-led peace enforcement operations, suffer greatly from a lack of enablers: intelligence, special forces, fires, helicopters, sustainment, perhaps funding. This lack of resources, training and different degrees of professionalism affect the credibility of the force. The performance of some however--Brazilian, Peruvian and Sri Lankan forces--is positive. However, in spite of the legitimacy provided by UNSCRs, the perception of peacekeepers collaborating with corrupt and unchanged institutions could potentially affect their credibility.

Furthermore, MINUSTAH and the UN DPKO are not about to decline offers from UN members and will integrate just about any contribution. This in no way undermines the effort and the intent, but peace enforcement operations require robust tools that some nations are unable or unwilling to provide.

The credibility of MINUSTAH was also exacerbated by the media in 2004-2005 as it struggled to reduce the level of violence in Cité-Soleil and Cap-Haitian. The diverging vision and approach between the force commander (the military general) and the Special Representative of the Secretary General may have prevented the force from seizing the opportunity for an aggressive information operations campaign to challenge detractors.

Unity of Effort

MINUSTAH HQ dealt with matters from strategic to tactical levels, which is often the case with UN-led forces. In preparation for the elections, it established a Port-
au-Prince regional command, where half of the force operated, and was authorized a
troop surge. Because Jordan provided a second battalion, it had a preponderance of troops
in the city and thus commanded the regional command which regrouped contingents from
Brazil, Peru and Jordan. However, that Regional Commander acted as a commander of
Jordanian troops, not a multinational commander. Thus, the regional command was
ineffective, and the Regional HQ was disbanded in the beginning of 2006. Realizing the
importance of Cité-Soleil for the success of the overall mission and the difficulties
Jordanian troops faced in that area, the Brazilian force commander convinced his own
country to trade areas of operations with the Jordanian battalion in that quarter. As a
result, the force efficiently dealt with criminal activities in that quarter and made every
round fired count. Despite efforts to make it function, the lack of common doctrinal bases
and various control problems forced MINUSTAH HQ to drop the regional (Brigade
level) command concept in February 2006 and return to a force structure where all
tactical units report directly to the operational HQ (Division level)--proving once more
that the UN does not possess adequate command and control capabilities.

Arguably, the UN and a select few TCNs did not go beyond the letter of the
mandate, nor its spirit, though it seems to have improved once a somewhat more robust
mandate offered by UNSCR 1702 came in effect. In addition, increased criticism prior to
the elections pressured MINUSTAH and HNP to be more pertinent and persistent.

Interoperability

A disparate force, its nineteen members do not use common doctrine. The nature
of UN operations calls for all members to contribute to the force HQ. Many staff officers
are not staff trained and many lack proficiency in English (mission language) and/or
French (country language). In July 2006, only seven out of 109 members of the HQ were English native speakers--as a result they were used to translate and edit most staff products. Because it is bound to be the common denominator in most multinational operations, efforts must be made to communicate effectively in English. In 2006, they hired Haitian nationals as translators who could speak Creole, French, English, and even Spanish) but they could not communicate with the troops coming from Sri Lanka, Nepal and Jordan. Some units, like Jordan had not brought Arabic to English translators and only a few officers who could speak English. Consequently, the troops could not interact with the local population and even other UN troops at the tactical level. Additionally, the exchange of liaison officers between nations remains dependent on the national commander’s goodwill, who likely did not sufficiently trust his flank units, although in some instances, MINUSTAH imposed such exchange. Additionally, intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination, critical to force protection, remain nearly impossible. A UN-led force must show transparency amongst its constituents, and information collected should in theory be shared with all members. Military intelligence is a notion incompatible with the UN parlance.

Availability and Efficient Use of Resources

The use of army aviation remains controlled by the force Chief Administration Officer (CAO). As he is focused on administrative support, not operational support, helicopters are restricted to defensive operations and can only fire in self-defense. Furthermore, at least until late 2006 if not to this day, he would approve every flight meaning that, even when the force commander authorized a mission, the CAO, under the advice from his civilian Chief Air Operations, could still cancel it if he felt that it was too
risky for the aircraft or the crew. Consequently, the deployment of the quick reaction force (QRF) and force projection throughout the country was difficult and irresponsible. Helicopter support, valuable due to a poor road network, was not a force multiplier.²

Several members lack proper equipment to be effective. The lack of night vision and night fighting capability, and of body armor, are bound to restraint one’s use of force. The situation in Haiti however calls for such basic pieces of equipment. Some participating nations still lack the tactical mobility to project force or possess vehicles poorly adapted to the harsh road conditions and narrow streets. The Peruvian battalion lacks ballistic protective gear and night vision goggles but is well trained. In contrast, Jordanians are very well equipped but were not well trained to employ their weapons and ammunition effectively.

Summary

Peace enforcement is beyond UN’s capacity. In fact, it is perhaps more fair to say that it just takes a lot more UN troops to do the same job than what a single country or coalition of like-minded countries can do. The force exercises command and control of assigned units directly because it has been unable to put together effective intermediate HQs and interoperability is low. The control of helicopters hindered operations and TCN caveats affect freedom of maneuver—the case of the QRF is a prime example. The force suffers from a lack of preparation on the part of its constituents. In January 2007, the force remained below authorized strength and those countries with best trained and resourced armies do not contribute. UN missions, and MINUSTAH is no exception to this, “generally adopt a more bureaucratic model of command where national representation often has priority over operational effectiveness” (Ryan 2002, 9).
Case Study Two: INTERFET

Overview

On 15 September 1999, the UNSC, acting under chapter VII of the Charter, adopted UNSCR 1264 authorizing the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure to address the degrading security in East Timor. The mandate of the INTERFET was to restore peace and security of East Timor, to protect and support the UN mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the small UN body tasked with administrating the referendum, and within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. It authorized participating members to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate (UN 1999). INTERFET (Operation Stabilise) was deployed between September 1999 and February 2000 on a complex peace enforcement operation only five days after it was authorized. UNSCR 1264 clearly underlined the force to take all necessary measures to restore security. The military objectives for INTERFET were primarily to establish and secure ports of entry; secure the border between West and East Timor, and thereby cut off support for the militia from West Timor (Bjornar 2004, 38). Its main task was to restore stability before giving way to a UN nation-building effort; it was relieved by UNTAET in February 2000.

The total force counted about 9,500 troops from twenty-two nations, many of them from the Asia Pacific region, with Australia providing the largest portion, including the force HQ based on Australia’s Deployable Joint Force Headquarters and “retained a strong Australian flavour throughout the operation” (Ryan 2002, 8). The area of operations was divided into three sectors, each further divided into a total of six national battalion areas. The tense and complex situation on the island required a force that was
capable of dealing with the existing threats. Combat operations were likely to occur, as well as, the humanitarian situation required focus and effort. Nevertheless, the multinational force contributions were primarily a wide variety of light combat units, and minor CS and CSS elements (Bjornar 2004, 39). One of the unique challenges for a relatively smaller state, as Australia, taking the lead in organizing a multinational operation is the limited size of its own military and thereby limited logistical capabilities to support the multinational effort. Due to limited multinational commitment of such capabilities, additional support from the US was crucial to accomplish the mission, especially in the fields of communications, intelligence, civil affairs and strategic lift. US forces provided essential enablers, but no ground combat troops (Collier 2001, 9).

The operation was a short-term intervention but provided important lessons. Its success lies in the speed and the effectiveness of the international response, and TCN’s willingness to go forward notwithstanding deficiencies. Its success, in contrast with other operations of the 1990s, was such that former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan held up the INTERFET as a model peace enforcement operation (Ryan 2000b, xi). The UN did not control its operations other than in the broad sense--this was a strongly Australian-led multinational effort. It resulted in an effective coalition of the willing (Ryan 2002, 12). The rapid deployment was the result of shuttle diplomacy by Australian military leaders with their regional counterparts with whom relationships had long been established.

Analysis

Restraint in the Use of Force

INTERFET took place in an environment of very little real opposition, so national caveats were predominantly an issue in the building and deployment phases. It was in
many ways a divided force, as most members either imposed caveats on the use of their forces and requirements for force protection, or made contributions that did not include a combat capability (Ryan 2000b, 64). The distribution of tasks therefore reflected the capabilities provided as well as the caveats placed by TCN’s government. By virtue of such caveats, some forces had to be deployed in more secure areas of operations. The requirement that force protection be provided for some contingents detracted significantly from the value of their contribution to the force’s effort. “Similarly, some contingents came unprepared to accept casualties--an attitude that is unrealistic and unhelpful on a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation” (Ryan 2000b, 94).

By comparison with the ABCA contingents, the ASEAN forces brought a different set of operational philosophies. “These were by no means consistent across all forces, but the ASEAN countries did share an aversion to being seen as overly belligerent” (Ryan 2000b, 95). Unprepared to accept casualties, some ASEAN nations did not want any confrontation.

This resulted in the logical grouping of ABCA nations (Australia, British, Canada, and New Zealand) plus Irish troops into a maneuver brigade in the west, and a combat unit in the Oecussi enclave where the tempo was at its highest, minimizing the impact of caveats where the need to use force was more likely. The Thai, Philippine and South Korean contingents, best structured and more inclined for humanitarian assistance, were assigned separate national areas of operations in the east and in the center where the violence was relatively low (Ryan 2002, 8).
**Perseverance**

ASEAN countries were determined to support the collaborating Indonesian government in restoring peace and security in the region. Some however emphasized their humanitarian rather than their security function. Had the situation been different and militia resistance fierce, several ASEAN nations would have avoided confrontation, perhaps withdrawn, leaving the fighting to Western and ABCA nations so not to damage their relationships with Indonesia, sensible to the policy of non-interference in ASEAN members’ internal affairs. Half-hearted commitment was evidently taken into account by the force in assigning areas of operation. For instance, Singapore, uncertain regarding the likely opposition and potential for casualties, could not offer rapidly deployable infantry forces as it felt constrained by internal political impact if their mainly conscript force should suffer casualties (Ryan 2000b, 48). It did not commit combat troops.

Perseverance is not a determinant metric as the force had short term objectives, mandated to transition soonest to the follow-on UNTAET--the composition of which however was largely bound to be from INTERFET ASEAN TCNs.

**Legitimacy**

Many governments were willing to participate in a coalition of the willing as long as it possessed a UN mandate--assets were not deployed until sanctioned by UNSCR 1264. The Australians understood the primacy of bringing some ASEAN members into the coalition, as without strong and committed regional participation the authority and legitimacy of INTERFET remained debatable. This legitimacy was demonstrated by a core element of regional nations in a cooperative international force, which appeased all but the most radically nationalist Indonesian sensibilities (Ryan 2000b, 114).
Credibility

From the outset, the reputation and obvious determination of the many TCNs played a major part in establishing their authority (Ryan 2000b, 72), even though the mandate required a strong and determined military presence that was not matched by some of the contributions received. Australia secured support from regional partners with whom they had shared various training opportunities, as well as gained support from other ABCA members interoperable in many regards. Regardless of Canadian reservations, for example, “and despite a number of offers of light infantry from other countries [Australia], was keen to obtain Canadian infantry, seeing them as a force multiplier because of their professionalism and experience” (Ryan 2000b, 58). However, Australia’s concern for broad-based legitimacy took precedence over force structure. Not expecting to form and lead a multinational effort, Australia had no plans on the shelf when the crisis occurred, and thus focused on securing a credible multinational effort quickly at the detriment of military effectiveness. The consequence of this was that contributions were offered which were not all required while other requirements were not easily fulfilled.

Above all, the swift deployment and a high discipline level greatly enhanced the force’s credibility. Furthermore, as missions that commence with a negotiated agreement can escalate into open warfare, the coalition prepared the best it could to engage with militias in the west, where it was most likely to occur, with highly interoperable and fully integrated forces that used common doctrine.
Unity of Effort

The coalition adopted a lead nation model with nations interoperable at the command level as well as some whose operational cultures were incompatible (Ryan 2002, 8). It did not have a truly integrated command as it remained mostly Australian, explaining why otherwise well-disposed partners complained that there was a tendency to plan all activities from an Australian viewpoint and forget the needs of the others (Ryan 2000b, 42). Still, it was effective, perhaps because the force adopted a simple command and control model supported with robust communication systems. Yet, Australians were criticized for their lack of cultural sensitivity with their partners and not demonstrating sufficient linguistic and cultural preparation.

It made sense for the Thais, South Korean, and Filipinos, who had distinct operational cultures, not highly interoperable with Western forces, to operate independently under INTERFET command, through the use of extensive liaison, maximizing their contribution to the overall effort of reestablishing security and normalcy. In contrast ABCA contingents were effectively integrated (Ryan 2002, 8), and prepared to tackle tasks at the high-end of the spectrum of operations.

Interoperability

The coalition was a mix of interoperable nations, and others that could make little contribution to the headquarters. The HQ had completed the CFLCC-level ABCA exercise Rainbow Serpent 98 the previous summer along with ABCA brigade HQs, and many Australian staff officers were still employed in that HQ. Maximizing the use of common ABCA doctrine to a large degree, as well as lessons learned from prior training opportunities (Australian and Thai forces as an example) enhanced force effectiveness.
Non-regional TCNs such as Brazil, Ireland, Italy and Scandinavian countries had no geographical or political concern in the area and were more easily interoperable with ABCA nations (Ryan 2000b, 89). Some in fact were using a similar doctrinal base. Nonetheless, the participants realized the importance of developing coalition doctrine that will add to the existing doctrine from alliances like NATO and entities like ABCA.

“If anything the firm response and coherent policy of the force demonstrated that, in order to make a force multinational without sacrificing functional interoperability, a limited number of countries need to accept responsibility for the conduct of any offensive operations that need to be undertaken” (Ryan 2000b, 64).

Availability and Efficient Use of Resources

The most important point to highlight about resources is bearing of the costs. A nation that accepts the lead-role has to accept that there are financial costs to be borne. UN was going to assume expenses of the UNTAET, not from the sub-contracted coalition. This was a shocking discovery for Australia and seeing that this issue was unclear at first, it scared off some possible contributors until resolved. Thailand for instance required a firm commitment that the UN would pay for the operation before it would become involved. The force secured financial support from nations who were reluctant or unable to different reasons to contribute troops--Japan for instance was willing to provide substantial financial support. The confusion surrounding the forecast of expenses and sources of funding undermined Australia’s ability to manage the coalition (Ryan 2000b, 44). There is a need to establish funding mechanisms, just as common doctrine and set of TTPs, and multinational training events are important.
The heavy airlift, along with strategic communications and intelligence support are also important capabilities that must be addressed in forming stand-by coalitions. US support was invaluable to INTERFET.

Summary

A strong lead nation model, INTERFET reconciled different operational cultures and capitalized on nations interoperable at the command or at the tactical levels. The force deployed rapidly, and the broad-based coalition comprising numerous ASEAN nations greatly enhanced its credibility and legitimacy. The force effectively coordinated deployment and employment of forces according to their national caveats and reservations, but had INTERFET been involved in high-intensity operations against capable opponents, it would have had a hard time with such constraints, cultural differences and the lack of common doctrine and TTPs from its diverse membership.

Case Study Three: ISAF

Overview

A coalition of willing nations, ISAF was initially formed to address the instability in Kabul after the fall of the Taliban. NATO-led since 2003, it is the Alliance’s first and largest ground operation outside Europe. Mandated under Chapter VII by UNSCR 1386, the peace enforcement operation was renewed by several successive UNSCRs and exists in accordance with the Bonn Agreement of December 6, 2001. ISAF’s primary role is to assist Afghanistan in providing a safe and secure environment within Kabul and its surrounding areas. Since 2004 however, ISAF progressively assumed responsibility for throughout the whole of Afghanistan in a four stage geographic expansion plan
counterclockwise from the north, and on October 5, 2006, ahead of schedule and amid intense fighting in the south, the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom handed over responsibility of the eastern quadrant, stage four (ISAF 2007). By doing so, roughly 12,000 US troops were transferred under NATO command. The thirty-seven nation coalition of over 35,000 troops exercises command and control via five Regional Commands (RCs) comprised of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). ISAF’s key military tasks include assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, and conducting stability and security operations in coordination with Afghan national security forces (ISAF 2007).

**Analysis**

**Restraint in the Use of Force**

Most TCNs have caveats--obviously many are classified. Interventions from politicians and senior officers have highlighted the impact of such constraints that nations place on their contingent, which profoundly affect ISAF’s operational effectiveness. This mission has shed the light on the impact of caveats, declared and undeclared because the situation in Afghanistan demands forceful actions and robust tools. Not all contributors see operations in Afghanistan the same way and some choose to limit the extent of their involvement to minimize risk to their troops at the detriment of achieving objectives. Some Allies only make a token contribution to ISAF for different reasons.

In 2004, KMNB had to deal some nations’ adversity to risk. For the most part adequately equipped and prepared for combat operations, some would not venture outside the Kabul area of operations or even worse, would not deploy outside their area of operations to support one another, would not conduct direct action (DA) or would impose
counterproductive force protection measures to their convoys, making it impossible for them to patrol in Kabul’s narrow streets.

Short on combat-ready troops in RC (South) in the summer and fall of 2006, allies and partners with proven combat forces deployed elsewhere were--and remain--reluctant to remove caveats preventing them from taking part in the fight against the resurgence of Taliban, preferring their more stable area. Paralyzing caveats from a few allies and key partners alike such as no night operations and no combat demonstrate that the survival of NATO is at stake and that it behooves allies and partners alike to balance risk and duty and embrace the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 336 on reducing national caveats.

**Perseverance**

ISAF operations are indicative of the Alliance’s willingness and resolve, or that of several members at least, to carry out offensive ground actions to defeat an enemy. The southern campaign of September 2006 was the first extended ground battle of NATO but many questioned the Alliance’s stomach for the fight. But with the battle raging, some allies and partners were reluctant to lend a hand.

The Taliban saw the transfer of authority to NATO control as a window of opportunity--testing ISAF members’ will to fight--and that was a mistake. They suffered a tactical defeat in the south when Operation Medusa gave a powerful message that they had no chance of winning militarily. That operation included several like-minded allies and partners committed to instilling peace and security in Taliban controlled territory. Perseverance is also shown in *The Afghanistan Compact* agreed upon on February 1, 2006 which indicates ISAF’s commitment through end-2010 (London 2006, 6).
Legitimacy

ISAF is a UN-mandated, Chapter VII operation and is comprised of all twenty-six NATO Allies and eleven partners, some of whom are hoping to soon join the Alliance. UNSCRs aside, NATO invoked article V of its Charter, in agreement with article 51 of the Charter of the UN, the day after 11 September 2001. Some allies formed ISAF that fall, and with NATO in command since 2003, the coalition of Allies and like-minded partners inherited that legitimacy. In contrast with Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF are both widely accepted as they aim to rout the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and for this reason are perceived as legitimate.

Credibility

ISAF inherits from NATO’s standing as the most capable multinational military alliance in the world. The expansion resulting in the grouping of a large portion of US forces from Operation Enduring Freedom in ISAF has greatly enhanced the force’s credibility. Although not all allies and partners are willing to fight the Taliban, those other than the Americans that did so far have proven highly capable. More importantly, the successful Operation Medusa was a turning point which showed that NATO is able to tackle the challenges of the COE.

Unity of Effort

European nations have resisted the call for more effort. The simultaneous demand to UNIFIL II after the Israeli intervention in Lebanon was perhaps an excellent opportunity for some to adopt a more comfortable political posture, choosing to put blue-helments between Arabs and Israelis, than to fight against radical Islamists, a much safer
alternative. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have particularly generated criticism in the fall of 2006 and even after the Riga Summit. These nations are doing superb work in their assigned--and yes, chosen--areas of operation but they have all resisted the call to add more soldiers for dangerous duty or allow their troops already in Afghanistan to be moved to RC (South) where some were taking the brunt of the fight.

Regardless of caveats however, no one is in Afghanistan for the ride. Efforts are made at all levels to achieve the ISAF’s objectives. Operation Enduring Freedom now complements ISAF brilliantly and provides much needed combat support in the tough fights. The force has an integrated command and national contingent commanders support ISAF’s mission within the limits imposed by their governments.

Interoperability

NATO has a solid doctrinal foundation that the vast majority of ISAF members adhere to. Thirty out of thirty-seven members are allies or are partners for peace who have expressed the intent to join the Alliance. The other members are highly interoperable by virtue of being an ABCA nation or having long worked with NATO in other operations. The integrated command structure of NATO allows for this coalition to be well represented in HQs. The sharing of intelligence remains an issue. However, mechanisms are in place within NATO for the robust national intelligence centers found in ISAF to share a substantial amount of intelligence in a timely fashion.

Availability and Efficient Use of Resources

ISAF’s manning hovers at about eighty five percent of the authorized number as promises for troops and assets are not always fulfilled. Nevertheless, behind the scenes
offensives to get NATO and like-minded nations to contribute more troops have yielded some overdue success after all. As of January 2007, some nations have announced that they will provide more troops to ISAF and will not place caveats on them that would prevent them from being employed in the south. Poland is one of them. ISAF still needs more helicopters, tactical airlift, and other enablers.

ISAF does not have a multinational logistic organization; it is at the mercy of national support elements. It was an important limitation for KMNB in 2003 and 2004 when, as Canada was in the lead, the Canadian support element was often requested, not tasked, to provide support to other coalition members in need. Logistical interdependence can hardly be achieved except to some extent for fuel, bottled water, food and such commodities, thanks to contracted providers. The lack of interdependence results in a large portion of a nation’s troops providing service support. The actual number of “boots on the ground” in ISAF is sadly a small portion of the 35,000.

Summary

ISAF is a NATO endeavor and as such, members are interoperable at the command level and can rely on past NATO experiences--operations and training exercises. The Alliance is however put to the test in the protracted effort to secure and rebuild Afghanistan, and the difficult operating environment has highlighted the negative impact of caveats that nations have placed for different reasons. ISAF attracted a lot of attention in 2006 for its difficulty in gaining more support and the increased violence. In spite of caveats affecting the commanders’ flexibility, it is nonetheless, a credible and resolute force, more prepared for peace enforcement than many other coalitions.
Chapter Summary and Conclusion

There are no established metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of a MNF. Because every multinational operation in the COE is a coalition, even if at the core, it consists of the twenty-six NATO allies, these operations consist of a coalition of the willing though some feel compelled to participate, as nations’ motivations for providing troops to a peace operation vary widely. The seven metrics used in this study are a starting point and are defined in doctrine, and refined in this chapter.

Using these metrics, this comparative case study illustrates the effectiveness of these three coalitions--MINUSTAH, INTERFET, and ISAF--within the parameters of their operational environment. The intent was not to compare one to the other, but rather to indicate that by using widely accepted metrics as a common-sense checklist, it becomes possible to identify points of friction, deficiencies, and strong points. A comparison of the three case studies is shown at table 2. The metrics have equal weight, and the rating ranges from one to three, where one is low and three is acceptable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>MINUSTAH</th>
<th>INTERFET</th>
<th>ISAF</th>
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<td>Restraint in the Use of Force</td>
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<td>Perseverance</td>
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<td>Credibility</td>
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<td>Unity of Effort</td>
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<td>Interoperability</td>
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<td>Availability and the Efficient Use of Resources</td>
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This simple comparison indicates that with the information available, and within
the parameters of each mission’s environment, that MINUSTAH, with the majority of the
seven metrics scoring low and a total score of ten out of a possible score of twenty-one, is
not a very effective peace enforcement mission. It faces issues not unlike those that have
plagued recent UN-led military forces, in particular those with a chapter VII mandate in a
difficult environment. The INTERFET, with a score of fifteen is considered acceptable.
Still, it has room for improvement, as pointed out so clearly by Alan Ryan. ISAF, scoring
eighteen, with four out of seven metrics scoring three, or acceptable, would indicate that,
in spite of its difficulties, it proves to be an effective peace enforcement operation.

This chapter reveals some important points. First, the doctrine has adapted to the
realities of the COE and the UN will provide comprehensive doctrine also that will
support present and future endeavors. Second, the factors to consider in building and
maintaining an effective MNF can be summarized as national will and interests, cultural
differences, military capabilities, interoperability and doctrine. Third, a coalition
commander has always had, and shall continue to operate within constraints. Providing
that these national caveats are made clear to him from the outset by TCNs, he should as a
general rule, be able to function within them.

Lastly, given the pace of globalization and the incidental effects on the global
security context, it makes sense to ask whether the existing multinational structures are
outdated, and possess the robust tools required to undertake the increasingly difficult
operations throughout the spectrum. The UN is arguably unable to conduct chapter VII
peace enforcement missions effectively. The same may be valid for emerging
multinational institutions. Africa, the region most in need of peacekeepers, is unable to
provide for itself. The African Union is trying to improve this capability; however it is desperately short of resources, and requires UN assistance. It does not possess enough enablers and the wherewithal of modern expeditionary forces.

The next and final chapter of this thesis will capture key conclusions and recommendations derived from this study. Of course, responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations reached in this work remains solely the author’s.

1 The interview between the author and Colonel M. Duhamel, Canadian Army, is found at appendix A.

2 As MINUSTAH is an ongoing operation, the author cannot confirm whether or not this procedure remains in effect.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The intent of this study is to examine the effectiveness of multinational operations in the COE. To answer the primary question whether coalitions are effective in the COE, this study exposed facts and opinions on the evolving nature of peace enforcement operations, and used three case studies: a UN mission, a coalition with a lead-nation, and a NATO-led operation. It was demonstrated that multinational operations increasingly require military forces that are capable of dealing with a wide range of military tasks, provided by troop contributing nations willing to do what has to get done.

The necessity of multinational operations, despite policy and capability challenges should be apparent. No nation, however powerful, could hope to tackle today’s increasingly global challenges alone. Although the multinational and interagency aspects are widely integrated throughout joint operations in US doctrine, one can argue that despite the political value, it is not an efficient way to create an effective warfighting capability. Nonetheless, there are sound strategic and military reasons to operate within a durable coalition construct in peace enforcement operations: legitimacy, economy of force, intelligence gathering, specialized units and assets that enhance the ability of the MNF to deploy and operate, and so on. The strategic value of a multinational effort is well worth it compared to the tactical level complexity it may cause.

Contributors to, and members of a MNF must share universal principles, and consider certain factors in building and maintaining a coalition, summarized in chapter four. In short, they consist of national will and interests, cultural differences among
members, military capabilities differences, interoperability in behavior, procedures and equipment, and differences in doctrine. It would be logical for joint commanders and staff officers to recognize and understand these factors, as well as to take concrete steps to mitigate any potential unconstructive consequence. They all play a major part in a nation’s decision on how to expend its national blood and treasure.

Multinational contributions can trigger military advantages as partners can bring forth support and key enablers, provided that interoperability—a fundamental principle for the operation of joint and coalition forces—is adequately addressed. Long standing alliances such as NATO, the world’s foremost military alliance, considerably reduce interoperability issues and disagreement upon objectives, once consent is obtained from its twenty-six constituents. There is on the other hand a growing divide in military capabilities between the US, European nations, and Canada, which limits the extent of interoperability and overall effectiveness of a MNF. Relentless efforts ought to be made to bridge gaps in technology and associated procedures. The same is also true of non-NATO members, like Australia, New Zealand and many other like-minded TCNs.

As shown in earlier chapters, multinational operations are conducted in the frame of alliances or coalitions. The short-term and often disparate nature of coalitions make it more complex compared to operations within the frame of an alliance. Both US and NATO doctrine address problem areas and key considerations, which may be described as differences in organization, capabilities and doctrine. Furthermore, US and NATO doctrine provide a relatively solid foundation for multinational operations, and albeit some of it is often written from the US perspective, it adequately accommodates Allies and non-NATO contributing nations, regardless of their capabilities.
The UN has acted in several scenarios in the recent years but proved largely unable to conduct Chapter VII peace enforcement missions effectively. In spite of its difficulties, MINUSTAH constitutes a success story from a UN perspective; a few members are even criticized for using too much force on some occasions, against criminal gangs. The UN is not a warfighting organization though, and should not be expected to carry out such tasks. Canadian Major General (Retired) Lewis Mackenzie has concluded that “a muscular peacekeeping mission must possess adequate command and control, which the UN cannot do and should not be ashamed to admit” (Mackenzie 1997, 125). For that reason perhaps, western governments, who have contributed key enablers and well-trained troops to UN missions in the recent past, have to some level lost faith in the UN to command those missions. They have declined to offer as much support as they used to, preferring more robust subcontracted coalitions of the willing.

On the other hand, several nations quickly moved in to enlarge the UNIFIL when the Lebanon crisis broke out in the summer of 2006, as the UN appealed for reinforcement. This happened to coincide with NATO being hard-pressed to find troops to fight the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Lebanon is, of course, more accessible than Afghanistan but also far less dangerous. Many consider the Arab-Israeli conflict much closer to their national interests than the effort to pacify Afghanistan. As a result, combat capable forces are deployed in a Chapter VI setting, while NATO is still trying to persuade some countries to add more soldiers for dangerous duty, and allow their troops already in Afghanistan to be moved to danger zones in the south. Evidently, when required to take part in a non-article five operation, Allies do not feel compelled to act, and NATO is faced with conflicting national goals and each nation’s political will.
Lead-nation command or regional arrangements, prescribed under Chapter VIII, are venues most preferred by the UN, provided the UNSC can agree on a resolution. The INTERFET is a success story, and it identified the need to prepare regional arrangements. Nevertheless, these arrangements need to reach an acceptable level of interoperability, common doctrine, and credible logistical support. The African Union military force operating in Darfur for instance, a regional arrangement authorized by the UN, desperately requires those force enablers which are in short supply—and expensive—around the world. It requires support which the UN has a hard time providing.

Occasionally, MNFs lack an essential element to their success: the credibility afforded by the capacity to act decisively with overwhelming power when needed. It is the author’s opinion that for peace enforcement operations in the COE to be successful, they require capable forces equipped with robust tools and robust mandates. These robust tools include but are not limited to, strong national will and support, minimal debilitating caveats on the use of force, an acceptable and workable degree of interoperability in procedures and equipment, a common doctrinal base, and an acceptable level of tolerance to risk and casualties in protracted operations. It will be interesting though to observe over the next few years the significance of the newly developed doctrine for UN operations and its application by TCNs. If adhered to adequately, it will hopefully address some of the concerns uncovered by the Brahimi report and scholars like Ryan.

There are no accepted metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of a MNF, an issue that has been either avoided, or has not been considered a priority, as alluded to by Ryan. The author identified seven metrics which were used in the three case studies examined in chapter four. They consist of restraint in the use of force, perseverance, legitimacy,
credibility, unity of effort, interoperability, and the availability and the efficient use of
resources. In the three case studies, they demonstrated that a coalition of willing nations,
with NATO Allies at the core, seems to offer the most effective multinational force
structure in the COE. It offers high degrees of interoperability and credibility, a proven,
common doctrinal base, as well as a credible logistical support system.

Recommendations

The soundness of the metrics used in this study may be open for debate. Nonetheless, they adequately demonstrated the effectiveness of the three case studies to draw the right conclusions. These metrics may be further refined in order to become as relevant as possible to joint commanders and staff officers. This issue may require more extensive analysis, and is therefore a recommendation for further study.

The challenges of the COE are trigger for transformation of militaries and enhancement of capabilities. Militaries must focus on multinational integration. The immediate focus should be on fixing deficiencies in interoperability. Applying common doctrine and TTPs can solve interoperability challenges. As rightly pointed out by a few scholars, nations that expect to make contributions to multinational forces should design and equip their forces accordingly, produce commanders and staff officers with cross-cultural skills, and prepare and train their forces through combined training opportunities. Multinational training opportunities must be sought and created to reduce force integration challenges in theatre as you operate. Nations also ought to make a conscious effort to embrace existing and widely used doctrinal concepts.

Providing relevant military forces to multinational operations requires a clear ambition and a long-term perspective. Stabilizing and rebuilding failed states on the
cheap is not working and the task requires perseverance and robustness. Some called in a
forceful way for others to participate in a very difficult task in southern Afghanistan.
Such decisions are costly and demanding, yet nations must feel compelled to act against
global threats at home and abroad. There is evidence that there can be no exclusively soft
approach to instill peace and rebuild countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Armed with
robust tools and strong mandates, multinational forces need to demonstrate robustness,
perseverance and tolerance to risk. The decision for a nation to participate being a
political one, this is thus equally valid for domestic politics that ought to support their
troops once committed, and follow through on their national objective and pledge.

It is in the interest of the UN, NATO, and the US to encourage cooperative
agreements among group of countries, and conscious efforts should continue to support
regional arrangements in peace enforcement and peacekeeping efforts.

NATO, the premier multinational military organization, should seek partnership
with other countries and regional arrangements that will give the Alliance more strength.
It must consolidate its current endeavors, and adapt its political decision-making process
to new realities. Broadening membership under existing rules would equate to obtaining
more votes for unanimity, to risk overstretching, and perhaps to render the Alliance
irrelevant. There were other traumatic moments in the history of NATO before, and it is
now facing a decisive moment in Afghanistan. This discussion extends beyond the
purpose of this study, and may be the subject of further research.
GLOSSARY

Alliance. The result of formal agreements between two or more sovereign nations for broad, long-term objectives that further their common interests.

Coalition. An ad-hoc arrangement between two or more sovereign nations for common action.

Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). The overall operational setting that exists in the world today and for the foreseeable future, characterized by military operations conducted across the full spectrum of conflict.

Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.

Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

Measure of Performance (MOP). A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

Metrics. Measures used to indicate progress or achievement. They are specific indicators that are measured in order to assess an organization’s performance and its impact on the physical or social environment. They are usually specialized by the subject area, in which case they are valid only within certain domain and cannot be directly benchmarked or interpreted outside it.

Multinational Force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose.

National Caveats. Restrictions placed by the nation on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation.

Peace Enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement does not require the consent of all parties. Such operations maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL MICHEL DUHAMEL, CANADA

Colonel Michel Duhamel, Canadian Army, was Chief of Staff of MINUSTAH from July 2005 to July 2006.

Q1. The report *Keeping the Peace in Haiti?* published in 2005 by Harvard Law Students contends the following statement: “Even now, staffed in full, the peacekeeping force continues to interpret its mandate complacently and with narrowness unfit for the situation on the ground.” In the same report, the authors argue that the MINUSTAH mandate provided ample ground for a robust approach to security, disarmament and human rights. The authors seem to believe that the mandate was sufficient and that is rather MINUSTAH that “has failed to comply with either the letter or spirit of its mandate as prescribed by [UNSCR] 1542”.

Do you believe that UNSCR 1542, prescribing a Chapter VII mission, was robust enough to continue the work of the preceding force, FMIH?

R1. Even operations under Chapter VII have restrictions. Two major restrictions are:

1. **National Restrictions:** Troop contributing commanders (TCC) retain full command of their troops and often impose employment/deployment restrictions which prevent proper use of troops to deal with security situations on the ground.

2. **UN Mandate:** Most of the mandate in Haiti calls for the UN troops to “support or assist” the interim government and the Haitian National Police (HNP), defacto precluding unilateral actions without Haitian involvement. In other words, the UN was mandated to work with the HNP, but the HNP was not mandated to work with the UN. Since the mandate had no teeth nor did it include the task to clean-up the HNP, the military had to support a mostly corrupt police force. The reality is that the military did many unilateral operations because the HNP was corrupted or did not want to get involved in dangerous areas like Cite Soleil. Had the mandate been written differently, it could have clarified the expectations for TCCs with regards to force generation and reduced the number of excuses that some contingents used not to get involved in certain operations.

Q2. Armed with UNSCR 1542 (authorization of MINUSTAH) and four subsequent UNSCR (prior to UNSCR 1702 of 15 Aug 2006) concerning issues other than the mandate, did MINUSTAH have a mandate commensurate to the situation in Haiti?

R2. No. The mandate should not be to support corrupted political, government, police organizations, and individuals trusting that our presence will change their behaviour which led to the failures of past missions in the country. The mandate should be to
impose security, run the elections, train and establish a new bureaucracy, police, judicial, etcetera (with input from the elected body).

Q3. If you could compare FMIH and MINUSTAH, how would you characterize the effect of re-hatting of troops from FMIH (UN-mandated) to MINUSTAH (UN-led) on 1 June 2004 on operational effectiveness and troops performance?

R3. Not good. Some examples:

1. FMIH mandate was to impose security vice UN mandate to support Transitional Government.
2. UN restrictions: Helicopter support administrative vice operational.
3. Slow build up of troops. It took one year to reach troop level of the first mandate.
4. Professionalism of troops was not always suited to the task.

Q4. Armed with the mandates discussed above, how could MINUSTAH intervene decisively?

R4. With difficulty, using the best troops available, who were willing to do the job. Difficult to know until the first contingents arrive. For example, the Brazilian battalions (BRABAT) preparing to deploy in Haiti improved their training for Chapter VII operations as time went on, and were extremely competent. Due to their experience with counterinsurgency operations in their own country, Sri Lanka battalions (SriBAT) were professional and efficient from the first contingent, and were often asked to come in to Port-au-Prince to support during a crisis. Once deployed, it becomes difficult to change the deployment plan (UN costs and/or national restrictions).

Q5. Armed with the mandates discussed above, was MINUSTAH able to project forces throughout its AO? What were the restrictions? What about Cité-Soleil and Cap-Haitien?

R5. Yes. MINUSTAH was in most large population centres but ended up deploying into many more permanent sites due to the bad road conditions. The force occupied permanent buildings in Cite Soleil, and deployed a battalion in Cap Haitian.

Q6. Was MINUSTAH able to conduct day/night mounted and dismounted ops?

R6. Yes, but it was limited and it had to be planned a long time ahead depending on the troops willingness, ability and training.

Q7. Was MINUSTAH able to conduct full spectrum operations in Haiti?

R7. There was no opposing “Force” in Haiti, therefore dealing mostly with criminal activities and doing police type work.
Q8. The Haitian National Police (PNH) is arguably corrupted and lacks credibility. How has MINUSTAH attempted to rectify this situation?

R8. Convincing the Political elite to appoint a non-corrupt police Director General and commit to assist him in re-training and equipping his police force. Not easy since we could not impose change… only suggest.

Q9. Mandates in Sierra Leone and Liberia written in a similar language than UNSCR 1542 have given rise to successful DDR processes. What prevented the implementation of a successful DDR program in Haiti?

R9. There was no single opposing force to negotiate with--many gangs and criminals with a wide variety of interests. Therefore DDR program targeting “individuals” which many did not pose a threat or refused to disarm because the gangs / criminals were keeping their weapons.

Q10. What were the national caveats some troop contributing nations (TCN) put in place that affected the mission the most? (Unclassified data only)

R10. Helicopter support restricted to defensive ops, no firing from helicopter allowed except in self defence, limit on flight altitude. FC Reserve could not be deployed in Cite-Soleil.

Q11. Did any TCN apply political pressure preventing decisive interventions?

R11. Political pressure is not necessary, local commander simply refuses to obey orders.

Q12. Were there bureaucratic issues with UN-led forces that constrain military effectiveness?

R12. UN air support regulations focused on administrative support, not operational. The Chief Administration Officer (CAO) is the only one that can approve every flight. If the Force Commander (FC) authorizes a mission, the CAO still can cancel it if he believes that it is too risky for the helicopter or crew (recommendation from a civilian Chief Air Operations). Example: Deployment of troops on roof of a hotel was delayed three hours because Chief Air Operations needed to be “comfortable” with the mission (although a direct order had been given to the commanding officer of the helicopter squadron).

Q13. Were the troops sufficiently trained?

R13. Some yes, others were unable to fulfill their assign tasks.

Q14. Did enough troops have a common doctrinal base? What about at force HQ?

R14. No. It will always remain a challenge for the UN.
Q15. Were the troops adequately equipped?

R15. Not all. Many lacked night vision/fighting capability, some lacked mobility or poorly adapted vehicles for the terrain, and some lacked basic personal protection (body armour).

Q16. Was the multinational C2 structure workable? Were staff officers sufficiently trained? Were they sufficiently interoperable (culture, training, doctrinal concepts, etc.)?

R16. C2 was not ideal but workable (Comd, Dcomd, COS, G1, G2, G3, G4 staffs, etcetera, with many units in command--no sector command) but many staff officers were not trained adequately and a large number arrived in the mission without adequate English language skills to be effective. If they were willing to work hard, instead of returning them to their country, I set up a mandatory English class… but it made for difficult internal and external communications. English native speakers in key positions i.e. Canadians, US (totaling 7 out of 109) ended up doing a large part of translation/editing work.

Q17. Was it necessary for UNSCR 1702, signed 15 Aug 2006, to demand that the force “reorient its [DDR] efforts” in Haiti towards a violence-reduction program?

R17. In my opinion, yes. The DDR program had a lot of funding but it all had to be spent or tied to individual “weapons”. Violence reduction programs will most likely give the DDR program additional flexibility to use their money for any program that helps reduce violence ; read fight poverty like training, work creation, etcetera.
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