THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS: TRAINING FOR FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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The changing strategic environment has necessitated a shift in Army training from traditional maneuver warfare competence to full spectrum operations to better defeat irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. The problem is that full-spectrum operations replaced traditional warfare training at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rather than complimenting or augmenting it. Thus the central research question is: Do the training models at the JMRC and the NTC train maneuver units for certain portions of the full spectrum of military operations at the expense of other critical tasks? The study traced the source of training guidance from the National Security Strategy to the Quadrennial Defense Review Report to The Army Plan and eventually to Forces Command and United States Army Europe. It used two examples of unit rotations (one at NTC and historical data from JMRC) to serve as a source of comparison between strategic guidance, operational direction and tactical employment of full-spectrum training. Both examples demonstrate a focus towards training to defeat insurgenesc at the expense of traditional expertise.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
ABSTRACT

THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTER: TRAINING FOR FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS? by MAJ Oscar Diano, 60 pages.

The changing strategic environment has necessitated a shift in Army training from traditional maneuver warfare to full-spectrum operations to defeat irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges more effectively. The problem is that full-spectrum operations have apparently replaced traditional warfare training at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) instead of complementing or augmenting it. Thus the central research question is: Do the training models at the JMRC and NTC, train maneuver units for certain portions of the full spectrum of military operations at the expense of other critical tasks? The study traces the source of training guidance from The National Security Strategy to The Quadrennial Defense Review Report to The Army Plan and eventually to Forces Command and United States Army Europe. It uses two examples of unit rotations (one at NTC and historical data from JMRC) to serve as sources of comparison between strategic guidance, operational direction, and tactical employment of full spectrum training. Both examples reveal a focus upon training to defeat insurgencies at the expense of traditional expertise.
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Lastly, I would like to thank the soldiers I have worked with over the years for whom I wrote this paper. It is for them I hope to raise the issue of training the US Army to higher level in an effort to avoid learning the next war while the Army fights.
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<td>S3</td>
<td>Operations Officer for a unit</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>The Army Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>BCTP</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff School</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Full-spectrum Operations</td>
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<td>JRTC</td>
<td>The Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>MMAS</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operations Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operations Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review Report</td>
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<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward movement and integration</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>The Army Plan</td>
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<td>XO</td>
<td>Executive Officer for a unit</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, pundits have proclaimed the end of large armies clashing with great formations of armor and infantry. In fact, the predominance of literature addressing future conflicts predicts no hint of conventional battles until the rise of a competitor to the United States sometime in 2015 or later. Can this be true? Is the future of warfare predestined to resemble conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan? If the answer is yes, then what effect does it have on the ability of the Army to defeat current and future threats? Specifically, how does an Army prepare for future conflicts that most experts discount?

The Research Question

Do the training models at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and the National Training Center (NTC), at Fort Irwin, California, effectively train maneuver units for certain portions of the full spectrum of military operations at the expense of other critical tasks?

Subordinate Questions

1. What is full spectrum warfare training?
   a. What are the capabilities of a full spectrum trained unit?

2. How are current training models developed at the Combat Training Centers?
   b. What is the current training model employed at the combat training centers?

3. What does a typical training rotation at NTC or JMRC currently look like?
3. Are there gaps between actual training conducted and the full spectrum training principle?

4. How do the resulting competencies compare to the US Army’s pentathlete competencies as expressed in the emerging doctrine of FM 6-22?

Assumptions

Multiple assumptions were identified in the course of formulating the research question. The principal assumption is that, for the purposes of this thesis, future conflicts will probably include land forces comprised of mass formations of mechanized infantry and armor such as Operation Desert Storm. The second assumption is that the combat training centers are under significant pressure to prepare units for the contemporary operating environment (COE). It is also assumed that, for reasons of configuration and infrastructure, the NTC, and JMRC will remain maneuver training centers and the Joint Readiness Training Center will remain primarily a contingency training center with few or no training rotations involving maneuver forces above battalion size.

Definitions

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). BCTP supports realistic, stressful training and leader development for ARFOR/ASCC, corps, divisions, and brigade commanders and their staffs. It supports Army components participating in joint exercises to assist the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA) in fulfilling duty of providing trained and ready units to win decisively on the modern battlefield and to conduct contingency operations worldwide.
Combat Training Center (CTC). An Army training base that provides the land (maneuver space), airspace, and exercise control systems and personnel, and opposing force to train Army units for future combat operations.

Full-Spectrum Operations. The range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war. (FM 3-0) These operations range from major combat operations to stability and support operations and humanitarian relief operations.

Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). The maneuver training center located in Hohenfels, Germany. It is tasked with providing tough, realistic, and challenging joint and combined arms training. JMRC focuses training on improving readiness by developing soldiers, their leaders and units in support of the Global War on Terrorism and for success on current and future battlefields. It plans, coordinates, and executes Combat Training Center (CTC) and Exportable Training Capability (ETC) Rotations / Mission Rehearsal Exercises to prepare units for full-spectrum operations.¹

Lethal Operations. Those operations conducted using force and violence of action to achieve mission accomplishment (e.g., Movement to Contact, Cordon and Search).

Maneuver Warfare. A concept of warfare that advocates attempting to defeat an adversary by incapacitating his decision-making through shock and disruption.

The National Training Center (NTC). The maneuver training center located in Southern California’s Mojave Desert. The NTC’s mission is to provide tough, realistic joint and combined arms’ training that is focused at the battalion task force and brigade combat team levels and to assist commanders in developing trained, competent leaders and soldiers. Additionally, it identifies unit training deficiencies, provides feedback to improve the force and prepare for success on the future joint battlefield.²
Nonlethal Operations. Those operations whose primary method of employment does not involve the use of violence (e.g., Information Operations, Negotiations).

Traditional Warfare. Warfare between fielded armies comprising mass formations of soldiers campaigning against an enemies’ fielded Army.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC is the Army command responsible for training and education for the Army's Soldiers. It develops leaders; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards and builds the future Army.

Context of the Problem

Training the Army for Future Conflicts: Is Full Spectrum the Complete Answer?

The responsibilities of the military within the current National Security Strategy March 2004 (NSS) focus on defeating global terrorism. The NSS outlines the application of military power to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism; prevent attacks against America and our friends; defuse regional conflicts and prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation. To defeat global terrorism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has shifted the military’s capabilities portfolio from traditional challenges toward irregular and catastrophic challenges. While training units over a two-year period as an observer-controller at the JMRC, the author observed that this shift in force capabilities has consequently weakened the ability of the Army to defeat traditional force-on-force challenges.

As a result of the shift in strategic focus and in the Army’s capabilities portfolio, the Army focuses training emphasis away from traditional mechanized force-on-force
maneuver training towards more non-lethal and lesser lethal operations. Consequently, the company grade officers of today are not experienced in traditional (force-on-force) warfare. More disquieting is the lack of maneuver training combat arms officers receive in their formative years as platoon leaders. What does this shortfall mean for the future Army?

It appears that the Army is losing its ability to train decisive maneuver with mechanized forces. Traditional training no longer exists at the “Dirt” training centers. Gone is the seven day force on force rotation followed by seven day live fire exercise. At the National Training Center, the customers (i.e., battalion and brigade commanders) requested that training rotations focus on non-lethal training in areas such as negotiations and information operations. Lethal operations are often limited to raids and cordon and searches. A unit might conduct high intensity operations against the opposing force if requested, but a vast majority opts to focus on preparation for upcoming deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan. Across the ocean, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center has trained only two battalion sized maneuver forces on force rotations since October 2002. Since December 2003, force on force maneuver has been limited to platoon sized opposing force elements against armor battalions. The remainder of the training calendar is filled with mission rehearsal exercises for Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan (see appendix B)

The trickle-down effect of changing training at the combat training centers manifests itself in the absence of force on force experience in combat units. Company grade officers serving today have as little as three rotations at a training center and each rotation lasts no more than fourteen days. For example, a combat arms branched captain
with five years in the Army today entered active duty in the summer of 2001. After six months of training, he reported for duty in early 2002. From 2002 to 2005, he will have trained no more than twice at a maneuver training center and likely deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for one year. If lucky, he led a platoon during a rotation and remained a platoon leader for his combat tour. From 2005 to 2006, this captain attended the captain’s career course and will take command in 2007. He does this with no more than forty five days of maneuver training in the preceding six years. This typical captain will participate in a mission rehearsal exercise at a training center once prior to a yearlong Iraq or Afghanistan deployment. Look beyond the present, to his twelfth to fourteenth year of commissioned service (2013-2015) and this S3 or executive officer’s maneuver experience will be limited to three rotations at a training center (with diminished maneuver training exposure) and two yearlong deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan. The battalion leadership will have little or no maneuver experience with which to coach or mentor junior officers.

Answering the research question is vital to properly training the force. If current training does not adequately account for all areas of full spectrum warfare, the Army is in danger of losing its capability to defeat traditional challenges.

Limitations

Due to the subject matter, books are not generally available on the subject of the training model for the combat training centers. As a result, the majority of the research is dedicated to strategic policy, operational directives in the form of training requirements, scholarly articles, doctrinal publications, and training request letters to the National
Training Center and training rotation schedules for units rotating through The Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

**Delimitations**

The researcher imposed several constraints to properly focus the thesis. First, only two of the four combat training centers will be studied. JMRC and NTC will receive the main focus of the research as they are the two training centers that train mounted maneuver on a regular basis. The neglected combat training centers are JRTC and BCTP. JRTC is traditionally a ‘light forces’ contingency training center and will not receive attention. BCTP is mostly a simulations trainer for commanders and their staffs and will receive limited focus. Lastly, the researcher will only consider those units that rotate through the JMRC and NTC when compiling the training model recommendation.

**Significance of the Study**

Answering the research question correctly is essential to understanding and executing the development of the U.S. Army’s full-spectrum war-fighting capability. The outcome of this study will highlight the intrinsic weakness in the Army’s Combat Training Center methodology and recommend changes to alleviate that weakness in preparation for future conflicts.

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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Scholarly works on the subject of training development are not as prevalent as critiques of current training environments thus the currently available literature deals more with training guidance for current operations and less on how to implement that guidance. That being stated, the predominate literature available to support the research question was limited to current strategic guidance, its derived operational guidance and articles addressing training changes at the combat training centers. These three loosely defined areas are bolstered by current Army regulations, doctrine and a limited number of books relating to the Combat Training Centers.

The following research is organized so as to present the strategic guidance from *The National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Review Report* in the first block followed by the operational guidance in *The Army Plan (TAP)*, *The Army Campaign Plan (ACP)* and FORSCOM Change 8 Training guidance to follow-on units in support of OIF and OEF. The literature review next examines books and articles relating to the training center methodology which shed unique insights into how the training centers are approaching training and concludes with current examples of unit training schedules at NTC and JMRC. The literature review concludes with an assessment on recent actions in Lebanon in which the Israeli Defense Force, after fighting a low-intensity conflict for almost a decade, were forced to quickly adjust to mid-to-high intensity operations in response to the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and rocket attacks from Hezbollah safe zones within
Lebanon. This assessment was gleaned from careful examination of recent articles on the Internet, as well as inference gleaned from the same.

**Strategic Guidance**

*The National Security Strategy,* by President Bush, is the strategic vision for the nation’s approach to national security. Within it, President Bush reaffirms the nation’s commitment to the global war on terror, its policy to seek and support democratic movements, and the best way to provide enduring security for the american people.¹

Within the *NSS* are listed nine essential tasks which must be accomplished in order for the United States to be secure. Among these tasks are: Strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, working with others to defuse regional conflicts and transforming national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.² These highlighted tasks relate directly to the Armed Forces and are used as source documentation for the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, a Department of Defense document, the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*, a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff product, as well as the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, a product of the Department of Defense.

The most significant essential task for the Armed Forces is to meet the national security challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. In this task, President Bush recognizes that the national military capabilities of the US were designed to defeat a different threat than exists today and that the capabilities need to change to defeat the current threat. As a result, the Department of Defense is directed to “better balance its capabilities across four categories of challenges.”³ Those four categories are:
**Traditional Challenges** posed by states employing conventional armies, navies, and air forces in well established forms of military competition.

**Irregular Challenges** from state and non-state actors employing methods such as terrorism and insurgency to counter our traditional military advantages, or engaging in criminal activity such as piracy and drug trafficking that threaten regional security.

**Catastrophic challenges** involving the acquisition, possession and use of WMD by state and non-state actors; and deadly pandemics and other natural disasters that produce WMD effects.

**Disruptive challenges** from state and non-state actors who employ technologies and capabilities such as biotechnology, cyber and space operations, or directed-energy weapons in new ways to counter military advantages the United States currently enjoys.  

The *NSS* relates to the research question in that it directly tasks the armed forces to shift capabilities away from its current strength in defeating traditional challenges to address perceived shortcomings in defeating other challenges. It is significant because the *NSS* is the base strategic document the Armed Forces, and ultimately the Army, reference when formulating training strategy at the combat training centers.

The *National Defense Strategy (NDS)* further narrows the scope of the National Security Strategy to address the Department of Defense (DOD). The *NDS* visualizes, describes and directs the Department of Defense’s accomplishment of the tasks detailed in the *NSS* and serves as the, “link between military activities and those of other government agencies in pursuit of national goals.”  

Within this document, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) “outlines our approach to dealing with challenges we will likely confront, not just those we are currently prepared to meet.” As a part of this approach, the SECDEF outlines his vision of eight operational capabilities that, ‘provide transformation focus for the department.” The eight focus areas are strengthening intelligence; protecting critical bases of operations; operating from the commons: space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace; projecting and sustaining US forces in
distant anti-access environments; denving enemy sanctuary; conducting network-centric operations; improving proficiency for irregular warfare; and increasing capabilities of partners, both international and domestic. Each operational capability is, in turn, further defined in terms of his vision and goals.

To complement the operational capabilities, the SECDEF outlines two attributes, the shape and size of the military and the global defense posture. The shape and size of the military are configured to accomplish four tasks. First, they defend the US homeland, second, they operate from four forward regions, third they swiftly defeat adversaries and lastly, they conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies. In this document the term, “swiftly defeat adversaries” is first used and defined in a strategic context. It is significant in that “swiftly defeating adversaries” is defined as, “a range of military activities--from stability operations to major combat that will vary in size and duration.” This attribute contributes to the research question by introducing the concept of full-spectrum operations in terms of stability on one end and major combat operations on the other. Both of which are listed as desirable attributes of the military in terms of its size and shape.

The NDS relates to the research question further by clearly outlining those challenges the Armed Forces will focus on in the coming years. It specifically states that, “The U.S. military predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare.” “Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United States through traditional military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods.” In effect, the DOD is stating that the Armed Forces are so good that no one will seek to challenge the US military directly and will adopt other methods to defeat it. To address this potential shift,
the DOD has directed an increase in the ability to defeat irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges through training and equipping the force. In light of this shift in training, the NDS seems to contradict itself only a few paragraphs later when it states, “As formidable as U.S. capabilities are against traditional opponents, we can not ignore the challenges that such adversaries might present.” It is entirely possible that this quotation represents a hesitation of the DOD to equally balance the ability to defeat each challenge. This hesitation may further explain the concept of full-spectrum operations and the mantra that has ensued regarding training full-spectrum operations.

Next in succession of strategic guidance, the NMS, provides the link between strategic and operational guidance and is to the military what the NSS is to the United States. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (March 2004) is the document produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “supports the aims of the NSS and implements the NDS.” “It describes the Armed Forces Plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.” The role of the NMS is to “define a set of interrelated military objectives from which the Service chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk.” The stated goal of the chairman’s vision is full spectrum dominance. This is defined as the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the full range of military operations.” It is the first time the term “full spectrum” is used in the strategic guidance and is directly linked to the desired attribute of swiftly defeating adversaries as stated by the SECDEF in the NDS.
The NMS establishes four strategic directives: secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and maintain global freedom of action; establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order and strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges.\textsuperscript{14} “It further defines the objectives in terms of Joint Operational Concepts (JOCs), which support each objective and link specific tasks to programmatic actions as well as guide the development of plans and the execution of operations. . . . The JOCs are: Homeland Security, Stability Operations, Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations.”\textsuperscript{15} These NMS further define the JOCs as how “the Joint Force conducts key missions and are supported by functional concepts of force application, protection, focused logistics, battle space awareness and command and control. The JOCs serve[s] to guide the continuous transformation of the Armed Forces and provide a key linkage to the Armed Forces’ vision for future joint war-fighting. This vision establishes the ultimate goal of the transformed force--the ability to achieve full spectrum dominance across the range of military operations.”\textsuperscript{16}

The NMS relates to the research question and previous strategic documents in that it further refines the shifting capabilities portfolio by assigning joint operational concepts to strategic thinking and represents the first “green suit” guidance relating to them. It is unique in that it does not prescribe a shift in capabilities to defeat the different challenges facing the military, instead choosing to articulate its guidance in terms of full spectrum dominance and joint operational concepts, a possible reflection of the military’s shift to joint doctrine.

The NMS further relates to the research question in that it is describes the security environment as having numerous dangerous and pervasive threats which necessitate an
ability to anticipate emerging threats, quickly change operations and defeat the threat. This sentence belies a shallow understanding of both training and the ability to transition from one type of full spectrum to another. A lesson the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) learned the hard way during the Israeli-Hezbollah war in late summer 2006.

The last in the list of strategic guidance documents, *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, produced by the Office of the SECDEF, “reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense.” It further defines the NDS and portrays the DOD’s shift away from traditional (i.e. force-on-force maneuver warfare) challenges toward more catastrophic challenges such as weapons of mass destruction attacks. The QDR covers topics from fighting the Long War to reconfiguring the total force; however, the research focused on those topics which directly addressed the research question.

Compared to other strategic documents, this report provides additional strategic direction for the military and is the steering mechanism for training at the Combat Training Centers. The QDR relates to the research question in that is drives home the points made in the NSS, the NDS, and the NMS about shifting the military capabilities away from traditional challenges. It graphically depicts the challenges faced by the military and how the QDR envisions the shift from current to future capabilities (see figure 1).
Figure 1. The Spectrum of Challenges

Operational Derivatives

Field Manual No. 1 (FM 1) is one of two capstone Army manuals, the other being FM 3-0, Operations. As the capstone manual, FM 1 represents the guidance of the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Army in all manners of employment, training and doctrine. It states the Army’s mission, vision, statutory obligations, and future operating environment challenges. It establishes the fundamental principles for employing land power.
FM 1 relates to the research question in the area of training guidance dictated on page 1-20. The training philosophy depicted below directly addresses the research question and highlights an area of concern for General Schoomaker.

But gone are the days when the Army could focus training only on major combat operations. Today the Army must train soldiers and units to fight insurgents and other irregular threats while executing multiple operations worldwide. The complexities of the strategic environment demand a balanced training focus. Both leaders and organizations must be able to accomplish missions throughout the range of military operations and at locations distributed throughout the operational area. Focusing training in capabilities at one end of the range of military operations and neglecting those on the opposite end is unacceptable. It would create an asymmetry for adversaries to exploit.18

The last sentence is almost prophetic in its prose. General Schoomaker warns against focusing training at one part of the spectrum of warfare as it produces a weakness in other areas of full-spectrum capabilities and possibly creates a weakness that an enemy could exploit. This warning is made even more poignant after reading FORSCOM Change 8 to OIF guidance which outlines training which is almost exclusively in the stability operations part of the spectrum of operations and little or no training in traditional offensive or defensive operations. The Army is, in effect, creating a weakness by focusing on stability operations at the combat training centers without providing for equal training of traditional maneuver warfare.

The Army Plan (TAP) is produced by the Chief of Staff of the Army in cooperation with the Secretary of the Army. It provides guidance to the Army on the balance of operational needs while modernizing and is broken into four sections which provide an overarching operational guidance to the Army. Section I of TAP is the Army’s strategic planning guidance and identifies strategic vision and intent. Section II provides Army planning priorities guidance and translates the vision in section I into prioritized
capabilities. Section III of TAP is the Army programming guidance memorandum which details resourcing tasks to complete the linkage between the strategic vision, capabilities and resources. Section IV is the Army Campaign Plan which provides the synchronized road map to achieve the Army’s objectives. The review of this literature will focus on section IV, the *Army Campaign Plan (ACP)*. It is this section that delineates United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) as the lead agency in training at NTC and in the ARFORGEN cycle.

*The Army Plan* relates to the research question in that it identifies FORSCOM as the lead proponent for units training at the NTC and subsequently represents the Army’s plan from 2006 to 2023. *The Army Plan* increases in importance when one realizes that every CONUS-based unit is under forces command’s purview and follows the guidance it issues. Since FORSCOM dictates the training requirements for units deploying to both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operations Enduring Freedom, FORSCOM, in effects determines the training focus of the Army. Contained within this campaign plan is the training guidance for units to focus their training on their assigned mission, be it regional or specific. It directs units to train to either mission focused METL or the own units core METL tasks prior to assuming either a Ready Expeditionary Force (REF) mission or a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) mission.

As the lead for unit training resourcing and guidance in the Army, FORSCOM has the unenviable responsibility of identifying those tasks which are required to be trained prior to deployment into theater. FORSCOM Change 8 to OIF training guidance for follow on forces deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom is the FORSCOM message that details all tasks, individual and collective that must be accomplished prior to
deployment to Iraq. It is also the reference document all units rotating to NTC use to focus their training strategy and their training rotation at the National Training Center.

FORSCOM, change 8, is important in answering the research question in that it identifies which tasks must be trained prior to deployment to the national training center. An analysis of these tasks reveals that units rotating to OIF are only required to complete table twelve qualifications prior to deploying to NTC. Table twelve which equates to platoon live fire and no higher. This document effectively narrows the capabilities of units rotating to OIF and OEF to stability operations and totally omits defensive tasks to be accomplished that are not related to base defense. FORSCOM change 8 also contains so many tasks that must be completed that it fills a units training schedule with little room for negotiation.

Books

*The Origins and Development of the National Training Center: 1976-1984* and *The National Training Center Matures: 1985-1993* by Anne Chapman are the sole books on the combat training centers. As such, these references provide an invaluable glimpse into the thought processes required to build a training center. The books relate to the research question by providing background information on why the training center was built and the original purpose behind its inception. Note here that the development of NTC was initiated to fill a perceived gap in unit training capabilities in fighting traditional force-on-force warfare. Ironic considering the situation the Army faces now and in the immediate future.
Papers, Articles, and Monographs

“Transforming the Combat Training Centers,” by Major Joseph S. McLamb, is a monograph written in 2002 by a School of Advanced Military Studies student and former observer-controller which addressed changing training at the combat training centers to accommodate the objective force. While a little outdated in terminology, this monograph demonstrates the ever-changing nature of training at the combat training centers in an effort to meet changing strategic, operational, and tactical unit requirements. This monograph reveals the ongoing debate on what should be trained at the combat training centers.

In addressing change at the combat training centers, Major McLamb examined four potential courses of action which incorporated expanding the training center’s mission capability to include training stability operations, executing platoon and company lane training, making the combat training centers more joint focused and lastly, modifying the training centers to focus on expeditionary operations. The monograph relates to the research question in that it examines and compares two of the major changes already incorporated into training at NTC and JMRC namely training stability operations and the incorporation of lane training for companies and platoons. Interestingly, in comparing stability operations training at the Combat Training Centers, Major McLamb gave it high marks for being beneficial to the objective force, but did not recommend it for inclusion into training citing only modest improvements over current practice.

“The Changing National Training Center,” by BG Robert W. Cone, commander of the National Training Center, provides a glimpse of the NTC’s support of training for
full-spectrum operations. In the article, BG Cone articulates how NTC has adapted to better replicate the capabilities of potential enemies by incorporating many changes. The changes touched upon include additional towns and villages which enable the human dimension of warfare by adding complex role playing programs and role players as well as a Joint Coordination Center that replicates joint and multinational efforts of higher level staff operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The article supports the research question by describing a typical rotation at NTC and how the focus has shifted in recent rotations to include more nonlethal operations which are focused on training the human dimension of combat in stability operations. Of significance is the fourteen day training rotation which has not changed for at least 10 years although the training requirements have grown. Ten years ago, the Army was training to defeat a traditional threat and its rotations were fourteen days long. Ten years later the Army must defeat a traditional threat while simultaneously conducting stability operations and the number of training days has not changed. This begs a question. If the Army needed fourteen days to train traditional warfare capabilities, would it not require more training days during a rotation to defeat that same adversary across the full-spectrum of operations?

“Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to meet the needs of the Army,” by General William S. Wallace, commander of TRADOC, speaks of how the Army is changing its training to meet the needs of a transforming Army. He provides valuable insight into the thought process for directing training straight from the TRADOC commander. It relates to the research question by presenting BG Cone’s bosses view of
the changing training environment and how Training and Doctrine Command is changing at all levels to address the ideas presented in the NSS and NDS.

“The Future of the Combat Training Centers To Meet The National Military Strategy,” by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Bertha, is a research project completed while he was a student at the Army War College. His paper argues that the, “various revolutionary changes suggested by critics [of the CTCs] are contrary to the basic purpose and fundamentals of the CTCs [and] detrimental to the readiness of the U.S. Army.”

Within paper, LTC Bertha addresses, among other topics, the feasibility of conducting [stability operations] at the combat training centers. His argument is that even minor stability exercises cause units to “lose training proficiency for conventional operations.” He also argues that, “Training for or executing [stability operations] simply does not exercise the same skills as those required for war. As a result, war-fighting skills do deteriorate while a unit is involved in [stability operations].”

His paper relates to the research question in that it provides additional insight into an earlier examination of how the training centers were meeting the national military strategy and as such proved valuable in evaluating the current manner in which the CTCs meet the National Military Strategy. His paper also lends credence to the authors own observations while an O-C at JMRC.

An article written by two experts on the Middle East, one a distinguished scholar and the other a retired intelligence officer is next in the review. This article is included in an effort to relate the Army capabilities trained at the combat training centers to the current operating environment. In their article titled, “Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hezbollah War,” Mr. David Markovsky and Jeffrey White relate the myriad of
lessons the Israeli Defense Force learned from their war with Hezbollah. The article is divided into two parts.

Part one, written by Mr. Markovsky, focuses on the Israeli policy and political lessons from the war and outlines the road to the war, decision making during the war concluding with an assessment of both. One lesson in particular relates to the research question, albeit obliquely. The emergence of a militia (Hezbollah) operating like an army but not bound by traditional rules of warfare is of note to the research question and speaks to emerging threat capabilities. Hezbollah was able to turn civilian centers into the new battlefronts which could indicate an emerging tactic. Part one further relates to the research question in that it describes a loss of deterrence credibility with respect to Israel’s actions against Hezbollah. In an effort to restore that credibility, Israel must, according to the article, institute major reforms in military training in conjunction with other political and budgetary changes. Part one concludes with an assessment in terms of a balancing sheet of actions and reactions.

Bolstering part one, part two, written by Mr. White, examines the tactical military implications of the war. His portion begins with an examination of the operational and tactical environment, discusses the dynamics of the war as well as the performance of the combatants. Part two concludes with a debate over the next round in the war and its possible conclusions. Mr. White’s contributions to answering the research question are significant and center on training for full-spectrum operations. The first answer speaks directly to the research question in that Mr. White argues, “Israel went to war with an army that had spent the last few years dealing with the threat from the Palestinians and investing in concepts and high technology capabilities to deal with looming threats from
beyond the horizon.” In particular, “Readiness problems were imposed by Israel’s ongoing war against the Palestinians. Specifically, training was focused on preparing units for counterterrorist and small unit war, not for conventional operations by large ground formations.” Mr. White’s argument is that Israel went into the conflict without the capabilities to defeat a traditional threat because it was more proficient in dealing with the Palestinian problem, a stability operation, than a traditional army, which Hezbollah represented. His article raises the possibility that training exclusively for one part of the spectrum of operations at the expense of others can be costly in terms of men, material and prestige. This example could also be used in the context of the Army’s lessons learned from the 1973 Israeli Arab war, the Air-Land battle doctrine birthplace.

**Governing Army Regulations**

Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, is the Army’s regulation that consolidates policy and guidance for Army training and leader development and supports a full spectrum, force projection, expeditionary Army. It relates to the research question in that it dictates training to be conducted across the Army and the frequency it is to be accomplished. Within AR 350-1 the proponent for the combat training centers is identified.

FORSCOM Regulation 350-1 is Forces Command’s refined guidance of AR 350-1 and represents the regulation that all CONUS based forces reference in their training guidance and plans. FORSCOM Regulation 350-1 relates to the research question in that it further refines AR 350-1 as well as depicting those requirements unique to FORSCOM assigned units. It is supplemented by FORSCOM guidance to units deploying in support of OIF and OEF change 8.
Army Regulation 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*. This regulation establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for Army-wide management of the Combat Training Center Program. AR 350-50 relates to the research question in that it is the CTC governing regulation in terms of capabilities and requirements for training.

The literature review comprises the breadth of material available regarding strategic guidance used by the combat training centers to formulate the training methodology. The review also takes into account the majority of operational guidance directed from the Army level and leverages it with applicable Army Regulations. The combined strategic and operational guidance drives the combat training centers to accommodate full-spectrum training in order to enable Army units to defeat traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive threats. Related opinion articles and MMAS thesis present the NTC and TRADOC view of the changing training environment and how it relates to the contemporary operating environment. The articles also present differing opinions on the capability of JMRC and NTC to adequately train full-spectrum operations.

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2 Ibid., 1.

3 Ibid., 43.

4 Ibid., 44.


7 Ibid., 12.
8 Ibid., 16.
9 Ibid., 2.
10 Ibid., 3.
12 Ibid., viii.
13 Ibid., viii.
14 Ibid., 9.
15 Ibid., 9.
16 Ibid., 3.
19 Joseph McLamb, “Transforming the Combat Training Centers” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: May 2003), iii.
20 Ibid., 42.
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 35.
25 Ibid., 42.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The question this thesis seeks to answer is does current training methodology at the combat training centers focus on one part of full-spectrum operations to the detriment of others. In order to answer this question, my research is focused on establishing what strategic documents, field manuals, Army regulations and policies influence training methodology at various levels within the Army.

Research Methodology

Research for this thesis relied upon three types of source information. These source types were current published strategic documents which outline strategy; operational guidance in the form of directives from FORSCOM and the unit training schedules at NTC and JMRC. Through research of the various documents, the author expected to establish a broad base of information upon which to ground the analysis. Once established, the research would shift to the training rotation schedule at the CTCs in question. The source documents for this would be the actual training rotation training schedules and training requests which identifies tasks to be trained and the manner in which it would be conducted.

The first research sources used were strategic documents from government agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and the White House. These sources were located using both government sponsored and civilian database engines or search engines. In addition, several of the readings assigned to CGSC students during the strategic block of instruction where utilized. All such sources used were publicly
available and have no distribution restrictions. This limitation was used in order to maintain a security classification of unclassified for the overall thesis.

The objective of this line of research is to provide background on current strategic influences to the training methodology. It also serves to answer, in part, the secondary question of how current training models are developed at the Combat Training Centers. The contribution to answering this question provided by the strategic document research is crucial in displaying how strategic policy documents influence both training methodology and training policies.

The second category of source information used in this thesis is the operational guidance put forth in FORSCOM training guidance change 8 to Operation Iraqi Freedom. These sources were also searched for and located with the same governmental and non-governmental databases as the strategic sources, with the same objective of maintaining an overall security classification of unclassified. This operational document dictated Army training for all units deploying to Iraq. Since every unit rotating to NTC and JMRC was in route to Iraq, it applies to the whole Armory.

This second group of research sources is used to answer the secondary research question of how current training models are developed at the Combat Training Centers. The thesis will use this directive as additional background information on the inputs into the training methodology. Understanding this directive facilitates full understanding of the process through which the training methodology is developed and links strategic material to operational inputs at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The final source category of research is unit training schedule and training request. The purpose of this category of research is to provide the specific information
necessary to evaluate how successfully current doctrine was applied during actual combat training center rotations. To do so required research into what an actual rotation at both combat training centers looked like and what tasks were trained during the rotation. These sources were provided by 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and JMRC. The information from JMRC depicted a typical unit rotation for a training unit rotating through JMRC before deployment to Iraq. The information from 3ACR depicted the typical training request of a brigade sized unit rotating to the NTC prior to deploying to Iraq.

**Analysis Methodology**

The primary means of analysis used in the development of this thesis consists of comparison between the resulting competences alluded to and addressed in strategic plans, Army regulations and Army field manuals against the competencies to be expected at the end of a training rotation at NTC or JMRC. In essence, the tasks actually trained at the CTCs were compared to the tasks outlined by strategic policy, Army regulations, and field manuals. Those tasks are further analyzed to generate competencies expected of a successfully executed training task and those competencies are then compared to the competencies detailed in Army field manuals, Army regulations, and strategic vision.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The question this thesis seeks to answer is: Do the training models at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) and the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, train maneuver units for certain portions of the full spectrum of military operations at the expense of other critical tasks?

To answer this question the evidence gathered centered on the training conducted at the NTC and the JMRC. The empirical data collected dealt with those tasks trained during rotations conducted at the identified CTCs. An analysis of this data is detailed further in the chapter and provided in appendices A and B. In analyzing the NTC, this study examined a unit’s annual training guidance and 180-day request for training and compares this training to the applicable strategic and operational guidance. While limited in scope, it is a logical assumption that the brigade analyzed is generally representative of other brigades preparing for deployment to Iraq and thus reasonably approximates that of a majority of brigade-sized rotations at NTC since the fall of 2003. Across the Atlantic, JMRC’s rotations are examined as a whole beginning with the last pure high-intensity rotation in August of 2003 to the current rotational construct. These rotations are also examined against the same strategic and operational guidance documents as NTC. The author acknowledges that a unit training for actual combat operations will narrow its training focus to those tasks it knows it will perform in combat; however, it is the opinion of the author that such a narrow focus over time eventually narrows the competency of any unit and herein the crux of the research is revealed. If the Army is preparing for the current fight, who is preparing for the next conflict?
The Comparison Standard

The comparison standard is the strategic and operational guidance applicable to training to across the full-spectrum of operations at the brigade level (Figure 2). In the words of the former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, “The goal is full-spectrum dominance--the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”¹ The range of military operations is defined as defensive, offensive and stability operations. Thus, the ability of a brigade to successfully defend and conduct offensive and stability operations is the criteria for determining it is capable of full-spectrum operations. Each type of operation is defined on the next page.

**Offensive operations** carry the fight to the enemy by closing with, and destroying, enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander’s will on the enemy. They focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.

**Defensive operations** counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks and destroy as many attackers as necessary. Defensive operations preserve control over land, resources, and populations. They retain terrain, guard populations, and protect key resources.

**Stability operations** sustain and/or establish civil security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or restore essential services and governments, and provide support to civilian agencies. Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations. However, they also occur separately, usually at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Stability operations lead to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate.

**Civil support operations** address the consequences of manmade or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities within the United States and its territories. Army forces conduct civil support operations to support homeland security.²
The defined full-spectrum operations\(^3\) each have associated mission types and subtasks to accomplish in order to achieve proficiency. It is the ability to accomplish each of these tasks and subtasks that marks a brigade as proficient in full-spectrum operations. For the purpose of analysis, a brigade-sized unit must be proficient in those tasks articulated in the applicable doctrinal manuals for the brigade type, that is, a BCT, would follow FM 3-90.6 and an ACR would follow FM 17-95. For the purposes of comparison, the standard of proficiency is training conducted either at home or during a CTC rotation, and the comparison chart is table 1.

Figure 2. Full-Spectrum Operations

In addition to the baseline full-spectrum operations, FM 3-90.6 describes reconnaissance and security operations. Both types of operations are considered to be inherent in every offensive and defensive operation and as such are not separate aspects of full-spectrum operations. For the purpose of clarity however, the tasks are broken down when comparing training conducted to full-spectrum operations competency. A “yes” annotation in the training conducted connotes the unit has trained at that task. The “yes” remark will be followed by the location the training was conducted. A “no” annotation simply states that task was not trained. A predominance of yes or no in a gray shaded field determines if that operation is trained.
The National Training Center

Prior to deploying to the NTC, a unit must submit a document entitled the 180 Day Training Letter (Appendix A). The purpose of this letter is to advise the NTC of proposed mission, training objectives, desired mission profile, proposed rotation schedule, resource requests and concerns for the training rotation. For the purposes of comparison, a brigade sized unit’s 180 day letter was examined to ascertain its resulting competencies assuming the mission profile requested remained a close approximation to the actual training event.

The mission request for the training at NTC asked for a Mission Readiness Exercise to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations in preparation for deployment to Iraq. The following is a brigade-sized unit’s list of tasks accomplished during home station training: Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance; Conduct Security Operations; Conduct a Movement to Contact; Conduct Combat Operations and Provide Direct Support to ISF; and Conduct Civil-Military Operations and Engagement. Incidentally, home station training focused on stability and counter-insurgency operations. This focus is significant to the research in that it delineates a train of thought contrary to guidance to dominate the full-spectrum of operations. Arguably, a unit training to deploy to OIF will focus on its combat mission; in fact, the Army campaign plan dictates mission and theater specific training prior to deployment. This focus does raise the question, once again: Who is actually trained in the full-spectrum of operations?

Based on a detailed analysis of both home station training guidance and the CTC request for training, table 2 is a summary of executed tasks, and reflects the basic competency of units deploying to NTC in preparation for combat operations in Iraq.
Table 2. The National Training Center Comparison

The chart represents a unit proficient in the offensive and stability operations of the full spectrum, but not the defensive operations portion of the full spectrum. It is thus not proficient in full-spectrum operations. As stated previously, the unit portrayed is preparing for OIF. However, strategic and operational guidance clearly states that units will be capable of defeating any adversary across the full spectrum of operations and makes no allowance for less capability in one area in favor of more capability in another. Of significance is the absence of training focused on defensive operations, a key activity in full-spectrum operations. Some will say the Army is already offensively minded. However, the ability to conduct defensive operations is vital to defeat an attack and/or prepare for offensive operations. Second, training for defensive operations is resource
intensive and difficult to train to standard at any place other than a CTC. As a whole, the unit depicted focused on stability operations which are not defensive in the traditional sense, and thus neglected.

An additional shortcoming is the absence of traditional maneuver training. Although the offensive operations were rated a “yes,” the training was geared towards counter-insurgency operations and did not involve units above company level. This is important because to become trained and proficient at executing maneuver warfare a soldier and his unit must practice it over several iterations at a CTC. In essence, the proficiency at offensive operations is strictly along stability operations lines and not across all levels of warfare.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the unit analyzed is not proficient in every element of full-spectrum operations. The focus on stability and counterinsurgency notwithstanding, training conducted will not produced a unit prepared for full-spectrum operations. While prudently prepared for combat operations, the unit is not prepared for dominance across the full-spectrum of operations.

The Joint Multinational Readiness Center

The JMRC is the Army’s center of excellence for coalition training and as such trains a variety of missions for Germany and Italy based US military forces as well as units from Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Units rotating to Kosovo in support of the UN KFOR mission as well as Bosnia conduct their mission readiness exercise prior to leaving for the Balkans and the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) conducts its own Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) at JMRC prior to assuming missions in Afghanistan. In addition to the Balkan and Afghanistan MREs, 1st Armored Division and
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) conduct Mission Readiness Exercises at JMRC in preparation for operations in Iraq. This analysis focused on the 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division’s rotational schedules, the tasks trained during their rotations and the resulting competencies because these two divisions provided the only brigade-sized mechanized forces to rotate through JMRC.

For the past three and one-half years, brigade-sized units rotating through JMRC have conducted MREs in preparation for operations in either Iraq or Afghanistan. As a part of the MREs, each brigade and battalion was validated against a set task list designed to produce units proficient in the specific theater of operations. The validation tasks are listed below.

**Brigade Validation Tasks:**

- **Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations**
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct HUMINT Operations
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Precision Targeting Process
- **Conduct Stability and Support Operations**
  - Key Enabling Task: Plan, Execute and Assess Information Operations
  - Key Enabling Task: Support Iraqi Reconstruction and Governance Initiatives
- **Command and Control the Brigade Combat Team**
  - Key Enabling Task: C2 Out-of-Sector Operations
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Detainee Operations
- **Attack**
  - Key Enabling Task: Execute Critical Time-Sensitive Targeting
- **Protect the Force**
  - Key Enabling Task: Defend Forward Operating Bases
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations
- **Sustain the Force**
  - Key Enabling Task: Secure Lines of Communication
- **Provide Operational Framework for Integration of Iraqi Security Forces**
  - Key Enabling Task: Evaluate ISF with Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA)
  - Key Enabling Task: Support ISF operating in the Area of Responsibility

**Battalion Validation Tasks**

- **Conduct Intelligence Operations**
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Passive HUMINT Operations
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Pattern Analysis and Targeting
- **Conduct Stability and Support Operations**
- Key Enabling Task: Plan, Execute and Assess Information Operations
- Key Enabling Task: Support Iraqi Reconstruction and Governance Initiatives
- Key Enabling Tasks: Perform Negotiations

- **Command And Control The Battalion/Task Force**
  - Key Enabling Task: Plan, Execute and C2 Out-of-Sector Operations
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Forward Collection Point Operations
  - Key Enabling Tasks: Conduct QRF Operations
  - Key Enabling Tasks: Execute Air/Ground Integration

- **Attack**
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct a Raid
  - Key Enabling Tasks: Conduct Cordon & Search Operations
  - Key Enabling Tasks: Conduct Cordon & Attack

- **Protect the Force**
  - Key Enabling Task: Defend Forward Operating Bases
  - Key Enabling Task: Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations

- **Sustain The Force**
  - Key Enabling Task: Execute Supply Point & Unit Distribution

- **Provide Operational Framework for Integration of Iraqi Security Forces**
  - Key Enabling Task: Support ISF operating in the Area of Responsibility

An analysis of these validation tasks reveals glaring gaps with respect to full-spectrum capabilities. First, units training at the NTC do not train defensive tasks and they are not a part of the validation. Second, as at NTC, the offensive tasks trained are focused on counterinsurgency-related operations and do not address traditional force-on-force challenges. In addition, the validation tasks only address certain portions of stability operations and neglect foreign internal defense; security assistance and show of force.

Table 3 combines the validation tasks analysis to identify another brigade that is incapable of full spectrum dominance. That is not to say the brigade is not capable of defeating the enemy. On the contrary, the brigade is most capable of defeating an insurgent threat. However, the focus on counterinsurgency combined with the lack of traditional warfare training has produced a unit proficient at defeating the irregular warfare challenge, but lacking in the ability to defeat traditional challenges.
Table 3. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM 3-90.6 Doctrine</th>
<th>TRAINING CONDUCTED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cover</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reconnaissance Operations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Route Recon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area Recon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zone Recon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recon in Force</td>
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<td><strong>Defensive Operations</strong></td>
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<td>Area Defense</td>
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<td>Mobile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recon in Force</td>
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<td><strong>Offensive Operations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Movement to Contact</td>
<td>YES-CTC (COIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Attack</td>
<td>YES-CTC (COIN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hasty Attack</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberate Attack</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exploitation and Pursuits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raid</td>
<td>YES-CTC (COIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
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<td>Counterattack</td>
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<td>Spoiling attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cordon and Search</td>
<td>YES-CTC (COIN)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM 3-90.6 Doctrine</th>
<th>TRAINING CONDUCTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stability Operations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations in support of diplomatic efforts</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Assistance</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to insurgencies</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Warfare</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Combatant Evacuation</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Show of Force</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercises and Demonstrations</td>
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</table>

Impact of Research

The research was conducted, in part, to address a perceived gap in capabilities the author observed while assigned as an observer-controller at JMRC. What began as frustration while watching a tank company administratively march down a road during a movement to contact has become an attempt to expose a potential vulnerability in Army capabilities. It is the author’s hope that this study will stimulate serious examination of the training strategy at JMRC and NTC to enable genuine full spectrum dominance as directed in strategic guidance given forth in the NSS, NDS, NMS and QDR.
During the course of research, the author unexpectedly discovered gaps in full-spectrum capabilities particularly regarding defensive operations. This discovery was unexpected because an offensively-minded Army begins with the capability to conduct successful defensive operations. Additionally, training a unit on how to defend requires more resources and effort than offensive operations. The author was also surprised at the level to which the reality of training was disconnected from the strategic vision. The full spectrum concept is contained in guidance from the NSS all the way to the Army Campaign Plan, but that the demands of the current operational environment negate the concept in practice. Units preparing for combat operations in a COIN environment do not conduct brigade-size movements to contact across the central corridor of NTC, nor do they prepare for a defense in sector along the Hohenburg Road at Hohenfels. Training units will naturally gravitate toward those tasks soon to be executed under fire. This is understandable, but not justifiable in the long term interest of full spectrum readiness.


3Ibid., 1-7.


5Ibid., 2.


7 Ibid., 2.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While investigating the research question, the author attempted to determine the training model at NTC and JMRC. Through this analysis the author determined that training rotations are influenced by multiple parties including strategic guidance in *The National Security Strategy*, *The National Security Strategy* and *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report* as well as operational guidance in *The Army Campaign Plan* and various doctrinal manuals and regulations. The comparison of strategic guidance to tactical employment exposed two overarching gaps that have national security implications.

First, the Army is not training full-spectrum operations as directed in the NSS, *NDS, QDR*, the Army Campaign Plan and ARFORGEN. Regardless of the clear mandate from these documents the Army is focused on training for stability operations and is losing expertise in traditional offensive and defensive operations which maintain the ability to defeat traditional maneuver battle threats. These perishable skills are what had been trained at the CTCs prior to 2003, such as battalion on battalion force-on-force missions at NTC and JMRC. Historically, the Army has a tendency to improve its capabilities in the current war which, after the conflict is resolved, results in an Army whose capabilities match better against past adversaries than future ones. In a sense the ARFORGEN Army was an attempt to correct that tendency and inculcate baseline competencies for the Army, such as proficiency at offensive, defensive, and stability operations METL. However, OEF and OIF clearly interrupted that attempt. Once again the Army is heavily committed to and perhaps overcommitted to the current fight. Is the Army doomed to repeating the error of training for the last war?
Second, the Army is focused on the tactical fight and not looking at its capabilities as a whole. Although strategic guidance allows the latitude to focus training across the spectrum of operations, the Army training emphasis at the operational level reveals a focus on the tactical fight, specifically the counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. The trends for the past two rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom have been a twelve to fifteen month alert, train and deploy cycle. Within that window deploying units are directed to focus on theater and mission specific METL as directed by FORSCOM Change 8 to OIF guidance to follow on deploying units. The FORSCOM training guidance directs a unit to be proficient in its core METL tasks. However, the simple reality is that there are too many tasks to train before deployment to include core METL tasks. Thus, unit commanders prepare their units to conduct combat operations in Iraq. The resulting competency is a unit skilled at urban operations and counter-insurgency fighting. Apply that standard to each unit rotating through NTC or JMRC and the entire Army is skilled at urban operations and counterinsurgency fighting, but not so skilled at traditional warfare.

**The Hidden Cost**

The focus on the tactical fight has implications beyond the loss of expertise in traditional warfare skills. These losses manifest themselves in the junior officers and non-commissioned officers of today’s Army. Their focus on combat in urban environments and counter-insurgency warfare results in a double loss of maneuver expertise and, eventually, maneuver training expertise. Multiplying the loss is the junior leader’s lack of experience in their basic branch skill sets.
For example, junior company grade armor and field artillery officers as well as noncommissioned officers are not as proficient in the basic tactical skills of employing their units in their traditional roles because they have been fighting on the ground or as light infantry and subsequently not trained in their basic branch skills. As an example, an armor officer should be able to accomplish two basic tasks as a platoon leader. First, he must be able to properly prepare a platoon battle position complete with two tiered fighting positions dug in with engineer assets. As a part of preparing the defensive battle position, the platoon leader must be able to, among other things, properly sight in the position, prepare a sector sketch and control the direct fires on his four tanks. This is a skill which takes multiple preparations to gain proficiency. The armor lieutenants of today have, with few exceptions, not been afforded the opportunity to occupy and defend a platoon battle position.

Second, a junior armor officer must be able to control his platoon while conducting offensive operations. An invaluable training asset for inculcating the offensive mindset is maneuvering on the field of battle in a tank. An armor officer must be able to control his tank and others under his command in order to be effective. The expertise in maneuvering tanks in combat can only be gained through training. In the years after the end of OIF, these officers will struggle to gain the requisite experience to enable them to execute their basic war-fighting skills to standard.

Basic branch experience is the first casualty of training for Operations Iraqi Freedom. The second casualty is the loss of experience in traditional maneuver warfare training, specifically, the loss of the ability to transfer traditional warfare lessons learned to the Army. As an example, a combat arms branched captain with five years in the Army
today entered active duty in the summer of 2001. After six months of training, he reported for duty in early 2002. From 2002 to 2005, he will have trained no more than twice at a maneuver training center and likely deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for one year. If lucky, he led a platoon during a rotation and remained a platoon leader for his combat tour. This platoon leader will have not led his tank platoon in a mounted attack, dug a platoon battle position and fought an overwhelming armored attack. Field artillery platoon leaders who have not laid their guns in for a table VIII qualification will soon lead field artillery batteries. Additionally, the NCOs, the true continuity in the military are facing similar challenges with training junior NCOs on their MOSs. From 2005 to 2006, this captain will attend the captain’s career course and take command in 2007. He does this having maneuvered no more than 45 days of the preceding 6 years. This captain will participate in a mission rehearsal exercise at a training center once prior to a yearlong Iraq or Afghanistan deployment. Look beyond the present, to his twelfth to fourteenth year of commissioned service (2013-2015) and this S3 or executive officer's maneuver experience will be limited to three rotations at a training center and two yearlong deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan and conducting stability operations. He will drive the training for the battalion based upon that. The battalion leadership will have little or no maneuver experience with which to mentor junior officers.

The theoretical timeline portrayed above can be applied to recent history to give a more contemporary feel. It can be argued that the Israeli Defense Force lived this timeline in its fight with Hezbollah. With the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, the focus of the IDF’s operations shifted to the Palestinians threats. Small skirmishes with Hezbollah along the Lebanese-Israeli border were the most
significant combat actions the IDF faced in the six years after their withdrawal with the predominance of their activities, both lethal and nonlethal, focusing on the Palestinian problem and its associated military actions. The six years of operations dealing with the Palestinian problems would have bred a military used to conducting operations against a small threat. This trend would continue unless their training expanded to include high intensity major combat operations. So, a soldier entering the IDF in 2001 would have faced only minor threats and conducted low intensity conflict operations prior to combat in the summer of 2006.

It can be inferred, from recent training exercises, that the IDF has learned from the 2006 war and is implementing lessons learned. From recent training conducted in northern Israel it can be inferred that the IDF has shifted its focus from simple low intensity operations to major combat operations and is making up for lost time.¹ This fact seems to be bolstered by the IDF chief paratroop and infantry officer who upon giving up his command in 2006 stated, “I feel the weighty responsibility on my shoulders. I failed to prepare the infantry better for war.”² The Israeli military paid for its focus on low intensity and stability operations with blood, can the U.S military prevent this from happening in the next war?

Recommemdaions

In order to truly train full-spectrum operations, the combat training centers must expand the number of training days during a rotation. The current training model at NTC still reflects the old fourteen-day training model despite an increase in the number of tasks trained. Instead of expanding the training days at the national training center to include counter-insurgency training, it was cut to conduct counterinsurgency operations
and thus the neglect of full-spectrum operations is promulgated. Currently, units rotate to NTC, conduct RSOI for approximately seven days and move to the field on day eight. After fourteen days of training which includes company, battalion and brigade training, the unit returns from the field and out-processes for another seven days. The numbers work nicely, but a twenty day training model would work better.

In an unconstrained resource environment, the unit could rotate to NTC, RSOI for five days, train for twenty and out-process for an additional five for a total of thirty days. The additional training days would allow the inclusion of full-spectrum operations and address all training requirements for the brigade to be capable of full-spectrum dominance. In the process of researching the feasibility of conducting rotations lasting longer than fourteen days, the author was unable to determine the driving force behind only training for fourteen days. The consensus in phone conversations with the department of training at forces command was that a fourteen day training cycle facilitated force flow into and out of the national training center. An answer as puzzling as it is short. Surely the combat training centers can adjust to train units, not simply assembly line them down the road.

JMRC is in a similar circumstance. Units rotating to JMRC occupy billets in a base camp and conduct COIN operations after a platoon and company train-up period. Following the train-up period, the battalions conduct COIN operations for ten days and return from the field to redeploy. Adjusting the training schedule to include full spectrum training would necessitate a five day period to RSOI, twenty days to train full-spectrum operations and out-process for five days for a total of thirty days. The additional training
days would facilitate the inclusion of full-spectrum operations and address all training requirements for the brigade to be capable of full-spectrum dominance.

In conclusion, the answer to training full-spectrum operations at the CTCs is to expand the training days to permit offense, defense and stability operations training across the full-spectrum of operations. By including traditional warfare in an expanded rotation, unit can accomplish those tasks set forth in the strategic directives and operational plans. Not enabling full-spectrum operations could place the Army in a disadvantageous position should the next war be fought in a traditional manner.

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APPENDIX A

NTC ROTATION 07-09 MISSION LETTER AND TROOP LIST

1. **Purpose:** The memorandum details the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s mission, training objectives, desired mission profile, proposed rotation schedule, resource requests and concerns for NTC 07-09.

2. **Mission:** 3d ACR conducts NTC Rotation 07-09 from 18 Jun – 16 Jul 07 in order to prepare the Regiment to conduct stability and counter-insurgency operations as part of Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) during OIF VII.

3. **Regimental Training Focus:** The training focus for NTC 07-09 is preparing units at varying training levels for operations in the OIF environment. The goal is for the Regiment and subordinate units to be able to effectively manage and direct counter-insurgency operations under conditions that replicate anticipated operations in Iraq as closely as possible. Due to fielding timelines and the ability to conduct home station collective training prior to the NTC rotation, subordinate units will enter NTC trained at various levels. Enclosure 1 (Anticipated Unit Training Levels) depicts the level that subordinate units will be trained to prior to NTC 07-09.

4. **METL.** The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Brave Rifles) METL, as defined by the current Army Universal Task List (AUTL), follows:

   a. **METL Task #1: Conduct Tactical Actions Associated with Deployment & Redeployment (Art 2.1):** While deployment and redeployment operations are inherently a strategic and operational level tasks, units at all levels must build and maintain proficiency on the tactical tasks associated with such operations. Maintenance procedures, property accountability procedures, personnel management systems, rail/air movement systems, and rear detachment operations are areas in which Regimental units must focus in order to succeed at any mission and subsequently posture for new missions.

   b. **METL Task #2: Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance (Art 1.3.3):** The 3d ACR provides higher level commanders with the ability to develop the situation on the ground and provide fresh, accurate information about the enemy, terrain, and populace within the area. In the context of ongoing counter-insurgency operations, units within the Regiment should all strive to achieve proficiency at conducting reconnaissance of not only insurgent activities but of the political, economic, military, social, and cultural aspects of their assigned area or zone as well. Ultimately, all reconnaissance operations support the Regiment’s comprehensive estimate of the situation, enabling follow on operations.

   c. **METL Task #3: Conduct Security Operations (Art 5.3.5):** Ongoing operations in Iraq will only succeed if the population believes that the elected Iraqi
Government is capable of meeting their security needs. As such, the Regiment will conduct security operations to provide the Iraqi citizens and Iraqi security forces the time needed to establish a lasting government capable of defeating the insurgency. All combat units within the Regiment will execute area security, rear area security, or base security operations.

d. METL Task #4: Conduct a Movement to Contact (Art 8.1.2): Unlike OIF 04-06, the Regiment will likely commit to an area where the situation is rapidly changing due to ongoing efforts to establish security throughout Iraq. As such, all Troop level formations and above must have the ability to move into a region, quickly develop the situation, and determine a follow on course of action that will ensure progress along ALL Regimental lines of operation. Troop level leaders must ensure that subordinate formations are proficient at conducting actions such as an attack or raid based upon the results of movement to contact operations.

e. METL Task #5: Conduct Combat Operations and Provide Direct Support to ISF (Art 8.3.2): The Regiment will likely conduct both offensive and defensive operations designed to support the Iraqi Government’s fight against insurgents. Additionally, because the Iraqi Security Forces are a decisive piece of the strategic objectives within Iraq, the Regiment must be capable of providing direct assistance including, but not limited to, civil military operations, intelligence, communications sharing and logistics.

f. METL Task #6: Conduct Civil – Military Operations and Engagement (Art 6.14): In order to succeed in Iraq, the Regiment must develop and build upon existing relationships between Iraqi Security Forces, local civil leaders, and the local populace. While not a subordinate unit battle task, all platoon leaders/platoon sergeants and above within the Regiment will ensure that they train to conduct effective liaison/interface between themselves, Iraqi security forces, and local authorities. Additionally, leaders must be proficient at conducting reconnaissance to assist in the acquisition of local resources, civil labor, facilities, and other support that the ISF require to accomplish their mission.

g. METL Task #8: Command and Control the Regiment (Art 7.0): While command and control of forces is inherent in all tasks executed by the Regiment, the C2 operations that will be conducted in theater demand that Squadrons and the Regiment be capable of conducting command and control of sustained operations over the course of the deployment. Manning requirements for staffs, synchronization systems, and control functions must be able to execute at all times. Similarly, the Regiment will integrate theater specific systems designed to ensure situational understanding at all levels such as CPOF. Finally, the digitization of the ACR demands that units place emphasis on training personnel capable of fully employing these systems. As a result, it is essential to mission
success that we place emphasis on this task during peacetime in order to effectively accomplish it in wartime.

h. METL Task #9: Conduct CSS Operations (Art 6.0): At the Regimental level, sustainment of forces constitutes a major task that must be trained prior to deployment. The ability of the Regiment to conduct sustainment operations over extended distances, protect logistical supplies, and resource units for the fight directly determines the success or failure of the organization along all lines of operation. Both Squadrons and the Regiment must ensure CSS systems are in place and adequately trained in order to begin operations immediately upon arrival in theater.

5. Training Objectives: Based upon individual unit training needs, the Regiment has identified objectives that must be met in order to enable the Regiment to deploy to OIF 07-09 fully prepared to conduct operations.

a. Demonstrate the competence and high level of discipline at the individual, crew, section, and platoon levels that are crucial for success in the OIF environment.

b. Conduct effective reconnaissance and surveillance operations at all levels IOT quickly develop the Regiment’s estimate of the situation and develop follow on courses of action.
   • Develop staffs that can produce timely orders which address 2nd and 3rd order effects of actions and anticipate future developments in the operational environment.
   • Deliver fires and effects to destroy high payoff targets and defeat insurgent operations
   • Develop effective intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination procedures at the Troop level and above.

c. Integrate all capabilities of the Regiment to shape and sustain counter-insurgency operations, to include:
   • Improve the Regiment’s ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations by targeting multiple, critical enemy capabilities simultaneously or in rapid succession to defeat insurgent activities, address the grievances of the population, and establish legitimate Iraqi Security Force operations throughout the AO.
   • Commanders and staffs able to direct multiple counter-insurgency & stability related tasks simultaneously.
   • Leaders able to make quick decisions and issue precise fragmentary orders to exploit opportunities.
   • Platoons and Troops able to respond immediately to orders and accomplish mission essential tasks under conditions that replicate the OIF environment.
• Employ lethal Troops, Companies, and Batteries that can operate in a
decentralize manner and execute their given mission.
• Use information systems to shape the fight in the Regimental AO to
clarify coalition intentions, address grievances of the population, and
discredit the insurgency.
• Integrate all arms and enablers to include SOF, CAS, IO, AV, LOG, MI,
CA, and PSYOPS to achieve security in the Regimental AO.

d. Conduct effective Civil-Military operations (CMO) and engagements to bolster
support for the legitimate Iraqi Government and Iraqi Security Forces
- Conduct assessment of essential services
- Administer projects
- Establish CMOC operations
- Provide support to local and provincial governments
- Coordinate Provincial Reconstruction Team support

e. Achieve “T” level proficiency at the Regimental level on the following METL
tasks:
- Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance Operations
- Conduct Security Operations
- Conduct Movement to Contact
- Command and Control the Regiment
- Conduct CSS Operations

f. Achieve “P” level proficiency at the Regimental level on the following METL
tasks:
- Conduct Combat Operations and Provide Direct Support to ISF
- Conduct Civil Military Operations and Engagements

g. Achieve “T” level proficiency in the following Squadron level METL Tasks
- Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance Operations
- Conduct Security Operations
- Conduct Movement to Contact
- Command and Control the Squadron
- Conduct CSS Operations

h. Achieve “P” level proficiency in the following ground Squadron METL Tasks:
- Conduct Combat Operations and Provide Direct Support to ISF

i. For 1/3 and 2/3 ACR Troop formations, demonstrate “T” level proficiency in all
METL Tasks with emphasis placed on conducting combat operation and
providing direct support to ISF.
j. For 3/3 ACR, achieve “T” level proficiency in all Troop METL task at the beginning of the rotation. During the latter portion of the rotation, achieve proficiency on conducting combat operations and providing direct support to ISF.

6. Current Unit Profile. The following provides a brief description of the organic capabilities and organization for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. As there is frequent misunderstanding of the organization of 3d ACR, Enclosure 2 (Brave Rifles 101) depicts the current organization of the units as well as major combat systems.

a. Maneuver Squadrons: The 3d ACR is a heavy, mechanized, and digitized Armored Cavalry Regiment. The rotational ground maneuver squadrons are 1/3, 2/3, and 3/3 ACR. By MTOE each squadron has a Headquarters Troop, three Cavalry Troops, a Tank Company, and a Howitzer Battery. Each Cavalry Troop is comprised of two scout platoons, two tank platoons, and a mortar section. The Tank Company is composed of 14 x M1A2SEP tanks, and the Howitzer Battery is composed of 6 x M109A6 Paladins. In total each squadron is equipped and will deploy with forty-one M1A2SEP tanks, forty-one M3A3 CFVs, four M7 BFIST, six M109A6 Paladins, and six M121 (120mm) mortar tubes.

b. Aviation Squadron: 4/3 ACR, the 3d ACR Aviation Squadron, is a modernized aviation squadron. The squadron has one Headquarters Troop, three AH-64D equipped Attack/Reconnaissance Troops, and one UH-60 L equipped Lift Troop, an AVIM Troop, an AVUM Troop, as well as the Forward Support Team (FST). It is equipped and will deploy with twenty-four AH-64Ds and ten UH-60L helicopters.

c. Regimental Support Squadron: SPT/3 ACR is the 3d ACR Support Squadron; it is a modernized, general support cavalry squadron. The squadron has one Headquarters Troop, one Medical Troop, one Maintenance Troop, and one Supply & Transportation Troop. It is equipped and will deploy with forty-nine LMTV series trucks, thirty-nine LMTV tractor trucks, twenty-two 5000-gallon tankers, four LMTV wreckers, twelve ambulances, six HETs, five M88s, three M113s, and an ORF section.

d. Separate Troops: The 3d ACR is organized with the following separate combat support units:

1) Engineer Company: 43rd CEC is an organic unit to the 3d ACR. The company will deploy with a Headquarters section, three ODS-E equipped engineer platoons, one A&O platoon, and one maintenance platoon. The company is equipped and will deploy with thirteen ODS-E, six M9 ACEs, six AVLBs, three SEEs, seven 5-ton Dump trucks, one Bucket Loader, and three Volcanoes.
2) **Chemical Company:** 89th Chemical Company is an organic unit of the 3d ACR. The company is equipped and will deploy with six Fox Reconnaissance Vehicles, seven M58 (WOLF) Smoke Tracks, one HEMMT (Fog Oil) vehicle, one HEMMT (Maintenance), three M17 Sanators, three Water Tank Pump Units (TPUs), and one M88.

3) **Military Intelligence Company:** 66th Military Intelligence Company is an organic unit of the 3d ACR. The company is equipped and will deploy with 2 x Shadow UAV Platoons (8 total UAVs), 1 x Prophet equipped EW platoon, one Analysis and Control Element (ACE) which includes three ASAS-SS, three ASAS boxes, 2 ASAS-RWS, four ASAS lights, one Trojan Spirit II, one JSTARS Common Ground Station, and a FAST. In addition, 66th MI will deploy one Counter Intelligence Team (CIT).

7. **Requested Task Organization & Capabilities:** The Regiment will conduct NTC 07-09 as a task organized Regimental Combat Team. Based upon planning factors outlined by FORSCOM in the rotation sourcing document, the following units, in coordination with the Regiment have been identified to participate in NTC 07-09. This can viewed in detail in Enclosure 3 and 5. Specifically, elements not organic to the Regiment which must be incorporated into this rotation are as follows:

   a. **Signal Company:** The Regiment has no organic signal units to support NTC 07-09. Tentatively, the VCSA made the decision to support the ACR with an ITSB capability. In coordination with NETCOM, B Co of the 63rd ITSB from Fort Gordon, GA (93rd SIG BDE) has been identified to support the Regiment with a JNN capability during NTC 07-09. FORSCOM POC for this action is LTC Frank Gonzalez, NETCOM G-3 office, (frank.j.gonzales@us.Army.mil). This element will tentatively be equipped with 2 x JNN and 10 x sub-nodes in order to support the Regiment’s operations over extended distances.

   b. **Civil Affairs (CMO Operations):** Due to a lack of organic Civil Affairs capability, the Regiment requests a CA element to enable the Regiment to conduct CMO operations during NTC 07-09. Specifically, the Regiment requests 2 x CAT A teams and 1 x CAT B team to conduct NTC 07-09 as a task organized element. IAW FORSCOM sourcing guidance, the Regiment has coordinated initial requirements through the 308th Civil Affairs Brigade (POC is G3 Plans Officer, MAJ Ronald Hydro, ronald.l.hydro@us.Army.mil, phone 708-957-2032 – Ext 216). During the rotation, CAT B team will be resident with the Regimental Headquarters, and both CAT A Teams will be under Regimental control.

   c. **Psychological Operations Detachment:** In order to enable the Regiment to effectively train Information Operations, conduct atmospheric assessments, and enable CMO, the Regiment additionally requests that two Tactical PYSOPS Teams participate in the rotation as part of the Regimental Combat Team. ICW the 308th CA BDE, the Regiment has tentatively established contact with TPD 1050 of the 308th
PSYOPS Company. POC is SSG Sancho Au, sancho.yatming.au@us.Army.mil; phone 816-318-0007.

d. USACE Detachment (FES Team): Engineer staff support in Iraq is critical to enabling effective CMO operations during OIF. Based upon the request of USACE to integrate LNO teams into BCT training plans, the Regiment requests the integration of a USACE Detachment (consisting of no more than 4 PAX). These construction engineer specialists will be resident within the Regimental Headquarters. POC for further information is MAJ Greg Ramey, USACE Southwestern Division Operations Officer, bryan.g.rameyII.MAJ@swd02.usace.Army.mil or bryan.ramey@us.Army.mil; phone 469-487-7019.

e. Military Police Company (-): Because of the increased emphasis on MP integration into security operations in theater, 3d ACR must be able to coordinate the efforts of multiple MP units in the AO. Additionally, because ACR units typically function as BCT level HQ’s in theater, the Regiment must be able to train these operations at the squadron level. As such, the Regiment requires 2 x MP PLT and 1 x MP CO HQ’s for the NTC rotation. Currently, the 220th MP BDE is scheduled to support this requirement. POC for further information is MAJ DiNenna, S3 220th MP BDE, david.dinenna@usar.Army.mil; phone 240-683-1042. Specifically, the 220th MP BDE has identified the 88th MP CO from the 400th MP BN to support his rotation.

f. Explosive Ordinance Detachment: Due to the IED threat within theater and the likelihood of being task organized with EOD elements during OIF, the Regiment requests 2 x EOD Teams to support NTC 07-09. IAW FORSCOM rotational sourcing documents, the Regiment has established preliminary contact with the 722nd Ordnance Company. POC is CPT Dorian Hatcher, dorian.hatcher@forscom.Army.mil, DSN 797-4258.

g. Engineer Mobility Augmentation Company: The Regiment requests an Engineer Mobility Augmentation Company with an attached Deployable Command Post to augment the Regiment during Rotation 07-09. The MAC and the CP are essential to fully train the planning and execution of Mobility Support (Route Clearance and IED Defeat) operations and allow the Regiment to plan, prepare and execute Civil-Military Operations (focus of reconstruction/construction). The Regiment needs the augmentation of the Engineer Company as the organic 43rd CEC is configured as a combat engineer element and is better suited to operate in its secondary role of “fighting as infantry” in support of the Regiment’s mission. The MAC provides the capability to plan for the utilization in training of the specialized clearance equipment available in theater as well as plan and resource construction projects. The Regiment anticipates a shortfall of personnel in the Regimental Engineer cell and the Deployable CP augmentation will assist with this aspect of staff integration. Currently the Regiment is coordinating with 4th EN BN from Fort Carson, Colorado for a company (+) during NTC 07-09.
h. Public Affairs Team (Combat Camera). IOT ensure that Public Affairs Office operations are effectively trained at the Regimental level, the 3d ACR requests one PAO team (embedded at the Regimental level) be integrated into the rotation.


a. Currently, the higher headquarters command structure is scheduled to be the 52nd Mechanized Division. While acceptable, the Regiment requests that the doctrinally correct simulations/feeds normally provided to a Corps MSC be provided during the rotation. Specific request are listed in paragraph 9.

b. The command and control element for NTC 05-03 is RHHT, 3d ACR. The Regiment additionally requests a detachment from the 11th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) to provide Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) support to the 3d ACR.

9. Exceptions to the Troop List. 3d ACR requests authorization for the following exceptions to the troop list for NTC Rotation 07-09:

a. JSTARS: 3d ACR requests JSTARS support during the rotation. The Regiment has a common ground station, which typically operates out of the Regimental ACE, to receive the JSTARS feed. The addition of JSTARS support will compliment the Regiment’s tactical collection abilities.

b. ACE Intelligence Feeds: 3d ACR requests a simulated national and theater intelligence feed to the IDSS, ASAS, and ASAS Light systems for our ACE. These feeds and systems are used by units in theater. Not utilizing this unique capability will reduce the versatility and effectiveness of the Regiment, and diminish the training value of the rotation for the 66th Military Intelligence Company/3d ACR.

c. ACE Deployment: As an additional issue, the Regiment requests the ACE receive necessary intelligence communications links normal for a Divisional ACE as the Regimental ACE has the same link requirements. We also request all connectivity be established as if the ACE is tactically deployed in the maneuver area with the Regimental TOC, and not requiring the Trojan Spirit and the FAST systems to co-locate at the Stars Wars Building.

d. MET Section: Request a meteorological section and fire finder radar support with the intent of the 3d ACR receiving the same enablers under the OIF task organization. The MET section provides necessary meteorological data to the Regimental indirect fire weapon computational systems which ultimately allows each Fire Direction Center to account for non-standard firing conditions. Correcting the gunnery firing solution to account for these conditions is absolutely crucial for the most accurate firing data to be applied to each indirect firing weapon system. This meteorological
data must be obtained within the Regimental Area of Operations, unique to the positioning of the Regimental indirect firing weapon systems, themselves. In other words, meteorological data from another MSC AO is not applicable or substitutable for computing accurate firing data. This MET capability will prove invaluable to the 3d ACR during an OIF rotation, considering the nature of a very complex battlefield, where indirect fire engagements often occur near built-up and populated areas requiring precision.

e. **TOPO Team**: Request a Terrain Analysis Team to be included in the Troop list with the intent of the 3d ACR training with an anticipated asset that will be attached under the OIF task organization.

10. **Mission Request**. The 3d ACR requests a Mission Rehearsal Exercise to prepare the Regiment to conduct stability and counter-insurgency operations in an assigned AO during OIF 07-09. Enclosure 4 provides a detailed example of the Regiment's proposed rotation timeline. Due to competing demands at home station and time available, subordinate units will enter the NTC trained at various levels. Enclosure 1 depicts the entry levels of the Regiment’s organic units. During the MRE, the Regiment requests the following:

   a. **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration (RSOI)**: In order to adequately prepare the Regiment to command and control RSOI operations in theater, the Regiment requests that RSOI during NTC 07-09 replicate as closely as possible the RSOI operations that will be conducted in theater under CFLCC supervision and as part of a Theater level JRSOI.

      (1) **Calibration/Screening**:  
      (a) The Regiment requests a facility/range complex to screen and calibrate all M1/M3 that have replaced major LRUs.  
      (b) The Regiment requests to conduct the required calibration for all artillery and mortars.

      (2) **TOA**: During RSOI week, Regiment requests to conduct a REGT/BDE level TOA with simulated units in the AO in order to orient leaders to the AO and prepare to conduct steady state operations.

   b. **Troop Lanes (TD 1-6)**: 3ACR requests a 6 day period to conduct Troop Lanes for each squadron. Troop Lanes will focus on all ground troops, tank companies, howitzer batteries, 43d Engineer Company, 89th Chemical Company as well as supporting aviation elements from 4/3 ACR (N, O, P Troops). Request that units train on the following tasks during Troop Lanes:

      (1) Conduct a Combined Hasty Attack (Raid) w/ ISF in an urban environment
(2) Conduct Route Reconnaissance Operations over extended distances
(3) Conduct a Dismounted Reconnaissance Patrol in an Urban Environment
(4) Establish a Patrol Base in an Urban Environment
(5) Conduct an Area Reconnaissance (Cordon and Search) w/ ISF in an urban environment.

Because of the inability to execute Troop lanes with 3/3 ACR prior to deployment to NTC 07-09, the Regiment requests that 3/3 ACR Troops execute the same mission set during this period; however, the focus must be on establishing basic proficiency at the Troop level. Combined operations w/ ISF at the Troop level must be a primary focus for 3/3 ACR during the Squadron and Regimental level MRE periods (T7-T14).

c. **Squadron FTX (TD 7-9):** Upon the completion of Troop Lanes on TD6, 3d ACR requests a 3 day Squadron Lanes period during which all ground Squadrons will move to new assembly areas (i.e. not the area that they executed Troop Lanes) and perform a three day Squadron level mission with task organized enablers. This period will establish basic proficiency at the Squadron level in reconnaissance, security, and movement to contact operations in an urban environment. During this period, operations will be controlled by the Regimental HQ’s as the Regimental staff simultaneously prepares for the Regimental MRE days. By day, these missions include:

   (1) Training Day 7: Squadrons execute a zone reconnaissance operation throughout the AO in order to identify threats to stability and establish initial contact with local leaders.

   (2) Training Day 8: Squadrons execute MTC operations in order to develop the situation in the urban areas based upon information obtained during TD 7. MTC Operations should be conducted in urban areas where the ethnic and sectarian violence has degenerated to the point that US forces must intervene in order to prevent further bloodshed. Operation: MTC, Task: Neutralize sectarian violence in (selected urban area in Squadron AO), Purpose: prevent further degradation of security situation in the Squadron AO.

   (3) Training Day 9: Squadrons establish area security throughout their AO based upon information obtained during zone reconnaissance and movement to contact operations.

d. **Regimental Operations (TD10-14):** Upon completion of the Squadron FTX period (beginning on TD10), the Regiment requests a 5 day Regimental level MRE during which the entire Regiment conducts operations simultaneously in a replicated OIF environment. Training objectives for each unit during this period include:

   (1) Regimental Level T10-T14 Training Objectives:
       
       • Achieve “T” level proficiency at the Regimental level on the following METL tasks:
i. Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance Operations
ii. Conduct Security Operations
iii. Conduct Movement to Contact
iv. Command and Control the Regiment
v. Conduct CSS Operations

- Achieve “P” level proficiency at the Regimental level on the following METL tasks:
  i. Conduct Combat Operations and Provide Direct Support to ISF
  ii. Conduct Civil Military Operations and Engagements

(2) Squadron Level (Ground Squadron) T10-T14 Training Objectives:
- Achieve “T” level proficiency in the following Squadron level METL Tasks:
  i. Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance Operations
  ii. Conduct Security Operations
  iii. Conduct Movement to Contact
  iv. Command and Control the Squadron
  v. Conduct CSS Operations

- Achieve “P” level proficiency in the following ground Squadron METL Tasks:
  i. Conduct Combat Operations and Provide Direct Support to ISF

(3) 1/3 ACR and 2/3 ACR Ground Troop Training Objectives:
- Demonstrate “T” level proficiency in the following Troop level METL Tasks:
  ii. Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance Operations
  iii. Conduct Area Security Operations
  iv. Conduct Movement to Contact (excluding HWB)
  v. Conduct combat operations and provide direct support to ISF

(4) 3/3 ACR Ground Troop Training Objectives: Having established basic proficiency at Troop level METL tasks during Troop Lanes (TD1-6), 3d ACR requests that the Regimental MRE period focus operations on 3/3 ACR and their ability to conduct combined operations at the troop level with ISF. As such, the primary objective for 3/3 ACR during this period is to achieve “T” level proficiency in the following Troop level METL Tasks:

  vi. Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance Operations
  vii. Conduct Area Security Operations
  viii. Conduct Movement to Contact (excluding HWB)
  ix. Conduct combat operations and provide direct support to ISF
e. **Live Fire Operations**: 3d ACR requests that Live-fire operations be integrated throughout the entire rotation at the Troop level. Throughout the rotation, 3d ACR requests each Troop, Tank Company, and the 43 CEC execute the following Live-fire exercise: Conduct a Live -fire Dismounted Reconnaissance Patrol in an urban environment. Additionally, the Regiment requests that each Squadron HHT (support platoon), the Regimental Support Squadron, as well as 89th CHEM execute a mounted live-fire exercise in order to establish proficiency in CLFX operations for all selected CS/CSS elements.

f. **Additional Training Requested**:

   (1) 3d ACR additionally requests that trauma training be integrated into the Troop level operations during the rotation for all medical elements.

   (2) In order to train 89th Chemical as the Regiment’s primary unit responsible for detainee operations, 3d ACR requests that Detainee Operations be integrated into the Troop Lanes Training for 89th Chemical Company. Specifically, the training can be accomplished through replication during Patrol Base and ECP Operations during T3-T5 on the schedule.

11. **Pre-NTC Training.**

   a. The Regiment’s current training plan has the following home-station events designated as key training in preparation for NTC 07-09. All home-station training is focused on conducting stability and counter-insurgency operations while operating in the OIF environment.

   (1) **Level I Gunnery Densities (NET Gunnery for 1/3 and 3/3; additional Level 1 for 2/3)**

   - 1/3: 07 FEB – 21 MAR 07
   - 2/3: 01 – 23 MAY 07
   - 3/3: 21 MAR – 3 MAY 07
   - 4/3: 18 MAR – 20 APR 07

   (2) **Focused individual/crew level dismounted/mounted training**

   - 1/3: 01 OCT - 17 NOV 06
   - 2/3: 01 – 25 AUG 06
   - 3/3: 01 SEP – 15 DEC 06
   - RSS/3: 01 – 25 AUG 06, 27 NOV – 14 DEC 06
(3) Platoon EXEVALs

- 1/3: 13 – 26 APR 07
- 2/3: 05 – 23 MAR 07
- 3/3: 04 – 23 MAY 07
- 4/3: 13 – 22 NOV 06

(4) TRP EXEVALs

- 1/3: 27 – 04 APR 07
- 2/3: 31 MAR – 06 APR 07
- 3/3: None
- 4/3: 13 – 22 NOV 06

(5) MILES Training – All units will execute MILES training prior to each unit’s PLT and TRP STX.

a. Units will conduct the following leader/staff training in preparation for the rotation:

(1) NTC LTP 25 FEB – 3 MAR 07
(2) XVIII AB Corps MRX (w/ 4ID) 04 – 15 JUN 07
(3) Regimental Command Post Exercise 03 – 09 MAY 07
(4) Regimental Staff Training Program 06 NOV 06 – 2 FEB 07
APPENDIX B

JMRC BOMB CHART

05-11 X-Days (Directed Missions)


Laauwe, Brad. 05-12 OIF MRE Laydown Brief. JMRC, Hohenfels, GE: September 2005.


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