COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree 
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
General Studies 

by 
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2007 

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**Title**: Community Oriented Policing and Counterinsurgency: A Conceptual Model

**Abstract**

Community-oriented policing is a model for police operations used in many countries. The goal of policing is to provide law enforcement of behaviors that a society considers criminal and to help the society in the process of control of those actions that may not be criminal but are undesirable in a community. It consists of three main elements: strategic, neighborhood-oriented, and problem-oriented policing. This method encourages community input into the government system and helps establish needs and priorities for government and social services. The successful British counterinsurgency in Malaya is used as a case study to examine the community-oriented policing model in the light of concrete experience. The case study reveals that the pattern of operation and the final organization of the security forces in Malaya conformed closely to the community-oriented policing model laid out in chapter 2. The model is then compared to current operations in Afghanistan to see what recommendations may be made. This paper concludes that community-oriented policing is a model useful for counterinsurgency, that U.S. military policing doctrine be expanded and improved, and that the U.S. ability to provide policing and police training abroad be expanded.

**Subject Terms**

Police; Policing; Counterinsurgency; Malaya; Afghanistan; Military Police

**Security Classification**

Unclassified

**Number of Pages**

102

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**Security Classification**

Unclassified
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In completion of this endeavor I have two people to thank. First is my committee chair Dr. James Corum, whose thought provoking instruction sparked in me the idea behind this thesis. Without his guidance in this matter I would not have succeeded. Secondly is my wife Amy, whose patience and understanding about the effort required to complete this thesis enabled me to get this undertaking completed.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

I have said that the police duties of the Army are of increasing importance, but they have to a large extend changed their nature under modern conditions. They may be roughly grouped in three categories, though in the course of events an incident may pass from one category to the other. In the first category are small wars: deliberate campaigns with a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil control. . . . The second category, and it is this which I have tried to illustrate in this book, includes cases when the normal civil control does not exist, or has broken down to such an extent that the Army becomes the main agent for the maintenance of or for the restoration of order. . . . To the third category belong those occasions when the civil power continues to exercise undivided control but finds the police forces on which it normally relies insufficient. . . . How are the officer to be trained for such duties? It is hardly possible to draw up exercises in which the work can be practiced.1

Major-General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O, Imperial Policing

One can see from a few of the elements of Major General Gwynn’s 1934 work that the problem of using military forces in a policing role has been a dilemma for many years. Armies train for the idealized worst case scenario, high-intensity combat against a well-defined foe. However, the more likely use of soldiers is in the small wars that Sir Gwynn referred to. The modern definition of small wars, that is, conflict against nonstate forces, seems to have wrapped his three cases into a single definition. Some of the views that Gwynn expresses about the difficulty of training military forces for these types of conflict is evident in the conduct of the United States military. In 1974 the United States Army published a field manual covering the conduct of counterinsurgency, capturing the
hard lessons learned during its long struggle in Vietnam. For reasons of institutional pride or pain, the manual and its useful lessons slowly faded from institutional knowledge over the following years. The United States military focused on the expected battle against the Soviet Union on the fields of Europe. Counterinsurgency was neatly wrapped into the unconventional warfare realm of special operations forces and the regular forces quickly forgot all but the bad memories from Vietnam. Over the years even the term counterinsurgency disappeared from the military vocabulary with terms, such as “military operations other than war” and “low intensity conflict,” replacing it. Now fast forward to the United States led coalition liberation of Iraq in 2003 where early in the campaign U.S. forces had experienced what by early 2007 what was a frustrating and costly insurgency.

December 2006 saw the publication of Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, the first institutional publication addressing this subject since 1974. The basic lessons of counterinsurgency have been re-learned through the pain of experience in Iraq and the resulting interest that current operations have sparked in the field. Yet the question still remains on how to properly prepare military officers to function in the real world that Sir Gwynn described. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to have again proven that training for major combat operations does not prepare a military force to function in a policing role.

Looking at the institutional pains the military has experienced re-learning counterinsurgency lessons and then trying to teach them across the force in a system that was designed to train large units to conduct full scale major combat operations leads one to look for things being done by civilian or military agencies that can help prepare troops
for counterinsurgency operations. The United States will be likely to face counterinsurgency operations after Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Questions About Insurgent Groups and Criminal Groups**

Major Gary D. Calese in his monograph “Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency Operations” provides an excellent comparison between criminal organizations and insurgent groups. By looking at leadership, structure, culture, recruitment, and finances, he establishes that there are enough similarities between the groups to establish that law-enforcement type activities may be useful in counterinsurgency. Establishing this linkage is the central issue of his monograph and he spends just a little time covering some of the law enforcement techniques that may be of interest to a counterinsurgent force. His examination leaves our important question unanswered. How have police forces evolved to combat crime? Are there more lessons that have been learned by police forces throughout the world that could be of value in fighting insurgencies?

Building from the basic connection provided by Major Calese, three basic questions have been crafted to guide the examination of possible connections between modern police operations and a military role in counterinsurgency. The first question is: (1) What is the most appropriate current police operations theory used today? Answering this question led me to the theory called “community-oriented policing.” This first research question narrows down to what is community-oriented policing and what evaluation and case studies are available to validate the theory? The second question posed is, Does this police operations theory provide a useful model to counterinsurgency? By examining a historical case study of a counterinsurgency campaign, it should be
possible to draw a conclusion to determine how appropriate a model police theory is for counterinsurgency. The final question is, If police operations theories offer a useful model for counterinsurgency, how do they compare to current operations?

Research Methodology

The basic construct for research into this topic is a qualitative method. In the police operations theory there is an abundance of material on current and past police operations theory and practice. The United States Department of Justice has an Office of Community Oriented Policing that provides a basic starting point for anyone interested in this model of policing. In this area of the thesis there is a fine balance between depth and breadth. The community-oriented policing theory has been around and in practice long enough that almost every conceivable subtopic imaginable has been explored. The theory has also been adopted by law enforcement agencies outside the United States, to include Australia, Singapore, Great Britain, and Israel among others. To cover the topic adequately, but not spend the entire thesis delving into the policing theory, a brief overview of the best sources concerning community-oriented policing is provided.

The second part of this thesis will deal with a historical case study of a counterinsurgency campaign. The challenge in this portion is to find a campaign where the counterinsurgent force is successful through legitimate means, that is, employing measured force in accordance with the rule of law and norms of human rights. A basic search through the materials available leads to the British experience against communist insurgents in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. The research into this campaign provides an excellent opportunity for analysis through the lens of current police theory.
The final section of the thesis will examine current operations in Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Taliban government in 2002, there has been considerable progress in building a legitimate government there. Reports from United States and coalition partners on the conduct and status of rebuilding in the country with a focus on the Afghan security forces are examined.

In conclusion lessons learned from historical and recent experience are examined in order to arrive at some practical recommendations to best employ the community policing model as a counterinsurgency tool. In addition, some insights on how United States training might be improved are added.

Literature Review

There is an abundance of literature available on police operations and theory. The most comprehensive book describing community-oriented policing in its entirety is William M. Oliver’s *Community-Oriented policing: A Systematic Approach to Policing*. This book is used as a college textbook and does an excellent job of introducing the history and concepts behind community-oriented policing. Oliver provides a solid logical approach to the subject and intersperses vignettes throughout the book that provide useful examples to illustrate his points.

Community-oriented policing has been the emerging or current police operations theory for over 20 years in the United States, and in other countries internationally there are also case studies available that examine the challenges and effects of community-oriented policing. Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M Hartnett wrote *Community Policing: Chicago Style* in 1997, and their work provides a superb in-depth look at the implementation of community-oriented policing strategies in a large urban police force in
Chicago.³ Dennis J. Stevens compiled *Case Studies in Community Policing* in 2001.⁴ In his work he establishes a standard method for examining eight police departments’ community policing efforts and comes to some general conclusions on nine evaluation areas that can be used to judge the potential for success for a community-oriented policing program.

From international authors there are two collections that provide a sampling of community policing efforts around the world. Robert J. Friedmanna’s *Community Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects* gives a great introduction to the subject and policing theory and then provides examples of the community policing efforts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel.⁵ Steven P. Lab and Dilip K. Das produced *International Perspectives on Community Policing and Crime Prevention* based on presentations by the contributors at the Fifth International Police Executive Symposium in 1998.⁶ It covers the history, status, and future prospects of policing efforts in ten countries including India, China, Mexico, and Russia among others. The book provides a wide sampling of efforts.

Professional organizations have also contributed greatly to the state of knowledge on policing through professional journals and sponsoring studies in the field. Journal articles and special study articles generally cover a specific issue or technique in policing. The U.S. Department of Justice operates an Office of Community-Oriented policing Services that makes many of their products available online. Some of the articles that are of interest to this thesis include Jean M. McGloin’s “Street Gangs and Interventions: Innovative Problem Solving With Network Analysis” for the Department of Justice.⁷ In
her work she gives a good explanation of problem and network analysis as it has been used to examine gang problems in several cities.

Another interesting work on gang issues is Deborah Lamm Weisel’s and Tara O’Connor Shelly’s *Specialized Gang Units: Form and Function in Community Policing* produced for the National Institute of Justice. The authors examined the utility of special gang task forces in a community policing construct to see how they fit. They found that these task forces do not interfere with community policing. Other topics that have been examined through these journals include the legal ramifications of police checkpoints, crime mapping, countering the sex trade, reports on the effectiveness of grant money used to fund community policing in the United States, community policing in small towns and rural areas, and methods to implement community policing strategies in departments. The articles reviewed for this thesis are listed in the bibliography.

There is much less literature available on British operations during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960. However, the United States military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have spurred some new analysis of the successful British campaign there. The most comprehensive look at the Malayan insurgency is Anthony Short’s *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*. Working in the University of Malaya beginning in 1960, Short was commissioned to write what is virtually the official Malayan government account of the campaign, completed in 1975. It thoroughly covers the campaign from both sides and from the tactical to strategic level.

Two works that were produced during the conflict provide additional perspectives. The first is Victor Purcell’s *Malaya: Communist or Free*. Written in 1954 during the height of the conflict, Purcell examines contemporary issues in Malaya. A
second contemporary work is *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya.* This book was the tactical manual for British military forces in Malaya and it gives the reader some insight on the conduct of tactical operations in Malaya.

Two more recent works provide additional analysis of Malaya. John Coates’ *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954,* provides an analysis of the history of the conflict and operations on both sides through what the author considers the breaking of the insurgency in 1954. The final work on Malaya is John A. Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.* Nagl’s work is focused on how armies adapt themselves during conflict and uses Malaya and Vietnam as case studies. His discussion of Malaya is short but would be an easy introduction for any new reader on the subject.

The conflict in Afghanistan that began in late 2001 is just over six years’ old at this time, and material that is openly available on the training and operation of the Afghan security forces is rare. Two documents have been produced by the United States government on the subject. The first is a joint report by the Departments of State and Defense as the *Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness.* It was released on 14 November 2006 and it gives a decent analysis of the current state of the Afghan police and provides recommendations to improve how the United States is helping train and equip the Afghan police force. The second document was produced by the Government Accounting Office in a June 2005 report to the House of Representatives titled *Afghan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police have Made Progress, But Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined.* It details the efforts to create the Afghan
security forces including training and equipping by the United States and other countries that are contributing to the effort.

Several documents are available providing analysis from people outside the United States Government. The best document that explains insurgency and counterinsurgency in a broader context and then addresses the specific issues in Afghanistan was prepared by the Europe-based Senlis Council. Their February 2007 report is an excellent educational tool and case study full of interview data from people in Afghanistan.14 A 2003 document prepared by the Bonn International Center for Conversion gives a solid early view of the issues in Afghanistan and gives insightful early suggestions for a way ahead that appear to have been largely ignored.15 Robert M. Perito, Special Advisor, Rule of Law Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace provided his independent analysis of the situation to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004.16 Vance Serchuk from the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research provides an interesting analysis of the capability of the United States government to train police forces as it is doing in Afghanistan and comes to a negative conclusion about prospects of success.17 Germany is the other major contributor to police training in Afghanistan and it produced several fact sheets on its operations there.18

Finally, the Combat Studies institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has been working to catalog what they refer to as Operational Leadership Experiences in the War on Terror. One interview that they conducted was with a U.S. Army Major Craig Whitten who worked in the military headquarters on the issue of training the Afghan police. He provides some keen operational level insights on the conduct of the program and challenges that he faced from November 2004 to May 2005.19
The recent U.S. experiences in attempting to re-establish police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has sparked some academic interest in how the police, democracy and rule of law are developed in a country. David H. Bayley’s recently published Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad is a superb study on this topic. He covers the linkage between democracy and policing, U.S. programs and policy on developing police forces in other countries, a strategy for reform, the link between security and reform, ideas on how to manage assistance to police forces, how to evaluate the impact of police development assistance and makes some suggestions on how to best organize in the United States to provide assistance to police forces abroad. Bayley’s book is perhaps the best single resource for anyone interested in the topic.


CHAPTER 2
COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING

The Community-Oriented Policing Model

The field of police operations theory and practice has undergone evolutionary changes since the inception of the first modern Western police force in London when the Metropolitan Police Act was passed in 1829 and the “Bobbies” at Scotland Yard were established under Sir Robert Peel.¹ Since the creation of this first formally organized police department, the methods used by police departments to guide operations have changed over time to better serve society. Experts on police theory George Kelling and Mark Moore break the development of policing in the United States into three phases. They describe the first phase from 1840 to 1930 as the political phase, where politics played a major role in determining the authority and conduct of the police. The second phase, 1930 through the 1970s, they characterize as the reform phase. In this period police forces became more focused on enforcing laws, professionalizing through the influence of ex-military personnel, and developing a centralized organization that improved efficiency and curbed some corruption, but distanced the police force from the community.² The current phase of development is the community policing, sparked by the writings of Herman Goldstien on “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach”³ in 1979, and James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety” in 1982.⁴ This phase of policing theory will be the focus of this portion of the thesis.

Critical to examining community-oriented policing is understanding the balance between law enforcement and social control. Robert R. Friedman in his book Community
Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects provides a logical framework for examining the potential roles of the police. He provides five possible interrelationships for the police and community. His first relationship is one where the police and community are mutually exclusive entities. In this case the police have not come from the community they serve in and the community has little or no authority over the police in their area. Friedman describes this as hard to envision as many police are recruited from the community they serve, live in the community and therefore are part of the community. Secondly from the community’s perspective, it would not be acceptable to have a police force that is not responsive or accountable to the community it serves. Because of these factors Friedman calls this logical model impracticable, though it is not unheard of in special cases. The most appropriate example of this model is the British experience policing in its colonies. The British model for police forces in its colonies was central control by British officers and the use of some “tribal” police forces, though in some cases tribal forces were not used on their own area, even being exported to other colonies to police, as some Indian units were sent to Kenya.

Friedman’s second logical option is one where the community and police are completely overlapping. In this case everyone in the community is a police officer, and Friedman rightly deems this model impracticable as well. The third model is one where the police is all encompassing of the community. He gives the police state of the former East Germany as an example of this type of community where a large portion of the community, 100,000 of a population of 18 million, is a member of the police or informs to the police on the behavior of the remainder of the population. In this case the police is responsible for entirety of law enforcement and social control for the community.
The fourth logical possibility is one where the community is the police. The clearest example of this is the Israeli Kibbutz or the Amish societies in the United States. The members of these communities “essentially police themselves by the strength of their internally limited informal social control forces such as special interest groups, ethnic enclaves and occupational groups.” These communities operate without uniformed police officers through informal social control where the community members themselves choose not to break the law or operate outside the societal norms. Friedman deems this model as practical for small communities but increasingly difficult to maintain because of the “increasingly global village.”

The final logical possibility is one where the police and community partially overlap. The police exist as a law-enforcement entity to deal with “the undesirable, with the criminals, with the order breakers and law-violators.” Law enforcement is limited to matters that are agreed to through democratic processes and the community exists to exert social control for the behaviors that where laws are not enacted. In essence society decides what acts are criminal and those are dealt with by the police. Other undesirable behaviors are discouraged but generally not in the purview of police response. This line varies over time as society as a whole evolves. One needs only to look at the scores of un-enforced laws on the books in the United States to trace this kind of evolution in the line between law enforcement and social control.

At this point it would be possible to break into an entire sub-chapter on social control theory, but the bounds of this thesis will prevent traveling that path. However, it is best to provide a basic understanding of the complex interrelationships and keep them in mind throughout this work. Travis Hirschi’s 1969 Causes of Delinquency provides a
basic model for understanding why someone would commit a crime. He theorizes that four factors prevent a person from committing a crime. First is attachment, the degree someone is attached to their parents, peers, teachers, religious figures and the like.\(^{17}\) Commitment is essentially fear of the consequences of the criminal behavior.\(^{18}\) Involvement is the measure of how active the person is in productive non-criminal activities.\(^{19}\) Belief is the common value system that the individual believes in.\(^{20}\) Looking at these four influences one can now build a continuum of behavior that ranges from accepted societal norm, to a middle ground of unacceptable but non-criminal activity, to criminal activity. A society decides what activities lie in each category, and through action or inaction how big the categories are and who is responsible for dealing with acts in each category. Again using Friedman’s fourth logical possibility, where the community is the police, the members of the community are generally strong in all four factors and generally police themselves. Lacking the daily need for policing, community members that deviate outside societal norms have to be dealt with police from outside the community.\(^{21}\) One major aspect of community-oriented policing seeks to address the more common situation where there is unclaimed space on the continuum and where the community is unable or unwilling to affect negative behavior in the community.

In order to understand the elements of community-oriented policing, the model from Williard M. Oliver’s *Community-Oriented Policing: A Systemic Approach to Policing* will be used.\(^{22}\) Many of the writings in the field deal with subparts of criminology and policing, but Oliver has put together a clear and concise manual for understanding the basics of community-oriented policing as a system. Oliver’s model provides a sound basic conceptual framework for the community-oriented policing
portion of this paper. Oliver breaks community policing into three subareas: strategic-oriented policing, neighborhood-oriented policing, and problem-oriented policing.

Oliver’s description of strategic-oriented policing is the policing that citizens of most democratic countries would recognize, but with a more intense focus. It seeks to address three main problems with traditional policing: (1) lack of resources to counter rising crime beyond what the currently assigned officers could handle, (2) the need to address areas of concern that in the overall resource allocation picture would be low priority, and (3) an understanding that a community’s feeling of security cannot be judged only on crime and arrest rates in an area.23 Central to strategic policing is the ability to “target” the needed resources to the right areas. Oliver states it well, “The determination what to target, what has precedence, and how the strategic policing should be carried out should not be directed in only downward communications, but in later communication with the police officers who patrol the areas being discussed, other public agencies, community leaders, and citizens who live in the area.”24 He essentially advocates a broad-based forum where all the government agencies and community representatives can provide inputs about potential problems and indicators of potential rising criminal activity. With inputs that range beyond the information that police departments have traditionally tracked in arrests, calls from citizens and the like, the proper additional resources can be allocated to an area to maintain the citizen’s perception of safety.

The three police actions in strategic-oriented policing are directed patrols, aggressive patrols, and saturation patrols.25 Directed patrols means tasking officers to check on areas of concern at appropriate intervals. It comes from an analysis of arrests,
tickets issued, and citizen calls. For example, if it known that after school a group of youths congregates in a vacant lot and causes vandalism in the area, having a police unit move through the area during that time would generally cause the kids to disperse without causing vandalism. Or if there are fights in a nightclub parking lot at closing time, having a patrol there prevents the fights from starting or can end them swiftly with intervention.

The second type of patrol is called aggressive patrolling. This methodology is “increased pressure on specific criminal or social order problems, as well as specific criminal elements by police.” It includes “aggressive order maintenance strategies include rousing or arresting people thought to cause public disorder, field interrogations and roadblock checks, surveillance of suspicious people, vigorous enforcement of public order and nuisance laws, and, in general, much greater attention to the minor crimes and disturbances though to disrupt and displease the civil public.” It essentially floods an area with officers so they have more time to look at, and deal with, lower priority issues that are indicators of or precursors to other crimes. It also increases the contact with the population in an area that must have a dual effect; contact with the criminal elements that officers may not have seen and more contact with the law-abiding citizenry who may or may not appreciate being randomly stopped on the road to chat with an officer. The two best examples of this type of patrol are foot patrol officers stopping youths on the street to talk with them (and possibly pat them down for concealed weapons or drugs) and the drunk-driving checkpoint where all drivers are stopped, their identification and insurance checked to give the officer time to look for the visual and scent clues that identify a potential drunk driver.
Oliver also puts the use of plainclothes officers patrolling in unmarked cars in the aggressive patrol category, seeking a “method of dealing with known criminal problems or a specific area that is suffering an order maintenance problem that would disappear, only to reappear again, if a police officer in uniform was observed.”\textsuperscript{28} He also puts the old police standbys, the sting and stakeout, in this category. They fit in this patrol category because they require resources more than those normally assigned to an area and they are specifically targeted to a known criminal problem.

The final patrol type is the saturation patrol. It is the most resource-intensive, calling on “officers from various shifts, tactical units, traffic units, and investigators, who, all in uniform, saturate a predesignated area in a show of force.”\textsuperscript{29} It places the maximum number of available officers into an area by pulling officers from lower priority assignments to clear a high crime area. Saturation patrols are doubly resource intensive, as Oliver figures they must be maintained for “one week to one month” to ensure the problem has been driven out.\textsuperscript{30} This type of patrol would be appropriate for an area that has become overrun with crime and the currently assigned officers have failed in their first effort to take back control from the criminal elements.

The second category under community-oriented policing Oliver calls neighborhood-oriented policing. This is the area of operations where the partnership between the police and community is evident. In strategic-oriented policing the community was only an input into the police targeting of problem areas. In the framework of neighborhood-oriented policing the “cooperative effort that the goals of reducing crime and reducing the fear of crime can be achieved.”\textsuperscript{31} It essentially seeks to break the police officer out of the mental mind-set that they work only on the limited
scope of law enforcement and make the policeman become more in tune with the community as a whole. It also requires the community to re-take its role as an element of crime control and order maintenance and not leave it to the police alone. This kind of policing has to be initiated and maintained by the citizens, and in its best form the citizens are essentially in charge of the police force, making decisions about the application of police resources as a part of their self-control over their neighborhood. The police role is five tasks: community patrols, community crime prevention, communication programs, community social control programs and problem-oriented policing.

In neighborhood oriented policing community patrols seek to get police officers closer and have greater integration with the community. Urban area foot patrols provide the community with a feeling of safety, reduced fear and increased satisfaction with the police. Additionally officers that conduct foot patrol have a better understanding of the neighborhood they patrol and have higher job satisfaction and morale. The other method used to increase officer interaction is the use of “ministations or storefronts.” It helps to decentralize the police and give the citizenry a closer location to seek out interaction with the police. Oliver notes that with both types of community patrol, “Once again, this form of community patrol may or may not reduce the numbers of actual crimes, but it changes that perceptions of crime on the part of the public and increases the accessibility and contact with the police officers.”

Community crime prevention is the effort to educate and empower the citizens to reduce the opportunity for crime. It consists of neighborhood watch, operation ID, and home security surveys. Neighborhood watches put citizens on watch in their
community to help watch for crime and call the police if necessary. It effectively increases the surveillance in the area and provides more data for the police to target patrolling with. Operation ID helps citizens mark property to assist with recovery if it is stolen. Finally home security surveys provide citizens with police officers that examine their home or business and advise on measures the citizen can take to improve physical security of their home or building and make them a tougher target for criminals.

The final aspects of Neighborhood Oriented Policing are communication programs and community social control programs. These programs should be designed to enable open communication between the police and the community. These information operations seek to educate the population on what the police do and how ordinary citizens can contribute to the community. Community social control programs directly target those activities that generally fall outside the resource ability of the police department to enforce, and above the ability of the community itself to handle. Oliver refers to police resident programs that give financial incentives to police officers to live in problem areas, juvenile curfew programs and code enforcement teams that address building safety and maintenance.

Oliver’s final aspect of Community-oriented policing is Problem-oriented Policing. POP is really the brainchild of Herman Goldstien. Oliver borrows heavily directly from Goldstien in his chapter on Problem-Oriented Policing. Problem-oriented Policing “addresses a particular problem, analyzes the problem, determines a course of action, implements the program, then follows up in and evaluative manner.” Other works have summarized this process with the acronym SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) or PROCTOR (PROblem, Cause, Tactic or Treatment, Output,
Key to this method is the involvement of the community to provide the kind of data and perspective that may not be reflected in the standard data collected by the police. This approach ensures that the real root cause issue is addressed instead of what may actually be a symptom of a larger problem.

Case Studies and Lessons From Community-Oriented Policing

Dennis J. Stevens in his book *Case Studies in Community Policing* provides an introductory avenue to look at nine cases of success and failure of community-oriented policing in the United States. One example given is the Sacramento Police Department (SPD). Starting the mid-1990s, the SPD instituted elements of community-oriented policing into its operations. The SPD consists of 654 sworn officers patrolling 98 square miles and 400,000 people. It developed a goals for the period 1994-2003 that included more education of city residents in crime prevention, institute a citizen’s police academy to provide opportunity for better knowledge of police practices and challenges, revitalize the Neighborhood Watch program, partner with the community to establish drug-free zones in targeted areas near parks, schools, and other areas; to create a more decentralized police command structure; and to obtain more community input through community forums, among other goals. In 1998, Sacramento had seen a 63.5 percent decrease in homicide over the 1993 rate, a 15.6 percent decrease in forcible rape, 26.9 percent decrease in robbery, 33.8 percent decrease in aggravated burglary, 19.6 percent decrease in burglary, 15.8 percent decrease in larceny from vehicles, and 23.9 percent decrease in motor vehicle theft. Stevens’ analysis of SPD’s actions in community-oriented policing rightly identifies one area missing at the time the analysis was conducted. The successes seen are absent from the direct community involvement in
decision making that is the ultimate goal in community-oriented policing.\textsuperscript{49} This example is useful in illustrating that even implementing portions of the theory can have an impact on crime.

A second useful case study provided by Stevens is the Camden Police Department in Camden, New Jersey. It consists of 386 officers patrolling ten square miles and a population of 84,000 people.\textsuperscript{50} It began the is experiment with community-oriented policing ideas in the late 1980’s with ideas put forth by the chief of police in “programs designed to help inner city youths would best serve public safety.”\textsuperscript{51} Over the next ten years, Camden implemented various aspects of community-oriented policing, including substations and community partnership councils.\textsuperscript{52} Over the next ten years the program slowly dissolved as a coherent strategy and the department returned to its previous role as a response to call organization. Stevens assessment is that the program failed because of too many chiefs (four over ten years), too much poverty and crime, too much resistance to change internally from police officers and externally from the community to get involved. There was also too little leadership. Stevens further states that Camden failed because of mistrust in the police leadership that was trying to implement the programs.\textsuperscript{53} The efforts in Camden were not without a limited success. The city experiences Mischief Night once a year that resulted in massive vandalism throughout the community. In combating this event, the community did become involved, assisting with neighborhood watches and other ways on the Mischief Night. Through good operational planning, the city was able to reduce vandal started fires by 75 percent over three years.\textsuperscript{54} Through the nine total case studies that Stevens presents, he presents some conclusions valuable to this study. First is that “a perfect community policing model compatible with every
agency does not exist. Every jurisdiction is unique because of its own history, demographics, cultural and economic mix, region, tax base, management, civic leadership, public perception, and numerous other nuances.” He rightly asserts that there is not a cookbook approach to policing that will produce results in every district.

Effectiveness of community policing in the United States has been measured through three surveys, one in 1992 by the Police Foundations with funding from the National Institute of Justice, one in 1997 by the ORC MARCO and the Police Executive Research Foundation (PERF), and the final in 2002 by the PERF. The 2002 survey was conducted with agencies that had responded to the 1992 and 1997 surveys; in all 240 agencies are accounted for in the 2002 survey. The results show that in key areas of interest to this thesis community-oriented policing can produce results. In the area of reducing citizen’s fear of crime, slightly under 90 percent of the agencies replied that COP had that effect in their community in 1992, with about 95 percent in 1997 and about 98 percent in 2002. In the 2002 survey, just under 80 percent reported it reduced fear to “some extent” and just under 20 percent said to a “great extent.” For reducing crime against property, about 65 percent reported the effect in 1992, with about 82 percent in 1997 and 85 percent in 2002. The effect was called “some extent” by slightly over 70 percent and “great extent” by about 15 percent. And for reducing crime against persons, about 60 percent reported COP having that effect in 1992, and over 85 percent in 1997 and 2002. The effect was called “some extent” by again slightly over 70 percent and a great extent by around 15 percent of the responding agencies.

Another effect of note was the increased participation of and information from the citizens. In the 2002 survey, 100 percent reported better police-community relations with
65 percent calling it “great extent,” 97 percent increased citizen participation with 55 percent calling it a “great extent,” and 99 percent increased information sharing from citizens with 33 percent calling it a “great extent.” The most popular ways community involvement was increased was by police-community meetings, citizen neighborhood watches, and groups that helped agencies identify and solve problems; 90 percent of all the responding agencies used each of these in their program. The biggest changes in programs from 1992 to 2002 was in using civilian volunteers in the agency (from 70 percent to 80 percent of responding departments), use of citizen patrols coordinated by the department (from 30 to 45 percent), and civilian police academies (from 25 percent to 80 percent). The counterpoint to the data collected from police agencies is the lack of data from citizenry served by the agencies that responded. There is a definite lack of corroborating evidence to prove that community policing really effects disorder, fear and crime. Additionally, only about 20 percent of the departments incorporate citizens in manners beyond volunteers and information providers, meaning that relatively few are fully implementing the police-community theory behind community-oriented policing.

In their work *Community Policing: Chicago Style*, Wesley Skogan and Susan Hartnett studied the implementation of community policing in Chicago prior to implementation in April 1993 through some expanded data collection in 1995. Chicago’s plan involved five main tenets: (1) inclusion of the entire Police department and other city agencies; (2) permanent beat assignments for officers that included 279 beats of around 10,000 people and 4,100 households; (3) focused training for all officers on the skills needed for community policing; (4) building community involvement in the program through the use of community meetings at the beat level and above; and (5)
linking policing to city services delivery by soliciting feedback on city services through the beat officers that contributed to the city’s overall prioritization of services delivery.\textsuperscript{68}

Several of Skogan and Hartnett’s conclusions are relevant to this thesis. First among them is issue of getting community involvement in the process. They found that the relatively better-off areas of the city had a greater citizen involvement in the program than the worse areas, meaning that the areas that needed more help had the quietest voice in the competition for city resources.\textsuperscript{69} Particularly problematic was getting involvement from the Hispanic community in Chicago. Skogan and Hartnett surmise that their personal (negative) experience with the police, perception about police treatment of the Hispanic population, language barriers and lack of a unified agenda created a situation where few Hispanic survey respondents even knew about the community policing program.\textsuperscript{70} The best sustained community involvement was in areas that were mainly white or home-owning neighborhoods with a resulting group and neighborhood focus; areas of mostly African Americans and the poor tended to have a more individual needs focus and program involvement waned.\textsuperscript{71}

Chicago’s program did show positive indicators for their program however. In the five initial districts, the community policing program showed progress in decreasing major crime, drug and gang problems, and combating physical decay in the neighborhoods when compared to similar control districts without community policing programs.\textsuperscript{72} Not only did the program have and actual effect on those areas, but the program was also able to make an impact on citizen’s perception of crime in their neighborhoods as well.

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Skogan and Hartnett’s overall conclusion is relevant as well. They surmise that the challenge in community policing is to get something visible to happen, and for it to happen three obstacles have to be overcome: changing the police force, getting all city functions to participate in the program, and getting citizen involvement. Once these are overcome, the program requires sustainment because nothing happens quickly; it may take years of working and modifying the program before seeing results.

The concepts of community-oriented policing are not only in practice in the United States. Community policing programs can be found in western-style agencies in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Israel, as well in countries that do not have similar backgrounds as the United States, such as Singapore, Kenya, and India. The perspectives and experiences of community policing provide additional insight into the practice of community policing so several will be discussed in the following paragraphs. The first country to be examined is Singapore.

Singapore first began to use community policing in 1981 with a full scale implementation in 1983. In the overall development of community policing, this puts Singapore at the leading edge of the development of community policing. In his monograph, David Blayley points out how similar Singapore is to cities in the United States to show how the lessons learned from Singapore could be of value to a U.S. police officer. Of note is that at the time of this monograph, Singapore had a population of 2.5 million with a population density of 10,965 which puts it on par with Philadelphia (12,108) and Chicago (13,119). The police force contained 7,394 sworn officers, equating to one officer for every 338 people, a ratio slightly lower than the U.S. average for large cities of one officer to every 286 people. Culturally Singapore is mostly
Chinese (76 percent) with large groups of Malay (15 percent) and Indian (6.4 percent) people, with the remaining 2.3 percent of the population encompassing all others. The author makes the point that “Many of the problems of policing are common across cultures, whether cultural differences are within countries or between countries. . . . Community policing practices might in fact be more transportable internationally than other practices, precisely because community policing stresses the need for police to adapt to local conditions. . . . Community policing may be a unique means by which police can bridge the gap between cultures.” Against this backdrop it is appropriate to examine how Singapore implemented its community policing program.

Singapore began its transition to community-oriented policing by examining how best to station its patrolmen to be near the population. Prior to implementation Singapore had operated in a Western-style organization with eight precincts, operating about 100 patrol cars and augmented by bicycles and scooters. One section of the precinct was responsible for responding to emergency calls, and the other patrolling was directed patrolling with only a small percentage of directed patrolling being on foot. A main focus in Singapore was to establish policing posts in the neighborhoods. The first three neighborhood police posts opened in 1983 and by 1989 Singapore was to have 91 neighborhood police posts each responsible for an average of 28,000 people and 2.5 square miles of territory, though the largest in size is 12.8 square miles and the smallest 0.16 square miles; in population 62,000 the largest and 12,100 the smallest.

The initial basis for creating the police posts was to site one in each parliamentary district and then to add additional posts in areas of greater population density or work loads. The police post is manned by twenty personnel to cover 24-hour, seven days a
week operation and a police Inspector supervises two posts. The officers assigned to these posts are dedicated to neighborhood policing. They spend their time handling walk-in business at the post or conducting foot patrols providing a visible presence and talking with residents; in fact, each officer is assigned an area of their post and is required to visit every location in their section at least once a year and the homes of neighborhood watch and local leaders twice a year. On their visits they provide crime prevention materials and each resident is given a business card with the officer’s contact information in case they need to contact a police officer, and the officer collects data on who lives in each location, including names, race, sex, contact information, and employment.

The neighborhood police posts fall into a larger police organization. The precinct level is responsible for providing units to respond to emergencies as well as criminal investigation. At the highest level there is a traffic patrol unit to handle motor vehicle law enforcement. An interesting adjunct to the police force is the citizen based supplemental police. Singapore has five types of supplemental police. The first two types are the Special Constables and Vigilantes. These two groups are draftees as part of Singapore’s mandatory national service when they come of age. Special Constables are serving armed, uniformed police officers that serve for two years, while the Vigilantes are high school dropouts that are unarmed and patrol with the power of citizen arrest. The third group is the National Police Reservists who are special constables who must provide two weeks of service annually for thirteen additional years after their two years of active duty. The fourth group is the Volunteer Special Constables. These citizens attend a short police course and patrol armed, in police uniform with full police power in the area around their home of business. The final group is the National Police Cadet Corps,
21,800 cadets who attend short courses to help maintain order at school functions, though they sometimes patrol with uniformed officers. The end result is there is much more police presence in a neighborhood than the five officers on duty of the twenty assigned to the police post. Additionally, these are useful steps to breakdown the police-citizen divide that many departments experience.

The result of community-oriented policing in Singapore provides mixed messages. Statistics gathered by the Singapore police department from 1985 to 1986 show that in areas with neighborhood police posts, robbery decreased by 1.3 percent while in areas without them, it increased 6.2 percent. Similarly for housebreaking, neighborhood police post areas saw a decrease of 18.3 percent and areas without saw a decrease of 15.6 percent. Overall the statistics seem to show that in areas with these neighborhood police posts, residents were more willing to report lesser offenses to the police. This may disguise some of the effects these operations had on reducing crime. An area of clear impact is on the arrest rate for felony offenses. It resulted in an arrest rate increase from 17.5 percent to 25.1 percent in areas with police posts. The final effect was to improve the image of the police force with the residents. From 1983 to 1984, the police force surveyed resident attitudes and saw a 10.4 percent increase in citizens who saw the police as “friendly,” a 9.9 percent increase in those who saw them as “efficient” and 3.9 percent decrease in those who saw them as “secretive.” In all, Singapore’s experience with community-oriented policing shows that these concepts can be implemented in other countries and achieve some noticeable impacts on crime and community perceptions. Implementation in other countries has given similar results.
India has turned to the concepts of community-oriented policing to cope with skyrocketing crime without an increase in police to combat it. India had a crime rate of 654.3 incidents per 100,000 people in 1995, one of the highest in the world. Over a ten-year period to the mid-1990s, the homicide rate in India had increased 44.3 percent, while over the same period in the United States it increased only 4.8 percent. Efforts to curb crime have included the training and employment of 1,500 Special Police Officers in Dehli who perform some of the functions a community policing officer would: patrolling the streets, training your girls in self defense and helping victims of property crime. Dehli also established neighborhood watch system to help deter and report crime. In Bhiwandi, a split Hindu-Muslim city, the police formed committees of local residents to meet with the police officials. The police-led forum progressed to provide an outlet for resident issues with availability of electricity and rationed food items. These forums increased interaction between Hindus and Muslims on issues common to each group. This allowed the police to better monitor the status of relations between the groups and broke down some barriers between the groups and has reduced incidents of violence between them. Other programs throughout the country have focused on teaching residents about physical security to help prevent crime and increase protection for the residents.

In Kenya, policing has progressed from the colonial force during British rule to an emerging modern force. The Nairobi police force established an anonymous hotline for residents to provide information on crimes that they have witnessed only in 1995, though there are incidents of false reporting. Kenya has seen an increase in drug related crime and has taken the traditional police approach of creating an anti-drug task
force to combat the spread. One interesting aspect of counterdrug operations is the
government use of “alternative media” to educate the population about drug use where
they use traditional dances, drama, and storytelling to inform the illiterate population.\textsuperscript{102}
The best examples of community policing are in the contributions of individual
neighborhoods. Neighborhoods of wealthier people have aided in the construction of
police stations, providing vehicles and patrolling their own area to allow the Kenyan
police to focus its limited resources in other areas.\textsuperscript{103}

Israel has developed a community-oriented policing strategy in an effort to
counter rising crime from a multitude of factors including heavy immigration of people
into the country, conflict with the Palestinians, frictions between ultraorthodox and
secular Jews, and the growth of organized crime using Israel as a base.\textsuperscript{104} Rising crime in
the 1970s spurred Israel to experiment with community policing concepts in the early
1980s. These experiments have progressed into a larger adoption of the Community
Policing Stations, with around 70 in operation after 1999.\textsuperscript{105} As seen in other areas, there
is little data showing a decrease in crime in Israel, but surveys have shown an increase in
satisfaction with the police force by residents and a decrease in complaints against police
officers by citizens in areas that have a Community Police Station.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{1}William M. Oliver, \textit{Community-Oriented Policing: A Systematic Approach to

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 12.

\textsuperscript{3}Herman Goldstien, “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach,” \textit{Crime
and Delinquency}, 1979.

\textsuperscript{4}George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson’s March, "Broken Windows: The Police

6 Ibid., 14.

7 Ibid., 15-16.


9 Ibid., 16.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 17.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


18 Ibid., 20.

19 Ibid., 187.

20 Ibid., 197.

21 Friedman, 16.

22 Oliver.

23 Oliver, 52-55.

24 Ibid., 55.

25 Ibid., 54.

26 Ibid., 62.

28 Ibid., 63.

29 Ibid., 69.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 79.

32 Ibid., 80.


34 Oliver, 91.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., 93.

37 Ibid., 94.

38 Ibid., 95

39 Ibid., 96.

40 Ibid., 100.

41 Ibid., 104.


43 Ibid., 108.


45 Oliver, 119.

47 Ibid., 177.

48 Ibid., 180.

49 Ibid., 179.

50 Ibid., 232.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 233.

53 Ibid., 249.

54 Ibid., 244.

55 Ibid., 257.


57 Ibid., 43.

58 Ibid., 44. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.

59 Ibid., 46. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.

60 Ibid., 44. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.

61 Ibid. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.

62 Ibid., 46. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.

63 Ibid., 44,46. Data from tables without exact percentages listed.

64 Ibid., 48. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.

65 Ibid. Data from a table without exact percentages listed.


69 Ibid., 159-160.

70 Ibid., 193.

71 Ibid., 239.

72 Ibid., 230-232.

73 Ibid., 246.

74 Ibid.


76 Ibid.


78 Ibid., 1.

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81 Ibid., 7.

82 Ibid., 8.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 10.

85 Ibid., 13.

86 Ibid., 13-14.

87 Ibid., 10.
88 Ibid., 11.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 23.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 24.
95 Ibid., 25.


97 Ibid., 114-115.
98 Ibid., 120.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 121.


102 Ibid., 133.
103 Ibid., 135.


105 Ibid., 107.
106 Ibid., 110.
Chapter 3

Case Study: Cop Model and the British Counterinsurgency in Malaya

The British counterinsurgency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 provides an excellent opportunity to examine the community-oriented policing model laid out in chapter 2. This chapter will explain the roots of the conflict and then look at the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign through the lens of the Strategic-Neighborhood-Problem-oriented policing model as discussed in chapter 1.

The beginnings of the Malayan insurgency lie in the rise of communism. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) began their resistance in the 1930s leading worker strikes that had to be suppressed by the British. The MCP was further strengthened by their anti-Japanese stance during World War II. It organized the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) as a military arm and received weapons and guerrilla training from British advisors from Force 136. In 1943 the British trained 165 personnel in a ten-day course; by the end of the war the MPAJA was 6,500 strong and had conducted 340 operations, 200 of them major. This training and experience that the MCP gained would form the core of the armed resistance to British rule after the war. After the Japanese left Malaya, the MCP and MPAJA were ordered by the returning British government to disband turn in their weapons. The 6,800 people were mustered out of the MPAJA and they turned in 5,497 weapons, 732 more than the 4,765 than were provided by the British during the war.

This insurgency was also an ethnic struggle. The MCP was an overwhelmingly Chinese organization and got most of its support from the Chinese immigrant "squatter"
population in Malaya. The MCP made some efforts to expand beyond the Chinese population, but had little success in recruiting Malays who were content with British rule and the status quo of Malay domination of the Federation’s politics. In 1947 ethnic Chinese comprised 34 percent of the estimated 4,908,000 people in Malaya. Over the years the Chinese population in Malaya had become one of Malay-born Chinese versus immigrants. In 1931, 30 percent of the Chinese population was Malaya-born; by 1947 it was 60 percent and 75 percent by 1957. Much of the population had fled the cities during the Japanese occupation and created a strong rural society, but one that had no ancestral ties to the land they lived on.

The politics of the MCP in Malaya was an extension of politics in China. The MCP followed the classic communist organization with a central committee, bureaus and local cells in a highly decentralized system. The local cells were strongly tied to the local population and cell size was based on the level of support of the people. This local focus resulted in a relative disunity of effort hampered by ineffective communications. Almost all MCP communication was by jungle runner, a slow process with messages taking months to reach outlying cells in some cases.

The MCP communist ideology was able to change the labor structure in Malaya to one that relied heavily on the labor union. The massive strikes it organized both pre and post World War II were a typical communist method and were effective in influencing both the government and the people. After a series of strikes on 12 June 1948 the British administration declared the MCP trade unions illegal. This took away any political leverage of the MCP left the Chinese with few other options to exert influence in the country. At this point the MCP began its armed struggle.
The beginning of armed conflict was not necessarily a planned event. The MCP essentially drifted into open conflict with the British when an armed force of the MCP, the 5th Regiment of the Malayan Peoples Anti British Army, killed three European planters on 16 June 1948. The MCP was not really prepared to for their “strategic offensive” phase of operations when the "emergency" started. The MCP goals in 1948 are threefold: Phase 1 was guerrilla warfare to disrupt economy and communications, kill government, police, and Chinese Nationalist Party officials; Phase 2 was to establish communist government in liberated rural areas, and Phase 3 was the joining up of liberated areas, capture of larger towns, and general revolt. Open conflict by the MCP got off to better start in July 1948 when 300 insurgents take towns of Gua Musang and Pulai, but were driven out after holding the towns for five days, never recapturing them.

These small, short-term gains made by the MCP makes in early 1948 were characteristic of their fate throughout the campaign. The British reaction was uncoordinated at the beginning, but by the end of 1952, the British had engineered a program for future success and a final victory came in 1960. For purposes of analysis, strategic policing will cover all manner of security forces operating in the counterinsurgency campaign. In Malaya it included the Malaya Police, the Army, and the Home Guards other augmenting organizations.

The Early Years: Strategic Policing

The beginnings of the conflict are a prime example an over reliance on strategic policing concepts and too little reliance on neighborhood and problem-oriented policing. The organization of the police and security forces lends itself to analysis of the entire effort under one umbrella. In 1948 the new High Commissioner in Malaya, Sir Henry
Gurney, decided that “The military forces available to aid the civil power should be at the disposal of the Commissioner of Police and operate under his general direction.” The elements of the Police, Home Guards and military would all be under the control of Commissioner of Police. This should have allowed the seamless integration of all aspects of strategic, neighborhood, and problem-oriented operations. In reality, the rapid expansion of the police force combined with the additional duties of coordinating operations from other forces left the small Police headquarters overtaxed and unable to properly control all its forces.

Gurney’s new Commissioner of Police seemed to be the right man for this job. Colonel W. N. Gray was appointed to the job in August 1948, about a month before Gurney arrived as new High Commissioner. Gray’s previous assignment was as the Inspector General of the Palestine Police, so he was no stranger to policing in an insurgency. Over the next four years, Gray was able to build a strategic policing oriented force that was critical to the future British success.

The force Gray took over in 1948 was 2,000 personnel understrength, demoralized by the Japanese occupation during World War II, and severely divided internally between those policemen who had stayed and worked with the Japanese and those who fled and later returned. It was organized into contingents that supported the eleven Malay states, one contingent assigned to a state except in one case where two states shared a contingent. There were two immediate concerns for the security forces in Malaya. The first concern was who would take the lead as the primary counterinsurgent force. Leadership had been placed in the position of the Police
Commissioner, but which agency would provide the majority of the forces was still in question.

There were three priorities for the use of security forces. One priority was to conduct offensive operations against the insurgents. This mission was seen as the primary mission of the military forces, though the police began conducting operations outside the cities as the military forces were insufficient. Second priority was to patrol the towns, villages and cities to keep the insurgents out of these areas. This task rightly fell to the police forces.

The final concern was to protect the economic interests in Malaya, the mines and plantations that were the backbone of the economy. The problem was the manpower associated with this task. The police expected that it could provide at most 1,000 uniformed officers to guard needed sites, and the military essentially refused the task as not their job.\textsuperscript{14} Initial estimate was that there was a need for 10-12,000 men to perform guard duties. The British response was to create a force of Special Constables placed under control of the Commissioner of Police to take over the static guard duties. This force would eventually grow from 24,000 in late 1948 to over 41,000 in early 1953.\textsuperscript{15} This lightly armed force became one of the front lines in the conflict, sustaining slightly more casualties over the period than the police did; 593 dead and 746 wounded to the police’s 511 dead and 701 wounded.\textsuperscript{16} In community-oriented policing construct laid out in chapter 2, the Special Constables filled roles in both the strategic and neighborhood policing realms. They were formed from local volunteers, and they generally remained at the same location throughout their employment, almost as if they were an armed neighborhood watch. In a few cases they were used to augment the area police forces and
it was envisioned that they would be used to conduct their own area patrolling, though it was into 1952 when they were assigned this role with an expected manpower savings in the regular police force of 10,000 men.\textsuperscript{17} It is also important to note that this organization was not the Auxiliary Police which will be discussed in following paragraphs.

The main police force itself was split between strategic and neighborhood policing out of necessity. Under strategic policing, the police force contributed a large amount of the forces for the campaign. In 1948 the regular police was authorized 10,000 personnel, though it was understrength. What this translated to was an average of seven uniformed officers assigned to typical villages in Malaya, with larger numbers in the bigger towns and cities.\textsuperscript{18} Over the initial months of the conflict, the police force was to be expanded by 1,000 officers, then by 7,000 and by 1952 the regular police force had 26,154 personnel assigned.\textsuperscript{19} In this number alone it outnumbered the Army forces available and when combined with the Auxiliary Police and Special Constables, it dwarfed the Army. The main duties of the Police were threefold: First to provide the normal policing duties in the towns and villages. Second, as the biggest counter-insurgent force available, it would take the fight to the enemy as an offensive force. Third was to train and equip the massive number of Police, Special Constables, and Auxiliary police.

Operationally, the desire to take the fight out to the insurgents consumed much of the focus of the Police. The presence of security forces in the towns and cities presented a challenge for the MCP to take and hold them. Throughout the conflict the MCP was only able to take control of three villages, and only able to hold them for five days. The Police spent much of its effort conducting patrols along the roadways, eventually purchasing 25 armored scout cars in 1948 and in 1951 establishing the overall need “\textsuperscript{900 troop carriers,
200 escort armoured cars, and 500 armoured individual transport carriers.”20 Off the roadways, the police formed “jungle squads” to conduct foot patrols in the jungle areas near towns and cities that had become the haven for the insurgent forces. By 1950 the Police had formed about 500 independent patrol squads of 12-18 men. In 1951 these squads were consolidated into company units, essentially mirroring an Army unit light infantry company complete with mortars and heavy machineguns.21

The expansion and early operations of the Police essentially forced it into a strategic policing mindset. The police bureaucracy was faced with a massive expansion in its lower ranks, the addition of new missions and the final task as the single coordinating authority for the overall campaign. All these tasks were not accompanied by an appreciable expansion of leadership or headquarters staff. Gray understood the need for sergeants and lieutenants but his answer was short-sighted. Having been in Palestine at the end of the British mandate, he looked to employ the manpower pool of trained Palestine Police. Eventually 500 ex-Palestine police officers would be employed in various roles in Malaya.22 The induction training program for new recruits was a shortened program that focused on getting as many briefly trained personnel on the streets as possible. There was no training for needed middle ranking noncommissioned officers and little for new officers.

The army remained the smaller force throughout the conflict. The army was given two missions; the first was to be the main force for the clearing of insurgent areas, and the second to support the Police with limited manpower when it was needed.23 Early army operations saw the two inexperienced infantry battalions present in Malaya conducting jungle patrols or attempting to conduct large sweeps in an effort to find the
insurgents. Early operations we conducted in a manner similar to Japanese operations against the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army during the occupation, something that did not endear the military to the local people. By 1950, the force had been expanded to include 17 infantry battalions, an armored car regiment and a field artillery regiment. However, the army was not trained or prepared for the type of operations it was needed to perform. When faced with the essentially police or security duties it really needed to perform, the Army leadership resisted doing what was asked of it. In addition to refusing to perform the site security early in the campaign, the army seemed to operate independently even though the Police Commissioner had been given authority to direct the counterinsurgency campaign. The early split between the Police and army is evident in an early 1949 incident where lack of coordination of operations resulted in an Army unit and some special constables exchanging gunfire because each thought the other was an insurgent group. Later in the campaign the coordination issues would be largely cleared up and the Army would continue its strategic policing role of jungle patrol for the remainder of the conflict.

The final strategic policing agency to discuss is the Special Branch. The Government in Malaya was surprised by the turn of events when the MCP conducted its first attacks. The small intelligence service in Malaya was centered in the larger cities so it had no reach into the jungle areas where the MCP was gaining strength. It had no real knowledge of the underground MCP organizations and the weapons stocks that the MCP was building up. Prior to the start of hostilities, the Malayan Security Service had identified communism as the biggest threat over the coming years, but considered the Indian Communist Party as the threat, not the Chinese Malayan Communist Party.
government reacted to the lack of and intelligence agency by creating the Special Branch in August 1948. It essentially converted the Criminal Investigation Division of the Police into the central intelligence organization for the counter-insurgent operation.

The Special Branch had a long way to go to transition from an investigation organization to an intelligence organization. In the beginning it had no Chinese personnel and few if any that could even speak Chinese. The initiatives to get Chinese speakers in the Special Branch were not impressive; in the early years, only one policeman and 28 civil servants were sent to learn the language. An additional challenge was the manner in which the Special Branch was created. The Criminal Investigation Division was modified to take on the additional task of intelligence collection and analysis. While on the surface it would seem that investigations and intelligence collection are similar, in practice it was shown that the skills and methods are somewhat different. It was not until later in the conflict that the Special Branch became truly effective as an intelligence service and the Criminal Investigation Division was recreated to split these two different functions.

The government’s drive to expand the Army and Police functions was not entirely a strategic policing operation. Several early initiatives fit a neighborhood policing model. These initiatives were the Auxiliary Police and the Frontier Force.

The Auxiliary Police was formed in 1948 to provide additional manpower for Police duties. Recruiting efforts led to 15,000 recruits by the end of the year, and a reported strength of 100,000 by September 1951. Its duties were envisioned as the same as the normal duties of the regular police, that of foot and vehicle patrols, some security operations and training of new recruits. These local recruits were the perfect opportunity
to get community members involved in their own security and it did so for ethnic Malayans. Around 90 percent of the 100,000 mentioned above were Malay “Kampong Guards” who helped protect rural villages. But in the Chinese community where the support for the insurgents was strong, there was minimal support for this program. In the beginning of the conflict in 1948, there was only one Chinese person in the entire Auxiliary Police, and it was not until 1952 that there was a concerted effort that resulted in a noticeable level of Chinese involvement in the Auxiliary Police.

A second force that can be viewed as a neighborhood policing effort was the Frontier Force. Malaya’s ungoverned and basically open border to the north provided a safe haven for Malayan insurgents and routes to additional safe havens across the border with Thailand. To combat this problem the government decided to place a force in the border region in addition to the normal police posts. It considered different groups to man the force, including Gurkahs, Punjabis, Chinese, Lushais, Chins, ex-Palestine police officers and the like. It finally decided that a force raised from the local area would be most appropriate for their existing local knowledge and familiarity with the region, with recruits screened for “physical fitness, local knowledge, and ability to speak some Thai or Chinese.” These units worked along side the police forces patrolling the border areas working in the jungles as their neighborhoods. Members of the Frontier Force stayed in their geographic regions as opposed to the Regular Police members who were periodically transferred around the country as needed. As such they were able to build on their existing local knowledge as desired in a community policing system.
1950: The transition to community-oriented policing

In 1950, after two years of counterinsurgency operations, the situation was not improving for the government. In February 1950, there were 221 MCP incidents, and 80 percent increase over the monthly average for 1949. The explosive and haphazard growth of the police forces coupled with the responsibility to coordinate the entire operation had resulted in neglect for some of the tasks that sustain and professionalize a police force. Creech Jones, the British Colonial Secretary at the time, remarked in a memo to the British Cabinet that basic recruit training had been reduced to the bare minimum to get the maximum number of men trained for duties and that there is no advanced training being conducted. After two years on the job, the new recruits would have been just coming to an understanding of what police work really is. The rapid expansion had also allowed some recruits to enter the service of poor moral character, leading to rising levels of police corruption, something contrary to the needs of the government in an insurgency. Furthermore, this was still an almost all Malay police force. The economic opportunity for the ethnic Chinese was greater than for the Malays, so the meager salaries that were paid did not attract Chinese recruits.

In March 1950 a government report was presented to the cabinet highlighting further problems. One critical issue was the need for more Asians to be trained and promoted into the leadership ranks of the police force. Since the inception of the insurgency basically none of the leadership had attended continuation training, and the report urged implementing a three-to-four-month training course for as many attendees that could be allowed to go. This report too identified the need to get more ethnic Chinese into the Police force.
Further analysis of the lack of progress despite great effort was made by James Griffiths, who replaced Creech Jones as Secretary for the Colonies in early 1950. In a memo to the Cabinet in June 1950, he called for the further expansion of the Police, expresses the need for trained, experienced policemen with many years of experience to fill the great need for intermediate leadership in the force, and the transition of training of Police Jungle Companies to the military.  

The negative trend in the campaign and the early 1950 reports on the status of the police force resulted in a critical event for the eventual success of the counterinsurgency campaign: the establishment of the director of operations position to assume duties coordinating the campaign, relieving the Police Commissioner from that burdensome task. On 3 April 1950 Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs arrived in Malaya to assume duties as the new Director of Operations.  

Briggs major contribution was development of what would be appropriately called the Briggs Plan, the basic roadmap for the continuation of the campaign. Briggs analysis of the situation resulted in him seeing security, confidence in the government and information as the keys to winning the campaign. Implemented on 1 June 1950,

The main aspects of the Plan were:

(a) The rapid resettlement of squatters under the surveillance of Police and auxiliary Police.
(b) The regrouping of local labour in mines and on estates.
(c) The recruitment and training of CID and Special Branch Police personnel.
(d) The Army to provide a minimum framework of troops throughout the country to support the Police, and at the same time to provide a concentration of forces for the clearing of priority areas.
(e) The Police and Army to operate in complete accord. To assist in this, joint Police/Army operational control is established at all levels and there is a close integration of Police and Military Intelligence.
The Briggs plan brought a central organization at the national level to the counterinsurgency operation and also established War Executive Committees in the Malay states to carry out policies, an excellent step toward the decentralized execution that is essential to a Community Policing program.42

Another aspect of the Briggs plan was to re-orient the Police back to its traditional police duties and intelligence collection, a task that is well suited to an organization in daily contact with the population. The Army was designated the main force for operations in the jungles away from population centers, except in areas where the police did not have enough manpower to adequately cover an area.43

The police-community interface was central to Briggs plan. He implemented a large scale resettlement of the Chinese squatters from the lands they were occupying into new villages designed from the beginning to facilitate a good community-government relationship. To accomplish the resettlement, the program followed a few general steps. First, a suitable location was selected for the construction of the new village in an area that would facilitate detection of guerillas coming out of the jungle. Next, housing and administrative buildings were built, followed closely by fencing around the village to further prevent covert insurgent access to the village. The infrastructure for the village was to include schools, medical support, shops, social services, and entertainment including community centers, radios, and mobile movie theaters.44 Before a new village could be occupied, the Commissioner of Police had to be notified to provide the manpower needed to secure the village.45 The people were then moved into the village and were screened and registered to ensure no insurgents were allowed in. An important aspect of this program was the giving of small plots of land to the relocated people. As
squatters they had worked the land but had never been able to call it their own; now they had a meager patch of land that was theirs.

This small act went far to encourage a sense of community in the Chinese population that up to this point had not been readily accepted into mainstream Malaya. A growth from this sense of community was the growth of Chinese participation in a neighborhood watch style program, the Home Guards. Up to this point there was little incentive for Chinese people to participate in these kinds of programs. Pay for police or security work in Malaya was below what the average Chinese could make doing other jobs, and with no ties to the land there must have been little incentive to protect it from the insurgents. Now with something to protect, some of the resettled Chinese chose to participate in the Home Guards.

In 1951 there were about 79,000 Home Guards of which about 40 percent were Chinese; by 1953 there were almost 250,000 Home Guards. The utility of the Home Guards increased as their trustworthiness was proven. New guards were unarmed and required only to over watch the village perimeter to sound the alarm if they spotted insurgents. In intermediate stages, the guards were armed on duty and accompanied police patrols. In the final stages, the guards kept their weapons at home and were essentially entirely responsible for the defense of their own village. By 1953, Home Guards were responsible for the security of 72 of the new villages, and by September 1954, they guarded 129 of 323 of the new villages. For the entire campaign there was never a new village that was overrun or captured by the insurgents. This neighborhood policing program was so successful that it provided manpower that was organized into Operational Sections to augment the police and army units with nine or ten man units,
Briggs also recognized the need for the police to return to police duties instead of the paramilitary functions it had grown into over the last several years. With Gray as the commissioner of police and Briggs supplanting him as overall director of operations there appears to have been some level of friction between them. Briggs role as director of operations in fact gave him less control over the police and military that the name might suggest, in fact he had no authority to direct either force. Only the High Commissioner had that authority.

Briggs and Gray had a string of disagreements that ultimately led to Gray leaving. Gray had been directed to provide more men to the Jungle Companies at the same time continue to provide more men to the police posts in new villages, something Gray believed he could not do with his current resources. Gray was beginning to understand that the demands placed on the police through new missions and personnel expansion were beginning to show signs of coming problems if not dealt with soon. Gurney and Briggs basically decide that Gray’s objections were not sufficient to postpone any of the needed expansions or operations, though it surely raised the issue in their eyes. Shortly afterward, Briggs issued a plan to reorganize the police force into police and security functions, a move that Gray called a complete reversal of government policy. Another disagreement that Gray had was with Gurney himself on the issue of armored cars for the police. Gray believed that when attacked, the police should get out and fight the enemy, not cower behind armor, and that it was hard to be a good police officer if you hid behind armor away from the population you were to protect. This issue highlights the conflict
between his vision for his police force and the reality it was operating in. Gray had neighborhood policing concepts in mind when we desired his police to be close to the population, but he applied those same thoughts to his police units that were carrying out jungle patrols in a strategic policing role away from the population.

By mid 1952 the Briggs plan was well underway and 423,000 squatters had been resettled into the new villages. In a time where there should have been a noticeable impact on the operation, the insurgents mounted their biggest year of the campaign, mounting 6,082 incidents that inflicted 1,195 security force casualties and 1,024 civilian casualties while sustaining 2,049 killed, wounded, surrendered, or captured themselves. The poor training and leadership of the police forces was in the limelight, placed there by Briggs and Gray himself. Despite the planning and efforts being undertaken in Malaya, the British government seemed to be losing.

One final act results in the forced resignation of Gray is the insurgent ambush and killing of High Commissioner Gurney. On the 6th of October 1951, Gurney is killed in chance ambush while traveling from Kuala Lumpur to the resort of Fraser’s Hill. In the wake of this tragedy, Gray was forced to resign and Briggs left a few months later in poor health, and died shortly afterward. The British government decided to consolidate the position of High Commissioner and Director of Operations into one position and appointed the very capable Gerald Templer to the post. When he went to Malaya in early 1952 he was accompanied by Sir Arthur Young who served as police commissioner. The transition to a community-oriented policing approach took off under these gentlemen.

Templer reviewed the Briggs plan and decided the plan was sound and began to improve the implementation of the plan. Templer and Young recognized the problems
with the police force in that its role of a paramilitary force had distracted it from its intended function to maintain law and order. Selected by the Colonial Office to reform the Malaya Police, Young came to Malaya on a temporary assignment away from his regular job as Commissioner of the City of London Police. Young saw the needed tasks as “to inspire leadership, to ensure confidence, to define command, to distinguish responsibility, and to secure common and effective standards…the Police should be acknowledge as a Service rather than a Force.”

Young’s transformational initiatives took several forms. To assist in the leadership vacuum, he expanded the headquarters and appointed five Senior Assistant Commissioners to handle the departments that he managed, and he appointed a Deputy Commissioner (Field) as liaison between the headquarters and the senior police officers in the states. The second initiative was to improve the training of the police force. Young brought in the Superintendent of the London Police School, John Kane, to head the training program. Kane created the infrastructure needed to educate the police at all levels. He created a police training school in Taiping, and a police college in Selangor. The College provided an eight month course for new trainees and a three month course for current officers that had not been given the proper training at their induction. Furthermore, some 29 carefully selected Malayan officers were sent to a year-long police course in the United Kingdom. Additional training was also instituted for the street policeman with 2,594 attending and 596 noncommissioned officers attending a similar course.

In addition to the lack of training in the police force, Young had some serious problems with standards in the force. From 1952 to 1953, Young found that many of the
recruits taken in during the massive expansion were physically unfit, illiterate or had other duty performance shortcomings, and he designed a program to release them from service and provided job training to ensure they had a means to support themselves when they were let go.66 In addition to those who did not measure up to Young’s duty standards, there was a serious problem with corruption. Over the same period of time he cut 10,000 policemen who he found to be corrupt or otherwise abusing their powers.67

Young also detected the need to incorporate more ethnic Chinese into the regular police force. The Chinese population was almost half of the population of Malaya, but in 1947 there were only 26 Chinese policemen in the force and early efforts to recruit them during the campaign had resulted in increasing this number to 800 in a force of over 20,000 in 1952.68 Young’s recruitment campaign resulted in the increase of this number to 1,824 Chinese in a force of 22,934 by November 1953.69 While the percentage of Chinese policemen was not yet approaching the demographics of the population the gains made were crucial in the police being better able to relate to a large portion of the population.

Young’s final steps to turn the Malay Police into a community oriented police force was his effort to change the mindset of the police from a paramilitary force to one that thought and acted like police. One first act he took was a simple one in changing how the police referred to itself, from a force to a service. To begin this transformation, Young launched “Operation Service.” Its goals were simple, “that the police should be both respected for their efficiency and zeal and esteemed for their kindness and goodwill to the public. The effectiveness of the police depended more than anything else upon the regard of the public and their appreciation that the police performed their duties with tolerance
and understanding. The proper regard of public for police and police for public led in turn to confidence and co-operation.” These goals sound much like the very essence of community-oriented policing. Young drew a clear distinction between the regular police and the auxiliaries, determining that the former were the service for the people and the latter were essentially an armed guard force. Further changes followed, including a new police badge that featured clasped hands, changing the names for police stations from “lock-up room” to “police house” and by the end of 1952 an order was issued that police in ordinary duties in urban areas would not carry rifles; in fact they would carry only one pistol for each pair of policemen on patrol. The result of “Operation Service” was the beginning of the change of the perception of the police from an oppressive tool to one that was the friend of the population and the go-to service for the population to get essential public services. It also spurred other governmental programs designed to show the people that government was there for them, such as the telephone department’s “Operation Courtesy.”

Young did not only focus on the neighborhood policing aspect of his force. He achieved some gains in strategic policing as well, most importantly in the Special Branch conducting intelligence operations similar to police undercover work, stakeouts or stings. Young assigned one fifth of the senior personnel in were assigned to the Special Branch to increase its ability to gather intelligence and conduct operations. In 1952, Young had 277 senior policemen trained in Special Branch courses, and he sent 46 more to extended Chinese language training. Special Branch personnel were successful in penetrating the MCP and supporting organizations to gather information. Its most impressive accomplishment may be the infiltration of one operative into the insurgent organization
who over time rose in trust and ranks to the point where he was selected by the insurgent group to infiltrate the Special Branch, a task that allowed him to feed false information back to the insurgent group. Though less spectacular, the Special Branch was able have agents penetrate various parts of the insurgent group or turn group recruit insurgents or supporters to gain intelligence critical to strategic operations.

An area of the community-oriented policing model that is difficult to detect at the lower levels of the organization is the problem-oriented policing model. However it is easy to examine the entire campaign through the elements of POP, gather data, determine the problem, find a solution and conduct a follow-up. Young’s approach to reforming the police followed this model. He examined the police force (gathered data) and found it lacking in professionalism and basic training (problem), designed a solution (training and elimination of problem officers), and conducted follow-up to ensure his program was meeting the needs of the service.

When Young and Templer’s tenures in Malaya ended in 1954, they had broken the insurgency and set Malaya on the course for its final victory in 1960. Insurgent attacks in 1954 were only 1,077, down from the high of 6,082 in 1951. Insurgent losses were 1,197 for the year, with only 241 security force casualties, down from 1,195 in 1951 and civilian casualties were 185, down from 1,024 in 1951. The security forces in Malaya now filled all aspects of a community-oriented policing model. The army and police auxiliaries (jungle companies and border police) conducted strategic operations outside the cities and villages while a reformed and professional police force worked closely with the population to provide a sense of security, law and order and a connection between the people and the essential services of the government. The population was
participating in the process with the neighborhood watch styled Home Guards. Final defeat of the insurgents would not be declared until 1960 but the successive teams of Gurney/Gray and Templer/Young had developed the force in a policing model that would not be truly recognized until the 1980s.


2 Ibid., 13.


4 Short, 427.

5 Coates, 50.

6 Ibid, 16.

7 Ibid., 18.

8 Ibid., 51.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 38.

11 Short, 121.

12 Coates, 28.


14 Short, 124.

15 Ibid., 125.

16 Ibid., 127.

17 Coates, 123.

18 Ibid., 30.
19Ibid., 123.

20Short, 281.


22John Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 46.

23The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 5.

24Short, 155.

25Newsinger, 47.

26Short, 225.

27Ibid., 162.

28Coates, 24-25.

29Ibid., 25.


31Short, 129.

32Ibid.

33Ibid., 134.

34Ibid., 135.

35Coates, 80.


38Ibid.

Coates, 81.

The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 8.

Newsinger, 50.

Short, 238.

Ibid., 293.

Ibid., 283.

Ibid., 412.

Ibid., 412-413.

Ibid., 413.

Coates, 91, citing Harry Miller, Jungle War in Malaya: The Campaign Against Communism 1948-60 (London: Arthure Barker, 1972) p. 76 and an interview conducted by the author with G. C. Madoc.

Short, 412.

Coates, 100-101.

Short, 285.

Ibid., 290.

Ibid., 278,280.


Short, Appendix Casualties, Incidents, Contacts.

Ibid., 303.

Ibid., 354.

Ibid., 355.

Ibid., 358.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.


67 Ibid., 18.

68 Ibid., 22.


70 Short, 356.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., 357.

73 Coates, 123.


75 Ibid., 20.


77 Short, Appendix Casualties, Incidents and Contacts.

78 Ibid.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY: COP MODEL IN AFGHANISTAN

In the fall of 2001 the United States toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in its opening operation in the Global War on Terror. Since the Soviet invasion in the 1980’s and the insurgency that arose to combat the invaders, Afghanistan had been ruled by warlords and their guns instead of the rule of law. After the stunning victory by the United States over the Taliban, the U.S. and international community was committed to the rebuilding of a stable government and society in Afghanistan. Central to these efforts is the creation of viable security forces that operate on behalf of the people and not the former warlords. This chapter will examine current progress in these endeavors in relation to the community policing model outlined in chapter 2.

Security Force Training in Afghanistan

Prior to the U.S. invasion, there was essentially no police force in Afghanistan. In 2004, the U.S. Institute for Peace report *Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan* surmised that of 3,000 policemen in the city of Kandahar, only 120 had received some form of training and it was of the Soviet variety more than ten years before. The report also estimates that there were 50,000 men serving as police in Afghanistan, though many were ex-Mujahudeen with questionable motives, untrained in police duties, mostly illiterate and ill-equipped.

In early 2002, Germany stepped forward to take the lead Afghan police force reform while the United States took on military reform, Italy judicial reform, Great Britain counter narcotics and Japan the disarmament and re-integration of ex-
combatants.³ Afghanistan opened its police training academy in August of 2002, beginning with 1,500 cadets in either a five-year program for officers and a three month program for non-commissioned officers.⁴ In November 2003, it had 1,000 officer trainees and 500 NCO trainees from 26 provinces and most of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan, and it had 33 women in training.⁵ In 2003, the U.S. State Department established a training program to retrain currently serving police in Afghanistan. The $110 million program was designed to operate one central and seven regional training sites, graduating 700 trainees from the central site every eight weeks from a two-week Transitional Policing course, an eight week basic police skills course for NCOs and officers, or a two to four-week instructor development course.⁶

A September 2003 report on the situation in Afghanistan prepared by the Bonn International Center for Conversion provides a frank look at the situation. It traces the causes of insecurity in Afghanistan to five root causes: warlords, “total spoiler groups” such as the Taliban, the drug trade, interference from other states, and crime.⁷ Progress toward remaking the national army was reflected as slow, with training programs behind schedule, leaving most units without properly trained NCOs and Officers.⁸ Additionally, the short 10-week training program in use leaves questions as to the quality of the trainee it produced. Low pay in comparison to employment opportunities in local militias and crime was contributing to an attrition rate of 50 percent.⁹ A bright spot for the overall professionalization of the army was noted in the selection of officers and NCOs for the units, a process closely monitored by non-Afghan trainers involved in the process. The standards applied during screening by the trainers eliminated many marginal candidates that appeared to have been appointed for political or friendship reasons.¹⁰
In the police force, a similar bleak picture was painted. The BICC report identifies the overall lack of equipment and support structure, lack of an overall police command structure in Afghanistan, and a building distrust between the community and the police because of lack of ethnic diversity in the police force. The report highlighted three developments that were positive steps; the German-run Kabul Police Academy to train professional officers and NCOs, the National Police Training center to train new recruits, and the Ministry of Interior Ali Ahmad Jalali’s plan to implement some strategic policing initiatives to help with the security situation. Jalali’s plan was to accelerate building of a police quick reaction unit to augment local forces when needed, add a highway patrol to help control the spaces between the cities, and to increase the border police to isolate Afghanistan from destabilizing influences from outside the country.

By March 2005, additional progress had been made. The U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that Germany and the United States had succeeded in training 35,000 of the 50,000 policemen that was the goal for the end of 2005, and they expected to have trained 12,000 border police at the same time. It did note however that the police still faced challenges in poor equipment and facilities, militia leaders that are the de facto town leaders, limited training and mentoring after basic police training, and a ministry structure that was still plagued by corruption and an outdated rank structure. The GAO cited examples of untrained policemen maintaining loyalty to local militias and senior police officials pressuring recent graduates to give their new equipment to them and to take part in theft from truck drivers and other travelers. It was also noted that the average policeman made between $30 and $50 a month, less than the $70 the army soldiers made, making criminal activity to augment income an attractive prospect.
corruption in the Ministry itself was also lending itself to a complete lack of oversight of
the police in the field, a key element to preventing corruption in the ranks.

Compounding this problem was a lack of overall plan for what the police would
look like and a clear end state of the German/U.S. force rebuilding program. For
example, the German training program was focused on creating Officers and NCOs, and
though it was not the lead for police training, the United States began a separate training
program to speed up getting policemen on the street for the Afghan elections in 2004.18
Neither country invested much in the field or continuation training of the policemen in
the field, citing poor security and the cost of doing so.19

The Army was faring a little better, with 42 percent of the expected 43,000
ground combat troops trained, however it noted that the little of the supporting
infrastructure, including 21,000 support troops, had been built, although the Department
of Defense listed 2009 as the expected completion date.20 Problems noted with
developing the Army were noted as too few trainers to work with Afghan units after they
completed basic training and the above mentioned lack of supporting infrastructure.21
The U.S. Government had allocated $4.1 billion from 2002 to 2005 to build the Afghan
army and police.22

The progress noted in the GAO report was in two key elements. First was that at
the small unit level, the Afghan army was generally performing well in the field.23 For
the police, it was noted that the Ministry was making some progress to reform with the
establishment of a professional standards unit and a streamlined and modernized
command structure.24
The joint U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State report *Interagency Assessment of Afghan Police Training and Readiness*, released on the 14th of November 2006, provides the most current assessment of what the U.S. sees as the needs of the police force. The police structure has been modified to place more policemen where they are needed, specifically moving some officers from the highway patrol to the border police. The training goal of 62,000 police had nearly been met, though the strength reported to the Ministry of Interior totals over 70,000 on the payroll, an indicator of some problems with accountability in the field. Further hampering the progress toward professionalization was the lack of an effective internal affairs or inspector general function. Since the establishment of the need in 2005, none of the Afghans trained in professional standards or internal affairs was performing this function at the end of 2006. One additional initiative mentioned in the report was the total disbanding of the highway police and moving the personnel into the regular and border police with no mention of how this function would be provided.

Some reform had also been seen in the Ministry of Interior. Key to this reform is the streamlining of the command structure to eliminate unnecessary high ranking positions and to create a pay scale that would reduce the potential for corruption or criminal activity to supplement meager salaries. Table 1 is from the interagency report and reflects a rank structure and pay table that should help professionalize the police.
The report also explains the training programs being conducted. The training consists of “Basic I, II, and III courses, Transition Integration Program (TIP), Border Police courses, Firearms handling, Range training, Building searches, Vehicle Searches, Drill and ceremonies, High risk vehicle stops, Defensive tactics, Baton Training, and Handcuffing techniques.” The report calls the training “relevant for the current security situation in Afghanistan” and that this approach is effective because: “When police recruit graduates return to their local police stations, they are not typically assigned to law enforcement activities. Instead, the ANP policemen are usually assigned to security guard and other entry-level duties. Performing advanced police duties is deferred. Enforcement of criminal laws, including making arrests, is left to more senior police officers and to members of the Criminal Investigation Division.” The continued fielding plan carries on with this training program, amounting to five weeks for literate
trainees and nine weeks for illiterate ones, though a 13-week program was being evaluated.\textsuperscript{32}

In essence, the training program is designed to produce a security guard that returns to his home village to be further evaluated and trained. But the further training is lacking as well, as the report notes that the contractor responsible for supplying the police trainers and mentors in the field had not filled any mentor positions by late 2006.\textsuperscript{33}

In early 2007, the Afghan people have not seen much progress beyond the status in 2005. A key effect of a good community-oriented policing program is that it increases the public perception of security, whether or not it is actually deterring crime or violence. The Center for Strategic and International Studies published a report titled \textit{Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan} on the 23rd of February 2007.\textsuperscript{34} It conducted 1,000 interviews in half of Afghanistan’s provinces, thirteen surveys, polls or focus groups, interviewed 200 experts and conducted daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 other organizations.\textsuperscript{35} It reports main findings are that the Afghan people are losing confidence in the government, that the expectations of the people are not being met, and that conditions in Afghanistan have regressed in all areas but the economy and women’s rights.\textsuperscript{36}

The report also concludes that the people are less safe in early 2007 because of the violence associated with the insurgency/counterinsurgency, unchecked drug trafficking, the continued prevalence of local warlords in Afghan society and that “State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they - particularly the Afghan National Police - have had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight…Traditional, informal
judicial structures continue to fill the gap in justice for many Afghans, while the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt, and is unable to confront impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.”

Analysis of current status

The various documents available on the current status in Afghanistan make for useful analysis of the current situation in the community policing model outlined in chapter two of this work. The analysis will first look at the key enabling elements of a police organization for it to operate as a community policing force and then a look at strategic and neighborhood policing operations will follow. Finally, this work will examine the current narcotics problem in Afghanistan through the problem-oriented policing model.

The first enabler for an effective community policing program is a distinct central organization that facilitates the operation of neighborhood police officers but empowers them to work with the community, and provides ethical oversight of the officers to ensure that corruption does not become an issue. In this task, the Afghan police is severely lacking. There currently is no internal affairs or professional standards function in the police, and the Ministry of the Interior seems unwilling to enforce this requirement on the outlying police posts. Additionally, much of the police force is short on equipment and facilities, another indicator of a lack of strong central command structure.

The second enabler is training. The German approach with long courses for officers and NCOs would seem to be an effective approach for providing well trained officers whose ethical standards meet the needs of the police force. The short courses conducted by the U.S. government that essentially produce security guards are of dubious
value. For comparison, the police academy for the city of San Antonio, Texas trains new recruits for 27 weeks (over 1,100 hours) of instruction, and then assigns the graduate to a field training officer for an additional 14-weeks of one-on-one training out on the streets. It is difficult to believe that an eight week program would produce a policeman with the required skills or ethical standards.

There appear to be shortcomings in the operational construct of the security forces as well. In the strategic policing realm, the elements in place are the border police, highway patrol, a police quick reaction force and the army. These, in totality, appear to cover the basic needs, but the expected elimination of the highway patrol leaves the question of who will control the areas outside the cities. It would appear that the force to do this is the army. While technically capable of this function it would be better to use the army away from the highly populated areas and use police forces along the roadways where they will have much more interaction with the population. If the intent is to use police forces from the cities to patrol the highways, it is advisable to create a standing patrol section to handle this task as it is decidedly different from neighborhood policing skills.

Neighborhood policing should be a strong suite in Afghanistan, but it is not. While police recruits generally return to the area they came from and thus have a strong local knowledge, this same fact lends itself to easy corruption of new recruits. It appears that the old power structures of the local leaders and militia that are not necessarily supportive of the government are still in place in many areas. With new recruits not highly indoctrinated into ethical policing and serving senior police officers not adhering to ethical standards, it would appear that the prospect for continued corruption is
unfortunately great. This corruption further alienates the people from the police forces that should be a great example of the new government.

Further progress is needed to stem the death spiral that the police may be in. Arthur Young’s example from Malaya is clearly appropriate here. The Ministry of Interior needs to act swiftly and decisively to eliminate from its ranks any policeman that takes part in crime or corrupt practices. However, care would need to be taken to provide an employment safety net to prevent personnel fired from becoming insurgents or other problem causers. This act would be for naught if some of the surrounding corruption is not dealt with as well. Local leaders and militias not explicitly loyal to the government need to be eliminated and suitable governance and security put in its place.

The tribal nature of the Afghan people would seem to lend itself to involvement of the people in collective security. What is lacking is the tie to the central government. Militias are raised by local warlords that may or may not be loyal to the central government; these should be incorporated into the overall government security program or immediately disbanded.

Wholesale population relocation is not an option as was done in Malaya, but the U.S. Department of Justice program “Operation Weed and Seed” may be an example of a way to proceed. The initial program in Aurora, Colorado in 1992 consisted of strategic policing initiatives to eliminate problems, neighborhood policing initiatives to create a link between the strategic policing and social services, and neighborhood restoration projects. Key in this approach would be the linkage of social services and reconstruction money to inputs received from the population through the police,
enhancing the police image as a positive entity of the government since the police is the daily visible representation of the government to the people.

In the application of problem-oriented policing concepts, the counter-narcotics program in Afghanistan must be judged a failure. In the elements of problem-oriented policing, determine the problem, analyze it, determines a course of action, implement a program, and then follow up, while relying on community involvement to provide additional data and perspective, few of these steps have been done correctly.

The Senlis Council provides excellent data on the current status to illustrate this point. In its February 2007 report, *Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies*, the council draws the conclusion that much of the insurgency in Afghanistan is related to the narcotics trade. The report lists a key grievance of the people as the poppy eradication program. Eradication is serving to eliminate a main method of supporting families in large areas of Afghanistan, and the central government and international aid is not sufficiently replacing opium as a means to support a family. The average Taliban fighter, supported by revenues from the opium trade, makes four or five times as much a month as an Afghan army soldier or policeman.

The government correctly identified opium as the problem. The analysis of the problem must have been heavily influenced by outside pressures, where the need to stop opium production was judged more important than the local economics of much of the country. The course of action was to outlaw growing poppies and to begin poppy eradication programs. Limited economic help or aid has been provided to replace this form of income for the people. Follow-up has been an increased emphasis on eradication.
The missing piece of this process is community involvement. Afghan farmers are having a hard time understanding the international community pressure to stop opium production when they say they are in Afghanistan to help the people there.\textsuperscript{43}

An alternative approach to this problem would have incorporated the Afghan farmer into the process at the beginning. With their participation, alternatives to opium that the farmers had a hand in creating could have been developed. With community participation the changes are more likely to succeed, though the government would still need to provide the support needed to support families until viable alternatives to opium farming had been developed. As it stands now, the Taliban forces that encourage opium production probably seem a better alternative to many Afghans than the central government that is attempting to eliminate their only means of economic support.

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{U.S. Institute for Peace, Special Report 117: Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan} (March 2004), 11.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{U.S. Institute for Peace}, 10.

\textsuperscript{3}Mark Serda, \textit{Brief 28, Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma: Reforming the Security Sector} (Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 2003), 11.

\textsuperscript{4}\textit{U.S. Institute for Peace}, 11.

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{7}Serda, 10.

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{Ibid.}, 28.

\textsuperscript{9}\textit{Ibid.}, 27-28.

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, 30.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, 33.
12 Ibid., 34.

13 Ibid.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 22.

17 Ibid., 26.

18 Ibid., 19.

19 Ibid., 25.

20 Ibid., 6.

21 Ibid., 17-18.

22 Ibid., 8.

23 Ibid., 18.

24 Ibid., 25.


26 Ibid., 11.

27 Ibid., 33.

28 Ibid., 29.

29 Ibid., 27.

30 Ibid., 19.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 45, 51.

33 Ibid., 25.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 United States, Texas, City of San Antonio, San Antonio Police Department Training Academy, Webpage at http://www.ci.sat.tx.us/sapd/ACADEMY.ASP?
res=1024&ver=true#cadet


41 Ibid., 70.

42 Ibid., 72.

43 Ibid., 78.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study examined community-oriented policing as a model and compared this approach to current counterinsurgency doctrine to determine if community policing is a useful model for counterinsurgency operations. This study has led to three lessons that can be drawn from the community policing model and four recommendations for developing counterinsurgency doctrine.

The first lesson is that community-oriented policing is indeed an effective model for conducting police operations. The case studies show that the impact of this style of policing does not necessarily have a direct impact on crime rates, but the community policing model does have an impact on the public perception of crime and safety. Community policing can also be successful in creating a stronger public-government relationship that can benefit both sides through enhanced communication and responsiveness to needs. Oliver’s model has proven its value as a comprehensive methodology to examine a police force to see if it contains the proper functions to be a community-oriented force.

The second lesson is two-fold. First of all, police forces are central to counterinsurgency operations. The British in Malaya understood the need for security for the population and the establishment of the rule of law as a means to directly counter the insurgents’ attempt to win the support of the population. By placing competent policemen among the people and employing the police to provide government services to meet the needs of the people, the British government was able to isolate the insurgents from the mass of the population and win a greater degree of popular support. This was a key
component in the British victory in Malaya. The second half of this lesson is that a police force must be professional and competent if it is to be an asset in countering an insurgency. The British began by creating a guard force that should not have been called a police force and performed its police duties poorly. Major reforms initiated by Sir Arthur Young in 1952 turned the police into a professional policing agency and instilled in it the spirit that is central to community-oriented policing. This transformation was one of the key enablers for the British program that led to their success. It can be argued that without this transition to a community policing model by the police, the government would not have developed the support of the people as it did and success against the insurgents would have been much more difficult and come at a much higher price. It is important to understand that time is a factor in this development as well. It was four years into the insurgency before the transition to community policing began; it was another eight years before the insurgency was finally defeated.

The third lesson that can be drawn from this study is that community-oriented policing is similar enough to counterinsurgency to be a useful model for military officers to study. The model put forth by Oliver works well in developing a sound analysis of the Malaya insurgency. Since the model proved valid for Malaya, using the model for further analysis of current operations in Afghanistan again showed that the model is an effective tool. Models might not be perfectly adapted to every situation, but they are an excellent starting point. Community-oriented policing is an excellent model to educate the uninitiated into some of the concepts that are critical to conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign. In short, these concepts of community-oriented policing have a place in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Law enforcement agencies
have long been dealing continuously with conditions that are similar to conditions that lead to insurgencies: crime, poverty, and dissatisfaction with governance to name a few. Law enforcement as an institution has worked these problems daily since its inception, and through years of experience and professional study, they have developed tactics for conducting checkpoints; how to patrol an area; how to deal with criminal gangs, drug and human trafficking; vandalism and delinquency, and countless other problems in urban and rural settings. However, it has not been until recently that the law enforcement community realized that it had developed methods to deal with symptoms of the problem and not the problem itself. Community-oriented policing is the law enforcement community’s effort to address the problem in a more effective manner and to link the essential community services to combat the problems they face.

This study proposes three key recommendations for the future. The first recommendation is to use law enforcement training and operational experience to provide a primer for military personnel expected to conduct counterinsurgency. Community-oriented policing and counterinsurgency are close enough in philosophy and conduct that exposure to a law enforcement organization that has a long history of policing a community would certainly be beneficial to military members. Education and familiarization with a community policing program in an inner city environment, observation of how a counter-gang or counter drug unit works to track leadership and break the organization, and even the conduct of saturation patrols and checkpoints in a city environment provide a mental frame of reference for military professionals now called on to do these same functions in Afghanistan or Iraq. Specialized community policing training could be beneficial for the military police forces in the U.S. military to
create a center of expertise in the service. Short courses consisting of a basic overview on policing would also be beneficial for certain unit leaders and planners during the pre-deployment training cycle for units headed to counterinsurgency duties. This could have two important effects for the military.

The first is that a community-oriented policing model serves as a useful starting point for counterinsurgency campaign planning. Community-oriented policing provides a mental model that can be the basis to compare its plan to the military approach in order to uncover gaps or shortfalls. A fortunate aspect to this approach is that there are community-oriented policing programs in the United States that can provide educational opportunities for military officers studying counterinsurgency. The study of the tactics, methods and lessons learned from the various COP programs in both big cities and rural areas can provide exposure to a conceptual framework that is greatly different from the major conventional war training that most military officers receive and help get military officers into the counterinsurgency mindset. One method to obtain this training would be to attend any of the various seminars presented by the International Association of the Chiefs of Police, the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing, followed by a short period of observation and job-shadowing in a large police force that has a community policing program.

A training model to achieve this could have multiple facets. The main force in use by the United States in counterinsurgency is the U.S. Army’s brigade combat team, a mixture of combat and non-combat ground forces teamed together to be a single maneuver element on the battlefield. The basic recommendation is for some level of study for select leaders, staff officers and some lower level soldiers, followed by an
internship at the appropriate level in a police organization. For brigade commanders and other senior leadership, a few days of upper level study of policing and a several day internship with a senior police chief in a large police force would provide a needed exposure to the field. For some of the middle leaders in the brigade, officers and senior noncommissioned officers, study of precinct operations and an internship with a police precinct that operates in all three policing realms (strategic, community, and problem-oriented) would be beneficial. Not every leader need be exposed to this police training, but the battalion and company commanders and a few of the headquarters staff could benefit from it.

A final round of training for lower ranking members, possibly one member from each squad or similar team that would be required to conduct patrols in towns or cities, training in beat officer skills and heavy doses of community policing philosophy and skills would be appropriate and beneficial. Certain other functions may benefit from some other specialized training, such as the military intelligence personnel. Exposure to investigative methods especially crime mapping and link analysis as used to track gangs and organized crime rings could be hugely beneficial. Internships of human intelligence personnel with investigators, especially in areas where the investigator must interact with different cultural groups again could pay huge dividends in developing policing skills that could be beneficial to a unit operating in a counterinsurgency. In the new modular brigade combat team organization there is a military police officer on the brigade staff. The background and training of this officer should be heavy in police operations and less of the other military police functions to ensure there is one expert in these operations on the brigade commander’s staff. Further examination of courses taught to police recruits,
continuation training or those college courses offered at any of a number of colleges would provide additional courses to consider for training military members.

The second recommendation is to thoroughly re-examine the United States policy on and conduct of police training assistance. David Bayley, in his book *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*, details how messy U.S. assistance to police forces abroad is. It is uncoordinated, haphazard and lacks key capacities to be a too for the development of policing that supports democracy-- not to mention being allowed only by exception to U.S. law. David Bayley’s idea of pinning the task on the Department of Justice to be the police assistance agency abroad is commendable, although the department of Justice lacks the skills in regular policing that are sorely needed in developing a police force. However, the European Union has made some steps to ensure it has a pool of police officers available for missions abroad, at one time having 1,500 ready and 5,000 reserves.¹ It would certainly be possible for the United States to match or exceed this figure. One potential solution would be for the Department of Justice establish a pool of experienced beat patrol officers on contract the be available for duties abroad with the same job security protections that members of the U.S. military reserves and National Guard enjoy. In this manner the United States may be able to develop a pool of officers to support United Nations or U.S. police missions abroad. A matching pool of 6,500 officers, similar to the European Union pool of officers, would be a huge step in capability for the United States.

The first priority should be to develop the relationships with those organizations or nations that have police forces that can deploy to conduct policing or train other forces. Countries that are reluctant to contribute military forces for an intervention may be
willing to put for some of their police forces in the post combat reconstruction phase. The international community has contributed significantly to the retraining of the Afghan police force, filling a gap in U.S. capability, while the United Nations stepped in to recreate the police force in Kosovo. But in Iraq there has been very little outside assistance in this matter. If the United States is going to intervene in countries it would be good to have international support, but such support might not be forthcoming in the levels necessary. Therefore, the US ought to look to building its own capacity to train police forces.

U.S. laws concerning police training assistance for other nations needs to be reconsidered in the light of international counterterrorism and counterinsurgency requirements since the beginning of the Global War on Terror began. Policing is critical in a counterinsurgency and, if the Global War on Terror is largely a counterinsurgency campaign, the United States should make police training assistance central to its foreign policy. At the time of this writing, police training assistance is allowed only as an exception to law created in the 1970’s. The current statutes ought to be reexamined in light of current conditions and requirements and a greater capacity to train and advise foreign police agencies ought to be created. A scan of the U.S. Department of State’s webpage for the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs reveals the focus of the agency: control of narcotics, human trafficking, and capacity building in other nations through training courses and country-specific programs to fight corruption and build the rule of law. This agency is designed to work within an existing police structure to help train it; it is not designed for large scale ground-up training and advising of a new police force. The courses offered at the four International Law Enforcement Academies are
advanced skills and taught by U.S. agencies that are not regular police forces: the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center. To add another avenue for the implementation of U.S.
foreign policy goals, the capacity to train foreign police forces must be expanded.

In any case, there is still a large gap in America’s capability to conduct
counterinsurgency, post-conflict, and stability operations such as the Haiti intervention in
the 1990s. Even if the Iraq War winds down, the requirement for the US to assist
countries in need will not likely diminish. One of the priority requirements in a stability
or post-conflict operation is the capability to ensure basic policing is conducted. While
regular military forces can provide some of the tasks needed in the community-oriented
policing model, they do not have the understanding of working in a community that the
police officer has. Even if other countries will contribute police forces for the post-
conflict phase, the military must provide the law enforcement function from the time it
secures an area until a credible police force can take over. If it fails to do so, the scenes
broadcast around the world of the looting and breakdown of social control in Iraq in 2003
will be seen again in future interventions.

To provide this function the U.S. military needs to re-examine its doctrinal
approach to policing, the third recommendation of this thesis. Scanning the current joint
publications that cover post-conflict operations, only one (Joint Publication 3-57 Joint
Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations) mentions the use of military police forces, but it
makes no mention of the role of policing in post-conflict operations.3 The Air Land Sea
Application Center published its Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Peace
Operations in October 2003.4 This publication is not joint doctrine but a collection of
current information on a topic. In it the writers correctly state that the U.S. Military does not have the capacity for community policing, but does give some good insights on effective ways to integrate a host nation or other police force into military operations. The shortfalls in discussing policing in post combat situations or in foreign internal defense programs should be addressed by joint doctrine in a much greater extent than it is now. Fortunately some of the service doctrine is beginning to reflect the importance of policing.

The recently released U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, outlines the importance of policing in a counterinsurgency. As a capstone doctrine document it has opened the door for the further development of doctrine on this subject. Operational service doctrine, however, needs to catch up on the policing requirements of current operations. The U.S. Air Force, with close to 30,000 active duty, reserve and National Guard security force members (military police equivalent) does not include policing duties off its bases in its service regulations. Its wartime duties are to defend airbases and no more. Review of U.S. Army doctrine again shows some unrealized potential. The core missions for the U.S. Army Military police are maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and resettlement, police intelligence operations and law and order operations. The first three are not police functions. The final, law and order, is policing; but in the doctrine it is put forth as the policing of U.S. forces, not the community. Only in Police Intelligence Operations does the doctrine begin to look at the community, but in this case only as an intelligence source through routine or chance contact with the civilian population through the
performance of other duties. It is really only a method to feed the standard Army intelligence process with another source of information.

The need to correct the deficiencies in service doctrine is two fold. The first is to develop a community policing doctrine for the military. This concept should be fully integrated into the regular doctrine for military police forces as something it practices both at home and deployed; this will ensure that the troops are familiar with the concept when they practice it in other countries. Secondly is doctrine on how to provide policing in other countries and police training when needed. An American service member understands much of the cultural dynamic in the United States; but he needs a guideline for policing an country that has different views on social control, law enforcement, and may have been under an oppressive regime. Doctrine should help explain what effective policing is, not necessarily what good American policing is. Adding this facet of community policing to the doctrine would better posture the military to perform policing as it has not been able to yet do.

Good policing is critical in any society and even more so when an insurgency challenges the existence of a government. The British spent a considerable amount of time and money to rebuild the Malay Police and turn it into a professional, community-oriented force and they beat the insurgents in the end. It would serve any organization conducting counterinsurgency to judge their efforts against the British success. The United States must re-examine its policy and capability to provide policing and police training in other nations as a part of its national security strategy.


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