Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act was enacted in 1986, the Navy has not fully embraced jointness within its service culture. Analysis shows that the Navy’s natural culture of independence, shaped by a combination of operating environment and traditional service values, continues to produce a significant barrier to the injection of joint concepts. This paper argues that this barrier can more easily be overcome by beginning joint education for all naval officers prior to commissioning and initial tactical tours. It is proposed that a new joint education program, called JPME Phase Zero, be created to offer specific classroom instruction and summer training to expose midshipmen to joint concepts during the pre-commissioning pipeline. Taught by a joint faculty in a newly created Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval Academy, the JPME Phase Zero program should be aligned with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Joint Officer Development through the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) and Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE). Additionally, it is recommended that JPME Phase Zero be taught to all OCS and NROTC graduates in the summer after their commissioning at the Naval Academy, which will standardize the training for all junior officers and reinforce the bond between all naval officers and the Naval Academy. Although significant counterarguments exist for devoting the resources to make this proposal a reality, JPME Phase Zero is worth the investment because of the increased complexity of the military operating environment and emphasis on joint warfare. By implementing this program in the next few years as detailed in this paper, the Navy can give every naval officer a predisposition to jointness and fix its culture from the ground up.
“The Case For JPME Phase Zero: Building a Joint Culture in the United States Navy From The Ground Up”

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Taking A Fix On Culture: Is The Navy On The Joint Path?

In the two decades since the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act, each military service has charted a different course in implementing joint concepts within their respective culture. One of the most significant challenges created by Goldwater-Nichols was the need to expand joint professional military education (JPME) programs. The military services, charged with educating and training their officer corps in both service-specific and joint matters, continue to struggle with this crucial task of developing the “total officer.” This is especially true in the case of the United States Navy.

Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO) observed over a decade ago that the Navy is the “service that traditionally has been most resistant to change.”\(^i\) From not sending its best officers to war colleges, to emphasizing Navy-centric and command tours over joint qualifications, the Navy certainly does not have the best track record of setting a joint course over the last twenty years. This said, the current Navy leadership has openly admitted that a change is needed to adequately address the importance of jointness. In his March 2007 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen stated, “Our path is designed to create a change in Navy culture so that it values jointness and therefore systematically develops a group of Navy leaders who are strategically minded, capable of critical thinking, and skilled in naval and joint warfare.”\(^ii\)

“With the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.”

- Thomas Jefferson
Changing a culture is a tough and nebulous endeavor. It no doubt requires patience and, in the words of Peter Schwartz, the “art of the long view.” Today, changes in joint requirements and education are ongoing as all the military services implement the Vision For Joint Officer Development set forth in November 2005 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is in this climate, ripe for change and innovation, that the Navy finds itself with a unique opportunity to change its culture and firmly center itself on the joint path.

The key question then becomes, how does the Navy make this course change with the long view in mind? The answer lies in the creation of a new phase of joint professional military education, called “JPME Phase Zero.” This new program, a combination of formal classroom instruction and summer training, will ensure every naval officer is educated in basic joint matters prior to commissioning. By aggressively instituting JPME Phase Zero in the next few years, the Navy can change its culture to truly value jointness from the ground up. And in so doing, the Navy will establish itself as the model service in joint education and officer development.

A Long & Unhappy Engagement: The Navy & The Transition To Jointness

What an organization does every day matters. In a very basic sense, daily tasks play a large role over time in defining a culture. The United States Navy has always had a strong service culture that clearly sets it apart from the other military services. This culture has been shaped by the Navy’s unique operating environment and traditional values such as independent action and initiative.iii
Over the last two centuries, the Navy’s culture of independence has emerged as a result of forces that are arguably diametrically opposed to the concept of jointness. While many of the other services train and fight as teams of combined arms to accomplish missions on land, the Navy throughout its history has spent significant time operating independently in the middle of vast oceans. In naval terms, joint operations often meant working with another ship or within a task force at sea. Integration with forces from other services did not occur until ships operated near land. Until recently, this was hardly considered an operational way of life for ships outside the amphibious warfare community.

On top of this fact, service parochialism has always played a major role in the evolution of joint relationships between services. If services do not work together and trust each other, it can lead to negative relationships that impact operations. Service cooperation perhaps reached a low point in 1899 in the Philippines, when Navy Commodore George Dewey “went so far as to warn General Otis, U.S. Army Commander in the Philippines, that he planned to sink the U.S. Army’s three river gunboats operating on the Pasig River if they entered Dewey’s zone of influence a second time.”

This is not to say that the Navy has always operated alone and far out to sea with no regard to the other services. To be fair, at certain important points in its history, the Navy emerged as a model of joint cooperation. Throughout World War II in the Pacific, and again in Korea, Navy operational commanders and Navy staffs displayed a high level of proficiency in joint operations. This joint expertise, resident in the Navy’s
amphibious warfare community, reached its apex in the 1940s and early 1950s with the highly successful island hopping campaign and the amphibious landing at Inchon.\textsuperscript{v}

Unfortunately, with the emergence of the Cold War, this expertise took a back seat and remained dormant for many decades. The resultant culture of the Navy in the 1980s had a tough time adjusting to sweeping changes in the joint world. The watershed event in this process occurred with the fight over the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Although every service reacted negatively to this legislation and argued against its passage, the Navy’s reaction was particularly vehement. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman argued in very strong terms that the Goldwater-Nichols Act would destroy the core strengths of the American military establishment.\textsuperscript{vi} And in a very telling episode, the Navy set up a “crisis management center”...the “purported mission” of which “was to defeat the [Goldwater-Nichols] legislation, an activity of questionable legality.”\textsuperscript{vii}

Since the end of the Goldwater-Nichols fight, the Navy’s rhetoric has strongly supported the concept of the joint force. In practice, however, it has taken a long time for the Navy to integrate policies that support this public stance. This is particularly true with regards to personnel policies that impact joint education and joint qualification. The history of the Naval War College, the Navy’s premier institution for educating naval officers in joint matters, clearly highlights this fact. Twelve years after Goldwater-Nichols, an article in \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly} painted a grim picture when it reported that “naval colleges still suffer from the conviction of their leaders that their
best and brightest have no time to attend…it sends few of its top officers to its own war college.”

In writing about the Navy in the century before World War II, retired Vice Admiral James Calvert observed that “the marriage of American industrial power and the Navy was preceded by a long and fitfully unhappy engagement; we were slow in developing the steel-and-steam warship in our Navy.” The dramatic culture shift from sail to steam took a long time to work itself out, but in the end, American industrial might produced the naval forces that destroyed the Japanese Fleet and won the war in the Pacific. The Navy’s culture at the time, cemented in tradition, finally embraced the changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution and emerged as the world’s premier naval force.

The culture shift that joint warfare represents to the modern Navy is no less significant than the shift from sail to steam. There are indications in the last few years that the Navy’s “long and unhappy engagement” with the joint world that began with Goldwater-Nichols has turned a corner. A prime example of this shift is the surface warfare community’s recent overhaul of the officer career pipeline. This dramatic change, a policy called “XO-CO Fleet Up,” allows for more flexibility in joint education and completion of multiple joint tours. Aligned with the Joint Staff’s 2005 Vision For Joint Officer Development, this new career path ensures that surface warfare officers “are better able to excel in the joint arena while meeting all career milestones.”

The bottom line behind this recent overhaul was that the surface warfare community was consistently failing to meet its quota of senior representation on joint
and combatant commander staffs. This situation developed due to many years of neglect with respect to joint officer development. Eventually, something had to be done to correct the shortfall. While the recent shift in policy is a step in the right direction, it will be years until this new initiative bears fruit and corrects this portion of the joint manning deficiency.

In many ways, this example illustrates the reactive nature of the Navy’s leadership in addressing shortcomings in the joint world. More importantly, the example involving the surface force is only one part of a larger “joint marriage” involving the entire service. The Navy has come a long way since Commodore Dewey’s words to General Otis over a century ago, but there is still a long way to go.

**No Officer Left Behind: PME, JPME, & The Realization Of A Vision**

It is important to understand that the issue of joint professional military education is only part of a larger and very complex framework. Each military service must develop their officers through service-specific professional military education (PME), in addition to the requirements for JPME. In the 2005 Vision for Joint Officer Development, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined that the military services “must mentor all officers toward the Joint Officer Development objective...the Services must develop a no-officer-left-behind attitude.” To achieve this vision, the crucial task of integrating PME with JPME presents a significant challenge.

Leaving it to each service to address service-specific PME, the Joint Staff has aggressively coordinated and improved cohesion among the various formalized JPME
programs. A cornerstone of this effort is the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), which is chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff. Meeting annually with representatives from every JPME institution, the purpose of the MECC is “to address key educational issues of interest to the joint education community, promote cooperation and collaboration among the MECC member institutions, and coordinate joint education initiatives.”

In addition to the MECC, the Joint Staff oversees the formal Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE). PAJE teams visit all JPME institutions on a periodic basis for inspection and assessment. Reporting directly to the Chairman, the PAJE serves as the accreditation authority and plays a critical role in ensuring that joint education is standardized across various joint educational institutions. The PAJE, coupled with the MECC process, has made significant strides in the last decade in strengthening the JPME Phase I and II programs and the institutions that administer them. Due to this focus and aggressive oversight by the Joint Staff, joint education as a whole has significantly improved since Goldwater-Nichols.

However, the JPME Phase I and II programs focus only on intermediate and senior level joint education. The intermediate phase focuses on majors and lieutenant commanders with over ten years of commissioned service. The senior level phase focuses on officers with over fifteen years of service. Strengthening the intermediate and senior levels of JPME education is vitally important to educating the joint force, but this only goes so far. Many would argue that it leaves out the most important part of joint education, the education received in the first half of an officer’s career.
In describing the vision of a “continuum of joint education,” the Joint Chiefs instruction clearly states that “officers receive JPME from pre-commissioning through the general/flag officer level.” This policy implements the finding of a previous Joint Staff effort in 1998, called “JPME 2010.” The JPME 2010 requirements team “confirmed that a seamless, flexible JPME system is needed for officers from pre-commissioning to the general/flag level.” The problem, twenty years after Goldwater-Nichols, is that this vision is not yet a reality.

Describing the importance of getting lifelong joint education right, the Chairman’s Vision for Joint Officer Development clearly spells out that “schoolhouses are the petri dishes for organizational culture.” To this point in time, the Chairman has left the implementation of the first two phases of the joint education continuum, the pre-commissioning phase and the primary phase, up to each individual service. Except for a report by each Service Chief to the Chairman every three years describing the nature of these programs, no oversight or inspection of this level of joint education is conducted. These programs are not standardized across the services. Furthermore, they are not included in either the MECC or PAJE process.

This lack of attention towards initial joint education is surprising, because it allows joint culture to begin to grow in service-specific “petri dishes” without the same rigorous oversight given to that same dish ten years down the road. It is time for this to change. And there is no better place to start than with the Navy, the service that continues to struggle the most with the inculcation of joint culture.
The Soul of the Navy: The Case For JPME Phase Zero

The Naval Academy is the Navy’s premier undergraduate educational institution and a key commissioning source of naval officers. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), a Naval Academy graduate and retired Navy Captain, recently wrote that the Naval Academy “stands as the very soul of the United States Navy.”xvi For these reasons and others that will be detailed below, the Naval Academy is the right place to implement the Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program. This program should commence in the next two years and follow four specific steps:

I. Establish Navy-wide JPME Phase Zero for all naval officers during the pre-commissioning phase of training.

JPME Phase Zero will fill the current void in the pre-commissioning and primary levels of joint education, and in the process build the foundation for all future JPME. Simply put, it will set the stage for and enhance JPME Phase I and II programs currently in place. The goal of JPME Phase Zero is not the creation of Joint Qualified Officers (JQO’s) at commissioning, but simply to meet the Chairman’s vision of the end state of the pre-commissioning and primary phases of JPME. Stressing the basics only, this includes “an introduction to their respective Service…knowledge of the basic US defense structure, roles and missions of other Military Services, the combatant command structure…and the nature of American military power and joint warfare.”xvii

To achieve this end state, the proposal for JPME Phase Zero consists of the following two programs:
A. **Joint Military Operations (JMO) basic course of instruction.** In the spirit of the JMO course currently taught at the Naval War College for JPME Phase I, this course will be taught in the second-class (junior) year for all midshipmen. It is proposed that this course be a three hour class with no lab time (3-0-3). The objective for this formalized course will be to teach midshipmen the basics of joint warfare in order to give them a framework upon which to build throughout their careers. It will fulfill all joint learning areas and objectives for pre-commissioning level and primary-level programs as outlined in CJCSI 1800.01C. Textbooks for this course will include *The Armed Forces Officer, Joint Pub 1,* and *Joint Pub 0-2.*

B. **JOINT-MID summer training.** Classroom instruction can only go so far.

Summer training, where midshipmen visit the Fleet and get hands on experience, “provides some of the most enjoyable, most professionally enriching, most memorable experiences at the Academy.” Building on the current Professional Training for Midshipmen (PROTRAMID) program, where midshipmen spend one week with each warfare specialty before their junior year (naval aviation, submarines, marines), JOINT-MID will expose midshipmen to a joint warfare command (JFCOM, PACOM, STRATCOM, CENTCOM, etc.) for two weeks during their first-class (senior) summer. This summer experience will give midshipmen a first-hand appreciation for current challenges in the joint world and reinforce the JMO course of instruction they received the previous academic year.
II. Create a Joint Military Operations (JMO) Department at the United States Naval Academy to develop, execute, and manage JPME Phase Zero for all naval commissioning sources.

To execute and teach JPME Phase Zero, a new Joint Military Operations (JMO) Department should be created and staffed by a truly joint faculty. Smaller but similar in construct to current war college faculties, these instructors from all the military services should be senior officers (O-5/O-6) with significant joint experience. Staffing this department will be a significant challenge, but several options are available.

As many have observed, “It has taken nearly a generation to grow a cadre of joint officers and a body of joint knowledge.”xix But after twenty years of the Goldwater-Nichols joint force, that knowledge and experience does in fact exist. It is proposed that faculty in this department be a mix of retired and active duty personnel. Active duty personnel on the JMO Department faculty should be incorporated into the Navy’s current Permanent Military Professor (PMP) program to ensure longevity and consistency of the instructors. Finally, the chairman of this department should be an officer of significant stature. This could take the form of a distinguished chair, and could potentially be a retired flag or general officer with the experience of multiple joint commands.

The new JMO Department at the Naval Academy should fall under the Division of Professional Development in Luce Hall (Figure 1). This will place the department in the same academic division as the Department of Professional Programs, which coordinates midshipman summer training programs and service assignment. This will
allow fluid coordination between the JMO basic academic course taught by the JMO faculty and the JOINT-MID summer program to be executed by the Department of Professional Programs. A cadre of JMO faculty should liaison directly with Professional Programs to lead the JOINT-MID summer program.

With JPME Phase Zero set up in this manner, the Naval Academy’s JMO Department could execute JPME Phase Zero for Officer Candidate School (OCS)/Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) graduates as well. Most naval officers are commissioned through these two programs, so developing a program that does not address these officers makes little sense. Therefore, it is proposed that all OCS/NROTC graduates spend one month in temporary duty at the Naval Academy in the summer immediately following their commissioning and prior to reporting to their first duty station.

In an intense summer school experience taught by the JMO faculty, these new officers will receive instruction in the JMO basic course while living on the
Naval Academy grounds. During the summer months, several wings of the Naval Academy’s dormitory, Bancroft Hall, are left vacant as midshipmen participate in various summer programs. The cost savings of berthing and messing OCS/NROTC officers at the Naval Academy is an obvious advantage to this proposal. Additionally, by living in Bancroft Hall and receiving in-residence instruction at the Naval Academy, all commissioned officers will receive the same standardized training prior to reporting to the Fleet. And if executed correctly, this program could create a significant bond between every naval officer and the institution that is the “soul of the United States Navy.”

III. *Once established, include Naval Academy JPME Phase Zero leadership in the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) process.*

The Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program at the Naval Academy should be integrated into the existing MECC process. The Joint Staff’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) should be modified to include the Chairman of the Naval Academy’s Joint Military Operations Department in the MECC Principals and MECC Working Group. This will finally align the pre-commissioning and primary levels of joint education with the other phases of joint education and bring them firmly under one umbrella. As the Naval Academy model is expanded to other service academies, the MECC process will strengthen JPME Phase Zero across the entire military establishment in the same manner it has done for JPME Phase I and II programs.
IV. **Expand the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) charter to include JPME Phase Zero.**

The Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program at the Naval Academy should be immediately integrated into the Joint Staff’s PAJE process. This will ensure that this pilot program is given the proper oversight and is aligned fully with the Chairman’s vision. Creating a program that is simply a “check in the block” will, in the end, do more harm than good. Therefore, it is imperative that initial certification and accreditation be rigorous. Lessons learned must be properly documented for future application in the potential expansion of the program to other service academies.

Implementation and certification of the Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program should occur no later than 2010. Accreditation should occur no later than 2012.

**First Things First: Tactical Proficiency & The Zero Sum Game**

The creation of a JPME Phase Zero program in the Navy has many advantages. First and foremost, it aggressively pursues the vision of developing joint officers by attempting to get out in front on the issue of early joint education. A second strength of the proposal is that it standardizes the first joint exposure and initial joint education of all naval officers. If done correctly, this program could reap huge benefits down the line, lay the positive foundation for a service-wide joint culture, and enhance JPME Phase I and II education in the future. But the opposite is also true, and there are many additional arguments for why this program will simply not work as proposed.
Congressman Skelton, often referred to as the “godfather of joint education,” observed that “service expertise comes first” and that “finding time for both service and joint training is difficult.” This is no doubt the case. Tactical proficiency and service-specific knowledge are vital building blocks to understanding joint concepts. Taking this one step further, the argument can easily be made that joint education does not make sense at all until basic tactical proficiency is achieved.

In addition to the issue of tactical proficiency, early training and education is a “zero sum game.” If JPME Phase Zero is established at the Naval Academy as proposed, something over the four-year program must be removed or modified. This is a contentious subject with passionate arguments on every side. One only has to look at the intense battles in the last fifty years over the Naval Academy’s curriculum to see that this is a lightning rod issue.

The case could also be made that the current Naval Academy curriculum does not need to be modified because it already meets the spirit of what is required for joint training. Midshipmen at the Naval Academy are currently introduced to the basics of the other services throughout initial indoctrination, including ranks, rates, organization, and platforms of the other services. This is reinforced during various lectures within the curriculum in the Department of Professional Development.

Additionally, joint culture is promoted through the Service Academy Exchange Program (SAEP). A program that dates back to 1949, SAEP permits a select few midshipmen and cadets from each service academy to spend an entire semester at another academy as exchange students. This program, intended to increase “the
understanding and good relations between the service academies and the four services, \textsuperscript{xxi} is a prime example of early promotion of joint culture currently in place.

But does the present level of joint instruction and programs such as SAEP go far enough in building a joint culture within the Navy? The answer can certainly be argued back and forth, but two key points bring to light the shortcomings in the current system. First, only a handful of midshipmen participate in SAEP, so this hardly qualifies as a program that develops a joint culture for every future naval officer. Secondly, the current placement and nature of instruction in joint concepts is not comprehensive enough to highlight its importance. A few lectures scattered throughout courses in naval warfare, leadership, seamanship, and navigation cannot possibly impress upon midshipmen the significance of joint warfare and joint education. This is especially true when these lectures are conducted by junior officers with little or no joint experience.

The issues with Naval Academy curriculum instruction aside, there is the predominate belief that early joint education can best be accomplished through less formal means. Even the Chairman’s Vision for Joint Officer Development discusses a proposal for online distance education via a “Joint Learning Portal (JLP).” The intent of this computer-based instruction is to fill the current void and assist junior officers in receiving joint education before they reach JPME Phase I programs as lieutenant commanders and majors.\textsuperscript{xxii} The cost savings alone of this approach is hard to argue.

In the end, the determining factor is sorting out these approaches boils down to measures of effectiveness. But measuring the “jointness of a culture”, and the various
effects of certain programs on that culture, is a tough, if not impossible, task. This could take decades to sort out, and that amount of time is not available. The time to act is now.

**Shifting The Rudder From Reactive To Proactive: A Predisposition to Jointness**

The rapidly changing environment in the post-Cold War and post-September 11\textsuperscript{th} world overshadows the arguments against JPME Phase Zero. The military’s operating environment is becoming more and more complex with the addition of various government agencies and non-governmental organizations working alongside our forces. Calls for an “interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act” are increasing. In this environment, an early grasp of basic joint concepts is more essential than ever for junior officers. Retired Army Lieutenant General Dick Chilcoat, a former President of National Defense University, foreshadowed this fact in 1999 when he wrote, “A strong sense of jointness will be even more important tomorrow. The synchronization of joint combat power is occurring at lower levels---brigades, ships, and squadrons…moreover, future military operations will increasingly include the integration of interagency and multi-national participants.”\textsuperscript{xxiii}

Given the increased importance of understanding joint concepts immediately upon commissioning, early joint education is too important to trust to computer-based methods. The mere notion of junior officers learning about joint warfare and what it means to work *together* in their profession by *sitting alone* at a computer console is, in and of itself, a contradiction. This proposal also goes against lessons learned from
decades of JPME Phase I and II instruction at war colleges. Some of the most important parts of joint education lie in the social aspects of the education, and the interaction between officers of different services.

Numerous studies and articles in the last twenty years have highlighted various issues with educating the joint force in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols. Many experts, including retired Admiral William Owens, have identified shortfalls and urged action in addressing early joint education at service academies and other pre-commissioning programs. Extensive studies by renowned think tanks have called for the development of “synergy between service academies and training programs, such as Officer Candidate Schools and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.” But few of these studies have outlined a detailed plan for achieving this goal. JPME Phase Zero, beginning with the United States Navy as the pilot program, does just that.

In the end, JPME Phase Zero will be a small step forward in a much larger journey. Success of this program will not be measured for years to come, and even then, it will be hard to quantify. But investment in education is never a mistake. By trusting in the long view, and proactively addressing the shortfall in pre-commissioning and primary joint education, the Navy can “shift the rudder” on decades of counterproductive and reactive policies. In the process, JPME Phase Zero will give every naval officer a predisposition to jointness, change the Navy’s culture from the ground up, and set the course for the lifelong education of the future joint force.

“History, modern and ancient, has invariably shown that an efficient personnel is the greatest factor toward an effective navy.”

- Theodore Roosevelt


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