**Title:** Development of the J9: An Operational Level Directorate for Security & Stability Operations for the Military

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**ABSTRACT**

The United States has routinely suffered in its execution of Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction efforts. Many historical case studies suggest that this is a result of not having an ever-present, multi-disciplined staff at the operational level devoted to monitoring and planning for potential SSTR operations. Specifically, the WWII occupation of Germany, the CORDS program in Vietnam, and OIF are referenced. The role of the military in SSTR should be to lead the efforts of security and stability and support the efforts of transition and reconstruction. An operational level directorate for SSTR would provide the GCC the capability to effectively lead security and stability operations. This directorate should be composed of officers representing civil affairs, intelligence, logistical support, law enforcement, legal, PSYOPS, finance, and the chaplaincy. These disciplines, coupled with a JIACG, are critical to SSTR planning.

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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10 May 2007

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Abstract

The United States has routinely suffered in its execution of Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction efforts. Many historical case studies suggest that this is a result of not having an ever-present, multi-disciplined staff at the operational level devoted to monitoring and planning for potential SSTR operations. Specifically, the WWII occupation of Germany, the CORDS program in Vietnam, and OIF are referenced. The role of the military in SSTR should be to lead the efforts of security and stability and support the efforts of transition and reconstruction. An operational level directorate for SSTR would provide the GCC the capability to effectively lead security and stability operations. This directorate should be composed of officers representing civil affairs, intelligence, logistical support, law enforcement, legal, PSYOPS, finance, and the chaplaincy. These disciplines, coupled with a JIACG, are critical to SSTR planning.
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Introduction

There are many terms used to describe the security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) process: peacekeeping operations, pacification, civil-military operations. Despite the label, there are currently three truths about SSTR. First, the military has been involved with SSTR in almost every U.S. conflict. Second, the military will be first on scene during and after kinetic operations and in a position to begin SSTR operations. Finally, the United States has routinely struggled in executing successful SSTR operations.

SSTR is always a long-term endeavor. Following the Civil War, Union Troops occupied the South for 12 years beyond Appomattox.¹ The Allied occupation of Germany did not cease until 1955. In Vietnam, the US never fully developed a successful SSTR strategy.² Now the United States finds itself involved, yet again, in lengthy and difficult SSTR operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in necessary organizational changes at the strategic and tactical levels to address the SSTR problem. However, attention now needs to be turned to the operational level, and specifically to the Geographic Combatant Commanders’ (GCC) staffs. The key to improving U.S. successes in SSTR is to stand up an ever-present, multi-disciplined directorate on the GCC staff devoted to constant monitoring of SSTR activities and preparing operational plans related to those activities. In particular, military SSTR planners should focus on the security and stability aspect of SSTR. The research presented supports this thesis by showing how past SSTR operations could have been improved if a long-term SSTR staff was present throughout the conflict planning. The research will also

show how current doctrine and practice does not fill the SSTR requirements for the GCC. Finally, recommendations will be made highlighting what disciplines should be included in a security and stability directorate. As with any analysis of operational concepts, it is important to begin with historical study.

**Historical Cases Studies for SSTR Planning**

It has already been asserted that the U.S. track record for SSTR operations has been less than successful. Furthermore, this lack of success could be attributed to the United States’ inability to effectively plan and prepare military troops for these types of operations. Looking at three cases with varied approaches and results reveals how the reactionary approach to developing an operational level SSTR cell has hampered success.

The western occupation of German following World War II has often been pointed to as one of the more successful SSTR operations. This success stemmed from the establishment of a military organization responsible for planning for the occupation. It could be said that SSTR planning for Germany started in May 1942 with the opening of the School of Military Government. From the time the school was created until the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEB) formed its final version of a civil affairs (CA) planning staff in April 1944, military involvement in the occupation was scrutinized by many, including President Roosevelt. Finalizing a CA planning cell was also hampered by conflicts in coalition desires for occupation. Despite these challenges, SHAEB CA planners

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5 Ibid, 13.
6 Ibid, 29.
were able to develop a basic SSTR plan that addressed the anticipated conditions of occupation.

The plan that was developed, Operation Eclipse, provided Allied forces with basic guidance for responding to conditions in occupied Germany. Troops effectively disarmed German forces, mobilized resources to restore basic services, and aside from isolated cases of hunger, avoided mass starvation amidst severe food shortages. However, there were some problems with the Eclipse plan. Estimates of displaced persons were extremely low and caused much difficulty for occupying troops. Perhaps the biggest disconnect in the plan was its failure to address the use of Nazi party members for governance in liberated areas. In many cases, liberating troops would replace Nazi officials with anti-Nazi personnel only to have U.S. Army Military Government officials return Nazis to positions of governance. These inadequacies in the plan may have been avoided if Allied CA staffs had been able to focus completely on planning instead of struggling for existence in the years prior to D-Day.

Although Operation Eclipse suffered some shortcomings, CA planners for the German occupation had created an effective template for SSTR planning. This planning effort was possible only because a staff was formed well in advance and given the opportunity to address SSTR issues at the operational level prior to D-day. Unfortunately, this staff template was forgotten when the occupation ended, leading to an SSTR nightmare two decades later in Southeast Asia.

In the mid-1950s, as the military activity in Vietnam gradually increased, military leadership was without a robust planning cell capable of handling the SSTR issues present in

9 Ibid, 81.
country. In a conflict where the underlying political objective was to sell democracy and prevent the spread of Communism, it was imperative to show how a democratic solution to Vietnamese issues could foster a stable environment. Thus, the SSTR efforts (known then as pacification) should have been the main effort in the Vietnam campaign.

Although President Kennedy formed the USAID program early to address some of the SSTR issues, it was not until 1966 that President Johnson laid the foundation for operational level SSTR planning. President Johnson appointed Robert Komer the head of the pacification efforts to combat the “other war” in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{10} Komer was able to quickly consolidate the U.S. SSTR efforts in Vietnam into the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). CORDS was integrated into the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and once again, the military found itself the lead in SSTR operations. Although CORDS showed much potential in unifying military and other U.S. government agency efforts to address pacification, it was unable to effectively attack the insurgency that had developed from the unstable conditions. Had a CORDS construct existed earlier, an effective SSTR concept may have emerged to complement the kinetic operations focus prevalent in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{11} Instead, the CORDS concept disappeared from military doctrine upon the nation’s official withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. Losing this staff concept hampered the ability to conduct SSTR operations effectively throughout the Cold War and into the United States’ most recent conflict in Iraq.

There is much criticism already published regarding the failed United States’ failure to adequately plan for SSTR in Iraq. Although the US had developed competent CA organizations and doctrine, military planning efforts SSTR in Iraq started late in the overall

\textsuperscript{10} Jones, 104.
planning timeline.\textsuperscript{12} Not until January of 2003, two months prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, did a formal planning cell, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) start mobilizing and developing a plan. ORHA immediately set forth attempting to provide analysis of potential post-conflict scenarios. However, hampered by inadequate planning time, interference from higher level policy makers, and lack of effective integration with specialist in the State Department, ORHA derived assumptions that were well off mark. These ill-conceived assumptions hampered the development of an effective operational-level SSTR plan.

The lack of an effective plan led to almost immediate security issues as well as a dangerous gap in basic civil services and critical infrastructure.\textsuperscript{13} Military commanders at the tactical level were forced to act as governors of cities in the absence of a planned approach to SSTR in theater. This failure to develop an effective SSTR plan has led to a prolonged occupation in a non-permissive environment. Since the official declaration of the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, over 3190 US military servicemen have died executing SSTR operations in Iraq\textsuperscript{14}.

These case studies point to the importance of establishing a cell capable of developing SSTR plans early in the planning process. However, before looking at how this cell should be structured, it is important to understand what role in the military will play in SSTR operations.

\textbf{Separating the “SS” from “TR”}

One of the unstated assumptions in the current attempts to tackle the SSTR issue is that SSTR is a single entity. Security, stability, transition, and reconstruction are interrelated.

\textsuperscript{14} http://icasualties.org/oif/
However, to truly attack the problem, one must look at each phase separately to determine the role that a given organization should play in that phase. To do this, it is important to define the terms. This study uses the definitions found in Table 1.

Table 1. Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Definitions\(^{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Security</th>
<th>A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences</th>
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<td>Stability</td>
<td>An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>The process by which military control of a permissive environment is given over to either non-military U.S. or indigenous governing agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>Those processes that improve essential governmental services, infrastructure, and economy to further a region’s capacity to exist as a self-governed, responsible and functional state.</td>
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General Anthony Zinni identifies a critical gap that exists between the time kinetic operations cease and reconstruction efforts begin.\(^{16}\) This gap finds the military soldier “stuck” in place, looking back over his shoulder as if to ask “what the next step would be?”\(^{17}\) As a result, the military commanders almost routinely take it upon themselves to conduct ad hoc SSTR programs.\(^{18}\) Sometimes these efforts are successful, but often lead to less than beneficial results primarily due to the lack of guidance from the operational level.

\(^{15}\) Definitions for “security” and “stability” are found in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, DC: 22 March 2007), 478 and 504. Definitions for “transition” and “reconstruction” have been derived through study of the topic.


\(^{18}\) For examples of this in current U.S. operations, see the following:
David Buckwalter and Donald K. Hansen, "Fallujah: The Second Time Around" (Unpublished Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: April 2006); (Continued next page)
All elements of U.S. national power participate in each phase of SSTR. Bridging the SSTR gap begins with determining which organization should lead a given SSTR phase. For ease of discussion, assume a unilateral scenario. The desired end state of any conflict is summed up in the 2006 National Security Strategy which establishes the goal “…to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” Working backward from this end state, successful reconstruction should be conducted in a permissive environment led by the State Department as well as the recovering nation. Military involvement by this phase should be limited to training and advisory roles that help build the recovering nation’s defense.

The transition phase should usher in the finalization of a permissive environment represented by pre-determined criteria. The State Department should lead this phase as well. However, this phase will be characterized by an almost equal sharing of the load between the State Department and Department of Defense (DoD). During this phase, all aspects of governance be appropriately removed from military leadership and placed back in the hands of civilian control.

Stabilization and security (S²) are more difficult to separate since by definition they co-exist. Additionally, S² operations will often be conducted in parallel with kinetic operations. The critical infrastructure and basic elements of governance that characterize stabilization need to be revitalized as soon as possible even if security threats still exist. For this reason, the military should be the lead for these phases. Military members take an oath to be put in harms way and have the established culture, resources, and manpower that allow


for the execution of orders within the chaos of these environments.

This division of responsibilities is not new (See Figure 1). Although never truly put into practice, CA planners for the occupation of Germany in World War II conceived a three-phase plan known as Slash 100. This plan called for “…a military phase of complete military government…; a transitional middle phase in which military command would pass its authority to a [non-military] control commission; and a final phase in which the occupations [under civilian leadership] would assume a permanent form.”

This plan was never implemented simply because the civilian Allied policymakers could not agree on a final phase end-state from which the previous two phases could be planned. Still, the idea that the military should be the lead of any phase of SSTR is met with confrontation.

It is routinely argued that this concept looks too much like “occupations” of old and should be avoided. Bob Woodward contends that the National Security Advisor opposed the idea of military governance in Iraq. However, it is a historical fact that the military is the primary operator in the non-permissive environments of S² operations. The United States has

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20 Ziemke, 58.
21 Ibid, 58.
22 Woodward, 111.
repeatedly attempted to seek non-military alternatives for occupation, only to fall back on military solutions. In all three case studies previously addresses, U.S. policymakers attempted to create civilian organizations to combat S² issues in lieu of the military. In every case, the responsibility for S² ended up as a military mission. Why should the United States expect this trend to change? By not insisting that the military lead S² operations, many military troops are put at risk. To combat the unstable, post-conflict environment, military control is a necessity. Because of this, the military must embrace this mission and put it on even par with kinetic operations. This starts with the military’s approach to the operational planning of S² activities.

**Recent Developments in SSTR Organization and Doctrine**

Many organizational and doctrinal developments related to SSTR have recently occurred. At the strategic level, Congress approved the formation of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to consolidate many SSTR efforts. Unfortunately, the S/CRS focuses on the civilian aspects of SSTR and is by no means capable of the robust planning required for military forces to operate in a post-conflict environment.  

Also at the strategic level is the guidance provided in DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for SSTR Operations*. Although many responsibilities are mandated in this directive, the focus is at the national (DoD) level and fails to mandate any sort of formal directorate at the operational level to handle the vast SSTR requirements for the GCC.

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23 Fischer, 76.
25 DODD 3000.5 does establish the requirement for a Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations, but this one officer does not constitute a directorate.
Much work has also been put into developing tactical level solutions to the SSTR problem. One example is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept which has become the accepted solution to bringing interagency aid to unstable regions. However, there is no formal doctrine for the use of PRTs and, according to Michael McNerney, the PRTs have been hampered by “…inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and, most important, limited resources…”  

Joint doctrine also discusses the use of Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) by a Joint Forces Commander. The CMOC (or variations of a CMOC) is stood up when the level of civilian support in a given area of operations merits the need to coordinate civilian and military efforts. Unfortunately, the military can only hope to coordinate and does not command the efforts of those civilian organizations. Various other military and interagency organizations have been formed to respond to SSTR issues at the tactical level and are referenced throughout Joint and Army doctrine. Unfortunately, none of these organizations attack S² issues from an operational perspective for the GCC.

At the operational level, joint doctrine gives some guidance for the formation of a Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) underneath the Joint Force Land Component Commander. The JCMOTF “…provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within

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Unfortunately, the JCMOTF focuses primarily on CA activities and does not represent all disciplines required for effective S² operations.

Another operational level development is the recent emphasis being placed on the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG). The focus of the JIACG is to incorporate other U.S. governmental agencies into the GCC staff. This is perhaps the first true attempt to provide jointness in the interagency arena and is reminiscent of the CORDS program from Vietnam. So far, the other agencies have responded fairly well in their commitment to the JIACG concept. However, there is no consensus across the various GCCs as to how to use a JIACG. There isn’t even consensus on where the JIACG fits in the staff. In CENTCOM, the JIACG resides in the J3 (Operations). In PACOM and EUCOM, the JIACG resides in the J5 (Plans and Policy). SOUTHCOM has developed a J9 to act as the JIACG. In the end, while the JIACG is important for coordinating interagency efforts and soliciting resources and aid, it does not address the fundamental problem of having a body within the GCC staff devoted to the military responsibilities in S² operations.

In the various formal and informal interviews and discussions conducted during this research, the sentiment has come forth that the organizations already established either in doctrine or in practice are the enough to handle the GCC’s S² interests. It is true that these organizations are important and must continue to develop at the tactical and strategic level to address S² operations. However, these organizations will never be able to address the operational level requirements for S² for one main reason: they are by definition, temporary. All the organizations (except the JIACG) exist only when an operation is being executed. The types of activities necessary to combat instability require an organization that is ever-

28 Collected from multiple telephone interviews with staff representatives from the various GCCs.
present, not reactionary. In order to prevent or effectively plan for future S\textsuperscript{2} operations, the GCCs must create a directorate that focuses on problems before they happen.

There is a model for an SSTR directorate buried in doctrine. Although joint doctrine does not address the need for a standing SSTR directorate within the GCC staff, Army Field Manual 3-05.4 explains that each GCC should have a Theater Special Operations Cell (TSOC). The TSOC has within its construct a J9 responsible for civil military operations (CMO). The J9 “...provides deliberate and contingency planning, maintenance of existing plans, and assessments and support [for] the GCC.”\textsuperscript{29} The field manual also indicates that the J9 function is usually supplied by a Civil Affairs Command responsible for a given GCC’s region. The field manual also discusses CMO staffs at lower levels as well. These lower level CMO staffs do exist in Iraq and Afghanistan today. However, the J9 at the GCC level does not.

For example, CENTCOM does not have a J9 and at the present time has a four person SSTR division under the J5. This staff is all that remains from a recently disbanded 15 to 30 person CMO division of the J5.\textsuperscript{30} Four people can hardly be expected to handle the GCC’s SSTR requirements for an entire region. Furthermore, coordination with the CENTCOM SSTR staff and its respective Civil Affairs Command appears to be weak.\textsuperscript{31} SOUTHCOM does have a J9, but it is basically a renamed JIACG.\textsuperscript{32} EUCOM is difficult to analyze at this point due to the organizational shake-up the new AFRICOM is driving. However, it appears that the limited SSTR planners EUCOM has are spread out through regional J5 divisions. The reality is that the GCC staffs have not fully responded to the guidance provided in Field

\textsuperscript{29} Department of the Army, \textit{Civil Affairs Operations}, FM 3-05.4 (Washington, DC: 15 September 2006), 2-27.
\textsuperscript{30} Anonymous source, US Central Command/J5, telephone interview.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Bruce Cheadle, US Southern Command/J9, telephone interview.
Manual 3-05.4. Not only is SSTR representation on the GCC staff still lacking in numbers and capabilities, the organizational location and makeup of SSTR personnel is not standardized. To address this deficiency, the next step in creating and establishing a true $S^2$ directorate is to determine what disciplines should be represented in the staff.

**Recommendations for Building the J9 (Security and Stability) Directorate**

Doctrine already supports the requirement for a J9. However, the GCCs have been resistant to their development. Currently, $S^2$ issues appear to be addressed by small groups of CA officers that may or may not be part of the GCC staff. While CA officers should be the heart and leadership of the J9, more disciplines need to be incorporated. Furthermore, commanders must break the paradigm that $SSTR = CMO = CA$. In fact, CA operations are only one building block for CMO which, in turn, is a building block for SSTR. Many more disciplines beyond CA are required to effectively address SSTR issues.

Because of this, the various disciplines depicted in Figure 2 need to be represented in the J9 (Directorate for Security and Stabilization). It is not necessary to develop a new specialty
in the armed forces for $S^2$. Instead, commanders should pull on the operational expertise of career specialties that already exist. The GCC should to take operators and planners from within the staff and redirect their focus from kinetic operations to $S^2$. At first glance, this may appear to be difficult and almost dangerous. However, history shows that many military members at the tactical level have successfully “flipped the switch” from kinetic to $S^2$ operations. With adequate training, it is easy to assume that military officers at an operational level, away from the battlefield, can make that switch as well.\(^{33}\)

The first, and obvious discipline needed in a J9 is CA. Career CA officers should lead the J9. CA officers are trained from the beginning to handle the broad-stroke requirements for $S^2$. Going all the way back to the first CA units in World War II, CA doctrine and schooling has continued to evolve. Most important, CA officers have the skills required to interface with the civilian population in a given area of operations (AOR). With new emphasis being placed on CA, especially in the active duty, this discipline will continue to evolve from an afterthought in military planning to a true operational function. The civil affairs officer on a J9 staff will be the preeminent operational artist for $S^2$ issues.

In establishing the J9, serious considerations should be given to bringing the JIACG underneath the J9. A CA officer could also be in charge of the JIACG as the deputy J9. Interfacing with interagency elements and other civilian organizations is part of the core CA mission and critical to the leading a JIACG. However, consideration could also be given to placing a civilian in charge of the JIACG. This concept is reminiscent of the CORDS program where the idea of having a military chief and civilian deputy greatly enhanced the pacification activities. Incorporating the JIACG into the J9 would provide immediate access to interagency assets as well as encourage coordination necessary for successful $S^2$ planning.

\(^{33}\) Anonymous source, US Central Command/J5, telephone interview.
A critical part to any planning effort is intelligence. For this reason, intelligence officers should be added to the J9 to provide focused intelligence efforts on S2. Intelligence officers that have become experts in targeting need to be incorporated into the S2 effort to determine what targets should be avoided. S2 operations can be tremendously aided if critical infrastructure can be identified and avoided during kinetic operations. J9 intelligence officers can also incorporate human intelligence and other resources to paint the cultural landscape, a requirement often overlooked by commanders. The efforts of an intelligence officer devoted to S2 issues are essential to the success of a J9.

All stability operations require massive amounts of resources, especially when a humanitarian emergency arises. However, logistical requirements for S2 are often inadequately addressed. In the German occupation, U.S. forces moved much quicker than logistics lines could support. In Vietnam, Robert Komer’s first realization was that competition for port space and inadequate port operations were halting the pacification effort. For this reason, the J9 should include logisticians, sealift and airlift experts, civil engineers, and even hospital administrators in order to predict and prepare for the various contingencies that may exist during the S2 phase. These experts should seek to build relationships with civilian counterparts to determine what resources are available for S2 efforts and how to use military assets to satisfy lift requirements for civilian organizations.

The immediate establishment of law enforcement and judicial services are required under international law. Because of this, military police, investigative officers, legal experts, and special operations forces capable of providing foreign internal defense training should be incorporated into the J9. These specialists can develop plans for the use of military troops to

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34 Yates, 32.
35 Kahn, 7.
36 Jones, 108.
police an occupied area, develop judicial systems appropriate for the occupied population, and determine how to transfer law enforcement activity over to civilian control.

Consideration should be given to other disciplines that can help the commander better understand the socio-economic structure of an AOR. Psychological Operations specialist should be included to understand how and what information should be dispersed to facilitate S^2 activities. Finance officers should be incorporated to develop preliminary foundations for economic recovery. Chaplains should even be incorporated to give the J9 religious experts. This concept is already being tested by chaplains in the CENTCOM AOR. Along with intelligence efforts, these socio-economic specialists can prepare estimates for how a given population will react to S^2 efforts. This information is paramount to formulate effective S^2 plans.

These military disciplines, coupled with expertise provided in the JIACG, would make the J9 a formidable staff capable of addressing all the S^2 requirements for a GCC. It is imperative to understand that this team is not the fix to all SSTR problems. However, this staff should become the center of excellence and advocate for all SSTR issues relating to military engagement. This team would be the owner of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan for a GCC, freeing up the other directorates to focus on kinetic operations. This team would be the lead on all contingency plans dealing strictly with S^2 issues, including humanitarian relief. For a kinetic operation contingency plan, the J9 would develop the guidance provided in the civil affairs and interagency support annexes. The inclusion of the JIACG would make the J9 the primary interface with civilian agencies and organizations for the GCC. Finally, as the primary advocate for S^2 operations, the staff would champion inputs

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for Joint Operating Concepts and the Uniform Joint Task List. Capabilities required for S² operations have been poorly represented in these planning tools primarily because there has been no one on the GCC to generate requirements for S² operations.

Resistance may arise against the idea of having the security and stabilization directorate exist as its own entity in a staff. After all, many planners are already dispersed throughout the GCC staffs that provide some degree of S² planning. One way to approach the S² problem is to have S² planners sit side by side with kinetic planners to develop and execute plans together. However, this concept only leads to S² specialist being overshadowed by the kinetic operation curtain. S² efforts continue to be treated as afterthoughts because there is no organizational thrust behind them. By consolidating these specialists into one directorate under competent CA leadership with direct access to the GCC, the S² effort gains its own independent visibility and legitimacy with the commander. That is why a separate CA structure was built for World War II. That is why Robert Komer answered directly to General Westmoreland in Vietnam. And that is why this construct should exist today.

**Conclusion**

History shows that the military will almost invariably be the agency that initiates SSTR operations in a post-conflict environment. History highlights the struggles the United States and its military have had in tackling SSTR issues, especially in the aftermath of kinetic operations. History also shows how the timely establishment of a planning element for S² operations is critical to overall SSTR success.

The United States is making great strides in its efforts to reverse its track record for SSTR. Necessary developments in strategic, operational, and tactical level organization and
doctrine have begun to address many of the shortcomings found in SSTR operations. However, the reactionary, non-permanent nature of these developments fails to meet the long-term S² requirements for the GCC. Developments in civil affairs doctrine is also a critical step, but other disciplines need to be incorporated for a successful solution. The Geographic Combatant Commander needs a permanent, multi-disciplined staff that will champion the S² cause and ensure that post-conflict activities are no longer treated as an afterthought.

There is much more research and development to be done for the military with regards to S² capability. As force structure continues to evolve to enhance our S² responsiveness, research needs to be done to determine size and skill requirements. Training programs should be developed to enhance the S² abilities of the front-line troop. Perhaps most important, the U.S. concept of operational art and planning needs to see S² as an end state to military operations. No longer should objectives be limited to the destruction of the enemy. Instead, kinetic operations should be a supporting effort for a main effort of restoring stability to a region and ripen the area in question for reconstruction. The establishment of J9 Directorates for Security and Stability Operations is the lynchpin for furthering these efforts and is also the next evolution in the profession of arms.
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