This paper begins with a synopsis of the strategic importance of Africa and a brief history of U.S. power projection on the continent prior to the formation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). It then describes the impetus behind AFRICOM’s formation, its planned innovative interagency collaboration design, and includes a snapshot of the planned headquarters organization. It describes how AFRICOM’s future success or failure will have major strategic, operational and tactical impacts on the United States’ ability to project power. The thesis suggests that EUCOM’s AFRICOM Transition Team has taken the wrong approach in its organizational command and control (C²) design, essentially disaggregating interagency collaboration at the highest levels of command. Three organizational solutions are presented to ensure effective theater-strategic and operational interagency cooperation: (1) a single Deputy Combatant Commander, in the form of a senior State Department ambassador-level administrator; (2) a revolutionary adaptation and transformation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as the foundation of the C² organization; and (3), at the operational level, AFRICOM must establish two semi-permanent Joint Task Forces (JTFs), geographically aligned to the current U.S. State Department’s regional division of Africa to maximize economy of force and unity of interagency, host nation, International Organization and non-governmental efforts.
U.S. Africa Command: An Opportunity for Effective Interagency Cooperation

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ________________________

10 May 2007
Abstract

This paper begins with a synopsis of the strategic importance of Africa and a brief history of U.S. power projection on the continent prior to the formation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). It then describes the impetus behind AFRICOM’s formation, its planned innovative interagency collaboration design, and includes a snapshot of the planned headquarters organization. It describes how AFRICOM’s future success or failure will have major strategic, operational and tactical impacts on the United States’ ability to project power. The thesis suggests that EUCOM’s AFRICOM Transition Team has taken the wrong approach in its organizational command and control (C²) design, essentially disaggregating interagency collaboration at the highest levels of command. Three organizational solutions are presented to ensure effective theater-strategic and operational interagency cooperation: (1) a single Deputy Combatant Commander, in the form of a senior State Department ambassador-level administrator; (2) a revolutionary adaptation and transformation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as the foundation of the C² organization; and (3), at the operational level, AFRICOM must establish two semi-permanent Joint Task Forces (JTFs), geographically aligned to the current U.S. State Department’s regional division of Africa to maximize economy of force and unity of interagency, host nation, International Organization and non-governmental efforts.
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The Importance of Africa

Africa is of the utmost strategic importance to the United States and the world, possessing valuable natural and human resources. It is geographically important due to its central location relative to Europe and the Middle East. Africa’s cultural diversity, and the ethnic and religious struggles resulting from this, brings insight into the complexities of past, present, and future conflicts throughout the world. Africa draws traditional European allies, other major world powers, and the United States, politically, economically and militarily into the continent. China’s increasing foreign policy projection within Africa is particularly noteworthy. Africa’s stability directly impacts the global balance of power. For these reasons, the United States’ ability to maintain a positive influence and strong ties with African nations, building valuable alliances in the process, will promote stability at this strategic crossroads, and achieve greater global security for all nations.

The tribulations Africa faces provide a unique opportunity for the United States to apply a plethora of lessons learned in interagency cooperation in order to prevent future conflict, and promote greater global cooperation, toward achieving peace and security in this vitally important part of the world. Establishing a new Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) in Africa highlights the importance the continent now has in U.S. foreign policy, and places responsibility for the success of interagency efforts in Africa squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. military. Establishing the appropriate organizational structure for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) today sets the foundation for future theater-strategic and national-strategic success in Africa and globally.
The Road to U.S. Africa Command

The United States’ foreign policy efforts in Africa since the end of World War II, arguably the continent’s most formative years, can best be described as unimpressive. United States’ power projection in Africa from the 1950’s to the 1980’s was defined by the Cold War. As elsewhere in the world, the United States’ efforts in Africa during this period were toward subversion of Soviet influence. Economic and military assistance to state and non-state actors throughout Africa was promoted in order to defeat the spread of communism.¹ Little effort was given to battling the underlying threats to prosperity and peace within the continent that still plague Africa today: poor governance, the failure of economic development, and ongoing conflict.²

While Africa became another battlefield of the Cold War, it simultaneously dealt with a tumultuous period of de-colonization and self-determination that further slowed progress toward stability on the continent by introducing an ongoing period of poor governance.³ In 1945, there were only four independent states in Africa, and all faced challenges: Egypt, whose corrupt monarch was heavily influenced by the British; Ethiopia, newly liberated from five years of Italian rule; Liberia, founded by American slaves, but effectively governed by the Firestone Tire Company; and South Africa, independent since 1910, under white-rule.⁴ As the colonial powers pulled out of Africa, the vacuum of effective governance was filled

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² Telephone interview with Mr. Trevor Monroe, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy (Sudan), U.S. State Department (02 March 2007). In addition to the resources used for this paper, Mr. Monroe’s views into Africa’s issues from a “boots on ground” perspective were extremely insightful. In addition to the issues listed, he mentioned the following: effective rule of law, national resources management, poverty and the wealth gap, narco-trafficking, Islamic extremism, and climate change.
with a mix of authoritarian rulers and elites more interested in staying in power for self
enrichment than ruling effectively.\textsuperscript{5} Throughout Africa, the amount of national wealth
siphoned by this ruling class remains staggering: an average of $148 billion dollars annually,
greater than 25\% of Africa’s annual gross domestic product as of 2002. Exacerbating the
pillage of the African economy by the ruling class, it has been estimated that
approximately 40\% of Africa’s private wealth is held outside Africa.\textsuperscript{6} These huge sums of
money drained from national investment continue to retard economic development.

In addition to its political and economic woes, the continent has been hit harder than
any other region in the world by the pandemic spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, an estimated
2.2 million people died from AIDS in Africa and 25 million people were infected with HIV.\textsuperscript{7}
Sub-Saharan Africa contains 10\% of the world’s population and 70\% of the its HIV/AIDS
cases. At an average of 3 million new cases per year expected, the prospects of African
governments overcoming this problem soon are abysmal. Combine the severity of this
medical calamity with the fact that 50\% of government budgets and 70\% of public
investment is supplied by Western aid and it is readily apparent that Africa can not handle the
cost of a solution to HIV/AIDS without greater international involvement.\textsuperscript{8}

Following the Cold War, the United States reinvigorated foreign policy in Africa
during the early 1990’s. Unfortunately, this renewed involvement quickly came to an end
following the death of 18 and wounding of 75 U.S. servicemen in Mogadishu, Somalia on 03

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, 686.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid, 687.
\textsuperscript{7} World Health Organization, UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, \textit{2006 Aids Epidemic
“In 2006, almost two thirds (63\%) of all persons [in the world] infected with HIV are living in sub-Saharan
Africa – 24.7 million (21.8 million-27.7 million). An estimated 2.8 million (2.4 million-3.2million) adults and
children became infected with HIV in 2006, more than in all other regions of the world combined. The 2.1
million (1.8 million-2.4 million) AIDS deaths in sub-Saharan Africa represent 72\% of global AIDS deaths.” 10.
\textsuperscript{8} Meredith, \textit{The Fate of Africa}, 682.
October, 1993. Following this incident, the United States withdrew its military from the continent and began a period of isolationism from Africa. The United States’ minimal response to the genocide in Rwanda, civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and its reluctance to engage in Darfur, Sudan, underscore a “no boots on ground” policy in Africa for the remainder of the 1990’s.9


Africa’s poor governance, her economic development failures, and ongoing conflict, are not just a military problem. It will take all forms of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic, to affect peace and stability on the continent. This effort until now has been divided unequally between three Combatant Commands: U.S. European Command, Pacific Command and Central Command. In light of this, on 07 February 2007, Mr. Ryan Henry, Principle Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, Directory of the Joint Staff, announced the establishment of AFRICOM, in order to unify the efforts of these three GCCs.

The concept for AFRICOM is to, “…support U.S. Government activities across Africa to: integrate U.S. Interagency efforts and assist diplomacy and development efforts. [AFRICOM] will consolidate the African responsibilities of three commands into one… [the] goal is significant inter-agency representation from the beginning…”10  U.S. European

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Command (EUCOM) was given responsibility for establishing this new command.

On 15 March 2007, EUCOM Commander, General Bantz J. Craddock, addressing the House Armed Services committee, outlined the problems facing Africa and the purpose of establishing a Unified Command in Africa:

… [W]e face a complex environment with enormous challenge and potential… [Africa] has historically struggled with relatively unstable governments, internal political strife, and economic problems. Many states remain fragile due to a variety of factors, including corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical ethnic animosities, and endemic poverty…. Africa is becoming a continent of increasing strategic importance to the U.S. and our allies. Africa’s vast potential makes African stability a near term strategic imperative. It is in our national interest to help Africa achieve broad-based and sustainable economic, security, political and social development. The DoD, in collaboration with other U.S. agencies, is seeking more effective ways to mitigate or respond to humanitarian crises, sustain African unity and stability, and improve cooperation on such transnational issues as terrorism and HIV/AIDS….

…the U.S. will work aggressively with our interagency partners, allied nations, and African regional organizations to advance our common interests and values through the establishment of a new Unified Command focused on the African Continent….11

The missions facing AFRICOM will test the U.S. military’s flexibility in cooperating, coordinating and supporting non-kinetic power projection within the African continent. Concentration of military support of interagency efforts for Phase 0 and I (Shape and Deter), and Phase IV and V (Stabilize and Enable Civil Authorities), assisting failing and failed states toward effective governance, provides AFRICOM’s transition team a unique opportunity: the chance to build an innovative and effective command organization geared toward interagency collaboration and cooperation from foundation to execution.12

… [W]e will be considering adaptive and non-traditional options to optimize collaboration with interagency and coalition partners, regional security organizations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This headquarters is projected to contain an innovative mix of U.S. military, DoD civilians, U.S. Government, and international partners.

While the eventual goal is to establish Headquarters, U.S. Africa Command on the African continent, there are no plans envisioned in this effort to base operational U.S. forces in Africa….13

AFRICOM’s purpose is to support USG activities across Africa by: integrating US interagency efforts and assisting diplomacy and development efforts. Though promised that AFRICOM would take an “innovative” approach to fusing interagency collaboration into headquarters, and would “consider adaptive and non-traditional options” in interagency cooperation, initial indications suggest otherwise. A rapid change in direction is needed at this early stage in AFRICOM’s development to ensure that true innovation is realized and effective interagency collaboration is achieved.

**Innovation in Interagency Collaboration in a Combatant Command**

This paper’s thesis suggests that EUCOM’s U.S. Africa Command Transition Team has taken the wrong approach to its organizational command and control (C²) design. The current design lacks innovation and displays a shocking separation of civilian and military cooperation at the highest level of command; effectively disaggregating interagency cooperation from the top-down. Three recommendations are presented to remedy AFRICOM’s predicament.

First, there must be only one Deputy Combatant Commander. The position should remain a senior State Department, ambassador-level administrator. As executive officer to the Commander, his main responsibility would be coordination of interagency efforts at the theater-strategic level. He would serve as director of interagency representatives, host nation LNO’s, and IO’s within AFRICOM.

Second, a revolutionary adaptation and transformation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as the C² organization within the Combatant Command is instrumental to true interagency coordination. It is time for the JIACG to become the

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14 Secretary of Defense AFRICOM Briefing, 06 February 2007.
construct for this Unified Command’s organization, with the traditional joint-coded staff in a supporting role.

Finally, at the operational level, AFRICOM must establish two semi-permanent Joint Task Forces (JTFs), geographically aligned to the current U.S. State Department’s regional divisions of Africa. Due to the primarily supporting and coordinating role of AFRICOM’s mission, in relation to other agencies within the continent, regionalized JTFs allow for a natural economy of force through existing host nation and country team support, greater cultural understanding and expertise gained through interaction with a regional population, and maximization of centralized direction and decentralized execution.

The success or failure of AFRICOM will have strategic, operational and tactical impacts. Strategically, though axiomatic when considering the United States’ recent and ongoing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and subsequent loss of international support for these efforts, failure to achieve greater stability in Africa will further deplete the United States’ international legitimacy in the eyes of allies and enemies alike. Continued instability in Africa would hamper U.S. efforts to reduce its dependency on Middle Eastern oil, as well as prevent African nations from exploiting their own resources in overcoming their economic crises: both affecting the global economy. Finally, continued instability in Africa prolongs the United States’ efforts in fighting the formerly known Long War. Conversely, stability in Africa addresses narcotics trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorism issues facing Europe, the United States and Africa.

Operationally, an ineffective GCC would erode U.S. legitimacy within Africa and effectively close U.S. Government access to this strategically important continent. Our inability to promote theater security cooperation would negatively impact United Nations,
European Union, African Union (AU), and Economic Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) efforts in Africa. At the tactical level, whether conducting humanitarian assistance, crisis response, peacekeeping or direct action, Africa would ultimately be more dangerous to troops and civilians in the performance of their missions.

To prove the stated thesis, AFRICOM’s organizational model proposed by EUCOM’s transition team will be outlined. It will be shown that though slightly different than current GCC organizations, this model will make interagency cooperation at the theater-strategic level more difficult. Based on this analysis, a recommendation will be made to rectify the inadequacies of this proposed headquarters C² organization for AFRICOM.

From the theater-strategic perspective, the main emphasis of this paper will then address a solution for filling a void left by EUCOM’s transition team: coordination of interagency efforts at the operational level through establishment of two semi-permanent geographic JTF’s. The recommendations that follow are focused on how to best harness interagency cooperation in order to meet the United States’ strategic and operational objectives of stability and security in Africa.

**The Flaw in Headquarters and a Solution**

On 17 February 2007, U.S. European Command’s transition team’s update brief for AFRICOM listed eight “on-going” and four “as required” mission sets for Theater Security Cooperation. These mission sets concentrated on collaborative efforts with other United States Government agencies, to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, strategic communications, medical assistance in dealing with HIV/AIDS and Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. They are consistent with the most recent

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16 *AFRICOM Transition Team Update*, 17 February 2007, slide 5.
U.S. National Strategy objectives. Additionally, identification of SSTR as a key mission set is in line with recent Department of Defense guidance to classify this as a “core capability” and regard these operations as on the same level as combat. In addition to AFRICOM’s mission sets supporting national-strategic objectives, they inherently require the military to act in a supporting role to other government and non-government agencies and organizations, “the interagency”, and there must be a mechanism to coordinate these efforts.

A Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) performs this important function within the GCCs organization. The new Joint Publication for interagency operations, JP 3-08, describes JIACGs as an “[i]nteragency staff...that establishes…collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners... tailored to meet the requirements of the supported commander, [it] provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments.” The function JIACGs serve of synchronizing Joint Task Force operations with USG agencies and departments is instrumental to successful non-kinetic operations.

Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, USMC goes further in his recommendations for increased interagency coordination. In his article describing his experience with the first JIACG established during Operation Iraqi Freedom in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),

17 “Helping the world’s poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative. Economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected... The United States must promote development programs that achieve measurable results – rewarding reforms, encouraging transparency, and improving people’s lives.

Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people’s lives.” U.S. National Security Strategy, March 2006.


he states, “The goal must be truly horizontal interagency planning performed virtually simultaneously at the [tactical, operational, and strategic] levels…”21 He identified a key shortcoming of CENTCOM’s JIACG model: the lack of unity of command over interagency efforts.22 The current proposal for AFRICOM shares this deficiency.

The organizational model for AFRICOM headquarters has two Deputy Combatant Commanders: Deputy for Civil Military Programs, a State Department ambassadorial position; and, a Deputy for Military Operations, both supported by a Chief of Staff. The Deputy for Civil-Military Operations is in charge of Civil-Military Programs: Theater Security Cooperation Policy and Plans, Peace and Security, Humanitarian and Development, and Outreach. Department of Defense representation is proposed throughout. The Deputy for Military Operations, is responsible for standard military missions of the GCC: Unified Command Plan missions (Assigned, Security, Force Protection, Security Cooperation, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, etc.); Special Operations, Strategic Deterrence, Contingency Ops, Counter-proliferation, Counter-narcotics, etc. Throughout many of these, interagency representation is identified.23

Though this organizational model is commendable for its attempt to increase interagency cooperation through a more robust role for State Department in the establishment of a Deputy Commander for Civil Military Programs, the innovation stops there and a blatant ignorance of Operational Art begins.

This organizational model, of two Deputy Combatant Commanders, sets up a parallel chain of command below the combatant commander. Though “[cross-] representation” is

22 Ibid, 15.
identified in both chains of command for DoD and interagency representation, this
effectively segregates interagency cooperation at the top of the organization, and sets up a
division of labor that the organization should be trying to eliminate. A line has been drawn
between perceived military and non-military, kinetic and non-kinetic operations, that by
virtue of the necessity of having representation of DoD and interagency in both, is
unnecessary. An artificial redundancy of effort has been established, unity of effort suffers,
and true interagency collaboration has been disaggregated.

Further, the shared support provided by the joint staff establishes an environment of
conflicting priorities to Civil-Military Operations and Military Operations. It requires the
staff, especially the Chief of Staff, to prioritize support to competing requirements and
direction from two deputies. Both deputies share support from the following joint staff: J-1,
Human Relations and Personnel Management; J-2, Assessments and Intelligence; J-4,
Facilities, Transportation and Logistics; J-6, Communications; J-8, Budget Planning and
Execution; General Counsel and Legal; Security and Force Protection; and, Medical
Services.24 Additionally, the model haphazardly places the JIACG under the shared support
of these joint-coded staff. This forces further redundancy in the organization by requiring
increased manning in the Civil-Military Programs, Military Operations and Shared Support
staffs.25 This is an inefficient use of manpower at best and a recipe for disaster at worse.

To fix this, two changes to the current proposal must occur. First, a single State
Department represented Deputy Combatant Commander must be established, effectively
combining the Civil-Military Programs and Military Operations into one unified chain of
command and effort. Second, the JIACG must disappear in body but remain in spirit.

25 See Figure 1.
JIACG’s serve an important function, but to fully integrate efforts - true interagency cooperation - they must be absorbed into AFRICOM’s command structure.\textsuperscript{26} Direction becomes centralized in the CCDR with his interagency deputy acting as chair of the JIACG. Unity of command prevails.\textsuperscript{27}

In light of the Transition Team’s 01 February 2007 current focus on constructing AFRICOM’s headquarters, it is not surprising that little attention has been given to the operational level organization of AFRICOM. The transition team’s current goal is to have initial operational capability of AFRICOM’s headquarters by 30 September of this year, with full command maturation occurring by October of 2008. With only a year and a half until final operational capability, there is still time to propose an operational level construct for the newest Geographic Combatant Command.

\textbf{The Operational Level Organization: Semi-Permanent JTFs}

AFRICOM was established to unify the efforts of EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM. Placing the African responsibilities of three combatant commands into the hands of one makes sense. It shows an increased priority of Africa in U.S. foreign policy to the international community and puts Africa on par with other regions. Proving the importance of Africa in U.S. foreign policy, and America’s commitment to individual nations of Africa, is just one reason to get the operational level organization of AFRICOM right from the start. Effective collaboration with State Department, USAID, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, as well as international organizations (IO’s), and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) will ensure AFRICOM’s success.

The creation of AFRICOM shows the desire of the United States’ to effectively

\textsuperscript{26} See Figure 2.
\textsuperscript{27} Bogdanos, \textit{Joint Interagency Cooperation}, 17.
project national power within the African continent. The scope of Africa’s cultural diversity and range of political, economic, humanitarian, and health issues requires AFRICOM to operate on multiple fronts within its area of responsibility (AOR). The Joint Task Force (JTF) is the vehicle to do this.

Joint Task Forces are established by the combatant commander to use the military aspect of national power and may be influenced by the interagency political military plan. The concept of AFRICOM is heavily influenced by interagency political military planning from the national strategic level. Collaboration, as seen in the organization at the combatant command headquarters, must be seen equally at the JTF level. As important as JTF staffing is to interagency cooperation, how the JTF’s are established within the AOR is equally important to how well they work with the existing interagency framework in Africa.

**Built on a Proven Model**

An effective regional division of Africa already exists within the U.S. Government. The State Department currently divides Africa into two regions: Near East and African Affairs. Each is headed by a separate Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs subordinate to the Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs. The Near East bureau includes the North African countries of Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. The African bureau oversees State Department’s efforts throughout the rest of Africa. This existing inroad into Africa is the ideal starting point for organization of AFRICOM’s JTF’s.

Two regionalized semi-permanent JTF’s for AFRICOM, aligned to State Department’s Near East and Africa bureaus, named JTF-Northern Africa (JTF-NA) and JTF-

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Southern Africa (JTF-SA) respectively, meet many of the principles of war, within the full range of military operations, and the key tenets of operational command and control.30 In regard to interagency cooperation, two regionalized JTF’s facilitate alignment of State and DoD objectives within Africa, thus achieving unity of effort. It creates a natural economy of force, by maintaining only two standing JTF staffs. Coordination of interagency efforts through existing country teams, allows the use of existing infrastructure without having to recreate existing inroads and relations within countries. The small number of standing regional JTF’s creates simplicity by minimizing the span of control within the African AOR.

By ensuring equally robust interagency representation within each JTF, who report to the interagency organization within the combatant commander’s headquarters, the ability to maximize centralized direction and decentralized execution is increased dramatically. This is not usually feasible when dealing with the interagency, where unity of effort trumps unity of command and cooperation and coordination (Co²) replaces command and control.

Regionalization helps overcome the obstacle that culture can be to effective operations within a specific area of operations. In accordance with Joint Publication 3-0, “[d]eployed joint forces must be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native populations, local and national government officials, and coalition partners.”31 A JTF-NA and JTF-SA staff, embedded within Africa for a tour of duty will be able to learn through direct exposure with civilians, military personnel, host nation diplomats, U.S. Embassy country-teams, other USG representatives, IGO’s and NGO’s within their region.

Learning the nuances of culture, language and history through immersion is often an overlooked and underestimated advantage in all operations, especially those associated with

31 JP 3-0, III-15.
the mission sets assigned to AFRICOM. Additionally, by insuring HN, African Regional Organizations (AU, ECOWAS, etc.), and members of NATO, EU and UN liaison officer (LNO) representation within the JTF organization as well as at the theater strategic level, transparency and cooperation is further institutionalized. This institutionalization of transparency and cooperation garners legitimacy for U.S. foreign policy within the international community and increases the desire for other countries to offer diplomatic, informational, military and economic support to AFRICOM’s efforts.

**The Cons to JTF’s**

Regionalized JTFs do have drawbacks. Limiting the standing number of JTFs to two effectively restricts the operational reach of AFRICOM, especially within JTF-South, due to its expansive land area and population. An obvious remedy for this, is to increase regionalization by creating more than two standing JTFs within AFRICOM. Although this necessitates larger staffing, expanded infrastructure, and force protection requirements, the pros outweigh the cons. The cons to this approach are associated with the space-force relationship associated with Operational Art. In the case of regionalization, the question arises as to whether only two JTFs is the correct size of force for the amount of power projection, kinetic and non-kinetic, required to succeed within such a large continent.

A future inevitability will arise for an expanded US presence in Africa: either unilaterally or multilaterally in times of crises. The doctrinal use of limited duration JTF’s in this case, when traditional military forces are required for contingency operations, is the most appropriate model. The benefit of having a well organized and efficient organization founded in interagency cooperation supporting these contingency efforts will assure a smooth
transition from Phase III (Dominate) to Phase IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable) operations.

**Another Point of View - JTFs Aren’t Needed**

It is arguable that JTFs are not needed for AFRICOM’s mission. Two counter-arguments portray that the United States effectively implements foreign policy in Africa without establishing semi-permanent subordinate commands. First, the United States, through host nation and U.S. State Department country team cooperation, has been working within Africa for decades. The fact that we supported Operation RESTORE HOPE (December 1992-May 1993, Somalia), and SUPPORT HOPE (July 1994-March 1996, Rwanda and Burundei) with varying degrees of success, without regional JTFs supports this counter-argument. These efforts successfully coordinated NGO and interagency efforts. Second, AFRICOM headquarters alone will be enough to support non-kinetic operations, relying on HN and country-team cooperation, in concert with interagency collaboration to achieve its objectives. All this is misleading.

The United States’ past involvement in Africa was in response to problems that gradually intensified over decades: reactive vice proactive. In the case of Somalia, a lack of cultural knowledge resulted in the United States misreading the political situation, leading to the failed second half of Operation Restore Hope. In the case of Rwanda, the United Nations, as well as the international community, was slow in responding to a situation that had been brewing since the 1970’s. By the time the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established and the United States became involved, upwards of 800,000 murders had been committed and two million people were displaced. Most of the population protected by UNAMIR was Hutus who had committing genocide against the Tutsis.34 All

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34 Meredith, *The Fate Africa*. 517-522.
these situations could have been prevented had semi-permanent JTFs been there to intercede, and coordinate interagency efforts during the early stages of the conflicts: taking a proactive vice reactive approach, and possibly preventing the need to augment these operations with combat forces.

Semi-permanent JTF’s are a proactive approach to Africa’s problems and demonstrate the importance of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. CJTF-HOA is an example of a successful semi-permanent JTF. We must become immersed within Africa’s regions in order to show the African people our resolve. JTF-NA and JTF-SA allow AFRICOM to gain cultural expertise and insight into the nuances of the diverse organizations and interagency efforts required throughout Africa.

**An Effective Operational Model**

This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth.35

From its earliest concept, U.S. Africa Command is unique in its overall supporting role to other U.S. Government agencies in Africa. The high degree of coordination and cooperation required with 53 host nations, supranational organizations, United States’ and non-U.S. government and non-governmental organizations operating within the continent is a huge undertaking for any command. Collaborative efforts with current knowledge experts in Africa, U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, Host Nation, ECOWAS and AU representatives in particular, will make AFRICOM successful.

Regionalizing two standing JTF’s, JTF-NA and JTF-SA, along the current divisions within State Departments Africa bureaus serves to unify our national power projection

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efforts, thus maximizing economy of force, and forces the military in Africa to rely on the
existing interagency architecture as both a training tool for AFRICOM as well as a means to
integrate the supporting capabilities that the military brings to the table.

There is a fear in some circles that establishment of AFRICOM will be seen as further
militarization of the U.S. mission in Africa, a Cold War style response to China’s economic
expansion into the continent, and is unilateral in origin.36 Embedding AFRICOM’s JTFs in
an existing diplomatic infrastructure develops a strong sense of culture and understanding of
the peoples and governments of the nations within these regions. Robust LNO representation
with host nation civilian administrators and military leaders, and IO’s (UN, AU, ECOWAS,
NATO, EU) enhances transparency between valuable partners, and garners international
legitimacy for the altruistic nature of AFRICOM’s mission.

Conclusion

By following the recommendations outlined in this paper: unifying a parallel chain of
command at the theater-strategic level; making the JIACG the command structure, and
establishing two semi-permanent JTF’s, with close host nation, country-team, and IO LNO
support, AFRICOM will be well on its way toward success.

Continued flexibility in the command’s organization is important. Place holders must
be built into the organization for interagency involvement now. Failing to do this makes
future changes in AFRICOM – funding, doctrinal changes, instructions, SOP’s and processes
– more difficult in the future. In addition, AFRICOM must be able to “plug and play”
executive department representatives into the command structure as required as situations
change in Africa.

36 Michele Ruiters, United States: Why US’s AFRICOM Will Hurt Africa [Analysis], AllAfrica.com – USA,
02/14/07, <http://intel.socom.smil.mil/socjic/osec/openafrica/07/0702/070220/070220fa05.htm>
UNCLASSIFIED, (accessed on 19 Mar 2007).
The relationship between the Operational Factors of space and force has an overwhelming effect on any organizational construct for AFRICOM. Greater cultural expertise gained through more direct interaction with the population is a force multiplier. Earning the respect of the people achieves greater cooperation from the people. As AFRICOM proceeds towards its Final Operational Concept date of October 2008, the factor of time will have a larger effect on the transition team’s ability to effectively plan and adjust for success. The importance of getting the design right the first time is critical.
Figure 1. AFRICOM’s Current Headquarters Proposal

Figure 2. Proposed Headquarters Model
Bibliography


