COIN goes “GLOCAL”: Traditional COIN with a Global Perspective: Does the Current US Strategy Reflect COIN Theory, Doctrine and Principles?

A Monograph

by

Lt Col Scott J. Erickson

USAF

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 06-07

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
COIN goes "GLOCAL": Traditional COIN with a Global Perspective: Does the Current US Strategy Reflect COIN Theory, Doctrine and Principles?

Lt Col Scott J. Erickson (U.S. Air Force)

Advanced Military Studies Program
250 Gibbon Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134

Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

The post-9/11 security environment is extremely complex. There has been much discussion regarding the threat, nature of the conflict and the strategy to address this environment. It is the hypothesis of this monograph that the current conflict is most accurately characterized as a global counterinsurgency (COIN) against the Westphalia nation-state system by an Islamist terror network and the overarching jihadist movement and as such, the ends, ways and means of US national strategies must be congruent with COIN theory, doctrine and principles. In examining the ends, ways and means of the current national strategies, this monograph compares these strategies to COIN theory, doctrine and the principles and imperatives derived from historical and contemporary COIN experiences. The research leverages the classical COIN theory writings of O’Neill, Thompson, and Galula. It also references contemporary authors such as Kilcullen, Hoffman and Cassidy. Additionally, this monograph references the recently released COIN doctrine throughout.

Counterinsurgency (COIN), National Security Strategy, Global War on Terror, Global COIN, Instruments of National Power, Radical Islam, COIN Principles, COIN Theory, COIN Doctrine

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, US Army

913-758-3302
Title of Monograph: COIN goes "GLOCAL": Traditional COIN with a Global Perspective: Does the Current US Strategy Reflect COIN Theory, Doctrine and Principles?

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Alice Butler-Smith, Ph.D.

______________________________ Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR
School of Advanced Military Studies

______________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Graduate Degree Programs
Abstract

COIN goes “GLOCAL”: Traditional COIN with a Global Perspective: Does the Current US Strategy Reflect COIN Theory, Doctrine and Principles?

by Lt Col Scott J. Erickson, USAF, 50 pages.

The post-9/11 security environment is extremely dynamic and complex. There has been much discussion regarding the threat, the nature of the conflict and the national strategies to address this environment. It is the hypothesis of this monograph that the current conflict is most accurately characterized as a global counterinsurgency against the Westphalia nation-state system by an Islamist terror network and the overarching jihadist movement and as such, the ends, ways and means of current national strategies must be congruent with counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, doctrine and principles.

The evaluation criterion for this research is two-fold. The strategy model formulated by Army War College instructor, Art Lykke serves as the foundation for the analysis. In examining the relative balance of the ends, ways and means of the current national strategies, this monograph compares the stated strategies to COIN theory, doctrine and the principles and imperatives derived from historical and contemporary COIN experiences.

The research leverages the classical COIN theory writings of Bard O’Neill, Sir Robert Thompson, and David Galula. It also utilizes the writings of contemporary authors such as David Kilcullen, Bruce Hoffman and Robert Cassidy. These contemporary authors are the leading advocates of addressing the current conflict as a global COIN and the adoption of a global COIN strategy. Additionally, this monograph references the recently released US Army/Marine COIN doctrine throughout.

Ultimately the research concludes that while crafting a strategy that openly acknowledges the current conflict as a global counterinsurgency and responds accordingly would be optimal, the existing strategies, as written, are congruent with COIN principles. Where the strategy is out of balance is in the execution. In order to improve this strategic balance, the monograph recommends several changes. Structural changes to the national security apparatus are needed to ensure a coordinated and integrated interagency effort. Prioritizing and proper resourcing of the non-kinetic aspects of the strategy are essential to long-term success. Additionally, organizational culture changes are required to bring more of the interagency expertise into the fight with the military component. Ultimately, all agencies need to embrace COIN concepts and become agile and adaptive learning organizations to match a highly agile and adaptive foe.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1 Introduction</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure and Methodology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Understanding the Environment…Insurgency/Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the Enemy and the Conflict</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of a Terror Network</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History, Culture &amp; Religion…Humiliation, Rage &amp; Violence</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives: Inspirations to Action</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory and Strategy…</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Global COIN Strategy: Ends, Ways and Means</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ends: Clear and Obtainable Objectives</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways: Aligned with COIN Principles?</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy: The Prime Principle and a Global Center of Gravity</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primacy of Politics—An Undisputed Boss</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort—Single Direction for Multiple Elements of Power</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the Environment—“Adapt or Perish”</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Drives Ops: Driving towards the Tipping Point</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolate Insurgents from their Cause &amp; Support—Eliminating Support &amp; Sanctuary</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Security Under the Rule of Law—A Foundation of Security and Trust</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be Prepared for a Long Term Commitment—Wristwatches vs Time</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means: An Imbalance in Resources and Priorities</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Conclusion and Recommendations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1 Introduction

Several years into the Global War on Terror against al Qaeda and its associated networks, strategists, terrorism experts and policy makers have recognized that rather than a counterterrorism (CT) campaign, the conflict is in fact, as depicted by David Kilcullen, current chief strategist for Department of State, CT “a campaign to counter a globalized Islamist insurgency.”

This sentiment was echoed by former Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, during a BBC interview: “(I think) the struggle is not so much a global war on terror. Terror really is the weapon of choice…What the struggle really is, it’s almost a global insurgency by a very small number of extremists…that are determined to attack the state system…”

President Bush eluded to the global insurgency in a 2005 speech: “Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Isamo-fascism. Whatever it’s called…This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom.”

If this assessment is correct, how should the US and its Allies respond? What is the most effective strategy to meet the National Strategy for Counterterrorism Strategy (NS-CT) ends to “defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them?”

A global insurgency requires a global counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. COIN theory and doctrine indicate that the success of this strategy will rely on a balanced strategy built on the coordinated application of all elements of national power and the international cooperation of states, coalitions and non-governmental organizations. It must isolate, attack and disrupt, or destroy terror networks while addressing the underlying conditions.

1 Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism.” Journal of Strategic Studies, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Volume 28, Number 4, Aug 2005.)


extremists use to create instability. It must appeal to the world and specifically, the moderate Muslim population, in an effort to de-legitimize extreme ideologies and isolate terror networks from sources of support. It must offer a vision to counter the extremists’ vision of violence and intolerance. Ensuring friendly, stable and effective governments with the capacity to fight an extremist insurgency is the best method to address local grievances, break the global linkages and thus counter the spread of extreme ideology. The implementation is highly dependent on the local and regional situation and culture.

It is the hypothesis of this monograph that the current conflict is most accurately characterized as a global counterinsurgency and as such, the ends, ways and means of current national strategies must be congruent with COIN theory, doctrine and principles. According to H. Richard Yarger, author of “Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model”, “…strategy is the employment of the instruments of national power to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.” He argued that, “Strategy is all about how leadership will use the power available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives that support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the…use of power to achieve specific objectives.” He concluded that, “Above all a valid strategy must find a balance among ends, ways, and means consistent with the risk the nation is willing to accept.”

Failure to recognize the nature of the COIN conflict and ensure strategies reflect COIN principles will increase risk and endanger strategic success.

**Structure and Methodology**

The introduction and second chapter of this monograph will lay the foundation for the follow-on chapters by analyzing the global nature of the conflict; the enemy and the extreme ideology it espouses; their political objectives and the ways and means of obtaining these ends; and the strategies required to meet this enemy. This analysis will also examine possible motives and underlying conditions that

---

contribute to instability and foster the spread of extreme ideology. Chapter Two will end with a
discussion of the specific COIN principles and imperatives that have evolved out of historical COIN
experiences. These will serve as the analytical framework and criteria for evaluating current US
strategies. Chapter Three will examine the current strategies as written to determine whether they are
congruent with COIN principles and “balanced” in its approach to the current conflict. It will start with
the stated ends and then focus on the ways depicted in the various national strategies through the COIN
framework and then conclude with an examination of the means to determine if the strategy is balanced
with regard to prioritization and resources. Chapter Six will provide conclusions and recommendations to
better meet the challenges of the global insurgency threat.

This monograph references the classical COIN theory writings of Bard O’Neill, Sir Robert
Thompson, and David Galula, while discussions on the current context relied predominantly on the
writings of contemporary authors such as David Kilcullen, Bruce Hoffman and Robert Cassidy. These
authors are the leading advocates of addressing the current conflict as a global COIN and the adoption of
a global COIN strategy. Kilcullen’s theories, COIN experiences, senior position in the US State
Department, and a recent selection to a position advising the senior commander in Iraq, put him in a
unique position to influence US policy and strategy.6 Additionally, this monograph will reference the
recently released US Army/Marine COIN doctrine throughout.

---

6 Multiple sources…see George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 11 Dec 2006 and Thomas
Chapter 2 Understanding the Environment…Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

Nature of the Enemy and the Conflict

Theorists have long stressed the critical importance of understanding the enemy and the nature of the conflict. Theorists have pointed to the COIN principle of understanding the conflict environment as the critical element in developing an effective COIN strategy.

According to the NS-CT, the enemy facing the US and its Allies is a “transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which all have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.”7 Al Qaeda and their affiliated terror groups are recognized as the most dangerous element of this movement. The movement shares a common ideology based on an extreme or literalist interpretation of Islam characterized by hatred and intolerance, and the common political goal of regional and global totalitarian rule of an Islamic Caliphate based on Islamic law. Although Islam is not monolithic, this extreme Islamic ideology and a literal interpretation of the texts on jihad appeals to Muslims across sects, cultures and class by offering to restore a glorified concept of a medieval Islamic empire to those who perceive themselves as victims.8

The emotional appeal of this extreme ideology combined with an effective information campaign shaping perceptions in and out of the region and the institutionalized extremist indoctrination found in schools like the madrassas have proven an effective tool for recruiting and mobilizing Muslim to join their cause. Extreme Islamic ideology also plays a key in legitimizing illegal activities and violent acts of terrorism.9 Thus, to be effective in countering this ideology the aim must be to de-legitimize it.

There is no compromise. Al Qaeda’s objectives are total in nature and are found in published strategy papers, statements and fatwas from its leadership. Their stated long term desire is to replace the

---

global “Westphalia secular state system with a medieval caliphate system based on an extreme interpretation of Islam.”

Near and mid-term goals include the expulsion of the US from the Middle East, destruction of Israel and the replacement of “apostate rulers” in the region with “true Islamic states” under strict Islamic law. Their way to achieve this objective is by waging a global jihad or holy war utilizing terror tactics while striving to obtain increased military capabilities to include WMD.

Terrorism expert, Bruce Hoffman, defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”

Robert Cassidy, author of Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, echoed the global COIN characterization, “The war against al Qaeda, its associate groups, and other groups that rally behind the ideological banner of radical Islamic fundamentalism is better viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate an overlapping network…who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in the ungoverned periphery and in failing states.”

Ambassador Henry Crumpton, State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, argued that “the enemy exhibits many of the characteristics of a global insurgency. They engage in intelligence collection, subversion, denial and deception, sabotage, terrorism, and even open warfare. We must, therefore, respond with a global counterinsurgency campaign with an extreme focus on three strategic targets: enemy leadership, enemy safe havens, and the political-economic-social conditions that the enemy exploits.”

According to Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, an insurgency is: “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict…political power is the central issue.” Further, COIN is: “political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and...

---

civic actions take by a government to defeat an insurgency…to support the government in restoring and enforcing the rule of law.”

Al Qaeda’s global ambitions, global reach and its appeal to Muslims across the globe clearly elevate insurgency from a local internal conflict to a global struggle.

**Characteristics of a Terror Network**

To further understand and defeat the enemy, one must analyze how they are aligned and organized. According to the NMSP-WOT, “All enemy networks rely on certain key functions, processes and resources to be able to operate and survive…In network vernacular, a resource may also be referred to as a “node” and the interaction or relationship between nodes is described as “linkage.” The document also identifies the following nine nodes or resources of a terror network: leadership, safe havens, finance, communications, movement, intelligence, weapons, personnel and ideology; and identifies personnel and ideology as the most critical nodes and linkages for any terror organization.  

NMSP-WOT defines “ideology” as, “a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture. It can be thought of as a comprehensive vision as a way of looking at things. There are many different kinds of ideology: political, social, spiritual, epistemological, ethical, and so on.” Additionally, the document states, “Extremist ideology motivates violent action and inspires individuals to provide material resources. Ideology is the component most critical to extremist networks and movements and sustains all other capabilities. NMSP-WOT points to this critical resource as the enemy’s strategic center of gravity (COG), and removing it is key to creating a global anti-terrorist environment.”

According to FM 3-24, “the ability to generate and sustain popular support…often has the greatest impact on the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness. This ability is usually the insurgency’s center of gravity. Support or

---

15 U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-2-1-4


tolerance, provided either willingly or unwillingly, provides the following for an insurgency: safe havens, freedom of movement, logistic support, financial support, intelligence, and new recruits.”\(^\text{18}\)

The unique element of this global jihadist insurgency is the nature of the links between al Qaeda and the global jihadist movement to local terror groups and the leveraging or co-opting of local grievances into the global agenda. Kilcullen, in his paper, “Countering Global Insurgency”, listed the common global insurgent links as: a jihadist ideology subscribing to a global pan-Islamic Caliphate vision; language and culture; personal history as a mujahidin in Afghanistan; family relationships; financial links; operational and planning support; propaganda; and doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. He also wrote, “Within each country…there are local actors, issues and grievances. Many of these have little to do with the objectives of the global jihad and often pre-date the jihad by decades or hundreds of years. But what is new about today’s environment is that, because of the links a new class of regional, or theater-level actors emerged. These groups do have links to the global jihad, often act as regional allies or affiliates of al Qaeda, and prey on local groups and issues to further the jihad.”\(^\text{19}\)

FM 3-24 covers this meeting of local and global: “Insurgents employ deep-seated, strategic causes as well as temporary, local ones, adding or deleting them as circumstances demand…They attract supporters by appealing to local grievances; then they lure followers into the broader movement.”\(^\text{20}\)

Understanding the elements of a terror network and the overarching regional and global networks and how each is related is an important aspect of strategy development, campaign design and targeting.

**History, Culture & Religion…Humiliation, Rage & Violence**

Admittedly, Islam is not monolithic but overlays multiple cultures, ethnic groups and is comprised of various religious sects and movements. It is important, however, to grasp the main cultural traits of the Arab-Muslim—a group largely represented in the extremist movement and its leadership.

---

\(^{18}\) U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 3-76.  
\(^{19}\) Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Volume 28, Number 4, Aug 2005.) 1.  
\(^{20}\) U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-49.
Raphael Patai, in his classic Arab cultural study, *The Arab Mind*, described the two main components of the Arab personality as the Bedouin and the Islamic components.21

The Bedouin component is characterized by an ethos which places greater emphasis on the concept of “face” or the outer perception of honor and self-respect than on the inner concept of guilt. Great pains, to include deceit and violence, are taken to avoid any such humiliation. This also tends to discourage self-critical assessments and often results in feelings of contempt for those they perceived as more successful. This trait is also manifested in the cultural tendency to disclaim responsibility of any failings and the casting of blame on external factors. This can also be seen in a strong cultural tendency to be swayed by or initiate conspiracy theories and perceive themselves as victims of a conspiracy.22 The NS-CT mirrors this, “Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information…is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge…prejudices and self-serving propaganda.”23

The Islamic component “permeates” all levels of the culture and serves as the “hub” of all Arab life as compared to the more secular existence of other cultures. Unlike Christianity, Islam has never experienced a reformation and thus Islam is currently “grappling” with issues “similar to those Western religions faced centuries ago: primarily the problems of adjusting an antiquated religious law to the changing conditions of modern life.”24 The religion’s ongoing clash with modernization on one end of the spectrum and its history of conflict with other religions on the other end continue to be deeply emotional, driving influences in the Islamic world.

Patai pointed out another central characteristic of Islam--a fatalism that associated with the notion that man’s destiny is pre-determined by God. He captured this when he wrote the following two lines: “the Arab mind, dominated by Islam, has been more bent more on preserving than innovating, on maintaining than improving, on continuing than initiating” and “In this atmosphere, whatever individual

---

spirit of research and inquiry existed in the great age of medieval Arab culture became gradually stifled; by the fifteenth century, Arab intellectual curiosity was fast asleep.”

The jarring humiliation of this stagnation was brought home in the late 18th century when French troops easily conquered Egypt. The Islamic Empire, once the world’s cultural center of knowledge and enlightened thought was quickly dominated and colonized by the European powers. It left a deep scar that still resonates today.

Thomas Friedman, foreign affairs columnist for The New York Times, aptly captured the impact of a powerful cognitive dissonance when Arab-Muslims come face-to-face with the fact that their world, in many cases, lags behind the rest of the world despite a “superior faith” which is “all encompassing of religion, politics, and economics.” He wrote that this is “the sort of dissonance, and loss of self-esteem, that sparks rage, and leads some…to join violent groups to lash out at the world” and “…leads many others, average folks, to give radical groups like al Qaeda passive support.”

Patai also described three interconnected characteristics of Arabs and their emotional responses—an “inclination to extremes” as demonstrated by the cultural tendencies for polarized views; emotional outbursts of temper; and the venting of indiscriminate hostility once aroused. The combination of this cultural trait, a large reservoir of rage, and a host of legitimate or perceived grievances is very volatile.

Motives: Inspirations to Action.

Motivations to join an insurgency or terror organization are as complicated as they are diverse. Common forms of motivations are religious, political, financial, territorial or criminal. Jihad is a central concept in Islam and is often a strong motive for many Muslims to join the global insurgency movement. There is wide-spread debate regarding the meaning and significance of jihad and its authenticity. Within the Muslim world, there tend to be two camps: the “radicals” who’s literal interpretation of the two main sources of Islamic doctrine, the Qur’an and the life’s examples set by the prophet Muhammad, dictate that

---

war against and conquest of other religions is the duty of all Muslims and the “moderates” who interpret
jihad in a more benign manner and claim the internal jihad is manipulated by extremists. According to
Ahmed Rashid, author of *Jihad, The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, “the greater jihad…is first
inward-seeking: it involves the effort of each Muslim to become a better human…” He then described
the lesser jihad as a fight “against the corrupt society…an unjust ruler” and thus, jihad can “become the
means to mobilize (for) political and social struggle.” Rashid continued, “Today’s global jihadi
movements…ignore the greater jihad advocated by The Prophet and adopt the lesser jihad as a complete
political and social philosophy. Yet nowhere in Muslim writings or tradition does jihad sanction the
killing of innocents…it is this perversion of jihad—as a justification to slaughter the innocent—which in
part defines the radical new fundamentalism of today’s most extreme Islamic movements.”

Authors on Islamic doctrine and jihad, Robert Spencer and Andrew Bostom, referred directly to
the Qur’an to point out specific examples inciting intolerance, conquest and forced submission of other
religions through jihad. According to Bostom, of 40 references to jihad in the Qur’an, all but four refer to
jihad in a manner consistent with the concept of waging war against non-believers.29 Spencer claimed
that according to the literal translation of the Qur’an, the examples set by Muhammad and Islamic
Doctrine there is no compromise, the only options for the non-Muslim world is conversion, submission or
war.30 He also argued that a common factor in a “radicalization” process was the individual’s effort to
become a more devote and their interaction with a radicalized Islamist cleric or mosque community.31

Stephen Coughlin, author of studies on Islamic doctrine, argued the following:

Hence, jihad is a duty that cannot be nullified. When speaking of jihad as a duty, its
meaning is limited to that of jihad as warfare against non-Muslims to establish the
religion. This duty is to continue until the entire planet is made the dar al-Islam. The

---

29 Dr. Andrew Bostom, “GWOT and the Jihadist: Jihad Then and Now” AOASF/AMSP Seminar. Fort
30 Bostom and Spencer, Qur’an passages cited: (9:123), (9:73), (9:5), (9:29). Robert Spencer. “GWOT and
the Jihadist: Jihad Then and Now” AOASF/AMSP Seminar. Fort Leavenworth, KS 4 Jan 2007.
31 Robert Spencer, “GWOT and the Jihadist: Jihad Then and Now” AOASF/AMSP Seminar. Fort
basis for this understanding is the Qur’an, sahih hadith, and consensus among the scholars. There does not appear to be doctrinal way for “moderates” to overcome this.  

Whether institutional or an extreme interpretation, jihad serves as the unifying core of the extreme ideology pushed by bin Laden and the extreme Islamic movement to justify violence and mobilize Muslims to vector resentment and anger into violent action for an extreme ideological cause. It is the basis of the call to support or join the declared “holy war” against the West. The global jihad combines religious motives with territorial and political motives in a desired Caliphate end state.

While many experts have focused on the religious motivations behind terror groups, political scientists, psychologists and strategists see something deeper and more basic to the motives to join and commit violence. Kilcullen stated during a 2006 interview with The New Yorker, “After 9/11, when a lot of people were saying, ‘the problem is Islam,’ I was thinking, it’s something deeper…it’s about human social networks…” He went on to state that, “there are elements in human psychological and social makeup that drive what’s happening…This is human behavior in an Islamic setting. This is not ‘Islamic behavior.” George Parker, the author of the article, wrote that Kilcullen “paraphrasing the American political scientist Roger D. Petersen, said, ‘People don’t get pushed into rebellion by their ideology. They get pulled in by their social networks.’” Packer concluded that “although radical ideas prepare the way for disaffected young men to become violent jihadists, the reasons they convert are more mundane and familiar: family, friends, associates.” The common bonds and group identity of such a group can be extremely strong and very effective in motivating members to conduct acts of violence.

Despite numerous attempts by senior members of al Qaeda to motivate and mobilize the Muslim masses to wage jihad on the West, the response on the “Muslim street” has been fairly quiet. James Robbins, contributing editor to National Review Online, attributed this to the fact that “interests, not ideology, is what drives the shifting alliances in the world of radical politics.” In referencing support for

---

33 George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 December 2006 8.
Osama bin Laden, he states that any “appreciation for the man who has chosen to stand up against the
global hegemon…does not automatically translate into mass political support…this is not the type of
commitment that mobilizes the masses; but without mass political action, the terrorists cannot win.”\textsuperscript{34}
This lack of support is indicative that in the struggle between a powerful, but warped ideology and the
individual’s core interests for a better life, the ideology does not carry the fight for the vast majority of
Muslims. Robbins summed up this idea when he wrote the following:

\ldots bear in mind that hardly anyone wants what the terrorists are selling. Al Qaeda's vision
of the future is a society like the one the Taliban erected in Afghanistan, or Iran\ldots at the
height of Khomeini’s power. It is a decidedly unpopular form of utopianism, and it is
useful to keep reminding people what the practical consequences would be if the
terrorists attained power. Some people already know. There is no popular movement to
bring back Taliban rule to Afghanistan. In Iran the inheritors of Khomeini’s revolution
are fighting a delaying action against a rising tide of freedom\ldots by a young population
who\ldots know there is a world of opportunity being denied them by theocrats whose
legitimacy is consequently fading…\textsuperscript{35}

According to Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, authors of “Counterinsurgency and the
Four Tools of Political Competition”, “The regard for one’s own benefit or advantage is the basis for
behavior in all societies, regardless of religion, class, or culture. Iraqis, for example, will decide to support
the insurgency or government forces based on a calculation of which side \textit{on balance} best meets their
needs for physical security, economic well-being, and social identity.”\textsuperscript{36}

Some experts point to the fact that the decision to use violence as a “tool” or means to a political
end and is the result of a “rational calculation” based on a cost vs. benefits analysis and a lack of other
feasible non-violent options to obtain their desired objectives. Dr. Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman of
the University of Maryland, made a convincing argument for the “tool” approach in recognizing that
terrorists make rational decisions to use terrorism as an instrument to obtain an objective rather than a

\textsuperscript{36} Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, “The Objective Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the
Four Tools of Political Competition” \textit{Military Review} Jan-Feb 2006, 1.
“syndrome” approach searching to find a root cause for terrorism. They wrote that a “justificatory system” is “psychologically necessary for the embracement of terrorism…” that is, an ideology claiming terrorism to constitute an effective and morally acceptable tool or way to achieve the actors’ objectives.37

At the nexus of interests and a rational calculus formulation is what Kilcullen refers to the “Constitutional path”--a method to “counter the grievances on which insurgent systems feed.” He pointed to the Malaya example where the British “countered the Communist appeal to nationalism by setting a date for independence and…transition to self-government” and the use of anti-communist trade unions in the Cold War. In this case, workers in countries like Poland were provided a ‘constitutional path’ to a better life rather than the stark choice between violent revolution and poverty.38

Other apolitical motivations include financial and criminal activities. Most individuals motivated in this manner, assuming they do not become deeply committed to the cause, can be “persuaded” by economic, coercive, or other means to convince them that their behavior is not in their best interests.

There is much debate regarding the existence of a “root causes” of terrorism. Studies show that there are multiple potential contributing factors or underlying conditions working together to contribute to the emergence of terrorism and instability rather than a root cause. A complete discussion on this topic is worthy of its own study but in the interest of limiting the scope of this paper, the discussion will be limited to examples of such conditions and their relation to instability, insurgency and the current conflict.

Experts point to various underlying conditions such as the effects of globalization; rapid socio-economic changes; rising expectations and the repeated failure to meet those expectations; poverty; economic, social and political inequalities; political repression; and education that may serve as sources of insurgent grievances. Grievances are key to the insurgents’ overall cause and recruiting efforts. These conditions are diverse and vary from state to state. For many Muslims, these conditions are seen as something outside their ability to influence because of limited opportunities due to limited political

participation or economic opportunities. The resulting frustration may then strengthen ties to their
religion and identity or movement to extreme ideologies as a means to downplay the relative deprivation
or a solution to perceived injustices.  

Many regimes in the region not only fail to provide a political voice of dissent or participation in
the political process but are also failing when it comes to economic development and providing essential
services. Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy, authors of *To Prevail*, summed up these “legitimacy”
and “effectiveness” gaps when they wrote, “the single most important driver of Islamic rage is the failure
of many ‘moderate’ Islamic states to create modern governments responsive to the needs of their people
and viable civil societies where even minimal levels of debate and democracy are tolerated. A number of
these regimes risk being failures in progress, with governing structures that are fundamentally
unrepresentative and corrupt and economies that do not meet the basic needs of their growing
populations.” Not only have these regimes silenced or imprisoned moderate or democratic voices, they
have tolerated clerics “preaching an antimodern and violent credo as long as it is directed at others.”

The NS-CT recognizes the role political alienation plays in the creation of an environment
conducive to insurgency and terror, “Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice
in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a
stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse political
vision based on violence and destruction.” Ultimately, as has been demonstrated in numerous historical
examples such as Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam the success or failure of a local COIN effort
directly depends on the ability to identify and address these grievances and underlying conditions.

Analysis of the motives, underlying conditions and the elements of a terror network can serve a
strategist well by providing a framework to examine the threat, understand the environment and develop a

38 Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen. “Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on
Terrorism.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Vol 28, Number 4, Aug 2005.) 28
39 Concepts based on the author’s multiple discussions with monograph director, Dr. Alice Butler-Smith
40 Kurt M. Campbell and Michelle A. Flournoy, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign
strategy to address the networks, centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. An effective strategy will serve to address these conditions to resolve local grievances while also isolating critical nodes by breaking linkages and thus diminish the ability for a terror network to operate or ultimately destroy the network. Effective implementation will counter an extreme ideology by addressing underlying conditions that undermine government stability. According to FM 3-24, “In the end, any successful COIN operation must address the legitimate grievances insurgents use to generate popular support. These may be different in each local area, in which case a complex set of solutions will be needed.”

Global Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory and Strategy…

Acknowledging that the war is a global counterinsurgency rather than counterterrorism, while seemingly subtle, has significant implications. This shift places the major focus on a coordinated and comprehensive political approach over a military dominated response. According to Bard O’Neill, COIN theorist, “force is part of a larger political-military struggle, success depends on its integration with political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, economic and social policies. This is particularly true when it comes to dealing with terrorists, and most important, guerilla threats because non-military factors, all of which the government can influence, largely determine the success or failure of these forms of warfare.”

Kilcullen wrote, “the notion of a ‘war on terror’ has led the US…to focus overwhelming on military responses” whereas “an insurgent has a mass base whose support can be won or lost through politics.”

Recent trends are encouraging yet only partial solutions to the challenges posed by the current conflict. The post 9/11 environment witnessed several national security structural improvements such as the Department of Homeland Security; intelligence reforms to include establishing a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC); creation of the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); US Agency for International Development’s

---

42 U.S. Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-49.
(USAID) implementation of their Fragile State Strategy and Conflict Assessment Framework; military changes to include the release of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations; the recent Quadrennial Defense Review increasing special ops forces, unconventional/irregular warfare and CT capabilities and the President’s recent announcement to increase the size of the ground forces; and a renewed interest in COIN theory and doctrine.

The Army and Marines combined efforts to update COIN doctrine with the recent release of FM 3-24, effectively filling a 20 year void with a comprehensive product that not only is grounded in history but also informed by contemporary experiences. While important, filling this void is not enough, to make an enduring impact, COIN theory must be institutionalized in military training and education.

As stated earlier, this paper will use the historical COIN principles imperatives as outlined in FM 3-24 as the analytic framework to assess the national strategies. The Eight COIN principles represented in the COIN doctrine are: legitimacy is the main objective; primacy of politics; unity of effort; understanding the environment; intelligence drives operations; isolate the insurgents from their cause and support; provide security under the rule of law; and be prepared for a long term commitment. The doctrine also highlights several imperatives: manage information and expectations; use appropriate levels of force; learn and adapt; empower the lowest levels, and support the host nation.

It is important that one know and understand these historic principles but also their limits. There is no “silver bullet” solution. According to FM 3-24, “COIN operations are complicated, and even following the principles does not guarantee success. This paradox is present in all forms of warfare but is most obvious in COIN. The…principles are presented in the belief that understanding them helps illuminate the challenges inherent in defeating an insurgency.”

---

insurgent and counterinsurgent is what led a Special Forces Officer operating in Iraq in 2005 to utter, “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.”

The impact of globalization extends to include the contemporary global jihadist insurgency and COIN efforts. Kilcullen captured this concept in two strategy papers—“Countering Global Insurgency” and “Counterinsurgency Redux.” In the first, he postured that since “classical counterinsurgency is designed and optimized to defeat insurgency in one country…traditional counterinsurgency has limitations in (a global) context. Therefore we need a new paradigm, capable of addressing a globalised counterinsurgency.” In the latter he concluded, “many fundamentals of classical counterinsurgency remain relevant, but not sufficient, for contemporary counterinsurgency. Mastering it may demand new mental models.” In light of this, this author believes classical COIN principles can be effectively applied globally if armed with awareness that the environment and nature of the conflict require adaptation. While this may be seen as a leap, the COIN principles are similar in nature to the principles of war and should be applicable at all levels of war as long as the strategist is aware of the differences between the tactical, operational and strategic environments. Secondly, if applied appropriately and effectively—that is to ensure a tailored region and local perspective while severing the global linkages, the conflict reverts to a local environment—an environment best suited for traditional COIN. In other words, “act local, with global impact.”

---

Chapter 3: Global COIN Strategy: Ends, Ways and Means

This review will start with an examination of the Ends, Ways, and Means of the current national War on Terror strategies from a COIN perspective. Army War College professor, Arthur F. Lykke Jr., describes the relationship of these elements as a three-legged stool where if the “legs” are not balanced the level of risk for strategic failure is increased.49 Kent Butts, Center for Strategic Leadership, states, “they are the three pillars upon which, when properly aligned, rests the crown of victory.”50

Ends: Clear and Obtainable Objectives

Sir Robert Thompson, noted British COIN expert with experience in Burma, Malaya and Vietnam, emphasized a clear political objective or ends as his first principle.51 For the NSS, the “ultimate goal” is “ending tyranny in our world…the goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” 52 The NS-CT’s objectives are to “defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.”53 The military’s NMSP-WOT seeks these same objectives. Overall, in the words of Kent Butts, “the vision that defines the end state of the NS-CT is clear and compelling.”54 Clear objectives are critical to build the strategic concepts or ways to obtain the objectives and the means--the process of prioritizing and resourcing to fulfill the strategy.

According to Dennis Murphy and John Traylor, authors of “A Process for Regional Cooperation”, “while the broad end (of the NS-CT) is globally applicable, the ways and means of achieving it may vary greatly from region to region. In other words, there is a need to think globally, but act regionally and, at times, locally.”\(^{55}\) Thus, by seeing the conflict as global and applying a strategy that is congruent with COIN principles in a manner that is tailored for regional and local scenarios is a good starting point. That said, the ways and the means need to be in relative balance to political ends.

**Ways: Aligned with COIN Principles?**

The NS-CT reflects long and short term approaches to ends outlined above. The “advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy” is the stated “long-term solution for winning the War on Terror”, while the short term emphasizes the priorities of preventing attacks; denying WMD access; denying the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and denying terrorist a “base and launching pad for terror” through simultaneously leveraging all instruments of national power and building the capacity of our foreign partners\(^{56}\). The NS-CT recognizes that the current conflict is “both a battle of arms and ideas” and that “the paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence” or a coordinated “whole government” approach to the strategy. The president referenced the relationship of three pillars of his strategy—defense, diplomacy and development in the NSS-- “development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security…”\(^{57}\) This approach, as written, is in line with Thompson’s third COIN principle:

> The government must have an overall plan. This plan must cover not just the security measures and military operations. It must include all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency. Above all it must clearly define roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure there are no gaps…It is essential, too, that there should be a proper balance

---


between military and civil efforts, with complete coordination in all fields.58

Following this, the NMSP-WOT, seeks these same ends through the following three ways:

Protecting the Homeland, Allies and Interests; Disrupting and Attacking Terror Networks; and supporting
mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism.59 Some experts refer to this last element as
Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST)--a comprehensive interagency effort to erode the
legitimacy of the global insurgency by addressing the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit.60

A CIST strategy is the most holistic and enduring of the three strategic pillars. Its aim is to build
the capacity of a state or region to wage COIN through a broad range of efforts that span the interagency
and all elements of national power. Examples include: establishing effective governments; security
assistance; military sales and training; military ops; diplomatic measures such as cooperative security
arrangements; intelligence collection and sharing; financial reforms; debt forgiveness; foreign aid
funding, grants and loans; info ops; economic development incentives; and law enforcement cooperation.

According to the NMSP-WOT, CIST is “achieved through countering extremist ideology and
encouraging democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity...A decisive point...occurs when moderate
Muslims lead the fight against the extremists. Key to this is (the) belief that terrorism is not a legitimate
means to pursue political goals”. This “must come from within Islam...” and “the US role...is to support,
where appropriate, and encourage and amplify the voices of moderates who oppose extremists.” The
DoD has deemed CIST as “the decisive element of the strategy.”61 The NMSP-WOT also recognizes that
“the principal thrust, must come from instruments of national power and influence outside the (DoD)” and
that the military’s role is to set conditions and coordinate closely with lead agencies in this effort.”62

58 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency. (Hailer Publishing, St. Petersburg Florida,
59 U.S. Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategic Plan
60 Dr. Kent Butts, Terry Klapakis and Art Bradshaw, “The Military’s Role in Addressing the Underlying
Conditions of Terrorism”, (Center for Strategic Leadership Vol. 05-06 June 2006) 1.
61 U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategic Plan
The stated three pillars of this strategy closely reflect FM 3-24’s “mosaic” nature of a COIN campaign --“a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations…the balance between them depends on the local situation.” CIST most closely matches the stability operations aspect of the “mosaic”. Recently released DoD Directive 3000.05 established policy elevating stability operations to “a core U.S. military mission [requiring] priority comparable to combat operations and [that it] be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”

The next sections will examine the ways of the current strategy as compared to the COIN principles to determine their overall congruence with COIN principles and doctrine. The intent of this analysis is to use locally derived and optimized COIN principles and apply them in a manner as to be effective in a global context. The analysis will start with the most important of the COIN principles.

Legitimacy: The Prime Principle and a Global Center of Gravity

Legitimacy, as perceived locally, is the main object of classical COIN. It is also critically important in the global context. Andrew Garfield, author of a 2005 joint study of British and US approaches to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations in Iraq by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, argued “to be successful, the intervening force’s legitimacy must be established” and claimed that “legitimacy is derived from three key sources:” domestic support, the support of the international community and from the “community being rebuilt.”

Domestically, Chaplain (Colonel) Charles Kriete, as quoted by Colonel Harry Summers in his book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, observed the challenges of maintaining domestic legitimacy and will for a prolonged, ambiguous, and irregular conflict in a democracy:

---

64 U.S. Department of Defense DoD Regulation 3000.05, (HQ Department of Army. 28 Nov 2005)
65 Andrew Garfield, “Instability in Iraq: Why it Exists, British Perspectives on the US Efforts to Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq” (Foreign Policy Research Institute Spring 2005)
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/1012/fpri/garfield_british.html
Societies in which communication is open, which safeguard pluralism…and…tolerate a high degree of political dissent find it much more difficult to develop and maintain consensus of commitment to the legitimacy of strategic objectives. Yet the maintenance of that consensus is one of the key objectives of national strategy, in both a political and military sense, for when it fails, the war is lost.66

Reminiscent of Vietnam, Kilcullen stated, “the greatest threat to victory in Iraq would be a loss of political will in the US, followed by premature withdrawal…” 67 Since Iraq is the GWOT “central front”, the loss will would have huge global COIN implications.68 Maintaining the political will to sustain the “long war” will be an enormous challenge and require effective strategic communications.

International legitimacy is essential in a global conflict. Bin Laden understands this and has claimed authority and legitimacy over the Muslim world. From the enemy’s perspective, Kilcullen wrote:

Bin Laden’s declaration of war announced a global campaign against the United States and the West. It issued a fatwa calling for jihad to all Muslims, thereby indicating that Bin Laden claimed religious and political authority as a Muslim ruler…al Qaeda’s statement declared a worldwide state of war against the West, and claimed authority over the forces engaged in that war. Unlike a traditional declaration of war, the declaration also claimed authority over a worldwide Islamist movement for jihad.69

A transnational threat with a global reach requires a coalition of global partners who recognize the vital nature of the threat, and possess both the national will and the ability to contribute to the fight.70 International legitimacy based on building coalitions, strengthening alliances and increasing the capacity of partners is a key component of all the national strategy documents.

US global legitimacy is problematic—especially in the Islamic world. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, experts on democracy promotion and authors of Uncharted Journey: Promoting

---


68 President Bush: “The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front in their war against humanity. And we must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror.” George W. Bush, “War on Terror” Speech to the National Endowment for Democracy. (Washington DC, October 6, 2005) on www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.


Democracy in the Middle East, discussed the credibility challenges facing the US in the Middle East. “Arab publics...simply do not believe the US government is sincere when it talks about promoting democracy.” They pointed to several examples that drive this prevailing perception: First, the timing of the democracy push and preparations for the war in Iraq led many Arabs to see such moves as an agenda to pursue removal of the region’s anti-American regimes. Second, American ideals of freedom and democracy are often balanced against the desire for stable and autocratic regimes that ensure access to oil and has led to an impression that the US is not serious in its push for political reforms in autocratic regimes supportive of US interests. The end result is the belief that US democratic reform efforts are “either a dark conspiracy or meaningless rhetoric.” Lastly, US policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as a credibility hurdle. “From the Arab point of view, the creation of...Israel was...an act of aggression against them; and although most Arabs have come to accept that the situation is irreversible, the sense of injury persists.” Even if this situation were resolved, it “would...not eliminate Arabs’ strongly held belief that the US cares much more about Israel than about them.” Carothers and Ottaway summarized, “Neither the problem of credibility nor...conflicting interests will go away anytime soon.”

Credibility problems exist outside the Middle East as well. Robert Kagan, Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pointed to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ hampering US efforts to exercise global leadership against the Islamist threat. The crux of this challenge is centered on the fact that Europe either does not perceive the Islamist threat to the same extreme as the US or they deem unchecked US hegemony as the greater threat. This perception has huge ramifications in a struggle against a threat that sets its sights on the global domination and not just the creation of a regional pan-Islamic state. Adding to the divergence in US and European perceptions, Garfield wrote, “The British consider the early development of a domestically and internationally recognized political end-state to be

---

an essential part of any S&R operation.” He argued that in the case of Iraq, “The US strategic approach…is seen as idealistic, ideologically driven, and not based on a pragmatic assessment of the situation on the ground. The planned end-state for Iraq has therefore failed to secure sufficient Iraqi or international community acceptance.”

The third and “most important” source of legitimacy for the intervening force is the “community being rebuilt.” FM 3-24 states “The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy” and “COIN…cannot achieve lasting success without…achieving legitimacy.” It also sees legitimacy as a balance of consent and coercion:

The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government…All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance.

Max Weber, German economist and sociologist, widely known for his views on the relationship between the state and the governed, commented on the importance of exclusive coercive means to the perceived legitimacy of a state, “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” McFate and Jackson argued that while the right to use force or the threat to use force is the state’s “most direct” source of political power, it alone or when executed in a heavy handed manner is not the “most effective mode of governing.” In

---


75 U.S. Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-40 and 1-120.


comparison, legitimate governance is considered a more effective and enduring source of political power. They surmised that, “Legitimate governance…implies a reciprocal relationship between central authority and citizenry. To be considered legitimate by the populace, the government must monopolize coercive force within its territorial boundaries to provide its citizens with the most basic human need—security. Where states fail to provide security to its citizens or becomes a threat to them, it fails to fulfill the implicit contract of governance.” The public’s perception of the effectiveness in doing so is essential. They also wrote that there are three key elements in the effort to maintain legitimacy in an insurgency: “using proportional force, using precisely applied force, and providing security for the civilian population.” Measured and precisely applied force are sound operating concepts and COIN imperatives which must be practiced in the effort to achieve security. Failure to do so hampers legitimacy.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) defines legitimacy as “the perception by important segments of society that the government is exercising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole.” Another main element in the legitimacy equation is “effectiveness” which USAID defines as “the capability of the government to work with society to assure provision of order and public goods and services.” USAID’s Fragile State Strategy claims, “Where both are weak, conflict or state failure is likely to occur.” In responding, they claim, “outsiders are far better equipped to address effectiveness deficits than to promote legitimacy.”

Failure to provide security and the basic needs of the population, erodes legitimacy and creates a power vacuum insurgents can exploit. O’Neill wrote, “Quite often, the extension of such aid to people will be the first step in involving them with the insurgent movement, either actively or passively. This would seem especially true when a government has been delinquent meeting the people's needs. The

---

McFate and Andrea Jackson, “The Objective Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition” Military Review Jan-Feb 2006, 2.

78 Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, “The Objective Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition” Military Review Jan-Feb 2006, 2.

social services provided by Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza strip of the past two decades provide a striking illustration.”\(^80\) The Taliban in Afghanistan and Hezbollah in the Lebanon are other examples.

Host nation ownership is essential to legitimacy and is captured in the COIN imperative: support the host nation. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, authors of “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21\(^{st}\) Century”, recommend that “local government and military forces take the lead” arguing that “the more the local government and security forces are subordinates of the United States, the more difficult it will be to establish legitimacy.”\(^81\) Using indigenous forces also builds capacity. According to FM 3-24, “The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation has to win on its own” and “while it might be easier for US military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local force and institutions.”\(^82\)

The use of indigenous forces is an important factor in the success of a COIN campaign for several reasons. Cassidy, pointed to the economy of force and increased environmental awareness factors when he wrote, “…it can provide a significant increase in the quantity of troops on the ground, troops whose knowledge of the terrain, culture, and language generally produce an even greater and exponential improvement in actionable intelligence on the insurgents…”\(^83\) Kilcullen postured that all COIN efforts must be focused on “post-conflict power structures” and that the insurgents have a strategic advantage of being able to wait out the COIN efforts and emerge after the intervening force departs. The long term solution to this dilemma is developing effective indigenous security and governance—“therefore, indigenous capability building drives the exit strategy timeline.”\(^84\) Garfield provided the following caveat regarding building indigenous capacity: “complete control should be handed over only when local officials have demonstrated their competency and impartiality. While public expectations regarding the

---


\(^{82}\) U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*. (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-147, 1-26


\(^{84}\) Lieutenant Colonel (Dr) David Kilcullen, “United States Counterinsurgency: An Australian View”
timing of the handover can be managed if progress is being achieved, the loss of control resulting from a premature handover is almost impossible to reverse.”

In a conflict with massive potential global commitments, an “economy of force” and burden sharing approach is essential to sustain the fight. The NS-CT emphasizes the importance of building the capacity of partner nations on multiple occasions—“a significant part of this effort includes expanding partnership capacity. We are building the capacity of foreign partners in all areas of counterterrorism activities, including strengthening their ability to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and military counterterrorism operations.” NMSP-WOT also recognizes “expanding foreign partnerships and partnership capacity” as a key “crosscutting element” of the three strategic pillars.

As discussed earlier, the strategies acknowledge the importance of Muslim ownership—“the most vital work will be done within the Islamic world itself…” and “the strategy…must empower the very people the terrorist want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam.” This is also essential as US legitimacy issues and political sensitivities create access issues and/or make a large presence undesirable.

Colonel Gregory Wilson, author of “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach”, referenced the “tailored, “low-visibility” capacity building approach in the Philippines as a “model effort” for the global conflict. He wrote:

The United States must employ a holistic approach that enhances the legitimacy of the host-nation government and its security forces in the eyes of the local populace…it must focus on the people at the grassroots level as the enemy’s center of gravity. Ultimately, we will win the “long war,”…by gaining broader acceptance of US policy within the moderate Muslim community. The best way to do this is by working in the shadows, “by, with, and through” indigenous or surrogate forces to marginalize the insurgents and win over the people. In an irony befitting the often paradoxical nature of counterinsurgency warfare, “the indirect approach” offers us the most direct path to victory.

---

Another important aspect of legitimacy is the local perception of authority. Weber stressed three types of authority: rational-legal; charismatic; and traditional. Traditional, relying on historical precedent is the most common in non-Western societies. McFate and Jackson argued that the “US failure to leverage the traditional authority of the tribal sheiks in Iraq hindered the establishment of a legitimate government and became a driver of the insurgency.” They claimed that “the fall of the strong central government…retribalized the country and the vacuum of the legal system after Iraq’s fall was filled by tribal law and authority. The subsequent decision by the Coalition Provisional Authority to “liberate” Iraqis from the “tyranny of the tribal system” rather than to leverage the system amounted to the loss of an “opportunity to curb the insurgency.” This also speaks to the need to understand the environment. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy in all three environments requires an effective information operations (IO) campaign to skillfully manage information and expectations—a key COIN imperative.

The national strategies all recognize the current conflict as a “battle of ideals” and the need to counter enemy propaganda and marginalize their violent ideology. The NMSP-WOT dedicates an annex to the topic of Strategic Communications and states the following:

The Defense Department’s strategic communication objectives in the GWOT are to align Coalition and partner nations against violent extremism, provide support for moderate voices, dissuade enablers and supporters of extremists, deter and disrupt terrorist acts, and counter ideological support for terrorism. Achieving these objectives requires a sustained, proactive strategic communication effort…A successful strategic communication strategy will insure maximum beneficial impact on the perceptions of target audiences, capitalize on truthful information, and exploit enemy exorbitance.  

—

General John Abizaid, commander of US Central Command, has described the war as “a war of intelligence and a war of perceptions.” Retired Lieutenant General David Barno, former commander of US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, argued “the war of perceptions—winning a battle of ideas, influencing other cultures, countering the virulent message of hate and intolerance promoted by our enemies—is a bitter conflict fought out every day.” Kilcullen recognized that the current global conflict is “fundamentally an information fight…the enemy gets that, and we don’t yet get that, and I think that’s why we’re losing.” Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld agreed: “I would say we probably deserve a D or D+ as a country as how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place…we have not found the formula as a country.” Frederick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies commented on a recent trip to Nigeria that it was clear that American propaganda was “being outclassed by those of the Iranians and Saudis”: “We’re not thinking creatively, expansively.” US efforts are “are sclerotic, bureaucratic, lumbering—you can see the US coming from miles away.”

US IO efforts are also hampered by a lack of a cultural understanding of the target audiences. At the tactical level, a Marine claimed that his unit had “lost the battle to influence public opinion because it used the wrong approach…we were focused on broadcast media and metrics. But this had no impact because Iraqis spread information through rumor. We should have been visiting their coffee shops.” Garfield also criticized the US strategic IO campaign as too reliant on “abstract concepts such as democracy and citizenship that have little to no relevance to Iraqis.” Carothers stressed “practical

95 David Kilcullen quoted by George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 Dec 2006 8.
96 Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 27 Mar 2006.
97 Montgomery McFate quoted by George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 Dec 2006 7.
application…rather than abstract principles” when he pointed to successes in US international civic
education approaches that are “tailored to the realities of the societies where they are being used.”

Packer summarized the status of the US global IO effort by quoting an unnamed expert in public
diplomacy with close ties to the State Department: “In general, there is little organized American effort to
rebut the jihadist conspiracy theories that circulate daily among the Muslims…” This shortfall must be
addressed. From all indications this critical component of the national strategy is lacking in multiple
areas and lacks leadership and coordination much like the overall interagency support to the current
conflict. Helle Dale, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, noted that current
American public diplomacy efforts pale in comparison to Cold War era strategies and structures. She
recommended that “Developing a national public diplomacy and strategic communication strategy is an
essential first step, but for it to do any good, the strategy must look beyond short term needs, assign clear
authorities and establish sensible processes to aid research, planning, clearing and assessment.”

Tempering expectations is the other part of the manage information imperative and is essential to
avoid dissent in the local population. USAID stressed the need to demonstrate a short-term visible impact
while considering the long-term efforts required to advance stability, reform and institutional capacity.
A significant problem surfaces when expectations are not tempered or realistic and the stated objectives
are not met. In the event of success there is often rising expectations. COIN doctrine highlights the
expectation challenges facing the US, “U.S. forces start with a built-in challenge because of their
reputation for accomplishment, what some call the ‘man on the moon syndrome.’ This refers to the
expressed disbelief that a nation able to put a man on the moon cannot quickly restore basic services. U.S.
agencies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts should avoid making unrealistic promises.”

According to a Garfield, the Coalition suffered from a “‘symphony of positive messaging,’ creating the

99 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, The Learning Curve, (Carnegie Endowment for
100 George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 December 2006. 9.
impression that (Iraqi) lives would be immeasurably improved in short order. In reality, Iraq was in far worse shape than…expected, and the Coalition was unable even to maintain a basic level of security. This dislocation of expectations quickly resulted in disillusionment…” The study recommended, “promise less but deliver more, and more quickly.”

Primacy of Politics—An Undisputed Boss

According to French COIN theorist, David Galula, that “political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the country’s political regime, and to defend it is a political affair.” Overall, Galula described COIN as “80% political and 20% military”. Thus, this conflict requires an emphasis on a “balanced” and coordinated approach of military and non-military that reflects the political primacy of a COIN effort. He concluded regarding the primacy of politics, “The inescapable conclusion is that the over-all responsibility should stay with the civilian power at every possible level.” Kilcullen, echoed: “As insurgency is a political, social; and military problem, military measures alone cannot succeed in this aim. Rather, the role of military forces is to dominate the environment and reduce the energy in the insurgency, taking it ‘off boil’ to allow the other elements of national power to become effective. Thus, military force alone can only contain and disrupt insurgent systems—but this is an essential first step in allowing non-military measures to succeed.” He also wrote: “successful counterinsurgency (at the strategic level) depends largely upon an effective political solution, while tactical actions to counter the insurgency buy time for political solutions to be implemented.” Kalev Sepp, author of “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”, wrote, “A government needs a single, fully empowered executive to direct and coordinate counter-insurgency efforts. Power-sharing among political powers undermines the coherence of the government’s ability to act.”

103 U.S. Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-139
bodies, while appropriate and necessary in peacetime, presents wartime vulnerabilities and gaps in coordination that insurgents can exploit.\textsuperscript{107}

The NMSP-WOT is clear in its position in the strategic hierarchy and that it is subservient to the nation’s political aims—this “strategy articulates the military contribution to achieving the national GWOT objectives as identified in [the multitude of national and national defense strategies].”\textsuperscript{108} Despite this, Garfield argued that the effort the “consensus view” in Iraq, “is that the Coalition has not effectively implemented the principle of civilian primacy. Too much control still devolves to the US military, which unsurprisingly continues to pursue a largely coercive solution to the insurgency.”\textsuperscript{109} He recommended that, “in any intervention, civilian leadership should be installed as quickly as possible. Doing so, he wrote, “can ensure that all the lines of operation are coordinated and in particular that the military end is in harmony with the political, economic, and informational ends.”

Unity of Effort—Single Direction for Multiple Elements of Power

Unity of effort is essential and is closely related to the primacy of politics principle. Galula wrote that the “final defeat of the insurgents—is not an addition but a multiplication of various operations; they are essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero. Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from the beginning to the end.”\textsuperscript{110} According to Kilcullen, COIN—“in its classical form, with a single Supremo coordinating actions—is problematic when applied at the global level…no world government exists with the power to integrate the actions o f independent nations to the extremely close degree required by traditional counterinsurgency.” In the current construct, there emerges a paradox—any nation

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
  \bibitem{Garfield} Andrew Garfield, “Instability in Iraq: Why it Exists, British Perspectives on the US Efforts to Stabilize and Reconstruct Iraq” \textit{Foreign Policy Research Institute} Spring 2005 \url{http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2006/1012/fpri/garfield_british.html}
\end{thebibliography}
powerful enough to act as a ‘Supremo’ would “lack legitimacy”, while any “collective…would tend to lack sufficient power to act effectively against Islamist insurgents or their state sponsors….it would be fatally constrained by the very factors that generated its legitimacy.” 111

Despite the previously discussed international legitimacy challenges, Kilcullen related the current context with the Cold War and the need for American leadership when he wrote that the “competition for global domination between Communism and the West did not require a world government. But it did require leadership from the US, and long term support from the rest of the world’s democracies. Such leadership and support are equally necessary here.” He also wrote that unity of effort can be achieved through “a common strategic understanding, and a common ‘best practice’. A common understanding would allow us to ‘think globally, act locally’.” 112

The national strategies contain multiple references to the importance of international support, coalitions and partnerships. American leadership is also a focal point of all the strategies. With or without international backing, an effective COIN effort requires an effective mechanism to coordinate efforts to leverage all elements of national power. The current administration has taken a lead agency approach to leverage an interagency unity of effort. One example of this approach is the recent National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 which designates the Department of State and its newly created Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) as the lead agency to coordinate, and plan with other nations and organizations to “anticipate state failure…and respond quickly and effectively…to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies and rule of law.”113

Kilcullen highlighted NSPD 44 and S/CRS as the “model for how to bring civilians into counterinsurgency…True enough, the words ‘insurgency,’ ‘insurgent,’ and ‘counterinsurgency’ do not

appear in NSPD 44, but it clearly envisages the need to deploy integrated whole-of-government capabilities in hostile environments.”114

Despite such policies, actual interagency unity of effort has fallen short. Dale Eikmeier, author of “How to Beat the Global Islamist Insurgency”, argued that “a multidimensional war with fronts in the political, ideological, economic, and law enforcement realms requires focus and coordination. No single U.S. department or agency can fight the war on terrorism alone.” He concluded that “the political weight necessary to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and achieve unity of effort to counter the global Islamist insurgency successfully requires management above the federal department level.”115

It is clear that the existing interagency organization structure needs to be addressed to ensure proper planning, coordination and execution across multiple federal departments. The National Security Council (NSC) would have the appropriate political weight to fill this void. Michael Vickers, Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, recommended that the new National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) “should become a subordinate national strategic and operational planning arm of the NSC.” He concluded that the “NCTC may be charged with national strategic and operational planning, but has limited authority and capacity to do so. It is an Intelligence Community, primarily a terrorist warning organization that has been charged with integrating strategic and operational planning for diplomacy, information influence operations, covert action and military operations. Responsibility for integrated national planning is thus divorced not only from execution, but for all purposes, from detailed operational planning as well.” Vickers argued that the integrated organization of the NCTC “will almost certainly be more effective at bringing to bear a fuller range of national and international capabilities than organizations dominated by one department or agency” or a lead agency approach.116 Thus, short of a Goldwater-Nichols II reform of the interagency, moving the

114 George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 December 2006 8.
116 Michael Vickers, “Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems” Testimony before the subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee, 15 March 2006
NCTC from under the Director of the National Intelligence to the NSC while still maintaining a strong intelligence support relationship, would serve to provide the proper political weight and authority to the NCTC to achieve a unity of effort across all agencies and departments.

According to Murphy and Traylor, “addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism requires a global strategy while recognizing regional distinctions that call for implementation plans viewed through a regional and, often local lens.” In short, a “regional approach” to the strategy “is essential for effective implementation…” and “must be tailored to meet the specific needs of the local communities.” Likewise, “the war of ideas is equally based on regional perceptions.” They argued, “but while coordination of these disparate efforts in important there are no regional plans that reflect an interagency effort to synchronize and integrate all elements of national power. Additionally there is no mechanism to offer overarching regional priorities for planning, to determine if gaps, seams or overlapping efforts are occurring…” They then highlighted the staffing shortfalls and cultural differences that have resulted in gaps in interagency planning capabilities, “Beyond the military most organizations are not structured with an inherent planning capability. Anyone tasked with developing an interagency regional plan outside of the military community would likely take in that task as an additional duty.”

Besides staffing and cultural limitations, Murphy and Traylor pointed to the need to come to a “common understanding of planning methodologies” in enhancing “long-term” interagency planning efforts. Along with the need for a common planning framework, the varied definitions of regions across the agencies needs to be addressed to ensure all players have a common reference point. They also pointed to the differences in focus—“most of the cabinet level departments of government focus their efforts at two levels—strategic and tactical. Consider the State Department with strategic planning occurring in Washington and tactical planning and execution occurring in embassies worldwide. The exception is the Defense Department who adds an ‘operational’ level planning and implementing entity

between these two levels (in the form of) Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC).” They highlighted the existence of ad-hoc interagency groups known as Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) to address regional issues in the RCC but that “they are not necessarily robustly structured or manned to conduct detailed planning.” Vickers recommended that “an NCTC-like organization capable of integrating strategic and operational planning be replicated at the regional level.”

Understand the Environment—“Adapt or Perish”

Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, authors of “Fighting a Global Counterinsurgency” predicted a future filled with asymmetric threats, small wars and irregular conflicts, “the US military’s unassailable strength… removes almost any incentive to engage it on the conventional battlefield.” They argued, “shock and awe campaigns….are only the price of admission to the war on terror; the counterinsurgencies that follow are the main show.”

According to Steven Metz, “Since counterinsurgency is won or lost in the psychological domain—it is about shaping perceptions, beliefs, and expectations—the first thing a counterinsurgent needs is ‘situational awareness’.” This speaks to both the managing information imperative and the understanding the environment principle. Understanding the environment, the threat and his motives, interests and objectives and how the population perceives the counterinsurgent and intervening force is essential. According to O’Neill, “an effective counterinsurgency program depends on an accurate, substantive, and comprehensive profile of the adversary and the environmental context with which he

operates.”122 The national strategies as written understand that the current threat is a complex, networked system and not monolithic. It also recognizes the existence of local grievances which must be addressed locally to potentially eliminate the linkage between the local disturbance and the global movement. The NMSP-WOT states that, “It is of supreme importance that the US Military understand the nature of the threat and the nature of this war. This… is critical to the implementation of this strategy. Integral to the NMSP for the GWOT is the concept of ‘supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism.’”123

The US has had multiple COIN experiences throughout its history; some might argue that the nation has seen more small wars than large conventional war experience. The enduring thread throughout, however, tends to be a failure to establish an institutionalized memory reflecting COIN principles in our doctrine and training. America’s preference for quick, clean wars fought by applying overwhelming force in a decisive manner does not match the protracted, ambiguous struggle and nuanced approaches typical of COIN campaign. The conventional and institutional Army also avoided addressing COIN doctrine and educational shortfalls, rejecting the lessons learned from its experiences in Vietnam and continued to focus almost exclusively on conventional force-on-force warfare.124 John Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, a study comparing the US and British Armies as learning organizations based on their experiences in Vietnam and Malaya respectively, attributed this failure to the organizational culture of the Army—“an unshakable belief in the essence of the organization (their core competency focused on defeating a conventional enemy) precluded organizational learning.” He concluded that the reasons for the British success in Malaya and the U.S. failure in South Vietnam was largely based on the fact that the British more readily changed failing policies and adjusted strategy based on the changing environment—the size and culture of the US Army precluded agility and adaptation.125

---

Given the current environment, an increased emphasis on COIN theory, doctrine and principles in the professional military education (PME) curriculum is essential to preparing the force to be agile and adaptive for this complex challenge. The educational agenda must also include interagency members. Military exercises and training must reflect stability operations and COIN scenarios. They must also increase awareness of what other agencies such as State, Justice and USAID bring to the fight. Awareness of interagency capabilities, limitations and operating concepts such as the USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework and Fragile States Strategy is extremely valuable and should be integrated into education systems. All elements of the interagency team would benefit from greater interaction with their interagency counterparts much like the military benefited from an increased emphasis on jointness.

The issue is greater than institutionalizing COIN theory in PME, training and exercises. New ways of thinking and changes to the organizational cultures of the military and the other federal agencies is required. The military must be able to dominate and win the decisive battles while also being flexible enough to effectively support peacekeeping, “nation building” missions and the challenges of a complex COIN environment. Establishing a learning organization is essential to this global COIN environment. Innovation and initiative must be encouraged down to the lowest levels. Zero-mistake cultures discourage such approaches and create a conservative, risk adverse organization. Nagl concluded, “Armies will have to make the ability to learn to deal with messy, uncomfortable situations an integral part of their organization culture. In T.E. Lawrence’s metaphor, they must learn how to eat soup with a knife. The process will not be comfortable, but it could not be more important.”

Learn and Adapt is a COIN imperative. Hoffman best summed up this concept in his recent House testimony: “In so fluid an environment, our strategy must accordingly change and adapt as well. What will be required…is a more integrated, systems approach to a complex problem that is at once operationally durable, evolutionary and elusive in character. In sum, we will need to adjust and adapt our strategy, resources, and tactics to formidable opponents that…are widely dispersed and decentralized and
whose many destructive parts are autonomous, mobile, and themselves highly adaptive.”127 The NMSP-WOT highlights this concept—“This (strategy) demands an agile and adaptive approach…”128

Empowering the lowest level is an essential COIN imperative related to the creation of an agile and adaptive COIN force. FM 3-24 states:

Mission command is ideally suited to the mosaic nature of COIN operations…effective COIN operations are decentralized…Mission command encourages the initiative…and facilitates the learning that must occur at every level. It is a major characteristic of a COIN force that can adapt and react at least as quickly as the insurgents.129

The Pentagon has also launched a new project to assist the commanders in the field to better understand the operating environment. The Cultural Operations Research Human Teams are five-person “human terrain” teams comprised of social scientists that will deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq for six to nine month tours serving as cultural advisors to the combat brigade commanders.130 This capability, focused to the specific region, should be resident in the interagency support to all Regional Commanders.

Intelligence Drives Ops: Driving towards the Tipping Point

The value of intelligence is evident throughout the national strategy documents. The lessons from 9/11 resulted in numerous sweeping reforms. The NS-CT points to several improvements such as the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the National Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Centers (NCTC and NCPC) and enhancements to the FBI, CIA and Treasury department focused on improving collection, sharing, planning, resourcing and prioritizing. “We have reorganized the Intelligence Community…to better integrate…efforts…into a more unified, coordinated,

---

129 U.S. Army FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency,* (HQ Department of Army. 16 June 2006) 1-146.
and effective whole...at home and abroad.” Such reforms reflect the successful example from Malaya where the “British and their indigenous allies established a unified intelligence organization under a single chief of intelligence” and “created district, province, and national intelligence fusion centers run by the police but with military and civil government liaison...” Such centers must be leveraged at the global/national, regional and local levels focused on the strategic, operational and tactical conflict.

Kilcullen argued that the most critical function intelligence provides to contemporary COIN is feedback on the effects of operations on public perceptions. He also stressed the increased importance of human and tactical signals intelligence. Feedback supports multiple principles and imperatives and is essential to the process of learning and adapting strategy to meet the dynamics of a COIN conflict. USAID’s Fragile States Strategy echoes the importance of intelligence in establishing “a system for early strategic warning that prompts rapid response to fragile states showing vulnerability to failure.” In addition to this “early warning” system, there is a requirement for a threat assessment process to determine the strategic impact of a failure of a given state in order to establish priorities and the nature of the response. State/CRS is currently working to fill this void.

FM-3-24 relates COIN operations without accurate intelligence to “blind boxers, wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm” while operations based on good intelligence are “like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact.” The unintended consequences of imprecise operations have hampered efforts in Iraq. The main focus on destruction of terror networks has resulted in many “untargeted” raids for terrorists, insurgents and weapons caches without the benefit of precise intelligence. Interviews from Fallujah in mid-2005 found

133 Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux” www.smallwarsjournal.com 11.
increased anger and resentment towards the US as a result of such actions. McFate and Jackson conclude, “to avoid causing resentment that can drive insurgency, coercive force must be applied accurately and precisely.” Legitimacy is clearly dependent on security based on the precise and proportional force—intelligence is essential to this objective. Intelligence is clearly a linchpin to many other COIN efforts.

Isolate Insurgents from their Cause & Support—Eliminating Support & Sanctuary

The isolation of insurgents from their cause and support is an essential element of a successful COIN campaign. Isolation has internal and external components. Thompson’s fourth principle stated that “The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas.” He concluded by relating to Mao’s revolution theories, that “if the guerillas can be isolated from the population, i.e. the ‘little fishes’ removed from the ‘water’, then their eventual destruction becomes automatic.” The national strategies recognize the importance of isolation. The NS-CT emphasizes the denial of support and sanctuary from rogue state by ending state sponsorship, disrupting the flow of resources and denying the use of governed or ungoverned territory as a base or launching pad. It specifically recognizes five state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba.

We will maintain sanctions against them and promote their international isolation until they end their support for terrorists, including the provision of sanctuary. To further isolate these regimes and persuade other states not to sponsor terror, we will use a range of tools and efforts to delegitimate terrorism as an instrument of statecraft. Any act of international terrorism, whether committed by a state or individual, is reprehensible, a threat to international peace and security, and should be unequivocally and uniformly rejected. Similarly, states that harbor and assist terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists, and they will be held to account…

The NS-CT also recognizes the contemporary challenges of eliminating sanctuaries in the current globalized communications environment. In addition to the need to address physical sanctuaries, it stresses the need to eliminate the non-physical sanctuaries found in legal, cyber and financial systems.\(^{139}\)

From the military perspective, the NMSP-WOT recognizes the importance of efforts to isolate the threat, eliminate sanctuaries and deter state sponsors—“Actions to counter ideological support should be designed to de-legitimize the enemy’s ideology and created conditions that isolate nodes and connections of the network. Once isolated, these nodes or connections may be treated as regional or local threats, vulnerable to local partner nation efforts.”\(^{140}\) Again, “think globally, act locally” applies and the chances for success are enhanced as classical COIN is optimized for a local environment.

Kilcullen stressed the importance of defining the enemy in “narrow terms”: “You don’t play into the enemy’s global information strategy of making it all one fight…You say, actually, there are sixty different groups in sixty different countries who all have different objectives. Let’s not talk about bin Laden’s objectives—let’s talk about your objectives. How do we solve that problem?”\(^{141}\) In Packer’s words, “the global ambitions of the enemy don’t automatically demand a monolithic response.”\(^{142}\)

Based on this, Kilcullen argued for a global isolation strategy—“a strategy of ‘disaggregation’ that seeks to dismantle, or de-link the global jihad…by finding ways to address local grievances…so that they aren’t mapped onto the ambitions of the global jihad.” He then stated, “In a global insurgency, this operational concept requires that individual COIN campaigns be conducted so as to reduce the energy level in the global jihad. It also demands that legitimate Muslim aspirations be addressed to provide a constitutional path, and military forces adopt an enabling, rather than dominant role.”\(^{143}\)


\(^{141}\) Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen, quoted by George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” (The New Yorker 18 December 2006) 4.

\(^{142}\) George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” *The New Yorker* 18 December 2006, 4.

Campbell and Weitz advocated “fragmenting the adversary” approach. They claimed that “a divide-and-conquer strategy can have three dimensions: exploiting differences within the adversary’s camp, separating the operatives from their domestic supporters, and isolating them form foreign sponsors.” This would mean countering bin Laden’s attempts to build a “single, eclectic but cohesive movement”; exploiting divisions within the networks and their support; exploiting sectarian tensions between Shiite and Sunni extremists; and a low visibility effort to “empower Islamic moderates” with the goal of draining “support and legitimacy from jihadi extremists.” Globally, they recommended that the US “continue to exert pressure on violent extremists to exacerbate differences among them—just as the firm US stand against the Sino-Soviet alliance during the 1950s helped divide rather than unite them.”

Securing borders is essential to an isolation effort. Sepp wrote, “border crossings must be restricted to deny terrorist insurgents a sanctuary and to enhance national sovereignty.” Failure to secure the border and fully isolate the Taliban has allowed insurgents to use the Pakistan border region as a sanctuary, hampering efforts to build a stable and secure Afghanistan. Likewise, porous borders in Iraq allow support and fighters to flow from Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the contemporary environment an international effort is needed to address the issues of open borders and ungoverned territory to eliminate support and physical and non-physical sanctuaries.

Provide Security Under the Rule of Law—A Foundation of Security and Trust

Securing the population is a critical step in COIN. McFate and Jackson supported this concept when they wrote: “Security is the most basic precondition for civilian support of the government” and that “to counter an insurgency the government must establish physical security for its citizens.” They highlighted the vacuum created when the state fails in its obligation to secure the population, “State failure to provide security may cause citizens to accept alternate security guarantees from non-state actors, which can be a major driver of insurgency.” Recent experience has witnessed this vacuum filled

---

by local militias such as Muqtada al Sadr’s Mehdi Army in the Sadr City, Baghdad.\textsuperscript{146} Similarly, other areas of the world witnessed the Taliban’s rise to power by providing security in civil war torn Afghanistan and the rise of the Islamic courts in clan warfare ravaged Somalia. Such militias are a direct challenge to the state’s monopoly on coercion and a legitimacy challenge. Additionally, USAID claims, “Security is a sine qua non for progress…”\textsuperscript{147} Thus, security is essential for all other efforts to address effectiveness gaps, underlying conditions and grievances.

Iraq serves as a cautionary tale for this COIN imperative and the importance of sequencing and prioritization of efforts. According to Garfield, “poor assumptions and blind optimism” hampered strategy formulation and adaptation in Iraq. He concluded “There was also a broad consensus that the Bush Administration failed to appreciate the difference between good governance and democracy, which cannot develop and mature without adequate security and effective governance.”\textsuperscript{148} Metz echoed this:

> From the beginning, the United States effort in Iraq was hindered by a strategy that did not approach stabilization and transformation as sequential. Ambassador Bremer embraced transformation, seeking to open governance and free markets in a society without the most basic level of security. Not only were the two not properly sequences, they were antithetical. Some of the most important elements of the transformation—de-Ba’athification, dissolving the old Iraq army, and the privatization of state owned industry—contributed to instability by taking away the status and livelihood of thousands of angry men, most experiences in the ways of violence…\textsuperscript{149}

If effective, security measures will normally see immediate dividends. Security efforts based on adequate troop strength to include indigenous forces operating in such a manner to ensure persistent presence and measured and precise use of force normally results in an increase in legitimacy, trust and accurate and actionable reports. This leads the “intelligence tipping point”:

\textsuperscript{146} Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, “The Objective Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition” \textit{Military Review} Jan-Feb 2006, 16-18.
\textsuperscript{149} Steven Metz, \textit{Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy}, (Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007) 87.
In order to secure intelligence and cooperation from populations…the government must demonstrate that they can protect their supporters…at some point the government acquires increasing information…which…facilitates more successful operations…this success increases the population’s confidence in the government ‘s ability to protect them. In turn, this success increases the population’s confidence in the government’s ability to protect them, making them more willing to provide additional information… 150

The COIN principles take the concept of security one step further by stressing the need to adhere to the rule of law. According to Thompson’s second principle: “if the government does not adhere to the law, then it loses respect and fails to fulfill it contractual obligation to the people as a government” and thus eroding legitimacy. 151 Enhancing the capacities of a government with regard to values and institutions that respect human rights and the rule of law is a critical element of the overall security effort. National strategies all stress democracy, human rights and the rule of law as essential elements. While security is essential in a local environment, it has limited direct global applicability, rather Hoffman argued that the path to a secure global environment “progresses from local to regional to global.”

Be Prepared for a Long Term Commitment—Wristwatches vs Time

The concept of a “long war” is ingrained in the national strategy documents. The strategic assumptions in the NMSP-WOT define the war, as a “long term war of varying intensity…expected to require decades of effort.” Kilcullen compared the current conflict to the Cold War, “there is a precedent for American success in a sustained struggle with a formidable enemy. If this is the Cold War—if that analogy holds—then right now we’re in…1953. It didn’t happen overnight—but it happened.” 152

General Barno concluded, “Our limited Western time horizons often precluded any serious look at a ten-year (much less 25-year) timeline to discern the long-term effect of our policies…this is a significant risk to any Western intelligence system, perhaps most so with Americans and our perceived ‘need for speed.’ In a culture of generational conflicts, centuries-old tribal loyalties, and infinite societal

and family memories, we are at a significant disadvantage.” He pointed out that the Taliban often remind the Afghan villagers: “The Americans may have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time.” This will require a shift in mind-sets and organizational cultures across the interagency and not just the intelligence community. Again, the patience and will to sustain the protracted effort will require effective strategic communications tailored for specific audiences.

Hoffman argued that a comprehensive global COIN “would embrace several elements: including a clear strategy, a defined structure for implementing it, and a vision for inter-government agency cooperation and the unified effort to guide it.” As discussed above, there are structure issues related to the current strategy that need to be addressed such as changes to the NCTC and strategic communications structures. Overall, although the national security documents do not directly refer to a global insurgency, they are, with a few exceptions, congruent with COIN theory, doctrine and principles. As written, the documents reflect a balanced approach recognizing that the critical element for success is not the military but the political aspects of the strategy. Why then, are we not having more success in the GWOT?

Means: An Imbalance in Resources and Priorities

Are the means aligned with the strategy? Is the GWOT effort properly resourced? Are the decisive elements of the strategy prioritized? According to Steven Metz, author of Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, “American strategy was characterized by a pervasive means/ends mismatch. We sought to alter history, to undertake one of the most profound political, economic, and social transformations in recent history, but we did not allocate money, time, in proportion

---

152 George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 December 2006, 10.
to this ambitious goal.”\textsuperscript{155} This statement highlights an important question that has been the subject of much debate: “In the current conflict, is the US a nation at war, or an Army or military at war?”\textsuperscript{156}

Clearly, the priority and resources are focused on supporting the direct effects element of the strategy rather than the more effective indirect approaches. Ambassador Crumpton, argued that “our most important task in the war on terrorism is not the temporary ‘destructive’ task of eradicating enemy networks, but the enduring ‘constructive’ task of building legitimacy, good governance, trust and the rule of law. Systems that are characterized by an absence of political choice, transparent governance, economic opportunities and personal freedom can create incubators for extremism. Ignoring human development problems is no longer an option.”\textsuperscript{157} James Kunder, acting deputy, USAID, reflected on the imbalance, “civilian agencies have received 1.4 per cent of the total money. During Vietnam, (USAID) had 15,000 employees; it now has 2,000. After the Cold War, foreign service and aid budgets were sharply cut.” He noted shortages across the civilian agencies—“it betrays the government’s priorities.”\textsuperscript{158}

Like USAID, State/CRS suffers from a lack of priority as highlighted by its limited resources and funding. Despite the critical nature of its role in NSPD 44, Packer described the office as “orphaned at birth” and that “Congress provided only seven million of the one hundred million requested by the Administration, which never made the office a top Presidential priority.” Additionally, “the State Department has contributed fifteen officials who can manage overseas operations, but other agencies have offered nothing. The office thus has no ability to coordinate operations…even as Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorate and new emergencies loom in places like Darfur and Pakistan. It has become insiders’ favorite example pf bureaucratic inertia in the face of glaring need.”\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{155} Steven Metz, \textit{Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy}, (Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007) 85.
\textsuperscript{156} Multiple AOASF Fellowship Seminar Discussions and Combatant Command Discussions
\textsuperscript{157} Henry A. Crumpton, “The Role of Public and Private Partnerships in the Global War on Terrorism” Remarks to the 5\textsuperscript{th} Annual International Counterterrorism Conference, Washington DC, 20 April 2006.
\textsuperscript{158} George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” \textit{The New Yorker} 18 December 2006, 8.
\textsuperscript{159} George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy” \textit{The New Yorker} 18 December 2006, 8-9.
If the “constructive tasks” are the decisive factors in the campaign, then those agencies with the resident expertise and institutional focus need to be prioritized and properly resourced to address the challenges of the current conflict. Agencies such as the State Department, State/CRS, USAID and others need to increase manning to support increased staffing levels from strategic levels to theater strategic/operational or regional and tactical levels (country teams and JTF staffs). Staffing must also address shortfalls in the abilities of these agencies to plan and rapidly deploy. The focus must expand beyond one of resources and include the broader issues of structure and cultures. The interagency must match the expeditionary posture of the military and be capable and ready to deploy on short notice.
Chapter 4 Conclusion and Recommendations

The current conflict is best described as a global insurgency waged by a violent network of terror
groups linked by an extreme jihadist ideology with the unlimited aim of overthrowing the existing nation-
state system and establishing a global Caliphate. Accordingly, counterinsurgency theory, doctrine and
principles are more relevant to this fight than the limited aspects of a counterterrorism approach. While
classical counterinsurgency is designed to defeat an insurgency in a local context, the basic COIN
principles can be effectively applied at a global level while simultaneously applying traditional COIN
strategies against local insurgent efforts. Attacking and isolating the global movement from the regional
and local efforts is the key to winning this struggle. In other words, “think global and act local applies.”

The review of current national security strategies finds them out of balance. While the ends
appear clear and achievable; and the ways are, except for a few notable exceptions, in line with COIN
theories and doctrine; the means are not in balance and therefore put the entire strategy at risk. If the
effort to counter ideological support to terrorism is the decisive element of the national strategy, and is by
its nature largely a non-military effort, then proper prioritization and resourcing need to be put behind this
effort. As has been demonstrated, an effective COIN strategy requires a balanced approach emphasizing
non-military approaches to co-opt or marginalize the insurgent’s cause by de-legitimizing the ideology or
addressing grievances and underlying conditions and thus win the support (hearts and minds) of the
population is essential to an overall victory. Thus changes to ensure a more balanced approach, an overall
unity of effort and improved interagency coordination are required.

Ultimately, while military action is required, these tactical actions are intended to set the
conditions and buy time and space for enduring measures to take effect. Building partner nation
capacities; focusing on indirect strategy elements of encouraging good governance and economic
development; and an effective strategic communications/IO campaign to discredit and de-legitimize the
radical Islamist ideology are the enduring measures required to defeat the global insurgency.
Continued emphasis on building an international coalition that shares a common perception of the vital nature of the threat and possesses the will and capability to fight it is essential to defeating this transnational threat for many critical reasons. First, the support of a unified international body equates to international legitimacy. The weight of such a body is key to the effort to de-legitimize the extremist ideology that terrorist use to justify their actions and mobilize recruits. Second, the support of such a vast and diverse body serves to better disrupt linkages to transnational terror networks through unified and coordinated efforts. This unity is critical to isolate these transnational networks and their state sponsors from the mass Muslim population and the world’s failed and failing states. By building international will and capacity, and maintaining coalitions operating under a common perception of the threat with common strategic operating concepts an international unity of effort can be achieved.

From a national perspective, there have been many improvements in US security apparatus in the five years since the attacks of 9/11 but there remains much room for continued enhancements. Additional structural changes are required to achieve a national unity of effort across the federal agencies to leverage all elements of national power. Recognizing the NCTC as the NSC’s central strategic and operational planning element with the proper authorities and responsibilities will bring an improved unity of effort across the federal government. The nation’s strategic communications shortfalls must be addressed. The imbalance in the means must be addressed. Prioritizing the indirect strategy elements of establishing good governance, encouraging economic development and democratic reforms is essential to long term success. The government agencies with the expertise and background to lead this effort must be resourced appropriately. State, State/CRS and USAID specifically need increased funding and an increase in personnel. The planning and rapid deployment capabilities of these agencies also need to be improved to ensure a timely and effective response to failed and failing states. Regional and local structures for these agencies need to be enhanced and aligned with the boundaries of other agencies such as the military’s regional structure to ensure all are operating within a common framework. Likewise, all members of the interagency team would benefit from increased interaction, training and cooperation. All players must recognize the unique capabilities and limitations of the other players.
The US military must emphasize and institutionalize COIN theory, doctrine and principles in its education systems. The military must evolve its organizational culture to a “learning organization” capable of agile and adaptive thinking. Force structure should be addressed to increase manning levels of those specialties most effective in this environment—SOF, Civil Affairs, Engineering, Intelligence are all key enablers in this environment. The military must also recognize that conventional units need to be capable of performing the “nation building” activities inherent in stability ops.

In light of COIN principles, security needs to be a priority focus. If the environment is not secure, basic government services and reconstruction will need to be addressed by the military preferably with the guidance of interagency expertise. Once secure, the interagency and non-government organizations can and should work with the military and local government to address the specific needs.

COIN theory, doctrine and principles indicate that the most effective response to an insurgent threat is not obtained by primarily military means. Heavy handed, large unit actions relying on mass and overwhelming firepower are very often counterproductive. Effective military measures are proportional in nature and characterized by sustained presence working with indigenous forces to ensure security. Such actions are intended to enhance the legitimacy of the local government and set the conditions for the other elements of national to resolve underlying issues and grievances. More nuanced approaches of establishing good governance, an environment conducive to economic development and democratic reforms built on a solid foundation of security and legitimacy are needed.

According to Kilcullen, “Western democracies are capable of winning the War on Terrorism—provided ‘victory’ is defined appropriately. Our Islamist enemies are neither inscrutable nor invincible, their methods have flaws that can be exploited, and the global jihad cannot effectively offer the world’s Muslim population the security, prosperity, and social justice that can only come through good governance at the level of nation-states.”

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Butler-Smith, Alice. multiple discussions as monograph director 2006-2007.


McFate, Montgomery and Andrea Jackson, “The Objective Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition” Military Review Jan-Feb 2006.


Packer, George, “Knowing the Enemy” The New Yorker 18 December 2006.


Rumsfeld, Donald. Remarks at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 27 Mar 2006.


