USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

DARFUR: A WAY AHEAD

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This paper reviews the potential for placing a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur; what has been done by the United Nations and why it currently cannot be accomplished. It examines the potential for United States unilateral intervention, but demonstrates that this method would not benefit the U.S. strategic position within the region, would not bring about a long term solution for Darfur and for Sudan, and would stretch the U.S. military beyond its capability while the United States continues to work in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world.

This paper offers seven different essential elements that must be applied in order to create positive change in Darfur. Applying any one or a limited number of these flexible deterrent options will not persuade or necessitate the Government of Sudan to stop its current treatment of these people. Applying all seven deterrents is necessary to bring about change, but one cannot expect to witness a sudden positive outcome. As these deterrents take shape they will have a positive effect and the violence will be reduced to a point where a change in the government can occur; with the assistance of the African Union and if necessary, the United Nations.
DARFUR: A WAY AHEAD

I. Introduction

The unresolved crisis in Darfur represents a significant threat to United States interests that necessitates a reexamination of the U.S. strategy and policy for the region. Every effort to end the killing of non-Arab populations within Sudan carried out to date by the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the United States, France and rebel factions, has been met with resistance, disingenuous support and disregard by the Sudanese Government. The Sudanese Government has successfully manipulated the international community, as well as various internal rebel and tribal groups to stop or delay any actions towards solving the crisis in Darfur. Sudan is using this strategy to conduct deliberate genocidal atrocities directly against a major portion of the population of Sudan.

Resolving the conflict in Darfur is unquestionably in the U.S. national interest within the global war on terrorism. To date, international efforts have failed and a closer look at a U.S. unilateral intervention, a multilateral military intervention, a regional solution, specific flexible deterrents, or a combination of these approaches is required to end the crisis in Darfur.

Unlike the similar genocide campaign in Rwanda in 1994, the United States has more than a humanitarian or peripheral national interest at stake. Within the context of the War on Terrorism, the United States has a major strategic interest in preventing the further spillover of the conflict to the region. As the United States and its coalition partners evict global jihadists from Iraq and Afghanistan, those terrorists may look to conduct operations and develop strategies from new safe havens or failed states in the region. Sudan’s Islamic state and its current political environment make the country ideal as a location for terrorists. Indeed, international terrorists have lived and operated in Sudan in the past, free from the Sudanese Government’s watch. Further, the United States has a significant strategic interest in the overall stability of Northeast Africa that is threatened by the crisis in Sudan. The establishment of hostile Islamist states directly threatens other countries in the region friendly to United States interests, as well as potentially undermines United States strategic interests in Northeast Africa and the Middle East.

The crisis in Darfur has already spilled over into Chad. Thousands of refugees attempting to escape from the atrocities in Darfur have moved into the eastern region of Chad, increasing tensions between these two nations. Tribes from Chad have aligned with either the existing government of Sudan or rebel factions in Darfur and the crisis now includes much of eastern Chad. The region is not stable and could explode into a catastrophic cross-border war. The potential exists for nations such as China or Russia to intervene, escalating the crisis to a level
that could heighten tension between major world powers. Allowing this situation to grow will only create a condition that will end up requiring a much larger international effort and require more financial and military support from the United States. Currently, the United States cannot afford to commit itself to a major combat operation in this region, as it is stretched thin by offensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to the crisis in the Darfur region of western Sudan. There is no quick way out, nor does a single deterrent exist that would stop the Sudanese Government from its path of genocide of a major portion of its population. The entire world watches as the United Nations attempts to persuade Sudan to bring to an end the violence in Darfur and to achieve a lasting peace with all tribes within Sudan. Given the failure of international efforts to end the genocide in Darfur, a new approach is therefore warranted to not only stop the violence, but to prevent the region from becoming a haven to terrorists.

This essay argues that the option for a United Nations peacekeeping, regional intervention, or a United States unilateral operation within Sudan would not produce a positive and supportive outcome for the people of Darfur, and that multiple flexible deterrents and concessions should be levied against the Sudanese Government to finally end the crisis in Darfur. Specifically, the United Nations in conjunction with the African Union must emplace multiple, significant and measurable deterrents upon Sudan that require timely and notable responses that will allow for the safe release and long term security of the non-Arab population citizens of Darfur that are currently existing in refugee camps in both Darfur and in Chad.

II. Background

The humanitarian situation in Darfur to date is quite bleak. In recent decades, nomadic Arab peoples of the Sudan have attempted to seize the resources of the non-Arab tribes in Sudan’s Darfur Province. The government of Sudan did little to protect these people and when they protested against the government, the government began a systematic process of eliminating them.

Those most affected by the brutal and corrupt government of Sudan are the black non-Arab farming tribes of Darfur. This native population is unable to defend themselves from the systematic destruction of their villages and the killing of their people. These people are unable to deter such attacks with non-violent intervention, and are unable to raise their voices against an unjust government, nor bring their story to the international community. Over two million people have been herded into harsh refugee camps where, without proper provisions, they die in large numbers every day. 

1.
Beginning in early 2003, the Sudanese Government has used its military to directly support an ethnic nomadic Arab population that has assembled into a Sudanese backed militia called “Janjaweed” and to exterminate non-Arab African people from Darfur Province. This process began after these people rioted to gain individual rights at the capital city of Kartoum. Rebel groups such as the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) sprang up against the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed once the slaughter of innocent people started and the burning of villages was underway. These poorly coordinated and resourced groups have taken up arms against their own government in an attempt to save their own lives and enable the equal sharing of resources within Sudan.

Determining the scale of death and destruction is difficult. The Janjaweed and the Sudanese Army have killed no less than 200,000 people and direct air strikes by the Sudanese military have destroyed villages throughout Darfur since the violence began. The number of killed has been reported as high as 400,000\(^2\). However, the total destruction of so many villages and the forced movement into refugee camps by the government of Sudan, (as well as the migration of people in eastern Chad), makes the level of loss impossible to ascertain. It is estimated that over two million non-Arab citizens of Darfur Province are currently living in refugee camps and at least 218,000 people have crossed into eastern Chad, adding to tensions between Sudan and Chad.\(^3\)

Those people that were able to escape this death and destruction have nowhere else to go except to the refugee camps. By all accounts the living conditions in these camps are horrendous. Food, water, basic medical support and physical security are all in very short supply. Men living in these camps and needing to forage for wood and supplies outside of the relative safety of the camp itself are frequently killed. Women leaving the camps to find wood to cook with and water for their children are often raped by the Janjaweed. Those people that chance a journey back to their destroyed village in the hopes of finding lost family members or to attempt to reestablish the ownership in their property are often met by awaiting Janjaweed militia and are killed.

The AU brokered the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), consequently signed by the Sudanese Government and the Sudan Liberation Army on May 5, 2006. It established the first solid steps to end the violence in Darfur and to begin the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the Janjaweed and a number of the rebel factions that arose out of the chaos and violence since 2003. Unfortunately, only the Government of Sudan and the SLA have signed the agreement, leaving a large number of tribes and rebel factions that have not agreed to the peace plan. This peace plan required all of the rebel groups in

\(^2\)Reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

\(^3\)Reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Darfur Province to agree to the DPA to have a chance of being successful. Unfortunately, the Jonahed were never given the opportunity to join the peace agreement plan.

The DPA has a number of shortcomings that, without external oversight and controls leaves the Government of Sudan and rebel militias unchecked. The disarmament and demobilization of soldiers from both the Janjaweed and rebel militias was the responsibility of each organization. Since the Janjaweed continued to strike out against non-Arab citizens, the rebels were not going to comply with the DPA either.

In addition to the DPA, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in early 2005 by the SPLM and the Government of Sudan. According to Deborah West of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the CPA establishes an oversight period of six years, allowing for the Government of National Unity, comprised of SPLM members, National Congress Party (NCP) members, and a small number of opposition parties to rule under a multifaceted power sharing agreement. The agreement requires the establishment of a Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to rule the South, extending a great deal of autonomy there during the interim period. At the end of the interim period, the South will have the freedom to choose to secede.4

Sudan has had a long history of tension and violence between its people from the north and the south. Lack of political representation given to the south, as well as the inability to acquire any level of wealth from national and regional resources created a twenty plus year period of instability between these regions, and a level of violence and killings that far exceeds that in recent Darfur. Thus, one may conclude that the CPA has been a major step forward in the peace process within Sudan. But, it is still a very fragile peace agreement and can be negatively influenced by what is occurring in Darfur and what resources and political representation may be given to these people.

The African Union has also agreed to offer a level of security to these people and has placed seven thousand peacekeeping soldiers in Darfur and along the border with Chad. Initially, the Government of Sudan resisted the deployment of AU troops and continues to deny the deployment of any additional United Nations peacekeeping troops within its borders to bolster the African Union’s mission to keep peace in the region.

The African Union has proven itself ineffective as a security force within Darfur. They have far too few soldiers to contain the violence and they are poorly equipped, making communications and travel throughout the region a significant issue.

The AU repeatedly asks for additional troop strength, weapons, ammunition, vehicles and critical supplies. Janjaweed attacks on AU soldiers have left them unable to protect citizens
living in and traveling to refugee camps. The Sudanese Government recognizes their inability to be successful in Darfur and resists any attempts to strengthen these troops within its borders. The Sudanese Government also recognizes that the African Union has a great need for resources and support, thus being ineffective in carrying out its mission to protect the people being targeted by Sudan and uses the AU to prove that it intends to support the ongoing international efforts to free the refugees and end the crisis in Darfur.

In summary, the Sudanese Government has not complied with any international organization’s pressure to stop the criminal acts against the non-Arab black citizens of Darfur. Military action against the Sudanese Government may prove to be fatal to the hundreds of thousands of refugees living in refugee camps. The international community is hamstrung to respond with a military action against the Sudanese government, since the coalition forces are occupied in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Although the United Nations does have ten thousand soldiers currently serving in Sudan as part of the North-South CPA, these soldiers are restricted to operating within Sudan to support the agreement and would be removed if they signaled intentions to specifically address the root cause of the crisis in Darfur Province.

It is evident that the solution to this crisis must be implemented by way of requiring Sudan to comply with a number of flexible deterrent options emplaced by the United Nations and a limited number of incentives that are offered by the international community. The current strategy to gain concurrence amongst the United Nations Security Council to intervene in Darfur Province has failed to this point. The option to have the U.S. intervene unilaterally would not be feasible and negatively impact U.S. diplomatic efforts throughout the region. As a suggested way ahead this paper will initially look at the first two options, followed by a third option on enhancing the African Union’s capacity to conduct AMIS in Darfur Province. The third option in and of itself will prove viable, but will require the support of an additional fourth option. The most viable option and the way ahead for Darfur will necessitate a fourth option to include enhancing the AU with a number of additional deterrents and incentives to effectively resolve the crisis in Darfur Province.

III. Possible Strategic Options

A. United Nations Military Intervention

A United Nations military intervention is not a viable solution. Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations describes the right by which the United Nations may call upon member
nations to create a military force able to respond to a peacekeeping or military offensive operation anywhere in the world.

The international community is hamstrung to respond with a military action against the Sudanese government since UN forces are currently occupied in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. The Sudanese Government continues to reject the United Nations proposal to bring in additional UN soldiers. As outlined by the *International Crisis Group*, a UNSCR 1706 authorized the creation of a UN mission of approximately 20,000 international military personnel and police to deploy to Darfur Province with a Chapter VII mandate allowing for the use of force to defend vulnerable civilians, UN personnel, humanitarian workers and the DPA.\(^6\)

UNSCR 1706 does not require Sudan’s consent to send troops, but does ask the government for its approval. Since Sudan will not approve such a resolution, troop-contributing nations within the United Nations have not agreed to enter Sudan and will not therefore enforce UNSCR 1706. Diplomatic efforts must address a campaign to gain support from China, Russia, India and Qatar, each abstaining from the vote. Each of these countries is engaged in oil and textile trade with Sudan. The United Nations would not be able to gain support to place sanctions against these four countries as they continue to directly and indirectly support Sudan, but they could offer long term economic packages that would be arranged between a newly formed Government of Sudan.

The United Nations Rapid Response Force (NRF) had been an idea that began with force modernization of U.S. forces as conceived by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He argued that a UN ready force could respond to a crisis anywhere in the world on a multi-nations contributing basis. As of October 2006, a force of twenty-six thousand soldiers has been trained and units sent to support Pakistan earthquake relief operations, as well as support for Hurricane Katrina. This force is primarily comprised of German troops.\(^7\) Funding for operations is still being argued through UN member nations and there has not been any indication that this force would be used to support any long term operation in Darfur.

**B. United States Unilateral Intervention**

A U.S. unilateral military intervention into Darfur Province is not a practical option. Military operations against the Sudanese Government may prove to be fatal to the hundreds of thousands of refugees living in temporary camps. The US military forces are currently being stretched by operations throughout the world. National Guard and Reserve forces are being used as operational reserves, rather than strategic reserves and dwell time for both active and
reserve components is being shortened, requiring soldiers to deploy on a rotational basis far more than expected.

Realistically, the United States cannot afford to become involved in an offensive military operation in Darfur that would assuredly be won, but followed by a protracted stabilization and reconstruction operation. Additionally, the AU wants to be the primary police force on the ground within their fifty-three member nations. Diplomatically, our nation would have a near impossible task of going into Darfur alone and maintaining positive relationships with United Nations member nations.

C. The Way Ahead

A regional approach to solving the crisis in Darfur Province is viable, but the AU will need financial, logistical and command and control resources to be successful in Darfur Province. Once given the capacity to effectively conduct a peacekeeping mission in Darfur Province, the specific flexible deterents and incentives outlined below can be effectively utilized to create a peaceful solution in Darfur Province. The following multi-faceted option will prove to be the most effective means to a resolving the crisis in Darfur Province peacefully.

1. Enhanced Regional Support to the African Union

Offering to enhance the support to the AU is viable, but problematic in that it will not by itself solve the entire problem in Darfur Province. It focused on keeping the mission in Darfur with an African nations’ face. They are willing to accept technical and logistical support, but wish to maintain troop strength through its membership, however they have agreed to a mission that it cannot complete in Darfur.

In a bid to resist UNSCR 1706, the Government of Sudan has offered to “plus up” the AU with the commitment of an additional twenty-two thousand troops from within the Sudanese forces. This reflects Sudan’s continued attempt to appease the United Nations while it continues to authorize the destruction of non-Arab black citizens of Darfur.

The United States and the European Union have supplied most of the financial support acquired in support of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The United States and France are asking for far greater international financial commitments to enhance the African Union’s capability to create a secure environment in Darfur.

The United Nations needs to take a lead in developing funding sources for the African Union. The crisis in Darfur is not a solitary crisis that the AU faces currently. As they continue to engage a variety of predicaments in Africa, they potentially reduce the requirements of the
United Nations and its peacekeeping efforts. Members of the United Nations would be encouraged to offer technical resources, military equipment and funds to the AU.

Financial support by way of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can provide resources that will further enable them to sustain themselves into the future. Additionally, contributing African nations need to better fund the AU. There are fifty-three nations within the organization, many of them poor. Some nations are rich in resources and must step up to provide a larger share of the financial requirements and burden created by AMIS.

The AU intends to provide troop support towards Darfur from the nations within Africa. So far, most of the support has come from Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Congo and South Africa. Rwanda and Nigeria provide battle-trained soldiers, but what is missing is strategic and tactical leadership to maintain command and control over the forces for the AMIS mission. Egypt also is an excellent source of military leadership to provide to AMIS. Egypt could be called upon to host training for troop contributing nations in Darfur prior to their deployments. Technical support need not be limited to Egypt as long as the training is provided within the bounds of an African nation.

The African Union is not well prepared to conduct diplomatic efforts between the Government of Sudan and rebel factions. France has played a key role in the development of the CPA and understands the complexities of the tribes and rebel factions in Darfur. France could be called upon to directly support the ongoing talks between the African Union, Sudan and the rebel factions.

2. International Criminal Court

This is a viable option, but requires other flexible deterrents to render a positive solution in Darfur Province. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has thus far identified seventeen citizens of Sudan as meriting economic sanctions and possible criminal charges levied against them. The list of seventeen names leaked to the press in February 2006 and clearly has those in power reluctant to have any additional troops placed in Sudan. Those seventeen individuals, having considerable influence and power in Sudan worry about the possibility of facing a trial by the International Criminal Court and do everything possible to keep outside influence from within their borders.

The threat of international court proceedings against key leaders within Sudan seems to be a critical blockade in resolving the current crisis, and in fact, those ICC sanctions may backfire. The President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir gave warning to the international community
suggesting that Darfur would become a graveyard if foreign troops choose to enter his country.\textsuperscript{10} As seen through the eyes of Bashir and other Sudanese leaders, bringing equipped and prepared troops to Darfur would in the end mean their capture and subsequent ICC trial. The Sudanese Government would most certainly escalate its intent to move genocide forward in Darfur.

Conceding the atrocities already made by those in power in Sudan and setting aside the threat of the International Criminal Court may yield a more certain and swifter solution. South Africa came to this rationalization as it worked towards peace and a new government. According to Desmond Tutu, “Instead the world saw something quite unprecedented. They saw the process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when perpetrators of some of the most gruesome atrocities were given amnesty in exchange for a full disclosure of the facts of the offense. Instead of revenge and retribution, this new nation chose to tread the difficult path of confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation.”\textsuperscript{11} Choosing not to bring those behind Apartheid before a court and to seek justice against their atrocities, they circumvented a long and protracted friction that would have certainly extended the number killed of both black and white people living in South Africa.

It can be expected that the Darfurians would not readily accept criminal charges being set aside and would have a strong commitment towards their form of justice. An information operations campaign, perhaps led by delegates from South Africa must be prepared and released to the people of Darfur Province. The information campaign needs to also reach the rebel factions that have not been forced into refugee camps outlining the need to waive criminal charges against the seventeen citizens listed in the ICC complaint, as long as these individuals seek asylum outside of Sudan and are not allowed to take with them illegally gained wealth and resources outside of Sudan. Amnesty must also be offered to the Janjaweed, or an assured bloodbath will take place to satisfy their need for revenge. The people of Darfur must be convinced that they have a great deal more to gain from reconciliation efforts and the tangible aspirations of a representative government that is committed to equitable sharing of it resources, than it can gain from witnessing a possible but uncertain justice of the criminal element in power today in Sudan.

Thousands of lives might be saved in Darfur Province if the ICC made the decision not to criminally charge those in power in Sudan. In turn, the Government of Sudan might consider permitting the United Nations to bring forces into Sudan. Prior to extending any decision to revoke criminal charges by the International Criminal Court, immediate steps to seize personal financial accounts and resources must be enacted world wide. This will give those in power in
Sudan an appreciation for the reach of the international community, as well as hinder their ability to fund future operations against their own people.

3. Sanctions against Sudan

Sanctions against Sudan levied by the United States are not working. On November 4, 1997, President Bill Clinton delivered an Executive Order that made illegal the importation of any goods and or services to the United States that originated from Sudan. The Executive Order also made it illegal to export to Sudan any U.S. goods, technology or services. The United States did not have extensive trade with Sudan, except for gum Arabic, an ingredient used in the production of different carbonated non-alcoholic beverages.

The Department of State listed seven state sponsors of terrorism in its Patterns of Global Terrorism report on April 29, 2004. The seven listed were Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Sudan, and Libya. This list makes it a crime for any U.S. business to conduct trade with Sudan. Moreover, it represents Sudan internationally as unstable and as a failing state. Sudan resents being on the United State’s Terrorist List, especially since it has some recent history of cooperating with the U.S. State Department in supporting the intelligence gathering and capture of known terrorists in Sudan and within Northeast Africa.

The response of the Government of Sudan and the rebel factions fighting against their own government may be more favorable if the United States would permit trade that would enhance their technological capacity to seek and produce oil resources, textiles and other resources from their land. Generating increased trade revenues within Sudan may offer greater incentives to wealth sharing not only between the north and south of Sudan, but also with Darfur.

China is the leading exporter of oil from Sudan and has recently conducted diplomatic efforts to persuade Sudan from its path of genocide in Darfur. A bilateral effort on the part of the United States and China to increase oil production technology in Sudan, may offer a future source of payment to China for our increased debt they currently carry on our behalf and may also bring our two nations closer together diplomatically and economically.

4. Establishing No-Fly Zones

Establishing no-fly zones in Darfur Province is a viable deterrent, but requires other initiatives to be successful. Darfur is a very expansive land with little infrastructure to support ground travel. The government of Sudan uses its aviation assets to reach out to Darfur to control the people, to attack and destroy villages to ensure that those in refugee camps do not leave those camps and to watch any operations that are conducted by African Union forces.
The Government of Sudan has used its cash flow from the production of oil to purchase weapon systems for its military. Sudan has modernized and enhanced its air force with Hind helicopter gun ships, purchased MiG-23 fighters and Antonov medium transport aircraft. The Army has procured new artillery systems and light assault weapons. Sudan acquires much of its military equipment from Libya, Russia and the Republic of China.

To ensure a greater level of security for those refugees, the United Nations must provide military air power to protect the ban on offensive air operations by the Sudanese Government over Darfur that the Security Council enacted in 2005. The United Nations could first look to air assets provided by the United Nations Rapid Response Force and augment that asset with additional member nation support.

The creation of a no fly zone, as made possible through UNSCR 1706 would protect refugees, but would need to allow for air travel by commercial and governmental requirements of Sudan, while restricting potential military flights that enhance their intelligence gathering and operational capability. A commitment of non-ground air asset requirement by the United Nations would be looked upon far more favorably than putting troops on the ground and likely provoking a disaster for people of Darfur.

While the Sudanese Government has allowed non-governmental organizations to offer humanitarian assistance in Darfur, these organizations have found it exceptionally difficult to render support, as they are continually attacked by the Janjaweed and other rebel factions that steal their supplies. These organizations would have a much greater opportunity to provide assistance, given the coordinated protection of United Nations air assets.

5. Unifying Rebel Groups in Darfur

Unifying rebel groups in Darfur is a critical step towards an end to the crisis in Darfur Province, but requires other steps to be a holistic solution. Sudan has been a country torn with strife and conflict for decades. In recent years, civil war broke out between tribes in the north and south of the country over the fair distribution of the nation’s resources. Based upon tribal connections and ethnic ties, rebel forces have sprung up opposing the government and in limited situations, backing the government in the move to exterminate a major population in Darfur.

There are currently nine major rebel organizations in Sudan, with most of them connected to Darfur. Most have a weak organizational structure and little ability to conduct operations against the Sudanese government. Predominately, these groups are based on tribal affiliation,
but most have one thing in common – they are being subjected to unfair rule by the Sudanese Government.

The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA) is the strongest of all rebel forces operating in Darfur. Three area tribes comprise the SLA: the Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit. Each had been attacked initially by the nomadic Arab tribes that were stealing their cattle and crops, then by the Janjaweed. They fought against economic and political divisions created by the central government and were able to enlist large numbers of rebels because of the horrendous activities against the people of Darfur.

The SLA does not function with a central leader and factions of this organization fight amongst themselves and other rebel organizations in Darfur. Largely due to such a rapid growth, the SLA does not have a central organizational structure and infighting leaves it currently incapable of working with the African Union in any positive manner.

The African Union has attempted to bring numerous rebel groups together to gain strength in numbers, but it has not succeeded to this point. The government of Sudan uses the divisions between these rebel groups to meet with and develop alliances with other tribal leaders that help to further splinter the rebel groups and minimize their potential threat against the government. The African Union has exhausted its capability in an attempt to bring the rebel factions together as one single voice, or even a representative delegation from each of the rebel groups to work out possible diplomatic efforts with the Sudanese Government.

The African Union needs assistance to bring the leadership of all rebel groups together and to develop a strategy to compel the Sudanese Government to listen to them. A well laid out information operations campaign that reaches out to the vast population will have the most significant impact on unifying the rebel organizations. Tribal divisions set aside would enable the synergy necessary to enable multiple rebel factions to work effectively against the Government of Sudan.

6. Recognizing the Janjaweed

As difficult as it might be to get past the people of Darfur Province, recognizing the Janjaweed and allowing them to play a role in the peace process is vital to a concrete resolution in Darfur Province. The Janjaweed came about in 1988 after Chadian President Hissene Habre, supported by France and the United States defeated the Libyan Army, and ending Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi’s territorial interests in Chad. The Janjaweed came from various Arab tribes from Chad and Darfur, looking to extort land and property from non-Arab farmers. As rebel factions sprang up in Darfur against the Government of Sudan, the government was quick
to offer arms to the Janjaweed. Sudan officially endorsed the Janjaweed in 2003 and incorporated large numbers of them into their army to fight the Sudanese Liberation Movement. It is difficult to obtain a clear number of Darfurians killed by the Janjaweed since 2003 however; the number is believed to be well over 100,000 non-Arab citizens. The Janjaweed now conduct deliberate operations in Darfur without the direction or leadership of Sudan. Sudan does not have the capacity to reel in the Janjaweed, nor does it seem to care to do so.

Neither the African Union, nor the United Nations has ever attempted to officially recognize the Janjaweed and they were not considered as potential signatories in reference to the DPA. It comes down to sharing the wealth and resources in Sudan that in the end may bring the Janjaweed to end their terror in Darfur. As incredible as it may seem, the non-Arab citizens of Darfur might be better served to accept a peace plan that would include rights and privileges being extended to the Janjaweed. If they do not, there is not a peaceful solution to the present situation in Darfur. Unless the Janjaweed believe that they have some credible gains, they will not demobilize, nor turn in their weapons and the carnage will thus continue in Darfur.

7. Support from Non-Governmental Organizations

Gaining support from non-governmental organizations is one of the key elements necessary to support the refugees in Darfur Province. The human disaster relief needs in Darfur are monumental and perhaps the most serious in the world today. Most non-governmental relief organizations are unable to establish programs from within Darfur and those that do operate at the refugee camps are under staffed, under supplied and unprotected against possible attacks by the Janjaweed. A shortage of food, water and medical care takes lives daily in and out of the refugee camps in Darfur Province. The potential for an outbreak of cholera and other diseases will likely spread quickly and will not be able to be brought under control before a large percentage of the displaced population is infected.

Without the wide array of relief organizations in place in the near term, the task of eliminating the non Arab citizens of Darfur will be made even easier. According to once source, the group Oxfam is supplying drinkable water to 30,000 refugees in and around the town of Beida. Unfortunately, Oxfam has reduced its staff due to an increased threat of refugees, including their workers. The Government of Sudan must be convinced to allow these relief organizations to conduct their work and offer protection from the Janjaweed and Sudan’s military.
IV. Conclusion

It is clear that current efforts to stop the violence in Sudan are not working. Intervening with a United Nations military peacekeeping force is not viable. Sudan is not offering the UN consent to deploy within their borders, nor are there sufficient UN participating member nations willing to commit to this option without Sudan’s consent. The United States providing a unilateral military approach to Sudan is also not viable. The United States is questionably overcommitted in other areas of the world, would not likely receive the support of the American public, would not receive the support of the international community and is not welcomed by the African Union.

Should the individuals holding power currently in Sudan realize that the International Criminal Court will waive charges they will likely be more open to peacekeeping operations in Darfur. If the United States chooses to drop sanctions against Sudan, open trade and support technology advancements in a package with China, Russia and India, there would be greater income sharing opportunities between all provinces in Sudan. Establishing no-fly zones would permit the AU to operate safely and more effectively without the threat of aerial attacks and reduce the vulnerability of refugees.

Key to the overall success of the African Union is unifying rebel groups in Darfur Province. Each group must work from within the DPA, foresee the benefits of working collectively and establish a basis for political representation in a newly formed government.

It is vital to allow the Janjaweed to be represented in a peaceful solution in Darfur Province and become a signatory to the DPA. It is essential that the Janjaweed anticipate a voice in the government and have the opportunity to share in the resources of Sudan. Finally, the work ahead towards a peaceful resolution requires the support of non-governmental organizations to operate safely throughout Darfur Province. The African Union must be able to provide the necessary security for these organizations to extend their services to the refugees.

With an enhanced role of the African Union and the flexible deterrent options that have been outlined above, this comprehensive option offers the most credible, obtainable and sustainable way ahead in Darfur Province. Each is needed to create a certain path towards peace and stabilization in Darfur and must be fully supported by the African Union, the United Nations, the United States and the world community to be successful.

Endnotes


3 “Q&A: Crisis in Darfur, Human Rights News.”


6 International Crisis Group, Getting the UN into Darfur, Policy Briefing No. 43 Nairobi: (12 October 2006), 2.


9 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. … The jurisdiction and functioning of the ICC are governed by the Rome Statute.

10 International Crisis Group, Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace, Policy Briefing No. 32 Nairobi: (6 October 2005), 1.


