DEVELOPING THE ARMY PENTATHLETE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin McElroy
United States Air Force

Dr. John Hawkins
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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ABSTRACT

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The Army needs to develop a new breed of officer, the "pentathlete", who is a leader, combat soldier, statesman and sociologist. How will they do it, and where will they find the personnel to fill the job? The Army is forced to deal with insurgency in Iraq, a type of engagement they have not dedicated training to since the end of Vietnam. The security situation in Iraq precludes civilian experts from helping rebuild Iraq. Yet, the Army is not trained to provide basic needs for the conquered Iraqi population while trying to secure the peace. To meet this challenge, the Army will grow pentathlete soldiers to win America's wars and secure the peace. This paper looks at the Army's need to better execute Phase Four Stabilization Operations, and presents examples of the roles pentathletes could fill. It will then focus on developing the company grade officer. The paper will examine commissioning sources, and suggest simple prerequisites to place on new officer candidates to prepare them as pentathlete candidates. Next, the paper will offer a course of action to train the budding pentathlete, and finally, present examples of where the program can be instituted and how it can benefit the Army.
DEVELOPING THE ARMY PENTATHLETE

The U.S. Military is fighting America’s greatest challenge ever to its safety and sovereignty, the Global War on Terror. The U.S. Army leads the effort in the Middle East, and is doing an admirable job in combat, but it struggles with stabilization operations (known as Phase IV operations) in Afghanistan and Iraq. The former Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, proposed a concept to meet the current and future challenges, to train our soldiers as “pentathletes”. The pentathlete is a versatile and athletic soldier, prepared to take on all the challenge the Army encounters throughout the stages of any operation.\(^1\) Dr. Francis J. Harvey, former Secretary of the Army, identified the pentathlete as “a multi-skilled leader that personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects, from warfighting to statesmanship to enterprise management”.\(^2\) Since my arrival to Carlisle Barracks, my fellow Army officers have expressed grave concern over what attributes an overly extended force should develop to become pentathletes, and how the Army intends to grow this “ideal” soldier. Some would argue that the added requirements of statesmanship and enterprise management are a set of skills already possessed by existing U.S. Government agencies. Given that fact, they question why should the Army train and retain these skills within its officer inventory? Unfortunately, the security situations in Afghanistan and Iraq prohibit the participation of civilian agency personnel, such as U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and a host of other governmental entities. The stark reality, therefore, is the Army must execute these tasks, since only military organizations are capable of surviving in and stabilizing the hostile post-combat environment. The Army is one of four services within the Department of Defense (DoD) that organizes, trains, and equips the finest warfighting force in the world, but has focused very little on training soldiers in Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO). General Schoomaker envisioned the pentathlete as the soldier that will win America’s wars decisively, and promote peace and stability where strife and dissension exists.\(^3\) In essence, the pentathlete leader must possess full spectrum combat skills and SSTRO abilities.

As a U.S. Air Force officer looking at the U.S. Army from the outside, I will suggest a path forward for the initial development of the pentathlete. I will focus on the development of the company grade officer, showing what it might take to create the pentathlete that will execute the guidance and orders of senior-level leaders. I will identify baseline skills that may aid the developing pentathlete, and propose where the Army might find the candidates with the right skill sets. Once the Army recruits people with the desired skills, I will offer a training path that will aid overstretched U.S. governmental agencies, meet the requirements of recent DoD
directives, and contribute to the long term development of the Army Pentathlete. Finally, I will offer examples of where the mutually beneficial program will strengthen the Army and the U.S. Government as a whole. The early development of the pentathlete will help prepare the future Army leader for all operations beyond warfighting.

The U.S. Army War Fighter

The U.S. Army trains and equips soldiers to fulfill its mission in service to the American population. The U.S. Army provides forces and capabilities to combatant commanders to support the U.S. National Security and National Defense Strategies. These forces are employed in a variety of ways to support the combatant commanders’ guidance, but the ultimate purpose of all assigned military forces is to support U.S. strategic objectives, if necessary. In the 20th Century alone, the Army provided forces that fought in major combat operations such as World War I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Desert Storm, as well as a host of minor operations. U.S. Military stabilization and reconstruction operations occurred during some of these conflicts, but not all.

The Army led reconstruction efforts after cessation of hostilities in World War II and the conflict in Korea, but the bitter experience of Vietnam shifted the Army’s focus to decisive combat operations. The desire for the U.S. Military to focus on warfighting skills, and less on stabilization operations, is illustrated by the overwhelming victory by coalition forces during the 100-hour ground war of Operation Desert Storm. The majority of U.S. Army forces redeployed after combat operations ended, leaving a small U.S., British and French coalition air force to enforce no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. After the Iraqi Army retreated from Kuwait, the Kuwaiti emir and his government rebuilt Kuwait with their vast oil revenues and with the help of numerous international contractors. The wealth and gratitude of Kuwait precluded the need for large U.S. governmental presence to carry out reconstruction in Kuwait. With the very successful first major combat operation since the withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. Military regained enormous prestige in the eyes of the American population, for the U.S. Armed Forces defeated Iraq’s forces decisively, quickly, and with very few casualties.

The success of Operation Desert Storm, coupled with the end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the Soviet Union, identified America as the world’s lone superpower, and the U.S. Military the greatest military in the world. The U.S. Military would now act as the world’s “policeman”, dealing with the thugs and aggressors of the world, if U.S. intervention was deemed vital to the world’s interests. This way of thinking was evident during the rest of the 1990’s, when U.S. forces were sent to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The
results of SSTRO and humanitarian operations in Somalia and Haiti showed the U.S. that military ground force involvement in failing states was very difficult and prone to failure, while kinetic operations in the Balkans showed that overpowering and decisive military force could end conflicts swiftly. Results of military operations in the 1990s led to the view that America would lead major combat operations, while smaller coalition partner nations would maintain the peace after combat operations ended. The U.S. orientation toward decisive combat operations was firmly reinforced in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, released in the aftermath of 11 September, 2001. The QDR called on the U.S Military to organize, train, equip, and employ forces to assure U.S. allies of America’s steadfastness towards security commitments, dissuade adversaries from threatening America or its allies, deter attacks by adversaries swiftly and with great cost to the adversary, and decisively defeat the adversary if deterrence failed. American Military forces would deter and decisively defeat enemies, but QDR mention of SSTRO in defeated nation-states was overlooked. The continued omission of training for SSTRO is understandable in light of the previous decade’s military operations, but that would all change with the beginning of the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan.

Security, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) struck the first blow against Al Qaeda in the Global War on Terror. U.S. Special Forces, supported by U.S. close air support, fought alongside warlord leaders of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. The Taliban, an intolerant Islamic ruling faction, provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, Al Qaeda. President George W. Bush directed CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks to go “into Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This is not retaliation. We are at war against terrorism, not the Afghan people.”

While CENTCOM was prosecuting OEF in Afghanistan, General Franks directed his staff to begin planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Normally, the planning process is continually executed for any one campaign, but because guidance was given to simultaneously develop plans for OIF in November 2001, planning focus on Phase IV planning for OEF was placed on the back burner. Phase IV planning normally incorporated SSTRO tasks for members of the U.S. Government’s interagency, drawing upon expertise from the vast array of governmental departments. Upon termination of hostilities, interagency personnel would lead reconstruction efforts, facilitate standing up a new government, and stimulate the new government’s economy. Due to competing priorities between both OEF and OIF, planning for Phase IV SSTRO was given little consideration in either plan. When major combat operations
came to an end in both OEF and OIF, a small number of interagency personnel moved into Afghanistan and Iraq to begin Phase IV operations, but when a growing insurgency, fomented by Sunni death squads and Al Qaeda foreign fighters, diminished security in Iraq, the civilian personnel had to leave Iraq for their safety. Without a permissive security environment, civilians could not, or would not, participate in Phase IV operations. As SSTRO stalled in Iraq, the Iraqi people’s support for their American liberators started to fade. The Iraqi people needed security and basic human needs fulfilled, but the U.S. Army did not have the skills to provide these simple requests. The Army was the best land warfighting force in the world, but could not provide for the conquered population once major combat operations ended. Looking towards the future, leaders asked, how would the Army solve the issues related to Phase IV operations in a non-permissive environment? The Army decided to answer this question by developing the characteristics of a new type of soldier, one that could win both combat operations and the peace decisively. That new soldier is the pentathlete.

The Army Pentathlete

What is a pentathlete? Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the pentathlete as “an athlete participating in a pentathlon”, where the pentathlon is an athletic contest in which participants compete in five different events." The Army chose the imagery of the pentathlete for the individual versatility attributed to the pentathlete. In Figure 1, the Army provided overall characteristics of the Army pentathlete. Analyzing the description from a training aspect, the Army must develop soldiers to be warriors, leaders, statesmen and sociologists.

![Image of Army Leaders in the 21st Century: "The Pentathlete"

Figure 1, The Pentathlete

**Army Leaders in the 21st Century**

**"The Pentathlete"**

**Multi-skilled Leader**
- Strategic and creative thinker
- Builder of leaders and teams
- Competent full spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier
- Effective in managing, leading, and changing large organizations
- Skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy
- Understands cultural context, and works effectively across it

**Leader Attributes**
- Sets the standard for integrity and character
- Confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations:
  - Prudent risk taker
  - Innovative
  - Adaptive
- Empathetic and always positive
- Professionally educated and dedicated to life-long learning
- Effective communicator
The Army already develops superior soldiers, and sets the environment to grow top-notch leaders. Where the Army needs to build training strategies is in the development of culturally-savvy diplomats. The need to train soldiers in non-traditional skills presents a problem for the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), for they have no recent experience in training skills such as those in Figure 1, and if older training doctrine does exist, that doctrine’s applicability to current challenges is questionable. The Army’s focus towards winning wars decisively, coupled with the decision of the 1990s to avoid peacekeeping or nation building operations, left TRADOC bereft of practical experience to build doctrine. As the Army mastered the skills of kinetic combat, the call for peacekeepers, infrastructure experts, diplomats, and social scientists fell to other entities. When a crisis somewhere in the world required a military response, coalitions were formed to deal with the crisis. The U.S. would contribute the preponderance of forces and lead combat operations, and because most countries spend far less on their military infrastructure, coalition partners would contribute smaller combat capability, or take on peacekeeping operations after hostilities ceased. Countries such as Great Britain, Canada, France, and Germany, as well as many others, have handled peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s, and stabilization operations fell to either the U.N. or USAID, who have done extensive work in aiding nations to rebuild since 1961. NATO and other willing nations aided our cause in Afghanistan, but our actions during Operation Iraqi Freedom were largely unpopular, and left the U.S. to tackle the problem with a small coalition, bolstered by our one steadfast ally, Great Britain. Additionally, the constant violence caused by foreign insurgents made the security environment unsafe for organizations such as USAID. The unstable situation in Iraq has left only the U.S. Army to carry out peacekeeping and nation building operations. Many fine soldiers stepped up to the challenge of trying to provide security and stabilization for the people of Iraq without any formal training, but the way ahead to train new soldiers remains unclear. TRADOC must gather examples of soldiers who exhibit and exemplify pentathlete qualities, both historical and contemporary examples, so they can determine what training requirements the pentathlete will need. I offer the following examples of leaders I feel exemplify the pentathlete.

Pentathlete Examples

The Army produced a number of remarkable officers that displayed the characteristics of the pentathlete. Great soldiers, such as General Douglas MacArthur and General Lucius Clay, were pivotal leaders during the reconstruction efforts for Japan and Germany in the aftermath of World War II. Their acumen for aiding the nation states conquered by force was truly amazing.
when one considers they had no formal training in government administration. Both men assumed responsibilities for governing and rebuilding the vanquished foes after World War II, with General MacArthur becoming the Commander of Allied Forces of Occupation in Japan, and General Clay succeeding General Eisenhower as the Military Governor of Germany.13 Because of their roles, both had access to the combined might of the U.S. Military and the U.S. Government, an apparent advantage over contemporary leaders. As generals, they possessed the organizational skills to command vast resources, and both executed their tasks extremely well. Interestingly, a trait that both men did possess was training and background as civil engineers, which gave them keen insight into civilian infrastructure.14 As civil engineers, they understood the importance of meeting the basic needs of the population, such as ensuring water and power were available to all. The U.S. Army Engineer combines warrior spirit with an understanding of basic human needs.

Another Army Engineer, Colonel Anthony Funkhouser, provides a more contemporary example of the Army pentathlete. Colonel Funkhouser led the 5th Engineer Battalion as commanding officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and directed stabilization operations in the Iraqi district of Taji.15 In the aftermath of major combat operations, insurgent attacks plagued the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division, and Funkhouser was given responsibility for clearing out the insurgents from the village of Asriya.16 He received minimal guidance from his brigade commander, so he went into the village to find the leaders.17 The village’s leader was a traditional sheik, but Funkhouser wanted to ensure legitimacy, and told the village population to select their leaders, to choose individuals that would deal with the U.S. Army on the village’s behalf.18 Funkhouser’s initial actions had sown the seeds of democracy for the first time in Iraq.

The village selected five council members, and selected the former mayor as head of the council.19 Funkhouser met with the new council leader, and negotiated a peace pact over a traditional Arab meal, a setting that placed Funkhouser and the council head on equal terms.20 After the two men shared the meal, Funkhouser presented terms of what he could do for the village, and what was expected of the villagers in return.21 The Army would repair schools and clinics in the village, and the villagers would pressure the insurgents to cease attacks and identify hidden weapons caches.22 The simple agreement remained strong throughout Funkhouser’s tenure, and after he redeployed, the villagers were noted to ask the new unit assigned to the village when Funkhouser would return to finish the job he had started.23 Funkhouser employed a myriad of skills he gained through formal Army training and life experience, such as his engineer knowledge, negotiations, and basic democratic governance.24 Colonel Funkhouser exhibited skills that exemplify what the Army needs in its pentathletes.
Current Approach to Building the Pentathlete

The Army has done a great job of building the warrior/leader, but how will they build the culturally astute statesman? The Army has proposed that leaders at all levels must be trained as pentathletes to meet the emerging challenges of the future environment. This means that Army leadership, from the newest non-commissioned officer to the most senior general officers, must become multi-skilled, innovative, agile and versatile. At this point, an assumption must be made to determine what educational backgrounds would give an Army leader a head start on pentathlete development. Referring to Figure 1, the Army currently does not train the multi-skilled leader attributes of governance, statesmanship, diplomacy, and the understanding of cultural context across the leadership spectrum. The assumption presented is that in order to partly fill this gap in skills, new officers entering the Army would be better prepared for pentathlete training and tasks if they joined the Army with college degree training (major or minor) in anthropology, foreign area studies, foreign languages, political science, international relations, or sociology, to name a few. Undergraduate or graduate degree studies in these specialties would give the new officers basic understandings of cultural cognizance, local and international relations, and human societal behavior patterns. They will further develop this basic wisdom through pentathlete training and on missions to regions where the Army is engaged in reconstruction or stabilization operations. If a portion of the new officers enter the Army with a basic education in these (or others identified by the Army) desired disciplines, the task of training the new pentathlete will be easier to facilitate. This is my analysis of what a pentathlete needs academically for success, but the Army has determined different requirements.

Up to now, the Army concentrated primarily on the long-term development of select senior officer pentathletes. The Secretary of the Army tasked TRADOC to determine how the Army would develop pentathletes. The results of the Review of the Education, Training and Assignments of Leaders (RETEL) Task Force recommends the Army exclusively select officer candidates who voluntarily take specific college programs for development as pentathletes. Officer candidates that show academic achievement in “cross-cultural savvy and mental agility” will gain elevated status when choosing their military operational specialty. Those officer candidates who show the highest academic achievement should be afforded the opportunity to immerse themselves in a foreign culture, to further develop “cross-cultural savvy”. After the officers are accessed, they begin a traditional operational career path, and at a point before they reach the rank of major, the same individuals are evaluated by a Leader Development Assignment Panel, who determines which officers will make the best pentathletes. Those select
individuals are tracked to graduate schools, military assignment across the interagency, and on
the path to command. This process attempts to narrow down promising pentathlete
candidates throughout all phases of an officer’s career, but what if the process identifies an
individual early on that later regresses, or separates from the Army? A more inclusive process
is needed, to avoid poor selections early, to encourage a greater portion of the force to
participate, and to actually meet the guidance of the highest Army leadership.

The Secretary of the Army (SECAR) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) call for the
preparation of leaders at all levels of the Army “to operate in uncertain, ambiguous and complex
environments.” All Army officers and non-commissioned officers are leaders, which leads to
the conclusion that all should aspire to be pentathletes. The reality is that SECAR/CSA
guidance to train all leaders as pentathletes is fiscally unfeasible. RETAL recommendation
narrowly focuses on potential officer pentathletes early in their careers at very little cost, which
does not meet the intent of SECAR and CSA, and also unnecessarily excludes other officers
before their career has begun. Thus, the goal must be to include the largest pool of officer
candidates without incurring large budgetary expense. This goal can be achieved by placing
mandatory prerequisites on the source of potential officers, the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point (USMA) and scholarship reserve officer training corps (ROTC) cadets.

Classically, all the military services look to their accessions for particular skills, whether
they come from the service academies, ROTC, or college graduates that earn their commission
through officer candidate schools (OCS). The Army has classically allowed USMA and ROTC
cadets to choose the discipline they would study while in university, as have all the other U.S.
military services. Forcing a potential officer into a specific collegiate discipline could be
disastrous for both the cadet and the military service if the cadet is ill-suited for the desired
course of study.

How to Build the Pentathlete

So, how does the Army sow the seeds for future pentathletes without excluding a portion
of the cadet population? My recommendation focuses on the development of the junior officer
corps as entry-level pentathletes. My first recommendation is to require pursuit of a foreign
language for all scholarship cadets. Cultural understanding starts with communication, and if
the pentathlete is to be culturally savvy, dedicating six to twelve elective credit hours for all
cadets places them on the path to improved communication and cultural awareness. Moreover,
it allows all cadets to begin their career on equal footing. A foreign language requirement is not
a new concept, for the USMA has a foreign language elective requirement as part of their
Placing the same requirement on scholarship ROTC cadets would put all future officers on scholarship on par for future advancement, and vastly broaden the pentathlete pool. RETAL recommends that cadets who achieve the highest academic standard be awarded opportunities to immerse themselves in a foreign culture at the Army’s expense, a recommendation I fully support. It remains important to allow incentives for those who excel at all levels, and a foreign immersion will be seen as a reward for the top cadets, as well as beneficial training for the best pentathletes. Thus far, the requirement addresses cultural awareness, but the pentathlete is much more than culturally sophisticated. How does the Army find those individuals with the skills of a statesman or enterprise manager?34

As I mentioned before, I recommend that a number of academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences would greatly benefit the development of the pentathlete, but I also suggest that it is ill-advised to force cadets on scholarship into disciplines for which they are not suited. How does the Army attract potential officers with college degrees in the recommended areas? To begin, Congress authorizes the Army to access a certain amount of new officers every year, in order to meet mandated end strength. For the year 2006, the Army was authorized 4600 new officers.35 The three sources for new Army officers are the USMA, ROTC, and OCS. In 2006, the USMA graduated 876 cadets with various degrees. The USMA offers numerous degrees in humanities and social sciences, to include studies in political science and sociology.36 The number of USMA graduates with degrees in the humanities or social sciences for academic year 2006 was 459 of 876 graduates, or 52% of the overall class.37 ROTC has historically accounted for 60% of the 4600 annual U.S. Army accessions, but that number has dropped to 46% for 2006.38 Also, ROTC cadets choose their degree path with few restrictions, but the Army does not manage what disciplines cadets will graduate with. With the USMA and ROTC contributing fewer than 3000 new officers, the burden of attracting over 1600 potential officers with the desired skills is on the shoulders of the U.S. Army recruiter. The recruiter faces a difficult challenge in convincing soon-to-be college graduates to attend OCS and choose a career in the Army, whether they are from programs such as humanities and social sciences, or technical degree programs.

The recruiter must convince university populations to join the Army and delay or forego their civilian job plans. Polls of this same college community show only 15% of the college undergraduates were likely to volunteer for military service,39 this despite an 82% favorable rating of Americans towards the U.S. Military forces.40 It is not beyond reason to surmise that the likely pool of college undergraduates from humanities and social sciences programs would be less interested in the military than the average college student, yet they are the very target
audience that possesses the education credentials needed for the pentathlete. If an Army recruiter is to find success in recruiting desired civilians to become pentathlete officers, the recruiter needs a form of incentive to attract otherwise disinterested candidates.

When the U.S. military services look to attract or retain specialty personnel, they offer incentives to entice the candidate to join or remain. The classic military incentive has been monetary, with pay bonuses used to retain personnel with critical skills. Exceptionally qualified recruits are offered highly specialized skills training, such as undergraduate pilot training or medical school, making commitment to the military more attractive. Offering college graduates signing bonuses to join the Army would strain an already tight defense budget, so incentives must be realized from other avenues.

At this point, I will present a second assumption with respect to American college students that prepare to graduate with a degree in the humanities or social sciences. As the prospective college graduates near completion of their studies, some will choose to continue their education at the graduate level, while others will enter the American workforce. The individuals entering the workforce will pursue entry-level positions in a number of industries, to include the vast number of agencies at the federal, state and local governments. Not all new workers will gain access to the agency they wish to join for various reasons, but if there is an alternative path for those individuals to get a ‘foot in the door’, they may consider that path to achieve their desire. So, I recommend a program that can potentially entice new officer recruits with sought-after skills, while at the same time, continues pentathlete training for USMA and ROTC cadets.

To find the incentive that would attract candidates with schooling or experience in the appropriate humanities or social sciences, while facilitating the training of the pentathlete and serving the needs of the U.S. Military, I recommend the Army look no further than the current U.S. Government’s interagency structure. The pentathlete must develop the skills of a statesman and an enterprise manager. What better place to garner an understanding of these skills than from government agencies? The Army must gain an understanding of skills the various agencies bring to the fight. By contrast, if the security situation denies access to civilian experts, the pentathlete can fill the gaps. A broad-based intern exchange program with federal, state and local governments, as well as U.S. Government agencies, will expose junior officers to the skills they need to expand on pentathlete qualities, build relationships with interagency personnel that could operate with the Army in SSTRO, and offer a ‘foot in the door’ to any officer that may desire a job within a government agency after the officer’s commitment is served. A key element of this program is that the internship must occur before the officer reports to his or her first duty station, in order to educate the officer before their first deployment to a combat
zone, and hold to the promise of internship made to non-scholarship recruits. This is a paradigm shift in the Army’s development of officers and leaders, and will require visionary leadership and support from Army leadership. The program I propose will draw great criticism, but when viewed against other military specialty training, the program can greatly enhance the quality of the fledgling Army Pentathlete.

The Pentathlete Intern Program

The Army’s Basic Combat Training (BCT) program for officers is a three-phase structured program that readies the newest Army officers to report to their first unit in as little as 15 weeks, to as long as 31 weeks. Officers commissioned through OCS spend twelve weeks at Phase I OCS, six weeks at Phase II Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC), and approximately nine to thirteen weeks for Phase III Technical Branch training, depending on their specialty. Officers commissioned through the USMA or ROTC enter BCT at Phase II BOLC. The Pentathlete Intern Program would add anywhere from six to eighteen months to the modified BCT course, based on the needs determined by the Army, and the agreement with the specific interned agency. The internship should occur immediately after BCT is completed, for the new officer will better understand what to draw from the internship if the officer is already trained in his or her military occupational specialty (MOS). The addition of training time for internship should not be viewed as unusual or unreasonable, for this is unique training for a unique type of officer. If the Army views the training investment in the same way as the Air Force views flight training for its aviators, the investment in time will pay dividends in developing the pentathlete. The Pentathlete Intern Program will not only benefit the Army, but the program will meet the intent of National Security Presidential Directive 44 and DoD Directive 3000.05, which states that DoD will seek opportunities to train with the interagency, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as take tours of duty with these same entities. The knowledge to be gained by all parties engaged in a Pentathlete Intern Program can be boundless, if all parties embrace the program. The basics of the program have been presented, so how should the Army proceed?

At first glance, the task may seem monumental, but upon closer inspection, much of the foundation of this potential program already exists. To begin, the U.S. Army already participates in a program that reflects the proposal. The Army Congressional Fellowship Program educates and trains U.S. Army majors and lieutenant colonels on congressional activities with focus on impacts upon the Department of Defense. The U.S. Air Force has a similar program, but one that centers on developing captains through a two year program of graduate studies and
internship within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff or the Air Staff.\textsuperscript{46} The program recommended for the Army would be shorter in duration and broader in scope, based on the needs determined by the Army. The Army could decide to narrow the program to focus on the military operational specialties the Army feels would benefit most from the training if the program was deemed too unwieldy or too large for all new second lieutenants each year. All specialties would gain from this initial pentathlete training, but if the Army chose to limit the program due to fiscal or other restraints, I recommend specialties such as Infantry, Engineer, Armor, Military Police and Logisticians would benefit most, especially in light of current stabilization operations.\textsuperscript{47} The Pentathlete Intern Program is ambitious in the construct presented, but to comprehend the program’s potential, I provide a few conceptual examples of program participants and the possible experience to be gained by the fledgling pentathlete.

The U.S. Congress is a great source of knowledge and experience for budding pentathletes to learn how government works. The Army already has an active congressional fellowship program for field grade officers.\textsuperscript{48} The current Army Congressional Fellowship Program runs for eleven months,\textsuperscript{49} which closely resembles the nine-month Congressional Fellowship Program administered by the American Political Science Association.\textsuperscript{50} Both programs provide fellows first-hand experience on how our government works by placing them on the staff of a member of Congress. Army lieutenants would benefit from a similar program, gaining first-hand knowledge on how a democracy works and an understanding of how negotiation and compromise are essential to the political process. A tailored congressional intern program would not make Army Lieutenants into statesmen, but it would give them practical statecraft experience. A nomination as a congressional intern could also serve as an enticing incentive to interested OCS candidates, especially to those who want to generate political contacts for future positions. The idea of an officer leaving the Army after an initial commitment that included a congressional internship could be construed as wasteful to the pentathlete development, but if viewed from the aspect of a future military advocate in political office, the long term benefits to the military could far outweigh the short term loss of an officer.

The intern program would not be limited to congressional internships; the Army would be usefully served if they expanded the program to state and local government, where interns could learn about basic infrastructure needs, such as electricity, water and sewage systems. This exposure would provide the interns with the basics for rebuilding a nation, key aspects necessary to winning the hearts and minds of the population in a war-torn area. This practice is already in place at Fort Leonard Wood, where Colonel Funkhouser coordinated a one-day symposium with his engineers and with the city planners of neighboring St. Roberts, Missouri.\textsuperscript{51}
Colonel Funkhouser’s desire to prepare his engineers before they deployed to Iraq again was borne out of his experiences in Asriya, Iraq. A broader program that could be coordinated by the Army would be with the City of New York. New York’s Department of Citywide Administrative Services already offers a broad array of internships throughout city departments, from Emergency Planning, Police and Fire Department, Department of Corrections, and a host of others. New York is similar to every other major U.S. city with similar departments, so the intern program potential is boundless across the nation. Another possible intern placement agency would be USAID, which specializes in nation building. The benefits to the Army increase with this organization, for the interns would gain insight on how USAID operates, and when the agency does gain access to the area in need, the trained officer can facilitate working relations between the Army and the USAID team. With a robust program that enlists government agencies at all levels, the Army can set the environment to create the true pentathlete.

Conclusion

The Global War on Terror has placed the Army in a situation that it was not totally prepared for, but it is determining the path forward to complete the mission. The Army is working hard to prepare itself for the missions of peacekeeping and nation building, missions to which it has paid very little heed since the end of the Vietnam War. To succeed in this endeavor, the Army looks to the pentathlete leader concept to carry out the mission. The Army has defined the characteristics of the pentathlete, and has determined how the pentathlete will develop, but I feel the Army is planning to implement the program with few prerequisites and far too selectively at the earliest stages of most officers’ careers. The Army has set a language standard at the USMA. ROTC programs should have similar language program requirements added to equip ROTC cadets with the same tools as their USMA counterparts. The Army also must rely on OCS accessions to fill the growing demand for officers, as well as pursuing candidates with degrees drawn from the humanities and the social sciences. A junior grade intern program implemented immediately after BCT would likely attract college undergraduates that would not normally consider the Army, and offer pentathlete-building experience to all junior officers. The suggested Pentathlete Intern Program would follow and enhance the Army’s traditional BCT Course. If the Army is to successfully meet the challenges of insurgency and nation building today and in the future, the Army must leave its training comfort zone and take aggressive action by instituting civilian internships. The bottom line is that education, especially cultural training, will be paramount in aiding the Army’s new pentathletes to understand and
empathize with the people they are trying to help. The Army can and will win the kinetic war, but unless they pave the way to winning the hearts and minds of the disenfranchised populations, the post-kinetic situation could cloud the future in any post-conflict region, and have long-lasting impact on America itself.

Endnotes


8 Colonel Peggy Combs, U.S. Army War College student, interview by author, 11 Dec, 2006. Colonel Combs was a member of CENTCOM/J3 in 2001, and indicated that CENTCOM planners executed crisis action planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom as forces prosecuted Operation Enduring Freedom.


11 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. For example, 18 of 26 NATO members spend less than 2.0% of their gross domestic product on military infrastructure. As of 2004, the U.S. total military spending of $466 billion was only $34 billion less than the combined military expenditure of the rest of the world.


14 Ibid.

15 Colonel Anthony Funkhouser, U.S. Army War College student, interview by author, 7 December 2006. Funkhouser related the villagers’ request for his return based on Washington

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


26 Ibid, p.15.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Harvey, p.19.


34 Harvey, p. 19.


37 Shirley A. Sabel, USMA Institutional Research and Analysis Branch, e-mail message to author, 17 January 2007.

38 Henning, p.11.


40 Telephone poll of 1,217 American citizens, Harris Poll, 8 September 2005. Available online at Polling the Nations database, under the subject heading “Military”.

41 Combs interview. Col Combs was the Chemical Battalion Training Commander at Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, until June 2006.

42 This estimation of time in training does not apply to Aviation, Armor and Special Forces Branches, which are longer in duration due to the specialty skills required.

43 My training as an EF-111A Electronic Warfare Officer took over two years, which is quite reasonable for Tactical Fighter Training.


47 Combs interview, 11 Dec, 2006. Colonel Combs indicated that all specialties needed to experience the suggested training, but agreed that the immediate needs of stabilization and reconstruction operations suggested that some MOS were more suited than others in the initial phases.

48 Army Congressional Fellowship Program, p. 2

49 Ibid, p. 4.


51 Funkhouser interview.

52 Ibid.
