USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

JOINT OFFICER SELECTION, UTILIZATION, AND COMMAND

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Goldwater-Nichols Act legislated the improvement of joint interoperability within the Department of Defense but has, of yet, not successfully integrated joint officers into a career field with a planned career progression. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of (JCS) has input into the vettement, education, command selection, and career paths of joint officers but has little proactive management capabilities. The Goldwater-Nichols Act implies that there are two types of joint tours needed to promote joint interoperability: one time familiarization tours and repeated career progression utilization. A Joint Personnel Command (JPC) would not only assist with selecting officers for joint familiarization tours after joint education but also identify officers for a permanent joint career. A JPC could also establish a single joint evaluation report to give the JCS a common evaluation of joint performance and better equip the JCS in selecting officers for return joint utilization. A JPC would assist with an orderly and logically templated career path for career joint officers which would help retain quality joint officers and assist promotion and joint command selection. Without the advent of a JPC joint officers are no more than temporary manpower serving, normally, to the detriment of their service career progression.
The progress of Goldwater-Nichols implementation has been well documented since 1986 with articles, reports, and research papers detailing intended outcomes, unintended consequences, successes, and shortfalls. There are politicians such as Congressman Ike Skeleton who have taken great personal interest in the growth of the joint education system and the development of a joint culture as well as military analysts such as Mr. Don M. Snider who have written articles on the need for a separate joint profession. However, most of their recommendations and insights have not addressed the one overarching management issue of joint officers. Many of the Goldwater-Nichols initiatives, and the ideas of Congressman Skeleton and Mr. Snider, have been implemented because their insights were legislated by law. However, most of the recommendations made by Congressional studies, RAND Corporation research, and independent analysis have gone unheeded because the recommendations exceed the limited language of the Goldwater-Nichols Act or internally, the services continue to meet the letter of the law, but not the intent, towards a joint culture or profession. Success in the present Global War on Terror (GWOT) has required an ever increasing joint focus and cooperation and the services have succeeded in operating at the strategic and operational level with ever more joint focus. Yet the officer management system that selects, trains, assigns, and retains joint officers remains immature and lacks proper organization.

Joint officers will always need to be experts in their own service to provide benefit to joint positions but, lacking a proper management system; the military will continue to waste the education and experience of officers who have had joint education, assignments, and commands. “. . . there has been no evolution toward a joint warfare profession instead, such evolution has been constrained by the intent and language of the original Goldwater-Nichols of officers Act:”\(^1\) of which the number one constraint has been the lack of a joint career path.

Although there are many joint issues at the strategic and operational level, the men and women who will be our future joint officers and leaders deserve a better system of personnel management. The first steps to a proper management system should be the establishment of a joint officer management directorate, a planned progression of joint officers within assignments integrated with service career development positions, a separate joint evaluation report, and the inclusion of joint commands or key billets on each services version of the Command Selection List (CSL). Calls for management reform and progressive personnel oversight have been logically outlined in various papers but most have identified problems or pieces of the issue and not addressed an overarching joint personnel system as a solution. Without one central
management system, that has directive authority over officers in coordination with service management; joint officers will always be an afterthought in officer management, promotions, assignments, and command selection.

Joint Officer Management System.

“Goldwater clearly expressed the intent of the Senate bill’s framers: By direct order of the Congress, a career specialty would be created for officers on joint duty assignment.”² Some observers of the joint officer have assessed joint assignments as “… just this side of Siberia.”³ And accused the services assignment officers as using the JCS as a “… dumping ground for inept officers.”⁴ Although joint assignments are not always welcomed by the services to fill, or desired by the most qualified officers to perform, joint assignments are not filled by bad or underperforming officers. But then again, the top 5% of the service officers do not seek joint assignments. The conundrum lies in that the services expect the top 5% of their officers to eventually become GO/FOs and to, at some point, perform duties as joint task force commanders. Services rarely assign their top 5% officers to joint assignments of any length because the extended absence from the service career path hinders future service promotion and command potential. However, without meaningful joint experience, other than a token joint tour, our future joint commanders are at a disadvantage not only in joint doctrine but in the utilization of joint capabilities and running a joint staff.

The intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to develop a shared joint culture across the services to enhance the planning of joint operations to take advantage of each service’s unique capabilities. The training of officers in joint issues should support learning joint doctrine and joint capabilities and not merely suffice as a joint credit tour. Joint education was not intended to develop a separate joint line of education for solely joint officers. The influx of officers back into the services who have had either joint education or joint experience benefits the services by inculcating the services with familiarity of joint doctrine and skill sets. The management of officers should ensure the development of joint skills and culture throughout a military career that supports service and joint development for promotion, education, and command. The joint education system is not perfect but there are sufficient building blocks to meet joint career progression if service members are tracked and re-utilized in joint positions. No office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for tracking graduates of the joint education system or former joint billet holders for repeat assignments. As of now, each service is individually responsible for selecting personnel for joint assignments, normally after service personnel requirements, or personnel distribution requirements, are met. In addition, one would have to ask what office is
specifically responsible for the review of promotions and selection for joint commands. One could argue that the joint staff does execute partial responsibility in arrears by reviewing promotion boards, after the fact, for joint assignments and parity but this belies the fact that each service has to be consulted for their records and the joint community does not maintain a separate joint career file on joint officers. “The fact that these personnel records are segregated amongst the Services means that there is no way, aside from examining the annual overall joint promotion and assignment statistics that the Secretary of Defense report to Congress …”5

The Goldwater-Nichols Act “… attempted to improve joint officer management policies6 in its Title IV which directed that the “Secretary [of Defense], with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall establish career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty. Guidelines shall include guidelines for selection, military education, training, types of assignments, and such matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.”7 However, to date, the CJCS can only address inequities of quantity and not quality of joint officers.

Although there are many advocates for a “fifth” service, and even some advocates for a stronger central joint command that oversees all military related decisions on budget, doctrine, strategy, and operations, there are just as many who cite the division between the services, and their corresponding separate civilian oversight, as a means to prevent the armed forces from gaining too much power. Many politicians are reluctant to amalgamate all of the military power and oversight under one central power or position. However, even with this reservation, joint doctrine, transformation, and operations cannot survive with a haphazard selection process. The stand up of a joint J1 may not demand the oversight authority to direct selection for education, assignments, and commands but at least the joint community would not rely solely on the services if a joint J1 had at least equal input to the process. The US military may never accept, and Congress may never approve of, a fifth service, or even a military command model that resembles the German General Staff of World War II, but at least the joint J1 would assure a solid core of joint officers who serve in joint positions throughout their careers.

The Special Operations community, and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), have embraced joint culture and have taken steps, outlined in their Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006, to further joint management that would serve as a template for a Joint Personnel Command (JPC). As outlined in the Capstone Concept USSOCOM is taking the lead to “Establish a process for Joint SOF human capital development . . . a cradle to grave career management system . . .”8 Although SOF is taking an active interest in the development of joint personnel by monitoring successive assignments present policy still dictates that “Each military department manages the selection and assignments of its
own JSOs. Final approval of the selections rest with the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is simply impossible to imagine that the SecDef, or his immediate staff could manage the numbers of joint assignments, with any clarity or continuity, below the general officer level.

A 2005 slide, the most up to date briefing posted, from the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) presentation entitled, “Report Joint Forces Staff College Stakeholders 2005” lists the number of graduates from the JFSC as 1,215 per year. This number includes Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for level II, the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), and the Joint Command, Control & Information Operations School (JC2IOS). Included in these numbers are 177 Reservists, 64 international officers and 12 interagency civilians which leave 945 active duty officers when you also subtract National Guard officers. The JFSC presently meets the required number of joint personnel trained to support a system that should, with normative service promotions, fulfill joint requirements for joint trained and experienced personnel on a continued basis. However, personnel who have attended some level of Joint education, or are veterans of a joint assignments, are not sufficiently managed and reassigned to a second joint assignment or enrolled in continuing joint education to support a joint career progression.

If the joint military community desires to maintain a focus on joint research and issues, and ultimately joint ready officers, the responsibility will remain on the JFSC. For example in the 2006 RESEARCH TOPIC REFERENCE BOOKLET, as published by the Joint Special Operations University, there are 13 research topic areas that JSOU recommends . . . none of which mention, or are related to, joint operations. In the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Commander’s Research Top Priority List -- 2005-2006 there are 36 areas recommended for research, none of which mention or are related to joint operations. The point is that relying on the services to integrate joint doctrine at every level of formal education has been unsuccessful because the services primary educational focus is to prepare officers for their individual services needs. True, joint education has improved greatly in the service mid and senior grade ranks but the bulk of the joint education is provided by JFSC which makes it imperative that graduates of JFSC classes are tracked for multiple reassignments to joint positions. The JFSC does not track the reassignment of joint trained officers to future joint positions nor does JFSC track joint officers for future joint education. Basically, JFSC trains whoever is provided by the services without management of their graduates. A Joint Personnel Center (JPC) could assess each officers present service career path with that service and jointly coordinate an education and career path to either utilize the officer for future joint positions.
The Joint Chief of Staffs responsibilities are outlined as:

1. Improve communication, understanding and cooperation between the J1 and our customers.

2. Enhance total force readiness by identifying, analyzing and acting on manpower and personnel issues through the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA)/Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process.

3. Optimize the Joint Staff organization to support the CINCS and the JCS.

4. Obtain highly qualified people for the Joint Staff.

5. Provide highly qualified manpower and personnel support to the staff and other agencies.\(^\text{12}\)

And the JCS Joint Manpower Division lists its responsibilities as:

MD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Branch analyzes pertinent personnel law, policy, and regulations, and then provides general oversight of JOM as required by statute, DOD policy or regulation. It reviews all pertinent promotion board reports to ensure compliance with guidance issued by SecDef and reviews all aspects of promotions and career guidance for Joint Specialty Officers to include waivers for joint duty credit and assignments. The branch manages the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System in cooperation with PDUSD (P&R), the Services, joint organizations and the Defense Manpower Data Center and manages the Joint Duty Assignment List Validation Board process.\(^\text{13}\)

Neither of these two documents requires, nor charge, the JCS with the actual career management of Joint personnel. At present the JCS limits itself to minimal oversight of boards for promotions after the fact only to ensure that promotion boards meet the minimal legislative requirements.

The Joint staff can quantitatively but not qualitatively monitor individual Service JSO promotion statistics provided by the Services to ensure compliance with GNA legislation. Unless laws are changed, however, the Services will ultimately determine the qualities of officers as they enter into the joint officer arena.\(^\text{14}\)

A JPC would eliminate after the fact reviews of promotion selection based on quantitative analysis only. The Goldwater-Nichols act should be extended to direct the JCS Manpower Division to include a qualitative review of personnel selected for assignment and education in conjunction with, or even separate from, the service’s personnel directorate.

If Congress is serious about joint culture taking a foothold in service doctrine then Congress will have to legislate the oversight. Don Snider states it best that if left to the services they will not develop a JPC without legal direction. “Military institutions are still established by law. Thus, the only way in which a new joint military profession will emerge is for it to be founded by Congress in the statutes that govern the Department of Defense.”\(^\text{15}\) Without
Joint Position Progression

If the J1 for JCS were given the authority to work with services and ensure that officers returning for joint assignments had previous joint experience, the J1 could also develop career development patterns, or assignments, to ensure joint officers progressed through a series of joint positions that either paralleled their service experience, or at least leveraged their service experience, in future joint assignments. Most JTFs are developed from the core of an existing command but the staff is primarily ad hoc. Yet a study on JTFs found “Combatant commanders conveyed to this group the “junior” officers assigned to JTF were unprepared to do the job and carry out their responsibilities.”16 If personnel were managed by joint qualification JTF commanders could rely on the JPC to, if not select, at least recommend joint qualified officers for JTF assignment. Under the present management system JTF commanders have little information on the joint officer’s skills and experience and rely on the individual service for joint officer assignments. Joint staff and command positions, even for enlisted personnel, require a broader understanding to encompass joint issues. A JTF commander should not be given little option to accept a minimally qualified joint officer based solely on a quantitative analysis. Joint officers are often assigned without specific training, other than a general joint education, for their assigned duties. “Of those officers now serving in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), only 2% had any previous joint staff experience . . . Only 13% have attended the five-month resident course at the Armed Forces Staff College . . .”17 The statistics for senior officers assigned to joint positions who have had joint training is better but still under 25%.18 These statistics only underscore the lack of corporate knowledge in the joint community.19

It is interesting to note that there has been no apparent trend, even a slight one, over the last fifteen years to select senior leadership that has had increasingly more joint experience than the previous generates of senior leaders. There seems to have been little or no increase in the amount of time spent in a joint billet required to be successfully appointed to a senior leadership position in the military.20

In Snider’s article he argues the need for a joint culture. This position takes into account the intent of Goldwater-Nichols but it oversteps the likelihood that the services will adapt this revolutionary of a step. Of Snider’s recommendations the most attainable, and the most likely to lead to a joint profession, is the organization of a JPC, “. . . with the authority to manage the careers of all members of the Joint profession, including selection, evaluation, assignment, promotion, and professional development.”21 Snider goes on to recommend that officers who
are selected and educated to be joint remain so throughout their careers and remain under the control of the JPC. This seems too large a divergence between the services and joint career paths to maintain a service career or knowledge. What makes joint officers successful is their knowledge of their services techniques, tactics, procedures and command and control systems. Making officers’ stovepipe joint would make them a fifth service without common service grounding.

“Other than growing in size and bureaucratic procedures, this management of officers assigned to joint duty has evolved little since the initial implementation in the early years after 1986.” Joint assignments lack any type of career cogent progression. “Thus the joint community has not evolved, at any point in time, beyond a collection of “borrowed military manpower” determined by bureaucratic selection and assignment procedures.”

Joint assignments are offered to the services by means of a JDAL where the services select an appropriate fit for the slot. Notice the word “appropriate” since the selection is rarely the services “best” fit. The joint assignment rarely is conducive to the officers’ career both from the aspect of time away from a service, prescribed career progression, and a joint position that lacks progression to the next service job. In addition, since joint assignments are not tracked by a JPC the officers’ subsequent assignments to service positions do not support any cogent pattern of preparation for a second joint position. If an officer serves a second joint job it is by pure luck of availability of the officer at the time a joint position is available. A JPC could develop a career progression pattern, in concert with the services, which would earmark JSO for general positions both in service and joint positions. This progression would lend to the officers competitiveness for promotion and command, the services utilization of a joint experienced officer, and the joint use of a well prepared and informed service officer. “Service personnel managers point out that joint officers need important service assignments to maximize the likelihood of receiving service command assignments.” The implementation of a career progression would make joint assignments “... a vocational profession, not a bureaucracy filled with a collection of ever changing, borrowed personnel as has been the case in the joint community for the past 16 years.” Until the development of a JPC the services and the Joint world will squander the experience and skill sets of joint officers

Joint Evaluation Report

The two advantages of a joint report is that it gives first and second line supervisors of joint officers a similar reporting format for each member of their joint command. Secondly, a joint report tells the individual service promotion and command boards, with clarity, that the
report is a joint report. There has long been a stigma that joint reports have the possibility of hurting an officer’s career due to unintended consequences based on the different interpretations of evaluations due to cultural differences. Joint reports are, at best, neutral reports that cannot help but may harm an officer’s career. “Written guidance to service promotion boards is inconsistent, and in the case of the Navy, nonexistent when it comes to treatment of evaluation reports rendered on officers serving in joint staff positions.”

Why not call a joint report what it is . . . a joint report? If the services continue to discount joint reports for promotion or selection boards, why insist on using service formats for evaluations and compound the incident rate of unintended consequence? In addition, a joint report would allow service promotion and command boards to view joint reports for what they are . . . another services evaluation of their officers in a joint position. Not only would this allow an independent non service evaluation of joint officers by raters and senior raters of other services but a joint OER would also give a joint management office a more standard report for selecting future joint officers for reassignment and command. “A common evaluation system could put teeth into the concept of jointness in the sense that joint officers would be evaluated against common standards vice parochial service standards.”

LTC Thomas Burgess’s research paper details the differences and similarities between the services evaluation criteria and the opportunity to use joint values referred to in Joint Pub 1 as the basis for a Joint evaluation report. His treatise is well researched but misses one component of joint evaluations. That component is that it is of little matter if the form is the original service report or an agreed upon joint report, any joint report is viewed as just that by service promotion and command boards . . . a joint report. “Across the board adoption of a single officer evaluation reporting system throughout the Defense Department is unlikely in the near term because of strong parochialism.” LTC Burgess is correct in stating that it is unlikely that the Department of Defense will accept a single officer evaluation process or form. But I disagree that the reason is “parochialism.” However, not accepting a DoD wide OER does not preclude a separate joint OER. The services recruit, train, and promote officers for different skill sets based on service needs. It is only logical that the services rate their officers using different evaluation reports. The argument that each service officer has a different set of traits or characteristics which the service desires to reward with promotion or command and therefore the evaluation must remain service specific is not logical. “Because officers assigned to joint staffs billets are not performing service specific missions or functions there is no compelling reason to evaluate that officer against service specific criteria.” The joint commander has
officers of all services in his command. The commander has three possible measurements to assess his joint officers:

1. Based on his experience of officers in his service.
2. Based on officers of the rated individual's services with which the commander has served.
3. Based on all officers assigned within the commander's joint command.

It is unfair to evaluate officers of different services solely on the ratings officer's services desired traits. It is fair for the commander to rate officers in his command in an order of merit fashion since the rater has a limited number of top rankings if he is using a joint evaluation similar to the Army system. "Commanders and supervisors of officers assigned to joint duty positions are burdened by having to prepare officer evaluation reports regulated by four distinct sets of service policies and procedures."  

If joint commands continue to use the services individual evaluation reports officers of less than stellar capabilities will return to joint positions because their services evaluation format has helped them get promoted, whereas joint officers of other services who have performed to a higher standard were not promoted based on the differences in service evaluations.

A joint OER would not only give board members the option to view a report as joint, and either give the report equal credit or dismiss the report if they are so inclined, but a Joint OER also gives the service the opportunity to rate their officers performance against other services officers and in turn give a joint selection or command board a common basis of evaluation for promotion, selection for joint assignment, or joint command. A joint report would necessarily be maintained by the service for promotion and command selection boards but also by a JPC to effect future assignment selection and a comparison of service officer’s performance in joint billets. "It seems that the Services still maintain a great deal of influence over joint officer management and prefer to tightly control their officers. This influence is understandably due to the fact that Services nominate their officers for promotions, and clearly those nominations will be based upon Service qualifications and not joint skills. This indicates, however, that there is no joint culture permeating the officer promotion system that can ensure the Services are nominating officers who will not only be good leaders with the that Service, but will also be good joint leaders in the future."  

Joint Command Key Billet Selection

A JPC would review all personnel nominated for joint education or assignment and for all Joint commands to include JTFs. Although a study of the joint experience of all GO/FO
nominated for JTFs based on quality and quantity of assignments would be interesting the fact remains that almost all JTFs are ad hoc organizations. Not only is the organization of the command ad hoc based on service personnel assigned but also as a 1998 study states: “Service headquarters usually provide officers to ad hoc JTFs without consideration of their JPME background.” MAJ Archibald Burns makes this point in a paper entitled “Joint Qualified Flag Officer Development: Is Production Broken?” Although he specifically states his paper is not an indictment of MG Hagenback’s performance during Operation Anaconda, his findings are based partially on MG Hagenback’s lack of joint experience. At the core of the Major’s research was that a lack of real joint experience and joint education limited MG Hagenback’s ability to plan and conduct joint air operations in Afghanistan leading to inadequate planning and execution of Operation Anaconda. Many joint assignments are curtailed to meet the minimum requirement for time or avoided altogether with Pentagon assignments that meet joint duty criteria but are not truly joint in nature. “Regardless of how much time these senior leaders have actually spent in JDAs, current rules concerning minimum time for an assignment to a JDA probably do not offer enough joint experience for future leaders.” Regardless of the actual impact on Operation Anaconda the Major’s point that JTF Commanders often do not have sufficient joint experience or meet education requirements is well made. In the appointment of joint commanders and officers to senior positions in joint commands it seems, “Joint experience does not seem to be as important as the language found in Joint Publication 1 indicates.”

A JPC could take the lead to develop joint commands that would be attractive to service personnel either in lieu of or in addition to service commands. Joint commands improve an officer’s resume for promotion and future command consideration. “Joint assignments can also be managed in ways that ensure they are attractive to officers. Assigning officers to positions that enable them to gain knowledge and skills that advance their potential performance in future assignments—especially key service assignments that would have an acknowledged need for such experience—would help to overcome cultural resistance to joint assignments, making these positions a desirable component of a military career rather than a “ticket-punching” exercise.”

Joint commands are not only not on the services version of a command selection list which leads to the “... strong perception exists that time spent away from one’s Service, especially working in a joint billet, is potentially detrimental to an officer’s successful career.” The only reason most officers seek a joint command is because they were not selected for a service command or have chosen to get off of their service career progression or promotion track for reasons of family, retirement, or various other personal factors.
Initially, this research paper was intended to outline suggestions to codify a systemic approach to joint education highlighting the need for earlier joint education, a more integrated Joint curriculum in service schools at every level, a mandatory course for JTF Commanders prior to appointment of command, and a more accountable education program for General and Flag officer selectees. After an in depth review of available research papers, military and government studies, it became apparent that even with improvements in the Joint education system the Joint staff’s inability to select nominees for Joint schooling, track Joint school graduates for future utilization, to increase joint oversight of selection for command and or key billet personnel, that even the best of joint education systems would be marginally efficient and just hopefully effective. The establishment of a JPC will undoubtedly require Congressional mandate or legislation but without a JPC that has authority to select for Joint education, joint assignment or Joint command the development of a Joint career path, and perhaps ultimately a joint profession, joint career progression depends upon the needs of service requirements first and not a formalized joint selection process. “In the end it appears, that without changes to the joint officer management policies and systems, Service perspectives will continue to control officer promotions and assignments, and the onus to gain joint experience will remain on each individual leader.”\(^{38}\)

**Recommendation**

Jointness should have two objectives: inculcate joint culture into the services through primarily service oriented career officers and simultaneously develop a separate Joint officer career path that is not a separate or fifth service, separate from the officer’s parent service culture but Joint in focus. To better manage personnel who are earmarked for a Joint career a JPC would be better served using a JSO identifier for officers with a joint career path and a Joint Service Qualified (JSQ) for officers with some joint experience or education but are not joint career oriented.

In addition to better delineating joint qualified officers a JPC should develop a joint OER that is easily recognizable by the individual service boards that serves to highlight joint service, a different service rater and senior rater, to make it easier for independent JCS and Congressional oversight of the effect Joint evaluations have on service and joint promotions and command selection. As of now, joint oversight is minimized to a quantitative analysis of promotions for joint versus service officers, with little oversight of command selection percentages, and no ability to qualitatively evaluate the joint officers selected.
A JPC should increase the number of JDAL positions that give joint credit while decreasing the number of waiverable positions, or Pentagon service specific positions, that serve in lieu of joint credit and also serve to avoid last minute joint assignments used to qualify for JTF command selection or GO/FO promotions. If joint assignments are utilized to not only train JSQ officers that are not oriented towards a joint career but also utilized as a career path for JSO officers the JDAL will need to be expanded commensurately with the capacity of the joint education system.

Develop a separate JPC that has access to the records of each service’s officers designated as JSO and JSQ and begin to develop Joint records and oversight of joint education selection, utilization, promotion, and command selection without total reliance on the service personnel commands. Without some qualitative selection process the joint assignments will remain, at best, neutral career assignments not sought by the top 20% officers of any service. Besides the lack of volunteers from the top 5% of the services for joint assignments is “Another indicator that joint perspectives take a back seat to Service officer management policies is that there exists no single agency that manages all officers.”

The major issues with Joint service start with a central authority to manage assignments, career paths and command selection. If a JPC cannot have influence either in the services command selection boards by designating joint commands on the services command selection list, or by having a joint officer sit on the command selection board, then the joint community must hold its own separate command board for joint positions. Service officers will not seek joint assignments or commands because they are not seen as career enhancing. Often officers will not list joint assignments or commands on their biographies. “One possible reason for the lack of emphasis on prior joint experience might be that there are very few joint commands and many joint staff billets, and it is far more prestigious to list commands one has held than it is to list work on any staff, joint or otherwise.” Although this trend is changing with senior officers due to the increased joint nature of GWOT, most junior and mid grade officers are very aware that only a service command ensures them a promotion or future command potential.

Quality officers will not seek joint command until they see a pattern of equal consideration for their service in joint positions with command and promotion selection within their service, and even more importantly, until the joint community offers a separate command track that rewards joint corporate knowledge, performance, and success. “Such transformation is, and will continue to be, completely dependent on resolving this systemic personnel issue that precludes the emergence of a new, joint warfare professional.”
Endnotes


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


8 U.S. Special Operations Command Capstone Concept for Special Operations (McDill Air Forc Base, FL: 2006),14


11 Ibid.


14 Jordan, 12.

15 Snider, 24.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Jordan, 9.

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28 Ibid., 6.

29 Ibid., 8.

30 Ibid.

31 Jordan, 11.


33 Archibald E. Bruns, “Joint Qualified” Flag Officer Development: Is Production Broken? (Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2003), 21.

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40 Ibid., 13.
41 Snider, 19.