THE EVOLUTION OF PHASE ZERO SHAPING AND INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION IN COMBATANT COMMANDER CAMPAIGN PLANNING

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College, or the Department of Defense.

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**Title:** The Evolution of Phase Zero Shaping and Interagency Integration in Combatant Commander Campaign Planning

**Abstract:**
Shaping is an evolving concept. Although it has been added to campaign planning as described in the campaign phasing model, the doctrine fails to adequately define shaping as a distinct category of activities. If shaping is to be something more than security cooperation, security assistance or diplomacy, it needs to be defined in terms of how it is different, whom it is intended to shape, what is to be shaped and how shaping is to be resourced. The joint doctrine is also clear that shaping activities are to be coordinated and integrated with the IA. If within the DOD shaping is not clearly understood, as I propose, then the DOD is not ready for IA and/or international coordination and integration. Without a common understanding of terminology, intentions and resources required to implement shaping, more security cooperation and security assistance is all that will result. As shaping relates to multinational coordination, we cannot hope for more from our international partners until we have done significant work at home first.
ABSTRACT

Shaping is an evolving concept. Although it has been added to campaign planning as described in the campaign phasing model, the doctrine fails to adequately define shaping as a distinct category of activities. If shaping is to be something more than security cooperation, security assistance or diplomacy, it needs to be defined in terms of how it is different, whom it is intended to shape, what is to be shaped and how shaping is to be resourced. The joint doctrine is also clear that shaping activities are to be coordinated and integrated with the IA. If within the DOD shaping is not clearly understood, as I propose, then the DOD is not ready for IA and/or international coordination and integration. Without a common understanding of terminology, intentions and resources required to implement shaping, more security cooperation and security assistance is all that will result. As shaping relates to multinational coordination, we cannot hope for more from our international partners until we have done significant work at home first.
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INTRODUCTION

“We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.”

- President George W. Bush

Forward deployed United States military troops have a long history of executing engagement activities with their counterparts in foreign militaries abroad. These activities are aimed at enhancing our national strategic goals, building international cooperation and improving the internal defense capacity and capability of partner nations. The U.S. military also maintains a global forward presence in order to be positioned to rapidly respond to conflict when required, render humanitarian relief, dissuade aggressors and assure our allies. Following World War II, and in support of the subsequent U.S. containment strategy toward the Soviet Union, the U.S. military has maintained a robust access, presence and influence posture throughout the world. That posture has varied somewhat in size, composition and geographic location over time, but the U.S. presence abroad today is still formidable with over 350,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines stationed in over 130 countries.

The Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) have had authority and responsibility for theater engagement planning since 1948 under the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The GCC planning efforts in the past, although not exactly ad hoc, were

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conducted within less than the formal planning constructs we see today. This was due in large part to the end of the Cold War and an examination of the role of the military on the international stage at that time. It was in the 1995 National Security Strategy (NSS) of “Engagement and Enlargement” that we saw a significant step toward codifying and expanding the engagement effort.

The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever. I am committed to forging a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad in pursuit of our cherished goal — a more secure world where democracy and free markets know no borders.

- President William Clinton

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) introduced engagement activities in the shaping vernacular at the National Command Authority level. The focus of the 1997 QDR was on developing a force able to “shape, respond and prepare.” Shaping has been continuously developed from its engagement roots, and today the joint doctrine that guides the military operational planning process - Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (JP 5-0) and Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (JP 3-0), have both incorporated shaping into campaign planning as follows: “Shape. Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and


to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies."\textsuperscript{8,9} Note that within the context that the Department of Defense (DOD) is a member of the interagency (IA) of the U.S. government (USG), shaping is not described as a function of DOD alone; rather it is a function of the IA as a whole. This paper offers an analysis of the development of shaping both specifically within the DOD as a component of the IA, as well as shaping as a concept requiring further development simultaneously across the IA taken as a whole.

Within DOD, joint military doctrine has incorporated shaping by including it as a component of the formal operational planning phasing model. There are six phases in a military campaign, of which shaping is phase zero. The phases are shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize and enable civil authority.\textsuperscript{10} The shaping phase of the campaign is described as critical in planning and preparation for stability operations, and includes the requirement to coordinate with IA planning agents. Per joint doctrine, phase zero operations are continuous, normally occurring in the context of day-to-day security cooperation. These operations are performed to “dissuade”, “deter” and “assure.”\textsuperscript{11}

The GCCs play have played a lead role in DOD’s effort within the IA at integrating the shaping concept by incorporating it into their operational plans. Overall development of shaping as a functional capability of the IA is lacking, but critically important to national security strategy. The 2006 NSS calls for the national security institutions of the USG to be transformed to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The way ahead for this to take place must include “Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full

\textsuperscript{8} JP 5-0, IV-35. \\
\textsuperscript{9} JP 3-0, IV-27. \\
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, iv. \\
\textsuperscript{11} JP 5-0, IV-35.
range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.”

From the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), “We aim, by various means, to preclude the emergence of the gravest dangers. The Defense Department’s capabilities are only one component of a comprehensive national and international effort.”

The 2006 QDR notes a shift in emphasis “From Department of Defense solutions – to interagency approaches.”

The guidance from these national command authority level strategic documents reflects the desire of our national leaders to improve IA cooperation necessary to affect shaping activities by all of the national elements of power. Along with the NSS, NDS and QDR, guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the form of the National Military Strategy (NMS), Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) as well as the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) from OSD all make the argument that an IA approach to international challenges regarding national security objectives must be pursued.

The NSS direction for national security institutions to coordinate and integrate is a considerable challenge for all of the IA partners across the USG. For purposes of this thesis, the interagency is United States Government agencies and departments, including the DOD.

With the exception of the DOD, the remainder of the agencies within the IA community on whole lack guidance to contribute to planning efforts directly involved in

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12 NSS 2006, 45.
15 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol 1, (Washington DC, April 2004), GL-10.
shaping.\textsuperscript{16} Non-DOD agencies are also not compelled legislatively to participate in shaping planning activities. Finally, whereas the DOD is well versed internally in strategic planning processes through their Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and their Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP), for the most part other federal agencies are not. This is not to say that the DOD is the only agency within the IA that is sincere or diligent in its efforts to implement national command direction to integrate IA efforts to shape the international environment. Rather, it more represents the current stage of development of the shaping concept.

Overall USG international engagement planning has matured to the point that today GCCs work in coordination with the U.S. Department of State’s (DOS) representatives abroad and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to plan and execute military theater security cooperation (TSC) activities on a routine basis. The maturation toward today’s formal TSC plans (TSCP) took root and began to be formalized during the mid 1990’s. The DOD uses the TSCP process to frame operations with security cooperation as a basic component of shaping. The DOS Mission Performance Plan (MPP) is coordinated with DOD to accomplish TSC and security assistance. However, DOS, United States Agency of International Development (USAID), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), Commerce Department, et al… have no such process or doctrine in place that can be drawn on in their coordinating role for specifically working with DOD on planning for shaping operations. There is no

guidance, doctrine, legislation, etc… that instructs governmental agencies (other than DOD) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) how to work together, much less that directs cooperation, delineates task lead agencies, defines assessment criteria, prioritizes activities across the collective agencies, etc. USG “agencies carry out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated way, resulting in a patchwork of programs that can waste funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort.” More to the point, there is no coherent focused methodology or guidance for coordinating shaping efforts across the interagency spectrum.

Shaping is being used as a generic term associated with practically any activity currently being performed by GCC and Component staffs, with or without other intergovernmental organization (IGO), IA, or NGO involvement or coordination that enhances the phase zero operations of campaign planning. There is a seam between shaping operations as they pertain to GCC campaign phase zero planning and the execution of shaping activities across the IA. The seam exists because of a lack of policy guidance and authorities needed to implement shaping. The nebulous, all encompassing concept of shaping, in its current construct, lacks the benefit of any clear policy guidance, leaving strategic and operational planners within DOD only traditional TSCP processes for guidance and direction in writing phase zero of their campaign plans. In order for international shaping to develop to its fullest potential to meet national security strategic goals, it must be defined and scoped within DOD and it must be fully integrated within the IA.

CHAPTER ONE: SHAPING GUIDANCE

In order to begin to analyze the shaping concept, it is important to understand the national level guidance. While calling for shaping activities in broad, sweeping, generic terms, national level guidance further directs that the coordination and integration of this effort be developed across the IA. Guidance to incorporate shaping activities into security strategic policy and doctrine comes from several national strategy documents. The NDS, NMS and the QDR all provide guidance on shaping. However, shaping guidance comes at the highest level directly from the President in the form of the NSS. As it relates to the GCC, “Based on guidance and direction from the President and SecDef, CCDRs [Combatant Commanders] prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish assigned missions.”18 Combatant Commanders, working with the Joint Staff of CJCS, have taken on this guidance and articulated their interpretation of shaping activities into formal campaign planning doctrine.19

The NSS of 2006 describes the two pillars our national security strategy is founded upon. “The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies.”20 To promote freedom and democracy, we must shape the operational environment. The NSS further describes the essential task to “Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century…”21 Not only is the President stating

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18 JP 3-0, I-8.
19 Ibid, IV-27.
20 NSS 2006, introduction.
21 NSS 2006, 1.
that America needs to actively shape the global environment, but by calling for a transformation of the government institutions charged with protecting our national security interests, he is pointing out that the coordination of those agencies as they currently function is inadequate to the task. When properly integrated and coordinated, the IA community as a whole is envisioned as being tied to the development and implementation of U.S. international shaping and global influence policy.

The 2005 NDS provides four strategic objectives, 1) Secure the United States from direct attack; 2) Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; 3) Strengthen alliances and partnerships; and 4) Establish favorable security conditions. The NDS explains that the DOD will “help international and domestic partners increase their capabilities to contend with complex issues of common concern.”22 The NDS also explains, “Our activities range from training and humanitarian efforts to major combat operations. Non-military components of this campaign include diplomacy, strategic communications, law enforcement operations, and economic sanctions.” The NDS provides guidance for the military to improve upon its traditional mission capabilities and to expand their integration and coordination with “domestic partners”, specifically other governmental and non-governmental agencies.

The 2004 NMS repeats the theme of a need for IA coordination: “We must strengthen collaboration among our joint forces, agencies at all levels of government and multinational partners.”23 In relation to shaping, “The threat posed by adversaries, especially those that possess WMD/E [weapons of mass destruction/effect], is so great

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22 NDS 2005, 16.
that the United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise attack. Achieving this objective includes actions to shape the security environment in ways that enhance and expand multinational partnerships.”

Finally, we get further guidance on shaping from the 2006 QDR. In it, DOD is to “shape the choices of major and emerging powers.” With regard to IA coordination,

“Security cooperation and engagement activities including joint training exercises, senior staff talks, and officer and foreign internal defense training to increase understanding, strengthen allies and partners, and accurately communicate U.S. objectives and intent. This will require both new authorities and 21st century mechanisms for the interagency process.”

This guidance lays out the requirement for transformation outside strictly military lifelines, i.e., the need for new authorities and mechanisms to accomplish this vision.

Although the DOD cannot on its own compel either the new authorities or reform of the IA process as called for, the NDS is driving home the point that if we are to transform shaping as outlined in the NSS, these actions must take place.

These documents make clear the national leadership’s desire for the IA community to both actively shape the global environment to meet our strategic security needs, and to reform its own institutions, integration and conduct in order to more effectively do so. However, as described in a subsequent chapter, the vision for shaping is not clearly provided, because it is not defined or scoped in its range of potential activities. Without development of the guidance into coherent policy, even the most enthusiastic attempts at implementation will be hindered.

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24 Ibid, 2.
The issue is not the overarching guidance to pursue shaping activities; the issue is that those activities have not been defined other than to reference traditional theater security cooperation activity as a key element of shaping. The task to shape, influence or engage on its face sounds like common sense, and perhaps it is. However, unless there is a common understanding of what shaping is, how it is to be executed by each individual agency and who has responsibility and authority for what and how it will be resourced, we simply have an idea that none of the required agencies can effectively execute. The NDS, NMS and QDR are all DOD focused strategic documents. Similar strategic documentation at the USG level that can focus all of the agencies required to integrate and coordinate a national strategic shaping plan must be provided.

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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND – EVOLUTION OF SHAPING

Given the strategic guidance directing the pursuit of shaping activities as described above, a review of the evolution of the shaping concept will provide a contextual backdrop within which to better understand where the implementation of shaping is today. As explained in the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century report, “Shaping a peaceful international environment and deterring hostile military actors remain sound military goals.”28 This report speaks to the vision for military engagement efforts to help inform the military’s developing role for shaping operations.

Although engagement has been a part of GCCs responsibilities for nearly 60 years, it was during the mid-1990’s the concept began to take on its present character. President Clinton warned in his 1995 NSS titled, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”, that “in a more integrated and interdependent world, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests — political, military and economic — without active engagement in world affairs.”29 Emerging from the Cold War, the national leadership recognized the unique position the U.S. held on the global stage as the last remaining military superpower and the leader of the world economy, and as such had a genuine desire to capitalize on this opportunity by expanding our economic freedoms, enhancing our security and exporting democracy at every available occasion. The President was seeking a strategy that would allow for democracy to effect a positive

change on the global stage. The U.S. had defeated the Soviet Union and our civilian leadership and general populace wanted to find a way to begin to reap the peace benefit that many felt we had earned.

The 1995 NMS was “A Strategy of Flexibility and Engagement”. The NMS explained that “this new national military strategy calls for flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment.”30 The theme of engagement in the 1995 NSS was taken up strongly again later in the 1997 QDR: “A strategy of engagement presumes the United States will continue to exercise strong leadership in the international community, using all dimensions of its influence to shape the international security environment.”31

The 1995 NSS, 1995 NMS and the 1997 QDR all stressed the intentions of our national leadership to actively pursue international engagement as part of formal U.S. foreign policy. This guidance started the DOD on a path toward development of the necessary processes required to implement this directive. Toward that end, the CJCS formally directed Theater Engagement Planning in military doctrine in 1998.32 The theater engagement nomenclature was changed to theater cooperation early in President Bush’s first term in office.33 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith explained the change in emphasis from engagement to cooperation in the following way:

31 QDR, 1997 chapter III
32 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A; Theater Engagement Planning, (Washington DC, 24 May 2005).
“Secretary Rumsfeld has directed his combatant commanders and others in the Department to move beyond the relatively unfocused practice of “engagement” – which sometimes amounted to little more than “showing the flag” abroad – and toward a more specific and practical set of goals to lay the foundation for our partners working with us in defense endeavors in the future.”34

Along with overarching guidance provided for in the NSS, NDS, NMS and QDR, the DOD produces specific strategic guidance to provide for the integration of security cooperation activities into formal GCC planning processes. This guidance is in the form of Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). These classified documents provide the primary strategic references for preparation of TSCPs. “The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders on the strategic objectives and priorities for theater engagement activities, which are intended to shape the theater security environment in peacetime.”35 The JSCP identifies the types of plans the GCC must develop, the assumptions associated with the plans, the forces to be apportioned, budget requirements and the number of annexes required. The CPG and JSCP integrate higher-level guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense into a family of executable plans. The SCG provides GCCs with a prioritized cooperation foundation that informs their individual TSCPs such that they maximize potential for engagement efforts to achieve national strategic goals. The SCG evaluates the security environment on a global scale, breaks it down by region (corresponding to GCC areas of responsibility) and correlates that


35 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A; Joint Strategic Planning System, (Washington DC, 12 September 2003), C-1.
security challenge to national security objectives to provide GCCs with guidance on what activities they are to pursue.
CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND – INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION IN THE EVOLUTION OF SHAPING

As the concept of shaping was evolving within the DOD, a parallel effort to improve IA coordination overall was also underway in the USG. The emphasis of this section of the paper is to understand how the USG continues to struggle within its lifelines to develop a mechanism by which integration of IA activities is achieved. In the wake of governmental difficulties following peacekeeping and peace making operations variously in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, northern Iraq, etc… in the mid 1990’s, the DOD attempted to address the shortcomings of IA cooperation within their scope of responsibility with Joint Pub 3-08 (JP 3-08), Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. This document was first published in 1996, and was intended to provide military planners and leaders with a basic knowledge of the intergovernmental processes and functions, the role of the National Security Council (NSC) and how the military apparatus functioned within that network. The DOD joint manuals, however, failed to energize the system as intended, and as a result President Clinton enacted Presidential Decision Directive – 56 (PDD-56) in 1997. PDD-56 was focused on “Complex Contingency Operations” and attempted to address the lack of IA coordination and integration through Presidential mandate.

President G. W. Bush recognized the need to continue the effort to bring about order and accountability to the IA coordination process very early on in his administration. In February 2001, President Bush replaced PDD-56 with National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council System. This document did not change any procedural IA activities, and served primarily to
reinforce the roles of the individual Department Secretaries, the Principal’s Committee (PC) and the Deputies Committees (DC) as organized by the first President Bush.\(^{36}\) With the added sense of urgency brought on by September 11, 2001, and the need for all of the USG to coordinate and integrate on National Security, President Bush enacted the classified Homeland Security Presidential Directive-15/National Security Presidential Directive-46 (HSPD-15/NSPD-46). Associated with these directives critical to the U.S. national security, the President also issued the classified National Implementation Plan (NIP) to designate tasks and lead agencies throughout the government to provide accountability and oversight for the implementation of HSPD-15/NSPD-46. This effort has so far met with considerable delays in execution by the stove-piped organizations attending to it.\(^{37}\)

While the President was attempting to generate greater cooperation within the IA via Presidential Directives, the DOD was refining its doctrine on IA coordination as well. Today, the original 1996 Joint Pub 3-08 on Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations has expanded to become the two volume Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations. This joint pub provides the following for DOD planners:

“Volume I discusses the interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) environment and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense, and other US Government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes key US Government departments and


agencies, IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.”

The new JP 3-08 has expanded greatly the depth and breadth of knowledge available to DOD planners and leaders needed to function outside of the DOD internal infrastructure.

38 Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-08 Volume 1, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination*, (Washington DC, 17 March 2006), I.
CHAPTER FOUR: SHAPING, SECURITY COOPERATION AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

I have made the argument that higher authority guidance for shaping exists, but neither that guidance nor the definition of shaping from the joint doctrine is clearly understood. Shaping incorporates security cooperation, which has evolved from military engagement, and as such a more detailed discussion of what security cooperation and engagement are will assist us with our understanding of today’s shaping concept. Also, security assistance (SA) is a component of the overall USG foreign engagement construct tied closely to GCC efforts, and a review of that program will further inform an understanding of shaping. The JP 1-02 defines Security Cooperation as “All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”39 Security cooperation activities are orchestrated by the GCC in coordination with the JCS and the DOS country team. Whereas the GCC TSCP is designed within a regional area context (as bounded by the GCC area of responsibility), the DOS country input is made on a country-by-country basis. OSD provides the GCC regional security cooperation guidance within a prioritized, tiered structure via the classified SCG. Within this document, security cooperation activities are laid out in a matrix-style format, with clearly spelled out

39 JP 1-02, 478.
cooperation priorities for the GCCs to plan to such that national strategic endstates are pursued. Security Cooperation activities are grouped into six categories:

1. Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.
2. Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.
3. Multinational training.
4. Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.
5. Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.
6. Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

SA is distinct from security cooperation in terms of activities involved. Both achieve advancement of the U.S. strategic interests in a particular region through outreach and engagement, but because SA crosses over into military armament and advanced training it receives more legislative oversight. Security assistance is a “Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.”

There are twelve program components, seven of which are administered by DOD: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) Program, Leases, Foreign Military Construction Services, International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, Military Assistance Program (MAP), and

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40 JP 5-0, I-3
41 JP 1-02, 477.
drawdowns.42 From Foreign Internal Defense doctrine, in relation to security assistance, “The military will primarily provide equipment, training, and services to the supported HN forces.” Moreover:

In the SA arena, geographic combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs do not have authority over the SA program, but have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. Geographic combatant commanders are active in the SA process by advising ambassadors through the SAO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. In addition, through coordination with HN military forces and supporting SAOs, the combatant commander can assist in building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional FID programs.43

The fact that GCCs and subordinate JFCs do not have authority over the SA program, as outlined above, is important to the military leadership trying to ensure that SA activities are integrated into phase zero of their campaign plans. In the normal course of campaign planning, unity of command is assumed throughout all phases. Unity of command presumes that a single Commander has veto power over each aspect of the plan (less those aspects he chooses to delegate). Lack of a single entity empowered to make final decisions with regard to all matters of the plan can cause a breakdown in synergy and unity of effort. Prior to formalizing phase zero shaping into the operational phasing model, this was not as significant an issue. However, by making the GCC responsible for shaping as part of the new phasing model, the doctrine has placed the GCC in a position whereby he cannot authoritatively dictate a portion of shaping activities to ensure they meet his operational plan objectives (in the form of SA).

Resources allocated to DOS in support of SA are not insignificant, and even if DOS were willing to cede authority for planning of SA activities to DOD for purposes of unity of command, SA funds are not likely to be given up willingly by DOS to DOD for the conduct of SA shaping operations. This statement is made in the context of a non-conflict environment in the planning phases only. Obviously during wartime, the military has the authority to act in accordance with what it thinks are the best courses of action to achieve national security objectives. However, in peacetime, the coordination and integration amongst well-intentioned professionals still come down to a decision, and ultimately the decision gets made by the party authorized to make it. Therefore, DOS will have veto power over DOD in phase zero SA shaping activities. Under current legislative authorities, the military supports the SA portion of the phase zero shaping plan; they do not have lead. The DOS, normally via the Ambassador or senior DOS representative, has lead on what happens in their country.
CHAPTER FIVE: SHAPING TODAY

Shaping is an evolving concept, and the joint doctrine on shaping is still less than mature. Shaping appeared formally in joint military doctrine (JP 3-0) as a distinct phase of operational planning less than a year ago. JP 3-0 tells us that shaping includes “normal and routine activities” and “various interagency activities… performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends…” Further, these activities are “executed continuously… in support of defined military and national strategic objectives.” These activities are also “designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access.” Shape phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.44

The CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures defines shaping as “Joint Force, Interagency and Multinational operations – inclusive of normal and routine military activities – performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships

44 JP 3-0, V-35.
with friends and allies.”

Higher authority documentation in the form of the 2006 QDR outlines shaping activities as having a critical role in the future development of the U.S. military capabilities and force structure. “Shaping the choices of countries at Strategic Crossroads” is a component of operationalizing the strategy in the QDR. In terms of whom we are supposed to shape, the QDR tells us that, “Beyond Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America are in flux and represent new geo-strategic crossroads. The United States will seek to shape not only the choices of countries in those regions, but choices of countries outside them that have interests or ambitions within them.” Also, “…the choices of major and emerging powers, including India, Russia and China…” are going to influence the international security environment as well, and need to be considered in our shaping strategy. Although it is instructive to distinguish the target of our shaping activities, given such a broad area of opportunity to engage as the QDR describes above does little to assist resource planners in prioritizing their efforts.

We are given examples from various joint publications as to “considerations” for shaping, direction as to what to focus our shaping activities on (e.g., stability

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45 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 3122.01A; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, (Washington DC, 29 September 2006), B-6.
46 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC, 14 April 2006).
47 QDR, 2006, 19.
48 QDR, 2006, 28.
49 JP 3-0, V-3.
operations)\textsuperscript{50} and categories of shaping activities (e.g., Civil-Military Operations - CMO)\textsuperscript{51}. In spite of what JOPES vol I offers in terms of a definition, all of the available guidance ultimately fails to provide a working definition of what shaping itself actually is. For example, there are no given restrictions on shaping operations as they relate to kinetic and non-kinetic options. Shaping operations are occurring during all of the six phases of the operational plan simultaneously, never beginning or ending. Descriptions of shaping in such general terms as are available in the JP 3-0 and JP 5-0,\textsuperscript{52} stand in contrast to its introduction as a distinct phase of campaign planning. The joint publications effectively talk around shaping and give reference as to the character of it, but they never truly pinpoint what it is. Furthering the complexity of writing shaping into GCC operational plans is that we are directed to plan for both global and theater shaping.\textsuperscript{53} The GCCs have mechanisms in place to link their engagement efforts across the seams of their areas of responsibilities, yet a similar effort to address the seams associated with the DOS’ geographic areas of responsibility, other IGO, NGO and

\textsuperscript{50} JP 3-0, V-4
\textsuperscript{52} The latest version of JP 5-0 is dated 26 December 2006, and pg. IV-35 in that document uses the exact same verbiage for shaping operations as does the JP 3-0 cited above in note 28.
\textsuperscript{53} CJCSM 3113.01A (page GL-7) is the only publication that defines shaping, and as such defines it as “Actions in which the US Armed Forces help influence the international environment, primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement.” Use of terminology such as help influence and deterrent qualities do not provide planners with substantive doctrine with which to write phase zero shaping activities. Also, the definition references peacetime military engagement – the “engagement” term was removed from the Security Cooperation Guidance in 2002, indicating the CJCSM publication is not updated.
multinational organizational spheres of influence in order to create a coherent USG plan and unity of effort does not exist.  

The JP 3-0 tells us that “GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. SCPs provide frameworks within which combatant commands engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.” However, “By design, operation plans generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed elsewhere. CCDRs generally use the phasing model in Figure IV-7 to link the pertinent SCP and operation plan operations and activities.” Further, “Planning that supports most shaping requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security cooperation, and combatant commands may incorporate phase zero activities and tasks into the SCP.”

The guidance in the joint doctrine serves to muddle the distinction between security cooperation and shaping activities. The first quote above tells us that “GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation”, and the second quote tells us that OPLANS, “by design”, do not generally include security cooperation activities. If shaping is a mechanism by which GCC’s shape their environment, then either it should

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54 Note that DOS does not have regional engagement plans that correspond to the GCC AORs. For a comprehensive review of this issue see A Common Interagency Regional Framework paper by Maj. Matthew Puglisi, Maj. Jason Hanover, Lt. Col. Phil Purcell and Dr. Kathleen List, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Class 7-01, November 2006.
55 JP 3-0, VII-1.
56 Ibid, VI-27.
57 JP 5-0, VI-35
be a part of the formal campaign (i.e., phase zero), or it should not. The guidance given within the context of the joint doctrine, to say the least, is confusing.

The GCCs have been incorporating Security Cooperation\textsuperscript{58} and Security Assistance (SA) activities as part of their formal planning efforts since 1998. If the intent of the new campaign planning construct is to alter that effort such that shaping activities are to be somehow different, more, enhanced, etc… than what they have been doing, the GCCs need to understand how that is to be executed. In lieu of failure to doctrinally differentiate shaping from security cooperation, SA, and similar engagement type of activities through clear policy direction, more security cooperation and more SA is all that will result. If more security cooperation and more SA are not what the authors of the new campaign model construct expect or desire, they must use specific terminology that is doctrinally defined to delineate what exactly they expect shaping to accomplish. If the intent was simply to try to put the need for greater IA, IGO and NGO integration and coordination into a formal doctrine publication, I would argue that writing that policy into the doctrine of the one agency (DOD) that currently has that need already identified throughout its joint doctrine will not suffice in getting the rest of IA, IGO and NGO community to the planning chalkboard.

In a recent article published in *Joint Force Quarterly* entitled “New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign”, USEUCOM outlined their plan for conducting phase zero operations in which they focus on “operationalizing TSC”. They describe phase zero shaping as follows: “Its ultimate goal is to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and

\textsuperscript{58} For clarification, I have not used the “SC” abbreviation for security cooperation, because the common abbreviation for Strategic Communication is “SC”. 
prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.” Further, “All Phase Zero efforts are coordinated and executed in accordance with theater strategic plans.” USEUCOM explains that they take a preventative approach to security in their AOR, and have “coordinated previously disparate TSC activities with information operations (IO) and other more traditional military operations into a seamless, effects-based program of operationalized TSC.” Although USEUCOM’s concept of operations for integrating phase zero operations in their AOR is exactly what the joint doctrine advocates, they do not describe any activities that would not normally fall under the umbrella of their TSCP. In fact, “U.S. European Command executes Phase Zero by conducting operationalized TSC throughout its area of responsibility.” USEUCOM appears not to differentiate between shaping and TSC, supporting my argument that the joint doctrine and higher authority guidance falls short of articulating that course of action. I am not suggesting that their efforts do not contribute to the overall advancement of the evolution of the shaping concept. Specifically, their dedicated effort at integrating security cooperation into their strategic plans and increasing IA involvement is exactly what the new doctrine envisions. Rather, I am suggesting they are simply doing more of traditional security cooperation, because that is all the new doctrine tells them to do. The doctrine attempts to set phase zero shaping apart as a distinct category of activities in lieu of incorporating it into the operational plan phasing construct. However, short of doctrine that delineates these distinct shaping operations, more TSC is what will ensue.

One conclusion that can be drawn in lieu of the confusing guidance in the joint doctrine is that because the current NSS, NDS, QDR and NMS documents all provide guidance for USG agencies to shape the international environment, the DOD has endeavored to take the lead in the effort and is the first to attempt to formalize shaping activities into their planning processes. This is understandable if looked at from the point of view that the DOD is the best resourced department in the USG, has the most developed formalized planning processes in place and also has extensive troops deployed throughout the world whose presence, access and influence could naturally be tapped into for this type of activity. Having DOD planners building phase zero shaping activities into their operational plans makes absolute sense. However, whatever shaping is supposed to be on the strategic level has not manifested itself into policy by our strategic leaders, nor is it doctrinally defined or universally understood by the DOD planners tasked with implementing it into the GCC operational plans.
CHAPTER SIX: STRATEGY OF SHAPING

Clausewitz warned that, “no one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it”.\(^{60}\) The ravages of armed conflict can be devastating to the loser, and the victor is often not much better off when all is said and done. Since World War II, the global community of free nations has sought to empower coalitions and intergovernmental agencies such as the U.N. and NATO to prevent aggressive nations from pursuing armed conflict for any number of reasons - religious, resources, land, tribal reasons, etc. It would seem Clausewitz’s warning has been heard and responsible governments across the globe are endeavoring to diminish the likelihood of war wherever they can. In particular, since the end of the Cold War there has been a concerted effort by the USG to look outside of its domestic national lifelines to secure our national interests via global engagement at all levels – this is where shaping emerges.

The USAID’s strategic approach to its global mission is expressed such that, “Throughout the world, the public face of the United States generates strong opinions, positive and negative. These public attitudes directly affect our ability to achieve our foreign policy and development assistance objectives. The Department leads the effort to shape these U.S. perceptions by relating this public face to our values as a nation and our history as a people.”\(^{61}\) International threats to the global community obviously affect not

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just the U.S., but individual countries and regions spanning the globe. Events including militant nationalistic aggression, terrorism, narcotrafficking, warlord/tribal cross-border fighting, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), famine, refugee migration, natural disasters and ethnic cleansing occur daily throughout the world, and the U.S. actively seeks to partner with other nations to address these matters. Phase zero shaping inclusion in the GCC planning construct is a response on the part of military leadership to contribute to that effort and to address a changing international environment.

A diplomacy-first approach to international engagement in implementing the U.S. national security policy is certainly not new. From the Monroe Doctrine that warned aggressors to stay out of our back yard, and the U.S. will stay out of theirs to President Wilson’s Good Neighbor policy, the U.S. has a long track record that shows its druthers to use words before bullets in dealing with foreign affairs. We have seen President George W. Bush stand for both aggressive, kinetic behavior and then later move to more diplomatic efforts in his policies during his two terms in office. Immediately following 9/11, President Bush’s policy reflected the nation’s mood for action in that it was an aggressive, preemptive policy that led directly to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Today’s strategy is a more diplomatically tuned approach as espoused in the 2006 NSS and 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. In these, we can follow the President’s policy as it begins to emphasize development, influence and diplomacy rather than the harsher “either you’re with us, or against us” earlier rhetoric hot on the heels of 9/11. The use of military power as a mechanism for enacting a nation’s political will is still obviously a valid tool in the
national security strategy implementation toolbox, but the U.S. national security
imperatives currently outlined by the President and his NSC delineate a policy of pursuit
of diplomacy first as the tool of choice in settling international disputes.62

Although the President’s guidance on national security strategy softened in tone
somewhat in the years immediately following military action in OEF and OIF, he was
perfectly clear terrorists and those who support their efforts would continue to be hunted
by the U.S. In the 2006 QDR, shaping took on a role of critical importance as one of the
four primary focus areas for DOD civilian and military officials to address in
operationalizing the national security strategy.63 Whereas it is the primary role of DOD
to build the military instrument of national power, the QDR emphasizes the military’s
capabilities and capacity in performing shaping operations as well. Instead of having
forces around the globe standing by to be called upon in response to crises, the force will
be transformed and organized in such a way they will shape the international
environment. As an example of this effort to operationalize the strategy, DOD has taken
a hard look at its forward basing footprint and concluded, “We also have been adjusting
the U.S. global military force posture, making long overdue adjustments to U.S. basing
by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing
emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe.”64

The diagram below from the QDR shows the significance of shaping operations
to the overall DOD transformational plan.65

62 NSS 2006, 23.
63 QDR, 2006, 3.
64 Ibid, v.
65 Ibid, 19.
Figure 1. FOCUS AREAS OF THE 2006 QDR

For countries at strategic crossroads:

“The choices that major and emerging powers make will affect the future strategic position and freedom of action of the United States, its allies and partners. The United States will attempt to shape these choices in ways that foster cooperation and mutual security interests. At the same time, the United States, its allies and partners must also hedge against the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future.”66

It was mentioned previously that GCCs help shape their geographic areas of responsibility through the physical presence and access their troops exercise, and by employing forces to actively seek out engagement and interaction with host nation uniformed personnel. The physical presence of U.S. military personnel and their high-tech, high-dollar equipment (and accompanied by a show of force or other displays of U.S. military might where appropriate) facilitate getting the deterrence message out to whomever our leadership determines might need influencing.

66 Ibid, 28.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CAMPAIGN PHASING MODEL

DOD military leadership acted on the guidance to shape by including it as one of the six phases of the campaign phasing, thereby making it an integral part of overall military planning doctrine. A review of the planning process and the phasing model are therefore important to understand how the GCC is operationalizing the shaping concept. The military planning process is described within the construct of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Two products of the JSPS guidance in particular, the NMS and the JSCP, provide strategic guidance and direction for the GCCs in the development of their campaign and operational plans.67 A campaign is a series of related operations designed to work in concert toward a common military objective. The campaign is broken down into distinct phases, all of which are integrated, synchronized and coordinated for maximum effect. Once military planners are directed to initiate a plan for any given contingency or crisis, the first steps in the evolution are to define the mission via a mission statement. The mission statement is “…a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.”68 Once provided with the mission statement, the next step is then to formulate a Commander’s Intent in order to outline what it is the plan is to achieve and the endstate or objective(s). Following these two initial steps, the planner begins to work on the concept of operations (CONOPS) as a way forward for the Commander to proceed in integrating the efforts of his forces.

Inherent in the structure of the CONOPS is the campaign phasing model. There are six phases to a campaign 1) phase zero, shaping; 2) phase 1, deterrence; 3) phase 2, 67 JP 5-0, I-2.
68 JP 3-0, IV-24
seize the initiative; 4) phase 3, dominate; 5) phase 4, stabilize; and 6) phase 5, enable civil authority followed immediately in sequence by the return to phase zero shaping operations. This is an oversimplified description of the process that leads to operational plan development, but serves the purpose of giving a general overview of the design.

The phasing model, as it appears below, is instructive only in so far as it must be viewed in conjunction with the “Notional Operational Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort” model in the discussion to follow.

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Before getting too far into the operational plan specifically, the military planning process itself needs a general explanation. The U.S. military JSPS process continues to be honed and updated to accommodate changing technologies, challenges, environments and methods of warfare. Whereas there is no golden template for creating and producing military plans because every set of environmental, threat, political situations, and endstate considerations, etc. are different, there are processes in place that guide planners and Commanders through the various planning considerations, concept developments and objectives. From a macroscopic view, the guidance tells us that “Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning,
Joint operation planning in turn is “…the overarching process that guides joint force commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises.”

Examining the construct below the macro level of military planning development, and particularly when it comes to understanding how the military intends to conduct operations in accordance with any given operational plan, one must have a basic understanding of the key elements of the overall campaign planning phasing procedure. Within the joint operation planning subset of military planning doctrine, we find the campaign phasing model described. There are 17 elements of operational design to consider in the planning process according to the doctrine. Phasing is a key aspect of the arranging operations element of operational design. Arranging operations is intended to do just what the name implies – arrange. This would include aspects of planning associated with timing and sequencing operations to successfully complete the mission. Doctrinally, we are given:

“Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, Service-unique deployment capabilities, diplomatic agreements, changes in command structure, protection, level and type of other governmental agency (OGA) and NGO participation, distribution and sustainment capabilities, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion.”

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69 Ibid, IV-1.
70 JP 5-0, I-4.
71 JP 3-0, IV-19.
The JP 5-0 tells us further that a phase is a “… definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.”

The purpose of the phasing model is that it “assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.” The phasing model below, as shown in JP 3-0, depicts shaping activities as an ongoing effort throughout the campaign plan phase continuum, occurring during all of the six phases of the operational plan simultaneously, never achieving a beginning or termination state.

Figure 3. NOTIONAL OPERATIONAL PLAN PHASES

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72 JP 5-0, IV-33.
73 JP 3-0, xxi.
However, the joint doctrine explains that the JFC “determines the number and actual phases used during a joint campaign or operation….” 74 What this allows for then, is that when “Working within the campaign phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely)…” 75 Further, “Phases are designed and protracted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase.”76 Although it may not be mandatory for every operational plan to include all six phases, the doctrine does direct that all Commanders “…are expected to demonstrate consideration of all phases during their planning.”77 In other words, all phases must be initially planned for and subsequently ruled out as deemed appropriate by the Commander. No matter the scope of the operation or campaign, phase zero operations are required to be planned for.

The phasing diagram above depicts the OPLAN activation as actually starting at phase one, distinctive in that it occurs at OPLAN phase zero shaping termination. OPLAN phase zero shaping then resumes after phase five, enable civil authority, at the termination of the OPLAN. What the diagram infers is that there are categories of shaping. In fact, in infers there are three types or categories of shaping – OPLAN, theater and global. The theater and global shaping activities are continuous throughout the campaign and are not interrupted upon OPLAN execution. On the other hand, the OPLAN shaping activities terminate upon OPLAN activation and resume upon OPLAN termination. This nuance is not explained in the verbiage of the joint doctrine. In fact,

75 Ibid, IV-25.
76 Ibid, IV-25.
“The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven.”78 That concept is easy enough to understand, but the doctrine here is contradictory. By effectively surrounding the other phases of the OPLAN with phase zero shaping, the assertion that shaping is a continuous, day-in, day-out activity is reinforced. However, phase zero is doctrinally part of the OPLAN phase construct, yet it resides outside of the OPLAN once the OPLAN is activated. If we are told how theater, global and phase zero shaping are doctrinally different, perhaps we could adequately plan for the division of shaping activities such that once an OPLAN is activated, only those shaping activities considered theater and global in nature would continue and those associated strictly with the OPLAN would cease.

It is not clear whether the authors intended for phase zero to be part of a larger campaign plan, and at the same time distinct from the OPLAN. That may explain some of the confusion, but to say that shaping is a part of the operational plan phasing construct – but not part of the operational plan is a difficult concept to get one’s arms around. Remember the earlier discussion that “By design, operation plans generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed elsewhere. CCDRs generally use the phasing model in Figure IV-7 to link the pertinent SCP and operation plan operations and activities.”79 This leaves us with the summation that security cooperation plans do not normally reside in the OPLAN, and phase zero shaping does not reside in

78 JP 3-0, IV-26.
79 Ibid, IV-27.
the OPLAN, but theater and global shaping do. Doctrinally, this represents considerable challenges for the planner writing an operational plan.
The joint publications tell us that the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) makes up a large portion of phase zero operations. I have already put forth the argument that doctrinally, phase zero shaping is really not distinguished from security cooperation/security assistance. Therefore, for the purposes of discussion, I will describe the security cooperation planning process in order to provide a reference point from which to understand the shaping planning process. Within the DOD, the TSCP process is formalized in doctrine such that the GCC activities are linked to national security objectives. The JSPS provides two primary documents for TSCP development, the SCG (from the SecDef) and the JSCP (from the CJCS). The TSCPs outline the U.S. military foreign engagement activities intended to promote shaping of the international security environment. Providing inputs to the GCC’s overall TSCP are the Service Chiefs, Service Components and combat support agencies. Service Components, supporting commands and other DOD agencies each in turn produce their own SCPs in support of the GCC’s plan. After receiving initial guidance from the SCG and JSCP, the GCCs develop a comprehensive overall strategic plan for their AOR, taking into account theater, regional and country specific objectives. From this strategic concept document, the specific security cooperation activity annex with forces and resources identified are then produced. This TSCP is reviewed by OSD (P), the CJCS and supporting GCCs and

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80 Ibid, I-6.
81 JP 3-07.1, III-5.
82 CJCSI 3100.01A, C-1.
then funneled ultimately into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) as part of the PPBE process for funding.\textsuperscript{83}

Resident within the GCC staff is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG is made up of civilian and military organizational experts from across the USG. One of the functions of the JIACG is to provide timely and collaborative operational inputs to the TSCP.\textsuperscript{84} Theoretically, the JIACG represents the operational level equivalent of interagency cooperation efforts that are supposed to be ongoing strategically within the National Security Council. Unfortunately, the challenges in successfully integrating and coordinating IA efforts within the JIACG at the GCC level have proven to be as difficult as the challenges found at the NSC level in terms of their success (or lack thereof) at integrating and coordinating national level security strategy implementation.

The JSPS does not allow for the allocation of forces to the GCC to execute their shaping activities. In practice, the GCCs use whatever forces are available to them via rotationally deployed units, units assigned to their AOR and via the Request for Forces (RFF) process in order to execute their engagement or shaping activities. The TSCPs are designed to reflect the GCCs strategic vision for his AOR. Just as important to the shaping effort as the GCCs vision though, is the vision of the senior DOS representative to the particular country - typically the Ambassador or Chief of Mission. As the direct representative of the President of the United States, the Ambassador or Chief of Mission of a particular country is overall responsible for the U.S. activity in his country. TSCP/shaping activities of the GCC are coordinated through the embassy staff. I have

\textsuperscript{83} CJCSM 3113.01A, A-2.
\textsuperscript{84} JP 3-08 Vol 1, xi.
mentioned previously some of the challenges associated with prioritization of engagement activities when the GCC and Ambassador do not see eye to eye. In circumstances where disagreements as to how to proceed are encountered in peacetime, the DOS has veto power. In theory the JSCP and SCG documents are reviewed by the appropriate IA organizations (to include DOS) prior to being published. However, in the political environment of the U.S., political parties in power, and therefore by default their appointed staff, rotate as often as the every two-year Congressional election cycle. In this environment, priorities and attention to detail shown to engagement activities by IA organizations fluctuate on a sliding scale of little to much. On a cautionary note, true IA planning integration and coordination could result in the paralysis of planning work on phase zero operations as they find the revolving IA leadership personnel personalities, priorities and national strategic vision interpretation indecisive or worse, impeding. Unless there is a forcing function at the National Security Council (NSC) level that is authorized to mandate integration and cooperation on a governmental-wide international shaping plan, with tightly controlled timetables and legislatively obligated deliverables, integration and coordination will continue to be a pick-up game with no consequences to the IA leadership for failure. Unity of effort must be forthcoming from all of the organizations and agencies tasked by the President to integrate and coordinate on shaping.

Whereas the JSCP provides prioritized engagement objectives to the GCC, what it does not do is prioritize between the different GCC regions or objectives within them. In theory, individual GCC TSCPs are supposed to be integrated into a Global Family of
In practice, the prioritization really is a concerted de-confliction of activities that strives to give each GCC a fair share of engagement activity resources. There is a general reluctance to tell the 4-star GCCs that their TSCP priorities do not meet muster. However, the reality is that scarcity of resources for engagement activities and readiness requirements within the current GWOT environment cause many requested engagement activities to be left unsupported.

The lack of prioritization between regional AORs and objectives within them allows for flexibility, but does create conflicts for resources. The OSD and CJCS mandate that the GCCs must coordinate the security cooperation and SA activities within their AORs on a detailed line-item basis within the TSCP. Each activity of the Service, GCC Service Component or other DOD agency is also planned for on a line-item level of detail in their individual SCP. I point this out only to stress that the GCCs are very much down into the details of the engagement planning at the operational level. Strategic oversight and consideration provided by OSD is not commensurately provided, and the global family of plans is not as well maintained. Exacerbating the strategic oversight issue is the lack of IA, OGA and IGO coordination.

The Joint staff, Services, Service Components and other DOD agencies plan security cooperation and assistance activities on a calendar planning cycle. In planning their TSCPs, the GCCs provide for a seven year outlook, although contingency and crisis action planning may warrant revisit times with more frequency. The overall GCC strategic plans are required to be updated on a two year planning cycle for CJCS review. The TSCP annex activities portions must be updated annually to ensure that the

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85 CJCSM 3113.01A, B-4.
engagement activity meets the intent of the SCG and JSCP. Coordination gets difficult in this planning cycle for a number of reasons. GCCs have limited control over certain key shaping instruments, for example, those controlled by other agencies such as the SA program under the authority of the DOS which is based on an annual budget cycle that is closely controlled by Congress. Specifically in regard to SA, because SA deals with foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), IMET, etc., the program offers the potential for large profits for private industry and is therefore politically sensitive. In FY 2004, 87% or $3.7 billion of military aid financing was used for procurement of U.S. military equipment and training. In FY 2005, SA spending topped $15 billion dollars. This program is not likely to be moved under authority of the DOD.

Another challenge with planning for shaping operations is risk assessment. Whereas risk assessment is built into the operational plan phasing model and therefore is inherent in campaign planning and OPLAN development, the process has not yet been developed for shaping, per se, because the process was not in place for security cooperation assessment. A major contributing factor to that problem is the lack of a common understanding by all IA, IGO and NGO agencies as to what shaping actually is. Without a common definition of shaping, there can be no detailed examination of its efficacy and/or success. Clearly, the attempt to tie GCC shaping activities to national

strategic objectives is there, but there is no mechanism to measure whether those activities in fact do support the shaping strategy. There are no measures of performance or measures of effect that tell GCCs how to adapt, change, alter, etc… their shaping strategies to become more effective. In fact, the only measure of whether or not the shaping activities are effective, in accordance with the doctrine, is whether or not the GCC has to actually activate his OPLAN. Phase zero shaping efforts are continuous up until the point of OPLAN activation. A failed shaping program therefore is indicated by increased deterrence and preparation for kinetic military operations. This also bleeds over into the problem of prioritizing resource/force allocation to shaping activities. Without a means to measure the effectiveness of one shaping activity or plan as compared to another, ensuring the most effective and efficient use of limited resources cannot be achieved.

Another challenge in implementing phase zero shaping is identifying who exactly is qualified to conduct shaping operations. Assuming again that the authors of the joint doctrine that have identified phase zero shaping activities as distinct and separate from security cooperation and SA intend for shaping to be something more than security cooperation and SA, the program must in some way prepare the troops intended to execute this mission with appropriate training to do so. If the OSD is serious about shaping the international environment, they need to significantly improve the Foreign Area Officer program, increase cultural and language skills and markedly improve leadership training and sensitivity to foreign area operations. Shaping activities have not been clearly defined, and therefore the standards by which to train and equip Sailors, Marines and Soldiers for that task have not yet been established. Training, equipping and
manning are Service functions, and the Services have not yet been availed the time, planning guidance or regional prioritization for how to train and equip these world shapers.

Shaping activities do have a common sense to them that lends itself to understanding that something good should come from almost any peaceful engagement opportunity our military troops pursue. Service Components are often forward based “in country”, and therefore they routinely conduct engagement activities catch-as-catch-can with host nation militaries. These ad hoc engagement activities are coordinated neither with the GCC nor the Embassy. These activities are often a product of the personal ties that military leaders resident forward within the region foster with their host nation counterparts. They are usually small in scale, but are often important as a show of goodwill and camaraderie with host nation troops. They also go a long way in the overall effect of positively influencing these foreign governments through their military components. This type of small scale, target of opportunity shaping activity should be encouraged. However, shaping in the larger sense as part of the overall GCC / IA strategic vision for an AOR must be developed with considerably more rigor and cross USG, NGO and IGO coordination in order to meet national security strategic objectives.

The application of the shaping paradigm to the entire USG, as the national security guidance directs, requires a precise definition of shaping. Defined too broadly, shaping becomes indistinguishable from DOS foreign policy implementation – otherwise known as diplomacy. As it relates strictly to the military instrument of national security policy implementation, it necessarily needs to be scoped to the point where measurable operational level objectives are clearly articulated by the GCCs. If shaping is going to be
incorporated into the GCC theater operational strategic planning construct, it needs to be
treated like all other operational planning phases in that it must be defined, a mission
statement must be articulated, the Commander’s intent must be published with risk-
assessed objectives and endstates expressed, and a CONOPS developed that is
measurable and attainable. The current TSCP process provides a relatively focused and
disciplined construct from which to begin this process, but the challenge of synchronizing
and prioritizing activities both within DOD and with the IA, OGA and IGA communities
must be overcome in order to implement any successful shaping program.
CHAPTER NINE: RESOURCING SHAPING ACTIVITIES

Efficiently and effectively acquiring and allocating resources necessary to execute shaping efforts represents significant challenges not just to DOD, but since the national strategic guidance tells us that shaping is an IA effort - to the USG as a whole. The resources needed to support shaping will come primarily from the DOD, DOS and USAID. The USG as a whole is impacted in its ability to shape and influence the international community by several factors, including the previously discussed lack of intra-USG coordination, aversion to uniformed U.S. military personnel in certain countries and regions, competition from governments of other nations as they pursue their own international shaping efforts and planning process disconnects within DOD itself. This short list of challenges is by no means exclusive, but it does represent a fair sample of some of the challenges of resourcing shaping activities.

When it comes to raw resources – people and dollars, no other USG agency or department can compete with the DOD. DOD, DOS and USAID are the primary agencies involved with shaping programs, with USAID managing the bulk of bilateral assistance and development programs.89 Since the missions of DOD, DOS and USAID are very different, making a body-for-body or dollar-for-dollar comparison of these organizations is helpful only in that they share a common responsibility to shape the international environment, and the ability to perform that function is related to overall resources available. The DOD budget for FY 2006 was $441 billion90, the DOS budget

89 Ibid, CRS-4.
90 Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, (Washington DC, April 2005), available from
was $10.2 billion\textsuperscript{91} and the USAID budget was $9.1 billion.\textsuperscript{92} The DOD musters roughly 2.9 million people active, guard, reserve, civilian and mobilized\textsuperscript{93}, the DOS has a fulltime payroll muster of 28,294 personnel\textsuperscript{94} and the USAID has a total of 8,214 full time personnel.\textsuperscript{95} I have already made the argument that the military has a historic and justified role in international shaping, and the sheer numbers tend to support the natural application of troops to such a mission. However, there must be a cautionary caveat expressed as to the use of the military in this way. U.S. uniformed military presence is not always acceptable to nations that wish to engage with the U.S., but do not want that engagement to be known to their populace. It is difficult for U.S. uniformed personnel to keep a low profile in most countries. The same is not necessarily true for DOS and USAID personnel. Their presence is often less obtrusive and threatening as compared to uniformed U.S. military personnel. Whether the tacit understanding that develops with these foreign governments is formalized into bilateral or multilateral agreements is not


the issue so much as is the desire of the host nation to keep their involvement with the U.S. below the domestic (and often regional) radar.

This is the case with most countries in the Middle East. Although these governments may be sympathetic to our policies, due to domestic and regional politics they are unable to express that sympathy. Saudi Arabia’s decision to remove U.S. troops after years of hosting them prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example of the political stress the Kingdom faces by supporting the U.S. objectives in the region. In the current GWOT environment, many other Muslim nations are in a similar predicament. The ruling entities in these regions are no different than those in most of the rest of the world in that self preservation is a paramount entering argument when it comes to determining their own foreign policies. Therefore, although the U.S. military presence abroad is significant, the actual amount of shaping success our military can attain is often limited depending on the political, religious and social climate.

Many of the nations we wish to shape, influence and engage with have limited resources and capacity with which to cooperate in engagement activities with us. We are only one of potentially dozens of other countries that also have their own engagement activity programs to execute, and many nations are overwhelmed with requests for access and cooperation. A lack of cohesiveness within the U.S. effort as a whole minimizes the effect on host nations and fragments our own resources. Unity of effort amongst USG IA, OGA and NGO communities would go a long way in preserving scarce resources and present a unified view of what the U.S. government is attempting to accomplish within each country engaged. We are often perceived as disjointed in our approach by foreign militaries. A good example of this is found in how we legislatively separate security
assistance and security cooperation. I am not arguing that we should discontinue this practice; however, what many countries want are our military hardware, technology and training, and not so much our other engagement activities. Even though the DOD administers the SA program through its Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the SA program falls within the DOS governance. Contrasted with no similar restrictions to promoting arms sales to foreign militaries by the French, British, Italian, Chinese, German, etc… militaries, and we often confound and confuse foreign military authorities that see the GCC and Component inability to perform that function as a slight and a reluctance to integrate with their forces.

In terms of IA and multinational coalition coordination and integration in shaping the international environment, the truth is that planning documents used by the DOD show no expectation of reliance on anything other than DOD resourcing options. Practically speaking, neither the potential contributions of other USG agencies, NGOs or IGOs of allies are currently considered in calculating resource requirements to meet national security challenges. The process simply does not exist to incorporate resourcing options for shaping operations in DOD plans by non-DOD entities. I believe the QDR is the correct document within which to spell out specifically the potential impact of IA and coalition cooperation to force resource requirements. Although the QDR does mention the need for much improved integration and cooperation with IA and coalition partners, it falls short of unambiguously citing the resourcing impact and potential savings in duplicative effort reduction to the DOD (and USG) if these other entities contribute necessary resources (not to mention unity of effort). Writing coalition contributions into U.S. military operational campaign plans built for contingency planning purposes may be
considered too risky, but USG OGAs and the IA organizations that we know are needed to participate in campaign or major combat operations as laid out in the operational planning phasing model are fair game for such expectations.

The figure below illustrates that military assistance, as a percentage of USG aid obligations overall, has steadily declined on average over the 15 year period from FY1990 to FY2004.  

![Source: USAID and CRS calculations](image)

Figure 4. U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDING FY 1990 - FY 2004

Another trend of note, albeit over a shorter timeframe, is that the DOS budget for the administration of foreign affairs has risen from $4,039,981 in FY 2000 to $7,984,648

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in FY 2006, an increase of nearly 51% in the overall budget.\textsuperscript{97} Much of that increase is due to increased spending associated with OEF and OIF, but the trend is encouraging in that the perception is that the U.S. is placing more emphasis on a non-threatening, diminishing uniformed military face on foreign engagement.

As shaping has evolved from security cooperation, shaping inherits the challenges associated with the security cooperation funding process. A RAND corporation study reports that within the JSPS itself, the TSCP process is aligned differently than are operational plans as they are injected into the PPBE (Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution) and POM process. The study suggests that this results in the TSCPs receiving slightly less attention and exposure than operational plans. Prioritization and resourcing decisions at OSD for engagement activities by default, therefore, take on a role of secondary importance due to a general lack of exposure and prioritization. Exacerbating this problem is that there is no resource allocation guidance within the CPG, SCG or JSCP documents for SCPs. Lack of attention and oversight from OSD and CJCS for engagement activities in the budgeting and resourcing arenas lead to shortcomings in force structure and capability assessments for future force manning considerations, and immediate shortfalls in available troops and resources to meet GCC assessed requirements.\textsuperscript{98}

The GCCs have made a concerted effort to capture the engagement activities occurring in their AORs. Recognizing that resources are scarce and that U.S.


engagement activities are in fact not coordinated across the USG, they have directed that
service component security cooperation activities be captured in the GCC Theater
Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) database. This
detailed database is designed to capture each individual engagement event, catalogue that
event by category, document the funding required, capture the training to be
accomplished, etc. In short, it is designed to be a master database in which all aspects of
engagement activities are recorded. Further, service component commands are to use
the TSCMIS database to update the progress of the planned engagement as it occurs
during the year, and to program in their intended engagement activities for the coming
fiscal year based on their own GCC approved TSCP. The TSCMIS data collection is an
effort for the GCCs to show how much security cooperation activities are being done and
the need for more, and for the services to show that although they are providing
considerable resources already for its execution, more resources are needed in their
coffers as well.99 Perhaps in the future, this tool may be expanded such that it is used in
determining measures of effect rather than just ticking off numbers of events.

As a specific example of where TSCP (and therefore shaping) is not tied neatly
into the PPBE resourcing process is within the context of the GWOT CONPLAN. U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is charged with developing the overarching plan
to synchronize military efforts in the GWOT campaign. Each individual GCC and
service component is tasked with developing their individual GWOT plan using
SOCOM’s plan as its base plan for guidance. These sub plans to SOCOM’s GWOT plan

99 Robert M. Murphy and Kathleen M. Murphy, “Managing Theater Engagement
Planning”, Military Review Magazine, (September-October 2002), 55, available from
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are called Regional War on Terror (RWOT) plans. Phase zero operations are included in the RWOT plans; however, they are not linked to the TSCPs. As has been discussed, the TSCPs fall under the doctrinal guidance of the OSD SCG. RWOT plans are resourced via CJCS’ SOCOM operational plan which is directed in the JSCP, and subsequently in the joint operations planning and execution system (JOPES) that gives us the operational phasing model construct. The distinction is important because it leads to disconnects in the phase zero planning construct between OSD’s SCG (and therefore TSCP) and CJCS’ RWOT. In effect, the phase zero and RWOT campaign plan shaping skip a doctrinal beat as a result. TSCPs then compete with RWOT phase zero shaping for funding and resources.

Resourcing the service component commands for engagement activities is of paramount importance. The fact is they perform the overwhelming majority of security cooperation activities abroad. Even though they report directly to the GCCs and their TSCPs are fashioned to support the overarching GCC TSCP, they actually execute most of the engagement activities within the GCC AOR. One interesting note is that because the service components resource the assets to accomplish a majority of the engagement activities within the GCC AORs, the GCC are not actually paying the bill for those services. As a result, GCCs have a tendency to request as much engagement as possible regardless of any ties to measures of effect. However, as I’ve discussed earlier – more requests for security cooperation in its existing form (as opposed to some new category of activities in support of shaping) is not an effective or efficient use of limited resources… just more of the same.
CHAPTER TEN: CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the leading component of the Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC) development program. The JOpsC looks at required future military capabilities and functions eight to twenty years into the future. The CCJO looks at joint military operations in terms of unified actions, or actions taken in coordination with IA and multinational partners. The development procedure identifies functional area gaps, and when appropriate the JCS directs the establishment of a Joint Operations Concept (JOC) to address that functional gap. In August, 2006, the Joint Staff tasked Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and European Command (EUCOM) to develop a shaping JOC. The JOC working group’s initial analysis revealed some basic problems with the concept of shaping as defined, scoped and utilized today in joint doctrine. Specific areas the working group identified were defining the capabilities and activities not currently being addressed that shaping is intended to address; the doctrinal overlap of shaping with deterrence, irregular warfare and Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSSTRO); and whether shaping is intended to influence potential adversaries, allies or non-hostile competitors.100

Under the concept of unified action, the desire in the doctrine is to integrate all appropriate agencies and partners in national shaping activities. The CCJO doctrine focuses on the need for the future joint force to be capable of supporting USG efforts to simultaneously influence the international environment to prevent conflict, fight a war if

need be and facilitate the transition back to peace and stability after that war.\textsuperscript{101} The CCJO describes future shaping operations in peacetime as possibly being aimed at “spreading democracy, creating an environment of peace, stability, and goodwill or even aimed at destabilizing a rogue regime.” These activities rely “heavily on active support and participation by other elements of national power.”\textsuperscript{102} This description of future shaping activity as envisioned by CCJO authors reinforces my premise that shaping is being used as a generic term associated with practically any activity a GCC/Component may be currently doing or could potentially be doing. The assumption that other elements of national power will coordinate and integrate as full partners with DOD is naïve in lieu of the failure to accomplish that goal to date despite Presidential direction to do so. Further, the concept lacks focus, leaving planners little concrete guidance on which to base their phase zero planning on. The aperture is so wide that it provides policy guidance neither for nor against any particular activity or family of activities. Clearly, every situation in which shaping activities may be appropriate is different depending on any number of factors in any particular region. However, failing to set any boundaries or framework whatsoever for shaping activities is a recipe for wasted staff energy and precious national resources.

It is important to note that the joint doctrine for phase zero shaping is still being developed. The Joint Staff directed the development of the shaping JOC just one month before phase zero shaping was formally introduced into joint doctrine publication via the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[102] Ibid, pg. 9
\end{footnotes}
JP 3-0 in September 2006. I am critical of the fact that phase zero shaping has been
written into joint doctrine before it has been developed as a concept. I do, however, see
the potential benefit to DOD individually and the USG on whole to successful
implementation of such a concept once it has been fully developed.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

National security and defense strategy documents articulate guidance for the military to actively participate in shaping activities. As a result, international shaping is today a part of the U.S. military’s doctrinal mission set. That mission specifically manifests itself in the form of the GCC operational plan’s phase zero. The requirement for the military to formally plan for engagement has existed since 1998. In relation to phase zero shaping, the moniker for this activity has changed over time from engagement to security cooperation and now to shaping. These activities are intended to influence the international environment such that U.S. security interests are protected abroad, foreign military capabilities and capacity for ally partners is improved and armed intervention by U.S. forces is avoided if possible. If armed conflict is not avoided, shaping activities should set the conditions for success in conflict. Shaping activities are to continue in preparation for when the conflict area is stabilized and civil-military authorities are enabled. In this way, phase zero shaping activities are continuous before, during and after implementation of an operational plan.

The challenge with writing phase zero shaping activities into GCC operational plans under the current state of maturation that we find shaping in today are significant. The fact that a shaping JOC has been recently established is proof that the JCS sees that the concept needs refining and development. There is an inherent value in codifying and further formalizing military shaping activities in an effort to focus resources and planning efforts to maximize their effect. The military leadership, within the Joint Staff, EUCOM and JFCOM principally, are actively working to resolve the outstanding issues associated with phase zero shaping. By writing shaping into the doctrine prior to developing the
concept, DOD is asking the individual GCCs to use their best judgments to figure out a way forward in adapting this concept. I would offer that multiple developmental efforts of the shaping concept occurring simultaneously within each GCC are not efficient. Since shaping activities in one region will be different from those of another region, the current real world experience each GCC brings to the shaping planning effort is important. Therefore, I am not saying that shaping activities cannot or should not begin to be integrated into GCC operational plans. Rather, planning inputs for phase zero with a shaping concept neither properly defined nor commonly understood will not yield strategic operational plans across DOD that are consistent in application or efficacy.

Shaping is an evolving concept. Although it has been added to campaign planning as described in the campaign phasing model, the doctrine fails to adequately define shaping as a distinct category of activities. If shaping is to be something more than security cooperation, security assistance or diplomacy, it needs to be defined in terms of how it is different, whom it is intended to shape, what is to be shaped and how shaping is to be resourced. The joint doctrine is also clear that shaping activities are to be coordinated and integrated with the IA. If within the DOD shaping is not clearly understood, as I propose, then the DOD is not ready for IA and/or international coordination and integration. Without a common understanding of terminology, intentions and resources required to implement shaping, more security cooperation and security assistance is all that will result. As shaping relates to multinational coordination, we cannot hope for more from our international partners until we have done significant work at home first. From Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ):

“Foreign policy objectives implemented through individual programs and activities are complex, sometimes contradictory, and often overlap jurisdictions of
multiple agencies. Activities of the State Department may be redundant, or conflict with those of the United States Agency for International Development – USAID, and similarly may be at odds with those of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. This leads to a perception – not without foundation – that foreign assistance programs are not coordinated and do not serve coherent foreign policy goals. These concerns fuel the perception that U.S. foreign assistance lacks focus, is out of touch with reality, and cannot be held accountable to meeting policy goals and objectives.” 103

The concept of successfully implementing a phase of planning into the phasing model construct that would, if successful, effectively render the use of the OPLAN phases one through five unnecessary is extremely appealing. Such a phase or concept is obviously worthy of pursuit and development. In fact, I believe that the concept of shaping is a natural evolution for military engagement that once developed fully will benefit the overall national security of the country. The issue is that authorities and policy for integrated IA, NGO and IGO efforts do not yet exist. If even Presidential directives are ineffectual in resolving IA coordination, as is currently the case, then more formal (i.e., legislative) actions are required. There is common goodness in attempting to consolidate assets and resources throughout the USG to affect global shaping of the environment to prevent conflict emergence. Focusing all elements of national power to that cause is absolutely the right thing to do. However, unless one agency within the USG is empowered to enforce IA integration and coordination, more of the same rhetoric is all that will be forthcoming.

While we have accomplished a great deal since 9/11, I believe several areas warrant further attention. First and foremost, we must bear in mind that this War on Terrorism can’t be won by the military alone. We need to ensure that we bring

to bear all our instruments of national power, and the instruments of power of the international community, in a coherent, synchronized manner. I recommend an independent, comprehensive review of our government—much like the Goldwater-Nichols review of the Department of Defense—to determine what organizational, procedural, and resource management changes are needed.104

I have made the argument that writing phase zero shaping activities into the Combatant Commander’s operational plans is a considerable challenge for several reasons. Chief among those are defining and scoping the shaping concept and laying out an IA plan that stipulates responsibility, authority and accountability for an overarching USG shaping plan. In order for GCC shaping activities to be effective, they must be part of a larger IA strategic shaping plan that nests within the NSS, and they must be coordinated and integrated within that plan. Doctrine does not exist that tells USG agencies, NGOs and IGOs how to work together to plan for a unified international shaping operation, and there is no overarching agency authorized to require coordination. I am suggesting that such doctrine is required if there is to be integration and coordination among these agencies. I would further suggest that there needs to be a single agency empowered to compel participation and to preside over this integration effort. My specific recommendations aim to facilitate these purposes and are as follows:

1) A definition of shaping needs to be developed that is clear and unambiguous across USG agencies, NGOs and IGOs. This is absolutely critical in order to build unity of effort. Organizational priorities, cultures and processes can only be overcome by clearly articulated, commonly agreed upon written doctrine.
2) National planning guidance that specifies individual USG agency responsibilities, authorities and accountability within a national strategic shaping plan needs to be developed. Further, in order to affect the execution of this interagency shaping doctrine, a single agency (I propose the NSC) needs to be empowered to oversee the IA integration and cooperation. Responsibilities for individual activities will necessarily vary according mission, however, in all cases the NSC would designate

the lead agency. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help federal departments and agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives.

3) National security professional education and training should be undertaken throughout the IA by senior civilian and military leaders and planners. The 2006 QDR recommended the development of a “National Security Officer” corps, which this recommendation supports. The training and education should focus on development of interagency integration and coordination, as well as developing a common USG strategic approach to national security strategy and shaping execution. Specific to DOD, improving the Foreign Area Officer program, increasing cultural and language skills and markedly improving leadership training and sensitivity to foreign area operations is also required.

4) Within the IA, there must be a system utilized that allows for evaluation of the risk and overall effectiveness of shaping activities. The considerable effort and resources being put forth in IA shaping activities must be assessed as to whether national security objectives are being met. Accountability as to whether measures of performance and effect are being accomplished is also a necessary mechanism in the feedback loop of the planning process. The DOD collects and categorizes engagement activities through its Theater Security Cooperation Measurement Information System, but it does not measure the effectiveness of that activity.

5) In addition to resources programmed through the Service Components, GCCs must consider and integrate resources budgeted by other agencies for security assistance. In the case of the DOS, for example, one difficulty with trying to integrate funding streams is that DOS does not use identical planning horizons and timelines for programming resources and the GCCs have limited, if any, impact on the DOS budgetary decision making process. With the establishment of a single oversight and coordinating agency, this issue could be resolved.

6) Along with considerations for resource budgets of other agencies in relation to shaping activities and planning within DOD, a mechanism whereby GCC operational plans can account for other OGA shaping activities within their plans must also be developed. For example, DOS has proposed a fast reaction civilian reserve corps. This program will reposition DOS domestic and overseas staff to better implement U.S. national security policies by having a more direct impact on foreign local and regional governments and populace.

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105 2006 QDR, 79.
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VITA

Commander Chatham is a native of LaPlace, La. He graduated from Temple University in 1987, and was commissioned through the Naval ROTC program. After completing pilot training, CDR Chatham served in various P-3 squadron operational and staff tours in Mountain View, CA, Norfolk, VA, and Kaneohe Bay, HI. CDR Chatham has served in various staff and instructor pilot tours in Pensacola, FL, Norfolk, VA, and Manama, Bahrain. CDR Chatham’s Command tour was with VT-31 in Corpus Christi, TX in the Navy’s Advanced Multi-Engine Pilot Training squadron. His next assignment will be in the J3 department at Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. Prior to his current assignment, CDR Chatham served as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Policy, Plans, Exercises and Theater Security Cooperation on the staff of Commander, Combined Forces Maritime Component Command in Manama, Bahrain.