National security policy objectives, both in the US and the UK, will be met more effectively and efficiently if a truly cross-governmental approach to complex operations is developed and implemented. At the strategic level, failure by the US to achieve adequate unity of effort was one cause of the failure to produce an adequate plan for the post-combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. At the operational level, an imbalance in resources between the military and other departments results in the situation that only the military are capable of taking effective action. A top-down solution that modifies the current Unified Command Plan to allow for the formation of whole-of-government operational level commands in lieu of military COCOMs (or PJHQ) is required. A review of the whole of the national security architecture, that redefines roles and missions, and allocates resources, is required to support the change.
Developing a Whole-of-Government Approach to Complex Problems

by

Wing Commander Andrew Burton
Royal Air Force

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature:

1 April 2007

Thesis Adviser: Professor R. Antis
Abstract

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1
Introduction

Interdependence - the fact of a crisis somewhere becoming a crisis everywhere - makes a mockery of traditional views of national interest. You can't have a coherent view of national interest today without a coherent view of the international community. Nations, even ones as large and powerful as the USA, are affected profoundly by world events; and not affected, in time or at the margins, but at breakneck speed and fundamentally.  

The use of military force in any context is a complex undertaking whether as the result of a crisis or a decision to execute a pre-prepared contingency plan.2 Operations in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and the Balkans are examples of crises because they required short-notice responses; the 2003 Iraq War, for which a contingency plan had been prepared, was a more deliberate act that was undertaken at a time of choosing. All the examples are ‘complex’ because they combine diplomatic, military, political, humanitarian, public security, social, economic and governance dimensions.3 To be effective and efficient in preparing for, reacting to, and solving complex crises we need to ensure that there is a cross-governmental “unity of effort” that draws together all actors and synchronizes the employment of elements of national power.5 Given that many recent crises have warranted an international response by a coalition or allied grouping, there is also a requirement for

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2 Contingency planning is a US term. The UK equivalent is advance planning and is defined as the activity conducted principally in peacetime to develop plans for contingencies identified by strategic planning assumptions. Advance planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information. UK Joint Warfare Publication 5-00. Page 1-2.
4 Unity of effort is defined as the successful synchronization and/or integration of joint and single-Service operations with the actions of supporting combatant commands, other military forces (multinational operations), and non-military organizations (government agencies; host nation agencies; intergovernmental organizations; and nongovernmental organizations.) US Joint Publication 5.0. Planning for Operations. 26 December 2006.
5 The US includes Information alongside diplomatic, military and economic power, resulting in “DIME.” The UK approach is to see Information as an essential underpinning of the economic, diplomatic and military instruments of national power in achieving political objectives, not as a separate and discrete instrument. See British Defence Doctrine (2nd Edition), pp. 2-4 & 2-5.
synchronization at international level. As the United States’ (US) National Security Strategy (NSS) states:

relations with the most powerful countries in the world are central to our national security strategy. Our priority is pursuing American interests within cooperative relationships, particularly with our oldest and closest friends and allies.6

Over the last few decades the level of complexity has increased for a number of reasons from which three stand out.

First, globalism7 means that instability anywhere on the planet can affect, directly or otherwise, distant parts of the world. Complex networks, intricate in nature and impossible to predict, span the globe. A state of interdependence exists between multitudes of actors. These actors are not just states and the interdependence covers a range of activities including military, economic, environmental, cultural and social spheres.

An adequate sense of the contemporary international system can no longer be gained by only considering states, as there are now innumerable interacting networks connecting many different kinds of actors operating at many different levels. The state remains important but principally only in creating the conditions that determine the extent of the networks linking a nation’s non-state actors to the wider world. States, however, have considerable difficulty regulating, controlling and policing these interactions as the network linkages between internal non-state actors and external agencies become progressively more extensive, denser and intense.8

For example, China’s economic growth is dependent on the US consumer buying its exported goods. This growth allows China to develop, if it chooses to, military forces that could in time threaten current US military hegemony. On the

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other hand, the US is dependent on cheap imports from China to help drive improvements in living standards and maintain low inflation. Each country needs the other and they are developing an economic interdependency. Globalization is predicted to be the “an overarching “mega-trend,” a force so ubiquitous that it will substantially shape all the other major trends in the world of 2020.”

Secondly, media coverage, combined with technological advances, transmits images of remote areas of the world directly into our living rooms. They provide snapshots, often with editorial commentary, of the effects that military force is creating. In doing so they provide, “to a large extent the source of the context in which the acts in theatre are played out.” Collective or individual actions can thus have unforeseen, occasionally devastating, consequences. The torture of inmates at Abu Ghraib prison by US soldiers is an example of this. The regime of Saddam Hussein undoubtedly perpetrated more hideous crimes at the jail but digital images of the abuses committed by US guards have had far more effect on global opinion, to the detriment of national and Coalition interests.

Take a website like Live Leak which has become popular with soldiers from both sides of the divide in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Operational documentary material, from their mobile phones or laptops, is posted on the site. These sometimes gruesome images are the unmediated reality of war. They provide a new source of evidence for journalists and commentators, bypassing the official accounts and records.

Finally, the general shift over the last 60 years away from industrial or total war towards ‘fourth-generation’ warfare has greatly complicated the military task.

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12 Fourth generation warfare is a concept used to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form signifying the nation states' loss of their monopoly on combat forces. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network. Fourth Generation wars are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, peace and conflict, battlefield and safety. A full discussion of this shift is beyond
It is now insufficient for a senior military commander to simply be master of his own ‘stove-piped’ environment. In addition to military strategy and logistics, he must now be able to integrate, influence, cajole and protect the multitude of entities that now inhabit the operational environment.

As an example of the complexity that exists, UK military personnel deployed to the Balkans during the 1990s:

...witnessed crisis and conflict involving a complex interplay of civilian, para-military and military groups and individuals, International Organizations (IOs) and the mass Media.13

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed to Croatia in 1992 but its mandate was soon extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) at the outbreak of civil war. By 1994, it was the largest and most expensive operation ($1.6 billion per annum) in United Nation’s history with 38 000 personnel from 37 nations.14 The commander was forced to deal not only with a multitude of local military and para-military forces but also to consider religious tension between the Orthodox, Muslim and Roman Catholic communities. Neighboring states (such as Serbia and Croatia) were deeply involved, as was Russia for whom the Balkans had been a historic sphere of influence. Moreover, a number of international organizations such as NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were involved; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as charitable organizations contributing to the humanitarian crisis, also operated in the area. With a confused mandate it was little surprise that by May 1995, “UNPROFOR was seen by all …to be without utility.”15

13 UK Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Joint Doctrine Note 4/05. The Comprehensive Approach, Jan 06.
Difficulties in past complex operations were not just the fault of the military commander on the ground. Clearly, too much emphasis has been placed on the military element in lieu of the other elements of national power. As the 9/11 Commission noted:

...long-term success depends on the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we shall leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.16

Similarly the 2003 UK Defence White Paper noted:

Whereas in the past it was possible to regard military force as a separate element in crisis resolution, it is now evident that the successful management of international security problems will require ever more integrated planning of military, diplomatic and economic instruments at both national and international levels. 17

Failures can be the result of an inability, at national and international levels, to effectively and efficiently integrate and synchronize all elements of national power. Without cross-government or international cooperation the commander in the field may be laboring with one hand tied behind his back. The chances of success are improved if he is able to implement a whole-of-government strategy not just an isolated military plan. In the US the mechanism for achieving unity of effort is commonly referred to the “interagency process”, in the UK it is termed the “Comprehensive Approach” (CA). Neither is unique and other allies, such as Australia and Canada are working to achieve the same result. In Australia, increasing emphasis has been placed on the development of “whole-of-government” approaches—a concept defined as:

… public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.\textsuperscript{18}

The key problem is that most government organisations are hierarchical and have well-defined vertical structures or stovepipes, with different organisations operating within their narrowly defined spheres of responsibility. However, the solution sets to complex problems are often spread horizontally across these vertical structures and require cooperative responses at the strategic, operational\textsuperscript{19} and tactical levels, from several different government and non-government organisations. For example, the military community is well-versed at working in isolation to integrate policy to determine military objectives. But in complex conflicts this is only one part of the wider picture and is no longer sufficient. Our enemies do not seek to confrontations just on the conventional battlefield but choose alternate methods to achieve their goals. A military victory on the battlefield is a pyrrhic victory if the battle was unnecessary or, if in the aftermath, the peace is lost. The US has recognized the problems of the interagency process for a number of years:

Operation Restore Democracy (1994) in Haiti was the genesis of the interagency coordination and planning initiative. During deliberations … senior policymakers observed that agencies had not sufficiently coordinated their planning efforts. More specifically, they found gaps in civil-military planning, disconnects in synchronization of agency efforts, and shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{20}

My thesis is that national security policy objectives will only be met effectively and efficiently if a truly cross-governmental approach to complex


\textsuperscript{19} British Defence Doctrine defines the operational level of war is the level at which campaigns are planned. Joint Warfare Publication 0-01. Page 1-2

operations is developed and implemented. The problem of horizontal integration exists at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This paper will concentrate on the first two and will only consider the tactical level when it has relevance to developing lines of argument. At the strategic level, the first key step in the chain to achieve synchronization of effort is strategic integration. This paper defines strategic integration as the process by which national policy is transformed to strategic planning guidance for further action by departments and agencies. This strategic planning guidance must then be utilized to develop courses of action (COA) at the operational level. These COAs provide the pathway for execution at the tactical level.

Good strategy can be expressed in terms of ends, ways and means set in a context of risk. The ends, or objectives, explain “what” is to be accomplished. In this paper “ends” are defined as developing an effective and efficient COA that synchronizes (internationally if required) the application of national power in response to a complex problem during crisis or peace. The ways, or strategic concepts, define “how” the objectives are to be accomplished. They are the processes of identifying, analyzing, planning and executing national (and international) responses to complex situations. The means, or resources, define the boundaries of what support is available to achieve the objectives. They include the organizations, funding and organizational structures that exist. Risk is relative to the mission. If the ends-ways-means are not synchronized then intervention into a complex problem risks being at best inefficient and at worst ineffective. This framework of ends-ways-means will be employed in this paper.

This paper is structured in three sections. The first describes, compares and contrasts, and analyzes the means and ways currently employed by the UK and US in
striving to achieve cross-government integration. It will trace problems back to their causes. The second section investigates and evaluates recent initiatives to improve cross-governmental integration. Finally, the paper proposes a way forward and recommends improvements to cross-governmental integration to achieve improved unity of effort. This paper will consider only the international arena; domestic considerations, such as homeland security are beyond its scope.
SECTION 1

President Bill Clinton’s counterterrorism Presidential Decision Directives in 1995... reinforced the authority of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate domestic as well as foreign counterterrorism effort... While [they] might prod or push agencies to act, what actually happened was usually decided at the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department. 21

CURRENT APPROACHES TO CROSS-GOVERNMENT INTEGRATION

The “Means”

The “means” are the resources available to translate policy into COAs and include the organizations, funding and organizational structures. The means are both tangible and intangible. Tangibles include personnel and funding; intangibles include the structures into which the personnel are organized and the “power” that these organizations wield within government. It has already been stated that all elements of national power must be used synergistically to effectively achieve the desired strategic effects in an efficient manner. However, in the past, the Department of Defense (DoD) (the UK equivalent is the Ministry of Defence (MOD)) has tended to coordinate the military effort, the State Department (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)) the diplomatic effort and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Department for International Development (DfID)) the developmental effort. These departments and agencies have developed differing “personalities” through time and often have objectives and institutionalized practices that are incompatible. They also have differing levels of resources available to develop key capabilities, such as an ability to contribute to planning efforts or to deploy and support personnel in overseas theatres.

In considering the functional departments and agencies to be one of the “means”, or resources available to contribute to achieving national security objectives, two key areas are worthy of further examination. Firstly, how effective are the executive structures (in particular the National Security Council (NSC) in the US and the Cabinet Office\(^\text{22}\) (CO) in the UK) in directing the integration process? Secondly, how well resourced are the individual departments relative to their roles and responsibilities?

**Executive Structures**

The processes by which the executive arm of government draws together departments and agencies are vital to the success of the integration process and achieving unity of effort. These processes are fundamental if policy is to be transformed into strategic planning guidance and implemented, overseen and coordinated at the operational level. A multitude of agencies and departments, each with their own agendas, priorities, resources and hierarchy, must work together to create synergistic effects. Ideally, different departments would naturally coordinate their efforts effectively and efficiently but experience has shown that without strong leadership from ‘the centre’ this will not happen. Planning for the post-conflict phase of the 2003 Iraq War, will be examined later in the paper, to highlight the importance of strong leadership.

**NSC**

The historical development of the NSC staff illustrates a fundamental dialectic of how government integrates. At the discretion of the incumbent President, the NSC staff can act as an empowered body that takes the lead in coordinating across government. Similarly, it can be confined to acting as merely a facilitator, or honest-
broker, between the competing departments. The distinction is important. A strong
NSC staff, with authority drawn from the President can effectively integrate at the
strategic level whereas a facilitating body can be impotent when confronted by
powerful departments that are unwilling to work together.

The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the
foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. It created many
of the institutions responsible for formulating and implementing foreign and defence
policy, including the NSC:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security so as to enable the military services
and the other departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

An Assistant for National Security Affairs post was created in 1953
(commonly referred to as the National Security Advisor) to direct a small NSC staff.
The NSC is chaired by the President and its membership varies at the prerogative of
the incumbent President. Under the current administration of George W. Bush, the
regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, Secretary
of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense (Sec Def), and the National
Security Advisor. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the statutory
military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the
intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and
the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC
meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of

23 The National Security Act of 1947 is available online at http://www.intelligence.gov/0-
natsecact_1947.shtml#s101 (accessed 13 Sep 06). A brief history of the organization is available at
other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.\textsuperscript{24}

As stated earlier, the level of autonomy and influence exercised by the NSC, the National Security Advisor, and the NSC staff, across other elements of government such as the Departments of State and Defense depends on presidential style. Eisenhower used NSC meetings to make key foreign policy decisions, while Kennedy and Johnson worked more informally through trusted associates. Under Nixon, the NSC staff headed by Henry A. Kissinger was transformed from a coordinating body into an organization that actively engaged in negotiations with foreign leaders and implemented presidential decisions. Under Carter, the National Security Adviser became a principal source of foreign affairs ideas and the NSC staff was recruited and managed with that aim in mind. The Department of State provided institutional memory and served as operations coordinator. The National Security Adviser's role exacerbated the difficult relationships with State. Carter’s Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert Pastor, argued that:

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\ldots\text{tension between NSC and State derives in part from the former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s control of implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious about the NSC usurping policy, and the NSC tends to be concerned that State either might not implement the President’s decisions or might do so in a way that would make decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wrong.}\textsuperscript{25}
\]

This enduring tension between the NSC and the State Department intensified during the Reagan administration when, for the first time, the National Security Advisor lost direct access to the President. The State Department took on primacy for

\textsuperscript{24} NSC attendees are listed at The White House website available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ accessed 14 Sep 06.

foreign policy formulation with the NSC relegated to a role of integrating the policy across government. Described by Brzezinski as the NSC’s “mid-life crisis,” it subsequently regained influence during in Reagan’s tenure. Indeed, the NSC took an over-active role in the formulation and execution of policy in the Iran-Contra Affair.

The frequency and format of NSC meetings varied for each administration. For example, the Council convened only 10 times during the Carter administration, compared with 125 during the eight years of the Nixon and Ford administrations.27 Other interdepartmental working groups or committees to facilitate the work of the NSC such as the Washington Special Action Group in the Nixon and Ford administrations also met periodically.

Since 1949, the NSC has functioned within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). However, the growing introduction of new national security organizations and activities that now function alongside the NSC in the “interagency space between the President and executive departments and agencies”28 has complicated the picture. These organizations were created in the wake of a changing security environment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They include the Homeland Security Council, which sits inside the EOP, and is on a level par with the NSC itself, the post of DNI that sits outside the EOP but within the NSC, and special offices with interagency responsibilities that are located within an existing “lead” department. One example of a lead department is the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) which is discussed in detail later in the paper.

27 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html accessed 14 Sep 06.
Cabinet Office (CO) and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC)

In the UK, the system for coordinating the various departments of government has many similarities to the US model. It also has some important differences. There is no formal EOP or NSC and ‘the Centre’ has evolved rather than been enacted by law; working on the principle of cabinet, rather than presidential or legislative, authority. The key body tasked to “mak[e] government work better” is the CO. 29

The CO is usually headed by a relatively junior minister who, although he has the implicit backing of the Prime Minister (PM), can lack the political authority held by colleagues in more senior positions such as the FCO. Within the CO, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) co-ordinates the Government's response (military, economic and diplomatic) to crises overseas. Similar in composition to the NSC, it is chaired by the PM and its members are the Secretary of State (SoS) for the FCO (Deputy Chair), the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer30, the SoSs for Trade and Industry, the Home Office, International Development and Defence. Other Ministers, the Heads of the Intelligence Agencies and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) may be invited to attend as necessary. Importantly, there is no National Security Advisor, the closest corollary is the Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat who acts as the Foreign Policy and Defence Advisor to the PM. Appointed by the PM and traditionally drawn from the Diplomatic Service, the advisor heads a small staff (currently 49 personnel) responsible for co-coordinating and supporting the formation of policy.

Analysis of NSC and DOPC Roles

30 The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the UK Government Finance Officer.
There are significant issues regarding the role of the NSC and the CO in integrating all elements of national power to achieve foreign and security policy objectives. The primary advantage is that each provides a forum and a process, at the strategic level, to bring together key government departments to produce a whole-of-government approach. The fact that the process is dependent on the incumbent President, or PM, provides flexibility of response to react to events. When considered only in these terms the NSC and CO are successful bodies. However, the main problem is that they attempt to coalesce the activities of departments, often run by more senior political figures, which retain a considerable power of initiative and independence.

At such senior levels of government “personality matters” and it can be difficult for the NSC (or DOPC) to achieve the best possible solution. There are many examples where strong leadership from “the centre” and better integration amongst departments could have had a significant impact. One recent example was the coordination of post-conflict strategy in Iraq. The details below are based on the US actions but the lessons are equally applicable to the UK.

**The Iraq War Example**

Planning for the Iraq War and subsequent occupation started, in the US at least, in November 2001 when the Sec Def tasked the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander to update the standing Operations Plan (OPLAN) for Iraq.\(^{31}\) Hindsight shows that this allowed 17 months for a COA to be created, and planning conducted, to successfully achieve the policy objectives laid out by the President. Defense was the “lead” department and CENTCOM created an audacious strategy that defeated the fielded Iraqi conventional forces in just one month. The President’s policy however called not only for the defeat of Iraqi forces and the

removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party from power but also to help the Iraqis “build a society based on moderation, pluralism and democracy.” As late as August 2002, General Franks, the CENTCOM commander, had told his staff that the State Department would lead the planning for the post-war phase. The military establishment did not consider “nation-building” to be part of its remit and developed a military plan that called for an extremely rapid drawdown of combat troops from levels that were already historically low when compared to accepted norms for occupying forces. This is important as RAND noted in 2003:

There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.

It was not until the autumn that Sec Def acknowledged that the DoD would take the lead in all post-war efforts with an in-country civilian administrator, and separate military commander, reporting to him. As late as February 2003, the plan for the post-war military command team was still being created and no credible, actionable strategy for post-war Iraq existed. Planning for the civilian administration was even worse; General Jay Garner (retired) was not approached to lead the administration until January 2003, only 2 months prior to the start of operations. NSPD 24 formalized DoD control of the post-war phase that same month despite the established practice of the State Department normally having primacy in recent post-


33 Ibid. Page 138.

34 RAND. *America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*. This quantitative study analyses levels of forces in a variety of nation-building operations. It demonstrates that the per capita levels of troop commitments to Iraq are low when compared to successful missions in Japan and Germany.
war reconstruction efforts, as has had been the case in the Balkans and Afghanistan.\(^{35}\)

“The decision to place the Defense Department…in charge of post-war Iraq may have doomed the American effort from the start.”\(^{36}\) As late as 20 February 2003, when the majority of actors responsible for post-war Iraq assembled at Fort McNair there “was no master strategy.”\(^{37}\) This was a mere month prior to the invasion.

This drift, with departments failing to comprehensively plan for the post-war phase, called for strong leadership to coordinate cross-government action – exactly the role that the NSC and its staff were created to do! With obvious antipathy existing between the Secretary of State and Sec Def, cooperation between the two departments was far from ideal. Unfortunately, the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, was relatively junior in comparison to her peers and “assumed that senior officials would cooperate and share information with their counterparts and … rarely cracked down when they did not.”\(^{38}\) Had she been more senior it is unlikely that the Sec Def would have allegedly required presidential direction to return her telephone calls.\(^{39}\) She did not “aspire to be a domineering advisor in the mold of Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski” and “was more coordinator than maestro and not one to knock heads together to get something done.”\(^{40}\)

Responsibility for the interagency breakdown rests with Condoleezza Rice. The job of the national security advisor is to maintain a level playing field and forge consensus between the president’s national security team.\(^{41}\)

\(^{35}\) The Defense Department did take the lead, in the aftermath of World War 2, in both Germany and Japan.


\(^{38}\) Ibid. Page 148.


The 9/11 Commission Report concentrated on rectifying intelligence failures and improving the counter-terrorism effort in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US. They made very specific recommendations regarding the achievement of a unity of effort in these areas. Whilst their remit was more narrowly defined than the broad scope of this paper they made an important recommendation that resonates forwards to our current problems of horizontal integration. They stated that:

[To achieve unity of effort] will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.\(^{42}\)

This is reflected by the US National Security Strategy (NSS) that states:

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.\(^{43}\)

It is also recognized by the UK CDS who stated:

… the UK needs the agility to switch quickly from one part of the operational spectrum to another, often within the same part of the same campaign. It means the UK needs the adaptability to react successfully to an uncertain future; to cope with challenges that it did not or could not foresee.\(^{44}\)

The failure to plan adequately for the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War is a symptom that demonstrates the need for change. The process to integrate all elements of national power at the strategic level failed to achieve satisfactory results. The changes that are required, especially relating to the National

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\(^{43}\) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006. Section IX.

Security Advisor and the NSC staff will be discussed later in the paper. The lessons identified are equally applicable to the UK.

**Funding**

*You need three things to win a war, money, money and more money.*

For successful cross-governmental action it is important that each arm of government has the tangible means to contribute. Resources take many forms and it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider every department and agency of government. However, when considering conflict prevention and resolution, including stabilization and reconstruction, significant resource anomalies exist in both the UK and the US. In particular, it makes little sense to spend billions of pounds on war fighting when much smaller sums, spent on developing other elements of national power, may prove more efficient and effective. Similarly, the balance between hard power and soft power, the power of attraction, must be considered when formulating strategy.

British Defence Doctrine suggests the concept of a conflict continuum depicted graphically at Figure 1. This postulates that relationships between nations or entities fluctuate between states of peace, tension, war and resolution in a cyclical fashion. This cycle often occurs over a long time period best measured in decades rather than years. A similar idea is postulated by Zinni who describes thee stages of instability, “*simmering, crisis and recovery.*” The cycle is not continuous and conflict, if it does not resolve an issue, may lead to further tension rather than peace.

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45 Trivulzio (1441-1518).
The departments of UK government that are most often charged with leading each phase are annotated on the figure.

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**Figure 1.1:** The Conflict Continuum.

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A full cycle can be described using the relationship between the UK and US. Considered simplistically, the US existed as a peaceful colony of the UK until tensions started to rise in the latter half of the 18th century. “Taxation without representation” was one source of tension. The failure to diffuse these tensions through diplomacy in order to prevent conflict led to the American War of Independence. Success in the war achieved independence for America but did not resolve all of the differences. Hence, rather than the cycle moving directly to a state of peace between the 2 nations, tensions remained that boiled over into further conflicts such as the Anglo-American War of 1812. It was not until the UK had passed its apogee of imperial power in the early 20th century that differences were fully resolved and an enduring peaceful relationship was established.
Other more recent scenarios, regardless of whether they have resulted in conflict can be analyzed using the model. For example, the UK went to war with Argentina in 1982 following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine government suffered from internal problems and saw the invasion as an opportunity to stoke nationalist fervor and divert attention away from the domestic situation. Tension had existed between the two countries over the Islas Malvinas for many years but had not escalated into war. Failed diplomacy contributed to the outbreak of conflict because the Argentine government came to doubt British resolve to defend the Islands. For example, UK Defence Reviews decided to take “the symbolic tripwire in the south-west Atlantic, HMS Endurance, out of service.”

The announcement that, after 27 years of continuous Antarctic patrol, HMS Endurance would depart in March 1982, and not be replaced, was construed by Argentina as a deliberate political gesture, a calculated diminishment of British interest in the Falklands commitment.

Maintaining a relatively inexpensive military presence may have prevented a costly war. Moreover, whilst the UK successfully defeated Argentine forces and reclaimed the Islands, no resolution to the issue of the sovereignty of the Islands has been found and tension regarding their future continues. The costs associated with this tension are significant as the UK built and maintains a significant garrison at Mount Pleasant to deter further aggression.

More examples exist that are relevant to current operations. Diplomatic failures prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the subsequent abrupt termination of the war by Coalition Forces in 1991, left Saddam Hussein in power. The failure to prevent war and then to properly resolve the peace are seen by many as directly linked to the invasion of Iraq, by mainly US and UK forces in 2003.

49 Charlton, Michael. *The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute.* Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell. 1989. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord at the time, states (Page 152-3) that the “actual saving on Endurance – it might have been £3 million – was peanuts.”

50 Ibid. Page 153.
The key point, and the reason for the above examples, is that failures in conflict prevention and post-combat resolution can be disastrous. Failure to prevent conflict can result in needless war; failure to resolve the post conflict phase can lead to the need to maintain an expensive military deterrent or, if containment becomes a substitute for resolution, further war. The fact that any war is expensive is amply illustrated by the ongoing Iraq War that has cost the lives of approximately 3250 US soldiers as of March 2007. Estimates of the financial cost vary but CRS estimates that the US will have spent about $379 billion by the end of FY 2007. Approximately 91% of these funds are for DoD, 8% are for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, with 1% for medical care for veterans.51

Given that conflict prevention and resolution failures can have such grave consequences, it is appropriate to consider what level of funding is provided to these functional areas. The traditional method for government funding is to allocate funds to departments. Whilst there are differences in the way the UK and US account for appropriations, there is no doubting that defense spending dwarfs the amount spent on international development and diplomacy. There are many reasons for the disparity, not least of which is the cost of military hardware and training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State Department (USAID)</th>
<th>Defense (DoD)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$10 ($2552 Billion)</td>
<td>$439 Billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006-7</td>
<td>$4 Billion</td>
<td>$10 Billion</td>
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54 Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2006. Amounts are billions converted at a rate of $2=£1. Available online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/376/24/cm6811_02_Chap_1.pdf accessed 25 September 2006. All figures are to the nearest billion.
The aim in detailing the relative levels of funding is to highlight the relatively small amounts of money spent on the ‘softer’ diplomatic and international development departments of government. Given that these departments have historically been the lead actors in conflict prevention and resolution it is particularly important. Of course, all elements of national power contribute significantly to all phases of the conflict continuum. However, from a cross-governmental approach, we need to question whether the balance of resources, capability, and emphasis, across each phase of the continuum is correct.

These questions are best explored with reference to the earlier example of the build-up to the latest Iraq War. The reasons for the failure to plan effectively and efficiently for the post-conflict phase are manifold. We have already identified the lack of strong direction from “the centre” in the form of the NSC as being a key factor. Moreover, strong personalities at the State Department and DoD, and antipathy between their principals, were also significant.

The President has ultimate responsibility for directing US resources but was disposed against using US military forces for long-term nation-building. Whilst debating the matter during the 2000 Presidential elections he stated:

I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.55

The DoD believed that the State Department was to blame for what it perceived to be inefficient practices in the Balkans. Sec Def had a different vision of nation-building. He believed a culture of dependency had been allowed to develop in the Balkans distorting the fabric of the state.

In some nation-building exercises well-intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems and say let's fix it. This is well motivated

to be sure, but it can really be a disservice in some instances because when foreigners come in with international solutions to local problems, if not very careful they can create a dependency.\textsuperscript{56}

He believed that “a long-term foreign presence in a country can be unnatural”\textsuperscript{57} and emphasised his own vision using the example of Afghanistan.

\begin{quote}
Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. The objective is not to engage in what some call nation-building. Rather it's to try to help the Afghans so that they can build their own nation. This is an important distinction.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and his department provided the counterpoint to the DoD. Powell was more of a “realist”\textsuperscript{59} than Rumsfeld and favored a more cautious approach, not only to undertaking the war but also, to the post-war phase. The State Department had traditionally led post-war reconstruction phases (such as the Balkans) and started preparing for this eventuality in April 2002. Working in conjunction with the Middle East Institute, it set up the “Future of Iraq Project.”\textsuperscript{60} Working mainly in the UK, on a shoestring budget of $5 million, it drew together 240 Iraqi exiles into a number of working groups to examine issues ranging from Public Health and Humanitarian Needs to Transitional Justice and Public Outreach. It produced over thirteen volumes of material described by one senior Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) member as “our bible.”\textsuperscript{61} It was an immensely informative and a good source for background material, and identified many problems, such as electrical power supplies and de-Ba'athification, that were to prove


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{60} Department of State. \textit{The Future of Iraq Project}. Available online at: http://www.gwu.edu/\~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm accessed 14 October 2006.

enduring to the CPA. However, the project did not produce an actionable plan for the post-Saddam phase of operations. Therefore, when the President decided that DoD would lead the post war mission, Powell did not object.

Though there was a bit of grumbling at the State Department, the secretary of state and his deputy took the position that *the Pentagon had the money and resources* for the postwar mission and was therefore entitled to run it.

The simple fact is that to administer a country the size of Iraq is a significant undertaking, even for combined resources of the US, UK and coalition allies. The State Department, including USAID (and FCO and DfID), is ill-resourced to conduct such stability and reconstruction operations. Whilst each department has specialized, highly motivated and capable operatives, they are not organized, equipped or resourced to do so. They do not have the personnel available, trained and in sufficient numbers, to plan for and implement such a huge undertaking. There are no extensive planning staffs with carefully detailed planning processes and no extensive core of first-responders able to deploy at short-notice. The military, where the resources and personnel are available, becomes the default option despite the fact that their war fighting culture, training and reliance on kinetic effects is often incompatible for the tasks set.

It seems clear that conducting complex stability and reconstruction will require the effective and efficient synchronization of all elements of national power in pursuit of policy objectives. This will require improvement in the two specific areas described in detail above. Firstly, the structures at the centre of government must be strengthened so that they can better direct the means at their disposal. Secondly, when considering the conflict continuum, the balance of resources, capability, and

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63 Ibid. Page 149. Italics inserted for emphasis.
emphasis, across each functional phase must be reviewed. Possible solutions to these
two problems are discussed later in Chapter 3.

The “Ways”

...attacks are coordinated across the spectrum of human activity: political, military, economic, and security. Our responses must be coordinated across these spheres too – but we currently have no mechanism to make this happen.64

The need for government to harness all elements of national power effectively is not a new concept. However, horizontal integration across government is a complex process and both the UK and US governments are striving to make improvements.

In 1999 Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) declared that it intended to ensure “that policy making is more joined up and strategic.” 65 Expanding on this it declared a strategic goal to create:

…a new and more creative approach to policy making, based on …designing policy around shared goals and carefully defined results, not around organizational structures or existing functions. Many policies are rightly developed and pursued by a single part of government. But a focus on outcomes will encourage Departments to work together where that is necessary to secure a desired result. 66

Whilst the paper was not specifically aimed at the MOD, it set the goal that cross-governmental unity, so often lacking in the past, must be achieved in the future. As part of this wider effort, a 2002 review of UK Defence67 specifically noted that the paper’s “conclusions take into account, and inform cross governmental thinking, and initiatives.” A subsequent review was more specific stating that:

66 Ibid. Section 2.6.
…the MOD will work with other government departments, particularly the FCO and DfID, to ensure that military effects-based planning complements wider strategic planning and the cross-government effort on crisis prevention and management.  

It went on to set up a pooled budget to support the inter-Departmental arrangements and ensure a whole-of-government response to conflict prevention. This policy guidance laid the foundations from which the Conflict Prevention Pools, that are discussed later, were created. It also drove development of the CA doctrine to guide the integration efforts. The CA aims to provide the conceptual framework to be used in “identifying, analyzing, planning and executing national responses to complex situations.” Led by the CO at the strategic level it is designed to facilitate a holistic approach to strategic processes, planning and objective development.

In the US, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 defined the key elements of the Clinton Administration’s policy on managing complex contingency operations. This process was overseen by an Executive Committee of the NSC through which individuals were held personally accountable to the President for designated portions of an operation. Published in May 1997, it was designed as a “reference for interagency planning.” It identified a “rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace” and stated that effective responses required “multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security.” It recognized that these

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69 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). *Joint Doctrine Note 4/05. The Comprehensive Approach*. January 2006. Page I-2. A JDN is published by DCDC to codify emerging best practice and provide initial guidance to the incorporation of CA thinking into the planning and execution of UK operations. The extent to which it will be formally codified within British Defence Doctrine is still under discussion at time of writing.

70 President Clinton. *PDD 56*. May 1997. Following quotes are drawn from the document.

71 PDD 56 defines “complex contingency operations” as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995 [onwards]) and the humanitarian intervention in Northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991).
operations could involve only non-military assets and would, most likely, be conducted as part of an international coalition. The PDD looked for military and civilian agencies to “operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management” and called for previous lessons to be learned and for the planning and implementation mechanisms to be institutionalized into the interagency environment.

From a military perspective PDD 56 is limited in scope and was never effectively implemented. For example, it is not applicable “unless otherwise directed” to “small-scale operations…military operations conducted in defense of US citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism…operations and international armed conflict.” It mandated the establishment of appropriate interagency working groups to bring together representatives of all agencies that might be involved in an operation and recognized the need for individuals to be trained in such an interagency environment. The NSC function is, in part, defined as “the President's principal arm for coordinating … among various government agencies.”72 However, two years later an independent report commissioned for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) found “little had been done,” that the “NSC was not stepping forward in [the] leadership role” and most agencies told the consultants they have “no role in carrying out PDD 56.” 73

PDD-56 was rescinded by the incoming Bush administration in 2001, but re-emerged in 2003 as an ‘interagency handbook’ published by the National Defence University (NDU).74 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 superseded

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PDD 56 and abolished the existing system of Interagency Working Groups in favor of 17 regional/functional NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations.

The requirement for interagency cooperation was reinvigorated in the domestic US theatre by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and in the international theatre by the problems encountered in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003 where the lack of inter-agency cooperation concerning reconstruction and stabilization efforts was evident in the post-war environment. This led to NSPD 44\textsuperscript{75} which directed the Secretary of State to:

… coordinate and lead integrated US Government effort, involving all US departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.

At the strategic level therefore, both the UK and US have a stated goal developing a cross-governmental approach to complex problems. The difficulty as always is translating this desire into practice. From a military viewpoint, doctrine, which is discussed in more detail below, provides the conceptual framework to guide a commander’s action and the impetus to drive change. To be successful however, all relevant departments of government must evolve and organize, train, equip and be resourced to play their role in developing and implementing strategy. This evolution has barely begun. The challenges that exist in implementing change are discussed below.

\textsuperscript{75} NSPD 44 is available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html accessed 14 December 2006.
Military Doctrine

The Armed Forces alone cannot secure the UK’s place in the international system. The challenges faced today – that will be faced in the future – are complex. And complex problems rarely permit simplistic solutions. There are cases where, even though it may be greatly regretted, armed forces are of limited or no utility. And where they have an important role to play – as the UK believes they often do – it is usually as part of a wider and united effort.\textsuperscript{76}

The UK CA\textsuperscript{77} was recognized as a requirement following difficulties encountered on missions such as the UNPROFOR in the Balkans. The impetus for change was driven by cabinet-level direction to achieve “joined up government.” During the Kosovo Conflict, NATO commanders acknowledged that shared understanding and collaboration at the tactical level were inadequate and responsibility for civilian-military cooperation was elevated to the operational level.

\begin{quote}
So the situation has arisen where the military alone cannot deliver that success; but where equally it cannot be delivered without the military. Hence the need for what is called the Comprehensive Approach, that is, the coordinated and synergistic application of all lines of development: political, diplomatic, military, legal, economic, social, and so on. And that means the co-ordinated and synergistic effort of those who are responsible for the various activities.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

To improve civilian-military cooperation, other government departments (OGDs) were represented in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO). The DCMO is a virtual organisation, formed from existing MOD departments and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).\textsuperscript{79} DCMO provides the Government with military advice and, in return, receives political direction as the basis for military

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{77} Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). \textit{Joint Doctrine Note 4/05. The Comprehensive Approach}. January 2006. This section draws on the JDN throughout.
\textsuperscript{78} Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup. \textit{British Defence in a Changing World}.
\textsuperscript{79} PJHQ can be regarded as the UK equivalent of a regional Comabattant Command. It is responsible for the planning and execution of UK-led Joint, potentially Joint, combined and multinational operations, and for exercising Operational Command of UK Forces assigned to combined and multi-national operations led by others, in order to achieve the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) military strategic objectives. It is a 3-star HQ and operates primarily at the strategic-operational nexus whereas a COMSOUTH is a 4-star HQ with responsibilities at the strategic level.
\end{flushright}
DCMO also serves as the MOD’s collective body for the overall management and resolution of crisis, including the higher direction of operations. In major crises the DCMO will provide the strategic level military liaison with OGDs, allies and coalition partners as well as with organisations such as the UN. A small permanent staff manages the Defence Crisis Management Centre in Whitehall as a focal point for the DCMO and OGDs.

In parallel, lessons identified in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrated that coherence required harmonization of strategic processes, planning and identification of objectives across all instruments and agencies. The CA is therefore the conceptual framework designed to reinvigorate the existing, Cabinet Office-led, approach to coordinating the activities and objectives of Government Departments in identifying, analyzing, planning and executing national responses to complex situations.

The CA recognizes that solutions require all elements of national power “together with an independent package of developmental and humanitarian activity.” It seeks to “strengthen, and hasten, the formation of [intergovernmental] partnerships” and recognises that “the relative weight of effort and influence of each individual instrument or element will vary” and Departments will be either a “supported” or “supporting” entity. Hence, “the military instrument may often not constitute the main effort” and may only be an enabler to support the actions of others.

The CA is regarded as a natural extension of the UK Effects-Based Approach (EBA) and is applicable throughout the conflict continuum. It looks to synchronize four concurrent activities (prevention, intervention, regeneration and sustainment) to produce a self-sustaining peace. It is based on the principles of shared understanding.

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(rather than conformity or uniformity), outcome-based thinking and collaborative working through “frequent personal contact, human networks and information sharing.” It recognizes that it can only succeed if participants can reach a “shared understanding” that must be “engendered culturally through routine working practices, liaison and education.”

The advantages to the military are manifold in that the CA should provide a clearer understanding of the problem, more efficient realization of desired effects, smoother transition of responsibility from military to civilian lead and a better overall chance of success. Many challenges exist to achieve implementation not least of which is to change the current, departmental model of government. This is a complex problem that requires relationships to be built and maintained in order to prevent “turf wars” developing. The CA therefore requires a “pre-disposed culture” to be developed, amongst those wishing to prevent or resolve crises, that pre-disposes individuals and organisations to work proactively, to share their understanding of situations, to base planning and activity on the basis of desired outcomes in the short, medium and long-term, and to collaborate wherever possible.81

The process has been described in the UK as “leading from behind” because implementation requires full participation from a wide-range of actors across government. An ad-hoc cross-government Comprehensive Approach Working Group (CAWG) has been established to take the CA forward. Amongst many tasks it must ensure buy-in at the highest level to drive the production of a cross-government conceptual framework. It has also established study groups to identify communities of interest and is looking to strengthen the CA culture through education and training.81

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81 Development, Concepts & Doctrine Centre (DCDC) brief to the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, 7 December 2006.
However, the real test-bed for the CA is the 2006 UK deployment of troops to the Helmand Province of Afghanistan which has been planned and is being implemented using the CA. The success, or otherwise, of this mission, which is discussed in more detail in Section 2, will be the determining factor in the further development of the CA.

The closest US corollary to the CA is “Unified Action.” It is defined as:

A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

If implemented successfully, unified action results in unity of effort. The term originally referred predominantly to the military sphere but is now being expanded to encompass collaboration across the military, interagency, industrial and academic fields.

Unified action is something broadly acknowledged now where military action as an instrument alone cannot handle the problems we face. It must do it in concert with the United States government, multinational elements and coalition partners, and inter-agencies and multi-agencies.

Unfortunately, Unified Action has also been described as “a fine idea with a prominent place in DOD doctrinal publications; unfortunately, no one else in government pays much attention to DOD’s doctrine.”

The US President, advised by the NSC, is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort and the Sec Def is responsible to the President for

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national military unity of effort. Combatant commanders should ensure that their unified action synchronizes and/or integrates military operations with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations), and nonmilitary organizations (DoD and other federal government agencies such as the USAID; the UN; and NGOs).

The doctrine sounds straightforward but in practice this is not so. The NSC, if it functions effectively, is a suitable forum for devising unified action at the strategic level that should lead to a unity of effort. It brings together the principal decision makers and enables the President to make informed decisions. The difficulty comes in the next step of translating these decisions to the operational level and maintaining unity of effort.

At the operational level, where strategy must be translated into the reality of tactics for use on the ground, there are numerous impediments to achieving unity of effort. The primary difficulty is that only the military, in the guise of the regional Combatant Commands (COCOMs), are organized, trained and equipped to take the lead. There is no operational-level interagency body that exists on the scale required to plan for complex crises. The effect is that the operationalizing of strategy becomes military led and the other agencies required to achieve unity of effort must use their often meager resources to integrate into and attempt to influence the well-established military planning process.

Unfortunately, in DoD doctrinal publications, “there is a clear implication that… the military Combatant Commander, or his subordinates at the Joint Task Force level, are first among equals for operational-level interagency coordination.”

This can undermine the interagency effort and subordinates it to the military commander rather than integrating it. Furthermore doctrine states that whilst civil
authorities retain their “primacy” within their spheres of responsibility, military commanders retain the ability to:

…clarify the mission; determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and personnel provided for the interagency effort; and assure seamless termination under conditions which assure that identified national objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation. 88

This overly-forceful doctrinal emphasis on military primacy over interagency partners contributes to poor integration.

Integration of the interagency effort into a COCOM is difficult for many reasons. For example, research has postulated the key elements required to achieve unity of effort in such an integrated organization. The single most important factor in pursuing organizational unity of effort is the establishment of a clear sense of purpose articulated as clear, attainable goals and objectives promulgated organization-wide. 89 Ideally, there should also be unity of command, strong inter-personal relationships and effective organizational policies and procedures.

Achieving the four key elements required for unity of effort is difficult because the COCOMs primary purpose is to conduct military operations, a *modus operandi* that is not be shared by other agencies. Moreover, unity of effort can deteriorate if interagency personnel seconded to the COCOM are forced to report back to their own agency; the result is working for two masters. In this sense, unity of command should be seen as essential element of unity of effort, rather than just a

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desirable concept that is too difficult to achieve. This is recognized in military doctrine which states:

Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.90

Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. It is the foundation for trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified action…91

Similarly, without being a part of the COCOM during day-to-day training, the inter-personal relationships vital to trust need to be formed under the pressure of a crisis situation. Finally, joint doctrine recognizes that effective organizational policies and procedures do not exist:

[T]here is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. . . . [T]here is no oversight organization to ensure that the myriad of agencies, departments, and organizations have the capabilities to work together.92

There are ways of easing this integration problem by establishing a permanent interagency presence in the COCOMs. For example, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) have been established at the regional COCOMs to integrate interagency personnel. Their utility is in Section 2 of this paper. US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is taking the lead in developing not only the JIACG concept and is also experimenting in exercises such as Multi-National Experiment (MNE) series design to better integrate the interagency and multi-national effort. The MNE 5 exercise problem statement is:

91 Ibid. Page III-1.
Coalition partners require improved methods to conduct rapid interagency and multinational planning, coordination and execution in order to create and carry out a unified comprehensive strategy.93

Similarly, the unified action concept remains under development nationally with JFCOM staff focused more on integration. JFCOM characterizes the movement from de-conflicted military operations in Desert Storm, to coordinated military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking to the future JFCOM sees the need to develop a truly integrated military as a precursor to an interdependent future that involves the interagency, multinational partners and industry/academia in addition to the military.94

Looking at the US and UK together, it is clear that the military are placing a high priority on developing doctrine that will enhance the integration of all elements of national power to achieve effective solutions to complex problems. However, much uncertainty remains. Can improved unity of effort be achieved? Will unity of effort be achieved without unity of command? This uncertainty is borne out by the Sec Def’s response when asked how he saw unified action evolving for the future. His non-committal response was that “challenges remain” but “we're better at it now than we were five years ago.”95

For both the UK, and especially the US given the increased scale of its national security architecture, the fundamental problem and key to the future is at the operational level. Only the military possesses the critical mass of resources and personnel to provide the framework for integration of all elements of national power. The result is that OGDs and interagency players are integrated, often poorly, into the military effort rather than all elements of national power being integrated into a

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93 MNE 5 Campaign Overview, 11 October 2006.  
94 Greenwald, COL Byron. Joint Capability Development. JFCOM J8 paper. 
whole-of-government plan. Any solution that wishes to achieve unity of effort in the complex environment we face must confront how this most fundamental of problems can be solved.
SECTION 2:
RECENT INITIATIVES IN CROSS-GOVERNMENT INTEGRATION

In this new war, cutting off funding is as important as dropping a bomb.  

Preparation for the post-conflict phase of the Iraq War, as discussed earlier, serves as an example of poor integration across government. Much effort was expended to achieve a robust plan but the fact that the different arms of government did not synergistically apply all levers of Coalition power contributed to the chaotic situation that exists in Iraq today. Even if a solution is found to stabilize and reconstruct the country the process will still have been far too inefficient, both in human lives and financial terms, to be judged successful.

This section of the paper will describe some of the strategic and operational level models that have been proposed to synchronize all elements of national power: changes at the tactical level are equally important but will not be covered in great depth. Numerous proposals have been made of how the ways and means at a government’s disposal can be improved. Some are in the early stages of implementation whilst others remain proposals for change. Three examples will be examined in detail: national stability and reconstruction units (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in the UK and the US State Department equivalent, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Operations), the UK Conflict Prevention Funds, and the JFCOM full-spectrum JIACG model. Implementation of these models is ongoing and their results will be assessed where

possible. The paper will then examine “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” (BGN)\textsuperscript{97} approach proposed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

**Stability and Reconstruction Units**

...we need to deftly use all our elements of power in an integrated and intelligent manner to generate stability in parts of the world where the myriad problems we face have their roots.\textsuperscript{98}

...the greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones.\textsuperscript{99}

In recent years, the US, the UK and other international actors have taken significant action to develop strategies that address the problem of weak and failing states. This focus is related to changes in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War. For example, in the period 1945-78 the UN initiated 13 stabilization operations. The comparable figure for 1978-88 was 0 but rose to 47 for 1988-2006.\textsuperscript{100}

[T]he predominance of intra-state conflicts over inter-state wars, increased demand for international involvement in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction operations, and the multiple humanitarian and security risks that emanate from failing states.\textsuperscript{101}

The 9/11 terrorist attacks represented a critical juncture because Afghanistan, a failed state, provided safe haven for the preparation of the attacks. The importance of failed states is recognized by the prominent position given to the subject in key strategy documents such as the US National Security Strategy. It recognizes that

\textsuperscript{97} BGN is a series of 3 reports by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) available online at http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/ accessed 3 January 2007.
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”  

Similarly, the UK Government recognizes the problem:

…one illusion has been shattered on 11 September: that we can have the good life of the West irrespective of the state of the rest of the world. Once chaos and strife have got a grip on a region or a country trouble will soon be exported. Out of such regions and countries come humanitarian tragedies; centers for trafficking in weapons, drugs and people; havens for criminal organizations; and sanctuaries for terrorists.

Stability and reconstruction operations, on which UK and US personnel are currently deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, are therefore of critical importance to the national strategies of the US and the UK. They are invariably complex operations and successful resolution will require the synchronized application of all elements of national power.

**Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS)**

The S/CRS was established within the US State Department by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 in December 2005. It works on a “hub and spokes” model by which all actors with relevant capabilities are integrated by the State Department hub. The stated mission is to:

…lead, coordinate and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

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104 This is a common model and examples of similar structures can be found in countries such as Australia. Further detail can be found on the Australian Government website including the paper “Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges.” Available online at http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment7.htm (accessed 31 October 2006).
S/CRS has responsibility for coordinating and leading integrated US Government efforts, involving all US departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization. For crisis planning the S/CRS aims to establish entities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to lead and synchronize the efforts.\textsuperscript{106} It has responsibility for both contingency and crisis planning and the Secretaries of State and Defence must integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans, where relevant and appropriate.

NSPD 44 specifically states that the DoD will support reconstruction and stabilization efforts if the situation dictates. DoD Directive 3000.05\textsuperscript{107} establishes how it will develop capabilities for stability, security, transition and reconstruction. It commits the DoD to supporting US efforts and in particular notes that stability operations are a core US military mission that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities. The Directive recognizes the need to prevent host nation dependence and promote independence and states that “many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals.”\textsuperscript{108} It also recognizes that to secure a lasting peace: “US military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”\textsuperscript{108} Hence, the US military underwrites the success of stability operations.

The S/CRS model has been developed at a number of exercises at the national and international level. At the strategic level it has stood up a Country


\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. Section 4.3.
Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG). The CRSG aims to achieve a unity of effort across government with a focused process for planning and implementation. Based in Washington, it is a planning and policy coordination body designed to channel interagency input and provide recommendations to the appropriate decision-makers through the NSC staff. Once the planning process is complete the CRSG aims to identify and mobilize resources, manage ongoing efforts and resolve disputes among interagency partners. Each CRSG will be supported by a secretariat and a full-time CRSG staff that will actually conduct the planning. An intelligence warning framework has been constituted to provide sufficient warning time for the process to occur.

At the operational level, Integration Planning Cells (IPC) will be established as a flexible interagency team of stability and reconstruction planners scaleable to the requirements of the specific scenario. With the empowerment of the CRSG, the IPC will deploy to support civ-mil planning with the relevant geographic Combatant COCOM, UN peacekeeping operation or multi-national planning mission. The aim is to ensure integration both horizontally across the agencies and also vertically between the strategic intent and the operational and tactical plans. Its objectives are to produce a comprehensive stability and reconstruction plan, to identify the specific civilian capabilities to deploy in support of the requirement, to identify the impact of any planned military (mostly kinetic) operations on the requirement and to develop a transfer plan, if required, from military to civilian lead. The IPC are also able to advise the operational commanders and to develop the scope and requirements for the deployment of tactical level teams (Advance Civilian Team (ACT)). A typical IPC may include 10 core personnel including specialists in fields such as economic

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109 *S/CRS Conference Notes, 7-9 September 2006.*
stabilization, governance, humanitarian assistance and logistics. IPC members will be organized, trained and equipped to deploy forward if required.

At the tactical level, the ACT will be the field deployable unit composed of US government civilians with skills distributed across the range of functions required. To build these teams the State Department is forming an Active and Standby Response Corps (ARC and SRC). The ARC comprises full-time ‘first responders’ trained and organized within the ACT framework and ready to move at 7 days notice. The SRC will comprise State Department personnel who have volunteered in advance for reconstruction and stability work and have undertaken a more basic level of training. They will be used to augment ACTs with further skill sets or to simply provide the weight of numbers to form extra ACTs. A civilian reserve will also be created that is able to mobilize specialists at one months notice. Other agencies will be expected to contribute similarly trained personnel up to an expected size of 20 to 25. It is assessed that 4 or 5 ACTs could be deployed at a regional (brigade) level. For extended operations it is envisioned that a “global skills network” of contract personnel will be used.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU)

In the UK, the PCRU has been established with a similar “hub and spoke” structure to the S/CRS. Formed in late 2004, it is a tri-departmental unit of the MOD, DfID and the FCO. DfID is the lead department and the stated mission is to:

…provide HMG and its partners with integrated assessment and planning support, underpinned by an operational capability, to deliver more effective stabilisation operations.\(^{110}\)

The PCRU is overseen by the Defence and Overseas Policy Sub-Committee\(^{111}\) for Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. The PCRU aims are to

provide integrated and common assessments and plans to determine essential stabilisation needs and priorities; operational capability to deploy staff at short notice for a time limited period to a country identified for stabilisation support; evaluation of key stabilisation lesson learned. PCRU capabilities are focused on governance, security and justice, with those for infrastructure and livelihoods being developed.

As of July 2006, the PCRU has 28 personnel drawn from five Government Departments and agencies including DfID, FCO, MOD and the Treasury. A £10 million budget for FY06 finances core staff, consultants, deployments, and associated vehicles and communications. Four hundred deployable experts, coordinated on a central database, are available to supplement field teams. The key focus of the PCRU since becoming fully operational in April 2005 has been on improving the coherence of UK stabilisation efforts. To do this it has worked closely with PJHQ to develop civ-mil planning capabilities through participation in joint exercises.

Operationally, the PCRU has already deployed an Assessment Team to Lebanon to develop options for UK Government in future reconstruction and stabilization work. Similarly, it provided staff for the UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Basra which coordinates and helps deliver UK, US and Danish capacity building assistance to the Iraqi Government in Basra Province.

However, the major focus of its work has been in Helmand Province of Afghanistan where it continues to facilitate both an assessment of and plan for the UK’s engagement. Seven staff and consultants deployed for 6 months in late 2005 producing a coherent aim and objectives for the mission and supporting implementation in areas such as security, justice and governance. It also provides

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111 The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee is analogous to the US National Security Council. A sub-committee is an equivalent level to a Principals Committee.
staff to the Strategic Delivery Unit in the British Embassy in Kabul to ensure the overall coherence of UK assistance efforts in Afghanistan.

**Analysis of S/CRS and the PCRU**

Past results of the international community’s engagement in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts reflect the difficulty of the task. Some interventions have been partially successful (e.g. East Timor, Sierra Leone, former Yugoslavia), some have been clear failures (Somalia), and in some critical cases (notably Rwanda and Sudan), multilateral institutions have become involved too late or not at all.\(^{112}\) These examples highlight the importance of S/CRS and the PCRU as the pan-government leads in the development of strategic level concept for dealing with failing states. Unfortunately both are experiencing problems.

The UK Secretary of State for International Development expected:

…the PCRU to be able, if necessary, to plan and organize a large-scale deployment of up to several hundred civilians, including police, as part of a post-conflict stabilization operation by mid-2006.\(^{113}\)

The importance of such timely reconstruction activity was highlighted recently by the NATO commander in Afghanistan:

This thing is going to be won or lost depending on the consent of the people of Afghanistan. What they want to see now is success in reconstruction and development, and that's what we've got to set about doing over this winter.\(^{114}\)

The reality in Afghanistan has turned out somewhat differently:

The [UK] government has quietly withdrawn its senior development adviser from Helmand in Afghanistan, crippling the promised reconstruction projects, because the area has become too dangerous.

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Only 4 out of more than 20 British civilian posts in the province are now filled…\textsuperscript{115}

In a failing state reconstruction is a vital, time critical activity. More often than not it will involve a significant degree of personal risk because success will go hand-in-hand with improving security. The success of the S/CRS and PCRU will therefore depend, in part, on the successful recruitment of a cadre of personnel willing to accept the risks inherent in the role. That is not to say they should be exposed to unnecessary danger, but often security and reconstruction will be interdependent. Military forces may be unable in isolation to provide lasting security without reconstruction activities bringing tangible benefits to communities. This point was emphasised by the North Atlantic Council when it stated that: “There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security.”\textsuperscript{116}

Reconstruction personnel must also be available in sufficient numbers to have an impact. The PCRU, with only 28 full-time staff, is perhaps too small to make a real difference at the operational level. The number of personnel that can be drawn from the database of expertise and deployed will be critical and they will require extensive military support. The S/CRS is only slightly larger than the PCRU at this time and is still to be fully funded. It was dealt a severe setback when the US Congress refused funding for a planned $100 million Conflict Response Fund proposed by the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{117} S/CRS plans to recruit only 16 ARC in FY 06 rising to 100 by FY 09. When compared to the US military, which has an estimated 2.4 million personnel, including several thousand planning staff it can devote to crisis and contingency planning, the comparison is stark.

\textsuperscript{115} Daily Telegraph. \textit{Britain pulls back on Helmand reconstruction}. 8 October 2006.


\textsuperscript{117} Washington Post. \textit{A Transformation at State}. 21 January 2006.
The under-resourcing, both financially and in terms of personnel, of the S/CRS and PCRU represents a failure to provide sufficient means in the ends-ways-means model of strategy. It is a critical failure that must be rectified for the units to be successful.

Differences in scale between the military and other agencies have been apparent in previous operations. For example, in Iraq in 2003 the CPA numbered about 1100 in contrast to nearly 173,000 military personnel, and found it difficult to extend influence beyond the confines of the Green Zone in Baghdad. In Vietnam, where integrated civilian-military teams were used with some success, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) teams still lacked civilian personnel. Only 1200 out of 7600 field team members were civilian causing an undesirable imbalance. Nevertheless, CORDS was probably successful in contributing to stability and security in South Vietnam.

By early 1970, 93% of South Vietnamese lived in “relatively secure” villages, an increase of almost 20 percent from the middle of 1968, the year marred by the Tet Offensive.

Despite these teething problems, S/CRS and PCRU are positive developments. Their “hub and spoke” model is viable but has limitations. In particular, when considering the key elements required in achieving unity of effort in an integrated organization, the single most important factor in pursuing organizational unity of effort is the establishment of a clear sense of purpose articulated as clear,

attainable goals and objectives promulgated organization-wide. Ideally, there should also be unity of command, strong inter-personal relationships and effective organizational policies and procedures. The S/CRS and PCRU only partially meet these attributes because their small size necessitates forming teams during crises to achieve the scale required for major operations. Whilst financial constraints will always limit scale, this affects all the essential attributes especially the development of strong inter-personal relationships.

The solution to the problems of both organizations is to recruit, organize, train and equip sufficient motivated staff willing to accept the inherent risks of reconstruction and stabilization. This requires adequate funding; the process to achieve the correct prioritization of funds will be discussed later in this section. However, financial constraints may mean they only gain the critical mass necessary to truly make a difference if international cooperation allows states, IOs and supranational bodies such as the European Union to unify efforts. This happens to a limited extent already but efforts at the national-strategic level should be intensified to improve cooperation. If this happens, then the hub and spoke model could perhaps be used to transform other areas of the national security apparatus.

**Conflict Prevention Funds**

> It is much better to prevent conflict than to have to resolve it. But even here the Armed Forces have an important role to play. Working in partnership with diplomats and development agencies they can help build capacity within states, both to maintain their own security and to contribute to regional peacekeeping forces.

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The UK has pioneered an inter-departmental pooling approach in the field of conflict management to provide expertise and funding for conflict prevention tasks. It differs from the reconstruction and stabilization units in that is managed by teams of officials drawn on a part-time basis from the FCO, MOD, DFID, Cabinet Office and HM Treasury, rather than the more traditional management structure of S/CRS and the PCRU. The most significant achievement of this approach to date was the establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) in 2001. The Pools conduct joint analysis, financing and coordination in areas where collaboration adds value to conflict prevention activities.

The Pools integrate the expertise of DfID, the MoD and the FCO to promote the unity of effort that was lacking prior to their formation. Each department contributes funds to the Pools to give an annual budget that is shared between the departments to finance programmes.

The Pools are directed at cabinet level by sub-committees of the DOPC that meet bi-annually. Taking the ACPP as an example, it draws strategic level guidance from the UK Sub-Saharan Strategy for Conflict Prevention and works with other donors and multilateral institutions to achieve a consolidated and coordinated approach. The over-arching goal of the strategy is to improve the UK government’s effectiveness for conflict prevention in Africa and implement the G8\textsuperscript{124} Africa Action Plan. At the regional level the Pool works through four Regional Conflict Advisors based in Africa. They link with regional bodies, NGOs and academic research institutions to facilitate operations. At the country level the focus is based on the

\textsuperscript{124} The G8 member states are the UK, US, Canada, Russia, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. The EU is also represented at G8 meetings.
existing infrastructure of the three departments involved liaising with government departments, national armed forces and local grassroots bodies.

The ACPP has funded a wide variety of conflict prevention activities across the continent. Programmes that receive funding from the pool tend to be those that will demonstrably benefit from inter-departmental collaboration. Whilst one department takes the lead, there is close interaction between the three principal departments. The ACPP has a strong thematic focus: enhancing peace support operations capabilities; security sector reform; demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration; curbing small arms proliferation and misuse; and the economic and financial causes of conflict. All of these programmes are jointly implemented with national governments and local organisations, and many are also undertaken in partnership with other bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors.

The projects undertaken by the pool are varied. For example, the ACPP has provided funds to the Ghanaian, Mozambican and Nigerian Armed Forces to facilitate their deployment on African-led peace support operations in Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi and Liberia. In Sierra Leone, it contributed to; organizing, training and equipping the army and police; the creation of a new Ministry of Defence with appropriate civilian oversight; funding for an anti-corruption unit; and support to a truth and reconciliation commission.125

The Pools are able to use the established networks to build a consensus for action in emerging conflict situations. They can also deploy resources quickly and effectively with minimum bureaucratic hurdles by circumventing departmental funding constraints. Moreover they act as a repository for institutionalizing lessons learned and building corporate knowledge. The Pools were evaluated in 2004, at the

request of HMG, by Bradford University. The evaluation judged that this unique approach was essential in order to ensure that, two years after their inception, the Pools not only functioned effectively, but actively added value to Departments.\textsuperscript{126}

The Pools undoubtedly provide an effective method of integrating effort horizontally across government to improve unity of effort. They minimize bureaucracy by using a virtual\textsuperscript{127} management structure whilst utilizing cross-government experience and knowledge. Common control of funding allows a rapid response to crisis prevention providing the agility to act quickly. They are able to retain this agility in part because the funds under direction are relatively small (\(£ 64.5\) Million for the ACPP programmes in FY 07). Whilst they are currently limited to the functional area of conflict prevention there is no reason why they could not be developed for use in other functional areas that require a unified response.

What the concept currently lacks is the ability to translate operations to a larger scale and apply them to functional areas requiring a greater level of activity. If the amount of money available were to be significantly increased it is unlikely that a Pool could continue to operate without a full-time secretariat to plan and direct operations. The bureaucracy and expense linked to a secretariat would remove the two most attractive elements of the Pool system; efficiency and agility. Moreover, without a fulltime secretariat the Pool system is limited in its ability to contribute to contingency and crisis planning at the operational level for major operations in fields such as stability and reconstruction. The Pool system is therefore best utilized for relatively small scale efforts that would benefit from a unified approach. The Pool


\textsuperscript{127} The term virtual is used because the management staff are all members of other government departments and are not full-time employees of the Pools.
model is not suitable for employment on a larger scale to unify effort across government.

**Full Spectrum JIACG**

The previous two examples of harnessing interagency effort focused on functional areas and covered the strategic to tactical levels. The JIACG is different. It is an operational level organizational initiative to improve coordination and planning for complex operations. It is an interagency group based within the military regional COCOM headquarters and designed to facilitate interagency planning and coordination at the operational level.

JFCOM has been developing the JIACG organizational concept since 2000. The idea was given impetus by the pressing need to improve interagency coordination on counterterrorism issues in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In 2002, the NSC agreed to the establishment of “limited” JIACGs in each regional COCOM and approved 3 DOD-funded positions for representatives from Treasury, State, and Justice at each COCOM.  

The JIACG is a multifunctional advisory element within a COCOM that facilitates day-to-day contact between civilian and military planners. It can represent the views of the interagency to the COCOM commander and share information across the interagency community. Its purpose, as a COCOMs lead organization for the interagency community, is to provide oversight, facilitation, coordination and synchronization of agencies’ activities within the command. As a fully integrated participant of the COCOM it contributes to both contingency and crisis planning.

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The core JIACG staff can be augmented if the situation dictates, or deployed forward as part of a Joint Task Force if required.

Each regional COCOM has used the “limited” JIACG differently. No two JIACGs look or operate alike. For example, in some cases, the JIACG reports to the J-3, in others, to the Deputy Commander, as driven by the COCOM commander’s requirement. The current “limited” JIACGs’ focus on counterterrorism and counter narcotics issues has proven to be valuable and all of the COCOMs have expressed interest in going “full-spectrum.” The first regional command to do so is Pacific Command (PACOM) which stood up its JIACG in late summer 2006. At time of writing however the PACOM JIACG is far from fully manned. A State Department representative is present (O-6 equivalent\textsuperscript{130}) and a USAID representative is expected but further billets available to agencies such as Justice, Treasury and CIA are not yet filled as of December 2006. Other COCOMs continue to struggle with JIACG Manning and often have to arrive at innovative solutions (such as trading an O-6 for a USAID official) to solve the problem.

The JIACG is a useful concept to provide interagency input at the operational level. It has been extensively researched and experimented by JFCOM and the COCOMs are attempting to implement the concept as best they can but there are a number of difficulties. Firstly, the established billets for agency personnel are a ‘drop in the ocean’ when compared to the mass of military personnel in a COCOM. Moreover, many billets necessary to give the JIACG sufficiently wide representation are not filled. Secondly, to be effective the personnel need to be high-quality individuals capable of integrating quickly and influencing strategy. Unfortunately, the most capable agency personnel are reluctant to undertake the posts because it

\textsuperscript{130} US O-6 is equivalent to UK OF-5 i.e. a full colonel.
takes them outside of their optimum career path and can jeopardize promotion prospects. Solving this problem will require incentives and this will be discussed later. Similarly, O-6 level is insufficiently senior within the confines of a COCOM to influence the combatant commander on a regular basis or for the JIACG to be a decision making body in its own right. This results in the JIACG becoming an umbilical between the COCOM and the interagency which decreases its effectiveness. Finally, as mentioned in Section 1, even if the JIACG concept is perfected, it still represents an interagency input to a military plan rather than the requirement for a whole of government plan with a military input.

A full-spectrum JIACG would be a useful tool for a COCOM commander and represents the best-practice integration of the interagency that currently exists in the US. It is however, merely a palliative that attempts to make the best of a flawed system and does not, in itself, form the basis for true horizontal integration at the operational level.

**Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BGN)**

A series of military failures, in particular the failed attempt in 1980 to rescue the American hostages in Iran, highlighted military interoperability problems and convinced Congress that the DoD was not functioning correctly.\(^{131}\) Despite resistance from the DoD and the four services, the landmark reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 were enacted to force “jointness” on the services.

A series of three reports, termed BGN,\(^ {132}\) by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) builds on the 1986 act with the underlying aim of

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\(^{131}\) These failures include the botched attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran, the bombing of the U.S. embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, and the interoperability problems during the invasion of Grenada.

\(^{132}\) BGN reports are available online at http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/ accessed 31 October 2006.
building jointness across the whole of the national security architecture rather than just the armed services. The reports make a number of assumptions amongst which they recognise the need to maintain the “institutional vitality” of the Military Services while extending jointness “as a means to achieving superior military, interagency and coalition operations.”

The Phase 1 report stated that the “organizational structures and processes initially constructed to contain a Cold War superpower in the Industrial Age are inappropriate for 21st century missions in an Information Age.” It made many recommendations amongst which it considered:

A critical first step is for the President to give greater organizational emphasis …by designating the Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC staff as having lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies and plans and ensuring greater unity of effort among agencies during execution, and by establishing a new office in the National Security Council with this mandate.

The BGN Phase 2 report is more comprehensive than the first and is based on the principle that “government should be more agile.” It focuses on the need to bring together “disparate parts of the US national security structure to row together, in both planning and execution,” i.e. at the operational level.

The report hits at the very heart of achieving a whole of government approach, rather than a military approach that tries to integrate the rest of government by recommending that the US adopt a “Quadrennial National Security Review to develop US national security strategy and determine the capabilities required to

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implement the strategy.”139 This all encompassing approach is absolutely vital to achieving a strategic overview and to allow capabilities across the full spectrum of national security to be properly prioritized for funding. Similarly, it recommends the production of “classified National Security Planning Guidance”140 to fill the vacuum that currently exists and to guide the development of cross-governmental plans.

BGN Phase II comments on the need to reassess resource allocation in light of changing national security priorities and enhance the links between policy, resource allocation, and execution. It makes many other valid recommendations including the removal of institutional barriers to the movement of personnel across departments (as discussed earlier when considering JIACGs) and building education and training programmes to support the whole of government approach.

BGN Phase II also pays due heed to the need to keep a separation between the strategic and operational levels lest the policy and strategic functions of the NSC and its staff become subsumed by the day-to-day minutiae of operations. It warns:

A stronger NSC role in providing policy oversight during planning and execution, however, does not mean that the NSC staff should be involved in the conduct of operations. Rather, the study team recommends that the NSC establish a new NSC Senior Director and office responsible for developing the Presidential guidance for complex contingency operations and ensuring that interagency planning for these operations is fully integrated.141

Operational capability would be provided by “rapidly deployable Interagency Crisis Planning Teams, comprised of regional and functional experts from all of the participating agencies, charged with developing truly interagency campaign plans.”142 These teams would support a deployable “standing Interagency Task Force (IATF) headquarters core element” that “would integrate the day to day efforts

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139 Ibid. Page 6.
140 Ibid. Page 6.
141 Ibid. Page 7.
142 Ibid. Page 8.
of all USG agencies. The IATF would be led by a senior civilian appointed by the President and the CJTF [Commander Joint Task Force], supported by a fully integrated civil-military staff.\textsuperscript{143}

The report cuts to the heart of the problems and recommends a system that allows for the generation of a whole of government approach to complex problems. It also highlights the point that this transformation will require extensive training and education and realizes that Congressional legislation will be required to move forward. In particular, the call for a Quadrennial National Security Review to ensure coherent resource allocation is vital. It is only with such a review that important organizational changes, such as S/CRS, can realistically compete for prioritized national security funding. Moreover, it addresses the need for horizontal integration in peacetime, preparation of whole-of-government contingency plans and recognizes the importance of inter-personal relationships in building unity of effort.

One area where it falls short is that it does not recommend the formation of an interagency operational level headquarters akin to a military COCOM. It postulates the IATF as a military-civilian HQ broadly equivalent to a military Joint Task Force. It suggests the Commander of the JTF (CJTF) would command the military element of the IATF whilst a civilian presidential Special Representative (SR) would be responsible for the civilian agencies. The military side would report upwards via the responsible COCOM to Sec Def; the SR would report to the Secretary of State. Together, the SR and the CJTF, would lead the IATF and be charged with integrating US interagency operations in the field.

This relationship breaks a fundamental rule of operations because it splits the command of the IATF rather than proposing unity of command. In some situations,

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. Page 8.
with the right personalities, successful integration could be helped by this relationship, but in others it is a recipe for disaster. A single individual must have responsibility for the success or failure of an operation and the suggested dual-command relationship is not recommended. For example, purely humanitarian missions do not require military leadership and in some regions, distrustful of foreign military, this may be a disadvantage. Whilst the military will undoubtedly have a part to play in complex crises, there are many scenarios that would benefit from presenting the civilian face of leadership. Similarly, there are times when a mission will be predominantly military in nature and will benefit from a military commander rather than a civilian.

An IATF, on a small-scale, with a narrowly defined mission already exists in the form of the Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-S). It conducts counter-narcotic trafficking operations, mainly involving narcotics in its area of responsibility. It is a successful organization that provides mutual benefit to the contributing agencies. It effectively integrates military and civilian personnel, from agencies such as the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency, under the command of a Coast Guard Director. The current vice-director is a civilian with experience as a pilot in the Customs Service. It provides a working example of a more suitable command arrangement than that proposed by BGN reports.

JTFs (and by implication IATFs) are created to achieve specific, limited objectives.\(^{144}\) They are typically disbanded when the set objectives are achieved. This transitory existence makes the JTF/IATF unsuited for creating the permanent, enduring environment needed to integrate all elements of national power. Whilst they are a requirement to conduct successful operations they are insufficient to shape the

broader strategic environment. That task sits at the operational-strategic nexus currently occupied only by the military COCOMs. The concept of providing a true, whole-of-government headquarters at this level, tailored specifically to employ all elements of national power and to direct multiple IATFs, is discussed in the next section.
SECTION 3

Proposing a Way Forward

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.\textsuperscript{145}

The thesis, that national security policy objectives will be met more effectively and efficiently if a truly cross-governmental approach to complex operations is developed and implemented, has been explored with a focus on current operations. Section 1 compared, contrasted, and analyzed the ways and means employed by the UK and US in striving to achieve the “end” of better cross-government integration. Section 2 considered some of the recent innovations introduced to improve cross-governmental integration. All had utility and need to be considered when proposing a way forward. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are struggling to meet their objectives at least in part because a cross-governmental approach was not taken initially or because the approach has either not been implemented or resourced sufficiently. This section will consider how a cross-governmental approach might be developed, implemented and resourced.

When the means, both tangible and intangible were considered, three significant problems with the current system were noted. These were:

- Resource imbalances result in only the military being organized, trained and equipped to lead at the operational level.

- Personality matters! Under the current system the role of the National Security Advisor, as defined by the incumbent President, is the key to achieving unity of effort at the highest level.

At the strategic level, there is no fundamental review process designed to match resources and capabilities to tasks across the whole spectrum of the national security apparatus.

The first problem is the most fundamental concept necessary to achieve successful integration of effort across government. Only the military possesses the capability at the operational level to plan campaigns and the risk exists that every plan will be military-centric. Interagency integration into the COCOMs and PJHQ, in the form of a JIACG, or similar body, undoubtedly mitigates the situation but does not solve the problem. Just as the NSC/DOPC at the strategic level is a whole-of-government body, so must the operational level command be representative of the whole-of-government. To do otherwise risks being overly-dependent on the military and the concern that the military hammer will interpret every problem as a nail.

Unfortunately, the nature of the complex operations in which we find ourselves engaged cannot be solved by stove-piped responses. It is evident from the complexity of the conflicts, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but stretching back to Vietnam and beyond, that a broader approach must be taken to achieve enduring results. The current path of “muddling through” at the operational level is a course of action that is inefficient at best and ineffective at worst.

If the need for a whole-of-government approach at the operational level is accepted then many options exist, of which three will be considered. The first option is to use a beefed-up, hub and spoke model akin to the S/CRS. Rather than just generating individual IPCs that complement a JTF, the S/CRS could be expanded to include its own functional operational-level command into which actors relevant to stability and reconstruction operations would integrate. However, extending this logic provides an argument for other functional commands such as counter-narcotics
or counter-terrorism. To expand the number of operational level commands would be extremely expensive and would serve to confuse rather than clarify authority. Moreover, complex missions, by definition, cannot be compartmentalized simply as “stability” but will contain many other elements. It is therefore rejected as the basis for solving the problem.

The second option to tackle the problem is to employ a bottom-up approach. The 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) notes that “cooperation across Federal Government begins in the field with the development of shared perspectives and a better understanding of each agency’s missions and capabilities.” The trouble with this approach is that it is inherently slow. The evolution from the tactical level could take years to feed through to the creation of an operational level whole-of-government command. Moreover, anecdotal evidence of cooperation at the tactical level is commonplace but this has never resulted in similar levels of cooperation at higher levels. Therefore, whilst this bottom-up approach is vital to success in the long-term, and should be encouraged, it is unsatisfactory as the sole means of generating the change required.

The third option to approach the problem is a top-down approach that modifies the current Unified Command Plan to allow for the formation of whole-of-government operational level commands in lieu of military COCOMs (or PJHQ). The practical way of achieving this would be to transform the regional COCOMs (and PJHQ) from military to integrated civilian-military commands. The COCOMs would retain their regional bias rather than reverting to global functional commands (such as war fighting, stability, drug-enforcement etc) because of the important liaison function they conduct in their theatre. The COCOM commander would then

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be selected both on ability to undertake the role and on the perceived mission of his COCOM. For example, the President may decide to select a law-enforcement specialist to command SOUTHCOM in order to deal with counter-narcotics whereas Central Command may require a military officer to lead the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Selection in the early years would be problematic because few outside of the military will have the breadth of professional training and experience to ensure success. Hence, a system of training and education, as well as incentives to broaden the experiences of individuals outside of their own department, would be required. Similarly, rationalization of civilian and military grades would be required. This proposal is equally applicable in principle to PJHQ although some facets of the UK system, such as the existence of the DCMO, make the problem less acute.

The suggested name of the commands, the National Security Command Headquarters (NSCHQ) (South/Pacific/Central etc.) reflects the proposed command chain that would be directly to the President / PM via the National Security Advisor.\footnote{This would require the formal establishment of the National Security Advisor post in the UK, in lieu of the current Foreign Policy and Defence Advisor post.} This would give a clear chain of command between the strategic and operational levels and fulfil the requirement for a unified command chain. It would give the National Security Advisor more influence at the centre of government without damaging focus of the NSC staff on its primary role of strategic level coordination. This is an important point as many reports, such as the Hart-Rudman Commission have commented on the desirability for the NSC to retain this focus at the strategic level and to avoid being drawn down to the operational level.

The NSC should be responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda. The NSC Advisor and
staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational role. ¹⁴⁸

Other benefits would flow from the process. For example, the current regional boundaries defined by the DoD and State Department are different. Other agencies are different again. Aligning these boundaries would be a secondary gain from empowering the NSCHQ as the lead agent for all national security activity in the regions. The stove-piped agencies would retain their specialization and knowledge but exist as force providers, just as the individual services function now. There would inevitably be worries in the US about developing powerful “centres of gravity” outside of Washington and the worry that decision-making would become remote. Twenty years ago this would have been a relevant concern but dramatic developments in communications technology negate this worry.

The NSCHQ would also allow the NSC to act more proactively. The NSCHQs, based on the modus operandi of the regional COCOMs, would have the ability to study its theatre in depth and the mass to conduct contingency planning. Where appropriate it would be able to employ all elements of national power in an integrated peacetime shaping effort. Commonly referred to as Phase Zero, or a Theatre Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), these operations would focus on the softer elements of national power. Activities could include conflict prevention, promotion of democracy or military training teams in pursuit of national security strategic objectives.

A concern associated with creating whole-of-government NSCHQs is that they will detract from the ability of the military to effectively and efficiently conduct pure military operations. Similarly, accusations of political interference in military

matters, such as those levelled against the Johnson administration in Vietnam, could be a risk. Fortunately the ability to foresee the risks should ensure that they are avoided. Military command chains would be preserved within each NSCHQ. For example, a civilian NSCHQ commander would have a four-star officer as a deputy responsible for military matters. Moreover, no crisis exists, that requires a pure military solution and every crisis requires political engagement. Military operations in support of a whole-of-government plan can still be conducted along exclusively military command chains within a Joint Task Force and political ‘interference’ is more a matter of training, education and personality than organizational structure. Further risk, that the appointment of a military NSCHQ commander implies the intent to conduct military operations, (or vice versa if a civilian head is appointed), would need to be dealt with through diplomatic and informational channels to shape perceptions.

Unity of command, through the National Security Advisor (or a senior director on the NSC staff) to the NSC and the President, would be the natural command chain to maintain the whole-of-government approach. This would inevitably generate controversy as it would serve to diminish the departmental influences at the expense of the national security staffs. This is not, in my opinion, detrimental. Just as military personnel in the US and UK are able to operate in Joint and single service billets, so individuals will be able to operate in either departmental or national security billets. A military officer may therefore choose to build his career within his own service, or choose to diversify to a Joint Staff and ultimately a National Security Staff. A system of education and training, such as the proposed metamorphosis of the National Defence University to become the National Security University, would need to be developed to support this.
Responsibility and accountability are also improved under the proposed command structure. At present, agency and departmental contributions to operations are often at the discretion of the agency management chain. Supported commanders may often not receive the required level of support if the agency has other priorities. This is apparent, for example, in the manning problems of JIACGs. Under the proposed command structure the NSC staff would have authority to assign capabilities (military and civilian) to a NSCHQ that would be able to utilise them as required. This aligns responsibility to capability and provides accountability.

When considering the four attributes, discussed in Section 1, linked to unity of effort, the NSCHQ fulfils the model:

- The single most important factor in pursuing organizational unity of effort is the establishment of a clear sense of purpose articulated as clear, attainable goals and objectives promulgated organization-wide is achieved by the proposed NSCHQ structure.
- Unity of command, enabling unity of effort, is achieved and mirrors the successful ‘joint’ system practiced by the military. Personnel grow and develop in their stove-piped agency to develop the strong foundations and specialized skill sets necessary. They then broaden their interagency experience by cross-assignment to make them competitive for higher command positions.
- Strong inter-personal relationships will be achieved by the broadening experience of cross-assignments and the fact that the NSCHQs will tackle the day-to-day problems as well as the crises.
- Effective organizational policies and procedures would flow from NSCHQ commander.
It is therefore recommended that whole-of-government operational level headquarters, or NSCHQs, be established in lieu of the regional COCOMs and PJHQ. Legislation to re-assign authorities would be required in the US as would associated restructuring to support such an organization would be necessary.\(^\text{149}\)

The formation of NSCHQs would be preceded by a major review of the national security apparatus to chart the path forward. Stove-piped departments already have successful methods to enable this such as a UK Defence Review or the US Quadrennial Defence Review. This principal should be extended across the national security architecture on a scheduled basis and be a comprehensive examination of the national security strategy, capability structure, capability development plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of national security program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the national security strategy of the US/UK and establishing a revised national security program.\(^\text{150}\) A move to do this is already under consideration in the UK.

There have been plenty of signals recently that this is the way the Government is heading, with Gordon Brown preparing to bring in a single security budget to cover all [national security] aspects across Whitehall. He believes every department has a role to play, including those that might not consider themselves in the front line, such as education or culture.\(^\text{151}\)

The advantage of such a wide ranging review, under the auspices of the National Security Advisor, that would precede any changes in structure, would be to match capabilities and resources to tasks across the conflict continuum. At the moment the relatively resource rich defense departments in both the UK and the US

\(^{149}\) In the US, this would require legislation, similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986. This is discussed in the CSIS papers: Beyond Goldwater-Nichols available online at http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/ accessed 3 January 2007.

\(^{150}\) The scope is drawn from the current remit of the QDR.

\(^{151}\) Daily Telegraph. We Need a Minister for Security Now. Philip Johnston. 14 December 2006. Gordon Brown is currently the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and is highly likely to become PM when Tony Blair steps down in summer 2007.
are forced to underwrite operations in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of deployable reconstruction specialists from other arms of government. 152 Using military personnel trained and equipped for war is inefficient and may prove ineffective. Hence, the defense review must examine the roles and missions of each department and agency and then resource them to achieve it. This may require a resource shift away from defense department spending tied to a reduction in the roles and liabilities of the military. This is shown diagrammatically at Figure 3.1. One example of this would be to adequately fund a pool of deployable reconstruction experts capable of operating independent of military support in all but the most hostile of environments. As one analyst commented:

The USG must provide not only incentives but also additional resources to promote jointness among national security professionals at the interagency level. The USG must also realign agency authorities and resources to match agency roles and responsibilities in mission areas ranging from homeland security and combating terrorism to stability operations and combating WMD. 153

It is therefore recommended that both the US/UK instigate National Security Reviews to define the roles and missions of each department and agency and to resource them sufficiently such that they can develop the capabilities required.

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152 This comment is not meant to imply that the DoD are adequately resourced for the task. It is simply an acknowledgement that Defence consumes a large segment of the budget when compared to the State Department or FCO, for example.

The final element to consider is the changes required at NSC level to provide the political authority, legal authority and personnel to ensure they can conduct a National Security Review and provide guidance to the NSCHQ. Given the range of authority that the position of National Security Advisor would carry the incumbent must be capable of operating at senior levels of the Cabinet. In the UK this would strengthen the argument for the creation a National Security Advisor which currently does not exist. The post can be considered the political equivalent to the CDS or the CJCS post in the military responsible for coordinating the stove-piped services. The National Security Advisor must possess sufficient authority over other departments to coordinate interagency operations in the required areas to avoid the coordination difficulties apparent in the preparations for the Iraq War. In the US this would require major legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. **In the UK, it is recommended that the post of National Security Advisor is created.**
The secondary effect of routing the command chain through the National Security Advisor is to bolster the relative strength of the post and by implication the NSC/DOPC. It has many advantages. Firstly, it should diminish inter-departmental rivalry and personality clashes that were a problem in planning for the aftermath of the 2003 Gulf War. Secondly, it adheres to the tried and tested adage of ‘centralized planning, decentralized execution’ by strengthening the centre of government to allow it to make coherent choices that the periphery can then implement. Moreover, the NSC/DOPC is close enough to be tied explicitly to Presidential/Prime Ministerial authority when difficult decisions need to be made. The scope of authority would need to stretch across all players in the national security environment.154

The drawbacks of a strengthened NSC would be an increase in staff levels at the NSC. These increases would be significant given the volume of work required to instigate a National Security Review. However, they would be offset by reductions at the stove-piped departments. Careful structuring of the NSC itself would need to produce an organization that is not “dilute[d]…from policy development and advisory functions … shortening its strategic view.”155 This is undoubtedly achievable as the DoD and MOD are currently tasked to maintain strategic focus, deal with resource issues and provide strategic guidance for operations in a similar manner to that being proposed for the NSC.

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154 In the US the interaction with the Department for Homeland Security and DNI would have to be carefully considered. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal extensively with these issues it is likely that the NSC would need to exert authority over both entities if it to complete the coordination role successfully.
Conclusion

A military HQ may provide the framework for a multidiscipline HQ…but it must do more than accommodate the representatives of the other disciplines – it must incorporate them.156

National security policy objectives will be met more effectively and efficiently if a truly cross-governmental approach to complex operations is developed and implemented. Globalization, the escalating effect of media scrutiny, and a general shift towards fourth-generation warfare make purely military responses to complex crises at best inefficient and at worst ineffective. Problems encountered by UNPROFOR, and on operations such as Restore Democracy in Haiti, brought the realization, both in the UK and the US, that a more holistic whole-of-government response was required.

The ends, ways and means construct for strategy is applicable for examining key areas where the UK and US are struggling to achieve cross-government integration. At the strategic level, the NSC and the National Security Advisor are the key elements in the US, whilst the DOPC and the Foreign Policy Advisor play similar roles in the UK. Both are dependent on personalities. The failure in the US at this level to achieve adequate unity of effort was one cause of the failure to produce an adequate plan for the post-combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The solution to this problem is to boost the profile and authority of the National Security Advisor relative to the Departmental Secretaries.

At the operational level, an imbalance in resources between the military and other departments (such as State or the FCO) results in the situation that only the military are capable of undertaking the roles required. This can result in the integration of other elements of national power into a military plan rather than the

military being integrated into a whole-of-government plan. The engine for driving change in the military is doctrine. In the UK, the CA expands on the Effects-Based Approach to operations and attempts to employ all elements of national power. It remains under development and is already being tested in current operations in Afghanistan. Many problems exist, not least of which is the interdependence of security and reconstruction and the need to fully resource all the departments and agencies required to contribute.

The second section investigated and evaluated recent initiatives to improve cross-governmental integration. Four were considered in detail: national stability and reconstruction units, the UK Conflict Prevention Pools, JIACGs and the CSIS BGN proposals.

The under-resourcing, both financially and in terms of personnel, of the S/CRS and PCRU represent a failure to provide sufficient means in the ends-ways-means model of strategy. It is a critical failure that must be rectified for the units to be successful. Despite teething problems, S/CRS and PCRU are promising developments. Their “hub and spoke” model is viable but has limitations in particular, when considering the key elements required achieving unity of effort in an integrated organization.

The Conflict Prevention Pools are undoubtedly an effective method of horizontal integration across government to improve unity of effort. They minimize bureaucracy by using a virtual management structure whilst maximizing cross-government experience. Common control of funding allows a rapid response to crisis prevention providing agility to act quickly. The Pool system is best utilized for small scale areas that would benefit from a unified approach especially to fleeting
opportunities. It is not suitable as a model to be employed on a larger scale to unify effort across government.

A full-spectrum JIACG is a useful tool for a COCOM commander and represents the best-practice integration of the interagency that currently exists in the US. It is however, merely a palliative that attempts to make the best of a flawed system and does not, in itself, form the basis for true horizontal integration at the operational level. The JIACG works as an umbilical between the COCOM and the interagency and therefore represents an interagency input to a military plan rather than a whole-of-government plan with a military input.

The CSIS BGN report is excellent. It cuts to the heart of the problems and recommends a system that allows for the generation of a whole of government approach to complex problems. In particular, the call for a Quadrennial National Security Review to ensure coherent resource allocation is vital. Moreover, it addresses the need for horizontal integration in peacetime, preparation of whole-of-government contingency plans and recognizes the importance of inter-personal relationships in building unity of effort. However, the proposed IATFs, whilst necessary, are an insufficiently enduring solution to the problems.

A top-down approach that modifies the current Unified Command Plan to allow for the formation of whole-of-government operational level commands in lieu of military COCOMs (or PJHQ) is required. The practical way of achieving this would be to transform the regional COCOMs (and PJHQ) from military to integrated civilian-military commands nominally termed NSCHQs. The COCOMs would retain their regional bias because of the important liaison and command function they conduct in their theatre. The NSCHQ commander would then be selected both on ability to undertake the role and on the perceived mission of the NSCHQ. A system
of training and education, as well as incentives to broaden the experiences of individuals outside of their own department, would be required. The proposed command chain would be directly to the President / PM via the National Security Advisor. This would require the formal establishment of the post in the UK. This would give a clear chain of command between the strategic and operational levels and fulfil the requirement for a unified command chain. It would give the National Security Advisor more influence at the centre of government without damaging focus of the NSC staff on its primary role of strategic level coordination. Military command chains would be preserved within each NSCHQ. Responsibility and accountability are also improved under the proposed command structure. The formation of NSCHQs would be preceded by a major review of the national security apparatus to chart the path forward. The advantage of such a wide ranging review, under the auspices of the National Security Advisor would be to match capabilities and resources to tasks across the conflict continuum and prevent resource rich departments being forced to underwrite operations best conducted by other arms of government. Hence, the review must examine the roles and missions of each department and agency and then resource them to achieve it.

The final element to consider is the changes required at NSC level to provide the political authority and personnel to ensure they can conduct a National Security Review and provide guidance to the NSCHQ. The National Security Advisor must possess sufficient authority over other departments to coordinate interagency operations in the required areas to avoid the coordination difficulties apparent in the preparations for the Iraq War. It is recommended that the UK create the post of National Security Advisor.
Bibliography


Vita

Wing Commander Andrew Burton is a Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 navigator currently undertaking the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College. A Qualified Weapons Instructor, his last two appointments have been as Executive Officer on a Tornado Squadron and as a Service Personnel manager responsible for the career management of fast-jet pilots and navigators.