

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**HYBRID WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS  
IN FAILING STATES**

by

Colonel Margaret S. Bond  
United States Army Reserve

Dr. Janeen Klinger  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 identified stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) as core missions for future US military operations. This policy envisions military operations in a variety of complex pre- and post-conflict environments. It commands military planners to expand their arsenal of resources for achieving this mission to include elements of economic, social, and political, as well as military, power. Thus, future strategic military plans will necessarily assume a kind of hybrid nature, embracing a spectrum of elements of national power. Historically, projection of the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power and development of the programs that sustain them has been the jurisdiction of the interagency, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs). However, where a hostile environment precludes deployment of civilians to implement such, the DoD becomes the only viable agency likely to succeed in the task. This paper develops a strategic concept for use by the US military in its future stability and security missions in pre-conflict environments. Further, this concept is adaptable for use in a variety of unstable environments. Finally, this strategic concept is designed to coordinate and transition to more traditional civilian programs as soon as the security environment permits.



## HYBRID WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS IN FAILING STATES

They which builded on the wall and they that bare burdens, with those that laded, every one with one of his hands wrought in the work, and with the other hand held a weapon.<sup>1</sup>

—Nehemiah 4:17

### A New Strategic Concept for the GWOT

The terrorist threat of today's global war on terrorism (GWOT) is peculiarly transnational, seeking to expand its ideological influence across geographic boundaries into regions where the central governments are weak and their internal security forces insufficient to resist infiltration. The opponents seek to expand their ideological influence across geographic boundaries into regions where host nation central governments are weak and their internal security forces insufficient to resist infiltration.

US National Security Strategy correctly identifies so-called failed and failing states as particularly vulnerable to these threats. The current strategy advocates preventing conflict and state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction and stabilization, and looks to the US Department of State (DOS) to take the lead in resourcing and implementing it. However, in practice this strategy is failing to accomplish its stated objectives for several reasons.

First of all, DOS lacks the organic resources, expertise, and personnel to implement the variety and scope of economic and political development programs sufficient to build institutional capacity of failing states to prevent the spread of terrorist ideology and resources in failing states. Indeed the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the chief arm of DOS in disseminating US aid, relies heavily on private contractors to implement its programs. Such outsourcing of organizations to administer US aid dollars adds additional layers of bureaucracy to the process resulting slower response time to developing crises.

Secondly, USAID programs and supporting non-governmental and international organizations (NGOs and IOs) are staffed and implemented by civilians. As such, they are ill-equipped or simply unable to work in hostile or non-permissive environments. However, such environments are characteristics of failed and failing states, where government forces and terrorist organizations vie for control. Thus, the very regions where the US National Strategy for stabilization and security is most needed are the same environments where the chief agency for implementing this strategy is effectively precluded from operating.

Finally, US stability and security operations to date have been primarily reactive, rather than pro-active, in seeking resources and strategies to inhibit establishment of terrorist strongholds in failing states. Indeed, billions of US dollars have been devoted to reconstruction operations in countries such as Afghanistan where the US has first resorted to military force to drive out terrorism and now seeks to prevent its return by building that nation's capacity to transition to democracy and sustainable peace. Again, the resulting ground conditions are typically too hostile and unsafe for civilian agencies to operate effectively. In light of these conditions, at present the US military is the sole effective agency to implement current national strategy for security, stabilization, and reconstruction in failed and failing states, wrestling with the threat of terrorist ideologies for political, economic and social control.

Given that the opponent's center of gravity is ideological rather than kinetic, to achieve GWOT objectives, the US military needs to refine its implementation of the strategy in order to counter this threat before it has a chance to take root. In particular, the military needs to develop a prophylactic capability to combine security and stability operations along with infrastructure reconstruction to prevent and eject terrorist infiltration into vulnerable regions, while simultaneously being prepared to respond with deadly force if the security environment suddenly turns hostile. Today more than ever, the US military needs a new strategic concept to respond globally to a startling array of volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous security environments and to counter regional terrorist threats conducting unconventional and irregular warfare across geographic boundaries in failed and failing states.

This paper develops the case for a broader, more pro-active employment of the US military to implement National Security Strategy for stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) in fighting the global war on terrorism. It first examines the broader vision of war as evolving along a continuum of policy objectives, in order to develop a new strategic concept for using military capacities in a kind of "hybrid war" in non-permissive environments. This paper then defines failed states and evolution and nature of stability and security operations that emerge from them. Finally, the paper covers development of SSTR as a core military mission, its doctrine, and its role in peace building lays the foundation for developing and deploying US military units in hybrid war. In conclusion, this paper discusses the future of hybrid war in SSTR operations.

### War as a Continuum

Prussian strategist, Karl von Clausewitz, wrote that one cannot understand war without understanding the broader political and social implications of the context in which it is executed.

In particular, he posited that war is never an isolated act, but rather must be considered as occurring somewhere along a continuum starting with armed observation through absolute war. Where war breaks out along this continuum determines the level and type of force to be applied to achieve the actor's objectives and their political and social implications.<sup>2</sup> Though writing for the security environment that existed in 18<sup>th</sup> Century Europe, von Clausewitz' characterization of war adapts fluidly to describe an evolving strategy for application of war in the highly unpredictable conditions affecting the global security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

US strategic thinking about the global security environment was radically altered on September 11, 2001, with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. This single event, more than any other in the five succeeding years, dramatized the complexities and dangers of an unpredictable security environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This era has also been marked by increasing numbers of failed and failing states in concert with the emboldening of fundamentalist terrorist groups and non-state actors exploiting these vulnerabilities to expand their bases of operations. In turn, the activities of such groups operating in the weakened states pose serious threats to US national security as they become safe havens from which to spread global terrorism.

The 2005 National Security Strategy<sup>3</sup> identified an array of traditional and irregular global threats to America, many of them capable of lodgment in failed or failing nation states. This threat is compounded by a form of "nation building" carried on in the ungoverned spaces by the global terrorist groups. Using versions of radical Islam as an ideology, groups such as al Qaida and Hezbollah gain footholds and other support from regional populations within failing states. Often, the education, health care, and other social services the groups offer far surpass anything offered by the host government of the failing state. In some cases the terrorist organizations develop infrastructure as well, such as roads, schools and hospital buildings.<sup>4</sup> Not surprisingly, such groups become implanted and protected, at least by regional tribes and other indigenous groups within the state.

#### A New Strategic Concept: Hybrid War

The foregoing problem calls for a new strategic concept for use of U.S. military forces in non-permissive environments in failing states. This new concept calls for greatly expanded roles and missions for our ground forces to support the political, informational and economic projections of national power, in addition to conventional military force, to achieve political objectives. As in the example of Nehemiah, future US ground forces will be required to execute stability and reconstruction operations and armed combat missions with equal facility. In other

words, war of the next century will comprise a kind of hybrid<sup>5</sup> war, projecting all elements of national power along a continuum of activities from stability, security, and reconstruction operations, to armed combat.

More specifically this hybrid war paradigm requires a new approach to using our armed forces for a broader and more comprehensive war of scale, ranging from purely peaceful humanitarian missions as preventive measures, to the development of hostile conditions, through traditional warfighting operations employing traditional combat strategies, to post conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts, where security and peace derive from thriving economic and political status.

Hybrid war envisions employment of a comprehensive and highly-nuanced variety of military activities, resources, programs, and applications, tailored to maximize a non-violent, persuasive use of economic and political influence to reform hostile governments, movements, or trends in politically, socially, and economically unstable conditions, characteristic of failing and failed states. It also includes a full range of military intelligence capabilities, nonconventional (including nonlethal) weapons, armaments, support units, and combat equipment, available for instant employment if ever opposition elements of regular forces or irregular insurgents, terrorists, or other non-state actors cross the hostility threshold and constitute a direct threat to or threaten these non-hostile activities.

### Defining the Threat in Failing States

Identifying the characteristics of failed and failing states is necessary for understanding why the new hybrid war paradigm must embrace stabilization operations in these states. Foreign Policy Magazine<sup>6</sup> and the Fund for Peace<sup>7</sup> maintain an Index of Failing States, using 12 socioeconomic and political criteria. For the purposes of this index, a failing state is one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force. Other aspects of failing states are an economy in decline (GDP/capita less in real terms than in earlier years), very high levels of government and business corruption, large “informal” (underground) economic sectors and low levels of trade with developed states, except for commodity exports. Public provision of education, health care, sanitation, and a predictable, objective justice system all seem underprovided in failing states.<sup>8</sup>

Failing states are also characterized by large areas within their borders of ungoverned or undergoverned space.<sup>9</sup> Frequently these areas are totally beyond control of the central



government of a state, and whatever social services or security are provided come from dissident groups, warlords and criminal gangs. These areas are fertile ground for terrorist groups of global reach to establish bases, recruit fighters and suicide bombers, raising funds through illegal activity such as drug trade, counterfeiting, and so forth. In short, ungoverned space in any state represents a potential threat to U.S. national security interests. Further, ungoverned space engenders non-terrorist threats to the world economic system by facilitating drug smuggling, human trafficking, pandemic disease, counterfeiting and copyright violations, and piracy. Thus, such spaces and the evils they harbor are common enemies of mankind and of Western globalization and need to be reduced or eliminated.

By definition, the central governments of the states hosting these spaces are incapable of removing them, i.e., restoring full governmental services, security, and infrastructure to support economic progress. Even large inflows of aid to such regions from international and private volunteer organizations, are likely to be ineffective, due to corruption and lack of security. Examples include: Palestine in 2006, Somalia in 1993, and Kosovo in 1999. Therefore, in order to realize physical, economic, and social security and stability in such a region and prevent development or establishment of a terrorist threat, a combination of armed force to provide security and foreign assistance in the form of humanitarian aid and infrastructure construction must be coordinated.

Identifying trends and precursors to states 'at risk' for terrorist infiltration, will require strategic thinkers to focus on nations within the "non-integrated gap" described by Thomas P.M. Barnett in *The Pentagon's New Map*,<sup>10</sup> roughly "developing" states within what was formerly called the "Third World". Many states within the non-integrated gap have ungoverned, or undergoverned, areas within their borders in which terrorist groups with global reach can flourish. These states are not unique to a particular region: Colombia and Tri-Border Region in the area of responsibility of Southern Command contain under-governed spaces, as do a number of states in the Middle East. Of direct concern for future stability and reconstruction operations, however, are nations on the continent of Africa, especially those below the Sahara. Such states are involved in a clear struggle for control between Muslim extremist groups and more Western oriented Christian and animist groups.

The characteristics and peculiarities of weak or failing states constitute hotspots of the world that present the most pressing requirement for development of the paradigm of hybrid war to meet national security objectives. US national security objectives for this paradigm require not only early detection of weakening governance, but also development of effective strategies for intervention. An intervention, if undertaken, needs to stabilize democratic indigenous

government institutions, strengthen the national economy and enhance the rule of law in order to staunch the spread of anti-western terrorist organizations in this state. This type of intervention is necessarily a long-term commitment of US power to a particular state. Short-term “peacekeeping” SSTR operations do not produce the desired effects on a permanent basis<sup>11</sup>.

### Evolution of Stability and Security Operations

The United States military has had much recent experience in conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations in failed and failing states, from the Balkans and Haiti in the early 1990s, through Afghanistan and Iraq today. What has emerged from over five years of the Global War on Terrorism and four years of war in Iraq is the realization that stability operations, to succeed, are long-term US commitments requiring large amounts of human and financial capital. Developing comprehensive plans to project all the elements of US national power into successful stabilization of a region requires a robust variety of skills and experience.

Recent administrations have attempted to craft a process to develop such plans, combining the strengths and experience of civilian and military resources. In 1997 President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) “Managing Complex Contingency Operations”. This Directive called for the National Security Council to establish of interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations, bringing together representatives of all agencies that might participate in such operations, including those not normally part of the National Security Council structure.<sup>12</sup> This Directive was later rescinded by President Bush who, In December 2005, issued National Security Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Directive aims to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states at risk from conflict or civil strife.<sup>13</sup>

The current 2006 National Security Strategy specifically cites failing and ungoverned spaces with weak governments as requiring outside assistance to regain control of its borders and develop the capacity to resist infiltration of terrorist elements into ill-governed areas in an otherwise functioning state.

To further (sic) counter terrorist exploitation of under-governed lands, we will promote effective economic development to help ensure long-term stability and prosperity. In failing states or states emerging from conflict, the risks are significant. Spoilers can take advantage of instability to create conditions terrorists can exploit. We will continue to work with foreign partners and international organizations to help prevent conflict and respond to state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction, and stabilization

so that countries in transition can reach a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and prosperity.<sup>14</sup>

Based on this Strategy, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism<sup>15</sup> calls for denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terrorist activities. Ungoverned or undergoverned space in key failing states, threatened by takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups with global reach, must be transformed, by direct U.S. or coalition action as needed:

Our terrorist enemies are striving to claim a strategic country as a haven for terror. From this base, they could destabilize the Middle East and strike America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence. This we can never allow... We will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or undergoverned areas as safehavens – secure spaces that allow our enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations. Ultimately, we will eliminate these havens altogether....<sup>16</sup>

Underscoring these positions, in July 2004, with bipartisan support in Congress and with the agreement of the National Security Council, the Secretary of State established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead U.S. efforts at assisting other countries in transition from conflict and helping them reach a sustainable path towards peaceful, democratic, and market-oriented societies.<sup>17</sup> The emphasis of the new S/CRS is to strengthen the U.S. government's institutional capacity to deal with crises in failing states and to reconstruct and stabilize societies recovering from conflict and civil strife.<sup>18</sup>

The S/CRS' stated goal is to provide an operational field response to post-conflict situations that emphasizes facilitation of peace implementation processes, coordination with international and local institutions and individuals that are developing transition strategies. In addition S/CRS will help implement transitional governance arrangements; encourage conflicting factions to work together; develop strategies to promote transitional security; coordinate with other US government agencies and the US military; foreign agencies and armed forces; and, if necessary, prepare a diplomatic base on the ground.<sup>19</sup>

Clearly, the goals and objectives of our national strategy and the S/CRS and the US government agencies and organizations supporting it, are focused in the right direction to address the requirements peculiar to post conflict stability and reconstruction operations. However, the focus of this strategy is primarily on assisting governments in transition, rebuilding stability and national infrastructure and other stabilizing operations *after* conflict has occurred. Building stability and security in pre-conflict situations and preventing conflict through prophylactic use of elements of national power is not considered. Yet this application of stability and security operations clearly is vital in failed and failing states, where prevention of the

establishment of opportunistic terrorist movements is key to maintaining the initiative in the GWOT and protecting US national security interests.

Ideally, such strategies would be developed and implemented through diplomatic, informational, and economic application of elements of national power.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the US State Department and key interagency members such as the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, along with national and international non-governmental organizations are typically expected to fill these requirements. However, a typical characteristic of these failed or failing states is that traditional systems of public safety and law enforcement are weak or non-existent. These systems are replaced by warlordism, corruption, and ad hoc protectionism available to the highest bidder. As currently configured, the US agencies and organizations tasked to carry out such operations are staffed exclusively by civilians and thus are neither equipped nor resourced to operate in radically unstable, hostile or nonpermissive environments.<sup>21</sup>

Organizations staffed entirely by civilians are unsuited for high-risk environments presented by failed and failing states for other reasons. In the first place, civilian agency employees are not under military discipline and can simply refuse to carry out assigned tasks in a non-permissive environment, or agree to remain for a short time only. Secondly, civilian stabilization workers are not organized into military type units that can integrate with force protection units to remain on station performing their missions. Further, civilian agencies lack the agility to mobilize and deploy rapidly and sustain their own operations long term with organic resources. Both these capabilities are inherent in the US military, making it the logical choice for implementation of these operations.

The environments in which terrorism and its resultant threats to US national security, thrives best are the ones most dangerous and least amenable to these non-military projections of national power by unarmed, civilian operators. However, it is these environments which are best suited to use of US military capabilities whose missions can range from humanitarian involvement to direct combat power. For example, one humanitarian mission for which the US military is superbly prepared is responding to natural disasters. Two recent successful efforts at winning good will both involved the military. One was the dispatch of soldiers to help Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami, and the other was the use of US forces to help Pakistan after the Kashmir earthquake.<sup>22</sup>

So far, the civilian agencies have been slow to develop a surge capability to deploy quickly into destabilized or rapidly deteriorating environments.<sup>23</sup> The National Security Council and the Department of State are still working on interagency doctrine for complex contingencies called for by PDD 56 ten years ago. Further, in light of the dangers from failed and failing states

to unarmed civilian organizations, it is unlikely they will be suited for use in such hostile regions. Thus, without a comprehensive, field-tested, interagency doctrine and corollary capabilities for deploying to unstable regions safely, today the onus of these vital requirements for staunching the spread of GWOT has devolved to the US military.<sup>24</sup>

#### SSTR: A New Core Military Mission

Indeed, the Defense Appropriation Act which established the S/CRS<sup>25</sup> identified US land forces as a critical component of stability and security operations by naming the Army as the executive agent for these operations. In 2005 the Department of Defense (DoD) went a step further in developing the role of the US military in stability and security operations. Specifically, Defense Directive 3000.05 (DD 3000.05) laid direct claim to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, denoting them as a core military mission comparable in scope and importance to combat operations.<sup>26</sup>

Further solidifying its claim to SSTR operations, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 defines a comprehensive scope of this policy's goals. In the short term these goals are to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs, while the long-term goals include helping indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and robust civil society.

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DoD 3000.05 also provides guidance on stability operations that evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons develop. This Directive establishes DoD policy on these operations and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. Additionally, this Directive provides for future DoD policy to address these areas and provide guidance on the components SSTR and the senior military and civilian roles in each.<sup>28</sup> Finally, and most significantly, in addition to establishing a clear purpose and guidelines for military leaders in stability operations, this Directive establishes clear policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority to combat operations and shall be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material leadership, personnel, facilities and planning.

This statement represents a definite and emphatic shift in civil-military relations in stability and security arenas and provides unequivocal strategic direction for military leaders in prosecuting future wars. Today's military leader is directed to take the lead in security, stability,

and reconstruction operations. In addition to planning for the traditional warfighting missions, the military leader is directed that stability operations are to be recognized as a core military mission and a core requirement in every military leader's planning process.

DoD Directive 3000.5 still recognizes a role for the civilian interagency process. The DoDD states "Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool."<sup>29</sup> It recognizes that participation in such teams is open to representatives from other U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and civilians from the private sector with relevant skills and expertise. Further, while assistance and advice is welcomed from the Department of State and other U.S. departments and agencies, the Directive is clear that whatever input is provided will be in a subordinate, supporting role to DoD efforts.<sup>30</sup> Thus, by taking the lead in this interagency stability and security process, DoD has clearly reestablished the role of the strategic military leader in this new hybrid war, calling on the military to develop new doctrine for resourcing diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power through plans that support the DoD policy objectives.

### Developing SSTR Doctrine

As the complex global threat from failed states or ungoverned space increases, strategic thinkers will be called on more and more to develop the theory and doctrine of hybrid war where military is called to perform operations ranging across a very wide spectrum from diplomatic and economic development and infrastructure improvements to more traditional war operations such as countering direct terrorist threats and combat operations. Additionally, strategic military thinkers will need to become more adept in identifying trends and precursors to state failure and other unstable conditions that result in ungoverned or undergoverned spaces.

The traditional approach, wherein the military quickly hands off development and stability operations to international organizations, such as the UN, or other regional governing body, such as the African Union, must be transformed, however, if the hybrid war strategy is to be maximally effective. In short, uniformed forces must shoulder much more of the development burden, for far longer periods of time, often in non-permissive environments. The Department of Defense has begun to recognize these requirements with DoD Directive 3000.05. In some cases, hybrid war campaigns will last for a number of years, even over decades. The military units assigned must, like Nehemiah, carry both a sword and a shovel.

A stable peace is built on four pillars: security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.<sup>31</sup> Success in each area depends on the

effective integration and interaction across them. Collective and individual security of all activities of every day living are preconditions for operating under the other pillars. A country menaced internally or externally by conflict often lacks the mechanism or institutions to provide for its own security, uphold the rule of law, or address human rights abuses. Its government may be nonexistent or too weak to provide services to its citizenry or improve their socio-economic livelihoods. SSTR operations must, therefore, approach stabilization and reconstruction as a national, governmental, mission, rather than as solely military or civilian, to enable the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to be harnessed and integrated effectively.<sup>32</sup>

The proposed approach to SSTR concentrates on the middle two pillars: economic development and enhancing the rule of law. In Thomas Barnett's concept, it prepares the state for connecting to the global trading system by building an environment receptive to foreign direct investment (FDI): "FDI does not flow into war zones, because it is essentially a coward – all money is".<sup>33</sup> Complexity will increase as stability operations embrace multiple partners, coalition forces, interagency players, international organizations, none-governmental organizations, and host nation officials. Further, future SSTR operations will probably occur in urban areas, requiring greater interaction with local populations and the media.

Traditionally, the US has considered combat and post-combat operations as two distinct phases, conceptualized as a linear progression from peace to conflict, to post-conflict peace. As US experience in Iraq demonstrates, SSTR operations will likely occur in environments where the mix between conflict and peace shifts as the main effort transitions from combat to peacekeeping operations.

Use of US military forces in future SSTR operations must encompass much more than post-conflict operations to achieve strategic ends. As Clausewitz envisioned, military activity occurs at different stages along a continuum of policy implementation. Where war occurs on this continuum determines the level and type of force applicable. To be effective in implementing US national policy for stabilizing failing states and resisting the flow of terrorist groups or insurgencies into ungoverned spaces, hybrid war must take place well before the indigenous government fails and the initiative for stability is lost. In short, to be effective for security stabilization, hybrid war needs to be implemented early in the continuum of US involvement in 'at risk' states, and hybrid warriors, with their shovels and weapons, deployed well before hostilities occur.

Indeed, tenets of tactical US counterinsurgency planning illustrate this concept. "In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything," wrote LTC David Kilcullen in his famous Twenty-

Eight Articles, recently embraced by General David Petraeus for his military surge planning in Iraq. "If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment."<sup>34</sup> Illustrating the value of intervening early in the continuum, this primer states: "The most fundamental rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can never outrun your enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So, your first order of business is to establish presence."<sup>35</sup>

At the strategic level the new paradigm for hybrid war requires both a prophylactic and a therapeutic approach to establishing secure and stable environment through skilful use of resourceful, highly trained military resources. In the prophylactic phase, military intelligence will need to define potentially unstable or deteriorating governments, susceptible to exploitation by outside states, internal insurgency or terrorist movements. Not all failing state situations mandate pre-emptive intervention by US forces, however. In each case strategists must assess the level of the terrorist or other threat to the existing government, combined with vital US interests in the affected region, in order to determine whether prophylactic intervention is needed.

#### SSTR Capabilities in Hybrid War

On the operational level military action will be called on to extend stabilizing political and economic influence to an unstable territory through peaceful, indirect methods. On the tactical level small company- or battalion-sized teams of highly-trained and equipped combat forces, picked for both their combat and specialized civilian skills, will look to build schools, health clinics, and water systems that extend the local government's influence in the area. They will bolster lagging economic and employment situations with programs in small business and other skills training and micro loans. They will enhance establishment of the rule of law through education in judicial reform and by improving efficiency of public safety systems. They will improve road and communication systems, not only enhancing education but also allowing communities better access to global markets and resources.

Assessed strategically, these conditions, if successfully established, enhance foreign investment in the private market, develop two-way international trade and so improve the local and regional economic and social stability. These conditions are essential to promoting and securing political and regional stability and national governments friendly to US interests. Further, they deny or arrest development of adverse conditions which might attract and nurture opposing governments or political/military movements.



If the environment turns more hostile from any overt source, these same teams are readily capable of shifting ways and means to a more tactically focused use of direct force. Relying on their inherent legal right to use deadly force for self-protection, these same teams are capable of moving up the Clausewitzian continuum to use that amount of force necessary to continue meeting their objectives. In this phase, understanding the limits of just how much pressure can or cannot be applied to the hostile force is essential. The team's combat skills of preparing and synchronizing all elements of power for tactical, air, artillery, and mortars can come into focus in case direct force becomes necessary. This activity communicates a more direct and ominous message to hostile forces, whether they are regular armed forces or irregular members of an insurgency, terrorist organization, or non-state actor, i.e.: The US military is planning on staying and is serious about and extremely capable of using deadly force.<sup>36</sup>

Upon achieving sufficient security to return to reconstruction and stability operations, the team will shift its position along the continuum of operations to resume the therapeutic forms of this warfare. The teams will commence immediate assessments and secure intelligence updates on the condition of the local and regional resources and infrastructure, risk factors, sector overviews and financial and commercial structure. They can then translate this information into necessary tactical and operational missions designed to continue the original or modified strategic goals of stabilization and promotion of interests favorable to our own.

To develop military units that are best suited for hybrid war will require new combinations of capabilities from forces optimized for major combat operations. Stability and reconstruction no longer can be viewed as a lesser included set of capabilities already found in a Brigade Combat Team or Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Rather, combinations of Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs Brigades and Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (SeaBees) can be built upon and modified to develop the needed capabilities. These will evolve as the needs of the region and countries served require. Force structure, both active duty and reserve component, will need to be added so that rotational forward deployments can be made on a predictable long term basis without undue stress on the troops. Navy SeaBees and USMC Marine Expeditionary Battalions have proven this feasible over decades before the stress and surge of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

For the US military, precursors to hybrid war have been evolving at the tactical and operational level for several years.<sup>37</sup> Pre-conflict stability operations, so called "Phase 0" operations, have recently become a consideration in national strategy planning. "Shaping" the environment was a key part of U.S. strategy in the previous administration.<sup>38</sup> The mechanism for shaping was through theater engagement plans

(TEPs), directed by the regional combatant commanders.<sup>39</sup> Hobbled in part by lack of resources and Service reluctance to support some missions, theater engagement was slow to develop. Moreover, following the 2000 Presidential election, TEPs were removed from strategy documents and renamed Theater Security Cooperation Plans TSCs). The new guidance for these activities from Department of Defense leadership limited military activity to combined operations and exercises, training, and military to military contact. TSCs offered little by way of active engagement in arresting the failure of unstable governments or stem the seepage of terrorism or insurgencies into ungoverned spaces.

US military strategy has now come full circle to active re-engagement with the threats and risks of failing states and development of new policies to secure them. Indeed, US policy mistakes in Iraq illustrate the ineffectiveness of restricting SSTR to post-conflict operations and inherent shortcomings of the interagency process to implement SSTR. Clearly, a national security policy embracing a proactive and strong use of military capabilities in volatile and unstable environments is necessary for US to achieve its strategic goals in the ongoing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

New strategic goals for U.S. foreign policy, to counter terrorism as well as develop new candidates for integration into the global system, now call out for this approach. The interagency having proven ineffective at meeting the needs of the strategy in non-permissive environments, it is past time for the armed forces of the U.S. to take on hybrid war as a primary mission and develop force capabilities to successfully implement it.

Traditional Clausewitzian militarists may be reluctant to accept expanding the capacity of an overtaxed, overused conventional fighting force to take on the new roles required for an SSTR mission. However, where the interagency process has been slow and ineffective in providing the capabilities to perform SSTR missions, there is no other option. There is a strategic imperative to be proactive in initiating SSTR missions to counter the threat of terrorist adversaries in ungoverned space. The US cannot wait for terrorist strikes from these spaces before dealing with the threat. Indeed, in embracing SSTR as a core military mission, DOD virtually mandated that our strategic military leaders embrace these new roles and develop the doctrine that guides them.

Where are the hybrid war battalions likely to deploy? In this context, the concept of a nation state as bounding the area of threat is misleading. States begin to fail due to various causes<sup>40</sup>, but often pressure from outside the border – from insurgent or minority groups, funded and armed by other states – is a key factor. Thus, hybrid war must take a regional approach to stability operations, directed and prioritized by the Combatant Command. This approach is

being applied in the Horn of Africa operations where General John Abizaid, former commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)<sup>41</sup> pioneered in implementing the principles of this approach to warfare.

In the fall of 2002, the U.S. military set up a task force in the Horn of Africa to counter any al Qaeda fighters seeking refuge in the region. Populated originally with elite special operations teams and Predator planes armed carrying Hellfire missiles, with a mission to kill terrorists, by 2006 the base housed about 1,800 regular troops building health clinics, wells and schools in areas where Islamic extremists were active. Their mission: to ease some of the suffering that leaves locals susceptible to the radicals' message, thereby bolstering local governments and increasing their capacity to resist terrorist pressures to support them.<sup>42</sup>

Driven by the failures of the U.S. policy in Iraq which based on forcible regime change and post conflict reconstruction, the Horn of Africa task force marks the first time that a large military command has been established solely to address the root causes of terrorism in a region.<sup>43</sup> One of its tenets is that change must take place gradually and be led by locals. Another tenet is that bigger changes that address the root causes of terrorism and its spread in the region must take place over years, if not decades, the so-called "long war" approach.<sup>44</sup>

#### Conclusion-Future of Hybrid War Operations in SSTR

This paper has argued that evolving National Strategy and the long war against terrorist groups with global reach requires both a new strategic concept to carry on this struggle over decades and new force capabilities for the U.S. Armed Forces in order to implement the concept. As has been shown, the threat is transnational and fluid, moving to "ungoverned space" found in failed or failing states. To counter the threat the U.S. military must counter the social benefits the terrorist groups offer, by performing nation building over long periods of time, often across national borders on a regional basis. By carrying out this strategy effectively, in many areas U.S. elements of power can proactively turn ungoverned space back into viable parts of the global community, and drive out terrorist groups by denying them a foothold.

Despite a clear national strategy calling for economic and political engagement to promote development of Western-based democratic and economic values as a key driver to shaping a stable and secure global environment, the US military continued to view these activities as secondary to its primary mission of warfighting. The advent of 9/11, the ensuing GWOT, and the glaring omission of US war plans to include SSTR operations in its Iraq strategy, compelled US national security advisors to re-look the "shaping" strategy of NSS 2000 and revitalize PDD 56 calling for an interagency approach to these complex issues.

Many of these undergoverned lands are also areas where the security environment for civilians is compromised. Under such circumstances – because the interagency is precluded from exercising diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power, -- the military must be equipped and prepared to respond across the spectrum of hybrid war to restore and maintain stability and security. Once the military establishes safe conditions the interagency can resume its functions. Like Nehemiah, the US military of the future must be prepared to build walls and simultaneously defend them.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> In 600 BCE, Nehemiah, Hebrew captive in Babylon, returned to Jerusalem for reconstruction operations on the ancient city, which was lying in waste after the ravages of both intertribal war and conquest from regional powers. Neighboring tribes from Samaria and Arabian Peninsula threatened by a resurgence of the Jewish state, attempted to destabilize these operations through a series of covert and overt terrorist tactics. To achieve his mission objectives, Nehemiah developed a kind of hybrid strategy where his teams simultaneously performed both reconstruction and force protection operations, demonstrating an ability to shift seamlessly from one role to the other as the security environment required.

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976), Book 1, chap. 2, 76.

<sup>3</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Al Qaeda did this with success in Sudan and Afghanistan, see Peter Bergen, *The Osama Bin Ladin I Knew* (New York, Simon and Schuster 2005 ).

<sup>5</sup> In this context, the intended use of the term “hybrid” is “ a.) Something heterogeneous in origin or composition: Composite (*hybrids* of complementary DNA and RNA strands) (a *hybrid* of medieval and Renaissance styles); b.) Something (as a power plant, vehicle, or electronic circuit) that has two different types of components performing essentially the same function.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, accessed March 10, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> “The Failed States Index 2005,” linked from Foreign Policy Magazine Home Page, “Special Reports”, available from <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php>; Internet; accessed November 12, 2006.

<sup>7</sup> “The Fund for Peace 2005 Index of Failing States”, linked from The Fund for Peace Home Page, available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php>; accessed March 11, 2007. See Index of Failing States 2005 below.

## The Failed States Index 2005

Rank	Country	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	Composite
1	Cote d'Ivoire	8	8	7.7	8.8	9	7.7	9.8	9.5	9.4	9	9.1	10	106
2	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	9	9.4	9	7	9	8	8	9	9.1	8.7	9.1	10	105.3
3	Sudan	8.6	9.4	7.8	9.1	9	8.5	9.2	8.7	8	9.8	8.7	7.3	104.1
4	Iraq	8	9.4	8.3	6.3	8.7	8.2	8.8	8.9	8.2	8.4	10	10	103.2
5	Somalia	9	8	7.4	6.3	9	8.3	9.8	10	7.8	10	8.7	8	102.3
6	Sierra Leone	9	8	7.5	8.9	8.7	10	7.5	9.1	8.7	6.3	8.6	9.8	102.1
7	Chad	8	9.1	7.1	8.3	9	8	8.9	9	9.1	7	9.4	8	100.9
8	Yemen	7.8	8	6.4	8.2	9	8.8	9.8	9.3	6.4	9	9.4	7.6	99.7
9	Liberia	9	7.8	7.3	8.1	9	10	7.5	8.2	8.2	6.5	7.9	10	99.5
10	Haiti	8.8	8	7.7	3.4	9	8.1	9.4	9.8	8.7	7.8	8.5	10	99.2
11	Afghanistan	9	8	8	7.4	8.8	7.5	8.1	8.1	7.9	8.2	8	10	99
12	Rwanda	9	7.8	8	8.6	9	9.2	9.5	5	8.3	5	8.9	8.2	96.5
13	North Korea	8	6	7.2	8.1	9	9.6	9.8	9.7	9	8.3	8	3	95.7
14	Colombia	9	8	6.9	9.2	9	7.1	9.8	4.2	8.2	5.4	9.2	9	95
15	Zimbabwe	9	8	6.4	7.7	9	7.3	7.9	8.5	7.5	9	7.9	6.7	94.9
16	Guinea	9	6	6.1	10	9	4.5	9.7	7.5	8.1	8.1	9.2	7.5	94.7
17	Bangladesh	8.4	7	7.6	6	9	7.4	9.5	8.2	8.5	8	8.7	6	94.3
18	Burundi	9	7.2	7.1	3.8	8.8	7.8	7.2	9	8.3	7.5	8.6	10	94.3
19	Dominican Republic	9	8	7.1	8.5	9	6.8	6.8	9.6	9.2	7	9.2	4	94.2
20	Central African Republic	9	5	8.8	3	7	9	9.7	8	8.2	9	10	7	93.7
21	Venezuela	8	8	6.8	7.6	9	4.5	9.8	8.2	9.1	7.8	7.2	7.5	93.5
22	Bosnia & Herzegovina	7	8	8.6	5.7	9	5.7	8.5	6	7.3	9	8.7	10	93.5
23	Burma/ Myanmar	8.9	8	6.3	8	9	6.9	9.2	8	9.6	9	7.5	3	93.4
24	Uzbekistan	6.5	8	6.8	6.8	9	6	9.1	5	9.6	9	9.4	8	93.2
25	Kenya	9	8	6.7	8.3	8.8	6.3	8.9	7.4	8.5	8.4	8.4	4	92.7

<b>A</b>	Mounting Demographic Pressures	<b>G</b>	Criminalization or Delegitimization of the State
<b>B</b>	Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs	<b>H</b>	Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
<b>C</b>	Legacy of Vengeance - Seeking Group Grievance	<b>I</b>	Widespread Violation of Human Rights
<b>D</b>	Chronic and Sustained Human Flight	<b>J</b>	Security Apparatus as "State within a State"
<b>E</b>	Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines	<b>K</b>	Rise of Factionalized Elites
<b>F</b>	Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline	<b>L</b>	Intervention of Other States or External Actors

<sup>9</sup> "The Failed States Index 2005, *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2005 (on line edition); available from [http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3420](http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420)), accessed November 12, 2006.

<sup>9</sup> *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (The White House, September 2006) available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ncst/2006/>; Internet, accessed October 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 4, 26-27, 167-79. The "non-integrating gap states" are states that do not "adhere to the globalization's emerging rule set" and are found in "the Caribbean Rim, Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia."

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., Endnote 319, citing to Minxin Pei and Sarah Kasper, *Lessons from the Past: The American Record of Nation Building*, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief No 24, May, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> *Presidential Decision Directive 56/PDD-56*, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," May 1997, available from , <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>; Internet, accessed October 10 2006.

<sup>13</sup> *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, 7 December 2005; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2006.

<sup>14</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (March 8, 2005).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Charles Oleszycki, "Update on Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance," *The Army Lawyer*, May 2006, 23. Operational experiences in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq amplify the reality that a field presence is essential in the early stages of a reconstruction or stabilization mission, both to keep the government informed of the situation and to shape the tactical environment for follow-on civilian elements, such as those envisioned by the S/CRS. In this light, the Department of State has been standing up an Active Response Corps (ARC), including full-time, specially-trained DOS Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel for short-notice deployments to assist with reconstruction or stability operations. So far the ARC has not deployed but has been involved in training exercises and in assisting with preparing and planning for countries or regions facing reconstruction or stabilization challenges. DOS is also establishing a Standby Response Corps (SRC) of volunteer Foreign and Civil Service Officers. These individuals will supplement the skills available in the ARC and will be prepared to follow on behind the ARC to support transition efforts over the long term.

<sup>20</sup> In current strategic parlance, the so-called "elements of national power" are abbreviated by the acronym DIME or, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

<sup>21</sup> Peter Pace, *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 15, 2006) available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMS-CWMD2006.pdf>, Internet, accessed January 2006. A "non-permissive environment" is defined in this Document, Annex A: as " An operational

environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area (Uncertain Environment), or an operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to oppose or react effectively to the operations a unit intends to conduct (Hostile Environment).” Interagency operations in Iraq are an example of where force protection (FORCEPRO) requirements confine operation of US civilian agencies to the so-called Green Zone inside Baghdad or outside Iraq completely to Jordan, Qattar, and Kuwait.

<sup>22</sup> Nicholas D. Kristof, “Aid Workers with Guns,” *New York Times*, 4 March 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Initiatives such as the Department of State’s plan for “transformational diplomacy” whereby Foreign Service officers are transferred to critical GWOT areas and its Active Response Team are steps in the right direction. See Endnote 19. However, so far there is no formal interagency doctrine with regard to stability operations and the various agencies are without a synthesis of a voluminous body of writings and analyses on the subject.

<sup>24</sup> An example of this gap was revealed in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s testimony before Congress on 7 February 2007 – exactly one year since Secretary of Harvey’s speech – that her agency could not fill over 40% of nearly 300 State Department positions to be added in Iraq as part of President Bush’s new strategy. Instead, the Secretary called on the Department of Defense for 129 people to fill those slots. “Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs,” *The Washington Post*, 8 February 2007.

<sup>25</sup> US Department of State, S/CRS Fact Sheet, [www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/4337.htm](http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/4337.htm), accessed 18 February 2007.

<sup>26</sup> US Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Directive No. 3000.05, 28 November 2005; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Hans Binnendijk, and Stuart E. Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2004), 90.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Barnett, 239-40.

<sup>34</sup> Kilcullen, David, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review*, May-June 2006.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. Article 23 of this piece describes hybrid war in counterinsurgency at the tactical level: “Counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first, then progress up Maslow’s hierarchy as each successive need is met . . . . Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else, not least the insurgents, so civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid (local communities and leaders) to help you help them.”

<sup>36</sup> Another common characteristic of this war is a form of offensive maneuver of the rapid and highly mobile checkpoint. Mobile units, usually consisting of mounted infantry combat engineers and TOW vehicles, move forward to key intersections in areas where armed regular or guerilla fighters operate and set up hasty roadblocks in order to disrupt unauthorized or unwanted military activity. This mission requires designated soldiers to detain and search intruders, a sizable element to overwatch the hasty checkpoint, air cover on station, mobile mortar support, and a quick reinforcement of TOW and infantry carriers that can extract the flying checkpoint force from trouble or reinforce it. This technique is valuable in controlling very large sectors with the same battalion-sized units.

If the final stage of direct and concentrated force becomes imminent, these same combat units are immediately capable of transitioning to full combat roles. Time standards and increasing levels of alert, previously specified, immediately shift into tactical offensive movements. Pre-established alert reaction forces, organic artillery batteries and pre-staged air support allow for immediate employment of swift and decisive offensive actions. John P. Abizaid, “Lessons for Peacekeepers,” *Military Review*, March 1993.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. U.S. *National Security Strategy*, September 2005, 15: “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”

<sup>38</sup> Greg Jaffe, “A General’s New Plan to Battle Radical Islam,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 2, 2006.



<sup>39</sup> Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, “Shaping” the World through ‘Engagement’: Assessing the Department of Defense’s Theater Engagement Planning Process”, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000).

<sup>40</sup> K.J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press), Chapter 6.

<sup>41</sup> Jaffe.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

