“Commanding Anti-Terrorist Coalitions: A Mid-East Illustration”

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Abstract

Every campaign or engagement is both a physical conflict and a psychological confrontation. The psychological confrontation is won when the other party submits to our will – i.e., we change their intent. Changing intent by methods other than War-
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Fighting becomes the commander’s Main Effort as we move along the spectrum of military operations from total war toward peacekeeping. A support system based on Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis is required to assist commanders in this task of psychological confrontation. This is of great importance for the War Against Terrorism. A War Against Terrorism operation aims to arrest or destroy terrorists after isolating them and depriving them of support, which requires forming and maintaining an anti-terrorist coalition. This is the nature of a War Against Terrorism operation at every level. At Grand Strategic Level, nations are brought into coalition. At Strategic Level, War Against Terrorism operations to be carried out by coalitions of nations are planned and Intelligence is pooled and analyzed. At Operational Level, operations varying from assistance to civil authorities (in the European and US theatres) to leading coalition forces (in theatres such as Central Asia or the Middle East) are conducted; sensitivity to needs of civilian players as well as military partners is essential to building, maintaining and motivating the widest possible coalition and thereby isolating terrorists. At Tactical Level, a War Against Terrorism commander’s primary task is to arrest or destroy terrorists; however, doing so involves maintaining a maximum coalition of local players, civilian and military, in order to isolate and locate the terrorists. When successful, confrontation generally changes intent firstly at high level (e.g., theatre level) leaving subordinate commanders (e.g., at tactical level) to ensure that changed high-level intent is implemented as promised. To maintain and motivate effective collaboration, information and decision-making must be shared with coalition partners. At the same time, military security needs must be met. This requires a dual system. This paper illustrates how such a system would work using as an example the injection of an international peacekeeping force into the Mid-East.

**Introduction**

It is April 2002. “There’s only a military solution to terrorism!” shouts Binyamin Netanyahu, a once (and possibly future) Prime Minister of Israel. “We’re not going to have a political process with the Palestinians when Yasser Arafat’s terrorist empire is allowed to continue!” [1].
Netanyahu represents the “tougher than thou” political opposition that the current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has to fear. Sharon, moreover, agrees with Netanyahu in opposing a political process that might lead to Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.

Sharon knows that most Israelis would support such a deal. Polls show this rather clearly [2]. However, Israel’s coalitional system of government ensures that such views are ignored. The upshot is that only a military solution is considered. Yet Israel’s military solution—destroying the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority, killing or arresting suspected terrorists and destroying their facilities, then creating buffer zones round Palestinian-occupied areas—is seen by the United States and the rest of the world as likely to spread terrorism, not stop it.

The following effects are feared:

- increased funding and recruitment of anti-Israel terrorists by Arab states and individuals;
- increased funding and recruitment of anti-US terrorists;
- withdrawal of support by moderate Arab governments for initiatives of the US-led War Against Terrorism—e.g., withdrawal of support for action against Iraq;
- overthrow of moderate Arab governments by terrorist-supporting regimes.

Are these effects inevitable? A simple Confrontation Analysis—set out below—suggests that many of them are indeed inevitable if potential terrorist recruits and supporters prefer a scenario of escalating terrorist activity (albeit accompanied by Israeli reactions) to acceptance of the Israeli-imposed military solution.

The effects may follow even without such a preference. If potential recruits and supporters estimate that Israelis, pressured by the US and others, will eventually prefer a political solution—i.e., one reached through the political process Israel currently spurns—to escalating terrorism, then they may opt for escalating terrorism even though they prefer what Israel is offering to them. They may do so, thinking that this will force
the Israelis to accept a political solution. This argument provides the rationale for Israel’s insistence that concessions should not be made to terrorists. The argument is: *making concessions induces terrorists to believe that terrorism exacts concessions, thereby encouraging further terrorism.* This argument seeks to justify a purely military solution, with no political process.

The argument does not hold, however, if we assume that escalating terrorism is *itself* preferred to acceptance of the Israeli solution. The correct analysis is then like that of a general who refrains from threatening to kill all prisoners, not on humanitarian grounds, but because making the enemy believe that fighting is no worse for them than surrender forces them to fight on. Just as the general, by refusing mercy, would make continued fighting inevitable, so the Israelis make escalating terrorism inevitable by rejecting a political process.

But is the necessary assumption (that escalating terrorism is preferred to acceptance of Israel’s military solution) correct? It appears so. The queues of would-be suicide bombers and the funds flowing in to support them are evidence for it. Note that just as Israeli policy is dominated by extremists, it is the Palestinian extremists and their supporters, not the general populace, that decide whether or not to send in suicide bombers.

The emotion necessary to sustain this preference, and with it the flow of bombers and funds, is likely to continue if continually provoked by Palestinian suffering under Israeli retaliation. Only killing or transferring virtually the entire Palestinian population—the kind of solution successfully carried out by Stalin and now advocated by some Israelis—would give emotions a chance to eventually subside.
In fighting terrorism, War-Fighting must be complemented by Confronting and Collaborating

The probable effect of Israel’s purely military solution is in contrast to that of the War Against Terrorism in Afghanistan. This campaign (albeit still in progress) has reduced the threat of terrorism because it did two things:

- it created a more stable and humane society and economy than existed before;
- it followed a diplomatic offensive that created an international coalition to support military action.

In these respects the operation followed the guidelines set out by President Bush in the weeks following September 11th. Cabinet members then stressed that the War Against Terrorism is not purely military. Military operations represent the tip of an iceberg compared to diplomatic, intelligence, financial and economic action. This is because the War Against Terrorism cannot afford to attack and destroy terrorists without isolating them and depriving them of support. Otherwise the War Against Terrorism would, like the Israeli campaign, risk increasing terrorism rather than reducing it.

Isolation and deprivation of support is an operation of bringing more and more supporters into an anti-terrorist coalition that must be maintained and motivated. It is a primarily psychological operation of changing other players’ intent, using a mixture of carrots and sticks, one of which may be the threat of force. These supporting coalitions need to be set up and maintained both before a War-Fighting operation and after it, when it is necessary to stabilize the post-conflict society and economy.

While this is perhaps non-controversial, some would question whether building and maintaining anti-terrorist coalitions is a job for the military. Can’t the military leave coalition-building to others?

Again, the answer is no. Firstly, because a post-conflict Peace Operation, with a (coalition) military presence to give security, is an essential follow-up to a War Against Terrorism War-Fighting operation. Secondly, even a War Against Terrorism War-
Fighting operation must be supported by coalition-building at every level. At Grand Strategic Level, nations must be brought into an international coalition. At Strategic Level, these nations must plan and conduct operations together, and share intelligence. At Operational Level, confronting the needs of civilian players as well as military partners is essential to building, maintaining and motivating the coalition. At Tactical Level, where a War Against Terrorism commander’s task may be to arrest or destroy terrorists, operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated how he is helped by the cooperation of local forces in intelligence-gathering and fighting, and hindered by lack of such cooperation.

In addition, modern commanders must also be media stars. With the explosion in live, “on the ground” newscasts, commanders at every level are liable to become directly involved in the management of public (and political) opinion.

In sum, the functions of military force in a War Against Terrorism are twofold. The obvious military function is to arrest or destroy terrorists when isolated and found. But force also functions as a threat to be used with other carrots and sticks to induce non-coalition members to join and stay inside the anti-terrorist coalition. This function of building and maintaining coalitions is primarily confrontational rather than physical. If successful, military force is not used, only threatened.

**The Unified Theory**

One way to understand President Bush’s War Against Terrorism strategy is through the Unified Theory of War-Fighting and Peace Operations presented at last year’s conference [3].

This posits that every campaign or engagement (whether “War Against Terrorism” or “non-War Against Terrorism”) is two things at once: a physical conflict and a psychological confrontation. The psychological confrontation is won *when the other party submits to our will*. 
There is, however, a difference in the way that this is achieved as we move along the spectrum of military operations from all-out War-Fighting at one end toward Peace Operations at the other. As we move away from all-out War-Fighting (which seems to be the trend in modern warfare), physical conflict becomes less important and psychological confrontation more so.

In all-out War-Fighting, the principle concern is with the physical operation of destroying enemy assets while preserving our own. It is through the complex and energetic business of differential asset destruction that the enemy is forced to submit. This, therefore, is where the commander’s Main Effort lies. But as we move away from War-Fighting, psychological confrontation becomes increasingly his Main Effort, and that of his subordinate commanders at every level of command. This is because non-compliant parties are now made to submit by the threat of sanctions that either involve no use of force (e.g., the threat that civilian agencies will not supply aid) or involve the use of force only at local, tactical level (e.g., the threat that riotous gatherings will be dispersed). Also, threats are increasingly wielded not by the military commander alone, but by the commander working in coalition with civilian agencies.

Whatever kind of engagement he is in, the commander is personally responsible for confronting the enemy at his particular level of command. In War-Fighting, the enemy does not submit to abstract forces but to a person—to the commander, whether the commander of a squad, a platoon or an army. In Peace Operations, non-compliant parties submit to the will of the International Community through its representatives, who form a coalition representing aid agencies, the UN, etc. The military commander at each level is an essential part of this coalition, even though in the later stages of a Peace Operation he may have a background role. He remains essential because he is the one who can decide on the use of force.

How do commanders deal with this personal responsibility to bring non-compliant parties into compliance—i.e., change their intent—through psychological confrontation?

Military doctrine, training, organization and systems are generally designed to support War-Fighting. It tends to be left to an individual commander how he adapts them for
confrontational purposes. *We recommend a more organized approach based upon the Unified Theory.*

When successful, confrontation generally changes intent firstly at high level (e.g., theatre level) leaving subordinate commanders (e.g., at tactical level) to ensure that the changed high-level intent is implemented as promised. In Bosnia, for example, theatre-level agreement on the return of refugees was obtained with the ethnic presidents and parties at national level. Translating this agreement into action on the ground required local confrontations involving subordinate commanders.

There is thus a hierarchy of confrontations, involving civil-military coalitions at each level. To coordinate the operation of this hierarchy, a commander can use a C2 system for Confronting and Collaborating (a C2CC). See references [3, 4, 5]. This will support him in working with civilian coalition partners and delegating confrontational missions to subordinate commanders, tasked to work with civilian coalition partners at their level.

The C2CC system cannot be a purely military system. Information and decision-making must be shared with civilian coalition partners. At the same time, however, military security needs must be met. This requires a dual system, as described in [3].

An internal, militarily secure system should be used to plan and run a campaign for getting necessary civilian coalition partners to collaborate. In this system, the various civilian agencies are modeled as separate parties pursuing separate interests. The commander uses the system to develop, and devolve to his subordinate commanders, strategies for getting collaboration.

Staff maintaining the internal system should, in addition, maintain and update an external, non-militarily secure system in which the commander’s civil-military coalition (brought together using the internal system) is shown as a single, unified party opposed to various non-compliant parties. All coalition members need to share the information in this system. It cannot, therefore, be militarily secure, and staff tasked with maintaining it must screen military intelligence before transferring any of it from the internal, militarily secure system.
The task of the external, shared system is to support the coalition in confronting non-compliant parties to obtain their compliance. To help coalition members use the system, military facilitators, responsible for process, not content, should help conduct Joint Strategy Formulation sessions. With their help, the coalition plans and implements a joint Confrontation Strategy against non-compliant parties and devolves supporting missions to lower-level coalitions.

This is the outline of a C2CC system. An appropriate tool for C2CC is Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis (CCA). Computerized displays show ‘option boards’ setting out each party’s threats and promises and assessing their credibility. The system also shows the relevance of each confrontation to horizontally and vertically linked confrontations, and stores, updates and analyses information in a form relevant to the commander's task of confronting non-compliant parties at his own level and tasking subordinate commanders.

In this paper, we illustrate how CCA should be used by describing how an international force assigned to a Mid-East peacekeeping mission might ensure success.

**New terms for old**

In discussing our example, we will use some new terminology for CCA that we believe brings it more into line with military decision-making. There is nothing wrong with the abstract, scientific terminology used until now. It has the advantage of generality, being as applicable to civilian organizations or personal relationships as it is to military command and control – and is still used in conducting non-military analyses. However, military applications have unique characteristics that military terminology should bring out, not disguise. The appendix contains a glossary showing the relationship between our suggested new terminology and the old one.

**The Palestine-Israel conflict in April 2002**

A simple analysis of the April 2002 confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians is set out in Table 1. Each party has proffered its compliance plan—its suggested solution to
the problem. The Israeli compliance plan (column I) is a return to the status quo, with an end to terrorism and terrorism-uprooting attacks on Palestinian infrastructure, but no agreement on settlements, refugee returns, Jerusalem and other Israeli-Palestinian differences. The Palestinian compliance plan (P) is that in return for an end to terrorism there should be Land-for-Peace negotiations, aiming at peace in return for a truly viable Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. All disputed topics would be covered in these negotiations which would, if successful, lead to the recognition of Israel by Arab states offered at the recent Arab summit meeting in Beirut. The threat plan (t) states each party’s communicated intention in case of no agreement. It consists of escalating terror and Israeli reprisals.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{ISRAEL} & I & P & t & P^{**} & P^* & I^* \\
\text{'uproot' terrorism} & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\
\text{negotiate Land-for-Peace} & 6 & 3 & 5 & 2 & 1 & 4 \\
\text{PALESTINIANS} & & & & & & \\
\text{continue terrorism} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

**Table 1: Options board modeling the Arab-Israeli conflict in April 2002**

Analysis reveals problems for both compliance plans. I is unrealistic, since Palestinian terrorists and their supporters prefer t and have the power to make this preference effective. We say this because the status quo with limited Palestinian autonomy has provided and will provide support, funding and opportunities for terrorists. (Note: numbers against parties’ names show their priorities, with 1 being the most preferred...
future). The Palestinians will, therefore, move from I to the preferred future I*, and will
not be deterred by the likelihood that Israel will then move from I* to t.

The problem with the Palestinian compliance plan P is that the Palestinians, driven again
by the preferences of militants, prefer P*, consisting of negotiations accompanied by
terrorism. They might be deterred by the threat of t (Israeli counter-measures and an end
to negotiations) but are likely to think they can avoid this, or at most go to P**
(negotiations accompanied by terrorism and counter-measures), which they do prefer to
P. They can hope to avoid t by dissociating their leaders involved in negotiations from
those involved in terrorism—a classic tactic used by other terrorists, such as the IRA, as
well as by Arafat. For these reasons, the Israelis cannot trust the Palestinians to adhere to
their own compliance plan P. Even if Arafat genuinely prefers P to P*, it is unlikely that
he could completely prevent militants from adopting P*.

But (aside from this mistrust) do the Israelis indeed prefer Land-for-Peace (the
Palestinian compliance plan P) to the threat plan t, in which continuing terrorism has to
be fought? We have assumed that they do, on the grounds that US pressure—omitted
from the model, but part of its context—will make such a preference effective. While
Sharon or Netanyahu would prefer to fight it out at t, hoping if not believing that they
could drive down terrorism by attrition, the US would be supported by most Israelis in
pressuring Israel to prefer P—if P were felt to be available. It is not, however, felt to be
available because Israel and the US cannot trust the Palestinians to implement it.

**A mission for an international force**

How can this problem be solved? How can the Palestinians be made trustworthy, in fact
and in the eyes of the Israelis? This is a problem not only for most Israelis but also for US
Mid-East policy, inasmuch as Arab countries will be reluctant to cooperate in confronting
Iraq while the conflict in Palestine continues. King Hamad of Bahrain, a US ally, has
already warned that America’s interests in the area could be in danger if it does not use
its influence with Israel to prevent further bloodshed.
Analysis of each country’s bilateral relations with the US might show that they could be pressured by the US into giving their support. But the US would certainly have to use more bargaining chips in this effort than would be necessary if an Israeli-Palestinian peace process were in place.

An answer that has been supported by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as well as by European and Arab countries, is to insert an international peacekeeping force. Palestinians have demanded this and would regard it as a step forward. It would, therefore, make a difference. A simple analysis indicates that the Palestinian Authority would become willing and able to suppress terrorism, if they and the Arab countries knew that should they fail, the force would merely continue Israeli policies, whereas success would mean phased Israeli withdrawal.

US participation would ensure Israeli respect for such a force. The US, however, is reluctant to commit troops to peacekeeping. Suppose, then, that a US-led force, with US participation but with most troops contributed by other nations, is sent. This might happen after Israel has concluded its incursions into Palestinian territories and has drawn up buffer zones around them. The international force might then step in to police the buffer zones, within an overall framework agreement between Israel, the Palestinians and Arab countries.

This agreement, we will suppose, allows for phased Israeli withdrawal to adjusted 1967 boundaries (which both sides have accepted in the past) conditional on Palestinian suppression of terrorism. It provides for many Israeli settlements to be closed down, with the remaining ones either becoming part of Israel or going eventually under Palestinian jurisdiction. For this to succeed, and for shared economic institutions to re-develop, requires each side to feel secure not only against terrorism but against provocation and violence short of terrorism; each side therefore undertakes to suppress these actions. The agreement also provides for aid to the Palestinians to be handed out by international agencies. Negotiations are meanwhile to continue on the issues of sharing Jerusalem and the return of refugees.
Internationally, the agreement commits Arab countries to act against both the funding of Palestinian terrorism and the propaganda in favor of it—while respecting freedom of speech in Arab countries. Recognition of Israel is scheduled to come as the withdrawal process is completed.

Now the theatre commander, as he gets intelligence about the flow of international funding and supplies that go to support terrorism in his theatre, will necessarily be involved in international diplomacy regarding these commitments. We will not model this aspect of his task, though it is also a CCA problem, but instead concentrate on his internal problems.

Table 2 models, in schematic form, the theatre-level collaborative confrontation that the agreement sets up between Israeli and Palestinian national authorities, the theatre commander and international agency representatives. A compliance plan for the agreement itself is in the first column (I,P). Essentially, Israel commits to phased withdrawal in exchange for Palestinian suppression of terrorism. Now extremists on each side will want this agreement to break down, but will see that immediate resort to terrorism or refusal to withdraw might be counterproductive. Instead, Israeli extremists may try to provoke Palestinian violence, either by committing violence themselves or by going out of their way to offend Palestinian interests and sensitivities, while accusing Palestinians of violence; they will try to use this tactic to justify refusals to withdraw. On their side, Palestinian extremists may try to break down the agreement by committing violence and making accusations against the Israelis, using this tactic to justify resumption of terrorism—the justification being addressed to their funders in Arab countries. Both Israelis and Palestinians have attributed this kind of motive to each other in the Temple Mount clashes.
Table 2: Options board showing the theatre-level collaborative confrontation

The Israeli and Palestinian authorities are required not to support such provocations and accusations by extremists, but may feel political pressure to do so. Hence, in terms of our model, Israel will tend to prefer column I* in Table 2, and the Palestinians column P*, to the compliance plan I,P. To deter them from moving there, the international force and civilian agencies have various sanctions. They may stop aid to the Palestinians or may move in to implement withdrawals that have been agreed. They may also take measures
to ensure Israeli or Palestinian security—measures such as closing roads or setting up barriers that will be unwelcome and oppressive to the party that is non-compliant.

Note that there is an important asymmetry in the way that such sanctions must be wielded against the Israelis, on the one hand, and the Palestinians on the other. The international force is, we assume, militarily stronger than the Palestinians but weaker than the Israelis. Measures to ensure security or implement withdrawals against the Israelis therefore need to be carefully prepared to appeal to international public opinion and to be defensive rather than offensive. Expert CCA will be helpful in this.

The general problem is that each side undertakes to carry out its part of the agreement, but cannot trust the other. If either side does defect (as in the columns I* and P*), the columns I** and P** show the sanctions wielded by the international aid agencies and the peacekeeping force that will, if made credible, deter such defections. (The diagonal slash through lower cells in these columns means that these options need to be automatically taken when the options above are taken/not taken as shown).

As the mission progresses, the theatre commander and international agency representatives update the options board to reflect new developments (e.g. new options or outcomes) and plan contingencies. As new data is added, the options board is re-analyzed to ensure that the stated positions of the party (i.e., the terms of the agreement) remain stable. When a party has an incentive to defect (as determined by a formal CCA of the options board), the theatre commander and international agency representatives will be required to take one of a range of CCA “decisions” to maintain the agreement.

As new data becomes available (e.g. via intelligence activities), it should be interpreted and classified in terms of the options board. This ensures that any new information is immediately considered, and documented, in the context of the on-going task.

The process of working through the options board clarifies and documents strategic goals, challenges and tasks. It allows distributed teams (military and civilian) to align and coordinate complex, flexible plans in a way that is not possible with traditional briefing techniques.
Table 2 is the theatre-level model in schematic form. Clearly, as day-to-day issues arise, the options for both sides will narrow down to those that are relevant while simultaneously widening out to cover more concrete details. Options written on the board to cover such interactions will be more practical, specific and concrete.

**The theatre commander’s task**

What, in general, is the task of the theatre-level commander in this projected operation? To repeat—we are considering here his internal problems only, not his diplomatic problems with other countries.

His task is definitely at the confrontational, Peace Operation end of the spectrum, rather than the War-Fighting end. He needs to ensure that Israeli and Palestinian leaders at national level are utilizing their respective power structures to ensure compliance with the plan. This means backing it publicly and privately to their followers.

One of the commander’s most important tools is intelligence. A major function of his force is to gather intelligence related to compliance, sieving it for relevance and making it available to him. He should know as much or more about what is happening at ground level as the parties he is pressing to comply.

But to use this intelligence effectively, the commander must work in close partnership with civilian agencies. His force does not have the authority nor control the necessary carrots and sticks to pressure parties into compliance without their collaboration. Now these agencies have a different agenda from the peacekeeping force, and cultural differences between civilians and the military inevitably create suspicion and misunderstanding. His first task, therefore, is to obtain the agencies’ collaboration in forming and executing joint strategies.

First of all, therefore, he must gather and analyze intelligence relevant to a *collaboration strategy* toward the agencies. Then he must carry out this strategy.

Table 3 illustrates, in schematic form, what a collaboration strategy against a particular agency might look like. We see the commander offering a compliance plan: “We’ll help
you provided you collaborate.” The agency’s compliance plan is: “You help us, we don’t collaborate.” The commander needs to be friendly but firm to win this confrontation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMANDER</td>
<td>help with logistics, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENCY</td>
<td>join in Joint Strategy Formulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Help</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: A collaboration strategy**

Often, getting agencies to collaborate is the most difficult and important part of a theatre commander’s task. It is, however, only the beginning. Having succeeded in getting collaborative Joint Strategy Formation off the ground, the commander makes use of the expert Info Ops and Intel staff that helped him to develop his collaboration strategy. These staff are tasked with providing *facilitation* to the Joint Strategy Formation sessions. The facilitators they provide are responsible for process, not content, helping the commander and civilian agencies to build a model in the form of a clickable options board. This looks like our tables, but is on a computer screen (see Figure 1), and is such that clicking on different parts of the model (rows, columns, cells) brings up a window giving intelligence information about that aspect of the problem. For example, clicking on the first row (ISRAEL) in Table 1 might bring up intelligence about Israeli strategy, beliefs, internal power struggles and conflicts over policy; clicking on the third row (‘negotiate Land-for-Peace’) might bring up the expected shape of negotiations assuming they follow on from the Taba talks between Israelis and Palestinians held in December 2000; and clicking on the first column (I) might give assumptions about how this “Status
Quo” future would develop, with expansion of Israeli settlements, Palestinians shut in behind buffer zones, and so on. Clicking on Table 2 (or the more concrete option boards created to model specific, current problems) similarly brings up the commander’s intelligence about parties, outcomes, strategies and so on.

Figure 1: Options board analysis system

How does information come into this system? Much relevant intelligence comes out at the Joint Strategy Formation sessions themselves, during strategy discussions. Other information is input from the military system—and this is another task for Info Ops and Intel staff, who are responsible for screening intelligence information to ensure that military security is maintained. This job is vital, as intelligence is wasted if not used by the civil-military coalition to put pressure on parties to comply.
Strategy discussions in Joint Strategy Formation sessions, responding to current crises, might take the form “Stones have been thrown at settlers in such-and-such area. The Palestinian Authority denies it. We think they are reluctant to carpet local Palestinian security men, who have been slow to act. What intelligence can we reveal to convince them we know what happened? What decisions do we need to take?” Or they might take the form. “Such-and-such settlers are refusing to move. Do we need to inform the Israeli Justice and Defense Ministries that we will use minimum force to move the settlers if they won’t go themselves and aren’t moved by Israeli forces?” As said, options in a model of a specific issue would be specific, practical and concrete.

How does CCA help the coalition to formulate an effective strategy? Analysis, led by expert facilitators, focuses their attention on a number of decisions that need to be taken. In an options board of the form shown in Table 2, where all parties formally agree on the same compliance plan (represented by column I,P), these decisions are:

- **Trust decisions:** Make sure that we can trust other parties to carry out the common plan. Do this by ensuring that they perceive any alternative open to them as being less advantageous to them than compliance. Therefore, take measures to make compliance more attractive, and the alternatives less so. In Table 2, this is done by ensuring that while columns I* and P* might seem to bring more benefits to Israelis and Palestinians respectively than column I,P, the columns I** and P** will inevitably follow, and these are less beneficial than I,P.

- **Cooperation decisions:** Make sure that other parties trust us to cooperate in implementing the common plan. Thus, make sure they perceive keeping our promises to be more advantageous to us than any alternative we will have. Therefore, reduce the advantages to ourselves of any alternative, and increase the advantages of promise-keeping. For example, the Palestinians may not believe that economic aid, refused because they did not comply, will be given if they do. Or they may not believe that our responses to Israeli defection (column I* in Table 2) will be as shown in column I**. We need to amplify their perception of
the advantages to us of keeping such promises, and the penalties we would incur in breaking them.

Success in these decisions ensures compliance provided we are, as here, *in a confrontation where all parties formally agree on the same compliance plan.*

This is the case in Table 2, but of course, agreement here is at a high level, where options are highly generalized. Looking into details is bound to reveal differences as to how the plan should be interpreted and implemented. When it becomes a question of differing compliance plans, a commander has four other decisions to make. We will look at these next in discussing how the commander’s overall strategy is devolved to his sub-commanders.

**Tasks for a subordinate commander**

As said, differences in how the high-level plan should be implemented are revealed when the plan is looked at in detail. Looking at details is another task for the theatre commander’s staff.

This task is to analyze the option boards the commander uses for getting collaboration with civilian agencies and for implementing Joint Strategy Formulation and derive from them missions for subordinate commanders, as well as missions for functions such as Info Ops, CIMIC, Public Information and PsyOps.

Here, we will focus on the missions devolved to subordinate commanders.

Subordinate commanders entrusted with a mission need to know their commander’s intent. When he is operating at the confrontational end of the spectrum, rather than the War-Fighting end, his intent is accurately conveyed by an options board setting out his *compliance plan* (the compliant actions and intentions he wants) and—in the case when different parties put forward differing compliance plans—the *threat plan* he makes it known that he will pursue if agreement is not forthcoming.
In our Mid-East example, clickable options boards based on those in Tables 2 and 3 would be communicated to subordinate commanders responsible for

- policing relations between local Israeli settlers and Palestinians;
- getting the collaboration of local representatives of civilian agencies.

These would give subordinate commanders with local responsibilities a clear view of their commander’s intent in each of these areas, so that they can make sure that their local strategies reinforce theatre-level strategies.

Next, to define the specific, local mission of a subordinate commander, staff at theatre headquarters would draw up an indicative options board showing their initial view of the problem he faces. For example, Table 4 shows an options board they might send to a local commander responsible for relations between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in a location intended, eventually, to come under Palestinian jurisdiction, where the settlers are thought to be creating trouble (by provoking and accusing local Palestinians) in an attempt to upset the agreement. The options board sets out a compliance plan (column P, I) for the local commander that is assumed to be agreed to by the local Palestinians. It also gives a threat plan in case this compliance plan is rejected. In effect, he is to require the settlers to refrain from trouble-making, making clear that if they do not he will recommend that the settlement be closed down, and will also take action to restrict settlers’ movements in order to protect Palestinians.
Table 4: Options board sent to subordinate commander

Note that this mission cannot be carried out by the local commander alone. He needs the collaboration of local civilian agencies, who would have to support any recommendation to close down the settlement. Thus, he will need a collaboration strategy, devolved to him from a general strategy like that in Table 3, to have succeeded before he can execute this strategy; that is, he will need to have set up a local mechanism for Joint Strategy Formation, supported by his own staff and intelligence systems. In other words, he will need to have set up a dual internal and external C2CC system similar to, though simpler than, the theatre-level system discussed above.

Assuming he has such a system in place, he will discuss, in a Joint Strategy Formation session with his local civil-military coalition, the initial, indicative options board sent down to him by HQ staff (Table 4).
Note that from the viewpoint of the civilian agencies he works with, they see themselves as making use of an information and decision support system that is not under military direction, though it is provided and supported by the military. After all, the national heads of their agencies have participated in theatre-level Joint Strategy Formation sessions at which the content, assumptions and tasks set out in the options board have been decided. It is crucially important that civilian agencies see themselves as owning these option boards and the decision-making system they support. Civilian agencies will not, in general, take dictation from the military, nor should they.

Suppose now that the local Joint Strategy Formation session decides that HQ staff are mistaken in their interpretation of local events. This is, of course, quite likely, as the local commander and civilians will generally be more in touch with what is going on than HQ staff. (If HQ have special military intelligence, its impact will have been made available, in a form that can be released to civilians, in the clickable options board sent down from HQ.) Suppose that in this particular case it appears that the settlers’ complaints are well-founded; they have been suffering from violent attacks that the Palestinian authorities have been reluctant to control. The Joint Strategy Formation session might then decide to send back to theatre level the options board in Table 5. This shows a different analysis from the indicative one sent down by HQ staff. It shows the Palestinians, not the settlers, to be pursuing a plan that is non-compliant.
Table 5: Options board sent back to HQ

A third possibility is that neither options board is thought to be correct—i.e., both parties are considered responsible for the current conflict. In that case, an options board like that in Table 6 would be sent back to HQ. This shows both parties to be pursuing non-compliant plans.
Table 6: Alternative options board sent back to HQ

HQ (informed by their own intelligence, by the theatre commander’s participation Joint Strategy Formation sessions at his level and by his personal meetings with national leaders) might continue to disagree with the local assessment. While HQ’s judgments must finally prevail, the options-board method of exchanging estimates shows clearly, accurately and impartially the difference between different accounts and the manner in which they are supported by intelligence. Different accounts will also be checked through meetings with Palestinians and Israelis at national and local level—meetings where knowing exactly what you want to know, while being clear that you are not there to make decisions, will be highly advantageous.
Analysis of the options boards in Tables 4, 5 and 6 would bring out the following kinds of decisions to be made.

- **Deterrence/coercion decision**: Is our threat plan adequate? Does each non-compliant party prefer our compliance plan to the threat plan? If not, we must take actions to make the threat plan seem worse for them and/or the compliance plan better. (For example, in Table 6, where there is no threat to close the settlement—because that would reward the Palestinians—we may need to make ordinary settlers aware how onerous the restrictions on their movements would have to be to ensure Palestinian security.)

- **Threat decision**: Is our threat plan credible? Is it believed we would have an alternative to implementing the threat plan that would be more in our interests? If so, actions must be taken to reduce the perceived attractions to us of such alternatives and increase our perceived gains from the threat plan. (For example, the aid agencies might be thought to be reluctant to stop aid, as in Tables 5 and 6, should the Palestinians persist in violence. Such agency reluctance may need to be reduced, at least in the eyes of Palestinians.)

- **Rejection decision**: Is our rejection of other’s compliance plans credible? Is it believed that we might have more to gain from accepting another’s plan than from carrying out the threat plan? If so, we must reduce such perceived gains and/or increase our perceived gains from the threat plan. (In our examples, allowing Arabs or Israelis to get away with disrupting the peace process would be shown to be totally unacceptable to both the peacekeeping force and the international agencies.)

- **Positioning decision**: Is our compliance plan seen as insincere or hypocritical, making us susceptible to arguments in favor of another’s compliance plan? If so, we must show our compliance plan to be coherent and consistent with our policy and that of the international community, more so than others’ plans. (This decision does not really arise in Tables 4-6. It arises for a peacekeeping force that is attracted to the position taken by one side among the non-compliant parties. For
example, the Muslim position in favor of a multi-cultural state in Bosnia, or the Unionist position in favor of democratic change in Northern Ireland, as opposed to terrorist-enforced change, were in some ways more attractive to the peacekeeping force than their own, more realistic compliance plan.)

Note that being successful in these decisions, as well as in the trust and cooperation decisions to be made when there is formal agreement on a compliance plan, is sufficient to ensure a successful mission. This is proved in [6].

**Equipping the commander…**

It is clear that military commanders, and their subordinates, must be able to develop and pursue effective Confrontation and Collaboration strategies - this paper has outlined how such skills are indispensable in fighting the War Against Terrorism. However, it is equally clear that the defense industry has failed to supply warriors with the tools necessary to do their jobs. Given the impact such tools could have on the effectiveness of modern warfare, this is simply inexcusable.

CCA, and the C2CC, represent a formal and concerted effort to provide warriors with the equipment to support the full conflict spectrum - from War Fighting to Peace Operations. A number of important steps have been taken:

- A formal body of theory underpinning CCA has been developed, tested and refined;
- Generic CCA concepts (taken from commercial applications) have been revised to meet the unique requirements of the military;
- A CCA Command and Control (C2CC) environment has been designed;
- CCA is being introduced into NATO.
The groundwork is well underway. It is now important to focus on equipping the warriors. To this end, the following development must be undertaken:

- Packaged CCA training courses must be developed and made available to all levels of command;
- CCA software tools must be developed and made available to command teams;
- A C2CC infrastructure must be developed to support coordinated Confrontation and Collaboration strategies.

Without these developments, commanders will remain under-equipped to perform a critical aspect of the War Against Terrorism.

The authors encourage anyone who is interested in developing these areas to contact them for advice or more information.

References

Appendix: Terminological changes

In this paper we have used a new terminology that seems to us better for military use than the general, technical terminology of Drama Theory (the theory on which CCA is based). The following substitutions have been made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical term</th>
<th>Military term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>position</td>
<td>compliance plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fallback</td>
<td>threat plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation dilemma</td>
<td>cooperation decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trust dilemma</td>
<td>trust decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deterrence or persuasion dilemma</td>
<td>deterrence/coercion decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threat dilemma</td>
<td>threat decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inducement or rejection dilemma</td>
<td>rejection decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positioning dilemma</td>
<td>positioning decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>card</td>
<td>option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>card table</td>
<td>options board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>player</td>
<td>party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that by using the term ‘decision’ rather than ‘dilemma’, we point a military commander toward the task he must perform, which is to decide how to overcome the problem posed by a drama-theoretic dilemma, rather than merely to observe it.