TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:
INTERAGENCY AUTHORITY, ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE

by

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Complex and agile threats in today’s international security environment can no longer be defeated through the unilateral application of a single element of national power. Whereas superior military strength may have been sufficient to deter, dissuade, and defeat state adversaries in the past, contemporary challenges to a stable international environment require the coordinated synergy of America’s national security apparatus. Enabled through the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) is the primary organization entrusted with the responsibility of interagency coordination. Subject to Presidential preference and administration turnover, the utilization of the National Security Advisor and structure of his/her Council Staff in managing interagency responsibilities are subject to change and varying degrees of authority and organization. In order to establish a deliberate, effective, and efficient interagency process, the NSC must be empowered with lasting authority to develop adept interagency coordinators and orchestrate interagency doctrine. Implementing “universal” doctrine, the NSC must lead Executive Branch agencies/departments in developing personnel capable of representing their organizations in planning and executing joint-interagency operations. Transforming the NSC will provide an organization closely attuned to the President’s direction in leveraging multiple elements of national power against threats in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global security environment.
A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century... In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.


The culminating clarion call of America's dead on September 11, 2001 forced the United States Government (USG) to come to terms with the fact that security threats of the 21st century would be of an entirely new genre of complex and divergent threats. Literature in the mid-1990s began to indicate the United States would need to revamp elements of its security structure and processes to meet emerging challenges emanating from a post-Cold War strategic environment. The United States, accused of being inconsistent in its foreign policy actions throughout the last decade of the 20th century, was labeled an aloof, solitary “superpower giant” and “reluctant sheriff”. Seeking consensus on the nature and extent of emerging crises across the globe, the USG continued to rely on Cold War security structures and policymaking processes to obtain information and ascertain potential solutions. Today, however, America's strategic leaders have a clearer understanding of the nature and face of ideologies and states that seek to do harm to the United States and fragile global stability. Unfortunately, only a modicum of piecemeal reform has occurred within the national security apparatus to meet and defeat the threats of the 21st century.

Responsibility for the security and welfare of the United States of America is vested by the second article of the Constitution in the nation's Chief Executive and Commander in Chief; the president. To aid the president in managing numerous and increasingly sophisticated security concerns in the post-World War II strategic environment, Congress created the National Security Council (NSC). Intended to assist the president in ensuring all elements of national power were utilized to safeguard the nation and secure its interests throughout the globe during the course of the Cold War and beyond, the NSC remains the sole statutory institution charged with interagency responsibilities. Unfortunately, bureaucratic leveraging, vacillating presidential prerogative, and unique signature threats of the 21st century clearly demonstrate that the NSC not only falls short of the initial Congressional intent in 1947, but also the reality of 2007 requirements. In order to fulfill its original charter, the NSC must be remodeled to provide the United States with a national security apparatus shaped to the strategy and strategic environment of its time.
In its appeal for transformation of the National Security Council, this project will examine criteria that comprise the exigency for institutional reform, briefly explore the history and development of the NSC, and provide a critique of the Council’s capabilities and institutional deficiencies within the framework of contemporary threats and challenges. Proceeding to the key variables that will enable transformational success, a review of proposals to amend the authority, organization, and doctrine related to United States national security policy and decisionmaking will be conducted. Additionally, within these examinations, recommended courses of action will be presented for consideration.

Imperative for Change

Since the culmination of the Cold War, numerous national security specialists and congressional committees have identified the critical necessity for the USG to realign its security institutions, policies and processes. In his evaluation of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, Michael Donley draws out several factors to explain why the USG has demonstrated a consistent inability to effectively integrate political, military, economic, humanitarian and other aspects of complex contingency operations into an efficient operation driven by interagency “unity of effort”. These factors were identified as the lack of government-wide procedures for developing integrated strategies and plans; the lack of a “planning culture” outside the Department of Defense (DoD), limited NSC staff capacity dedicated to integrating agency strategies and plans; the inability of designated “lead” agencies to speak for the President; lack of deployable experts and capabilities in civilian agencies; and the absence of standardized mechanisms for coordinating the planning and conduct of complex operations among coalition partners.3 Furthermore, Donley notes that with changes in institutions designed to facilitate interagency requirements, such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC), the interagency system, patterned on Cold War constructs, is now both more complex and crowded, thus having outgrown the NSC and lacking an overarching framework.4

Newt Gingrinch and Mark Kester have commented that if America’s national security apparatus plans on transforming societies into responsible nations, the current “interagency committee system” has to be replaced by an integrated system of clear authority and accountability. These gentlemen note that in order to focus all of America’s national power (both governmental and non-governmental) on transformation, an “integrated doctrine” must be developed that details which agency is in charge of an effort and how each agency interacts with one another in support of that effort.5
Just as the opening epigraph of this project served as a harbinger six months time preceding the attacks on 9/11, an additional salient observation from the Hart-Rudman Commission Phase III Report was serious deficiencies existed in the institutional design of the Executive Branch of the USG, thus requiring major significant organizational redesign. Most noteworthy was the comment identifying the lack of an overarching strategic framework to guide U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Although it was acknowledged that planning did occur, it was noted that clear goals and priorities were rarely set, and planning efforts were ad hoc, often only representing the specific interests of Executive departments and agencies.6

In section nine of the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS), titled “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century”, the current Administration acknowledges the necessity to improve the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges. The NSS accedes the need to strengthen the capacity for departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-oriented planning, to include incorporating agencies that traditionally have not played a role in foreign and security affairs, in order to improve interagency activity at home and abroad.7 However, as the Defense Science Board noted in its 2004 Summer Study on Transition to-and-from Hostilities, achieving political goals, not just military objectives, depends on preparation years in advance, and stabilization and reconstruction activities years after major military operations are complete.8

Due to looming threats, persistent reconstruction and stability challenges, and years required for properly shaping and coordinating political conditions for future security actions, the need has never been greater for an effective interagency capability, possessing proper authorities and coherent policies and procedures. Donley states it is clear that the limited statutory framework for the NSC and Presidential directives describing the NSC system may no longer reflect the scope of activities now occurring in the interagency space above the level of individual departments and agencies, or across agencies below the policymaking level.9 Cumulatively, the complex strategic environment, agile threats, and recently created security structures within the USG present a scenario to the nation’s strategic leaders with an imperative for national security transformation.

History and Development of the NSC

At the end of World War II, Congress sought to enact legislation that would reorganize how the U.S. conducted national security affairs, with the intent of precluding an event like the
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor from ever reoccurring.\textsuperscript{10} Amy Zegart adds that in addition to Congressional concern about “intelligence failures” leading up to the attacks on December 7\textsuperscript{th}, the Legislative Branch of the USG was also concerned about the “freewheeling”, ad hoc leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt over the course of World War II. Recognizing the challenges that the postwar environment would entail, to include an atomic bomb-armed, increasingly bellicose Soviet Union, Congress wanted to create a broader foreign policy decisionmaking system within which the president could operate.\textsuperscript{11} Unfortunately, as Zegart portrays in her analysis of the origin of the National Security Council System (NSCS), what transpired in the creation of the NSC via the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 was a “brass-knuckle fight to the finish” over the issue of military unification.\textsuperscript{12} This struggle consisted of the Department of War (Army) favoring military unification as a means to increase its postwar national defense budget, the Department of the Navy strongly opposed unification, believing it would lose stature as the preeminent service having enjoyed years of strong budget gains and increases in resource capabilities. Oddly, the concept of the NSC was a Navy derived solution to counter unification efforts under an overarching Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{13}

Noble Intent

In response to Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal’s June 1945 request for a recommendation on what form a postwar organization should be to provide for and protect the nation’s security, Ferdinand Eberstadt replied three months later with a report including recommendations possessing striking relevance to the strategic circumstance being encountered today. Mr. Eberstedt, the former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and vice-chairman of the War Productions Board, wrote to Secretary Forrestal:

The military services are but a part of the national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security policy calls for active, intimate, and continuous relationships not alone between the military services but also between the military services and other departments and agencies of the government…We have suggested new organizational forms responsible to our new world position, our new international obligations, and the new technological developments emerging from the war…\textsuperscript{14}

Eberstedt’s 250-page report listed the additional salient observations and recommendations germane to contemporary transformation consideration:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The great need, therefore, is that we be prepared always along the line, not simply to defend ourselves after an attack, but through all available political, military, and economic means to forestall any such attack.
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Much has been said about the importance of waging peace as well as war. We have tried to suggest an organizational structure adapted to both purposes.

It (NSC) should be charged with the duty (1) of formulating and coordinating overall policies in the political and military fields, (2) of assessing and appraising our foreign objectives, commitments and risks, and (3) of keeping these in balance with our military power, in being and potential.

The Council should control the policies and activities of the organizations responsible for the conduct of psychological and economic warfare and should maintain close relations with the civilian agency set up to coordinate military and civilian scientific research and development.

The Council should render annual reports to the President and to Congress. Thus the public would be kept posted on these vital matters by an authoritative and dependable source. In this way, the Council could aid in building up public support for clear-cut, consistent, and effective foreign and military policies.

Flawed Outcome

Zegart posits that the formation of the NSC system illustrates that national interest took a back seat to the self-interests of the Departments of War (Army) and Navy, and the President himself. Gregory Foster notes that in addition to the NSC, the National Security Act of 1947 created several other organizations: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the National Military Establishment (Department of Defense), headed by a Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff; and the unified (multi-service) and specified (single-service) combatant commands (or at least the authority to create them). Because of the organizational orientation and missions of these new security institutions, Foster asserts the National Security Act produced an organizational engine that kept the nation running in a permanent state of limited mobilization. By giving renewed credence to the term “national security” over the more traditional term “national defense”, Foster purports that this naming convention produced a security posture dominated by military concerns and priorities. Additionally, the Act is said to have called for integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies, yet with regard to domestic policy, the emphasis appeared to be on domestic resources and initiative giving way to and supporting emergency military needs, with the relationship between military and foreign policy being unstated. Foster also notes that the Act, perhaps inadvertently, laid the foundation for the seeming preference for crisis management over crisis prevention; that the act institutionalized and legitimized secrecy and
covert activities as central features of our national security posture, and though the Act certainly articulated the subservience of the military to civilian control, actions taken to ensure “unity of action” became little more than “window dressing”.\(^{20}\)

Carnes Lord argues that whatever the original intent for the 1947 NSA, the emerging NSC apparatus, the Department of Defense, and the CIA bore much of the burden for developing and executing American policy as Cold War tensions increased. Lord further states that some have argued these new organizational tools (NSC, DoD, CIA), effective as they may have been, were also responsible, at least in some measure, for biases, missed opportunities and other deficiencies that marred U.S. policy. Lord stipulates that this argument rests on the following four assertions:

- That the 1947 system is inseparable from a culture of secrecy that distorts national priorities and encourages an amoral approach to dealing with perceived security threats, whether domestic or foreign.
- That it privileges the military and intelligence components of national security, thereby favoring force over diplomacy and national or unilateral over international or cooperative solutions to policy problems.
- That it privileges the traditional political-military dimension of foreign policy at the expense of economics and non-traditional global issues such as the environment and human rights.
- That it privileges the foreign policy arena altogether, ignoring the security implications of domestic issues such as poverty or education and skewing national priorities away from them.

Lord asserts that taken altogether, these tendencies are said to establish within the executive branch a nexus of bureaucratic power that escapes accountability and temps presidents to pursue irresponsible course of action. In this summation, Lord draws attention that Gregory Foster has acclaimed “The Institutions set up to fight the Cold War…have partially destroyed the freedom they supposedly were set up to defend. The vast military and intelligence apparatus created to preserve freedom and dignity instead have smothered the rest of society and sown the seeds of paranoia among its citizens.”\(^{21}\)

Considering the critical evaluations of the national security apparatus created by the 1947 NSA, the requirement for transformation may be necessary due to original design flaws in addition to the nature of modern security threats. America’s capability to safeguard its populace and shape a future peaceful, secure global environment has possibly been compromised by taking inappropriate, albeit short-term successful, “kinetic” military actions.
Development of the NSC, NSCS and National Security Advisor (1947 – Present)

By the intentional compromise in the wording of the 1947 NSA, the manner in which the NSC and National Security Advisor (NSA) were to be utilized was ambiguous and left to the prerogative and personal preference of the president. Consequently, each President has organized the NSC to reflect a management and decisionmaking style dictated largely by the nature of the crises occurring during his tenure in office. For example, President Truman was less than enthusiastic about the NSC during the first three years of the Council’s existence. He was sensitive to the fact that certain members of Congress did not believe he had the foreign policy experience to be the Commander in Chief. Because of this, President Truman viewed the creation of the NSC as Congress legislating who could advise him on national security. However, these sentiments changed in 1949 with the formation of NATO, the commencement of military assistance in Europe, the Soviet Union detonating an atomic bomb and the Communists winning control of Mainland China. Additionally, President Truman found new utility for the NSC and made additional Council structural changes with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

Following the Truman Administration, President Eisenhower used his experience and comfort with the military staff model of policymaking to shape the NSC system into a highly structured organization to develop integrated military, international, and internal security affairs policies. As the Kennedy Administration came into office in 1961, the ensuing Bay of Pigs disaster left the new president with little confidence in his State Department. Because of this, President Kennedy became highly reliant on McGeorge Bundy, the “Advisor to the President on National Security”, or more readily, the “National Security Advisor” and the creation of a situation room in the basement of the White House’s West Wing. Collocated with McGeorge Bundy’s NSA office, this White House Situation Room was used to monitor communiqués of the State Department, Department of Defense, and the CIA. Hence, the Kennedy administration departed from the Eisenhower-era model of NSC long-term planning and focused on ad hoc inter-agency working groups functioning as crisis action managers.

Thereafter, throughout the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr., Clinton, and current George W. Bush Administrations, the organizational composition and position of the NSC and National Security Advisor has varied greatly in structure and utility. From minimal consultation to primary source of foreign policy planning, the NSC has been employed with great variance during, and after, the conduct of the Cold War. The role and capacity of the National Security Advisor, to advise and influence foreign policy development, has also fluctuated significantly between the personalities and positions of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and at times, the White House Chief of Staff. Power of personality and
Presidential preference have had a tremendous effect on the manner in which the Chief Executive is advised on matters of foreign policy and national security. Whereas such an organizational arrangement has met the preferential desire of past presidents, it has often created a tenuous strategic planning environment marked with animosity and frustration. At the very least, a survey of past relationships between the President and his Secretaries of State and Defense, Chief of Staff, and National Security Advisor present compelling arguments that “unity of effort” has rarely been accomplished in presenting well thought out strategic planning and crisis action courses of action.

Current Situation: Absent Authority, Organization, Doctrine

The performance of today’s national security apparatus in its efforts to engage the global strategic environment reveals numerous shortcomings in the areas of absent authority, organization and doctrine. These absences preclude a true “unity of effort” by the USG to deter modern threats. Even in 1997, the National Defense Panel report titled “A Broad National Security Approach- Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century” brought to attention that new technologies had diminished the importance of geographic distance, but increased the importance of time and the ability to respond quickly to emerging problems. The report further noted that in such an environment, the ability to anticipate and defuse such problems before they reach conflagration would be more important than ever to national security. With limited authority, flawed organization, and non-existent doctrine, the developing strategic environment of the 1990s continued to present crisis scenarios the current national security, interagency apparatus was unable to identify, deter, or initially defeat prior to September 2001.

Michael Donley notes that recent interagency reforms and proposals are coming piecemeal, aimed at specific problems without a holistic view of what a future interagency system should do or how it would function. Affirming that the current interagency system has become increasingly complex and crowded, he asserts the system has outgrown the NSC and is lacking an overarching framework.

In regards to strategic direction being provided to USG institutions participating in the interagency process, Edward Filiberti astutely noted in 1995 that:

Because there are no formalized decision criteria or standard formats for issuing strategic guidance, the thoroughness and quality of that guidance varies substantially from document to document, from crisis to crisis, and from administration to administration. The resultant products reflect a process that lacks both a standardized structure and a set of relevant factors to be considered and communicated before committing U.S. elements of power. What emerges is
strategic guidance that tends to reflect a lowest common denominator of agency positions, or an incoherent compromise of partly or wholly inconsistent views.\textsuperscript{28}

In their article, “A Congressional Guide to Defense Transformation: Issues and Answers”, James Carafano, Jack Spencer, and Kathy Gudgel note that in order to address the challenges of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, all the instruments of national power need to be transformed, not just the U.S. armed forces. They quote Newt Gingrich as stating real national security goals transcend the Defense Department and the interagency process is what enables our nation to operate around the globe. With the stark importance of this process, Gingrich states currently the nation does not possess an effective interagency process and is not well organized to operate around the globe.\textsuperscript{29} Carafano, Spence, and Gudgel also note in their analysis that within the strategic assessment process, while the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identifies important issues requiring improved interagency processes and capabilities, as a DoD-authored document, it cannot speak to how national security issues should be addressed across multiple agencies.\textsuperscript{30} Additionally, these security specialists opine that the QDR tends to lead Congress and the Administration to focus excessively on military instruments as the best solutions to national security challenges at home and abroad, to the point where “every problem looks like a nail, when all your have is a hammer.”\textsuperscript{31}

In her article “Transforming the National Security Bureaucracy, Michele Flournoy enumerates five key elements that preclude the USG from achieving greater unity of effort in its interagency, security endeavors:

- An ad hoc approach to planning and conducting interagency operations.
- No agreed upon division of labor among agencies.
- Lack of a planning culture and capacity outside the DoD.
- Lack of rapidly deployable capacity—personnel, funding and appropriate authorities—in civilian agencies.
- Few incentives for “jointness” at the interagency level—and plenty of disincentives…rotations out of one’s home agency are often viewed as the kiss of death for upward mobility.

Actions, such as the creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs), developing a Department of Homeland Security National Response Plan (NRP), publishing an “Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook”, sending non-DoD department/agency personnel to attend service war colleges, and instituting interagency education programs all aid in improving interagency operational capabilities. However, \textit{in toto}, they reflect the shortcomings of today’s national security apparatus. Short of substantial
transformation delivered by the National Security Act of 1947, unity of effort in the application of all America’s elements of national power via effective authority, organization, and doctrine will remain an unobtainable goal.

Authority

Authority for the conduct of interagency organization currently receives its legitimacy from Constitutional and statutory provisions. The Chief Executive derives his uncontested authority and responsibility for actions related to national security directly from the second article of the Constitution. The National Security Advisor, as a member of the Executive Office of the President's White House Office, derives his/her authority for interagency coordination via the statutory provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. However, since the inception of this arrangement after World War II, the amount and complexity of issues demanding the President’s attention has far outpaced the capacity of a single executive. Even with the advisory role that the National Security Advisor was originally charged with to assist the President, contemporary strategic challenges necessitate a reevaluation of the distribution of authority related to national security and interagency operations.

In his second “Rethinking the Interagency System” paper, Donley surveys several alternative coordinating and decisionmaking mechanisms in the space between the President and individual departments and agencies that would strengthen coordination of interagency operations. In brief, Donley’s options include:

- Broadening the responsibilities of the NSC. This course of action would enable existing interagency committees to expand outside the traditional NSCS policy development role and participate in the actual planning and oversight of interagency operations related to their areas of specialization.
- Creating new interagency structures within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Noting that experience in interagency operations of all kinds require a constant, dynamic interaction between policy development and execution throughout the continuum of pre-crisis or conflict planning, military operations, and post-conflict activities.
- Create new interagency structures outside the EOP. Modeled on this approach, future interagency centers could be used to coordinate regional affairs throughout the U.S. government, or functional purposes such as disaster/contingency support or stability operations.
Assign responsibility for interagency integration at operational levels to a “lead” agency, specifying Executive Branch department and agency support/supporting roles. Scrutinizing Donley’s thoughtful alternatives, a recommended course of action would entail elements from three of his suggestions. First, the existing role of National Security Advisor would be transferred outside the NSC and would be relegated to a non-statutory, non-confirmed position of “Security Counsel to the President”. Possessing no accompanying staff and no actual or inferred authority with the EOP, this would ideally be a position filled by an extremely experienced security specialist who would be able to examine policy actions within the framework of the President’s personal and political party interests. Second, a supra-cabinet position would be created, termed the Chancellor of American Security (CAS). Like other cabinet positions, personnel appointed to be the American Security Chancellor would require confirmation by the Senate. Additionally, unlike other cabinet officials, unique to this position and in keeping with traditional national distrust of military authority and civilian control thereof, the CAS would be statutorily barred from the Presidential succession plan.

Operating in the position of the second element of a National Command Authority (NCA), the Chancellor of American Security would assume the deployment/execution authorities currently associated with the Secretary of Defense. Statutorily charged with security responsibilities, the American Security Chancellor would be empowered with authority under the direction of the President. As the senior cabinet officer of an administration, the Chancellor would exercise limited authority over other cabinets, departments, and agencies of the USG. Responsible to coordinate, direct, and manage all aspects of interagency security planning, policymaking, and execution, the Chancellor’s authority would be commensurate with the charge and responsibilities of the new security institution- an American Security Chancellery.

Organization

In evaluating recommendations for organizational change, Gregory Foster makes several observations that are decisively apposite to how America should structure itself in relation to national security interests. First, he makes note that the way we organize does three things that are especially important in the context of the national security establishment:

- Organization influences thought processes by determining whom deals with what issues. Assigning responsibility for a particular issues is a way of prescribing who is and is not permitted to even address it.
A formal organizational structure institutionalizes and gives permanence to a pattern of relationships and a mix of actors that is intended to be more or less immune to the whims of personality or changes in participants.

The composition and placement of an organization project an image to outsiders of one's worldview.33

Second, Foster draws attention to the fact that the national security establishment is not simply an organization. It is a system of interrelated organizations that presumably share a common purpose and is a vital institution that both reflects and shapes the dominant values of American Society. Building on this system perspective, Foster provides four insights:

- The national security establishment does not exist in isolation. It consists of all the organizations of the federal government; is an element of the broader national security community that includes other elements of society such as the media, industry, think tanks, universities, state government, and the informed public; and is part of the even broader international security community.
- Ideally, the cooperative interaction of the national security establishment’s constituent elements will have a synergistic effect that exceeds and is qualitatively superior to the mere accumulation of their individual contributions operating in parallel.
- The holistic notion that everything is related to somebody else provides a robust conceptual underpinning for broadening the notion of national security to encompass a fuller range of concerns than defense, foreign policy, and intelligence- the major organizational elements embodied in the 1947 NSA.
- Open social systems interact with their governing environments. This suggests that the structure of the national security establishment must be capable of reconfiguring itself, not simply to adapt to its internal and external surroundings, but to influence the direction and shape of those surroundings.34

Lastly, Foster draws attention to the concept that we create institutions, but they also create us- they educate us and form us, especially through the socially enacted metaphors that provide our normative interpretations of situations and actions.35

Drawing upon Foster’s organizational structuring insights, a recommended remodeling of the National Security Council would be the establishment of the United States Security Chancellery (USSC). Inspired by concepts of Stephen Cambone’s new institution of a National Security Directorate, Gregory Foster’s U.S. Security Council, and Carnes Lord’s reconfiguring the NSC staff to be modeled along the lines of higher-level military staffs, the United States
Security Chancellery would entail significant alteration from today security establishments. Replacing the current NSC and its system, the U.S. Security Chancellery would be structured similarly to Lord’s model, initially containing a C-1 (C= Chancellery), C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-6, and C-8, with functions closely resembling those of Joint/General Staff subject area expertise and responsibility. In addition to its overarching supra-cabinet, interagency authority, the USSC would be unique in that eventually all of its personnel will be of GS-11, O-4/O-5 or higher in equivalent rank. All personnel will have initially commenced careers in other Executive branch departments, bureaus, and agencies, but at the obtainment of field grade rank, GS-11 standing, (approximately 12 years time of federal service), will be given the choice to opt between two separate career tracks- remaining in their initial, USG parent institution, or competitively applying for a position within the USSC.

**Doctrine**

In addition to the American Security Chancellor’s statutory authority and the United States Security Chancellery’s supra-cabinet standing, the true strength of this new security establishment will be in its development and adherence to USG “universal” USSC Doctrine. Charged from its inception to integrate in its planning and operations all elements of American Security (homeland defense, economic security, environment, domestic poverty, science and education, pandemic threats, etc) this doctrine would cover the entire expanse of the Executive Branch of Government and applicable aspects of the Legislative Branch in its oversight and budgeting responsibilities. Through planning and operating under universal, USSC doctrine, the U.S. Security Chancellery will provide a closely integrated national security apparatus that minimizes Presidential courses of actions based upon the whims and influence of partisan politics.

Acting as the primary venue to translate comprehensive American security authority into unified action, USSC doctrine would advance U.S. public, institutional and government understanding that security threats of the 21st century entail much more than the notion of aspiring hegemons and isolated overseas insurgencies. USSC doctrine would serve to ensure standardized interagency participation in planning, shaping and executing actions to safeguard the American populace and its allies. By participating in universal doctrinal procedures, a framework of accountability and assessment would be provided to the U.S. populace, government and serving Administration, thus obviating a tendency of bureaucratic diffusion of responsibility amidst security failures. Banded together under “universal” doctrine, U.S. security
capabilities would once again be organized to effectively engage threats of a rapidly changing global environment.

Conclusions

Within the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s Phase III Report “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change”, commission members noted that at present, in regards to strategic planning and budgeting, neither the Congress nor the American people can assess the relative value of various national security programs over the full range of Executive Branch activities. To remedy these problems, the Commission’s initial recommendation is that strategy should once again drive the design and implementation of U.S. national security policies. Bolstering this proposition, Gingrich and Kester add that in this age of rapid global communication, America cannot afford continuous confusion in its efforts toward those it wants to help transform. Transformation of the U.S. interagency process cannot just consist of other agencies playing on within the past processes established by the NSC and the DoD to fight enemies no longer occupying the last chapters of history texts. A substantial change must take place that provides the proper authorities, organization, doctrine, leadership, and incentives for all participants in the USG to contribute to the safety and security of its populace and allies. Absent a national commitment, such as Monroe’s “manifest destiny”, or a national goal, such as the Kennedy-era “placing a man on the moon”, America must not only reorganize its national security structure to engage the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous threats of the 21st century, it must also find a renewed vision that will carry it beyond the current Global War on Terror. As a sagacious statement reads engraved on a committee room wall within the Rayburn House of Representatives Office Building- “Where There Is No Vision, The People Perish”.

Endnotes


2 Article II, Section 2 – Civilian Power over Military, Cabinet, Pardon Power, Appointments, United States Constitution


4 Ibid,10.


8 Donley, 7.

9 Donley, 5.


12 Ibid, 57.

13 Ibid, 54-75.


16 Zegart, 69-74.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Lord, 2.

22 Whitaker, Smith, and McKune, 6-7.


24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 5.


33 Foster, 6.

34 Ibid., 6-7.


38 Gingrich and Kester, 9.