Abstract

The management of modern distributed systems is complicated by scale and dynamics. Scalable, decoupled communication establishes flexible, loosely coupled component relationships, and these relationships help meet the present demands on management. However, traditional decoupled addressing mechanisms tend to focus the addressing on only one of the parties involved in communication while, in general, a communication relationship involves a sender, communicated content, and receivers. The state of all three are simultaneously relevant to correctness of a management relationship and its communications. We introduce Selective Notification, a scalable, decoupled event dissemination architecture supporting simultaneous and combined addressing of senders, receivers, and events. We demonstrate its application to programming dynamic, scalable management relationships. We then discuss its implementation, and present measurements of its effective capabilities.

1. Introduction

Very large networked information systems—with millions of components—have become crucial to many organizations, both military and civilian. Yet they are inescapably exposed to a wide variety of traumas including extreme environmental conditions, failures of operating software, and losses of available resources because of malicious or accidental damage. In order to provide dependable service such networks have to respond to these changes with explicit management because, without response, dependability would be limited by entropy. The required responses may be large and complex, necessitating a sophisticated management service architecture.

In this paper we introduce a communication mechanism for facilitating the distributed management of networked information systems, Selective Notification, that provides symmetrically addressed, decoupled event dissemination. It permits reconfiguration to be commanded quickly, efficiently and in a highly scalable way. This type of reconfiguration can be used for error recovery. Coupling this with a sense/analysis error-detection capability yields an architecture for hierarchical management in support of general fault tolerance mechanisms for networked information systems.

Researchers are pursuing more dynamic and less hierarchical management structures. Yet there is still merit to the hierarchical approach because of its ability to respond in a coordinated way to damage or attacks that are geographically diverse. The combination of hierarchical and widely distributed management has significant potential in complex systems, and more generally, management hierarchy must apply to increasingly large and dynamic information systems [10].

The elements of an approach to hierarchical management with increased dynamics may be found in the form of a loosely coupled system [5]. Our proposed mechanism is a general architecture, illustrated by the intentionally general example of Figure 1. A very large collection (millions) of nodes of type A (e.g., those requiring management) operate in coordination with a smaller collection of nodes of type B (e.g., those determining management actions). The hierarchical relationships between them are established dynamically, being based on the current state of participants and third parties such as trust authorities. In this example, nodes interact with those of the same shade, where shade indicates some aspect of a node’s state. As their modelled state (shade in the figure) change, their management relationships are automatically updated to reflect appropriate connections. Thereby, these relationships remain current and appropriate over highly dynamic system state. This occurs transparently, without requiring any node to know the state of any other.

Consider the nodes of Figure 1 to be managers over a large distributed system. In general, the appropriateness of their intercommunication might involve any combination of the state of senders, content, and receivers. This requires a communication service addressing all three elements. It is in their simultaneous combination that loosely coupled management relationships may be achieved. By contrast, existing scalable services such as publish/subscribe support asymmetric addressing. The questions we address are: (1) whether a symmetrically addressed mechanism can scale
**Efficient Hierarchic Management for Reconfiguration of Networked Information Systems**

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with reasonable performance; and (2) whether it can be used effectively for expressing management relationships.

Selective Notification is a symmetrically addressed, decoupled event service that deals with both of these questions. In this paper we present Selective Notification’s core concept, symmetric indirect addressing, and then we demonstrate its utility through application in a hypothetical management scenario. This is followed by exposition of its implementation as data transforms as well as modifications and extensions to Siena [2], a scalable publish/subscribe architecture.

Our assessment of feasibility is based on experiments with a full implementation. The results of these experiments allow us to model its performance for systems far larger than we can implement directly. We conclude that symmetrically addressed decoupled communication scales for hierarchical event dissemination in loosely coupled management.

2. Selective Notification

Clients of decoupled communication interact without having knowledge of one another. More specifically, spatially decoupled communication [5] allows clients to interact despite not knowing each others’ location, quantity, distribution, or state. Property-based communication is a particularly useful form that allows otherwise decoupled components to communicate by describing—rather than explicitly naming—relevant objects in communication relationships. Communication in this form involves two key elements:

- **Property addressable objects**: Some objects advertise a model of their properties to the communications service. An object’s properties constitute its address.

- **Descriptive, indirect addresses**: Clients communicate by describing, (often through constraints) properties of addressable objects. A description forms an indirect address of the relevant targets for communication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Addressed Object</th>
<th>Addressing Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content-based Publish Subscribe</td>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Receivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentionally Addressed One-to-many Messaging</td>
<td>Receivers</td>
<td>Senders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sender Qualified Messaging</td>
<td>Senders</td>
<td>Receivers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary of traditional, decoupled, property-based addressing schemes.

Several forms are in use today, and they differ in which objects are addressable and which objects perform addressing. Three common forms are summarized in Table 1. They are content-based publish/subscribe [3, 4], intentionally addressed one-to-many messaging [1], and sender qualified messaging. If these decoupled addressing mechanisms were used by a loosely coupled hierarchy such as that illustrated in Figure 1, several requirements might arise. A node undertaking reconfiguration might apply intentional addressing to indirectly target an event to managed nodes, doing so by describing the states of their internal security alarms for example. Likewise, managed nodes might apply sender qualification to describe necessary properties of high-level

![Figure 1. General networked information system management relationships.](image-url)
managers from which they will receive commands, requiring proper authority for example. However, the architectures of Table 1 do not support delivery of communication events based upon simultaneous consideration of all three addressing mechanisms.

2.1 The concept of Selective Notification

Selective Notification combines content, sender, and receiver addressing in a unified, simultaneously applied addressing mechanism, and permits a scalable implementation. We refer to the mechanism as the Selective Notification service or just Selective Notification where the meaning is clear. We refer to events using this mechanism as Selective Notification events. Selective Notification event delivery is illustrated in Figure 2. A message sending client is shown on the left and an array of potential receivers clients are shown on the right. Both senders and receivers advertise their local state to form their respective addresses. In the figure, each client’s advertised state is represented by an attached “puzzle-piece”. Sender addresses are lightly shaded, while receiver addresses are white. Sender qualification is shown by sender puzzle pieces attached to receivers, and intentional addressing is shown with receiver puzzle pieces attached to senders. The characteristics that define receiver content of interest are depicted by a black puzzle-piece at each receiver.

Senders push events to the communications system. Figure 2 shows a sender emitting an event. Its content is a U-shaped black puzzle-piece. In the notation of this figure, an address matches an indirect address when their respective puzzle-pieces “fit together”. The Selective Notification service delivers an event to a receiver if and only if intentional addressing, sender qualification, and content addressing match. In this example, the sender’s event will be delivered to receivers 1 and 4. The remaining receivers mismatch in one or more element of addressing.

3. Related work

Several research groups have applied decoupled communication for the purpose of management, including Software Dock [7] and Astrolabe [13]. To our knowledge, the importance of symmetry in establishing loosely coupled management relationships has not been discussed.

Skarmeas et al. [11] describe a symmetrically addressed, decoupled communication mechanism in the form of an agent blackboard. It was not designed as a scalable architecture.

Overlap in potential between intentional addressing and publish/subscribe has been applied in many applications, including sensor networks [9] and the control of robots [6]. Designers of scalable communication mechanisms have also noted this potential. For example, Siena has been modified to support intentional addresses [8], while the authors of the Astrolabe system have proposed using Bloom filters to achieve publish/subscribe [12].

4. An example application

An example application for Selective Notification might be defending against a worm. Returning to the illustration of Figure 1, we assume on the order of a million low-level managers are embedded within a global distribution of Internet Web servers and several thousand high-level managers are run by service providers. We also assume that the Web servers are owned by a fictitious corporation, “Macrocorp”, that Macrocorp obtains security service from a second fictitious corporation, “Intellimune”, and that Macrocorp cooperates with government emergency response activities.

Our hypothesized scenario assumes the spread of a worm that, like most worms, exploits a bug in network code to self-replicate (in this case, in Web servers). Unchecked, the worm might undermine Macrocorp’s global application. Fortunately, Intellimune and government systems monitor
for attacks against common software applications. Detecting
the attack, they manage systems such as Macrocorp’s
through symmetrically addressed decoupled communication
policies. Our implementation uses an XML syntax but, in
this example, a more human-readable syntax is used.

4.1 Modelling system state

Our model of Web servers, i.e., the state that Web servers
advertise as their address, is:

\[
<\text{Model WebService}> = \{
\begin{align*}
\text{String} & \quad \text{application}; \\
\text{String} & \quad \text{application\_version}; \\
\text{int} & \quad \text{service\_Port}; \\
\text{DomainedSet\{docs, cgi, xml\}} & \quad \text{services}; \\
\text{float} & \quad \text{load}
\end{align*}
\]

Models are named elements consisting of typed, named
attributes. Every Web service in our example application
presents an instance of this model to Selective Notification
in which there is an assignment of a value to each model
attribute such as in the following example:

\[
<\text{WebService}> = \{
\begin{align*}
\text{application} & = \text{“IIS”}; \\
\text{application\_version} & = \text{“2.4.0”}; \\
\text{service\_IPAddress} & = \text{“128.142.55.55”}; \\
\text{service\_Port} & = \text{8080}; \\
\text{services} & = \{\text{docs, cgi}\}; \\
\text{load} & = \text{0.39}
\end{align*}
\]

This Web server is free to change its attribute values at any
time. It might, for example, periodically update its load
attribute with its latest calculation. Changes can also include
servers joining and leaving the system. All such changes are
handled automatically by the decoupled communications
aspect of Selective Notification.

Now suppose that Macrocorp agrees to respond to gov-
ernment regional fault-response systems. Such high-level
systems are not allowed to define their own region of com-
mand or trustworthiness. Instead, these are assigned to fault-
response systems by authorized third parties, such as a regu-
lated trust manager. For example, a Northwest regional con-
troller might be assigned the following sender qualifications
by authorized third parties:

\[
<\text{Model FRS\_System}> = \{
\begin{align*}
\text{String} & \quad \text{command\_region} = \text{“northwest”}; \\
\text{int} & \quad \text{trust\_level} = \text{4}
\end{align*}
\]

Restricted sender qualification within Selective Notification
allows a tiered-authority model of sender state enforcement,
so that increasingly critical state can be managed by increas-
ingly trustworthy elements.

4.2 Connectivity policies

Web servers describe the messages they will receive and
the clients from which they will receive messages through
definition of connectivity policies. For example, the Web
servers in our hypothetical application might register the
following policy:

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle\text{Event}\rangle & : \quad \text{alert} = \text{ANY} \quad \text{AND} \\
& \quad \text{threat\_level} \geq 4 \quad \text{AND} \\
\langle\text{Sender} == \text{“Controller”}\rangle & : \quad \text{command\_region} = \text{“northwest”} \quad \text{AND} \\
& \quad \text{trust\_level} \geq 2 \}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle\text{Event}\rangle & : \quad \text{command} = \text{ANY} \quad \text{AND} \\
\langle\text{Sender} == \text{“Controller”}\rangle & : \quad \text{entity} = \text{“Intellimune”} \quad \text{AND} \\
& \quad \text{command\_region} = \text{“national”}
\end{align*}
\]

which translates to “Observes command events from any
national Intellimune control system as well as alerts greater
than or equal to threat-level 4 from Northwest controllers
with trust rating greater than or equal to 2”. Once in place,
received events from senders are those for which evaluation
of the connectivity policy expression is true. Thus, Web
servers only receive understandable commands and alerts
from qualified commanders.

4.3 Command and alert events

Assume that a worm has begun propagating through
Macrocorp’s networks. A fault-response system in the
Northwest is the first to detect the worm infection. It deter-
mines that the sensor events are all coming from Web serv-
ers running version 2.4 of “IIS.” First, it reports this to
national fault-response systems. Then, it issues a worm alert
as an event:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Event} & : \\
\text{alert} & = \text{“worm”}; \\
\text{threat\_level} & = 4; \\
\text{target} & = \text{“IIS”}; \\
\text{version} & = \text{“2.4.*”}
\end{align*}
\]

Any receiver of this event will be able to obtain the informa-
tion associated with it by examining the attributes.

Given that Web servers are enforcing the policy defined
above, all Web servers in the Northwest region will receive
this alert. From the alert they can determine whether they
are vulnerable to attack. Meanwhile, the worm continues to
infect the network. Intellimune attempts to halt the attack
with commands to Web servers. Its national fault-response
system has determined that the worm is spreading through a
vulnerability exposed in CGI-scripts running on version 2.4 of IIS Web servers. Therefore, it issues the following command event:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Model} & \equiv \text{WebServer} : \\
\text{application} & \equiv \text{"IIS"} \quad \text{AND} \\
\text{application\_version} & \equiv \text{"2.4"} \quad \text{AND} \\
\text{services} & \equiv \text{supersetOf\{cgi\}} \\
\text{Event} & : \\
\text{command} & \equiv \text{"disable\_cgi"}
\end{align*}
\]

This event contains a preamble that is a selector (intentional address). It selects Web servers that are running “IIS” version 2.4 and support CGI scripts. The event itself is a command for those Web servers to disable CGI elements. The goal of this command is to limit the infection by disabling the worm’s attack vector.

In an attempt to limit the worm’s aggression, Intellimune emits another command. It has determined that IIS version 2.4 servers showing sustained load are potentially infected. These servers are ordered to shut-down with the following command event:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Model} & \equiv \text{WebServer} : \\
\text{application} & \equiv \text{"IIS"} \quad \text{AND} \\
\text{application\_version} & \equiv \text{"2.4"} \quad \text{AND} \\
\text{load} & \equiv 0.9 \\
\text{Event} & : \\
\text{command} & \equiv \text{"shutdown\_now"}
\end{align*}
\]

This example has demonstrated the delivery of an alert event and two command events to application components of an Internet-scale system. The connectivity policies between managers address properties of senders, receivers and content. They define a total connectivity policy targeting management at run-time based on the current state of participants.

5. Implementation

We now proceed to describe our implementation of the Selective Notification service. We note that it has two limitations: (1) not all clients are supported as simultaneous senders if efficiency is to be maintained; and (2) it necessitates more traffic in the overlay network than is strictly required for content-based forwarding.

Our implementation was developed, in part, by modifying the core data structures and algorithms of Siena [2] (Scalable Internet Event Notification Architecture)—a content-based, publish/subscribe infrastructure.

Siena’s core data model is Filters and Notifications. A Notification is a communicated event consisting of a set of typed attribute/value pairs. Filters are Boolean conjunctive expressions over notification attributes. They are used to define content subscriptions issued by potential receivers. Siena operates as a distributed tree of dispatch servers, an example of which is shown in Figure 3. Dispatchers perform two key algorithms. These are:

- **Filter Propagation**: A subscribed filter, \( f \), propagates up the dispatcher tree until it arrives at the root of the tree, or at a dispatcher with a filter logically covering it, i.e., a filter that passes a superset of that passed by \( f \). Dispatchers store received filters. Siena scales very well when most subscribed filters are covered by others as occurs frequently in publish/subscribe applications.

- **Notification Forwarding**: A published notification, \( p \), is propagated up to the root of the dispatcher tree. It is also sent down any sub-tree from which a matching filter was received. As a result, notifications are only forwarded to sub-trees with receivers.

5.1 Data transformations

The Selective Notification service transforms receiver policies and Selective Notification events into publish/subscribe filters and notifications, respectively. Figure 4 sketches the transformation of data constructs from the Selective Notification service to Siena publish/subscribe. Shapes represent data objects. Arrows represent the products of transformations. “Plus Signs” indicate the combination of two data objects in a transform.

Siena already supports content-based addressing. The transformation of sender qualification is straightforward, attributes and constraints are stored in notifications and filters, respectively. The transformation of intentional addressing is more complex and best illustrated by example. Consider a receiver with an attribute called “load” with value “0.3”. If the receiver advertises the selection function “\( X < \text{load} < Y \)”, then this is translated to a Siena filter of the form “\( X < 0.3 \) and \( 0.3 < Y \)”. When a sender selects a set of receivers by load, it does so by sending a notification defining values for \( X \) and \( Y \).
5.2 Modifications to publish/subscribe infrastructure

The second part of the implementation required modification to the Siena dispatcher algorithms and data structures available at the time this work was done. This is because the characteristics of Selective Notification are not equivalent to publish/subscribe. If it were applied without change to Siena, our transformed input would: (1) not take advantage of the scalability of Siena filters; (2) fail to deliver most relevant notifications; and (3) allow clients to lie arbitrarily about their attribute qualifications. If data transforms only were applied, Selective Notification would be a nearly-pathological application of publish/subscribe. Therefore, significant alterations to algorithms have been made while preserving the two core operations of notification forwarding and filter propagation. Briefly, these alterations and modifications are:

- **Notification Persistence**: Notifications remain at dispatchers for a specified lifetime where they forward to later subscription filters. In this way, the consistent and rapid changing of filters for intentional addressing and sender qualification does not impede reliable delivery of notifications.

- **Filter Coagulation**: Intentional addressing does not generate efficient filter covering relationships. Hence, we deliberately generalize filters, i.e., make them less specific, to maintain system scalability. This reduces message forwarding efficiency because some messages are forwarded along paths that will not use them, but aggregation maintains notification delivery reliability, i.e., all receivers obtain all and only relevant notifications.

- **Attribute Authorization and Capability**: Clients of Selective Notification must register for notification and subscription capabilities by "login" with a password. This restricts clients to stating attributes in models and notifications for which they are authorized to make claims.

- **Third Party Qualifiers**: We enable third parties to contribute state to client addressing, for example for trust management. Third parties must be given permission, by session key, from the client which they are to augment. Importantly, a third party may have different authorized capabilities than the client it augments. This supports tiered authority models in the use of sender qualification and intentional addressing.

- **Channeling and Event Ordering**: Rather than computing the forwarding path for all events, some events record their forwarding paths, and others follow these paths. This allows streams of events to travel to the same set of receivers, even as their state changes.

6. Measurements of performance and a model of scale

The essential practical challenge with Selective Notification is maintaining adequate performance with scale both in terms of network size and rate of change of addresses. The issue of performance is complex because performance metrics need to be defined and measured along the spectrum of dimensions that will affect performance in real systems. From the perspective of general utility, we consider the following to be the critical metrics:

- **Sustainable event delivery time**: Time from event issue to event delivery to all relevant clients.

- **Sustainable event throughput**: The sustainable rate at which events can be issued into the service without overloading the service.

With those metrics in mind, the key dimensions that affect performance are:

![Figure 4. Data transforms through (a) the Selective Notification service and (b) Siena](image)
The size of the application system as measured by the total number of independent nodes.

The addressing policies that describe senders, receivers, and content simultaneously.

The rate of change of the state, i.e., addresses being presented to the Selective Notification mechanism.

In this section, we present the results of experiments to determine the metrics above for these parameters. Using the results, we develop implementation performance-driven models of scale.

6.1 Experimental method

In an effort to evaluate Selective Notification, we have operated overlay networks on a test-bed of 128 physical computers, each of which is a dual 400 MHz CPU i86 machine running Red Hat Linux 6.1 with kernel version 2.2. All software was implemented in Java for runtime 1.4.1. Network level communication was performed with TCP sockets over a 100 MBit/sec fully switched Ethernet. Some computers were dedicated to the execution of Selective Notification dispatchers and the remainder were used to execute a hypothetical distributed application. Several application nodes were located on each physical machine and this permitted a total of several thousand client nodes to be constructed. The number of clients varied with the details of the experiments being conducted but was typically 3,400.

This target system allowed us to demonstrate some aspects of feasibility. However, this system is clearly not even close to Internet scale and so we were not able to test Selective Notification over applications with hundreds of thousands or millions of clients using it. Instead, we have measured the maximum, worst-case performance of a single dispatcher and used the results in an implementation-driven model of performance of a large system. Assuming that all dispatchers have the same resources, we have modeled the worst-case performance of a dispatcher overlay network using the worst case performance obtained from the single dispatcher for all dispatchers in the tree (assuming optimal network-level performance.) From this data, we have modeled the resources required to achieve necessary service properties in large networks.

6.2 Measurement of dispatcher performance

We assessed dispatcher performance by operating and measuring a dispatcher in a controlled environment; one in which all the input factors affecting performance are controlled. These factors were:

- **Available Resources:** This includes computing hardware, network resources, and the run-time system environment.
- **Event Forwarding Set Size:** The size of the set of sub-dispatchers and clients to which events are forwarded.
- **Event Persistence Lifetime:** The persistence lifetime of event messages.
- **Subscription Change Rate:** The rate at which clients modify their state and the rate at which filter coagulation is performed.
- **Connection Policy Complexity:** The number of attribute constraints registered by clients.

Our experimental apparatus, illustrated in Figure 5, is a “ping-pong” throughput experiment. A single “Pinger” application sends “ping” messages to “Ponger” applications in sequence. Ponger applications respond to the Pinger with a “pong” message. Additionally, Ponger applications generate broadcast-like background “chatter” messages sent to all other Pongers. During the entire experiment, Ponger applications randomly change the values of their client models (essentially their addresses) at a specified rate, representing diverse dynamic state change throughout the distributed system. These last two conditions emulate a worst-case system behavior with consistently changing client state and the continuous broadcast of commands and alerts.

By varying the number of Ponger elements, the rate at which they chatter, the event-persistence lifetime of chatter, the size of the Ponger client model, and the rate at which Pongers change their client model instances, we observe performance capability with respect to the input parameters of interest. For purposes of experimentation, each application—including each Ponger, the Pinger, and the Selective Notification dispatcher—were run on separate computers.

![Figure 5. An experimental test-bed for performance measurements.](image-url)
6.2.1. Event throughput and output performance.

Figure 6(a) shows the maximum throughput rate computed using the ping-pong experimental configuration. Figure 6(b) shows the maximum event forwarding rate computed for the same experiments. The X-axes are the number of Ponger clients attached to the Selective Notification dispatcher in the experiment. The Y-axis of Figure 6(a) is the chatter rate of Pongers communicating with each other using Selective Notification but in a worst-case, broadcast-like way. The Y-axis of Figure 6(b) is the rate of output notifications from the dispatcher.

Maximum throughput rates were calculated by varying Ponger broadcast-chatter rates and determining the point of throughput saturation, i.e., the point where the dispatcher would begin falling behind permanently. This experiment was performed with 10 second client-model attribute updates and coagulation updates, and 60 second persistence lifetimes for notifications. Ping notifications were sent every two seconds.

In order to determine the factors affecting performance, three versions of the Selective Notification dispatcher were run in separate trials. The first (labelled SN in Figure 6) was complete, the second (labelled Forward Only) performed forwarding calculations but then simulated infinitely-fast network communications, and the third (labelled TCP Relay) blindly forwarded all notifications, i.e., it provided no Selective Notification notification service. The results (Figure 6) show that the throughput rate of Selective Notification under worst-case forwarding conditions (broadcast-like) is dominated by the cost of network communications. The dispatcher performing all forwarding calculations but only pretending to do network communications (Forward Only) had twice the throughput of the dispatcher doing network communication but only pretending to do forwarding calculations (TCP Relay). Figure 6(b) shows that these costs are governed by the total number of output events that must be produced by the dispatcher. The measured rate of output events shown in Figure 6(b) is nearly constant for a given feature set (attributes in address and other parameters) regardless of branching factor (number of Pongers). Thus, the primary determination of throughput is the size of the set of potential receivers. The cost is not comparable at ten Ponger nodes because of domination by the cost of Java garbage collection and other system activities occurring coincidentally.

6.2.2. Effect of client model size on performance.

The size of client models, i.e., the number of attributes in the exposed address, has a significant impact on system performance. A client-model’s size is measured by the number of attributes in its address. This is proportional to half the size

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**Figure 6.** (a) Worst-case event throughput with forwarding-set size; (b) Worst case event forwarding rate with forwarding-set size.

**Figure 7.** The effect of client model size in attributes on the rate of notification forwarding.
of the default filters generated for intentional addressing. Figure 7 shows how the output notification rate of Selective Notification varies with the size of the attribute model. This experiment was performed with 60 second message persistence, 10 second filter coagulation, and 50 Ponger applications. The second data point (5 model attributes) corresponds roughly to the size of the attribute models in the experiment from which data was collected in Figure 6.

6.2.3. Round-trip message time. Our experiments recorded round-trip message time for ping and pong message pairs. Figure 8 shows ping-pong time over the course of an experiment in linear and logarithmic scale. The data is from an experiment with 50 Pongers, with attribute changes every ten seconds and notification persistence of 60 seconds. Ten messages were input to the dispatcher per second, so that the system was not processor-saturated. The experiment was run for 200 seconds. Average round-trip time was 220 milliseconds, with a standard deviation of 430 milliseconds. Deviation occurs from persistent notification timeouts, filter coagulation, clusters client model changes, and Java garbage collection. Under the worst case example of these conditions, round-trip time may be as high as three or four seconds.

6.3 A Model of scale

From these experiments, it is clear that the throughput of Selective Notification depends heavily on the number of clients and dispatchers connected to a dispatcher, and on the size of client models. Less important but still significant are the rates of client attribute (model) changes. Using the measurements from the previous section for a dispatcher operating in controlled conditions, we can estimate the maximum throughput potential of Selective Notification in large distributed applications.

A hierarchy of Selective Notification dispatchers is needed to reach large numbers of clients. Consider a system with a million clients. Such a system could be served by a three-level tree of dispatchers if the branching factor was 100. Figure 9 shows the estimated notification worst-case throughput and worst-case delivery time for variations in dispatcher-tree branching factor and resource dedication. We consider dedicated dispatcher networks (labelled with solid shapes) in which the dispatchers use all computational resources, and peer dispatcher networks (labelled with shape outlines) in which the dispatchers use one tenth of the resources while clients use the remainder.

Using our current implementation, a dedicated dispatcher tree with a branching factor of one thousand can support a notification every three seconds and deliver events in four seconds to a million elements. With a branching factor of ten, a peer dispatcher tree can support four notifications per second delivered in 60 seconds. Dedicated dispatchers at the
higher levels of the tree and peer dispatchers at lower levels can provide intermediate results for both notification rate and throughput. 10,100 dedicated dispatchers at the base of the tree with a branching factor of 100 followed by peer dispatchers with a branching factor of ten to the clients would result in four notifications per second throughput with 24 second delivery time.

7. Conclusions

We have introduced a comprehensive and symmetric approach to communication between managing entities and managed entities that has immediate utility in dealing with security attacks and other traumas that require rapid reconfiguration of large networked information systems. Our experimental assessment of our implementation suggests that the approach scales and provides acceptable performance. It might be possible to cope with worm attacks in very large networks through rapid, targeted event dissemination as illustrated in Section 4.

While additional properties in management relationships are necessary to implement loosely coupled management, symmetric decoupled communication can serve as a backbone for potential architectures. These systems will allow flexible, dynamic, and run-time management relationships to reflect and change with system and manager state. As a result, traditional management structures, such as hierarchy, may be applicable to very large and dynamic systems. This includes application to interface with more widely distributed and cooperative forms of management.

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