September 11, 2001 was a watershed event for homeland security. Within a year, sweeping changes in both civilian and military organizations were made to address perceived vulnerabilities within the homeland. Through the establishment of United States Northern Command and currently emerging joint doctrine, the Department of Defense has redefined its role in providing domestic civil support. Concurrently, the newly established Department of Homeland Security has become the lead federal agency for all homeland security issues.

Given that DHS will continue to build capability across the homeland security mission spectrum, the Armed Forces contribution should proportionally diminish. In order to support this thesis the paper explores the emerging operational constructs that define how NORTHCOM will utilize joint forces when executing the civil support mission. Analysis will identify key problematic issues associated with current and future mission execution with specific emphasis on manpower, training, and redundancies that effect both DOD and DHS. Problem areas are addressed via recommendations to CDRUSNORTHCOM and offer suggestions designed to optimize economy of force and unity of effort across the homeland security mission spectrum.

### 14. ABSTRACT

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### 15. SUBJECT TERMS

Homeland Security, Civil Support, NORTHCOM
The Civil Support Mission—Is NORTHCOM On The Right Path?

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 FEB 2005

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Abstract

September 11, 2001 was a watershed event for homeland security. Within a year, sweeping changes in both civilian and military organizations were made to address perceived vulnerabilities within the homeland. Through the establishment of United States Northern Command and currently emerging joint doctrine, the Department of Defense has redefined its role in providing domestic civil support. Concurrently, the newly established Department of Homeland Security has become the lead federal agency for all homeland security issues.

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Introduction

In the wake of the terrorist attacks committed on September 11, 2001, the cry for improved domestic security and emergency preparedness motivated leaders across the spectrum of government to respond to their constituents with reactive initiatives and programs designed to increase public safety and reduce the Nation’s vulnerabilities. For the President of the United States and Secretary of Defense, the establishment of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 2002 assuaged imminent national security concerns. With its two-fold mission, NORTHCOM was established to lead all aspects of homeland defense within North America and plan for substantial military support to civil authorities.

Shortly after the establishment of NORTHCOM, President Bush called for the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in order to transform the “current confusing patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary mission is to secure our homeland.”¹ Manned with over 180,000 employees and armed with a 2005 discretionary budget of $33.8 billion, ² DHS is well poised to continue its consolidation and improvement of homeland security initiatives across the full spectrum of homeland security missions. A key DHS function is the coordination and integration of federal, state, local and private-sector homeland security functions. As DHS officials gain experience, it is logical to assume that synergy between federal, regional and local civil authorities will improve and overall capability will grow.

Thesis

As civilian agencies increase capabilities in emergency preparedness and consequence management, the NORTHCOM civil support mission should proportionally diminish. Failure by Department of Defense (DOD) to extricate the Armed Forces from the manpower, training and logistics requirements necessary to provide the proposed levels of civil support will result in poor economy of forces and degraded unity of effort amongst the myriad agencies involved in homeland security. Further, the opportunity costs absorbed by the DOD in preparing for the civil support mission will inevitably result in a degraded ability to focus its limited resources in other mission areas that require the exclusive use of the Armed Forces.

Background—Key Definitions

From both the civilian and military perspective, homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support have evolved and fluctuated in both scope and application within the last three years and require definition. For the purposes of this discussion, homeland security (HS), as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” Homeland defense (HD) is “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression.” Civil support (CS) is “Department of Defense support provided during and in the aftermath of domestic

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emergencies—such as terrorist attacks or major disasters—and for designated law enforcement and other activities.”

**Background—Evolution of Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security**

A host of documents provide national guidance for homeland security. Of these, it is important to note that only the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the *National Response Plan*, and the series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) have been signed. While the DOD *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* and its supporting *Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security* (Joint Publication 3-26) represent the most current thinking on homeland security within DOD, they remain final coordination drafts. Accordingly, both continue to solicit analysis and constructive criticism.

The emerging joint doctrine outlines the operational constructs that will ultimately fulfill objectives within the DOD *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. Further, the DOD *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* supports the strategic initiatives delineated in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. While this nesting of policy represents traditional development of joint doctrine across all mission areas, a key differentiation is apparent with respect to civil support. Namely, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* puts limited emphasis on the Armed Forces role in achieving consequence management objectives. Specifically, only one of the twelve major initiatives in this area directly tasks the military—the requirement for NORTHCOM to “plan for military support to civil authorities”. This ambiguous requirement has been aggressively interpreted within DOD, whose strategy defines core competencies that will provide

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comprehensive support to civil authorities beyond current capabilities and therefore require concomitant investments in force structure, training and technology.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{Scope of Analysis}

The following analysis will describe the current architecture through which the Armed Forces provide civil support and will identify key problematic issues that negatively impact mission accomplishment. Central to this scrutiny is noting the source and impact of manpower shortfalls, training requirements and unnecessary redundancies. HD issues and CS issues involving geographic commands other than NORTHCOM are out of scope.

\textbf{Operational Construct}

The military contribution to HS is through HD and CS\textsuperscript{7}. Specifically, the four doctrinal DOD HS objectives are conducting missions abroad to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks, protecting the territory, domestic population and defense critical infrastructure of the United States, supporting civilian authorities for law enforcement and response to domestic emergencies, and ensuring that emergency preparedness resources and procedures are in place in order to support the Secretary of Defense or other agencies that may require assistance.\textsuperscript{8} This spectrum of mission areas is consistent with the “active, layered defense” construct contained within the DOD \textit{Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support} that sorts mission areas based on whether they are conducted in forward regions, within the approaches of the United States, or within the homeland. Civil support missions are conducted within the innermost portion of the layered defense—the homeland. Since these

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., I-11.
missions comprise the emphasis of subsequent analysis, further definition and review is useful.

**Current Civil Support Mission Areas**

The majority of civil support missions fall under the broad mission of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) that is further parsed by joint doctrine into three areas. The most widely recognized form of DOD CS is Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) since it includes support for and response to high profile natural disasters. Also within this category is support for special events such as the Olympics, various summits, and most recently the Boy Scout Jamboree. Response to manmade disasters is also included, most notably chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management. Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACD) includes employment of the Armed Forces to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and provide federal supplemental assistance to States to maintain law and order. Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) is the final category and includes anti-terrorism support, National Special Security Events Support (NSSEs), counter-drug (CD) operations, Maritime Security, and loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel to law enforcement.\(^9\)

**“Heavy Lifters of Last Resort”\(^10\)**

In accordance with the *National Response Plan* and the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, DHS provides federal assistance primarily when the resources of local and state agencies are unable to cope with incident at hand (or when required by the Stafford Act, as in response to terrorist acts). Further, in accordance with the draft DOD *Strategy for*

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\(^10\) Slogan used by NORTHCOM to succinctly describe their role in the civil support mission as shown on website, United States Northern Command, “Role of NORTHCOM: Facts and Figures”, available from [http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.first_role](http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.first_role)
Homeland Defense and Civil Support and the Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security,

Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) will provide for civil support primarily when the resources of civilian authorities are insufficient or a needed capability is existent only within the military. Intuitively, this arrangement implies that the civil support mission is one that would be executed rarely—especially if the capabilities of local, state, and DHS agencies continue to grow at the current rate. This conclusion is verified within the National Response Plan “Concept of Operations” that maintains the vast majority of the domestic incidents will be adequately handled by civil authorities.\(^\text{11}\) When juxtaposed with the expanding DOD resource requirements for ongoing overseas missions and the shrinking DOD budget,\(^\text{12}\) economies of forces issues raised by this memorable slogan are brought to the forefront.

**Problem Area—Manpower**

The majority of MSCA and MACD missions require extensive manpower and involves core capabilities inherent in military police and infantrymen. Unsurprisingly, the primary economy of force issue is manifest in the competing demands of the Army, and more specifically the National Guard. Contemporary CS missions include the 15,000 active duty forces plus 6000 guardsmen called upon to assist in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the deployment of 5000 active duty personnel and 10,000 guardsmen in the 1999 Hurricane Floyd disaster. After the September 11 attacks, President Bush authorized the federal activation of 50,000 National Guard and Reserve troops to execute security operations around reservoirs, nuclear power plants, seaports, and other civilian and

government facilities. This represented the largest call-up for a military operation on American soil since 1916.\(^\text{13}\)

While the Army was capable of providing large-scale active duty forces and National Guardsmen for past disasters, its ability to do so in the future is limited by the current manpower and training requirements associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and ongoing transformation. As of February 2, 2005, over 153,000 National Guardsmen and Reserve troops were activated,\(^\text{14}\) and according to recent Pentagon comments, the troop commitments required for Phase IV operations in Iraq will not soon diminish.\(^\text{15}\) Since proposed joint doctrine requires all civilian requests for military assistance to be weighed against the criteria of readiness for and risk to higher priority missions,\(^\text{16}\) any domestic catastrophe in the near future that requires the constabulary skills of military police or even infantrymen will force tough decisions and likely go unanswered.

The requirement to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, dams, and nuclear or chemical facilities when under a heightened threat of terrorist activity places a tremendous burden on state governors. For many states, the National Guard (under Title 32) has become the primary source of readily available, trained, and organized emergency manpower. Should another major terrorist attack occur within the United States, the Army should expect


a conflict of interest if they request to federalize the same National Guard units for subsequent operations overseas in response to the attack.  

**Problem Area—Training**

Compounding the problem of determining how the services will allocate manpower and training resources to accomplish HS missions is the open-ended nature of the requirements. How much civil support should be planned for? If a catastrophic event rapidly overwhelmed local, state, and federal agencies, is it not also likely that it would overwhelm the support that DOD is able to provide? A scenario where the total commitment of military resources would be inadequate is not hard to envision. For example, the consequence management response personnel requirement for responding to a single anthrax attack would be in excess of 22,000. If similar anthrax attacks were coordinated to include simultaneous release on both coasts, the number of troops required would quickly exceed the amount available or trained.

The issue of open-ended manpower requirements is not raised to demonstrate that skillful terrorists could overwhelm the total resources of the country, but to emphasize the costs of providing civil support training to forces before a requirement is defined. Coupling the service components’ inherent inclination to prepare for the worst-case scenario with the competing training demands associated with transformation and overseas missions reveals an opportunity cost that is large indeed.

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18 Lynn Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy* (Rand, 2003), 77
**Problem Area—Unnecessary Redundancy**

The strategic objectives of DHS regarding incident response (lead, manage, and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies) and disaster recovery (lead national, state, local and private sector efforts to restore services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies)\(^{19}\) are almost synonymous with the MSCA missions resident in NORTHCOM. Most likely due to the rapid evolution of homeland security policy and the complicated legalities associated with MSCA, the initial inclination was to separate vice integrate NORTHCOM and DHS planners. As such, redundant mission areas were explored and funded by both DOD and DHS. Now that the current trend is towards DOD and DHS integration, many redundancies have become unnecessary. Two illustrative examples follow.

The first is comparing Project BioShield, led by DHS to the Chemical/Biological Defense Initiative, led by DOD. BioShield was signed into law in 2004, and “is a comprehensive effort… to develop and make available modern, effective drugs and vaccines to protect against attack by CBRN weapons.”\(^{20}\) In 2004, $5.6 billion was appropriated to support a “comprehensive, multiyear effort to accelerate research, development and procurement of advanced countermeasures” to biological and chemical attack in order to make the domestic population less vulnerable.\(^{21}\) Well prior to the commissioning of BioShield, the DOD Chemical/Biological Defense Initiative, among other objectives, had pursued similar prevention technologies. As part of its continuing efforts, the Chemical/Biological Defense Initiative had earmarked $420 million for dedication to

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\(^{21}\) Ibid.
homeland security and homeland defense functions. These monies have since been removed, presumably because of the stand-up of BioShield. The complication is in the fact that DOD has been formally excluded from BioShield yet maintains the requirement to provide extensive support to the CBRNE-consequence management mission. As such, many of the research and product development goals between the two programs continue to overlap.

The second example of unnecessary redundancy is found in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) research and procurement. Historically, only DOD could afford to research, develop, and procure UAVs. This is no longer the case. In 2004, both the Army and DHS conducted research and development of UAVs for use in border security, resulting in the eventual acquisition of three “Hermes 450” UAVs for exclusive use by DHS. Given that border security is not an explicit Army mission and DHS now has adequate funding to support UAV research ($10 million is earmarked for additional UAV programs in the 2005 DHS budget), it seems intuitive that the $163.6 million the Army plans to spend on UAVs in 2005 could be reduced or redirected.

The examples of unnecessary redundancy provided are large-scale examples representing millions (if not billions) of dollars previously spent in duplicate venues. Their existence suggests that many unnecessary parallel efforts on smaller scales are likely and continue to diminish the overall capability of DOD. This is not a new problem. It is

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analogous to the widespread duplication of effort that existed between the individual services when joint concepts were still fledgling. The “lessons learned” by the services in addressing unnecessary redundancy suggest a starting point for collaborative solutions.

**Recommendations for CDRUSNORTHCOM**

The following recommendations strive to improve the economy of force and unity of effort associated with the overarching homeland security mission. The general premise is to effectively reduce the Armed Forces’ requirements associated with the CS mission while maintaining a prescribed national level of homeland security. The recommendations utilize several key assumptions in order to justify change. The first assumption is that resource constraints—both manpower and budgetary—will continue to play a major role in the next decade and force DOD to prioritize missions and force allocations. The second assumption is that DHS budget will not decrease from the 2005 baseline but will most likely continue to see incremental increase. Simultaneous with this continued funding will be a concomitant improvement in both the efficiency and spectrum of missions it can accomplish. The third assumption is that the likelihood of US military operations overseas will be high throughout the next ten years. The last assumption is that the National Guard will continue to represent a significant portion of the Army’s combat power and that federal activation will be required whenever the Army is deployed for war and various military options other than war. This assumption negates the feasibility of wholesale CS mission transfer to the National Guard.

**Proposed Action Item #1—Clearly Define the Mission**

One of the key tenets of effective Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is engaging only in missions that have a “clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective”.26

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Any construct that assumes the military will provide assistance to the extent that it is needed may be comforting but is completely inadequate for the service chiefs who must train and equip their forces. Given that the U.S. force planning culture is to prepare for the worst, the ripple effect created by a failure to set boundaries has necessarily resulted in extensive training of forces to be prepared to support the various functional and operational plans promulgated by NORTHCOM.

Ascertaining this requirement is not simple since the factors that effect how a CBRNE event or natural disaster will impact society are inherently complex. Nevertheless, CDRUSNORTHCOM should demand more specific guidance regarding the magnitude of assistance he is required to provide. Until CDRUSNORTHCOM is able to define the upper limit of capability that the Armed Forces are expected to provide the National Incident Management System, extensive and quite possibly excessive training in areas unique to domestic civil support will detract from the training time and resources that would otherwise be allocated to alternate missions.

**Proposed Action Item #2—Leverage The Growing DHS Capability**

Across the spectrum of military mission requirements, trade-offs are continuously made in order to strike a balance that prioritizes the most pressing concerns. In the case of CS missions, alternatives that utilize non-DOD assets are particularly promising in that they meet the overall mission requirement without requiring the associated reduction of other mission areas exclusive to the military. Since CS missions that require equipment and training for exclusive use in domestic emergency preparedness represent a concentrated opportunity cost, they should be the focus of an effort to transfer capability to DHS. Specifically, CDRUSNORTHCOM should publish a Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP) that enables the wholesale transfer of training intensive mission areas that represent “concentrated opportunity cost” to complete DHS control within the next five years. A primary example is CBRNE consequence management.

As of January 2004, the National Guard maintained thirty-two Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) and had a congressional mandate to increase the number of teams to fifty-five. Each twenty-two man WMD-CST supports local and state authorities at domestic incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, and advising on response measures. Every team member requires fifteen months of initial training, and is non-deployable for overseas missions.27

At fifty-five teams, the requirement to train and maintain the domestic CBRNE capability is both money and manpower intensive. Unlike the Army's Technical Escort Units and the Marine Corps’ Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, the WMD-CST provides no dual use force protection capabilities for missions overseas. Because experts anticipate that civilian authorities will eventually develop better capabilities to deal with CBRNE incidents,28 transfer of this mission is promising. As part of a new TSCP, CDRUSNORTHCOM could provide subsequent team training to designated DHS or FEMA personnel with a goal of eventually transferring the requirement to local responders resident within each state.

Proposed Action Item #3—Reduce the Scope

The transfer of capability from military to civilian counterparts need not be limited to areas of “concentrated” opportunity cost. Some of the missions (such as critical

infrastructure protection) shouldered by military personal require additional training in constabulary skills and could be successfully accomplished by similarly trained civilian personnel. Much debate exists regarding the cost effectiveness of using military personnel or contracted civilians to execute constabulary missions. While cost is a factor, the primary benefit in transferring missions of this type is in freeing training time and manpower for higher priority missions.

CDRUSNORTHCOM should transfer constabulary mission areas to resources within the growing DHS and adjust joint doctrine to reflect the elimination of these missions. This will limit the scope of missions to which service components must train and reduce potential friction points regarding utilization of National Guardsmen. NORTHCOM planners should identify specific tasks suitable for handover to civil authorities and outline a transition period of training and infrastructure development, as required. The transition process should be captured within the TSCP, with an end-state that frees manpower and training resources for missions that can only be accomplished by military personnel.

Proposed Action Item #4—Officially Recognize (and train to) Manpower Limitations

Within the 2004 National Defense Strategy, force structure is postured to 1) defend the homeland; 2) operate in and from four forward regions; 3) swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving the president’s option to call for a decisive result in a single operation; and 4) conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.\(^{29}\) Economies of force issues necessarily have excluded civil support. Only in special categories (such as WMD-CST) is manpower held in reserve. This suggests that manpower will only be assigned to civil support as available. Since the need for increased civil support

can be inextricably linked to an increased need for manpower in other mission areas (i.e. the competing demands of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Iraqi Freedom on military policemen), it is reasonable to assume that manpower may not be available for handling national emergencies that have overwhelmed the capability of DHS.

Currently, DHS anticipates NORTHCOM assistance when their resources are exhausted or a unique capability is required. The non-availability of adequate military forces in a national emergency is largely understudied. As a result, the apparent unity of effort that employs complementary DOD and DHS forces may—in some likely circumstances—be a ruse. In subsequent consequence management exercises such as Determined Promise, NORTHCOM planners must emphasize to their DHS counterparts that the forces available may be inadequate or in some cases completely unavailable.

*Alternative Solutions—Enlarge the DOD*

The Armed Forces have a tremendous record of success and currently enjoy the trust and confidence of the American public. Many Americans consider the soldier to be ultimate professional and trust him to achieve success in the most difficult missions. When considering an issue as critical as national response to catastrophe and subsequent public safety, the military should attempt to shoulder the majority of the load instead of shedding capability to a newly formed and completely untested Department of Homeland Security. The DOD maintains a proven ability to efficiently organize and create synergies amongst its components—the DHS does not. Why not channel the 180,000 personnel and $35 billion annual budget into the Department of Defense?

In the spirit of Posse Comitatus and Alexander Hamilton’s “Federalist Number 8” paper, increasing the Armed Forces role in domestic affairs could lead to the destabilization
American society. The separation of domestic civil affairs and military activity is a result of over 200 years of wise practice and has served to solidify the legitimacy and longevity of our method of government. A society that becomes more and more reliant upon the Armed Forces to provide for its needs becomes vulnerable to a system of control that it did not elect. Providing permanent military security for the domestic population is not viable, since “to be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.”

Alternative Solutions—Form A Civilian Source Of Deployable Manpower

Many of the CS missions of the recent past did not require special skills and most others only required basic security skills. Given that it is more economically sound to train a force tasked with strictly constabulary duties like infrastructure protection, crowd control and natural disaster assistance than it is to train a soldier in a warfare specialty, it seems logical to train a deployable civil support force whose participation in consequence management was assured in both size and capability and was not encumbered by the legal restraints imposed on MSCA missions. This concept would disentangle the National Guard from its competing demands and enable the Army to preserve its total force concept. It is consistent with suggestions to establish paramilitary forces studied by the Rand Arroyo Center in its attempt to define the Army’s homeland security needs.

Unfortunately, transferring traditional National Guard missions to civilian control involves risk and an associated transfer of money and power. It is unlikely to win immediate

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31 Lynn Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy (Rand, 2003), 79
support from either Congress or state governors and is therefore at best a longer-term approach.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Synthesis}

Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Department of Defense has become increasingly committed to domestic consequence management. Now that the reactive “dust” has settled, a scrutiny of the impact of DOD policy changes is required. There is no doubt that the national capabilities necessary for responding to large-scale terrorist attacks needed attention. There is also no doubt that in 2001, the core capabilities inherent in the military provided an immediate address to shortfalls. But this cannot be the permanent solution—the impact is too great.

Encouraging for the future, DOD now recognizes it “must not take on responsibilities and costs for homeland security missions better addressed by other federal, state, local, or tribal authorities.”\textsuperscript{33} Further, its architecture “aims to decrease long-term risk by improving the capabilities of our interagency and international partners”.\textsuperscript{34} This is a monumental task given the constantly changing security environment and the rapidly growing capabilities of DHS, state, and local agencies. Balancing the needs of civil support with the competing demands of other combatant commanders requires flexible operational and functional plans that recognize and address the problematic issues. It is now up to NORTHCOM to pioneer this effort.

\textsuperscript{32} Lynn Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., \textit{The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy} (Rand, 2003), 79.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
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