A permanent seam exists between homeland security (law enforcement) and homeland defense (military). After the 9/11 attacks two organizations were created, the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, one on each side of the divide. After over two years, U.S. Northern Command is still not being fully empowered and utilized as a combatant commander of the U.S. homeland.
NORTHCOM: The Missing Half of a Two-Piece Puzzle.

By

Lee A. C. Newton
LCDR, USN

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _______________________

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CAPT Ivan Luke
Faculty Advisor
Abstract

A permanent seam exists between homeland security (law enforcement) and homeland defense (military). After the 9/11 attacks two organizations were created, the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, one on each side of the divide. After over two years, U.S. Northern Command is still not being fully empowered and utilized as a combatant commander of the U.S. homeland.
INTRODUCTION

During the War of 1812 British troops attacked Washington DC and burned the White House to the ground. War had been declared.¹ Enemy troops were readily identifiable. Extant rules were obeyed. On September 11, 2001 the U.S. was again attacked on its home ground. Extant rules were disregarded. War had not been declared, and enemy “troops” wore the uniform of terrorists, fitting in among the very people they sought to kill. An adversary had effectively attacked the world’s only remaining superpower. The weapons: innovation, audacity, and persistence. We will not know with certainty when, where, or how our enemies will next attack, but it is expected that they will.

The U.S. began a thorough self-examination in response to the attack on 9/11, and the resultant transformation in our security and defense postures is ongoing. There exists an underlying sense of urgency, evident in the seemingly endless stream of ideas on how to address our shortcomings; the feeling that we must arrive at a workable solution soon, before it is too late. From this fervent effort the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Northern Command were born, a response that is illustrative of the U.S. mindset that there is a divide between the forces and capabilities we will readily employ at home, and those we prefer to employ only abroad. The Federal Posse Comitatus Act, prohibiting military forces from being used for law domestic enforcement, is having an effect on the way the military is being viewed in the homeland protection picture, as noted by Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.² I believe that this systemic restraint, along with the inherent differences between the force employed by the military and law enforcement, and the multitude of civilian agencies in homeland security, has produced a seam between the concepts of homeland security and homeland defense, and it is permanent.
At issue is how we deal with it. The 9/11 attacks changed the way the nation, and the world, viewed war; they must also influence the way we prepare to fight in this new environment.

On the homeland defense side of the seam rests the U.S. Northern Command. Because of our reluctance to focus the power of our military on our home ground, however, NORTHCOM remains just one of many solutions in progress, not being fully utilized as the unified Combatant Commander of the homeland. It appears we want to exhaust every other possibility for homeland defense before allowing an active duty military officer to effectively perform in a leadership role on U.S. soil.

It is my contention that there has been a constant casting about for a solution to homeland defense that has brought us no closer to a resolution and has actually weakened our posture. We must have a lead entity on the military side of the seam, with established procedures, workable plans, and a relationship with the DHS that allows these two organizations to make decisions in real-time about where and when to apply forces, which forces are to be applied, and which entity is in the leadership role at any given moment. U.S. Northern Command is perfectly positioned to assume the lead role on the military side of the seam. It is my contention that NORTHCOM, since it became operational, has not been fully recognized, empowered, or utilized as a unified combatant commander. Only when it is will DHS, as well as all facets of our military, look to NORTHCOM to provide leadership in homeland defense, and only then can NORTHCOM execute all of the responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan, to include “planning for and executing military operations as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense in support of the National Military Strategy.”3
This paper assumes that U.S. Northern Command’s counterpart on the opposite side of the divide is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is not within the scope of this paper to evaluate DHS’s suitability for the role. It must also be noted that the terms homeland security and homeland defense have frequently been used interchangeably by people on both sides of this issue, occasionally blurring the line between law enforcement and the military. Peter F. Verga, the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has stated that the two concepts are not interchangeable, because “‘security’ connotes law enforcement.” Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the term homeland protection will be used to describe the collective efforts being made to strengthen the nation’s posture against adversaries that seek to attack it on its home ground. The term homeland defense will apply to the NORTHCOM (military) side of the seam, and the term homeland security to the DHS (law enforcement) side.

UNITY OF COMMAND REDUX

A divided command invariably has been a source of great weakness, often yielding fatal consequences.

Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare

Some things never really change. The necessity for taking quick, decisive action in an emergent crisis to thwart an attack and mitigate the damage done is one of those things. Unity of command is one of the nine established principles of war that “guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels,” and one important standard by which the nation’s post-9/11 efforts at improving homeland protection must be measured. As defined in the Joint Doctrine for Operations, “Unity of Command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a
common purpose.”6 Unity of command must be an operative standard for each side of the divide.

UNITY OF EFFORT: THE NEXT BEST THING

When it is impossible or impractical to place multiple agencies and organizations under a single lead agency, as is the case when it comes to the seam in homeland protection efforts, the best one can work toward is unity of effort between the lead organizations, DHS and NORTHCOM. Unity of effort is defined as “coordination through cooperation and common interests – [unity of effort] is an essential complement to unity of command.”7

In both cases, unity of command and unity of effort, it is important to note the underlying presumption that less is more. Someone needs to be in a position wherein they can make decisions based on the big picture without other persons of equal authority but different organizational interests deciding to wrest control of forces away from the main effort. Stove-piping is the antithesis of unity of command and the bane of unity of effort. It is also important to note that centralized direction does not preclude decentralized execution.8 Lead personnel for agencies and organizations that fall under a single commander or leader are expected to execute their missions, exercising independent judgment in the process.

THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

A combatant commander provides unity of command for military forces, as noted below in an excerpt from the Unified Command Plan:

Except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic AOR [area of responsibility] assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command. This includes National Guard and Reserve forces when ordered to federal active duty….9
Additionally, the Unified Command Plan assigns responsibility to combatant commanders for “providing the single point of contact on military matters within the assigned AOR.”10 A simple, straightforward, and concise structure: combatant commanders are directly responsible to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, for “the performance of assigned missions and preparedness of their commands.”11 Standards of training and readiness, and enforcement of those standards, is what a combatant commander of the homeland provides for the disparate forces that would have to be called into action in the event of an emergency. U.S. Northern Command is the assigned combatant commander for the U.S. homeland, out to 500NM at sea.12

**HOMELAND PROTECTION**

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, created in 2002, released their comprehensive report in 2004 detailing the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks and including recommendations to improve the nation’s homeland protection posture. In chapter 13 of the report, the authors note that, “those attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing business rooted in a different era are just not good enough. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists.”13 Based on the government structure and the response capabilities of the time, one of the recommendations made under the heading “Setting Priorities for National Preparedness” stated clearly that “when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command.”14 The authors clearly distinguish between joint action, which is desirable, and cooperation, considered second best.15
On the homeland defense side of the divide, a unified combatant command was established; by definition a single commander for all military efforts toward homeland protection. Its creation was “prompted by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, which highlighted Defense Dept. and government interagency weaknesses attributable to no ‘unity of command’ for homeland defense and security.” Its establishment “ensures unified action” according to Peter Verga, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security.

The Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force, in a report issued in January 2002 saw the “CINC for homeland defense operations,” the future NORTHCOM, as “a Unified Command that has a strong staff familiar with the National Guard and land and maritime operations. It cannot be a highly specialized specified command that is expert at a single facet of warfare (such as air or space defense).”

HOMELAND DEFENSE – EVOLVING UNCERTAINTY

Given the initial expectations for unified leadership on the homeland defense side of the divide, how has NORTHCOM fared since it became operational? U.S. Northern Command was established on 1 October 2002. Its mission:

- Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and
- As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.

Since NORTHCOM became operational there have been numerous recommendations and efforts to either subdivide the homeland defense mission, or hand it over to other agencies.

Five months after its establishment in April 2002, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, Peter Verga, referring to NORTHCOM, noted
that, “With regard to what we’re calling ‘high-end’ problems – the extraordinary circumstances under which we might have to operate – having a single command responsible for both the planning and execution of those activities is important.” He added that what NORTHCOM would “bring to the fight is that unity of thought, unity of effort, and the ability to plan for catastrophic situations which we have not been able to concentrate on.” Verga also observed, however, that “NORTHCOM will add another layer of bureaucracy when civil authorities call on the military for aid” (emphasis added).

In November 2003, Verga, now the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, described the process by which his office will work with state and local authorities in the event of an attack as, “Initially, local authorities will respond, calling for state or regional support if needed. In the event that federal resources are required, the Homeland Security Department will assess the problem, determine what is needed, then turn to federal agencies for assistance.” This effectively places Verga’s office between the lead agencies on the two sides of the homeland protection divide, undercutting NORTHCOM as the lead for homeland defense. As Verga sees it, the military’s job is to provide protection to the U.S. from overseas, with DHS and civilian agencies taking the lead role at home. He sees the Defense Department’s primary contribution at home to be research and development, developing new technologies and making the information available to civilian agencies.

On September 11, 2001 the CNO called the Commandant of the Coast Guard to offer the services of the Navy in support of the CG homeland defense effort. In December 2003, 14 months after the creation of NORTHCOM, with an AOR extending out 500nm from CONUS, and other Combatant commanders abutting that AOR, the CNO and the Coast Guard Commandant, along with other officials, met “to discuss a framework for
collaboration…” between the Navy and the Coast Guard in maritime domain awareness “where the Coast Guard has the lead.” NORTHCOR was mentioned only for its operation “Determined Promise 2003,” drilling “how the Navy-Coast Guard work together to counter threats to homeland security and homeland defense.” But, in a telling evaluation, Peter Verga stated “that Determined Promise showed the process by which Navy forces could be made available to the Coast Guard during a crisis ‘is not where it needs to be’” (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that it was not the combatant commander that was expected to be in charge of Navy forces within its AOR, but the Coast Guard, in its law enforcement capacity.

Six months later, in June 2004, Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense stated that the Defense Department’s role is “providing support to DHS and other civil authorities, when requested,” and that “the Pentagon’s role is to stop terrorists in their home bases…or in the air or at sea, before they reach the United States.” If this is true, is NORTHCOR even necessary? PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM can and do provide protection from overseas, and JFCOM can provide personnel, if required, to train homeland security response personnel.

Caruso, et al, noted in February 2004 that NORTHCOR focuses on “coordinating military activities with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (now part of the Homeland Security Department), other security organizations, and first responders at the state and local levels.” And “in general, the command acts only when a state governor requests help.”

In June 2004, the Secretary of Defense “ordered a study that will explore whether NORTHCOR should be merged with SOUTHCOR, a move that would create an Americas
Command.” And the Coast Guard was again recognized as having the lead role in U.S. maritime security, with NORTHCOM supporting the DHS in “protecting the nation’s shoreline.” This appears to be tacit acknowledgement that NORTHCOM is not crucial for homeland defense, even though that is what it was created for.

The constant reiteration that NORTHCOM acts only in a supporting role with other agencies leading the homeland protection effort, and with actual homeland defense defined as taking place in the AORs of other Combatant Commanders, is illustrative of the short shrift given to NORTHCOM.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) recognized in a report dated May 2004 and released in September that “U.S. Northern Command must be empowered for the nation to achieve its homeland security and homeland defense goals.” The DSB co-chairmen, in a memorandum included with the report, add that “There are so many assets to protect, so many modes of attack available to adversaries, and so many organizations involved, that, understandably, both the conceptual thinking and the capabilities required are still immature.” A core competency expected of a Unified Combatant Commander, operational planning and execution, was listed as one of three core competencies that NORTHCOM could export “that match the needs of other organizations that have home security [sic] responsibilities,” the other two being training and experimentation.

In a concise summation of the confusion between homeland security and homeland defense, and the corresponding issue of what specific role NORTHCOM would play, the Deputy Director of Operations at NORTHCOM noted that the states are “scared” of the DOD’s penchant for being in charge. He noted that “he thought NORAD and NORTHCOM would be in charge of homeland defense,” but that “we’re going to defer to the Coast Guard
and DHS (Department of Homeland Security) when it comes to security.” He then added that, “The $64 question [sic] of course, is what’s defense and what’s security?”

Despite establishing NORTHCOM on the military side of the seam, with a clear mission, and despite the passage of over two years in which NORTHCOM would reasonably be expected to have taken charge, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, when asked in October 2004 whether the DOD should play a role in homeland security/defense different from that of just supporting a lead federal agency, he replied “I don’t know the answer to that, but we need to be open-minded.” He also noted that the DOD, a huge organization, is difficult to change.

**ALTERNATIVES**

Despite the establishment of the DHS and U.S. Northern Command, effort and energy continued to be expended on developing alternative proposals for leadership in homeland protection.

**THE NATIONAL GUARD**

No doubt because of its special status as an organization that operates on both sides of the homeland protection seam, the Army and Air National Guard has been viewed as playing a significant role in both homeland security and homeland defense. Erckenbrack and Scholer believe that homeland security should be “the primary mission of part of the national guard.” In homeland defense, the Guard has actually played the lead role in an event involving multiple agencies operating on both sides of the homeland protection seam. At the 2004 G8 Summit, designated a national security special event by the DHS, the U.S. Secret Service played the overall lead role, with the Guard having the lead military role and a National Guard officer commanding Army and Air National Guard as well as active duty
troops at the event. The Democratic National Convention in Boston and the Republican National Convention in New York were handled in the same way.

The Guard is currently operating with active duty military commands as well as federal and state government agencies. It advertises itself as “integrated on both the interagency and intergovernmental levels” and operating “around the clock.” Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense told a House subcommittee on April 29, 2004 that “protection of critical infrastructure will likely become a core National Guard mission,” and that the Guard “has been given the task of supporting civilian authorities following a terrorist attack.”

While the guard is definitely a crucial part of operations on both sides of the seam, aiming for the leadership role was perhaps unrealistic. The Guard’s role in Iraq has taken a toll on retention, with loss projections of up to 22% of those deployed in yearlong overseas tours. In 2004 the Guard missed its recruiting goal by 7,084 personnel, 2% of the goal. And in November 2004, GAO called for “a strategy for improving the Army National Guard’s structure and readiness for overseas operations and clearly defining its homeland security role” from the Secretary of Defense. Overseas missions have caused concern at the state level about the Guards’ readiness to provide support at home now. It is having trouble meeting all of its obligations with 30-50% deployment rates, and with some units trained for missions that are no longer in demand.

Despite all recent efforts to transform the Guard into a central player in homeland protection, President Bush has stated that the size of the Guard will not be increased and that its mission will “closely dovetail with active Army units, so that the pressure…is erased.” The strengthening of the Guard’s homeland security and crisis response infrastructure that
has occurred will not be lost, and it will in turn strengthen the nation’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to a crisis anywhere in the country. But the National Guard Bureau’s vision of transformation requires retooling; instead of growing into new and bigger roles, it may be shrinking a bit and will definitely be refocusing on its traditional mission.

THE COAST GUARD

Like the National Guard, the Coast Guard is a prime candidate for bridging part of the homeland protection divide; routine operations take place in the law enforcement realm and, when under the Department of Defense in a time of war, it becomes part of the military. Also like the National Guard, however, its focus is rather narrow. Where the National Guard is a land- and air-focused organization, the Coast Guard is Maritime-focused. And where the National Guard must vie for position with the DHS, other civilian agencies, and NORTHCOM, the Coast Guard is vying for position with the Navy and, in the case of the overall maritime domain, with the U.S. Northern Command.

The relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard is a dynamic and evolving one, as noted throughout this paper. The Coast Guard, as the maritime arm of DHS, is taking the lead in the creation of an “integrated maritime domain” with the Navy credited as being a “part of this endeavor.” The Coast Guard has deployed with Navy battle groups, and its Deepwater Program is designed to expand its capabilities in this area, although the program has been under-funded and projections have its completion requiring 25 years. For its part the Navy is working toward an expansion of its littoral capabilities. The relationship between the sea services is definitely a complimentary and overlapping one, but with regard to homeland protection, the interaction, coordination, and missions of the Navy and the Coast Guard are still being sorted out.
The Chief of Naval Operations has characterized the effort by the Coast Guard to create an integrated maritime domain as a ‘maritime NORAD’ and, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense of Homeland Defense Paul McHale, has proposed it to the DOD, a concept he (McHale) is in favor of. McHale also has a proposal of his own. Anticipating that there may be a seam between the Coast Guard’s “close-in area of responsibility” and the Navy’s “far-out role,” he believes the Naval Reserve should fill the space in between the other two services.

Michael W. Little, arguing his thesis on the basis of the principle of unity of command, concluded that the Commandant of the Coast Guard should be made a Combatant Commander for the maritime defense of the homeland. This seems to fit with CNO’s vision for interaction between the Navy and Coast Guard in homeland defense. However, Little’s scenario for demonstrating the effectiveness of this relationship ended at the shoreline, where multiple agencies, with no connection to the maritime COCOM, waited to handle any land-based part of the attack. This is characteristic of many proposals to further divide areas of responsibility in that it does not solve for either the military or the law enforcement side of homeland protection, but further subdivides a domain that overlaps both.

There is no solution to be found in selecting specific services to take charge of portions of the homeland defense mission. As noted by the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force, cited at the beginning if this paper, the lead entity for homeland defense must be a unified command, not a highly specialized specified command. Unity of command is necessary for success. Creating parallel military structures, each dependent upon voluntary cooperation by major agencies and departments to ensure that all aspects of preparedness and response are maintained to an acceptable level, is magical thinking.
THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND DEFENSE

Despite what appears to be a clearly defined mission, it is obvious that NORTHCOM remains an uncertain player on the homeland protection team. Indeed, it seems true that NORTHCOM was created and then left to its own devices in making a place for itself. Established as a unified combatant command, it should follow that NORTHCOM is recognized as such, and that it exercises the prescribed authority. But this is not the case.

The Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is currently in final coordination draft form. This document represents an opportunity to identify and support NORTHCOM as the single commander for all homeland defense (military) efforts, reaffirming the need for unity of command. The document establishes that “the Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense,”51 and that “the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense provides overall supervision of DOD’s homeland defense activities.”52 Although the strategy does charge NORTHCOM with “planning, organizing, and executing all aspects of homeland defense and civil support missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters,”53 proposals for subdividing the mission that have been put forward over the past 26 months of NORTHCOM’s existence are also included in the draft. The DOD is still trying to sort out the relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard in the draft, and it adds that “the United States must have a concept of operations for the maritime defense of the homeland. Such a concept may require the routine assignment of naval forces to US Northern Command. DOD will also consider the use of US Naval Reserve forces to undertake unique roles in maritime homeland defense.”54 The strategy claims a “Total Force approach” that “incorporates the capabilities of Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces” employed
on a “situation-dependent” basis by the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{55} Notable throughout the strategy: it is the Department of Defense that is charged with action, not NORTHCOM. In fact, the strategy acknowledges that “to succeed, the Department will need a systematic approach to ensure close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency, state, and local partners….”\textsuperscript{56} Noticeably absent from this statement is recognition of NORTHCOM as the entity that provides that close coordination.

No other combatant commander has DOD personnel specifically appointed to provide oversight for and supervision of the respective COCOM’s AOR. More layers are not the answer.

**RECOMMENDATION**

There is no shortage of ideas and proposals; the missing element is decisiveness. U.S. Northern Command is the solution to homeland defense. It is uniquely positioned to plan for, and provide training and leadership to, all military forces, active duty, reserve and National Guard, during an exigent emergency. All that remains is for NORTHCOM to be utilized and supported as a combatant commander. Joint Publication 0-2 delineates the authority of a geographic combatant commander of a unified command in an emergency, it states that the combatant commander “may temporarily assume OPCON of all forces in the assigned AOR, including those of another command….”\textsuperscript{57} The nation has identified the lead entity for homeland defense. Selectively “trying out” or utilizing other agencies in the job only adds confusion and prevents the identified lead from effectively planning for future operations. It is conceivable that an enemy could make use of a weakness in our ability to effectively organize and employ our forces. Ambiguity in the chain of command benefits only our adversaries.
The first step in addressing the many existing stovepipes is gaining control. Professor Milan Vego, in his article “Operational Command and Control in the Information Age,” notes that in situations wherein there exists a lack of common operational concepts and doctrine, centralization of command is necessary. He provides the following definition of centralization:

Authority is concentrated in a single commander and headquarters under centralized (order-oriented) command and control. One actor determines objectives and directs their accomplishment. Centralization ensures unity of effort through unity of command, facilitates decisionmaking [sic], offers effective use of forces and assets, eliminates uncertainty, and maximizes control.\(^58\)

He also cautions against the misuse of this concept, as it has detrimental effects on the ability and desire of subordinates to act independently. It would be, however, a good starting point for the disparate forces lining up against our unseen enemy. From centralization, a capable organization graduates to the concept of unity of command, centralized direction with decentralized execution.\(^59\)

The Posse Comitatus Act remains an issue, but not a debilitating one. As stated by General Eberhart, former commander of NORTHCOM, “Posse Comitatus does not preclude the President of the U.S. from using federal forces – our military – to protect our people.”\(^60\)

**CONCLUSION**

Post 9/11 saw a flurry of activity at all levels of government. From the mountain of evidence available in the media, it is apparent that the U.S. has attempted to expand and strengthen many existing agencies, and added others to fill perceived gaps in our homeland protection capability. Americans everywhere have sought ways to strengthen the infrastructure of our open society against a determined enemy. A crisis of the magnitude as that represented by the 9/11 attacks requires immediate action, so it comes as no surprise that
the country experienced a “knee-jerk” reaction. But I believe this reaction has produced significantly stronger stove-piped organizations, despite some of the lessons learned that have been pointed out by the 9/11 Commission.

The seam between homeland security and homeland defense is not an open area devoid of coverage; it is actually a place where many services and agencies overlap, with no clear direction from the highest levels of government on who will be in charge, in what circumstances, and how the various agencies will plan, coordinate, and deconflict their operations.

Many well-articulated proposals for resolving the post-9/11 homeland protection problem have been advanced. Most include the selection of one or more organizations for the lead role, in homeland security, homeland defense, or both. This open-door evaluation of all possible contenders for the role has continued after it was determined at the highest levels that there would be two organizations established, in the wake of 9/11, to take lead roles, one in homeland security, and one in homeland defense. Since then, many government organizations have taken slices of the pie for themselves, but at the expense of the principle of unity of command. Consequently, we have undercut NORTHCOM’s ability to effectively plan and prepare the homeland defense side of the divide for the next attack(s). If an incident was to occur today, and we were to assemble a chain of command from current mix of agencies that have a piece of the homeland protection pie, we would produce something on the order of a space shuttle wiring diagram. This is not acceptable.

In order to properly formulate and prepare for theater-strategic and operational objectives in the homeland theater, and in order to conduct subsequent operations in support of those objectives, U.S. Northern Command must be fully recognized, empowered, and
utilized as the single commander for homeland defense, responsible for all military planning, coordination, and execution.

With a lead entity on each side of the homeland protection divide, the problems of determining when a weapon is a weapon (as opposed to a collection of disparate parts), when to shoot, when to arrest, etc., will be constantly evaluated, and the transition or hand-off from defense to law enforcement or vice versa will appear seamless.
NOTES


9 Unified Command Plan, 2.

10 Ibid, 4.


14 Ibid, 397.

15 Ibid, 400.


21 Lawlor, 58.


23 Ibid, 1 and 2.

24 Ibid, 2.

25 Kennedy, “Pentagon,” 40.


29 Ibid, 4.


H. Steven Blum, “National Guard Capabilities for America,” The Officer (December 2004): 53.

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