CHALLENGES FACING NEW NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MEMBER STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ALLIANCE’S ONGOING ENLARGEMENT

A thesis presented to the faculty of United States Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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by

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While the primary focus of American foreign policy is clearly outside the European continent, NATO’s ongoing enlargement and successful integration of new members remains in the vital interests of the United States. Alliance members, both old and new, are contributing to the American led war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, these forces are assuming an even greater responsibility in Afghanistan with 7,838 troops as of 21 February 2005, and while the alliance leadership is not directly involved in Iraq, twelve member nations are contributing 17,964 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom as of 16 August 2005.

By adequately addressing challenges of integration, new member states could be able to accept a greater share of the burden in current and future military operations. This study will endeavor to address three primary integration issues; culture legacies and their future impacts; institutional reform; and issues of military interoperability. Finally, the study will consider how each category affects American governmental leaders, alliance leadership and new members themselves, followed by possible considerations for all parties.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

CHALLENGES FACING NEW NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MEMBER STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ALLIANCE’S ONGOING ENLARGEMENT, by MAJ Walter Richter, 104 pages.

While the primary focus of American foreign policy is clearly outside the European continent, NATO’s ongoing enlargement and successful integration of new members remains in the vital interests of the United States. Alliance members, both old and new, are contributing to the American led war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, these forces are assuming an even greater responsibility in Afghanistan with 7,838 troops as of 21 February 2005, and while the alliance leadership is not directly involved in Iraq, twelve member nations are contributing 17,964 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom as of 16 August 2005.

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CHAPTER 1

THE SETTING

Seven NATO Partners are about to join our Alliance, and they will become a member of the European Union before too long. But that will still leave many countries on this continent looking for political stability, economic perspectives, and a sense of belonging. They deserve not only our continued support, but a perspective of membership too. The Alliance will continue to display that openness and engagement, also after this next round of NATO enlargement. Closing our doors is simply not an option. It would not only amount to an abdication of our responsibility, but of our very vision of Europe as a zone of freedom and shared values.\(^1\)

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Scheffer,
*Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda*

On 2 April 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia became members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at a flag raising ceremony at its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Following this enlargement, ten of the alliance’s twenty-six states are former communists, nine of which are former Warsaw Pact members. What had seemed unimaginable fifteen years prior was now a mere afterthought, receiving only light coverage from the British and American press.\(^2\)

Given the absence of a conventional threat from the former Soviet Union, as well as the accession of former Warsaw Pact members, the alliance now finds itself a victim of its own success, redefining objectives, and integrating new members into operations in order to ensure European stability and security from increasingly divergent threats. Additionally, the United States government’s inability to gain the necessary consensus for decisive coalition support in Afghanistan and Iraq has led many in Washington to
question NATO’s relevance in a post-Cold War environment, leading to a rumored mock slogan of: “NATO keep the myth alive” among staff at the Pentagon.³

While the primary focus of American foreign policy is clearly outside the European continent, NATO’s ongoing enlargement and successful integration of new members remains in the vital interests of the United States. The alliance’s ongoing enlargement could contribute to the continued stability of an expanding Europe and promote the development of strong new allies in the war on terrorism.⁴ As of 21 February 2005, these forces are assuming greater responsibility in Afghanistan with 7,838 troops, and while the alliance leadership is not directly involved in Iraq, twelve member nations are contributing 17,964 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom as of 16 August 2005 (see figure 1). Furthermore, on 8 December 2005, NATO foreign ministers endorsed a plan to expand the alliance footprint in order to increase its influence in the Afghan government.⁵

While the present alliance role in Iraq is limited, it should increase as NATO takes greater responsibility for the training of Iraqi forces.⁶ Additionally, all nineteen members supported a decision in 2004 to support Poland’s control of Division South Central in Iraq.⁷ Most importantly, successful integration of new member states into the alliance could foster greater allied contributions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. By adequately addressing challenges of integration, new member states could be able to accept a greater share of the burden in these and future military operations.
Methodology: The Question

The primary question of this study is: What challenges do new NATO members face? It is a complex question requiring an evaluation of the new members’ culture, military institutions, and interoperability, both individually and collectively. In order to
illustrate these challenges more clearly, the study will endeavor to answer the following secondary questions.

The first and most essential question is in reference to culture: How do major historical and cultural differences influence perceptions of long-standing and new alliance members? In order to address this, one must consider the alliance’s origin and original purpose, as well as the motivations of the founding members. The alliance is enlarging as the European Union is expanding to encompass more ethnicities, languages, and cultures. As the enlargement continues, how will it affect entrant nations’ perceptions of NATO, their own military, as well as the quality of their soldiers, officers, and noncommissioned officers? Following cultural differences, how prepared are new member states to integrate their materiel and personnel into ongoing operations? This study will look at key areas in regards to military budget, control of the military, as well as the development of military, and security doctrine.

Beyond standardization of doctrine, how many of each state’s soldiers are professional? If the country still practices conscription, does that conscription serve as a rite of passage for its citizens, focused on service to the state or as a source for borrowed military manpower, a strategic reserve for national emergency or only a means of manning the army? Is there a professional NCO Corps that has depth of experience, expertise and the capability of leading soldiers? Do officers allow enlisted leaders to have the authority necessary to lead soldiers? Lastly, and arguably most importantly, the study will address interoperability of equipment, language, and the development of niche capabilities that can address shortcomings in NATO’s existing force structure.
Assumptions and Limitations

The research and analysis presented in this paper is reliant upon several assumptions. Foremost is the assumption that North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be the sole guarantor of security in Europe, and its current members will continue to support it militarily. Second, is the assumption that the European and Security Defense Policy will not deviate from its current assertion that European Union does not pose a challenge to the treaty organization and will “only be used by Europe if NATO...decides not to be involved.” More critical is the assumption that new members will continue to strive to meet force goals outlined in each nation’s Membership Action Plan for treaty organization integration, based on their continual support for alliance membership despite political unrest, which the thesis author details in Chapter 2 of this study. Lastly, the study assumes that the United States will continue to provide the same level of security assistance to emerging democracies. Given the already substantial contributions to military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it appears likely that the United States will continue to invest in developing greater military capabilities in Europe to better support American led operations in Iraq and NATO operations in Afghanistan (see figure 1).

In part, the author conducted the research for this project during the course of a regional study of Europe from July 2004 until July 2005 as a United States Army Foreign Area Officer. During this time, this author was able to visit a dozen NATO countries, both recent and older members and gain an appreciation for challenges facing the alliance’s enlargement. From September 2005 until 2006, research was conducted using extensive resources available through databases at the Leavenworth Combined Arms
Research Library, as well as telephonic interviews with instructors at the Command and General Staff College, the United States Army War College and military officials at American embassies in Europe.

The study will review the ongoing transformation in each military to include personnel training, functional and NATO interoperable equipment, budgets, and quality of life for soldiers. The study will further consider the value that each nation places on national defense and the respect afforded to its military members. The study will neither consider performance standards or other issues pertaining to the demands of the European Defense Force, nor will it consider non-European alliance members or American-led operations in Europe.

The Thesis

New members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization face a number of problems as they endeavor to fully integrate into the organization. These include, but are not limited to problems of culture, institutional structures, and interoperability with existing alliance members.


5 “NATO to head South in Afghanistan” *NATO Update* (Brussels: NATO 8 December 2005) [article on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/12-december/e1208a.htm; Internet; accessed 27 February 2006.

6 “NATO’s Assistance to Iraq,” *NATO Website*, (Brussels: NATO, 9 January 2006) [article on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance; Internet; accessed 10 January 2006.

7 Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “Foreign Press Center Briefing,” (Washington, DC, 20 May 2004) [article on-line]; available from http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/32646.htm; Internet; accessed online 3 January 2006.

8 Traditional definitions of the profession of arms by Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz have offered extensive, albeit differing definitions of the professionalism within the army. While both consider the army a professional institution, neither considered the noncommissioned officer to be a professional. Huntington considered the career enlisted man as one who works for monetary gain as opposed to the officer who pursues a calling in the service of society. Janowitz fails altogether to discuss the enlisted soldier. In the context of the study, the definition of a professional noncommissioned corps comes from the United States Army Field Manual Number One, which states that officers should give noncommissioned officers considerable authority early in their careers. Officers further expect that noncommissioned officer will exercise initiative to identify and resolve unforeseen circumstances. Professional militaries should develop noncommissioned officers through a series of schools that equip them for greater responsibilities as they move through the senior enlisted ranks. Sources: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and State* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1971); and Department of the Army, *FM 1: The Army*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2005).

9 By common agreement, NATO retains sole responsibility for the collective defense of Europe as covered by Article Five of the Treaty of Washington. Nevertheless, regarding the tasks that the EU might undertake under the Petersberg Tasks, there is neither formal separation nor division of labor between operations that the EU could undertake as opposed to those missions that NATO will undertake. However, part of the understanding between the European Union and the alliance is that that NATO is the only organization charged with Europe’s defense. Implicit in this agreement is the understanding that it may be necessary for some European Union military operations to leverage NATO’s much more extensive and robust capabilities in order to conduct European Union operations for humanitarian and security operations. Source: Robert


11 The *Membership Action Plan* was establish by NATO in April 1999 in order to assist countries aspiring to join the alliance by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of alliance membership, both civil and military. Each nation submits an individual annual national program for reforms in political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal areas based on the self-determined individual objectives of each nation. Progress in all areas is annually assessed yearly by the North Atlantic Council, which has the option of offering full alliance membership to each aspirant based on progress and the country’s ability to contribute the alliance.

12 The European Union (EU) is a family of democratically elected governments in Europe that evolved from a regional economic agreement among six neighboring states in 1951 and now is a supranational organization of 25 countries across the European continent. The EU is not a federation in the strict sense, but is also far more than a free-trade association and has many of the attributes associated with independent nations, having its own flag, anthem, founding date, and currency, as well as an incipient common foreign and security policies in its dealings with other nations. Source: “European Union,” *CIA World Factbook*, [database on-line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ee.html-Intro; Internet; accessed 1 March 2006.
CHAPTER 2
CULTURAL CHALLENGES

As the European Union moves toward greater unity, it is easy for an outside observer to overlook major differences among its twenty-five members. Europe is a broad collection of many peoples, each with its own culture, folklore, and national heroes. These differences affect each country’s view of world history as well as the perception of its own role in world history. More importantly, considerable differences exist among the alliance’s new members in relation to roles that each has played in former regional and world powers to include: Poland-Lithuania, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Within the past century, these states have often faced each other as adversaries in the Balkan Wars, The Great War, World War II, and the Cold War. Figure 2 highlights the transitory nature of alliances among new members during four conflicts of the twentieth century.

It must be stated that some new members, such as the Baltic States, were unwilling members of the former Soviet Union; while states such as Bulgaria and Romania willingly aligned their governments and ideology with that of the communist superpower. The resultant differences in public attitudes towards each other, Russia, Western Europe, and the United States inevitably lead to some level of conflict in even the most mundane of matters between states. Cultural difficulties facing new members include often-conflicting attitudes between East and West Europeans, public trust of the military and traditional roles of the military.
Attitudes between West and East Europeans

Despite the consensus of NATO’s members in these latest accessions, divergent agendas often belay the common goal of a “stable and secure” Europe. As the alliance seeks to transform itself into a highly mobile, interoperable and sustainable force capable of the full range of military operations, it must foster incorporation of new members, bolstering further development of expeditionary capabilities in order to leverage each member’s niche capabilities in the alliance’s ongoing transformation. The term, niche capabilities has been used extensively throughout alliance publications and speeches in reference to the Prague Capabilities Commitment and is generally defined as specialized.
capabilities, necessary in out of area operations and typically capitalizing on particular skills that individual states possess, such as special-forces, mine clearing and chemical decontamination. As new members continue to step out of Russia’s shadow and gain recognition as credible sovereign and democratic states, the value of these niche capabilities in alliance operation outside Europe may greatly increase.³

An understanding of the larger cultural and historic differences that exist between the organization’s member states will be essential to the success of its enlargement. Eastern Europe’s isolation during the Cold War has played no small part in the historical perceptions of each nation. In his article, “The Myths and Truths of World War II,” Andrew Krzeminski details how modern perceptions of the involvement of each nation in World War II often conflict with established fact. The most notable example of this phenomenon is the self-perception of former Axis states to include Germany itself, that members of the Axis were hapless victims of the Third Reich, whose citizens never willingly embraced the party’s ideals. While Germany is the most blatant example of this revisionism, other nations such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, Italy, Hungary, and Romania, have all propagated their own myths of being united in resistance to the Third Reich, although, the Third Reich was for all, for at least a time; a patron, benevolent ruler or even ally.⁴ Despite such blatant historical revisions, these nations are far more objective and critical their assessments of other European nations’ roles in the Second World War. While one should never discount the war’s impact, these lingering differences in historical perspective also often reach back centuries and have continued through the Cold War to the present day.
Aside from issues of war guilt emerging from the Second World War, a larger issue for most West Europeans has been the reluctance to trust the validity and permanence of any democratic reforms in East European nations. Critics have noted that while nations such as Poland struggled against communism to achieve democracy in 1989, they lacked the perseverance to effectively institute lasting reforms, reelecting former communist leaders in 1995, only six years after the Solidarity movement drove these officials from office. One could overlook the Polish example as pure anomaly, except that the pattern has repeated itself several times since then, in nations such as: Romania, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Here, citizens have banded together to remove corrupt communist regimes, only to later return them to power through democratic elections. The most recent example of this was the Czech Republic’s European Parliamentary elections in June of 2004, in which the Communist Party of Czech and Moravia gained 25 percent of the vote and six of twenty-four available seats. In fairness, it must be noted that all six members later allied themselves with the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left, and while the political coalition is left leaning in its agenda and clearly not pro-European Union, it is actively pursuing its agenda through a democratic process. Moreover, according to some observers, it is providing a counterbalance the predominant Socialists and Christian Democrats. Representatives from the Czech Republic are the only coalition members from a former Warsaw–Pact state, with the remaining members from Scandinavia, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and France. More importantly, this coalition has sought to achieve socially oriented goals through a democratic process, adding to the diversity of the parliamentary process. More importantly, while this coalition may proclaim itself the
European United Left, representatives from the Czech Republic are the only members from a former communist state, with the most of its members coming from Germany and Italy as well as other West European states.⁹

Surprisingly, many in Eastern Europe continue to harbor animosity toward the west in regards to the Yalta Agreements between Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Even within the United States, there has been criticism of agreements that the Soviet Union would administer post war reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe. American critics in the 1950s, such as Felix Wittmer derided President Roosevelt’s agreements with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, suggesting that Roosevelt took a casual attitude towards communism; valuing diplomatic consensus among super-powers over the democratic aspirations and the value of human rights within Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁰ While one may view Wittmer’s views as extreme, they represent real attitudes present in post-war America and Europe. President George W. Bush recently lent further credence to these views in a speech during a recent trip to Latvia.

The agreement at Yalta followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable. Yet, this attempt to sacrifice freedom for the sake of stability left a continent divided and unstable. The captivity of millions in Central and Eastern Europe will be remembered as one of the greatest wrongs of history.¹¹

While there is debate among historians as to whether or not the Yalta and Potsdam conferences actually gave Stalin control of Eastern Europe or merely acknowledged that existing control in lieu of a further global war between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.¹² The fact is that enough Eastern Europeans held these views that the American president addressed it in a speech, offering an apology for American actions following World War II.
Despite oft-conflicting views of individual states toward Western Europe and the United States as well as Russia, support for alliance membership has been consistent. The most common reason for membership stated in the Central and Eastern European Barometer was the view of the alliance as the sole guarantor of peace and stability in the region (52 percent of respondents). Beneath this consistent, overall support lays many conflicting outward and inward perceptions that have been remarkably inconsistent. Alina Zilberman, a teaching Fellow in International Security in the European Research Institute, expressed the often complex nature of the origin of these perceptions, stating that “Public opinion on an issue evolves and deviates from disconnected, poorly informed reactions to more considered conclusions from volatile and unstable opinion to settled judgment.”

Continued support for alliance membership in Eastern Europe is particularly significant since virtually every state opposed NATO’s actions against Serbia during the Kosovo Crisis, with the notable exception of Bulgaria, which provided access for alliance aircraft. Nonetheless, while support in the aggregate has been consistent, there has been a variance of support and extremely varied motivations for alliance membership among supporters. The 1997 Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer revealed several patterns in East European motivation for alliance membership. Aside from peace and stability, 13 percent believed that the alliance would control and reform the military; 6 percent, predominantly in the Baltic States, considered alliance membership as security from Russia; and finally, 10 percent, predominantly in Bulgaria and Romania value alliance contributions to general progress and cooperation in military and nonmilitary terms.
Additionally, 7 percent of respondents stated that their country needed alliance membership without stating a specific reason.\textsuperscript{15}

In Romania, where there has been a consistent, genuine enthusiasm for NATO membership with support reaching as high as 83 percent,\textsuperscript{16} Romanians consider national security the chief benefit of alliance membership (59 percent of respondents). However, among Romanians polled, 51 percent perceived increased credibility for foreign investment to be a principle benefit of alliance membership, and 41 percent believed that a modernization of the Romanian defense industry would be the chief benefit of membership.\textsuperscript{17} In the other non-European Union State, Bulgaria, citizens polled perceived the same membership benefits as Romanians. However, 60 percent also cited stability in the former Yugoslavia as the main incentive since Bulgarians increasingly consider stability within Bosnia and Kosovo as essential to their own security.\textsuperscript{18}

Within the Baltic States: Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian support for alliance membership is approximately 58, 47, and 70 percent respectively. Like Bulgaria and Romania, citizens perceive the guarantee of national security resulting from alliance membership to be a primary benefit. However, each of these states has a significant Russian resident population that uniformly opposes NATO membership, decreasing nationwide support (citizens and residents) for the alliance, lowering it well below 50 percent in each Baltic State. Many consider the opposing attitudes of Baltic citizens toward Russia and Russian residents in the Baltic States as the overriding reason for this dichotomy of perceptions. In the alliance’s two remaining accession states, Slovakia and Slovenia, support for alliance membership has fluctuated significantly. Within Slovakia,
pro-alliance sentiment fluctuated between 58 and 70 percent, but dropped to 38 percent in 1999, mostly in response to the NATO bombing during the Kosovo crisis.¹⁹

According to the Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer in 1998, there was not a clear consensus of perceived threats among NATO aspirants. Romanians have consistently viewed Russia as a significant threat to national security. However, this view has decreased significantly in recent years, from 62 percent in 1992 to 42 percent in 2002. Despite this decreasing perception, the fact remains that Russia remains the largest single perceived Romanian threat. Slovaks share this perception, although the figure has moved from 26 percent to 51 percent and back to 45 percent from 1992-2002. In Slovenia, Russia’s threat perception has varied wildly from 3 to 21 and back to 3 percent within the same time-period. Aside from a Russian threat, Romanians considered the unrest in the other Balkan states to be the second largest threat to Romanian stability. Both Slovaks and Slovenians also considered immigrants and ethnic minorities inside their own borders to be a substantial threat. Among all new states, the United States and Germany were the lowest perceived threat to their own stability.²⁰

Public Trust towards the Military and NATO

Beyond perceptions held by member states towards each other, there has been a societal chasm between the military and civilian populace. While the concept of the citizen soldier has been a tenet of American society, there was a considerably different perception of the military within the Warsaw Pact, ranging from protector of the state to that of a bureaucratic organization with political ambitions. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, there remains a lingering distrust toward western and especially American influence in Central and Eastern Europe. A prime example of this is the persistent belief
throughout the Baltic States that the United States Government permitted the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, using it as a means to pacify Stalin and prevent further conflict in Europe.

There is an equal amount of distrust from Western Europeans concerning the inclusion of the former communist states, questioning the permanence of these new democracies, and raising questions regarding the concern that the inclusion of so many states into NATO will make consensus virtually impossible. Ironically, aside from concerns of eastern states lapsing back into communist or totalitarian rule exists the fear that these states may form a virtual American Trojan Horse within both the European Union and the Treaty Organization due to the support of all new members for American led military action in Iraq. Much of the support for American preemption may well be the result of a greater emphasis on national security among public officials and elites in post-communist countries. For understandable reasons, security threats within Eastern Europe generate much more concern than they do in Western Europe. Consequently, Eastern Europeans have often mirrored the American mood since the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001.

Leading up to the American led military intervention in Iraq, all seven new members as well as alliance aspirants, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, issued a statement on 5 February 2003 in response to the evidence presented by the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council. All ten signatories affirmed their commonality with the American interpretation of United Nations Resolution 1441, declaring that Iraq was already in material breach with the terms of the resolution. Most importantly, all members stated a willingness to contribute
to an international coalition that would enforce the provisions of the resolution to fully disarm Iraq.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite these differences between Eastern and Western Europeans, a genuine enthusiasm exists among these most recent entrants to the alliance. Not surprisingly, there are several explanations for this enthusiasm. Alliance membership has been associated with the preservation of new freedoms and opportunities for advancement, rather than their extension, together with greater security from future conflict. More importantly, most consider the benefits of NATO membership as being more evenly distributed throughout the population than benefits resultant from the governmental and economic transition from communism. Nonetheless, those who have benefited the most in the transition are the most likely to be supportive of alliance membership. It has also been argued that alliance membership will provide Eastern Europe with the opportunity to break out of its frequent role as a playground for Russian or German predominance and become a genuine participant in European Diplomacy.\textsuperscript{24} Ultimately, the most common thread in explanations for such eagerness among these former Warsaw Pact members is simply protection against Russia. “NATO’s obvious military superiority to Russia and its successful history of resistance to Russian expansion in the Cold War make it an appealing alliance partner.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Role of the Military}

Soldiers have maintained a pivotal role in warfare, empire building, and national security in addition to being the subject of epic poets and historians.\textsuperscript{26} However, the military’s specific role in Marxist – Leninist society followed a markedly different character than militaries in western democracies. While modern military organizations
are typically professional bodies lead by professional officers, militaries in communist societies have generally formed a close if not symbiotic relationship with military and political elites within the government.

Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Eastern European militaries have undergone profound changes in the roles they perform. While all new members have experienced Soviet domination to some degree, there have been and continue to be significant differences among the alliance’s seven newest NATO members in the primary role the military fulfills within each society. Prior to 1989, the military’s role as a liaison between the Communist Party and the state in conjunction with its use of universal conscription for both politicization and socialization created many shared themes in military-society relationships that were common to all states within the region. Key roles for communist militaries predominantly included nation-defense, nation-builder and régime defense.

As democracies have emerged in these nations, militaries have developed different bases of legitimacy (sources of legitimate authority) and begun to fulfill different roles within each society. While this change was primarily due to the emergence of democracy, new roles are not necessarily the traditional western roles of national and territorial defense, serving a much broader function within the government and society of each nation. Predominate roles now include: normative-military diplomacy and the internal role. Although a particular role may predominate within each state, these roles are by no means mutually exclusive of each other, and a military may perform both to some degree.
One can now view each post-communist state as primarily falling into patterns of military-society relations that point to the emergence of common social or cultural trends amongst three predominant groups of states. In the first group, which includes the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and recently, Croatia, the military has historically enjoyed an esteemed societal standing that has only been strengthened in the transition to democracy and free markets. Here, the militaries’ performance in multinational peace operations and role in their own state’s NATO accession has fueled the perceived legitimacy of these militaries. In the second group, which includes Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, an overall apathy or disinterest has developed among the public towards the military. This is most likely the result of a societal de-prioritization of defense issues and defense budget in favor of aggressive commercial development. However, because of recent NATO accessions, militaries in these states are developing within both the normative-military diplomacy and the internal role, thereby also increasing the military’s increased legitimacy in its society.\(^{31}\)

Within the third group, the military has retained a prominent role in society, but many negative perceptions toward the military exist among the populace. While the military in these states is still an important symbolic national institution, its dire socio-economic position and the poor conditions in which its soldiers, who are predominantly conscripts, serve contribute to poor military performance, high casualty figures, and systematic human rights abuses. Fortunately, for the current enlargement, no alliance members fall into this category. Countries in this category are Ukraine and Serbia.\(^{32}\)

While no members of the third group are NATO members, the Ukraine retains significant regional influence with its large military, consisting of 361,000 Ground, Air
and Naval troops, providing a bridge between the Russian Federation and Central and Western Europe. All of the newest NATO members fall into the first grouping with the exception of Slovenia, which falls into the second grouping. Not surprisingly, the army is one of the top three respected institutions of the newest NATO members, holding the top position in three of the seven newest members (see figure 3).33

### Most widely trusted institutions (% by country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charitable/vol. orgn</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The police</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The European Nations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The police</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charitable/vol. orgn</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>The European union</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Most Trusted Institutions in Post-Communist, Alliance States

Ultimately, while culture presents significant challenges for the successful integration of new members, it also represents tremendous potential for the alliance. The national pride felt in most of these nations for military accomplishments in multinational operations in addition to the overall high esteem enjoyed by most of these militaries presents tremendous potential to both the alliance in general and the United States in
particular. However, in order to realize this potential, alliance leadership and national leadership of entrants must work to overcome old grievances and prejudices. Furthermore, while there is strong support for alliance membership among new entrants, alliance leadership should not take that support for granted. Most importantly, for the United States, there is great empathy among new members for the loss experienced by the United States in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks as well as the demonstrated need for increased security against internal instability and seemingly distant threats.


3Ibid.

4Andrew Krzeminski, “As many wars as nations; the myths and truths of World War II,” *Polityka*, 23 March 2005),1-18.


6Ibid.


Dr. Felix Wittmer was a history professor at Montclair State College, and a powerful voice against communist influence in the United State following WWII. One of Wittmer’s claims that were more dubious was that the communists had infiltrated the National League of Women Voters. Source: Felix Wittmer, Just How Far to the Left is the League of Women Voters?” Rutgers Library Website, (October 2005) [database online]; available from http://wwwlibraries.rutgers.edu/rul/libs/foster/pivotal_right/16.shtml; Internet; 17 October 2005 and “Felix Wittmer, The Yalta Betrayal, (Idaho, The Caxton Printers: 1953).


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 55.

Ibid.

Ibid., 64.

Ibid., 52.


Ibid., 25.


28 Danapoulos and Zirker, 2.

29 Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and Andrew Cottey, *The Armed Forces and Society in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change* (Swindon, UK: King’s College London and Joint Services Command and Staff College, May 2002), 2-3.

30 Ibid., 3.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

Of all the challenges facing new alliance members, institutional differences arguably pose the greatest difficulty. For while the Warsaw Pact might have maintained the appearance of being a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in practice, the two organizations shared little in common in both practice and purpose. From its inception until the mid 1980s, the Warsaw Pact was not an autonomous organization, serving the Soviet Ministry of Defense as a means to keep Eastern European allies under political control. Consequently, military institutions within these states developed along vastly different lines than those in Western Europe.¹ This chapter will begin with a brief explanation of the NATO Membership Action Plan, followed by a detailed look at major institutional challenges facing these states in the areas of military budget, control of the military, and reform within the military itself.

Before the latest accession to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all seven entrants were participants in the alliance’s Membership Action Plan. This alliance established the program in 1999 in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which allows the alliance to invite other European nations to join. The plan contains five chapters which are: political and economic issues; defense and military issues; resource issues; security issues; and legal issues. The plan works in conjunction with two older programs: Partnership for Peace and the Planning and Review Process. The review process consists of a series of goals for force interoperability and capabilities. It is important to note that while the alliance designed this program to enhance
capabilities of future members, it is by no means an inflexible criterion for final membership approval. Instead, alliance leadership based on a wide consensus that the candidates’ membership would contribute to security in Europe.\(^2\) Nonetheless, the inability of any candidate to fulfill criteria in their action plan and their Planning and Review Process will greatly their ability to substantially contribute to NATO operations.

**Budgetary Challenges of New Members**

The simplest measure of a nation’s military strength and ability to integrate is the size of its military budget. While a budget’s size does not predict force availability, interoperability, or the ability to operate independently in military operations, it identifies nations with extremely limited resources, as well as those unable or unwilling to maintain military budgets at 2 percent of the gross domestic product (see figure 4).\(^3\)

![Table of Military Budgets](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>New NATO Members</strong></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget percent GDP</th>
<th>Budget in Million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>$356</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>$1,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.87%</td>
<td>$406</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>$155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>$1,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>$87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>$230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>$3,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.47%</td>
<td>$985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>$370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Largest European NATO Nations</strong></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget percent GDP</th>
<th>Budget in Million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>$42,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>$28,180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>$9,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Military Budgets of New and Old Alliance Members

Bulgaria and Romania face the significant difficulty of restructuring large land-based armies focused on territorial defense with a Warsaw-Pact legacy structure. While Bulgaria has succeeded in achieving military contributions greater than 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), its army arguably requires the greatest amount of reform of the seven new members due to its estimated strength of 30,000 troops and the lowest budget relative to troop strength. The government is attempting to remedy the problem by way of a one billion dollar (US) extra-budgetary fund for the acquisition and upgrade of vehicles, aircraft, ships, and equipment. Romania has the largest land force of recent entrants with an estimated 66,300-troop strength undergoing significant transformation reducing its size from 150,000 in 2001. Fortunately, Romania appears to now have a realistic grasp of the scope of required transformational changes and is providing the largest percentage of its gross domestic product to its military budget of any recent alliance entrant.

Militaries from the Baltic States as well as Slovakia and Slovenia have had difficulty reaching force goals, largely due to the total creation of their militaries within the past fifteen years. Although Slovakia did inherit a great deal of equipment from the Czech Army, following the Czechoslovak breakup in 1993, the Czechoslovak officer corps was skewed in favor of the Czechs, forcing the Slovaks to create a completely new personnel infrastructure. Slovenia has did not have the same materiel benefit as Slovakia as Yugoslav forces seized all Slovenian armaments during Slovenia’s war for independence in 1991, forcing the Slovenes to virtually create their army in its entirety. The task is compounded by Slovenia’s current military spending of only 1.7 percent of its
GDP. The government is attempting to do more with less by formulating developing a defense strategy structured on paid and voluntary reservists.9

Finally, the Baltic States face the task of creating militaries from virtually nothing following more than fifty years of Soviet occupation. This has been an overwhelming task for nations with such small Gross Domestic Products. They have attempted to remedy this through several Baltic cooperation projects to include a peacekeeping battalion, de-mining squadron, military school, and cooperative air defense system. While these projects demonstrate a clear willingness to support interoperability and military reform, the budgets of these states remain the three lowest in the alliance and have a collective value larger than only that of Slovenia. Despite strong public support for membership in NATO, ranging from 68.5 percent in Latvia to 70 in Estonia and 75 percent in Lithuania, only Lithuania has been able to contribute 2 percent of its gross domestic product to their military with Latvia and Lithuania contributing 1.2 and 1.9 percent respectively.10

Corruption and Control of the Military

Civilian control of the military by a transparent, democratic government is essential to the integration of new members entering the treaty organization. While all states have instituted democratic reforms with varying degrees of success, civilian control presents unique challenge for recent entrants whether they are reforming established military institutions in Bulgaria and Romania and to a lesser extent in Slovakia or creating an entire ministry of defense with very little institutional knowledge, as in the Baltic States and Slovenia. Factors, such as qualified civilian personnel and institutional
corruption significantly impede the effective and ethical civilian control of the military. Unfortunately, governments have often been more concerned in appointing ministers more fluent in the rhetoric of the ruling government than military training and force management.11

A common metric for measuring the corruption within a government’s leadership is the “Corruption Index” from Transparency International, which ranks more than 150 countries based on perceived level of corruption by recognized experts and opinion surveys. While the elimination of corruption is a necessary task in and of itself, it also demonstrates that both the government and military serve the same tax paying populace, rather than any particular regime. Figure 5 illustrates the current ranking of alliance entrants in the global transparency index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Rank</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>CPI Score*</th>
<th>Confidence Range</th>
<th>Surveys Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.0 - 7.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.7 - 6.8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5 - 5.1</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.8 - 4.8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8 - 4.6</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.4 - 4.6</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6 - 3.5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanatory Notes

* CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
** Confidence Range provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a country's score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Normally, with 5 percent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 percent it is below. However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.
*** Surveys used refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. 16 surveys and expert assessments were used and at least 3 were required for a country to be included in the CPI.

Figure 5. Corruption Index Ranking of New NATO Members

Detection of and elimination of corruption within the leadership of these militaries is particularly difficult due in no small part to traditionally high levels of security in military and security systems as well as the isolation of the military as a separate “caste.” The aforementioned lack of civil expertise in the ministries further hampers this reform. Furthermore, resources issued in the transition are often unregistered, exceeding the ability of governmental control agencies to monitor. In addition, security services personnel were often in key political and economic positions during transition years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, preceding accession into NATO.12

The issue of corruption does not stem so much from a failure of the military to be subordinate to a civilian authority as much as from its misuse for political purpose by corrupt civilian officials. Corruption presents a challenge to some degree in all new members, but has been particularly acute in Bulgaria and Romania. The most common explanation for this situation is that both Romania and Bulgaria have reformed former communist security structures rather than creating them. Within Romania, members of the Securitate, a communist era secret police force, enjoyed privileged positions in the government Prime Minister Adrian Nastase’s government (2000-2004) despite objections from alliance officials. Aside from general corruption, there has also been a significant amount of Holocaust denial within Romania, or at the very least a questioning of any Romanian involvement in the killing of Romanian Roma and Jews despite Romania’s willing alliance with the Nazis in World War II.13 Unlike Romania, Bulgaria has not encountered the same problems of democratic consolidation within its government, but like in its neighbor to the north, corruption in the highest echelons of power Bulgaria has
also plagued the alliance integration. The problems of both states are essentially the result of confronting Warsaw Pact culture in civil and military structures inherent in the restructuring of large heavy armed forces while effectively dealing with the challenges of NATO defense planning. Following Bulgaria and Romania, corruption has been the most pervasive in Latvia. The government’s economic dependence on Russian oil transshipments, which are often infiltrated by political activities, has created persistent graft within the administration and contributed to the country’s low standing in the “Eurobarometer Corruption Perceptions Index 2005.”

**Military Reform**

Similar to western armed forces during the Cold War, Warsaw Pact militaries were strictly territorially oriented in their defensive planning. Preceding the 2004 NATO enlargement, each new member, to include Slovenia, the only non-former Warsaw Pact member, completely revised both its defense and military doctrine. Revised doctrines stated an emphasis on creating deployable forces that are interoperable with other alliance members. The entire alliance accepted the Secretary General’s goal that 40 percent of each nation’s military is deployable and interoperable with NATO forces, and that each military is able to sustain 8 percent of its forces at any one time. However, there has been a wide variance among the nations in their approach professionalization goals; use of American military assistance; establishment of a professional noncommissioned officer corps; and soldier quality of life.
While Bulgaria and Romania both focused reform efforts toward streamlining operations, Bulgaria appears to have the furthest to go in order to meet NATO standards. Bulgaria’s greatest difficulty in deployability has been restructuring its top-heavy personnel system while increasing recruitment of professional soldiers. From 2001-2003, Bulgaria reduced its personnel strength from 120,000 to 60,000, while raising the military budget to 3.1 percent of its gross domestic product. That same year, the military employed 4,777 professional soldiers. Yet, despite these efforts, the military continues to fall short of authorized strength, mostly in its lower ranks. A likely explanation for this is that military pay for junior professional soldiers continues to lag behind the societal average. Not surprisingly, recruitment of young officers and soldiers continues to be problematic with many soldiers choosing to leave military service once they have acquired marketable skills. As Romania has reduced its military’s size, many mid-grade officers and non commissioned officers positions have become redundant. What is more, the government has forced officers over the age of fifty to resign. In that time, an estimated 1,093 officers and noncommissioned officers were relieved. Unfortunately, this action followed promises by the government that no officers or noncommissioned officers would face involuntary discharge, and while the government has provided retraining for officers involuntarily discharged, there has been strong opposition from the officer corps.\(^\text{18}\)

Despite force reduction efforts, both Romania and Bulgaria maintain forces far larger than any other alliance entrant with 66,300 and 30,000-member militaries respectively. Consequently, while troop contributions to alliance operations are higher than other enlargement states, both states have the lowest overall percentage of deployed
troops. However, regardless of military size, no state is close to achieving Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s stated capability goal of maintaining 8 percent deployed forces.

Within the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, governments and defense ministries have not focused their military reforms on troop reduction, but rather the creation of entire militaries. All three nations have stated in their national defense strategies that no immediate national threat is foreseeable in the future. The military reform in these states has therefore focused on interoperability and the development of niche capabilities rather than the development of a traditional military force capable of national defense. In the event of a major threat to national security, each Baltic state has created provisions reliant upon bilateral agreements with other Baltic States, Scandinavian Countries, the European Union, and NATO.

Bulgaria, like other former Warsaw Pact members does not have a mature noncommissioned officers corps. There, noncommissioned ranks are attained by attending military secondary schools and are considered only stepping-stones on the way to attaining a commission and not careers in and of themselves. Of greater concern within the Bulgarian National Defense Strategy, is the lack of emphasis on personnel training, focusing instead on the modernization of equipment. The focus on equipment over people is demonstrated by the fact that the most common documents for training and modernization of Romanian Armed Forces pertain to military acquisition training, rather than actual use of equipment and development of military skills. Like Bulgaria, Romania also faces the challenge of restructuring a large, territorially defense oriented, land force. Both states’ reforms have the distinction of seeking assistance from NATO in
obtaining assistance in the professionalization of their national defenses, having sought alliance membership for military rather than political reasons.

To aid emerging democracies as they reform and modernize their militaries and governments, the United States Government has established the State Partnership Program. Each of the new alliance members is a participant in this program, which pairs both the National Guard and government of an American state with the military and government of a partner nation. Currently, forty-three American States, two territories, and the District of Columbia maintain active partnerships with fifty emerging democracies around the world. State partnerships with new alliance members are: Bulgaria and Tennessee; Estonia and Maryland; Latvia and Michigan; Lithuania and Pennsylvania; Romania and Alabama; Slovakia and Indiana; and Slovenia and Colorado. The program provides exchange of professional expertise and materiel, not limited to the military, but including interagency training from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Customs, the United States Border Patrol, the Environmental Protection Agency as well as state and local governments. Most importantly for military reform, each of the national guards maintains one officer at each United States Office of Defense Cooperation in that country who cooperates with the host nation’s ministry of defense.

Many consider the active partnership program between Maryland and Estonia to be a model program. The Maryland Joint Contact Team Program has conducted presentations in Estonia through interpreters on such topics as force structure, budgeting, staff officer development, civil-military cooperation, leadership, public affairs, recruiting and retention, and combat life saving. Funding directly from the Maryland National
Guard has brought Estonians soldiers to participate in Maryland National Guard annual training, including forty-five Estonian light infantrymen to the Patriot Exercise at Fort Drum in June 2004, and ten Estonian maintenance soldiers to Grafenwoehr, Germany in July 2004.20

Other contributions of note are medical training for Bulgarian units by the Alabama National Guard and $50,000 worth of medical equipment to a Bulgarian unit training for a military response to a disaster.21 The Office of Defense Cooperation has also entered into bilateral agreements with the local military to facilitate distribution of International Military Education and Training funds; Foreign Military Financing from the United States Government and Excess Defense Articles, such as individual weapons and associated ammunition, individual soldier equipment and vehicles that the United States government provides at no cost.22 While there has been success through these programs, there has been an overall tendency, as is the case with Bulgaria, to focus wholly on material acquisitions at the exclusion of any reforms to the actual conduct of personnel and training management.

As new alliance members reform their militaries to effectively address defense issues and NATO interoperability, the establishment of a professional noncommissioned officer corps is one of the most difficult and controversial challenges that new members face. Slovakia has made considerable strides in this regard, installing a senior noncommissioned officer of the entire armed forces as well as a sergeant major at every level of command down to the battalion level. American International Military Education and Training funds have enabled a total of eighteen senior noncommissioned or warrant officers from Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to attend the United States
Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss Texas. Based on this author’s personal observations visiting military units and American offices of defense cooperation in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, commissioned officers also require a substantial amount of training regarding the proper use of noncommissioned officers. In military operations and training, officers are generally reluctant to empower enlisted leaders with the necessary authority to make decisions about soldiers under their leadership with little of no officer oversight. All too often, these senior enlisted leaders merely serve as personal and administrative assistants for officers.

Due to the need for more professional soldiers, each new member faces the challenge of making military service appealing to capable young men and women. Since conscription was generally less than two years in length, there was previously little concern over quality of life issues. As these states begin work to professionalize their forces, they are placing quality of life issues pertaining to housing and medical care for soldiers in the defense budget prioritizations. Bulgaria has gone so as to create an initiative to address quality of life for its soldiers, providing housing allowances, social assistance for disabled veterans, social/pension insurance and a program for the reintegration into civil society from military service for involuntarily released personnel. Despite progress on these issues, care for families is virtually nonexistent. Given the tradition of socialized medicine in these countries, it is not surprising that military doctors focus solely on military members. However, as free market reforms progress in each of these states, medical care for family members of the military may very well become an issue.


6Ibid.

7Ibid., 30-31.

8Thomas S Szayna, “Slovak Civil-Military Relations: A balance Sheet after Nine Years of Independence,” Conflict Studies Research Centre (Swindon, UK: UK Royal Defence Academy, December 2001), 44.


11Ionel Nicu Sava, “Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Europe,” Conflict Studies Research Centre (Swindon, UK: UK Royal Defence Academy, August 2003), 17-18.


24Bulgarian Government, “Program for Improvement of the Quality of Life of The Military Personnel,” Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria (2005) [article on-
CHAPTER 4

INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES

Since the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has mounted military interventions at an unprecedented rate of about once every other year. During the Cold War, armies were in key areas, arrayed in defensive positions West German Border or in their home countries. Multinational cooperation generally occurred at national, army or corps level. Now, as the Soviet has fallen away, more numerous and divergent have supplanted the previous alignment of super powers stabilized by mutually assured destruction, necessitating a far more flexible organization, decentralized in its operations with multinational cooperation at every level of leadership from Brigade to the individual troop level. As new members seek to fill ever more specialized niche capabilities, cooperation looks only to increase, and with these capabilities equipment and personnel interoperability at all levels of command will be ever more critical.

The alliance has attempted to address this issue by means of the NATO Standardization Agency and Standardization Organization, which both answer to the Standardization Committee, chaired by the Secretary General. The Standardization Agency director, Major General Jan H. Eriksen, is currently stressing the importance of common knowledge of friendly forces, goals, and doctrine over the standardization of equipment, logistics, and procedures, with the rationale that interoperability issues must be in place before any consideration of any military operation. This statement, by the agency’s director, appears almost paradoxical inferring that standards will likely change with each mission and therefore, never permanently established. Eriksen goes on to state
that the alliance may address interoperability on equipment, logistics, and procedures on
an individual basis. However, given the overwhelming task of forming an interoperable
alliance from among former adversaries, his statement may reflect a realistic outlook.
Obviously, there are several issues of interoperability stemming from NATO itself as
well as the new member states that the alliance must address, ranging from: coherent
acquisitions, language training, niche capability development and deployability of troops.

While the alliance’s original purpose remains unchanged, the organization is by
no means static and must therefore adapt itself to effectively address new and emerging
threats to its security. The Defense Capabilities Initiative attempts to address this need
and identifying changes to the threat environment and the way ahead. The most
significant development of this document is that it acknowledges that: “Potential threats
to Alliance security are more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other
crises beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery.”

The initiative goes on to state that future conflicts are likely to be smaller in scale,
longer in duration and likely to occur concurrently with other alliance operations.
Furthermore, these operations are likely to be non-Article 5 operations outside Alliance
territory utilizing non-Alliance partners. The initiative states that it is “important” for all
member states to “make a fair contribution to the full spectrum of Alliance missions,
regardless of differences in national defense structures.” This acknowledges the limited
capabilities for the rapid deployment of forces outside Alliance territory while stressing
the need for better interoperability in the realms of equipment as well as doctrine, training
and operational procedures.
Military Acquisitions

As the newest alliance members modernize their force structures and equipment, effective, efficient and ethical acquisitions gain special significance. Aside from budgetary restraints; the lack of qualified civilian in defense ministries; the inability to effectively prioritize acquisitions; and a persistent culture of corruption within defense ministries discussed earlier often hamper the effective implementation of reforms in military acquisition within enlargement states. Although earlier chapters discuss corruption, its significance within the acquisitions’ process deserves special mention.

To better appreciate the current conditions within defense ministries, it is necessary to provide some historical perspective. Before 1989, all Warsaw Pact state institutions, to include the military, were subordinate to the state. However, this control differs significantly from a western concept of civilian control of the military. In Eastern Europe, a party or political prerogative rather than the state or administrative function controlled the military. That is not to say that the military did not exercise its own authority during this time, quite the contrary.¹ For while government officials of the time held considerable sway over military leaders, they generally lacked technical knowledge and skills in defense matters. The result was a subjective military control, which actually civilianized its leadership and made them a mirror of the state, as opposed to objective civilian control of the military, practiced in West European and American armies, where the state militarizes the military, making them a tool of the state rather than a particular party or government.⁵ Therefore, while a high degree of political party control existed within the military, there were still aspects of professional autonomy and subsequent
separation from the political process. The military functioned apart from real society, thereby allowing it a degree of autonomy in order to be effective.\textsuperscript{6}

In reforming this semi-functional system, government officials often believe that civilian oversight of the military is possible by simply replacing military officers with civilians. Unfortunately, governments transitioning from communism have often replaced competent military officers with less competent civilian personnel having little or no defense ministry experience. This lack of acquisition expertise within defense ministries has greatly negatively affected the ability of these states to match military acquisition to operational needs of the military. Nations confronting acquisition reforms fall into two basic categories: those with large heavy armed forces heavily focused on force modernization and reduction and those creating complete military acquisition systems. Countries in the former category are Romania and Bulgaria; with the remaining five nations creating militaries either in their entirety, as is the case in the Baltic States or from (The Baltic States) or from whatever materiel they could obtain from their former governing states (Slovakia and Slovenia).

In Romania and Bulgaria, cold war era senior officers reluctant to adopt transparency in the military acquisitions process often impede military transformation. An American Military Contact Team representing the United States European Command with the mission to assist military transforming in emerging democracies noted in a 1994 visit that the defense industry was fully government owned. Government officials of the time viewed defense contracts as a service order from one section of the government to another, which no official could refuse. The concept of competing for a contract in transparent negotiations was a foreign concept.\textsuperscript{7}
Since that time, there have been considerable efforts in the privatization of the defense industry. However, while Bulgaria has privatized most of the twenty Bulgarian industrial firms, it is often in name only, since existing management has often purchased these firms and allowed the government to retain a controlling interest in the business. The inability or unwillingness to address these issues may be in no small part due to the elevated status of the military in these states. Colonel Valeri Ratchev, the Deputy Commandant of the Bulgarian National Defense Academy, notes that militaries such as Bulgaria have long considered themselves a pillar of society and viewed as a normalizing force during the transition to democracy, reinforcing its dominance in society. This is not to imply that these states are function as military dictatorships, but that these militaries have generally held an inappropriate level of influence in governmental matters. More importantly, undue influence combined with weak civilian oversight lacking in experience that sought to use the military for political purposes, often left military leaders to conduct military acquisitions in a manner inconsistent with operational requirements of the military. The United States Government has invested heavily through security assistance programs in each country in order to promote transparent and ethical military acquisitions that will effectively address military operational needs of each nation. Figure 6 illustrates the amount that America has invested in each nation in the form of Foreign Military Financing and International Military and Education Training.
Figure 6. Security Assistance Provided from the United States

Armed forces within the Baltic States, more than confronting transformation, are overcoming the difficulties inherent in creating military organizations with little or no materiel or professional legacy from a previous armed force. Given the Baltic States’ size, they cannot hope to build large, powerful armies comparable to those of long-standing alliance members. Estonia, for example, relies on an 8,900-member reserve, which if called out, would face critical shortages of equipment. Estonia, like the other two Baltic States, currently lacks artillery and armored formations. If these nations faced an external military threat, they would solely depend on NATO for their national defense. As each nation works to create a professional army, they are focusing acquisition efforts on modern equipment to enhance niche capabilities rather than a full spectrum combat force. Latvia, for example, is developing specialized ordnance and minesweeping units and is considering development of a minesweeping unit. All three states are now endeavoring to provide niche capabilities, some of which appear in figure 7. The military
strategies of the Baltic States depend upon NATO and not each individual states to provide overarching territorial defense. Consequently, the limited budgets of these nations concentrate on providing only the materials for these tasks and not creating a military capable of national defense.\textsuperscript{13}

Slovakia has made great strides in linking acquisitions to niche capabilities and replacing aging Warsaw Pact era equipment. Additionally, the acquisition of NATO-standard equipment has been a priority, since over 75 percent of the land force equipment and 90 percent of the air force equipment will be obsolete without modernization by 2010. Currently, the Slovak Ministry of Defense is phasing out all MiG-21s, and does not plan to use existing fixed wing aircraft past 2008, at which time it will either lease or purchase other fixed wing aircraft. This has allowed the Slovak Ministry of Defense to place an even greater emphasis on the acquisition of NATO interoperable equipment for its ground forces, such as lighter wheeled armored vehicles (Alligator) and an upgraded tracked combat vehicle (BVP2).\textsuperscript{14}

Slovenia also faces many of the same standardization issues as Slovakia and the Baltic States. Likewise, the Slovene government has taken steps to modernize its military sector in accordance with NATO standards, focusing its acquisition efforts on the development of enhanced air defense systems as well as upgrades to its rapid reaction and mobilization capabilities. In order to address these shortcomings, the government has designated approximately 17 percent of the military budget for modernization. Like Slovakia, Slovenia is now diverting resources from its fixed wing aviation and focusing on rotary aviation.\textsuperscript{15} Despite these efforts, Slovenia has previously made some very questionable decisions in acquisitions. In 2001, the Slovenian minister of defense, Dr.
Anton Grizoid would not permit extra money allocated for the implementation of their *Membership Action Plan* goals.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, that year, the Slovenian government purchased a VIP government aircraft, at a cost equal to roughly 10 percent of that year’s budget.\textsuperscript{17} At best this was a poor prioritization and at worst, blatant corruption.

**Language**

Even more so than interoperable equipment, personnel interoperability is paramount to the successful new member integration. The most basic element of this is language. Given NATO’s new force generation model, which often creates multinational organizations as low as the platoon and squad level, proficiency in either English or French has gained new importance for soldiers and officers of all ranks. While both English and French are official languages, new members have placed a greater emphasis on English over French. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization establishes standards for interoperability among members using a Standardization Agreement, or STANAG. The agreement that specifically establishes standards for language is STANAG 6001. There are five levels of language proficiency. A speaker with skill level one will have an elementary proficiency, able to practice routine practical needs related to travel, level two has a limited working knowledge of the language, able to carry conversations, give directions and is easily understood by native speakers. Level three has a minimum professional proficiency and can discuss as well as comprehend complex issues. Level four has a full professional comprehension with minimal accent that does not interfere with comprehension. Finally, level five is considered a native speaker with no detectable accent.\textsuperscript{18}
Learning English has presented an acute challenge in the former Warsaw Pact states, where the general populace and the military have not had the same opportunities to learn and practice English as in Western Europe. Additionally, there have been complications regarding uniformity in what instructors consider to be a professional level of English, since during communism, language tests, especially those for senior officers, were essentially formalities. Some general officers that were later entered in the NATO standardization exams only to fail. To be fair, it must be said, that some senior officers have made considerable progress in English, some whom have become chiefs of staff of their respective militaries. However, there is a top-heavy emphasis on English language training for senior officers at the expense of junior officers and noncommissioned officers despite the top-down downsizing in many countries that has made many military senior officers who recently received training redundant.\textsuperscript{19}

Aside from inconsistencies in determining language skill levels of their personnel, there have also been challenges in determining appropriate foreign language requirements for positions within the alliance, such as high-level offices currently filled by senior staff with poor linguistic skills. Conversely, there has been the problem of alliance positions with unrealistically high linguistic requirements that new member states are unable to fill.\textsuperscript{20} Fortunately, all enlargement states have taken steps to increase proficiency in English or French among their professional soldiers. Romania has a particularly robust system that includes four main centers and fifteen secondary English language-training facilities. Courses of instruction range from a four-week familiarization to twenty-four week beginner and twenty-two week advanced training programs. In Romania, these programs have resulted in 500 soldiers receiving advanced training and an additional
1,400 soldiers receiving either basic or specialized language training. Slovakia has also enjoyed considerable success in its English language training, leveraging assets that include seven language training centers and two service academies in addition to English language training opportunities in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The result of this has been more than 1,700 military personnel and civilians receiving language training. While the numbers represent a considerable commitment to alliance integration, no more than 5 to 10 percent of those trained have reached STANAG level three.

Within the extremely small defense ministries of the Baltic States, the three nations have pooled training resources in order to affect better language training. However, the efforts to increase language proficiency in English and French while concurrently restructuring the military have presented a particularly difficult challenge. Additionally, these states face the challenge of losing talented young soldiers who leave the military seeking more lucrative employment, creating further challenges for the alliance in meeting its linguistic requirements. Nevertheless, the Baltic armed forces have placed a significant emphasis on meeting language requirements for alliance operations while undergoing internal military restructuring. Outside the Baltic States, the other newly created military, Slovenia has extensively implemented English language training into all levels of leadership and staff. Furthermore, the Slovene military is addressing the varying language needs of soldiers as well as officers by taking developing language training to specifically target different capabilities required for peace support operations, firefighting and air surveillance crews. Furthermore, Slovenia has established a language course for staff noncommissioned officers.
The United States Department of Defense has played no small part in these transformations, continuing to support individual nations through bilateral training agreements as well as contributing to the training of personnel in alliance doctrine as well as English and French. Through the International Military Education and Training program, the United States has provided more than $77 million in grants for modernization and training in the past and looks to continue that for the near future. Figure 6 details the current contributions in security assistance for these nations as well as the request for 2006.25

Niche Capabilities

In the summer of 2002, at the Prague Summit, alliance defense ministers established the Prague Capabilities Commitment, emphasizing eight main areas for improvement within NATO. These areas were; nuclear, biological and chemical defenses; intelligence; air to ground surveillance; command, control and communication; combat effectiveness; strategic air and sealift; air-to-air refueling and deployable combat service support. Key areas for improvement were; deployability and mobility, effective management; command, control and communication; as well as sustainability and logistics.26

In order to fulfill the Prague Summit priorities, alliance leadership encouraged new members to develop and offer the alliance niche capabilities; skill specializations appropriate to each contributing nation’s means. Whether through the deployment of small units with special skill sets or the use of forward logistics, the alliance has been able to better leverage the generally limited assets of new entrants. Development of the
Prague Capabilities Commitment grew out of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, approved by allied leaders at the 1999 NATO summit in Washington, DC. The initiative’s greatest weakness was that countries were not required to report individual progress in establishing or further developing key capabilities for the alliance. In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 and subsequent invocation of Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO began to narrow its focus onto four key areas essential to all missions, including defense against terrorism. The areas were: nuclear, biological and chemical weapon defense; effective command, control and communications; improved interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; as well as rapid deployable and sustainable combat forces.

National leaders within NATO planned to improve the effectiveness of its forces through firm nation-specific commitments undertaken based on national decisions and incorporate target dates for when nations must correct operational shortfalls. Defense ministers agreed to increase international cooperation in order to achieve the capability targets in addition to ensuring targets are realistic within each nation’s economic terms. Two years later, at the Istanbul summit, Defense Ministers agreed to “usability” standards for their countries’ ground forces that each nation could deploy 40 percent of its forces and sustain 8 percent of its total forces in an overseas mission at any one time.

The Istanbul Summit Communiqué, dated 28 June 2004, emphasized the further need for member states to fulfill shortages addressed by the Prague Capabilities Commitment. While acknowledging progress in strategic sealift, air-to-air refueling, and the Alliance Ground Surveillance system, the document stated the need to reallocate resources no longer needed for national defense and for new member states to provide
greater support to overcome remaining critical shortages within the treaty organization.\(^{31}\)

Unfortunately, given the limited budgets, the development of many of these critical shortages by newer members may not be an option.

New members have focused available assets, in varying degrees, to the development of rapid reaction forces, capable of deploying after five days’ notice and sustaining themselves for operations during thirty days or more if re-supplied. Former Warsaw Pact members have also provided Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) regiments, decontamination units and other specialized capabilities, all of which could enhance the alliance’s ability to combat terrorism outside Europe.\(^{32}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialized Military Capabilities of New NATO Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Specialized Military Capabilities of New NATO Members

Figure 7 details the specializations of new member militaries as of April 2003.

The skill listing is not comprehensive, but rather highlights particular areas of expertise among these states. Recent entrants have made the following force contributions:

Romania has offered one seventy-member NBC company, an mountain infantry company and medical personnel to allied operations in Afghanistan; Estonia has offered two
explosive-detection dog teams for airbase operations; Slovakia has offered a special forces regiment, NBC reconnaissance and engineering units and a mobile field hospital. Even if forces of new members do not achieve the same military-wide standards as other larger NATO militaries, the specialized contributions of alliance entrants have generally been interoperable with alliance forces and have made an invaluable contribution to the organization’s ability to confront rising asymmetric security threats within and without Europe.33

All members contribute a wide variety of resources in alliance operations in the war in the Balkans and in South West Asia. While alliance members have aimed their military reforms on increasing the usability of troop contributions, there are numerous other ways nations may contribute; to include intelligence sharing as well as basing and airspace rights. Despite the contributions of new members prior-to their accession, none have fully met the formal criteria for membership outlined in their Membership Action Plan.34

Force Generation

The current concept of force generation within the alliance is relatively new. Previously, planners coordinated efforts of entire national militaries in order to prevent a large-scale military conflict. The NATO alliance was largely defensive in nature and did not consider the expeditionary capabilities of its European members. Starting in 1992, the alliance initiated its first military operation when it provided mobile headquarters to the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia Herzegovina. Since that time, this capability has steadily grown and NATO has executed a variety of missions from enforcement of
no-fly zones (Sky Monitor1993-1995) in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the training of Iraqi military officers (Iraqi assistance 2004-Present).\textsuperscript{35}

Despite this increased operational tempo, the alliance suffers from an outdated force generation process. The current process used to generate forces is the Defense Planning Questionnaire, which is a legacy of the cold war. The forces outlined in the questionnaire are the same that member nations draw upon for their own defense needs as well as those of the United Nations or the European Union. Furthermore, the questionnaire covers a five-year period, and can prove woefully inaccurate. For instance, possible procurements such as vehicles for a transportation company or a fleet of helicopters may only be a procurement aspiration of a contributing nation, rather than a deployable asset.\textsuperscript{36}

While the process varies, it focuses on operational needs and follows a basic form that begins in the North Atlantic Council, where member nations announce the decision to undertake a new mission. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe then nominates a joint task force commander, who in turns develops a detailed plan in partnership with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. All parties involved work to ensure that the overall plan and the statement of request are consistent with the politic goals of the alliance’s members and within the limits of its military capabilities. Following the overall plan’s approval by the council, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe releases an Activation Warning, informing members and alliance commands what type of force is required, a mission outline and key planning dates. The headquarters then issues the initial statement of request, establishes formal contact with the designated members, and
releases the activation request message formally requesting specific military contributions in accordance with the statement of requirements.  

Once the specific alliance needs are established, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the joint task commander will host a conference with representatives from every nation, who in turn will submit offers of supports of personnel and materiel via a force preparation message, detailing the available unit and its capabilities as well as any operational limitations or caveats. An engineer battalion, for example, may be unable to operate in an area where there have been hostilities in the past forty-eight hours, or an aviation squadron may only fly non-combatants in theater etc… The process is ongoing and further conferences may be necessary to consolidate all assets and fill critical shortfalls from the original statement of requirements.

This is an extremely generalized accounting of a force generation process that will inevitably vary according to mission. The processes described here, between the council’s top down guidance and the release of the activation order, do not necessarily occur sequentially. Most importantly, the activation order is not always the end of the process. On the contrary, it tends to be only the end of only first stage. Following this stage, NATO must continue to generate forces for subsequent mission rotations and further develop the concept of operations as the mission continues to evolve.

In 1995, the alliance began to employ former Warsaw Pact militaries as members of the Stabilization Forces in Bosnia and later Kosovo Force. While one should not discount the historical and political significance of these contributions, the alliance aspirants soon realized that their conscript based militaries, while sufficient for territorial defense, were insufficient for expeditionary operations. While Balkan operations
presented significant challenges to NATO aspirants, they were relatively close to home with a mission easily understood by the citizens of these nations. Despite the overall success of these missions, participants often developed rules of engagement or other procedures that actually impeded force interoperability.\(^{41}\)

Later, on September 12, 2001, in the wake of Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center, the alliance invoked Article Five\(^ {42}\) of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history. However, the United States was not coming to Europe’s defense. Rather NATO and airborne warning and control systems protected the United States, alliance naval vessels patrolled the Eastern Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic Council began planning for military operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). Any challenges the alliance faced in the Balkans now increased exponentially. Increased distances to the theater were generally beyond lift capacity and international rationale for these operations as well as the heightened risk often exceeded the public’s perception of their own national security interests.\(^{43}\)

Despite the difficulties faced by alliance members, there were significant contributions from former Warsaw Pact members. Poland was able to initially deploy more soldiers for operations in Operation Enduring than it had for NATO’s implementation force in Bosnia, deploying 90 combat engineers to Bagram Airport and sixty commandos to Kuwait, as members of an American command. Later, in the June of 2004 at the Istanbul Summit, the alliance established the goal that members should have the ability to deploy 40 percent of their forces while sustaining 8 percent of their forces abroad at any given time.\(^ {44}\)
Despite the difficulties inherent in the development of deployable forces, there has been significant progress in this regard. Contributions from the enlargement alliance members are approaching that of the largest five members, assuming an increasing share of the burden within the alliance. While the average deployed for the largest five members is 3.2 percent versus 2.4 percent for enlargement states, the average drops to 2.5 percent when the United Kingdom is removed from the equation. While new members cannot match the sheer numbers of forces deployed by traditional members, their contributions represent a comparable share of their own militaries, which appears all the more significant when taken in the context of ongoing transformation. Additionally, the enthusiasm that these states demonstrate for their soldiers’ actions demonstrates the potential for the utilization of these forces. Alliance leadership should neither overlook this quality nor take it for granted (see figure 8).

### Troops Contributed to Multinational Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size of Military</th>
<th>Kosovo (Kosovo)</th>
<th>Afghanistan KFOR (Afghanistan)</th>
<th>Afghanistan ISAF (Afghanistan)</th>
<th>Iraq ISAF (Iraq)</th>
<th>UN Led Operations</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of total military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czech</strong></td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>32,300</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>141,500</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,359</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td>4,980</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lithuania</strong></td>
<td>13,510</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>66,300</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovakia</strong></td>
<td>20,195</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td>6,650</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>207,630</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>259,050</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>284,500</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>194,000</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>150,700</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figures 8**. Troops Contributed to Multinational Military Operations by Alliance Members


Ultimately, the contributions of new members, while limited, have had strategic and tactical benefits that may prove greater than the sum of their parts as they lend further political consensus to alliance operations within and outside Europe. The increased emphasis on combating terrorism and the need to project forces beyond the European continent have also shaped the Membership Action Plan for each new member. These states have demonstrated their willingness to provide niche capabilities, even at the potential expense of their own nation’s capability to field a national defense force. Furthermore, The development of role specialization among new members has enhanced the alliance’s expeditionary ability and illustrated the shift from cooperative defense by national armies to that of a collective defense by nations contributing units of varying size under a multinational command structure.

In analyzing interoperability shortcomings among new member states, entrants quickly fall into the categories of either having to reform or to create entire defense
systems. The difficulties presented by large militaries reforming Warsaw Pact practices may often seem overwhelming, especially confronting corruption and graft in acquisition and personnel systems, which have all too often become their corrupting influence. Despite these problems, the potential benefits presented by these large militaries may eventually rival those of the United Kingdom or France. Moreover, while it is unwise to discount the niche capabilities of smaller nations, they will never replicate the capabilities brought to bear by a large, full spectrum military. Unfortunately, these militaries will also require the most aggressive attention by alliance leadership, as they work to further integrate themselves into alliance leadership.

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1According to the original alliance charter of 1949, the stated purpose of NATO is: “…. [To] safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:” [speech on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet; accessed 8 January 2006.


3Ibid.

4Dr. Ionel Nicu Sava, “Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Eastern Europe,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, (Swindon, UK: UK Royal Defence Academy, August 2003), 1-31.


6Sava, 10.

7Randy C. Zittel, “A Learning Curve Begins; Traveling Contact Team Assists Bulgaria,” Defense Acquisition University Website (DAU), (1994) [article on-line];


10 Ibid.


20Ibid.


27NATO, “Prague Capabilities Commitment, how did it evolve?” NATO Topics, (19 September 2005) [article on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/issues/prague_capabilities_commitment/evolution.htm; Internet; accessed 13 January 2006.


30 Ibid.


32 NATO, “Prague Capabilities Commitment, how did it evolve?”


34 Ibid.


36 Ibid., 26-30.

37 Ibid., 17.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


41 Ibid.

42 Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty states; “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” [document on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet; accessed 26 January 2006.
43 Simon, 2.

44 NATO, “Prague Capabilities Commitment, how did it evolve?”
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

While analyzing and addressing the challenges of NATO enlargement, it is important to acknowledge the burden share already shouldered by recent entrants to the alliance. While none of these militaries can approach the actual budgets of traditional member states, the proportional contributions of these junior members hint at their tremendous potential. By adequately addressing integration challenges inherent in cultural differences, institutional reform and the implementation of interoperability standards, these new entrants to the alliance may accept an even greater share of the burden in these and future military operations.

Culturally, new entrants have accepted the task of meeting the alliance on western terms, eagerly accepting language standards and slowly adopting much of the military professional culture through personnel exchanges and small unit deployments on NATO operations. Conversely, there seems to be little if any cultural awareness from the west directed toward the east, which is understandable since it is an enlargement of the alliance founded by the Western European Union. However, as entrants overcome difficulties to contribute, a lack of appreciation for new members’ histories and cultures could be extremely detrimental to any efforts further expanding new member troop contributions. Institutionally, all new members have accepted the alliance doctrine. However, as long as states continue to contribute only small units at the company and platoon level, it is unlikely that senior officers will adequately be tested in the incorporation of alliance doctrine in brigade and division level operations.
Pertaining to the questions of interoperability, the alliance faces the two-pronged issue of personnel and materiel interoperability. New members have begun many ambitious programs to train individual skills, while facing the problem of retaining personnel that have acquired language and technical skills. Collective skills thus far do not seem to be a priority for new entrants, as the focus remains on the deployment of smaller units and individuals. However, as contributions increase, this could become a larger issue. In regards to materiel, new entrants appear to have the interest to allocate substantial budgetary amounts, but corruption and inexperience in effective acquisitions may further hamper the modernization of these forces. Despite these challenges, personnel and equipment interoperability, while far from perfect, appears to be slowly improving.

As stated previously, the quality of new member integration has consequences for both the alliance as a whole and for the United States in particular. This chapter will first consider the changing nature of the alliance’s defensive strategy and the implications for its members. The chapter will then analyze the implications of integration for the alliance as a whole; as well as any proposed changes to current alliance practices. A similar analysis aimed specifically at the United States with recommendations will follow, before the study’s overall conclusion.

NATO’s Changing Defensive Strategy

Beyond the details of each military’s integration into NATO, is the larger issue of the entire transition to collective from a cooperative defense. This transition is directing the emphasis of new member states to focus training at ever-lower levels of leadership, potentially ignoring senior leaders. Previously, NATO established interoperability
standards and provided leadership and doctrine standards to its members, who in turn prepared to wage a defensive ground war on their own territory, until such time that they either defeated the enemy (unlikely) or reinforcements from other nations arrived (more likely). In this scenario, the alliance directed efforts of entire national military organizations against a single, unchanging threat, the Soviet Union. Each nation’s assets were wholly at the alliance’s disposable since the threat singularly and overwhelmingly threatened each nation’s very existence (see figure 9).

![NATO Cooperative Defense Model](image)

**Figure 9. NATO Cooperative Defense Model**

In the current scenario, the alliance now has a greater responsibility in unit composition as the central alliance leadership assembles rapid reaction forces with expeditionary capabilities from small specialized units, even platoon sized elements to create, often with multinational integration at or below the battalion level of leadership.
Furthermore, the alliance now finds itself responding to increasingly numerous and smaller threats, as well as political instabilities and humanitarian crises (see figure 10).

![NATO Collective Defense Diagram]

**Figure 10. NATO Collective Defense Model**

Previously, the alliance leadership filled a role similar role to that of an orchestra conductor. Each nation continually filled the same role, the music never changed, and the orchestra rehearsed for a performance it hoped to never give. Now, the repertoire changes daily, performances are common, in different locations and the size of the groups performing vary from small ensembles to the full orchestra. The alliance acts less like a maestro and more like a booking agent, cobbling together continually new arrangements of units for continually changing requirements and sends them to an increasing number of
locations. While the large-scale war is no longer an imminent threat, Europe now confronts rapidly changing, smaller threats that show no signs of abatement.

This shift is more visible in the enlargement states, which do not have mature professional militaries. The Baltic States, in particular, have governments focused on developing much needed niche capabilities for NATO rather than developing a full-spectrum force, capable of defending its borders against a major ground attack. While there is considerable financial incentive among the alliance’s members for supporting full-spectrum militaries, solely maintained at the alliance level, the treaty organization must recognize the risk inherit in this current trend. For while it may provide an immediate return for these militaries as they contribute to alliance operations, in the potential event of a conventional conflict, it could create further alliance obligations militarily to support smaller states incapable of their own defense.

The ongoing transition to a cooperative defense model appears to discount the possibility of a traditional conflict between large conventional militaries. While the current threats facing the alliance for the near future do not consist of large conventional forces, one must be cautious when making long-term defense strategies. From 1948-1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrine firmly focused on protecting Western Europe from a Soviet Invasion. During this time, planners continued to develop a collective defense strategy that increasingly focused on a political dialogue with the Warsaw Pact, seeking to limit the size of both Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in 1973 as well as incorporating economic factors into the alliance’s security concept in 1974.

These developments notwithstanding, there was little change on what the alliance perceived to be. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the alliance’s focus has
repeatedly changed and expanded. In that time, the focus has shifted from imposition of sanctions in Iraq and support of the UN authorized actions of its members to the support of economic and political development in former Warsaw Pact states through the Partnership for Peace Program. Concerns for rogue states in the Middle East soon gave way to halting genocide in Bosnia and later Kosovo, using peacekeeping forces and the alliance’s first military air strikes against Serbia in 1999. Later, as the alliance expanded, NATO leadership put greater emphasis on expeditionary operations in South West Asia, following the first ever invocation of Article 5 powers in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City.¹

One of the main benefits of the new strategy is that it allows new members with smaller military budgets to focus on specialized skills that fulfill an alliance shortage and are within the budgetary capabilities of new members. Furthermore, role specialization will increase inter-reliance among new members, enhancing beyond military cooperation, having consequences for more than just military capabilities. In the near term, this inter-reliance could greatly diminish the risk of conflict among member states. However, a potential risk of the current strategy is that states may only allocate enough to their defense budgets meet particular specialization goals. Consequently, many states may not have complete militaries capable of territorial defense, possibly creating significant security gaps in states in Europe. Transformation of a full spectrum force coupled with the development of deployable niche capabilities is simply not an option for many smaller militaries. Additionally, new member states seeking integration to the European Economic Union could likelier invest in their economies in order to be more competitive
with Western European Union States, rather than focusing government spending on defense budgets.

**Implications and Recommendations for the Entire Alliance**

Beyond the redesign of the NATO security strategy, the integration of new members into alliance standards of interoperability may offer the alliance an expanded capability to address emerging threats in both Europe and abroad. The alliance, however, faces the challenge of balancing the need to meet immediate threats with that of fostering development of professional militaries. As mentioned previously, the current emphasis on niche capabilities does not appear to support transformation of entire militaries. This emphasis, while based on limited budgets of new members and the current threat environment where there are no European state based threats, may eventually leave nations permanently dependent on the alliance for their own territorial defense. While the alliance has previously always provided a guarantee of defense for all members, it has not served the function of any state’s entire military. Alliance leadership may want to consider the long-term implications in serving such a role.

In assessing the motivations for new members to aggressively pursue alliance integration, as well as an increasing number of multinational commitments; European alliance leadership should give further considerations to possible economic incentives to encourage effective integration of new European Union NATO members. Given the frequently non-military motivations for alliance membership, larger members may be able to positively influence new member integration by assisting junior European Union members with their entry in the European Economic Union, as well as providing assistance with trade and labor issues and rights for new member state citizens to seek
employment in Western European states. In short, if older alliance members want new members to take increasingly challenging missions, it must offer some form of official recognition as well as financial benefits for those nations contributing troops to alliance missions.

**Implications and Recommendations for the American Foreign Policy**

The United States Government stands to benefit the most, at least initially in the successful integration of new NATO members. Political support from new alliance members for the American led operations in Iraq has been unanimous, and while troop support has often been less than 100 troops per country, enhanced standardization and deployability of those militaries could provide greater support for American led operations around the world. Additionally, these states have provided critical shortages such as de-mining and chemical specialists to allied operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States should work to highlight accomplishments of new alliance partners in both Afghanistan and Iraq. More importantly, it should take a greater interest in how the European Union treats these countries as they work to transform their militaries, governments, and economies, and should provide some incentive for governments whose militaries are accepting ever-increasing missions in Iraq.

Given the remarkably fluid nature of the European continent throughout much of the twentieth century, it seems naïve to consider only the past decade when looking to the future. Moreover, decisions to create long-term strategies reliant upon the stability of Western European states, which now face increasingly complex immigration issues; stability of former Warsaw-Pact and Soviet states still emerging from the dominance of
Russia; as well as the stability of Balkan nations, which have yet to achieve a lasting political solution to their problems, may be premature at best. Obviously, governmental and military leaders are only able to see the future several months at a time and must create long-term strategies based on what they perceive to be current trends. Nonetheless, planners must not be so quick to completely abandon conventional military skills that appear to be no longer necessary due to the present peaceful situation in Europe. For historical perspective, it seems unlikely that a strategic planner in 1910 could have foreseen the events leading to World War I or the consequences of the armistice of 1918 or its subsequent consequences.

As the alliance’s enlargement continues, its leadership must work to foster the transformation of these members who seek to professionalize their forces, achieving materiel and personnel interoperability. In doing this, alliance leadership must work to understand the motivations that bring each new member to the alliance, developing effective incentives for each state to further enhance their own capabilities and provide greater contributions to alliance. However, while these transformations are ongoing, it should not disregard current contributions to alliance operations. While the tactical and operational benefit of these contributions may sometimes be small, their strategic significance establishing international consensus is invaluable. For the United States government, this enlargement presents a unique opportunity to strengthen old alliances while fostering new partnerships within Central and Eastern Europe. The past century has taught the world that no superpower with international interests can survive without broad alliances.
1 NATO, NATO's Response to Terrorism, (6 December 2001) [article on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-159e.htm; Internet; accessed 30 April 2006.
GLOSSARY

Defense Planning Questionnaire. DPQ. The database of forces available to NATO from a member nation.

Foreign Area Officer. FAO. A US Army officer with foreign language skills and civilian education concerning a specific global region. Army FAOs serve as defense attachés, security assistance officers, as well as serving on Army and joint staffs as subject matter experts on specific regions.

European Security and Defense Policy. ESDP. Policy within the framework of the European Security Forces that covers questions relating to EU security. Policy could possibly lead to European common defense if the European Council so decides.¹

Interoperability. The ability of military forces to mutually support each other, communicate and effectively function across the full spectrum of military operations.

The Membership Action Plan. MAP. NATO program of advice, assistance, and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.

North Atlantic Council. NAC. Body within NATO with effective political authority and powers of decision; consists of permanent representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The council also meets at higher levels involving foreign ministers, defense ministers or heads of government but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets.²

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO. An alliance of twenty-six countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949.³

Noncommissioned Officer. NCO. An enlisted leader of soldiers (either a corporal or sergeant). NCO typically receives leadership training while actively serving in military, as opposed to commissioning at a service academy before entering the military. An NCO serves as either a direct leader of soldiers, trainer or technical expert, providing officer leadership with counsel on technical matters or issues affecting soldiers. The officer leads the unit, while the NCO ensures that every soldier does his or her duty in a professional manner.

Niche-Capabilities. Military capabilities that fill specialized, low density roles in NATO operations. Typically capitalizes on any special skills that nation has developed beyond that its peers. Examples of current niche capabilities are chemical decontamination and mine clearing.
Office of Defense Cooperation. ODC. US military office within each host nation in charge of consulting on foreign military sales, bilateral military cooperation, as well as military and humanitarian assistance to include training funds for host nation military members to obtain training in the US or other NATO schools in Europe. The US is the only nation that handles these responsibilities outside of defense attaché office.

Partnership for Peace. PfP. A major initiative introduced by NATO at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The PfP program focuses on defense-related cooperation, forging a partnership between each Partner country and NATO. The program promotes stability in order to diminish threats to peace and build security relationships based on practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles.4

PfP Planning and Review Process. PARP. This assesses partners’ capabilities for multinational training, exercises, and operations with Alliance forces. The countries concerned undertake to provide a wide range of information covering their defense policies, progress in democratic control of the forces and relevant financial and economic plans. The Alliance provides guidance on interoperability and required capabilities.5

Professionalization. The establishment of a more capable enlisted corps of soldiers with longer lengths of service and broader depth of operational knowledge. May or may not be done in conjunction with the complete or partial elimination of obligatory universal military service.

STANAG. The term derived from the NATO standardization agreement. It is the record of an agreement among several or all of the member nations to adopt like or similar military equipment, ammunition, supplies and stores; and operational, logistic, and administrative procedures.

Usability. The capacity of forces to perform assigned missions in NATO missions. Alliance Defense Ministers defined the minimum standard of “usability” each member nation being able to deploy 40 percent of its ground forces and continuously sustain 8 percent of its ground forces abroad at any one time.6

United States Defense Attaché Office. USDAO. The office within an embassy of the military representative (attaché), who advises the ambassador on military matters pertaining to the host nation and represents the US government in dealings with host nation military.


6NATO, “Prague Capabilities Commitment, how did it evolve?” NATO Topics, (19 September 2005) [article on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/issues/prague_capabilities_commitment/evolution.htm; Internet; accessed 13 January 2006.
APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

To accurately assess NATO’s ongoing enlargement and transformation, it is necessary to examine the alliance’s original purpose and the driving interests of its founding members. Following World War II, the allied powers were eager to take steps to avoid another conflict of such magnitude. Germany was still considered by many Europeans most likely future enemy, while they viewed Russia as an ally who had bravely fought the Third Reich while enduring horrendous suffering.1 The current perception of NATO as an alliance that emerged from a Europe united in its opposition to Soviet influence oversimplifies the post war situation fails to consider lingering security concerns that many Europeans harbored toward Germany.

Originally, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin sought to establish a Western European Union, composed of Britain, France and the Benelux to prevent a renewal of any German aggression, but became increasingly troubled over the Soviet dominance of Central and Easter Europe, most notably in Czechoslovakia. Later as the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia unfolded, Bevin’s fears were confirmed and leaders in Greece, Turkey, Finland, and Norway began to feel pressure of Soviet Expansion as well.2

France meanwhile was fearful of aggression from both Germany and the Soviet Union and saw the need for continued American presence in Europe before any discussion of a trans-Atlantic military alliance. However, prior-to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, there were numerous obstacles to France joining any European defensive alliance. There no clear consensus in France on what threats that the country faced. The
The communist movement had a strong following with many leaders stating that France would never take part in a war against the “Red Army,” which they would in fact support. However, following the dismissal of three communists from the French government, to include the minister of defense, the French government began to pressure the American government for a bilateral alliance against Soviet expansion in France. Initially resistant, the US came to regard a militarily strong and democratic France as in the American interest.

Following the fall of Prague, France saw the benefit of German inclusion to be a defense against the Soviets in Germany rather than a defensive perimeter around French Pyrenees, as was the current American plan. Consequently, French Prime Minister Georges Bidault agreed to the European Recovery Program and the North Atlantic Treaty, creating the Federal Republic of Germany. Most importantly, the treaty moved any potential Soviet conflict eastward into Germany, away from France.

In the United States following World War II, President Truman’s foreign relation policies were unclear to European leaders who feared that he would not share the late President Roosevelt’s vision for a defensive alliance among Europe’s leaders. However, Truman had given members of the American government an inkling of his ideology during as early as 1943 as a little known senator in an address to the Senate.

I am just as sure as I can be that this World War is the result of the 1919-1920 isolationist attitude, and I am equally sure that another and worse will follow this one, unless the United Nations and their allies and all the other sovereign nations decide to work together for peace as they are working together for victory.

Britain had realized in the final months of the war that the USSR had greater and knew that US military forces would be necessary to counter any further westward
expansion of the Soviet Union. Truman kept in close contact with former Prime Minister Churchill, and invited him to speak at Westminster College in Fulton Missouri and receive an honorary degree. Churchill welcomed the opportunity to voice his anti soviet views. In the speech he stated

> From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.\(^7\)

Churchill was immensely successful in raising international awareness of the Soviet threat. Furthermore, Truman knew that American disengagement could only lead to more war. He greatly respected Churchill, but did not share the same feeling for Prime Minister Atlee and Secretary Ernest Bevin, preferring to use Churchill as an intermediary. While its inception was in Europe, the plan for a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union took seed in the United States on 4 April 1949 at the signing of the Washington Treaty by 12 Western European Allies. The preamble to North Atlantic Treaty states;

> The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.\(^8\)

In 1951, NATO established first alliance headquarter near Paris with the American General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and British Lord Ismay as Secretary General. While the alliance’s focus remained firmly
within Europe, United States' military was its center of gravity. Fear of a Soviet
dominated Europe had not created the initial desire for military alliance, but had
strengthened the broad support for its final approval as well as providing a consistent
threat that would shape the organization’s defense structure. While, all twelve original
signatories held widely varying reasons for initial membership, by 1951, there was little
doubt among members that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to peace and stability
in Europe.

From 1951-1989, NATO opposed Soviet expansion in Europe through aggressive
diplomacy and posturing of its forces throughout the European continent. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, peace keeping operations in former Yugoslavia and the
accession of former Eastern Block nations; Czech, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, the nature of the threat in Europe has
completely changed. Nations that previously posed NATO’s most immediate threat are
now its most junior members. Despite the radial changes, NATO’s stated mission to
“safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization” remains the same.

NATO’s Anxious Birth, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 11.

2Rendel, Page 13.

3Claude Delmas, “A Change of Heart; Concerns behind the discussion in France,”
NATO’s Anxious Birth (New York, NY, St Martin’s Press, 1985), 64-65.

4Claude Delmas, 61-62.

5Irwin Wall, “France and the North Atlantic Alliance,” NATO, the founding of the

6Ibid., 51-52.

This study relied on the most current information available, through print and electronic media. The literature used falls into six categories: professional journals, NATO publications, congressional reports, conference proceedings, defense attaché offices, and news releases.

There has been much material written on NATO’s first round of enlargement that included Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. This provided a wealth of information in regards to challenges faced by earlier entrants. The most notable authors encountered throughout the research were Dr. Jeffrey Simon and Thomas S. Szayna. Simon is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, whose works include: “Partnership For Peace: Charting A Course For A New Era”; ”New NATO members, will they contribute?” and “The Next Round of NATO Enlargement.” Szayna is a political scientist at RAND, whose published work includes “The future of NATO and enlargement” and “NATO Enlargement: Assessing the Candidates for Prague”. These works and more from the preceding authors gave considerable insight into the capabilities of the latest seven members in NATO, however did not address implications for American led operations outside the framework of NATO.

The most detailed information on the individual militaries comes from the United States Defense Attaché Offices (USDAO) at the American Embassies in each of the country. As an American Foreign Area Officer trainee in Slovakia (2004-2005), the author received briefings from embassy the staff of sixteen alliance and Partnership for Peace nations as well as the staff at NATO and European Union headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium. Using prior research and additional materials from embassies visited, aided in providing the study a detailed view of each military’s capabilities, and helped direct further research necessary for the study.

Aside from personal contacts made while conducting research in Europe, there is a vast amount of material available online, such US Congressional Reports, doctoral research, proceedings from governmental and academic conferences, as well official documents from the treaty organization and each member nation. These reports are available online and offer a wealth of information pertaining to trends in the alliance as well as the whole of Europe. NATO, itself provides a wealth of material through its official publications for public release. There is a shortage neither of materials detailing the organization’s history nor essays that present a range of views within the treaty organization.

Commercial news services have been another valuable asset for very general information. However, while these articles detail historically significant proceedings and speeches by key leader as well as well providing basic data of events, analysis from these sources was sometimes prejudicial, often providing more opinion than objective insight. The most in-depth analysis and facts concerning the enlargement were in professional journals and published studies, of which there was a multitude available through Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library. Although there has been considerable discussion of the alliance’s accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech enlargement in 1999 and its significance to American foreign policy, the second round of enlargement in 2004 has received considerably less attention. This would seem most likely due to the international focus on actions of the American led coalition in Iraq and the international
debate surrounding this conflict. However, research centers, such as the Conflict Studies Research center at the United Kingdom Royal Defense Academy and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control on Armed Forces provided insightful articles on NATO matters pertinent to this study.

Some of the initial primary sources used for study were:


This document gives the legal basis for NATO and establishes rules for any NATO military action. This document in conjunction with secondary historical sources provided insight into political climates from World War II, throughout the Cold War and to the present, shedding some light on how history of early and mid-twentieth century impacts current attitudes among the nations of Europe.


This treaty established the present alliance and provided the same historical perspective as the *United Nations Charter*.


This speech clearly illustrates official positions from the alliance’s senior leadership.


These databases, accessed through the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library, provide a broad base of statistical data on each nation and military in
the alliance, detailing personnel and materiel data as well as ongoing acquisitions in each military.


This document details results of the summit and gives official declaration from NATO on operations in Iraq, as well as providing the official motives for enlargement, stating that NATO is not an exclusive club and that the door remains open for further members.


This NATO publication details the alliance’s ongoing transformation and the significance of the summit to that process.

**Primary Sources**


Secondary Sources

Books


NATO Publications


Academic Studies


Governmental Publications


Zittel, Randy C. “A Learning Curve Begins; Traveling Contact Team Assists Bulgaria.” *Defense Acquisition University Website (DAU)*. 1994. Available from

Journals and Periodicals


Interviews

D’anieri, Paul, Ph.D. Associate Dean, Humanities, Kansas University, Interview by author, 14 October 2005.


Ulrich, Mary Beth, Ph.D. Professor of Government, United States Army War College. Telephonic interview by author, 28 December 2005.
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