THE UNITED STATES ZONE CONSTABULARY: AN ANALYSIS OF MANNING ISSUES AND THEIR IMPACT ON OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
United States Zone Constabulary: an analysis of manning issues and their impact on operations.

On VE Day, 8 May 1945, the United States had over three million military personnel in Europe. Through redeployment of forces to the Pacific Theater and demobilization this number dropped to just over 622,000 by 1 January 1946. Staff planners initially estimated a thirty-three-division force to control the US Zone of Occupation in Germany, but War Department directives caused that force to shrink to 133,000 by 1 July 1946. In order to provide security in the US Zone, planners determined a small force composed of high-caliber Soldiers could provide security in the zone using police type tactics. This force was named the United States Zone Constabulary. Although the United States Zone Constabulary was planned as an elite organization composed of 38,000 high-caliber combat-veteran Soldiers, redeployment soon made this goal unachievable. This thesis shows that instead the constabulary was an understrength organization composed of whatever Soldiers were available in theater, or as nonveteran replacements. To achieve the high standards required for their mission, the constabulary relied on constant training, inspections, and evaluation to ensure that those assigned could complete their mission. The constabulary also used high-operations-tempo to cover its lack of personnel through constant and unpredictable visibility.
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Although the United States Zone Constabulary was planned as an elite organization composed of 38,000 high-caliber combat-veteran Soldiers, redeployment soon made this goal unachievable. This thesis shows that instead the constabulary was an understrength organization composed of whatever Soldiers were available in theater, or as nonveteran replacements. To achieve the high standards required for their mission, the constabulary relied on constant training, inspections, and evaluation to ensure that those assigned could complete their mission. The constabulary also used high-operations-tempo to cover its lack of personnel through constant and unpredictable visibility.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1ID</td>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Armored Cavalry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Allied Control Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACR (USCON)</td>
<td>Armored Cavalry Regiment (United States Zone Constabulary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Constabulary Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Counter-Intelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Detachments</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Constabulary Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Constabulary Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>General Staff Personnel Office/Officer</td>
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<td>G2</td>
<td>General Staff Intelligence Office/Officer</td>
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<td>GESTAPO</td>
<td>Geheimstatspolizei</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of Military Government (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP/LP</td>
<td>Observation Post/Listening Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTB</td>
<td>Occupational Troop Basis</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITREPS</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Battalion and Brigade Staff Personnel Office/Officer</td>
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<td>Sicherheitsdienst</td>
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<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<td>United States Army Europe</td>
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<td>United States Forces European Theater</td>
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CHAPTER 1
AN OVERVIEW OF POSTWAR GERMANY

The peace that settled on Europe in June of 1945 found a devastated continent with tens of millions dead, lamed, destitute or uprooted. Not even the Thirty Years’ War or the Napoleonic wars had ravaged the continent so cruelly and so widely. None remained untouched.

William L. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*

**Introduction to the United States Zone Constabulary**

On VE Day, 8 May 1945, the United States had over three million military personnel in Europe. Through redeployment of forces to the Pacific Theater and demobilization this number dropped to just over 622,000 by 1 January 1946. Staff planners had initially developed a plan to use a thirty-three-division force to control the US Zone of Occupation in Germany, but War Department directives caused that force to shrink to 133,000 by 1 July 1946. In order to provide security in the US Zone, planners determined a small force composed of high-caliber Soldiers could provide security in the zone using police type tactics. This force was named the United States Zone Constabulary.

The idea for the constabulary evolved over the months following the end of World War II in Europe as redeployment of forces for duty in the Pacific and for demobilization quickly eroded the number of troops available for occupation duty. The constabulary was established to provide security in the United States Occupation Zone with a minimum of troops while the Occupational Military Government completed the tasks of disarmament and demilitarization of German society. The Constabulary was planned as an elite organization composed of 38,000 high-caliber combat veteran
Soldiers, but never attained this number of personnel. Despite severe personnel issues, the constabulary successfully completed that mission through a program of strenuous training and constant operations that made them a well-trained force, highly mobile and visible throughout the US Zone and that prepared them for mass operations in the event security in the zone was challenged.

The constabulary was organized into three brigade elements under the command and control of the constabulary commander who reported directly to the theater commander. The organization did not remain static, however, changing to reflect the tactical situation in Germany, the strategic situation worldwide, as well as in response to the manpower situation in the Army and in Europe. By 1950 the tactical situation in Germany had changed to such an extent that the constabulary was considered unnecessary, and it was inactivated in November 1950, though one constabulary squadron remained in service until 1952.

The constabulary did not obtain the full number of troops required by the tables of organization or the high-caliber Soldiers envisioned by the planners. Instead the constabulary was an understrength organization composed of whatever Soldiers were available within theater or as draftee replacements. The constabulary also lost assigned Soldiers through normal tour rotations. The constabulary sought out high-caliber soldiers wherever possible, even recruiting from other units in Europe and the United States.

These factors influenced the constabulary’s training programs and operating methods. To achieve the high standards required for its mission, the constabulary relied on constant training, inspections, and evaluations to ensure that those assigned could complete their mission. The constabulary also used high operations tempo to cover its
lack of personnel through constant and unpredictable visibility. The constabulary’s mission was also affected by the strategic situation. Originally intended as a police organization responsible for providing security in the US Zone, it became a more tactical organization to counter perceived threats from the Soviet Bloc, and it was this threat that eventually caused the United States European Command (EUCOM) to inactivate the constabulary.

The success of the constabulary has implications for the current US Army in its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because there are those who argue that Iraq requires a constabulary force in order to free the Army from peacekeeping duties, the Army must relate the constabulary’s operations to the contemporary operating environment, to determine whether a constabulary type force is a viable option in Iraq or Afghanistan.

As a note, while the United States Zone Constabulary provided security in the US Occupation Zone in Germany, the Fourth Constabulary Regiment, composed of the 4th, 16th, and 24th Constabulary Squadrons, was established to provide security in the United States Zone in Austria and in the US Sector in Berlin. Though they had a similar organization and mission, the Fourth Constabulary Regiment was separate from the United States Zone Constabulary in Germany, and so is outside the scope of this paper.

**The Postwar Operating Environment in Germany**

At the close of World War II, Germany was in ruins. The landscape was destroyed from five years of bombardment and a winter of fierce ground combat. Industry lay flattened by bombing or was geared more towards the needs of the military than the civilian populace. The portion of German industry that had not been destroyed was hampered by wartime dispersal of production and supply\(^1\) and would soon be liable
for removal as war reparations.\textsuperscript{2} Power production was reduced significantly. The Allies had targeted the transportation network during the war to interdict German forces moving between war fronts, and the network was hampered by wrecked rail lines, blown up bridges, and cratered airport runways and \textit{autobahns}.\textsuperscript{3} The fighting had also destroyed German agriculture,\textsuperscript{4} farm buildings were destroyed, the land was torn up from maneuvering forces, and the fighting forces had requisitioned many draft animals for transport and food.

The German population had been devastated by the war. Huge numbers were without shelter and adequate food. The adult male population had been reduced by a large percentage through combat deaths. Many more had been captured by the allies, and remained in prisoner of war camps scattered around the world, three million in American custody alone.\textsuperscript{5} Those that remained in Germany were often not of fighting age, either very old or very young, or were wounded veterans returned from the war. Germany had also absorbed nearly three million displaced persons,\textsuperscript{6} ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe fleeing the advancing Red Army,\textsuperscript{7} or foreigners brought to Germany, voluntarily or not, to fill labor roles in German industry and agriculture.

The civil administration, long filled and controlled by the Nazi party, would soon be restructured. Those who had filled key positions under the Nazi government were no longer eligible for service,\textsuperscript{8} and in some instances were arrested as criminals. Before filling unoccupied positions, the occupation forces would have to evaluate potential candidates to ensure they were free of Nazi sympathies or connections.\textsuperscript{9}

Into this environment marched the Allied Armies, predominantly those of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These four nations each assumed control
of a zone of Germany, as agreed upon at the Yalta conference in February 1945. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) was originally established to plan the cross-channel invasion of Europe but its scope was later expanded to include the occupation of Germany and the liberated European nations. The invasion and occupation was laid out in a series of operational plans that were revised and renamed over time. In the August 1943 Rankin Plan, COSSAC planners estimated that the occupation would require a force of thirty-three divisions\textsuperscript{10} or approximately 721,000 Soldiers.\textsuperscript{11} The War Department, however, placed a ceiling on the number of troops remaining in Europe. This troop ceiling was referred to as the occupational troop basis (OTB)\textsuperscript{12} and was based on the War Departments prioritization for troop deployments and the level of troops allowed in the Army by Congress. The occupation plan and the OTB did not remain constant.

By 10 November 1944 the occupation plan was titled Operation Eclipse, and it addressed military operations subsequent to the German surrender, including operations in newly liberated areas until their national governments could resume government responsibilities.\textsuperscript{13} The Eclipse plan assigned specific occupation responsibilities to British, American, and French tactical unit commanders and covered subjects, such as the terms of surrender, care of allied prisoners of war, and civil affairs and military government.\textsuperscript{14} Operation Eclipse was written as a two-phase operation, with the phases likely overlapping.

The first phase was the culmination of Operation Overlord, the invasion of Northwestern Europe, and addressed the seizure of strategically important areas deep in Germany. The second phase was the seizure of additional strategic areas; movement to
occupation areas, implementation of control over the occupied territory; and the control, disarmament, and disbandment of German military and paramilitary forces. The length of the occupation was not established at the outset, but would be decided at an undetermined future date, based on the success of the military government to establish peaceful government institutions in Germany. This meant the American forces were facing a long occupation with no readily apparent end date.

The general plan for the occupation of Germany called for each of the major powers to occupy a zone of Germany as designated during a series of conferences between the leaders of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States between 1943 and 1945 (see figure 1). Internal administration of each zone was the responsibility of the occupying power, while an Allied Control Council (ACC) would decide trans-zonal issues. Due to the vagaries of combat operations, the locations each Army occupied at the cessation of fighting were not precisely those outlined at the Yalta Conference and in the Eclipse plan. American battle lines extended from northwestern Germany, southeast into Czechoslovakia, and Austria. To remedy this, the forces took several weeks to reposition and occupy their assigned areas.

In the United States Occupation Zone, combat units of the US Army established initial control and were responsible for establishing a military presence in the defeated nation and for maintaining law and order. Their areas of responsibility were specified in operations type orders, and mainly followed existing German civil boundaries, roughly composing the German *Lander* of Bavaria, Wuertemberg-Baden, and Hesse. As the American forces settled into their occupation zone in Germany their overarching task was
preventing Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the United States or world peace.

Figure 1. Map of Occupation Zones in Germany
To do this they would have to destroy the Nazi apparatus of power, remove all Nazi influence from public life, arrest and prosecute members of the German civil and military leadership, disband the German General Staff, disband military and paramilitary forces, and destroy the means of military production. While most of these tasks would be the responsibility of the US Group Control Council (Germany) (USGCC), they would affect the American military forces in Germany as they assisted and supported the military government. The US Group Control Council (Germany) later renamed the Office of Military Government (United States) (OMGUS), was created to plan postwar control of Germany based on the European Advisory Commission (AEC) directives and intent and administer political and economic matters in the US Occupation Zone. While the USGCC/OMGUS oversaw the political and economic matters, it would require military assistance to enforce the directives and actually do the legwork of demilitarization and denazification and providing security in the US Zone, until the mission was complete. At the same time, the American forces faced the additional task of redeploying troops to the Pacific Theater for operations against the Japanese and to the United States for demobilization.

Prior to the end of hostilities Allied planners had feared a strong resistance organization in occupied Germany. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, pointed out his view of the threat in a letter to General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, dated 25 September 1944.

I must confess that post-armistice matters do not occupy any great share of my thoughts. We still have a long ways to go here because of the intention of the enemy, which I think is becoming obvious, to continue the most bitter kind of resistance up to the point of practical extermination of his armed forces. Thereafter, we may be faced with some kind of guerilla problem.
Partly due to the exhaustion of the German population after six years of fighting and partly due to the rapid arrest of potential leadership figures from the German Schutzstaffel (SS), Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and Geheime Statspolizei (Gestapo), this resistance did not arise in force. There were instances of antioccupation-force violence, most often the work of displaced persons or of German youth. Displaced persons (DPs) were responsible for much of the disorder in the US Zone, committing crimes of violence, looting, and large scale black market operations. Gangs of DPs roamed throughout the zone, and Germans organized vigilante groups to defend against them. While these DP and vigilante groups predominantly worked against each other, they were also suspected of targeting US forces and installations for robbery and violence, though no cases were confirmed. Another, unexpected, threat to order in the occupation zone unfortunately came from American troops.

As the environment of the theater changed, so too did the organization. On 8 May 1945, the date of the German surrender, the United States Army was composed of approximately 3.1 million Soldiers in Europe, with 1.6 million Soldiers in the US Zone of Germany. Due to the anticipated need for additional combat forces for the invasion of Japan and a US public desire to “bring the boys home” quickly at the end of the war, the number of forces available for occupation duty quickly shrank as units were transferred to the Pacific or were sent home for demobilization. In March 1945, the headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) estimated it would lose 1.5 million troops to the Pacific theater and another 600,000 to discharge within nineteen months of the surrender, leaving an occupational troop basis (OTB) of approximately 404,000 troops. The force reduction schedule was accelerated, however, such that in August 1945
it was estimated that only 370,000 troops would remain in Germany by January 1946. This meant that the low point of troop strength would occur during the first postwar winter. USFET reasonably anticipated that civil unrest, if it did occur, would come during this period due to extreme cold and lack of shelter, heating, and food for the civilian population.

By July 1945, the War Department had set a lower OTB of 400,000 troops, but lowered that further to 300,000 in December 1945. In order to reduce the forces required for occupation to meet the OTB, the theater command structure was streamlined between July and December 1945, beginning with the elimination of the 6th and 12th Army Groups and their subordinate units in July 1945. The United States Occupation Zone was then divided into Eastern and Western Military Districts, commanded by the Third and Seventh Armies, respectively.25

To ensure the fair and reasonable redeployment of forces, the Army developed a standard point system for redeploying and demobilizing enlisted Soldiers from Europe, based upon their adjusted service rating.26 Under this system, a Soldier received varying numbers of points for months of service, time overseas, decorations, and number of children under age eighteen. The critical score differed for men and women in Europe: for men it was eighty-five points, for women forty-four. Priority for demobilization was for Soldiers with over eighty-five points and worked down from there. Priority for retention in the occupation forces or redeployment to the Pacific was on Soldiers with fewer points and worked upwards from zero until it met the point cutoffs for demobilization.27
Rather than redeploying individuals, the Army determined that only complete units would move; personnel were then redistributed among units, so that all members of a unit had approximately the same number of points. This weakened command structures and caused the loss of unit cohesion and a general lowering of discipline. While units were awaiting transport to the Pacific or the United States, most training was discontinued. There were units constantly waiting to move, moving to the ports of embarkation, and waiting to board ship. Training could not be initiated due to the unit’s imminent departure. This left the Soldiers with a great amount of time and little to do, further weakening discipline. Indiscipline manifested itself in numerous ways: uniform standards fell; crime rates among Soldiers rose, including violent crime, black marketeering, absence without leave; and motor vehicle accidents became epidemic. Venereal disease rates also rose astonishingly high, to the point that in the summer of 1945 all Soldiers were required to carry condoms at all times.

Anticipated civil unrest was not the only difficulty facing the occupation forces after VE day. Due to the lack of resources in Germany, a black market soon developed, dealing in everything from food and cigarettes to coal and gasoline. The civilian police force that remained was incapable of coping with these issues, and crime quickly spread. To maintain order in the US Zone, a force was needed that could conduct law enforcement duties to stamp out criminal activities, but was robust enough to transition to combat operations in the event of renewed hostilities. The American method to provide this security was to establish the United States Zone Constabulary.
Organization of the Paper

This paper examines how personnel issues affected the United States Zone Constabulary. Chapter 1 has provided a brief overview of the environment in Germany at the end of World War II. Chapter 2 reviews the reasons the constabulary was established and its organization and shows how the environment changed between 1944 and 1952. Finally, it reviews the specified and implied tasks the Army set for the constabulary and whether they changed due to changes in the operating environment.

Chapter 3 focuses on the constabulary’s manning. It reviews changes in the constabulary organization during this time frame to determine if changes to the constabulary were due to manning issues, were based on the operating environment, or were the result of Army-wide changes. The chapter looks at how the Army selected personnel for the constabulary and benefits to service in the constabulary.

Chapter 4 focuses on training and operations. The constabulary established a constabulary School at Sonthofen, Germany, to ensure troopers were well trained on their duties and responsibilities. The chapter looks at how closely this training prepared the Soldiers for their duties, formal certification prior to assignment to the constabulary, and refresher training. All of these issues may have had an impact on constabulary operations, so the remainder of chapter 4 looks at some of the constabulary’s operations between 1946 and 1951.

Finally, chapter 5 reviews these issues to show the impact of personnel issues on the constabulary. Because there are those who argue that Iraq requires a constabulary force in order to free the Army from peacekeeping duties, chapter 5 also ties the
constabulary’s operations to the contemporary operating environment, to determine whether a constabulary-type force is a viable option in Iraq or Afghanistan.

**Literature Review**

Sources used in this thesis break out into background information on Germany and the occupation, mainly used in chapter 1; constabulary histories used throughout the paper; and current operational information used in chapter 5.

The books used for background information consisted of *Planning for the Occupation of Germany* from the Occupational Forces in Europe Series, which covered the planning of the final stages of the war in Europe and the occupation of Germany, John Gimbell’s *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949*, and *A German Community Under the Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52*, and Earl F. Ziemke’s *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, which was the key book for this period. Detailed information came from Lucius D. Clay’s *Decision in Germany* and *The Papers of Lucius D. Clay*.

The existing literature pertaining to the constabulary falls into two broad categories; those written during the actual constabulary period concentrate on telling what the constabulary accomplished in the period covered by the report, much like a unit situation report (SITREP) or annual history. Those written later concentrate on telling what a good job the constabulary did, and are mainly unit histories or personal recollections. Neither type really lay out what the constabulary accomplished compared to its mission.

The key book on the constabulary planning and early operations was Major James M. Snyder’s *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Zone Constabulary,*
3 October 1945-30 June 1947. Major Snyder served in the Historical Subsection of the constabulary G3 and prepared the history at the direction of Major General Harmon, the constabulary commander. MG Harmon also contributed to the literature with his autobiography, *Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier*.

The unit histories provided the majority of the details included in this paper, and are predominantly found in the National Archives and the private papers of former members of the constabulary located at the Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Those found in the National Archives were located within Records Group 0549 and consisted of regimental monthly, quarterly, and annual histories, though neither a complete set for any particular year nor for every regiment. The Military History Institute has constabulary documents contained in the personal files of former unit members, including Henry C. Newton and Halley G. Maddox, both of which contained constabulary memoranda, programs from constabulary events, and photographs.

Additional unit histories, photographs and sources were located in the Archives of the United States Cavalry Museum and the United States Cavalry Association, both at Fort Riley, Kansas.

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3 German words and acronyms are listed in the glossary.

4 Bach, 89.

Joseph R. Starr et al., *The First Year of the Occupation, Part One: The Transition from Combat to Military Occupation (8 May-17 July 1945)*, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: European Command, 1947), Table 1, following page 70.

Clay, 103.

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Chase, 2.

21Ziemke, 358.


23Ziemke, 358.

24The Occupational Troop Basis (OTB) set the maximum number of troops the War Department allowed in Germany and was based on meeting worldwide commitments as well as meeting the overall troop strength set by Congress.


26Ziemke, 328. Officers were not eligible under this system initially. Under the Adjusted Service Rating system, a Soldier received 1 point for each month he had been in the service since September 1940, 1 point for each month of overseas service since September 1940, 5 points for each decoration or battle star, and 12 points for each child under age 18 (up to 3 children).

27Ziemke, 329.

28Harmon mentions a Constabulary project to cut down on the number of traffic accidents in the American Zone by establishing speed traps, mobile summary courts and severe punishments for speeding, 288.

29Bach, 77. Bach states that the rate rose over 200 percent by September 1945, and in one unnamed town, over 30% of the girls known to be in contact with US troops were infected with one form or another of VD.

30Davis, 162-171.
CHAPTER 2
FORMING THE CONSTABULARY

“Harmon,” McNarney said to me, “you are going to be head of the Constabulary.”
“What’s that?” I asked.

Ernest N. Harmon, *Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier*

Introduction

As the American forces settled into their occupation zone in Germany their overarching task was preventing Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the United States or world peace. While most of the occupation tasks would be the responsibility of the Military Government, they would affect the American military forces in Germany as they assisted and supported the military government until such time as the Allied Control Council deemed these tasks complete. While supporting the military government, the American forces faced the additional task of redeploying troops to the Pacific Theater for operations against the Japanese, and to the United States for demobilization.

The forces available in Germany on VE Day, 8 May 1945, quickly dispersed through redeployment of forces to the Pacific Theater and demobilization. The American Military determined that to maintain order in the US Sector, a force was needed that could conduct law enforcement duties to stamp out criminal activities, but was robust enough to transition to combat operations in the event of renewed hostilities. The force would also stand as an example of American authority and professionalism to occupation troops and the German population through strong discipline and military bearing. This force was the United States Zone Constabulary, but it was not the first attempt at
maintaining security, as Army units created mobile security forces before the end of the war, and later by USFET to provide mobile security in the occupation zone. These organizations were used as a model for the US Zone Constabulary, and their operations were studied for guidance on constabulary training and operations methods.

A Police Type Occupation

The origin of the idea for a police type occupation cannot be pinned on any one person or planning staff, but instead came from three major sources: the experiences of tactical units as they occupied areas of Germany in late 1944 and early 1945; the War Department, whose interest lay in the general problems of occupation of Germany and Japan; and the G2 Section of the Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater (USFET).³

In late November 1944, the Fifteenth United States Army studied the problem of occupation troop requirements in order to determine the correct distribution of forces as it occupied the German Rhineland.⁴ As a result of this study, Fifteenth Army divided their forces into City Garrison and Frontier Command troops. The City Garrison troops would occupy urban areas to establish US control and maintain order. The Frontier Command troops were intended to control the border areas through a series of permanent and temporary posts, roadblocks and checkpoints and by conducting mounted patrols in the areas along the border.⁵ After Fifteenth Army successfully established its garrison and frontier command troops, other units established similar mobile forces to serve as combat reserves for the widely deployed occupation troops.⁶ Third United States Army also recommended adding a small mobile force to those infantry divisions assigned to the occupation to maintain security in the rural areas of the occupation zone.⁷ While Twelfth
Army Group concurred with this recommendation, no action was taken by USFET to make this a theater wide organization change, but again many USFET subordinate divisions made local reorganizations and created mobile forces to secure their outlying areas. These changes marked the extent of reorganization of tactical units to police type organizations until the fall of 1945.

The second source of the police type occupation concept was a September 1945 USFET G2 proposal to create “military district constabularies” organized along the lines of armored cavalry units using special personnel and equipment. Recommended as a response to falling manpower availability due to the rotation of units to the Pacific Theater before VJ Day, and the hurried demobilization of forces in theater, it was intended that each Military District would have it’s own constabulary force, commanded by the District Commanding General (CG), to provide security for the entire district or enclave where they operated. The proposal marked the first use of the term “constabulary” in theater planning for the occupation forces.

The final source of the concept of the police type occupation was the War Department. While USFET studied the best methods to provide security in the US Sector, the War Department considered this same issue regarding Japan, Korea, and the Ryuku Islands in the Pacific Theater. In October 1945, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, forwarded a War Department plan for the occupation of those areas to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander in Japan. The plan entailed a supermilitary police force organized as regimental combat teams, with highly mobile tactical units as a reserve. The bulk of the manning for this force would come from native populations with American Soldiers and Officers in key positions. General Marshall also sent the
plan to USFET and requested General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s comments. General Eisenhower, Commander USFET, responded that he considered the basic plan as applicable to the European Theater, but the lack of a German government structure, the division of Germany in four occupation zones, and the large and fluid population of displaced persons and refugees required changes to that plan.12

The District Constabularies

The final version of the September 1945 USFET G2’s proposal for district constabularies was released to the USFET General Staff and subordinate commands on 31 October 1945. It directed that mechanized cavalry groups be used as District Constabularies in the Eastern and Western Military Districts, and the US Zone in Austria, and mechanized cavalry troops be used in the Bremen Enclave and the Berlin District. Each Military District Commander would have control of the District Constabulary, who would exercise jurisdiction over all security matters within that district (see figure 2).

The District Constabularies were intended as a mobile tactical reserve, capable of quick action to maintain security by patrolling specific areas, conducting searches for and apprehending wanted persons, recovering contraband items, and assisting Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) units. The District Constabularies were not intended to compromise the jurisdiction, duties and responsibilities of CIC forces, Military Police or Civilian Police forces, only to support and reinforce these organizations.13 The plan called for specialized training for the district constabulary units on government, language and police duties. Training would be conducted by the units and at CIC schools.14

Reorganization was to begin on 15 November 1945, and be completed by 30 November 1945. While the district constabularies were based on the wartime mechanized
cavalry organization, some units were actually formed from infantry units, requiring reorganization to mechanized cavalry organization, but they retained their infantry designations.\textsuperscript{15} District constabulary operations differed between the Military Districts. The Eastern Military District Constabulary conducted limited patrolling, concentrating instead on raids, and search and seizure operations. The Western Military District Constabulary meanwhile conducted patrols throughout the district, and operated courier services for the counter-intelligence corps (CIC) and criminal investigation detachments (CID) units.\textsuperscript{16}

![Map showing Eastern and Western Military Districts with assigned District Constabulary Regiments](image)

**Figure 2.** Eastern and Western Military Districts Showing Assigned District Constabulary Regiments
The district constabularies operated from 30 November 1945, until the United States Zone Constabulary absorbed them in April 1946. In many instances the District Constabularies were reflagged as units in the United States Zone Constabulary in March and April, but continued to operate as District Constabulary until 1 July 1946. District Constabulary personnel were also cross leveled to provide cadre for new United States Zone Constabulary units during the spring of 1946. District Constabulary operations were studied during the initial planning stages for the United States Zone Constabulary, and at a minimum, the District Constabularies contributed to the success of the US Constabulary by providing lessons learned and know how to conduct police type occupation duties.17

The Zone Constabulary

Subsequent to General Marshall’s October memorandum, HQ USFET produced a plan for a police type occupation in Germany. General Eisenhower notified his subordinate commanders on 24 October that the occupation in Germany and Austria would eventually be conducted by a United States Zone Constabulary organized along state police lines, supported by tactical units. He also notified the War Department of his thoughts on a constabulary, saying he believed the police type occupation would allow the United States to complete its occupation duties with the smallest required force.

HQ USFET realized that a police type occupation was without precedent, and so would rely on the operational experience of the District Constabularies, which would soon come into operation. With that in mind, the USFET G2 and the Office of the Military Government for Germany (US) (OMGUS) Public Safety Branch held a conference to estimate the number of troops required for a police type occupation.18 Using a rough estimate of one constable required to maintain order for every 450
Germans, a required force of 38,000 was determined. A second proposal based on a force of 140 constables, organized as a mechanized cavalry troop, required to patrol a rural area of 224 square miles yielded a force of 26,800. Comparing those estimates, G2 and the Public Safety Branch agreed that the 38,000 constable force would better meet the requirements of occupation, because it provided the manpower to perform administrative and support functions required to efficiently run the force.\textsuperscript{19} The force estimate was then included in the USFET plan for the United States Zone Constabulary.

The plan directed a gradual reorganization to a police type occupation with a single United States Occupation Zone Constabulary supported by a three division combat reserve.\textsuperscript{20} The reorganization would begin in April 1946 and the constabulary would assume control of the Zone on or about 1 July 1946. This date was proposed as it was after the first winter of occupation, when the German population would either have rioted due to the conditions or remained quiet, and it coincided with the date OMGUS would civilianize most of its job positions, freeing military personnel for other duties. Finally, the district constabularies would also have some operational experience to assist in final planning and preparation for the Zone Constabulary. The tentative plan was forwarded to the War Department on 1 November 1945\textsuperscript{21} and released to the USFET Staff as planning guidance on 3 November.

In the tentative plan USFET pointed out that the number of forces available in Theater made it unlikely that USFET would be able to take action outside the US Zone to support other allied forces or for implementing national policy in other parts of Europe, a limitation of the concept. To mitigate this risk, USFET assumed that the other occupation powers and European nations would maintain law and order in their own national or
occupancy areas, and that USFET would not be required to provide forces outside the US Zone.\textsuperscript{22}

The planning guidance released to the USFET Staff outlined the 38,000 personnel strength, mission and duties of the constabulary, the requirement for close coordination between constabulary units and local German police, the widespread stationing of the constabulary throughout the US Zones in Germany and Austria, and the types of training required to get the constabulary operational.\textsuperscript{23} It was intended that this would provide the planning staff with enough information to move forward in planning for the constabulary. USFET released a formal directive on 24 November that required the staff to plan for the police type occupation, defining the police type occupation as a method of controlling the population of an occupied territory by means of a “zone constabulary.”

Finally the work of the staff sections was consolidated into a theater plan for the zone constabulary and forwarded to the War Department on 22 December. It reaffirmed the previous assumptions pertaining to the 1 July date for commencing operations, and specified the command organization as a single army level headquarters, responsible for administration, training and operations, commanding both the Zone Constabulary and a three division mobile combat reserve. The mobile combat reserve would be regimental combat team size units concentrated in southern Germany. Along with the creation of the zone constabulary, the theater would be further reorganized by the inactivation of Seventh Army, leaving only Third Army as a tactical headquarters in theater. Further details of the zone constabulary were left to the as yet unnamed constabulary commander to work out, in order to allow him the most latitude to develop the organization as he saw proper.\textsuperscript{24}
The plan defined the zone constabulary’s mission as “maintaining general military security and to assist in the accomplishment of the objectives of the military government by means of an active patrol system prepared to take prompt and effective action to forestall and suppress riots, rebellion, and acts prejudicial to the security of the United States occupational forces.” The zone constabulary was to complete this mission by supporting and reinforcing the established American and German law enforcement agencies. They were not, however, replacing, doing the work of, or interfering with the established US military and German law enforcement agencies.

The primary benefit of securing the theater with a zone constabulary supported by a tactical reserve was it’s saving in the number of personnel required to effectively control the US Occupation Zone. By organizing the theater as the constabulary and tactical reserve, USFET estimated that the occupation would require only 281,000 Troops, a savings of 82,000 troop spaces. This was feasible based on the constabulary’s anticipated method of operating as mobile patrols covering large areas. The constabulary’s mobility would allow forces to rapidly converge on an area as required to respond to unrest or other emergencies.

Organizing the Zone Constabulary

On 10 January 1946, Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, who succeeded General Eisenhower as American military commander in Germany, designated Major General Ernest N. Harmon as the Commanding General, United States Zone Constabulary. At that time Harmon was the only member of the constabulary. To remedy this situation, Major General Harmon appointed a constabulary planning board of seven officers and warrant officers, which met for the first time on 14 January 1946 at the Third
Army Headquarters in *Bad Tölz*, a resort town in Southern Bavaria. Their first task was to determine the proper organization for the zone constabulary.\(^28\)

Lieutenant General McNarney rejected a first design proposal, based on armored cavalry squadrons with light tank and armored field artillery battalions as a tactical reserve, deeming it too much a combat organization and not enough a police organization.\(^29\) Referring back to the initial planning guidance given to the USFET staff in December 1945, the Planning Board found success in a design where the Zone Constabulary would be composed of three brigades headquartered at the *Land* capitals in Wiesbaden, Munich and Stuttgart. Each brigade was responsible for that German *Land*, a political division roughly equivalent to a US state (see figure 3).

![Figure 3. Constabulary Headquarters and Brigades Showing Area of Responsibility for the Constabulary Brigades](image-url)
Each brigade would have three regiments with headquarters located near a *Regierungsbezirk*, a political division between state and county levels that roughly corresponds to an American court district (see figure 4).

![Map Showing Constabulary Brigade and Regimental Sectors](image)

**Figure 4. Map Showing Constabulary Brigade and Regimental Sectors**

Each regiment would have three squadrons, which would control one or more *Kreis* or county (see figure 5).

Brigade, regimental, and squadron headquarters were located near German political headquarters in order to facilitate liaison between the German government, and the constabulary and followed the organization of the occupational military government. To create these new units, USFET would reorganize and redesignate current units.
Figure 5. Map Showing Squadron Headquarters Locations
Note: CB refers to constabulary brigade, CR refers to constabulary regiment, and CS refers to constabulary squadron.

Once the organization was approved by USFET, the Planning Board produced Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) for each of the constabulary units, showing the personnel and equipment required to effectively conduct operations. These were then carried to the War Department for final approval. As laid out in the TOE, the zone constabulary would be composed of a constabulary headquarters organized as a conventional corps level headquarters, with additional medical, communications, and air liaison assets. The constabulary headquarters would also control a schools squadron that would operate a constabulary school for the instruction of unit cadres, troopers, and
newly assigned personnel. Subordinate to the constabulary headquarters were three
brigades also organized as standard Army brigade headquarters (see figure 6).

![Diagram of Constabulary Headquarters Organization Showing Subordinate Brigades, Regiments, and Special Troop Units](image)

Figure 6. Constabulary Headquarters Organization Showing Subordinate Brigades, Regiments, and Special Troop Units
Note: The 2nd Brigade is shown with subordinate regiments; see Appendix A for a complete breakout of constabulary organization.

In turn, each brigade would have three regiments. Each regiment was made up of
three squadrons, plus additional light tank, motorcycle, horse reconnaissance,
administrative and maintenance personnel (see figure 7).

Each squadron had five troops; two motorized and three mechanized, with the
different troops used for different missions. Both the motorized and mechanized troops
had the same number of personnel, the difference being in the assigned vehicles. The
mechanized troops were equipped with armored cars and ¼ ton trucks, the troop was then
divided into jeep and armored car mounted sections and teams for mounted patrols
throughout the assigned AO. The motorized troops were mounted in 1-½ ton trucks and
were used for fixed posts and dismounted foot patrols in urban areas and along the zone
boundary.\(^{31}\)
Figure 7. 5th Constabulary Regiment Showing Its Subordinate Units
Note: This depiction shows the three subordinate squadrons, flight detachment, light tank troop, Service Company and Headquarters Company, with its subordinate signal, horse, and motorcycle reconnaissance platoons. Other Constabulary Regiments were organized in a similar manner.

While waiting for War Department approval of the T/O&Es, USFET and the constabulary continued planning the reorganization of the Theater. On 4 February 1946 they held a conference in Bad Tölz to plan the reorganization of the Theater and the activation of the Zone Constabulary. Based on their draft proposal, Third Army issued “The Directive and Policies Covering the Formation and Operation of the US Zone Constabulary” on 12 March 1946.

This directive established the United States Zone Constabulary as of 15 February 1946, made the Commanding General United States Zone Constabulary responsible for the constabulary, all its subordinate units, agencies, and installations, designated his area of operations as the United States Occupied Zone, with the exception of Austria, the Bremen Enclave, and the Berlin District, and placed the constabulary and its subordinate units under Third Army. It designated the constabulary mission: maintaining general military and civil security and assisting in the accomplishment of the objectives of the
United States government in the US Zone in Germany exclusive of the Bremen Enclave or Berlin District, by means of an active patrol system, and to maintain effective military control of the borders encompassing the United States Zone. Again it was emphasized that the constabulary would not assume or interfere in the work of United States or German law enforcement agencies, but would support and reinforce those agencies by performing military police duties when no military police were present, or to assist and cooperate with military police when requested by a military police unit or at the direction of Third Army. The constabulary was also to cooperate with Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and Criminal Investigation Division (CID) personnel in the performance of their duties. Finally, the constabulary would guard installations, conduct traffic control and other police type duties required to perform the assigned mission.

The Third Army directive also established a general timeline for the constabulary’s activation, which roughly broke out into three phases. From 15 February until 1 June the constabulary would concentrate on reorganization, restationing, and individual and cadre training. During the first phase, between 15 February and 1 April 1946, the constabulary would take operational control of all designated Third Army and Seventh Army units as laid out in the original USFET planning guidance, and those units would conduct individual training on constabulary tasks (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of units assigned to the constabulary and the dates they came under constabulary control). In the second phase, 1 April to 30 May, constabulary units would move to their assigned areas and begin unit training. In the final phase, 1 to 30 June, the constabulary units would conduct on-the-job operational training. Also on 1 June 1946 the
constabulary would assume complete control of all ports of entry along the zone frontiers, and assist German border police where required.37

Each constabulary unit was assigned a geographic area of operations (AO); generally these matched German political boundaries, with Brigade areas matching the Land boundaries, and Squadron areas matching Kreis boundaries. Within these AOs the constabulary would maintain control through irregular patrols, occupation of key terrain, and direct contact with US troops, military and civilian law enforcement and government agencies. “They would also set an example of soldierly dress and discipline.”38 Mobility was the key factor as patrols and contact were to be frequent but would not follow a standard routine or route.39 The constabulary would have jurisdiction over all US and Allied Military personnel and civilian personnel working with the military in the assigned zones.40

**Early Issues in the Zone Constabulary**

The Third Army Directive and schedule was confirmed by the Theater Reorganization plan on 13 April 1946, unfortunately the schedule was not always successfully met due to various logistical and personnel issues. These issues reflected the problems facing USFET and the Army as a whole, but caused additional burden on the constabulary, and came to impact its operations.

Some units designated for the constabulary were occupied in manning static positions as part of the Army of Occupation, and their parent units were unable to release them until other units relieved them. At the same time, cavalry units assigned to the District Constabulary could not depart from their assigned district nor begin training until relieved, though this was less of an issue as the execution of their assigned duties
amounted to on-the-job training for the constabulary missions they would soon assume.41 These problems were overcome and the last designated unit came under constabulary control on 25 April.42

There were also numerous difficulties in finding suitable locations to billet constabulary units. Kasernes designated for constabulary use were often already occupied, whether by American units, displaced persons, or local Germans whose housing had been destroyed. These personnel had to be evicted prior to the constabulary moving in, but this often required a further shuffling to find them suitable locations. Other Kasernes were in such poor repair that they required extensive work to make them suitable for occupation. General Harmon took a special interest in this issue and ensured that work progressed steadily, and by 1 July 1946 only the 22nd Constabulary Squadron remained out of its correct Kaserne.43

Not all of the units designated for constabulary duties were cavalry units. This caused logistical issues in supplying them with the correct equipment required to perform constabulary duties. Units were required to draw the necessary items from ordnance depots located within theater if available, or request the item from CONUS or the Pacific theater if it was not. Often, the equipment required was available in an ordnance depot within theater, but did not appear on depot inventories, or logistical roll-ups at Theater level due to inaccurate records. Inaccurate records were the result of the redeployment of skilled supply personnel, and required Theater personnel to inventory complete depots in order to regain accountability and provide the constabulary with the required items. Further, building materials were in short supply, causing delays in reconstruction and occupation of billeting for the constabulary.44 The logistical issues were not limited to a
lack of the proper equipment, however. Equipment coming from the depots was in the
condition it was turned in by redeploying units. Again, a lack of trained personnel had
curtailed maintenance and refurbishing work at many depots.45 This especially caused
problems in providing the motor vehicles required by the constabulary. These issues were
slowly worked through, but by 1 July some units were still not fully supplied.

In order to reduce personnel turnover once training commenced, prior to the
constabulary assuming command and control for a designated unit, that unit was to clear
all personnel who had a high number of points towards rotation or discharge.46 In
numerous instances this caused units to come under the constabulary as paper units, a
unit on paper but nearly empty of personnel. This then required cross-leveling personnel
to those units, either from deactivating units or from constabulary units that were in better
personnel shape. Personnel strength will be covered in more depth in chapter 3, but
continued to be an issue throughout the operational life of the constabulary, and was not
fully resolved before the constabulary was deactivated.

Training the Constabulary

Along with organizing, equipping and manning the force, an immediate priority
for the constabulary was training on assigned tasks and missions.47 While the exact
missions were not established when training commenced, General Harmon and his
planning staff were able to establish a preliminary curriculum based on their wartime
experience. Colonel Henry C. Newton and Colonel J.H. Harwood, whose prewar
experience in civilian education and police work combined to complement Harmon’s
tactical knowledge, assisted the planning staff in designing the police work portion of the
curriculum and helped ensure the success of the training program.48
The constabulary conducted training in three levels covering individual, unit, and operational tasks, the schedule for which corresponded to the activation schedule laid out in the 12 March 1946 Third Army directive covering the formation and operation of the US Zone Constabulary. Training was conducted both at the unit home Kaserne and at the Constabulary School in Sonthofen, Bavaria. The Constabulary School was established to train constabulary troopers in the methodology of policing the US Zone and on specialized skills required in the command. Instruction at the school was intended as training the trainer; troopers who completed the school course of instruction returned to their units to serve as subject matter experts, passing on their knowledge to the unit. The training courses were deemed successful, but a constant turnover in both instructors and students necessitated continued operation at the school. The Constabulary School Historian noted that the main problem with the students “was that too many of them were scheduled for redeployment within two or three months from the date that they entered the school.”

As soon as they were formed, new constabulary units conducted individual training for the troopers at their home Kaserne. This training covered the tasks the individual trooper required during operations and was instructed by cadre trained at the Constabulary School or by instructional teams from the District Constabularies. This initial training was completed successfully by most of the constabulary, and even those that did not complete the course of instruction at least gained familiarity with their equipment and a general refresher in basic military subjects.

On 1 April 1946, the constabulary began an eight-week unit-training program to prepare for future operations. Because there were differences in the level of proficiency
between the former District Constabulary units and the newly forming constabulary units, and even between units within those two categories, regimental commanders were given authority to tailor the program to meet the needs of their specific unit. The unit-training program was capped off by a series of field training exercises that required the performance of duties such as raids, checkpoint operations, border control, and riot control. Constabulary training officers judged that this training provided superior results to the cadre and individual training periods, but that the results did not meet the standards required for the constabulary.

The preoperational training phase, the final phase of the training program, began on 1 June 1946. The objective for the preoperational training was final preparation for constabulary units to assume their operational responsibilities beginning on 1 July. All constabulary units participated in this training, including the former District Constabulary units. This training emphasized realistic conditions, consisted of practical exercises, demonstrations and on-job-training and required performance of previously trained police duties. The constabulary training officers judged the results of this training as excellent. They felt it was superior to the individual and unit training periods and had accomplished its objective. Training was still hampered by personnel turnover, but the units were ready for assuming their operational duties.

**Constabulary Operations**

The United States Zone Constabulary became operational on 1 July 1946, tasked with maintaining order in the United States Zone, controlling zone boundaries, and assisting in achieving US Government goals in the US Zone. As stated earlier, the US Zone was split up along German political boundaries and assigned to constabulary units.
These units were responsible to identify indications of subversive activity, ensure coordination and communication with intelligence and military government organizations and to check-up on German police organizations in the assigned sector. They accomplished this mission through an active and coordinated patrol system, backed up by a reserve to quickly mass and suppress disturbances or threats to security and US Government interests. Not all constabulary units were operational at the same time, operational Troops were rotated to ensure the troopers did not burn out and to provide a period for refresher training. While conducting refresher training the troopers composed the reserve force used to quickly reinforce patrols or border posts requiring assistance.

Most patrols were conducted by squad-sized elements of approximately thirteen troopers, either mounted in vehicles in open areas, on horses or on foot in urban areas and near the zone boundary. A German policeman generally supplemented these patrols to assist in translation. The constabulary also operated aerial patrols using light aircraft to patrol larger areas of the zone. The patrols relied on mobility and communication to cover the assigned area and ensure public safety.

The constabulary was also responsible for control of the Zone boundaries. This was accomplished by mounted and dismounted patrols, and by border posts at authorized border crossing points. These border posts and patrols differed in composition and operations depending on what border they controlled; between the US zones in Germany and Austria, between the US and British or French Zones, or between the US and Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia. Border operations were also assisted by German border police, either armed or unarmed depending on what border they controlled.
Colonel J.H. Harwood’s *United States Zone Constabulary trooper’s Handbook* assisted constabulary troopers in the conduct of their duties. This manual clearly laid out the standards and procedures for most aspects of constabulary operations. If the trooper encountered an issue he was not familiar with, he could consult the handbook for the proper procedure to resolve the issue. If the issue was not covered in the handbook, the trooper could communicate with his higher headquarters for assistance or answers.

**Reorganization of the United States Forces in Europe**

By the end of 1946, the US forces in Europe saw internal unrest in Germany as less likely than the threat of invasion by a foreign power.64 By 1948 tensions with the Soviet Union over the occupation agreements had increased to the point that the USFET Commander hoped to reestablish the tactical capabilities of the forces in Europe, regardless of OTB reductions. To do this, USFET directed the consolidation of administrative requirements to free manpower from static occupation duties. This would allow more troops in the tactical forces and allow them periods to conduct field and maneuver training.65 The additional training would allow the forces in Europe to better prepare for emergency operations as needed.

In spring 1947, the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) reorganized by eliminating the Third Army headquarters, transferring its functions to three revived Military Districts,66 organized around tactical headquarters from the 1st Infantry Division, the 26th Infantry Regiment, and the Division Artillery 1st Infantry Division,67 and the military posts under the jurisdiction of those districts.68 The Military Posts would fulfill the administrative requirements for the forces in their jurisdiction, and the Military Districts would maintain oversight on the Posts. As part of the Theater Reorganization,
the Constabulary Headquarters moved to Heidelberg and assumed those Third Army functions not assumed by the Military Districts. The constabulary would phase out these remaining functions by 15 March 1947 when it would resume the normal functions as Constabulary Headquarters.

These functions were not phased out however, instead the Constabulary Headquarters assumed additional duties. On 17 February, Theater Headquarters directed that the constabulary would assume responsibility for the 1st and 2nd Military Districts. On 21 February, the Constabulary Headquarters formally redesignated the Military Districts, assigning the 1st Military District, Land Bavaria, to the 1st Infantry Division and the 2nd Military District, Lander Württemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse to Headquarters, US Constabulary. This marked the transition of the constabulary from a purely tactical organization to an organization having both tactical and administrative duties. The position of Constabulary Deputy Commanding General was established in order to provide oversight on District affairs. The 1st Infantry Division and US Constabulary then established headquarters and headquarters detachments (HHD) to assist in the district administration.

The constabulary was ordered to assume control of the 2nd Military District in order that the 1st Infantry Division could consolidate the 26th Infantry Regiment in the area of Grafenwöhr and train it as the Combat Reserve. Originally intended as a reserve to assist the constabulary in the United States Zone, by November 1947 the 26th Infantry Regiment was referred to as the European Command reserve. If committed to action it was to be released to the Commander of the US Constabulary or the Commander of US
Forces in Austria, and was required to be able to move one-third of its forces within four hours of alert and the remainder within twelve hours.\textsuperscript{73}

While the additional administrative tasks assumed by the constabulary Headquarters were a further burden on an already overtasked organization, the Theater Reorganization did relieve some constabulary units from the administrative role as senior tactical commander of their respective communities. These functions were now passed to the military post commanders.\textsuperscript{74} The military posts were not a specific fenced in installation, as they are in the United States; instead they were large areas under a single commander that could contain one or several installations. The military posts provided support to the organizations and individuals of the US military forces and agencies stationed within the area of the military post by providing supplies and housekeeping services, by performing necessary construction work within the post, maintaining law, order, and internal security within the post, and enforcing proper military conduct, bearing, and appearance on the part of all personnel stationed there.\textsuperscript{75} In short, the military posts began to assume some of the internal security mission from the constabulary, allowing the constabulary to reorient on its tactical mission.

A further step toward reestablishing a tactically ready force in Europe occurred on 15 March 1947 when Headquarters, US Ground and Service Forces, Europe was established in Frankfurt, Germany. Headquarters, US Ground and Service Forces, Europe served as the senior headquarters for all Army units in Germany. At the same time, the European Command (EUCOM) replaced USFET as the senior command of all United States military forces in Europe. On 15 November 1947 the US Ground and Service
Forces, Europe was redesignated Headquarters, United States Army Europe (USAREUR).  

The Constabulary Reserve and Tactical Reorganization

When the constabulary became operational in July 1946, their duties and responsibilities did not remain static, causing refinements in the constabulary organization. These changes were caused by reductions in the OTB and by changes in the tactical situation in Europe. Gradually the constabulary took on a more tactical orientation than originally intended. From its inception, the constabulary had had difficulty attaining and maintaining the necessary personnel strength. As early as October 1946, Constabulary Headquarters directed that all subordinate units hold conferences to propose recommendations to change constabulary tables of organization and equipment based on operational experience.

These recommendations were based on the assumption that the area security mission would remain unchanged, and tactical and combat requirements would be unlikely. Therefore, the number of line troops in each squadron was reduced to four, while the strength of each troop was increased to 185. At the same time, the troops were standardized as mechanized troops as experience had shown the motorized troops were inadequate for their assigned duties.

Further revisions in this reorganization were the inclusion of provost marshal sections down to troop level, the relocation of maintenance and administrative personnel from regimental level to squadron level, and the inclusion of staff specialists, including inspector general, judge advocate, public relations and recruiting personnel, at the brigade and constabulary headquarters levels to better perform those necessary duties.
The lack of personnel strength in theater required additional cuts in early 1947. The first was the elimination of all regimental light tank troops in February 1947, followed in March by the inactivation of all ‘E’ troops from the constabulary in accordance with the proposed four troop table of organization.\(^7\) While the reorganizations saved approximately 1200 spaces,\(^8\) they did not save personnel as the constabulary was under strength at the time of the cuts, and this merely brought the paper organization closer to reality.\(^8\) By 30 June 1947 the constabulary was manned with 98 percent of its officer strength and 72 percent of enlisted strength.\(^8\) In August 1947, the constabulary requested permission to conduct a further reduction by discontinuing one brigade headquarters and inactivating four regimental headquarters, bringing the constabulary strength to 22,181. The War Department approved this reduction on 10 September 1947.\(^8\)

By summer 1947, the German police forces\(^8\) were operating efficiently, and due to their operations and the improving conditions in Germany it was seen that the constabulary could reduce their internal security role.\(^8\) At this time Headquarters, US Ground and Service Forces, Europe wanted to supplement the reserve force composed of the 26th Infantry Regiment with a constabulary reserve. The constabulary reserve would be composed of one reinforced regiment freed from static duties and prepared for reserve duties through training and field exercises.\(^8\)

The Constabulary Headquarters, after reviewing locations capable of stationing a consolidated regiment, designated the 5th Constabulary Regiment, stationed in Augsburg and composed of the 35th and 74th Squadrons, as constabulary reserve.\(^8\) The constabulary then augmented the 5th Regiment with the 66th Squadron, from the
inactivated 2nd Regiment, and the 68th Squadron, from the inactivated 3rd Regiment. Two troops were then converted to further increase the combat power of the reserve, E Troop, 68th Squadron as a recoilless rifle troop, and E Troop, 74th Squadron as a light tank troop. These two troops were then combined with the headquarters and service troop to form a provisional squadron. In early September the reserve participated in a series of tactical exercises at Grafenwöhr. On 20 September 1947, the 5th Constabulary Regiment was redesignated the 2nd Constabulary Regiment, and the 35th and 74th Squadrons were redesignated the 42nd and 2nd Squadrons. At that time, the Constabulary reserve was composed of five Squadrons, four stationed in Augsburg and the fifth in Deggendorf and three troops from each squadron were continually in training.

In early November 1947, Theater planners directed that the constabulary further prepare for tactical operations by forming field artillery battalions. Since there were no tables of organization for constabulary field artillery units, the 94th Constabulary Squadron and Troop D of the 14th Constabulary Squadron were inactivated and redesignated as the 91st and 94th Field Artillery Battalions. These Battalions were organized outside the constabulary organization.

The Constabulary Headquarters Becomes a Corps Headquarters

The tactical reorganization continued in 1948 with a 22 April directive to adapt line constabulary troops to a more tactical organization by removing the provost marshal sections from the troops, assigning the duties to the Squadron provost marshal sections and utilizing the personnel elsewhere. This was followed in June by a conference and directive from EUCOM to reorganize the constabulary roughly similar to an armored division. The Constabulary Headquarters was also tasked with assuming the role of a
corps headquarters in case of emergency, when both the constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division would fall under its control. To better provide command and control in an emergency, the 1st and 2nd Constabulary Brigade headquarters were reorganized as combat command headquarters. The constabulary began the reorganization even before the Department of the Army had approved.

Under the reorganization the 2nd, 6th and 14th Constabulary Regiments were reorganized as armored cavalry regiments. The 2nd Constabulary Regiment was reorganized first and served as a training school for the other regiments. Additional units were added to the regiments to increase combat power, including antiaircraft artillery battalions, additional field artillery battalions and combat engineer battalions and bridge companies.

While this transformation was underway, constabulary units conducted training with an emphasis on tactical training including limited objective attack, hasty defense, delaying actions, obstacles and demolitions. Most training time was devoted to platoon training while troop through regiment training was devoted to tactical control, communications, and mobility. The 2nd Constabulary Brigade established a light and medium tank school to train the tank crewmen for the regiments. This training continued into 1950 while other reorganizations occurred.

The Rise of USAREUR and Seventh Army

On 11 May 1949 Headquarters EUCOM published a list of its subordinate commands, including the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR). Publication of the list created an organizational pattern in Europe where the major commands of EUCOM were the headquarters of its service components. USAREUR was now an actual
operational headquarters, and the constabulary and 1st Infantry Division became subordinate commands.\textsuperscript{99} Due to the continued shortage of personnel EUCOM and USAREUR staffs could not both be fully manned, and staff personnel were forced to fulfill roles on both staffs. In an emergency, the Constabulary Headquarters would serve as Headquarters, USAREUR, augmented by personnel from the EUCOM staff.\textsuperscript{100}

In 1950, world events continued to push USAREUR and the United States Zone Constabulary towards operational readiness. The constabulary, still plagued by personnel shortages, was not considered fully capable of defensive operations.\textsuperscript{101} To remedy this situation, USAREUR directed that the constabulary be fully realigned as an augmented corps or reduced army, completing the transformation begun in 1948.\textsuperscript{102} This transformation included the realignment of the constabulary flight detachment and the addition of the 19th Medical Detachment.

The constabulary’s internal security mission continued however. On 14 July 1950, USAREUR issued the Internal Security Directive giving detailed security responsibilities to subordinate units. The constabulary was responsible for suppression of civil disturbances when requested by a Post Commander, providing a Squadron sized post security force for each military post, coordination of security plans with the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the Wiesbaden Military Post and security of the US Zone border.\textsuperscript{103} During security alerts or actual combat, the constabulary was responsible for providing security at the Rhine bridges located at Mainz, Worms, Frankenthal, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe; and was to be prepared to assume responsibility for employment of antiaircraft artillery in the defense of the bridges. The 1st Infantry
Division also came under operational control of the constabulary, enabling the latter to alert and deploy all tactical troops in theater.\textsuperscript{104}

Constabulary manning did not remain inviolate however, as troops were withdrawn from the constabulary in November 1950, when it and the 1st Infantry Division were tasked to provide troops to form a cadre for a newly activating 4th Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia.\textsuperscript{105} The constabulary was further reduced on 24 November with the reactivation of the US Seventh Army. This caused a general reshuffling as units previously designated as subordinate commands of USAREUR were shifted to Seventh Army, which became the parent organization of all ground tactical units in theater including both the 1st Infantry Division and the United States Zone Constabulary’s subordinate brigades. The constabulary headquarters was inactivated at this time, and the Commanding General, Major General Isaac D. White, became the Deputy Commanding General of Seventh Army.\textsuperscript{106}

1951 saw the continued reduction of the constabulary as units were inactivated, transferred to other commands or redesignated. In August the 1st Constabulary Brigade was inactivated and the three remaining regiments, the 2nd, 6th and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments (US Constabulary) were placed directly under the command and control of Seventh Army.\textsuperscript{107} The constabulary still existed in these three regiments, operating as a mobile force under Seventh Army. In June 1952 the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment was assigned to VII Corps and the 14th Cavalry was assigned to V Corps. By December 1952, however, the regiments were fully absorbed by Seventh Army and after six years of operations the constabulary was fully disbanded.
The United States Zone Constabulary was formed soon after the end of World War II in response to the tactical and manpower situation in Germany. Intended to secure the United States Zone while conserving personnel strength, the constabulary relied upon mobility to patrol the zone and mass forces when necessary and communications to maintain contact over the entire zone. As the theater changed the constabulary changed in organization and mission to maintain security. The constabulary was also influenced by the personnel strength in the theater. How personnel factors influenced the constabulary will be discussed in the next chapter.


3James M. Snyder, *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Zone Constabulary, 3 October 1945 -- 30 June 1947* (Heidelberg, Germany: US Constabulary G3 Historical Subsection, 1947), 2. Snyder later states that the idea came from the War Department, citing General Marshal’s response to General Eisenhower’s comments. This is probably General Marshall telling General Eisenhower that the plan did not come from General MacArthur’s command in Asia, however. See Snyder p 4.


5Ibid., 66.

6Ibid.

7Snyder, 2.

8Ibid.

Military History: 1975), 340, Frederiksen, 66, and Snyder, 5. Davis names the G2 --
Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert.

10 Frederiksen, 66.

11 Davis, 163.

12 Ibid., Frederiksen, 66, and Snyder, 3.

13 Snyder, 6.

14 Frederiksen, 66, and Snyder, 11.

15 Snyder, 10.

16 Ibid., 11.

17 Ibid., 12.


19 Snyder, 13.

20 Ibid., 12.

21 Ibid., 14.

22 Ibid., 14.

23 Ibid., 17.

24 Ibid., 30.


26 Harmon memorandum, 1.

27 Snyder, 15

28 Ibid., 31.

29 Ibid., 31.

30 Harmon Memorandum, 3.

32 The product of this conference was Harmon’s memorandum and draft directive establishing the US Zone Constabulary sent to LTG Truscott, CG Third US Army.

33 Snyder, 35.


35 Snyder, 34 – 36.

36 The training program is covered in chapter 4 Training and Operations.

37 Snyder, 37 and 58.


39 This paragraph summarizes the writings of Ziemke (340-341), Frederiksen (65), and Snyder (38).

40 They would not exercise court-martial authority over all these personnel however. Constabulary courts martial only had jurisdiction over personnel assigned to the Constabulary or living on installations commanded by Constabulary officers. Others who were apprehended for breaking a law or regulation would be turned over to their respective organization for trial and punishment as required, Snyder, 41

41 Snyder, 58. In many instances, the initial training cadres for both the newly established Constabulary units and the Constabulary School at Sonthofen came from District Constabulary units.

42 Ibid., 60. See appendix See Appendix A for the planned and actual dates unit came under Constabulary control.

43 Ibid., 58-62. In fact, progress of *Kaserne* occupation was a standard briefing point during Constabulary daily and weekly staff meetings.

44 Ibid., 77.

45 Ibid., 76.

46 Ibid., 62.

47 Training will be covered in more depth in Chapter 4.
Harwood wrote the *United States Zone Constabulary trooper’s Handbook* that “gave [the] prospective policemen a step-by-step guide to their duties,” Harmon, *Combat Commander*, 281. Newton was assigned as the assistant commandant and director of training at the Constabulary School based on his experience as a civilian educator and as the Armor School director of training at Fort Knox, Snyder 80.


Snyder, 79.

Pettigrew, 4.

Snyder, 66.

Ibid., 67. Those units that did not successfully complete the course of instruction were those with late assignment to the Constabulary or late arrival to assigned locations causing late start on the training.

Ibid., 67.

Ibid., 68.

Ibid., 71.

Ibid., 71.

Ibid., 72.

Ibid., 72.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid., 75.

Ibid., 129.

Snyder, 133.

Chase, 32.

Ibid., 24.

The Military Districts reflected the three *Landen* of the US Zone; Bavaria, Greater Hesse and Württemberg-Baden.

Snyder, 143.
Snyder, 144.

Snyder, 144.

Ibid., 144.

Ibid., 145.

Ibid., 144. The 2nd Military District’s HHD was a paper organization as the duties were performed by the Constabulary Headquarters staff.

Chase, 26.

Snyder, 145.


Chase, 21.

Snyder, 136.

Ibid., 137.

Ibid., 143. See Appendix C for the Constabulary Organization wire diagram.

Ibid., 142. Spaces refers to positions shown on a TO&E where a Soldier is required and can be assigned. A Soldier fills the space shown on the TO&E. By eliminating these spaces the organization is reduced and the Soldiers are no longer required and can be assigned to other organizations. Or, as in this case, it merely closes up an empty space.

Chase, 28.

Ibid., 28.

Ibid., 28. The constabulary inactivated the 3rd Constabulary Brigade, and the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 10th Constabulary Regiments and subordinate squadrons on 20 September 1947. See Appendix A for a listing of all Constabulary inactivation dates.

German police forces included the normal police, border police, railway police and the customs service.

Chase, 29.

Ibid., 28.
52

87 Ibid., 29.
88 Ibid., 30.
89 Ibid., 31.
90 Ibid., 31.
91 Ibid., 38.

93 Chase, 42.

95 Chase, 39.
96 Chase, 40.
97 Chase, 40.


CHAPTER 3
MANNING THE CONSTABULARY

The most difficult problem we faced in the creation of the Constabulary—and one never completely solved—was to obtain qualified men, and, once they were fully trained, to hang onto them.

Harmon, *Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier*

*Manning the Constabulary*

On Victory in Europe Day (VE Day), the United States Army had over 3.1 million Soldiers in Europe, with over 1.6 million in Germany. These numbers dropped quickly due to redeployment of forces to the Pacific Theater, and to the United States for discharge. While the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) planning group had estimated a required thirty-three divisions to occupy Germany, it was quickly evident that this was a number that could not be achieved. Regardles of personnel strength however, USFET was required to secure the United States occupation zone and complete all assigned occupation tasks.

Early in the occupation USFET determined that the forces available for the occupation were barely adequate to provide security and the forces would quickly be further reduced through redeployment and demobilization. Therefore, the planners developed the constabulary to cover the occupation area with the smallest number of troops by constantly patrolling and using show of force operations to advertise the constabulary’s capabilities and deter the population from taking action in opposition to the occupation. To do this, the planners considered they required a force of 38,000
troopers, based on one trooper for every 450 Germans,² made up of men with specific skills and attributes.

The Right Men

The constabulary’s mission was roughly broken out into security and law enforcement duties. The law enforcement duties would bring the constabulary trooper into contact with people of every stripe and criminals that ranged from simple speeding drivers, to black marketers, prostitutes and pimps, and accused murderers. General Harmon stated in his memoirs Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier:

Clearly the Constabulary was peculiarly dependant upon the good judgment, sensitivity, and honesty of the individual trooper, for much of the police work was to be carried on by groups of two or three men operating away from their headquarters. They were to possess unusual powers of arrest, search, and seizure. We could expect them to be tempted frequently by the possibility of bribes, for Europe was filled with desperate people willing to pay high prices for permission to cross borders illegally or to deal in black market goods.³

Further, because of precise rules of law and evidence, and the technically exacting nature of completing police investigations and preparing detailed reports it was necessary that the constabulary trooper possess a high degree of intelligence.⁴ This combination of intelligence and discipline caused the planners to visualize the constabulary as an elite force composed of high-quality personnel with the general qualifications of officer candidates.⁵ Harmon had observed these qualities in his Soldiers during the war, and believed the force could operate successfully composed of veterans.⁶ Unfortunately, veteran personnel were not available in large numbers due to redeployment and discharge. In an effort to retain qualified personnel, the constabulary initiated a recruiting campaign directed at veteran personnel.⁷ This was not fully successful however; instead the constabulary was filled with eighteen-to-twenty-two-year-old draftees.⁸
While many of these draftees met the high standards set for the constabulary, not all did. Soldiers were deemed unfit for service with the constabulary for any number of reasons; over or under the height and weight standards, criminal record, lack of English language proficiency, or low intelligence level. In an effort to prevent assigning unfit personnel to the constabulary, a Theater Placement Board was established to review personnel to find a position that allowed the Soldier to provide the greatest benefit from his experience and knowledge. Similar boards were established at squadron, regiment and Constabulary HQ level. A Soldier being assigned to the constabulary, who was deemed unfit for an operational assignment would be reviewed by a squadron, then regimental, then constabulary board in order to determine if there was a position the individual could fill within that level of the constabulary. If the individual was not fit for any position within the constabulary, he would go before the Theater Board for assignment within theater but outside the constabulary. In this way the constabulary was able to raise the level of the assigned Soldiers, impacting operations and morale.

During the constabulary’s initial buildup period, February to July 1946, many units came under constabulary control manned below the required levels and others were merely paper units, empty of personnel. It was necessary to fill these units quickly in order to begin the required preoperational training. Filler replacements came predominantly from within theater. While there were combat veterans who volunteered to remain in Germany to serve in the occupation forces, many of the replacements were new arrivals who lacked the required number of points for redeployment and discharge, and therefore lacked experience. This would have significant impact on the preoperational training program and later operations.
Foreign Nationals as Another Source of Manpower

The shortage of personnel in Germany was recognized early on in the planning process, both at the War Department and USFET level. Various sources to provide manpower were proposed to man the constabulary or fill other units to free manpower for assignment to the constabulary. One of these proposals was for the use of foreign personnel to serve in the constabulary. This was proposed by the War Department in the initial cable on establishing a police type occupation with foreign nationals serving as the troops and US personnel filling key positions.\(^\text{10}\) It was again proposed on 16 October 1945.\(^\text{11}\) The foreign troops would come from the liberated countries, mainly Holland, Poland, Denmark, and Norway, and would be recruited through the foreign governments themselves. The forces would operate in national units, but fall under the strict control of United States forces. USFET replied that this was impractical in the European Theater, but they would make a study of the proposal to fully determine feasibility. Their conclusion was that using foreign nationalists would cause more problems than it would solve, due to language differences, decreased efficiency due to national differences, and training difficulties and increased costs caused by both.\(^\text{12}\)

The suggestion did not die here however, as it was again proposed by USFET in January 1946 based on reductions in the OTB. This time the foreign troops would be screened Germans operating under American officers and noncommissioned officers. Again the proposal was denied, due to the anticipated public reaction to building up a German military force.\(^\text{13}\) The idea finally died after a 5 March 1946 memorandum from USFET to the War Department stating that the money required to establish a foreign unit would be better spent establishing a dependable American force, seeing that the
constabulary could soon be the only United States tactical force in Germany. Therefore, although the pool of foreign nationals could have relived many of the personnel shortages USFET experienced, they were never tapped as a source of tactical manpower.

Personnel Turnover

A further problem that impacted the constabulary’s preoperational period was retention, keeping the troopers already assigned. In early planning, the constabulary planning staff estimated a required force of 38,000 troopers, based on one trooper for every 450 Germans. By February 1946 this had been refined to a force of 1837 officers, 93 warrant officers, and 29,825 enlisted men for a total force of 31,755. The planners believed the quality of the constabulary trooper would allow successful operations by this reduced force. Despite force requirements in Germany, troopers left the constabulary to return to the United States at the end of their overseas tour or maximum time spent outside of the United States. Initially in 1945 and 1946, there was no maximum tour length; Soldiers would remain overseas indefinitely until their term of enlistment ended. This caused morale problems in Germany, and the USFET staff repeatedly request the War Department provide a policy to allow veteran Soldiers to return to the United States in exchange for veteran Soldiers serving at bases within the Continental United States. On 19 January 1946, the War Department accepted a USFET proposal to set the maximum tour length at 30 months, unless the Soldier requested to remain longer. This policy remained in effect for the remainder of the constabulary’s operations.

During the preoperational period and first year of operations, the constabulary strength varied greatly. While personnel strengths are not available for all constabulary units, the 14th Constabulary Regiment reported a strength of twenty three officers, four
warrant officers, and 2992 men on 1 May 1946, the date it came under constabulary control. Over the next seven months, the strength rose to 169 officers, four warrant officers, and 2992 men on 31 December 1946. This is against a table of organization authorized strength of 138 officers, one warrant officer, and 2765 men. The following table illustrates how the strength fluctuated in between (see table 1).\(^{20}\) While this table shows that the 14th Constabulary Regiment experienced overstrength periods, it also shows the fluctuation in assigned strength and the reader can imagine the difficulty in operating as an efficient organization with rises and drops in the number of assigned personnel. Data on the number of reassignments into the regiment is unavailable, so turnover in personnel strength can not be determined. Snyder does provide this data for the constabulary as a whole however.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 May</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By 1 July 1946, the date the constabulary became operational, the constabulary had attained an aggregate 97 percent manning fill, but with officers only manned at 78
percent and warrant officers at 53 percent. Further, a large proportion of the constabulary was constantly rotating due to redeployment and arrival of new replacements. The following table shows the number of losses and replacements to the constabulary through its first year of operations (see tables 2 and 3). Note that in March 1947, the table of organization strength dropped due to the inactivation of the light tank troops in February 1947, this will be discussed later.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month / Year</th>
<th>T&amp;E/O Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Percentage</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Turnover %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>29437</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>6581</td>
<td>6221</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>31730</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>3732</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>32245</td>
<td>108%</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>30005</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>3431</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>28954</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>3216</td>
<td>2165</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>28795</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1946</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>27771</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1947</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>24397</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>2978</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1947</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>23793</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>1708</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1947</td>
<td>29093</td>
<td>23067</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>3775</td>
<td>3049</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1947</td>
<td>29093</td>
<td>23182</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>2409</td>
<td>2524</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1947</td>
<td>29093</td>
<td>22274</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1947</td>
<td>27930</td>
<td>21468</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Loss/Gain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30324</td>
<td>22787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note that personnel turnover is figured using the number of personnel who depart an organization in the 90 days prior to a status report. For that reason, no turnover is available for the first three months shown in these tables. However, turnover averaged approximately 20 percent during the first year of operations. Personnel turnover affects a
unit by removing trained personnel and introducing untrained personnel in their place, breaking team cohesion and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{22} A unit experiencing 20 percent turnover is considered to be significantly affected in its capability to conduct operations for these reasons, and requires additional resources and training time to bring all personnel to job proficiency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month / Year</th>
<th>T&amp;E/O Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Strength</th>
<th>Assigned Percentage</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Turnover %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>541</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>105%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>105%</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>2070</td>
<td>107%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 46</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 47</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>102%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 47</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 47</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 47</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 47</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 47</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Loss/Gain | 30324 | 22787


Note: the officer table combines both officers and warrant officers.
Note that enlisted strength drops throughout the first year, while officer strength increases, despite the loss of the E troops and light tank troops in March 1947. Again, the reduction of enlisted strength reduces the effectiveness of the organization by removing the people most needed to conduct operations. Finally, new replacements from the United States were rare, as USFET continued to reduce its strength to meet the OTB. Therefore, most of these gains came from within theater from units not designated for the constabulary, and from units inactivating or rotating to the United States.23

The constabulary staff developed a training regimen to prepare troopers for their assigned duties. This training was divided into cadre training, intended to train constabulary leaders to further train their assigned troopers, unit training, intended to develop constabulary leaders, prepare the Troops for preoperational training by training on the specific tasks they would perform in their operations, and instill high standards of cohesion, discipline, appearance, and esprit de corps, and finally preoperational training, a final preparation for assumption of full operational duties through the use of on-the-job training. While the training program succeeded in giving units an orientation on their assigned equipment and tactics, the results were later reduced by redeployment and personnel turnover.24

Due to the inability of the Army and USFET to provide the high quality Soldiers desired by the constabulary planning staff and the constant turnover of assigned personnel, training continued for newly assigned personnel throughout the constabulary’s operational period. In order to standardize training for newly assigned troopers, Reinforcement Training Detachments were established at each constabulary regiment and squadron. The Reinforcement Training Detachments conducted four week training
programs for groups of 100 newly assigned constabulary troopers on the key individual and unit level tasks required during operations. Instruction also included familiarization on subjects such as the Occupation Military Government, United States (OMGUS), interaction with military and civilian police organizations and German language training. The Reinforcement Training Detachments were manned out of hide, without additional personnel for the task, further reducing personnel available for operations in an under strength organization.25

Personnel turnover impacted the constabulary in two ways. First, it constantly changed the makeup of the organization, removing trained individuals and bringing in untrained. This reduced the effectiveness of the organization by interrupting the development of institutional knowledge or lessons learned; the knowledge gained through various means which enable the organization to translate historical data into useful skills and procedures. In short, it slowed the constabulary’s translation of knowledge of what did or did not work in the operational environment into the best methods for conducting operations.

Second, the constant turnover required diverting trained personnel from operational assignments to assignments training newly arriving troopers. While it is readily apparent that using the best individuals as trainers allows them to pass their knowledge on quickly, by removing them from operations it prevents them from impacting the operations themselves.26
Manpower Effects of Reorganizing the United States Forces, European Theater

By spring 1947, the continued reductions in manpower levels to reach the OTB of 117,000 troops by 1 July caused the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) to reorganize by eliminating the Third Army headquarters and transferring its functions to three Military Districts based on the German Lander of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse. USFET intended the reorganization to relieve the tactical units from the day to day responsibilities of running individual kasernes and reduce administrative overhead in the theater. The districts were organized around tactical headquarters from the 1st Infantry Division, the 26th Infantry Regiment, and the Division Artillery of the 1st Infantry Division. The Military Districts were direct subordinate units to HQ USFET, reporting to and taking direction from the theater commander. Military posts were then organized under the jurisdiction of the districts to provide administrative control for units within those posts. As part of the theater reorganization, the constabulary Headquarters moved to Heidelberg and assumed those Third Army functions not assumed by the military districts. The constabulary would phase out these remaining functions by 15 March 1947 when it would resume the normal functions as constabulary Headquarters.

The reorganization did not fully meet the required personnel savings however, requiring additional cuts by reducing the military districts to two, based on Bavaria and a combined Hesse/Württemberg-Baden. The constabulary then assumed control of the Second Military District, Greater Hesse and Württemberg-Baden, while the 1st Infantry Division assumed the First Military District, Bavaria.

The addition of responsibilities caused by the control of the Second Military District also brought additional personnel to the constabulary Headquarters, though not as
many as identified for elimination. When the Second and Third Military Districts were planned for control by elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 105 spaces were identified on the Constabulary Headquarters staff for transfer to the districts and military posts. When the Second District was transferred to the control of the Constabulary Headquarters, only 76 additional spaces were transferred to the Headquarters staff, adding responsibilities, but not providing the bodies to do the work. The constabulary was also directed to inactivate the light-tank troops in each regiment, and the “E” Troops from each squadron, contributing approximately 1200 troop spaces to the theater total for use in building the Military Post organizations. The First Constabulary Regiment reported that this reorganization, “although not affecting the overall squadron strength shortage, did tend to bring the individual troops up to more nearly T/O [table of organization] strength.” While the USFET reorganization was intended to save personnel by reducing administrative positions within theater, it caused a reduction in the tactical capabilities of the constabulary, the primary security force in theater, and added administrative functions to the constabulary staff.

By September 1947, the reduced security needs in the US Zone coupled with increased German police capabilities and the personnel strength in the constabulary permitted the inactivation of the Third Constabulary Brigade, along with the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 10th Constabulary Regiments and the 13th, 71st and 72nd Constabulary Squadrons. The operational mission of these units was assumed by other constabulary regiments and squadrons and the assigned personnel and equipment were transferred to fill shortages within the constabulary. In an effort to address the tactical deficiencies caused by the inactivations, the United States European Command (EUCOM) directed the
consolidation of one regiment of the constabulary to serve as a tactical reserve force. The constabulary selected the 5th Constabulary Regiment, headquartered in Augsburg, Germany, and augmented it with two additional squadrons and converted two troops to recoilless rifle and tank troops to increase available firepower. The Regiment was then redesignated as the 2nd Constabulary Regiment.

From this point onward, the constabulary operated above 90 percent assigned strength. This was more a function of the reductions in the organization than it was assignment of additional personnel. EUCOM and USAREUR remained at fairly constant personnel strengths until mid-1950. Personnel were assigned to the constabulary based on needs throughout the Theater, with units receiving replacement based on their manning level. EUCOM also conducted recruiting drives in Europe and the United States to procure additional personnel. In 1948, EUCOM sent recruiting teams to the United States to recruit Soldiers for the command, with Soldiers recruited between September and November 1948 earmarked specifically for the constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division. Teams also recruited American citizens living in Europe and made plans to recruit non-US citizens from among the population of Europe.

There were additional changes in the constabulary organization, specifically the reorganization of the 2nd, 6th and 14th Constabulary Regiments as Armored Cavalry Regiments and the inactivation of the horse cavalry troops, but these were due to the renewed tactical orientation of USAREUR and EUCOM rather than as attempted personnel savings. The constabulary also provided troops to serve as cadre for a reactivated 4th Infantry Division at Ft Benning, Georgia in November 1950. However,
The Constabulary Headquarters was inactivated in November 1950, and the final constabulary units were redesignated or disbanded by December 1952.37

The United States Zone Constabulary was established as a means to provide security in Germany at the lowest cost to the Army in personnel. Occupation planners had determined that the forces available for the occupation were inadequate to provide security and the available forces would be further reduced through redeployment and demobilization. Therefore, the planners developed the constabulary to cover the occupation area with the smallest number of troops through constant patrolling and show of force operations to advertise the constabulary’s capabilities and deter opposition. Initially designed as a force of 38,000 troopers the constabulary was whittled away to a force of no more than 20,000 by 1950. That it was able to complete its assigned missions is a testament to the tough training and robust operations it conducted between 1946 and 1952.


4Snyder, 115-116.

5Ibid., 116.

6Ibid., 35.

7Ibid., 128.

8Harmon, 284.
German and certain nationalities of displaced persons were utilized as a force to guard installations and facilities, but this was outside of the Constabulary police type duties.

This is a problem even today and the solution is far outside the scope of this paper.
29 Francis S. Chase, *Reorganization of Tactical Forces, VE-Day to 1 January 1949*, Occupation Forces in Europe Series (Karlsruhe, Germany: 10 March 1950), 20; and Snyder, 144.

30 Lytle and Lay, 8; and Snyder, 122.

31 Lytle and Lay, 9. While these inactivations saved 1200 spaces they did not save personnel as the Constabulary was under strength and the cuts merely brought the organization on paper closer to reality.


37 These two paragraphs are a review of the Occupation Forces in Europe Series from 1948 through 1952. Additional information on the tactical reorganization is in chapter 2 of this paper.
CHAPTER 4

CONSTABULARY TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

At 010001 July 1946 [12:01 AM, 1 July 1946] this Headquarters along with other units of the Constabulary became operational. Operations were the culmination of months of preparation during which men and equipment from infantry, cavalry, artillery and armored units were welded thru hard work into a fast moving-hard-hitting force.

Lafayette E. Burns, First Constabulary Regiment
Report of Operations, July 1946

Training for Operations

The United States Zone Constabulary went from an ill-defined idea for a police organization to a fully functioning tactical organization responsible for zonal security and order, all in less than seven months. While constabulary planners had envisioned a force composed of superior-caliber Soldiers, these Soldiers were not available in sufficient numbers in the European theater due to rapid redeployments and demobilization. Therefore the constabulary established a strenuous training program to bring the Soldiers assigned to the constabulary up to the standards required in a trooper. They hoped they could accomplish this regardless of the Soldier’s caliber.

The training program was intended to prepare the troopers for an aggressive operational system of patrols, checkpoints, speed traps, and raids in coordination with military and civilian police organizations. Their operations were directed at four primary populations, the people of defeated Germany, ensuring they would not rise up to challenge the occupation forces; the 600,000 displaced persons remaining in the US Zone, ensuring they did not disrupt the peace or turn on the German population; the Soldiers of the United States Army serving in the occupation force, providing an example
of discipline, and military bearing; and finally any military power outside Germany that may have attempted to acquire additional territory by challenging a weaker neighbor. The constabulary used different techniques for each group, but all depended on the constabulary’s ability to move quickly and hit hard.

**Training the Constabulary**

To achieve the required standard, the constabulary established a rigorous training program to form the organization, familiarize the troopers on assigned equipment, become proficient in duties and responsibilities, and instill a high standard of conduct and esprit de corps before actually beginning operations in the US occupation zone. Most units in Germany conducted little training during this period as they were engaged by their occupation responsibilities or were in the process of redeployment or inactivation.\(^2\) In order to achieve and maintain the high standards required by their mandate the constabulary continued training long after the unit was operational, even up until the constabulary was deactivated in 1952.

Along with organizing, equipping and manning the force, an immediate priority for the constabulary was training on assigned tasks and missions. While the exact missions were not established when training commenced, Major General (MG) Harmon and his planning staff were able to establish a preliminary curriculum based on their wartime and civilian experience. Colonel Henry C. Newton and Colonel J. H. Harwood, whose prewar experience in civilian education and police work combined to complement Harmon’s tactical knowledge, assisted the planning staff in designing the police work portion of the curriculum and helped ensure the success of the training program.\(^3\)
The constabulary established a preoperational training program conducted in three levels covering individual, unit and operational tasks, the schedule for which corresponded to the activation schedule laid out in the 12 March Third Army Directive and Policies Covering the Formation and Operation of the US Zone Constabulary. Training preparations began as early as 15 January when the Second Cavalry Squadron assumed control of the Ordensburg, a former Nazi schoolhouse in Sonthofen Bavaria, and began preparing it for operation as the Constabulary School.4

The United States Zone Constabulary School

The Constabulary School was established to train troopers in the methodology of policing the US Zone.5 It was seen as the best method to quickly bring the assigned troopers up to the required level of job proficiency, indoctrinate them on the high standards for appearance and conduct required in the constabulary, and prepare them to train and lead their units in constabulary operations. While the school was essential to training constabulary troopers during the preoperational training program, it continued in operation after the constabulary was operational by providing instruction to develop constabulary troopers and officers for increased responsibility and specialized job requirements. On 23 January MG Harmon took a personal interest to ensure the future school cadre understood his intent for the school, briefing them on the mission of the constabulary, the constabulary school, and the importance of the curriculum and operations at the school for preparing the command for operations.6 The instructors then moved to the constabulary schoolhouse in Sonthofen to implement his guidance. The next weeks were spent developing the school table of organization, writing the course curriculum, gathering information and resources for the classes, and preparing the
buildings and grounds for classes and billeting. The first classes began on 4 March 1946. Again, MG Harmon showed his personal interest in the school by addressing the class during the opening ceremonies, stressing the mission of the constabulary, and the importance of the training the school provided.\textsuperscript{7}

Instruction at the school was intended as train-the-trainer; troopers who completed the course of instruction returned to their units to serve as unit level trainers, passing on their knowledge to the other members of the unit, and serving as examples of the high standards required in the constabulary. The school was made up of six academic departments, the departments of Tactics, Motors, Communications, General Subjects, Public Safety, and Geopolitics, and initially conducted two separate courses of instruction, the basic course and the communications course (see figure 8).

![Figure 8. US Constabulary School Organization, 1946]
The Basic Course was initially composed of 176 hours of instruction broken into four 44-hour weeks. Instruction covered the normal military subjects such as maintenance, driver training, leadership, weapons, map reading and tactics, but also included subjects called “Constabulary Subjects.” These were police-type subjects required in the course of the constabulary operations: identifying and inspecting passes and permits; techniques and mechanics of arrest; operation of desk and records section; interrogation, confession and statements; evidence rules, collection, and preservation; traffic control and accidents, and a litany of others. The trooper’s education was completed by the instruction of subjects of vital interest in Occupied Germany, such as: German history, courts, law and political parties; decisions from the Potsdam Conference; military government; The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and displaced persons; and international relations. The Basic Courses did not provide all of the skills required by the constabulary, however, requiring additional training courses for certain specialty jobs.

As the need for certain skills became apparent in the constabulary, the school added specialist courses intended to train constabulary troopers on key or shortage job specialties, such as communications, intelligence and provost marshal. These courses were instructed by the same departments, and varied in length due to the particular subjects covered. The school also conducted three-day orientation courses for field grade officers assigned to the constabulary, providing instruction extracted and condensed from the basic course in order to provide an overall understanding of the training their troopers received at the school.
Initially, the Constabulary School was restricted to those assigned to the constabulary, who attended based on needs of the unit and spaces available. By January 1947, theater manpower shortages required United States Forces European Theater (USFET) to consolidate all theater schools under the Constabulary School. The two primary theater schools, the Third US Army Aircraft and Mechanics school in Bad Reichenhall and the 7719th Theater Administrative school in Seckenheim, continued operations, but were considered part of the Constabulary School, and now admitted constabulary troopers and personnel from other USFET units based on a quota allocation system.\textsuperscript{10}

By July 1947, the Constabulary school was conducting a variety of basic and specialist courses. Combined these courses could seat a total of 800 students at a time, and course length ranged from two to five weeks. Between 3 March 1946 and 1 July 1947, the Constabulary School graduated 2066 officers and 7399 enlisted men, broken out by the following courses (see table 4).

All of these training courses were deemed successful, but a constant turnover in both instructors and students necessitated continued operation at the school. School operation was hampered by both a difficulty obtaining instructors and turnover of assigned personnel due to redeployment. Captain Dee W. Pettigrew, Constabulary School Historian, noted that the main problem with the students “was that too many of them were scheduled for redeployment within two or three months from the date that they entered the school.”\textsuperscript{11}
Table 4. Constabulary School Graduates Shown by Course of Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Course</th>
<th>Number Graduated</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Courses</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>3948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk and Records</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>724</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigators</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and Mechanics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade Orientation</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special CID</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provost Marshal</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Administration</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Administration (instructors course)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officers (Administrative, Supply, and Basic)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2066</td>
<td>7399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The academic departments cited personnel difficulties in their individual sections of the Constabulary School’s Report of Operations dated 10 July 1946 for the period 15 January to 31 May 1946. The Department of Tactics noted: “[d]uring the period a total of seven officers and three enlisted men were lost by redeployment or by transfer to other departments to fill vacancies caused by redeployment. The rapid turnover in personnel hampered the evolutionary improvement of instruction since the same instructor seldom taught exactly the same subject in succeeding courses.”\(^\text{12}\) This is echoed throughout the report. The Department of Motors noted the department was composed of three officers until the latter part of February 1946 when another officer instructor and several enlisted mechanic-instructors were assigned. Remember the first class began on 3 March 1946, giving little time to ensure these instructors were prepared for the start of classes. By the
end of May 1946, the department had forty enlisted mechanics, only eight of whom were qualified in motor maintenance. The Department of Public Safety experienced nearly 100 percent turnover of instructors, for each class instructed, and at no time did the department have the full complement of ten enlisted instructors. The heavy turnover was only relieved by writing-out the course of instruction in paragraph form, allowing the redeployed instructors to quickly orient their replacement.

The Headquarters and Headquarters Troop was hit “quite hard” by redeployment in May. The Demonstration and Guard Troop “lost many men due to redeployment. This necessitated replacing key men in the organization and setting up an understudy system for men who were in a redeployment status.” The shortage of instructors was even noted in a school memorandum on student examination failures, which noted “this school has neither the available instructors, nor the time available to devote to individual tutoring of failing students so as to increase their fund of knowledge sufficiently to enable them to pass a makeup examination.”

It is clear that personnel redeployment hampered operations at the Constabulary School, and required the reorganization of the school. Shortages and lack of training in instructors was relieved only by establishing detailed programs of instruction, enabling untrained cadre to provide a certain level of instruction to the students, but not nearly as capably as a trained and experienced instructor would have. This would impact the constabulary brigades as well, as the troopers they sent to the school, returned less than fully trained.
Constabulary Training at Home Kasernes

While training began at the Constabulary School, the newly formed constabulary units initiated their preoperational training program at their home Kasernes. This training was broken out into three periods, as directed in the Third Army directive. First came a Cadre Training program during the period the constabulary units formed and received personnel and equipment. During this period the primary goal was organization of the constabulary units and individual training of assigned personnel. Training was instructed by cadre trained at the Constabulary School or by instructional teams from the District Constabularies. Instruction covered individual tasks, tasks that the individual trooper would complete such as basic first aid, preliminary marksmanship training, stowage of gear and ammunition on vehicles, vehicle driving, road marches, team tactics of mechanized or motorized sections and any additional subjects the unit commander considered necessary and the Cadre were capable to instruct. This initial training was completed successfully by most of the constabulary, and even those that did not complete the course of instruction at least gained familiarity with their equipment and a general refresher in basic military subjects.

On 1 April 1946 the constabulary began an eight-week, unit-training program to prepare for future operations. Because there were differences in the level of proficiency between the former District Constabulary units and the newly forming constabulary units, and even between units within those two categories, regimental commanders were given authority to tailor the program to meet the needs of their specific unit. This training had five goals; train the newly formed constabulary units to permit the on-the-job training scheduled for June 1946, raise the proficiency of the District Constabulary units, raise the
level of discipline, appearance and professionalism of all assigned personnel, raise unit
cohesion and develop high esprit de corps, develop and indoctrinate the assigned
officers.20 This training also included specialist training for those troopers whose duties
would require specialized tasks. The unit-training program was capped off by a series of
field training exercises that required the performance of duties such as raids, checkpoint
operations, border control, and riot control.21 One training exercise involved the 42nd
Squadron of the 2nd Constabulary Regiment on a Saturday afternoon in early May, when
they were alerted to concentrate for operations. Though the squadron’s troopers were
widely scattered on their day off, they were quickly rounded up, while other troopers
readied their vehicles and equipment for action. In less than an hour the squadron was
mounted and moving. It arrived at its destination, 120 miles distant, less than six hours
after alert without losing a single vehicle.22

Constabulary training officers judged that this training period provided superior
results to the cadre and individual training periods, but that the results did not meet the
standards required for the constabulary.23 This was caused by the newness of the
constabulary organization and concept, the constant personnel turnover, a lack of officers
trained in constabulary type duties, and in some instances, by the lack of training
facilities.24 The training officers hoped the training conducted during the preoperational
training period would correct these deficiencies.25

The final phase of the training program, the preoperational training phase, began
on 1 June 1946. The objective for the preoperational training was final preparation for
constabulary units to assume their operational responsibilities beginning on 1 July.26 All
constabulary units participated in this training, including the former District Constabulary
units. This training emphasized realistic conditions, and consisted of practical exercises, demonstrations and on-the-job-training.\textsuperscript{27} It also required performance of previously trained police duties such as patrolling, actions at the scene of a crime or other incident, use of constabulary forms and policies, and search and seizure operations.\textsuperscript{28} The constabulary training officers judged the results of this training as excellent. They felt it was superior to the individual and unit training periods and had accomplished its objective. It was still hampered by personnel turnover, but the units were ready to assume operational duties.\textsuperscript{29}

The Constabulary Becomes Operational

On 1 July 1946, the constabulary assumed control of policing the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany through a program of active mounted and dismounted patrols, static checkpoints and roadblocks, and raids in coordination with military and civilian police. Their intent was to “maintain general military and civil security; assist in the accomplishment of the objectives of the United States Government in the occupied US Zone of Germany (exclusive of the Berlin District and Bremen Enclave).”\textsuperscript{30} In effect, they were showing the power of the United States, covering up for the lack of Army personnel remaining in Germany by seemingly being everywhere at once. Lieutenant Colonel Albin F. Irzyk, 1st Constabulary brigade S-3, described the beginning of operations:

Very quietly and unobtrusively a new force took control of the policing of the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany on 1 July 1946. There was no fuss nor fanfare as a brand new military organization became operational. Rather, the transition was affected smoothly, thoroughly and efficiently. The impact of this change, however, was felt at once in the entire Zone. Yellow flashes of color, characteristic of the new unit, became conspicuous all along the Zonal Boundaries and Frontiers separating the US Zone from the Zones of the French, Russians, and
British and from the countries of Czechoslovakia and Austria. New and brightly outfitted soldiers in their freshly painted vehicles were quickly noticed, as well, along the roads and in the towns. The Germans, Displaced Persons and American Troops immediately became aware of something new.31

MG Harmon, the first Constabulary Commander, spelled out his intent in the constabulary motto “Mobility, Vigilance, Justice.” He wrote, “We were to be fast moving to ensure that no part of the American Zone was without the police power it needed; we were to be ever alert for trouble, especially on the borders and above all we were to be fair and impartial in our dealings with everyone.”32

To reinforce the concept that the constabulary was an elite organization, MG Harmon requested and received permission to uniform the constabulary in service coats, vice the standard Ike jacket worn by other USFET Soldiers, with a brimmed service cap rather than a garrison cap. The troopers wore paratrooper or two-buckle cavalry boots, a glossy black lacquered helmet liner, and a Sam Brown belt with leather pouches and holster, all highly polished. The unique shoulder sleeve insignia was a yellow circle enclosed in a blue border, with a blue “C” and red lightning bolt, representing the cavalry, infantry and artillery organizations that had provided the original constabulary troopers (see figure 9).

The unique uniform extended to vehicle markings. All constabulary vehicles were marked with a blue stripe enclosed by two yellow stripes, and a duplicate of the shoulder sleeve insignia. Due to this uniform and insignia, the constabulary soon came to be referred to as “Circle C Cowboys” by USFET Soldiers and as the “Blitz Polizei” (or lightning police) by the German public.33 The Blitz Polizei nickname came not just because of the lightening bolt on the shoulder insignia, the constabulary also worked hard to strike like lightning.
Figure 9. An Officer from the 2nd Constabulary Regiment in Dress Uniform, and a Constabulary Sergeant in Field Uniform Showing Personal Equipment and Weapons

Economy of Force Operations

The constabulary provided security for the US Occupation Zone and the surrounding 1,400 miles of zone and international boundaries through three types of operations. At the border, the constabulary operated 126 border posts responsible for securing an authorized crossing point, and serving as a base for border patrols. At the border posts, a half-section of troopers checked the identities and documents of personnel wanting to utilize the crossing, if they lacked the proper credentials, they were not allowed to cross. Illegal crossers, or those who did not want to go through the authorized crossings, quickly learned the locations of the border posts and simply avoided them. To prevent illegal crossings the constabulary operated intensive mounted and dismounted patrols within a 1,000-yard strip along the border (see figure 10).

The patrols varied times and routes to make their appearance at any point on their route unpredictable. The patrols were generally accompanied by a member of the Land border police who served as translator, would make arrests if a German was found breaking the law, and to increase the knowledge, visibility, and prestige of the German police organizations. The Land Police were armed in the border areas, except along the Russian Zonal boundary, and the Czechoslovak international border. The patrols also established day observation posts and night listening posts (OP/LPs) in areas requiring special attention.

The sections maintained communications with their headquarters using radios or telephones at border posts, with communications continuing up the chain of command to Constabulary Headquarters. In the event of an emergency, the constabulary planned to reinforce the border post or patrol section at any trouble spot by the remainder of the
section within fifteen minutes: by a full platoon within one-half hour: and by two troops including the light tank troop, within two hours. In this way the constabulary could man the post with a small force, but have a greater force available in the event of trouble, mixing force conservation with force protection. The intent of all of these operations was securing the border and preventing smuggling and other illegal activities. As an element of the monthly report of operations each regiment reported intercepted or apprehended illegal border crossers. In April 1947, the First Regiment reported apprehending 652 illegal crossers, 1,496 in May, and another 1,356 in June 1947.

**BORDER CONTROL PLAN**

**FRENCH INTER-ZONAL BORDER**

**RUSSIAN INTER-ZONAL AND CZECH INTERNATIONAL BORDER**

Figure 10. Border Control Plan

*Source: Snyder, following page 133.*
Behind the 1,000-yard border strip, the constabulary covered the US occupation zone with Constabulary Troops responsible for one or more German Kreis. Initially, the constabulary provided security using patrols, checkpoints and roadblocks, again in an effort to prevent illegal activity and control the German population. A typical mounted patrol involved a section from a mechanized troop, made up of thirteen troopers in an M8 armored car and three one-quarter-ton trucks (typically referred to as Jeeps). The area patrols were also accompanied by a member of the German civil police. In the course of a patrol, the troopers would move along a designated route, varying the route to prevent predictability and provide complete coverage of the zone. During the patrol, the troopers would visit the offices of local Army units, civil government, the military government, police, and Army criminal investigation or counter intelligence detachments to maintain liaison and show support for these organizations (see figure 11).

In rough terrain, patrols were conducted dismounted by the motorized troops or on horseback by the regimental horse platoons. Again, the patrols were small. The regimental horse platoons were organized into three sections of nine horse-mounted troopers. Patrol techniques varied between regiments, with some operating patrols very similar to the mounted patrols, marching from the platoon headquarters and returning to the platoon at the end of the patrol. The 3rd Regiment’s horse platoon conducted independent patrols along the Rhine River border between the French and American zones in order to control smuggling and illegal border crossings. This platoon established three operating points along the river, and operated two man patrols between the points. The patrols operated day and night on a varied timetable along routes that varied as well.
In the course of its operations the 3rd Regiment’s horse platoon also conducted search and seizure operations, and racked up a considerable number of arrests and seized contraband materials.42 The 11th Regiment, operating on the Czechoslovak border, divided the horse platoon among the three subordinate squadrons.43 The 14th Regiment’s platoon operated as a full platoon along the Russian-American zone boundary and worked in cooperation with German border police, patrolling an average over 100 miles daily.44 The horse platoons also served as honor guard for special constabulary and Military Government ceremonies and meetings.45
The motorized platoons also consisted of three sections; each section consisted of twelve troopers riding in a 2 1/2-ton truck (commonly referred to as a deuce or a deuce-and-a-half). The motorized sections would drive to the start of their patrol route and conduct the patrol in a manner similar to the mechanized patrol, only on foot, and for a shorter distance. The motorized troops had primary responsibility for zonal and international border areas and urban areas, were used to establish checkpoints and roadblocks, and operated the network of border posts.

Along with border operations and patrols in the assigned area, the constabulary conducted roadblocks and checkpoints to enforce law and order, and maintain contact with the German population. Roadblocks were mobile operations consisting of a section of troops who established a blocking position on a roadway and used that position to inspect vehicles and documents of all personnel who passed. The constabulary section would establish a roadblock in a seemingly random location; inspect personnel and vehicles for a period of time, then move to a new location. Again, the location and time period they operated the roadblocks would vary to prevent predictability. In an effort to remain unpredictable, constabulary operational techniques did not remain static but changed based on operational needs.

In the fall of 1946, the constabulary evaluated crime rates in the American zone and adjusted operations accordingly. Among the adjustments were increased patrolling between 6:00 PM (1800) and midnight (2400), when a higher percentage of crimes occurred, and a reduction of patrols between 7:00 AM (0700) and 6:00 PM (1800), when fewer crimes occurred. A further study conducted during the winter of 1947 determined that certain areas experienced higher crime rates than others. To counter these areas, the
constabulary directed a reconsolidation of constabulary troops near areas of higher crime rates and reduced patrols in areas of lesser crime. Due to increasing capabilities of the German police forces and the perceived docility of the German population, in May 1947 the constabulary directed further reductions in area patrols. Patrols were now conducted to establish checkpoints in specified areas. Checkpoints were very similar to roadblocks, but were incorporated into patrols, with the section moving along a designated route to a designated location, establishing a checkpoint for a designated period, and then moving to a new location to establish a new checkpoint.48 The constabulary also established checkpoints in areas of known disorder, such as in the vicinity of displaced persons camps. With the decrease in patrolling, liaison with Military Government offices, German civilian government, and US tactical units was conducted by personal visits by constabulary commanders and staff officers.49

Most operations in the constabulary were conducted at the section level. By conducting operations at the lowest level, a platoon, which consisted of three sections, could cover a larger area concurrently. Figure 4 shows a simplified patrol route with only one patrol. On the complicated German road network, several patrols would operate on close, but separate routes. In that way a Troop, three platoons, could cover more area, and the Squadron, five troops could cover a large percentage of the assigned area of operations every week, and visit every area at least monthly. Seemingly, the constabulary would be everywhere at once.

That the constabulary tried to be everywhere at once is shown by the 1st Constabulary Regiments reports of operations. In August 1946, the Regiment conducted 999 mounted patrols covering 35,253 miles; 761 dismounted patrols covering 3,377 miles
and 120 horse mounted patrols covering 930 miles. These were all conducted as part of border security, along the interzonal boundary between the US, British and Russian zones. Throughout the remainder of the Regimental sector, they conducted 732 mounted patrols covering 45,514 miles; and twelve dismounted patrols covering thirty-six miles. This tempo continued, as shown in table 5.\footnote{50}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Vehicular</th>
<th>Dismounted</th>
<th>Horse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 46</td>
<td># Patrols</td>
<td>Miles</td>
<td># Patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 46</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>80,767</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 46</td>
<td>3,148</td>
<td>143,266</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 47</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>124,998</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 47</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>61,112</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 47</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>33,344</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 47</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>42,554</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 47</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>26,938</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to note two things in table 5. First, the regimental horse platoon was utilized patrolling the rough terrain along the Zone boundary with the Russian Zone. The Platoon was involved in training in June making it unavailable for patrol duties. Second, the constabulary was in the process of reorganizing from February to April 1947, eliminating regimental light tank troops and the E Troop from each Squadron. The E troop is one of the two motorized troops, eliminating half the force designated to conduct dismounted patrols in order to fill shortages in the other troops. In effect, training and personnel shortages forced the Regiment to reduce security, one of its primary missions.
Mass Operations

The operations discussed above were generally conducted at the section level, just enough troopers to accomplish the mission, while allowing forces to spread over the operational area conducting other operations, training or other tasks. At times the constabulary massed their forces for particularly important missions. These operations were grouped into shows-of-force and check-and-search operations.\(^5^1\) Show of force operations were basically a tactical parade intended to awe or intimidate the German population by openly displaying the tactical capabilities of the constabulary. Generally the shows of force were conducted in areas with the highest criminal activity, and were made up of from a complete troop to a full regiment, moving through a German town or city in complete readiness for combat. The 1st Constabulary Regiment conducted show of force operations in Kassel on 26 September and again on Halloween, 1946. The September show of force included tanks, scout cars [M8], jeeps and motorcycles from C Troop and Service Troop of the 11th Squadron, and the Regimental Light Tank Troop.\(^5^2\) The Halloween show of force utilized B Troop, 11th Squadron and the Regimental Light Tank Troop.\(^5^3\) The appearance of the show of force operations served as a reminder that the constabulary was not spread thinly throughout the zone.\(^5^4\) While shows of force were successful in reminding the German populace of the constabulary’s combat power in other areas a more direct approach was required to control criminal activity.

Check-and-search operations, also referred to as sweeping raids, were intended to isolate and investigate a particular area in order to detect and deter criminal activity. They generally involved hard information of criminal activity, weeks of preparatory investigation, and were closely coordinated with adjacent military units and the Military
Government. The 14th Constabulary Regiment conducted Operation Duck in December 1946, along with elements from the 1st and 3rd Constabulary Brigades. Operation Duck was aimed at Wildflecken displaced persons (DP) camp. Over 1700 troopers secured the camp with a surrounding perimeter cordon. Inside the camp, the troopers separated the men and women and searched their quarters and belongings. Troopers were instructed to maintain a professional bearing, and the reasons for the search were explained to camp leaders, stressing that it was a response to criminal activity. Results of the operation were the discovery of illegal stills, drugs, weapons, and US property, and the arrest of fifteen DPs.

**Reinforcement Training**

The successful assumption of operational duties did not mark the end of training in the constabulary. Due to the inability of the Army and USFET to provide the high quality Soldiers desired by the constabulary planning staff and the constant turnover of assigned personnel due to redeployment and tour rotations, training continued for newly assigned personnel throughout the constabulary’s operational period. In order to standardize training for newly assigned troopers, Reinforcement Training Detachments were established at each constabulary regiment and squadron. The Reinforcement Training Detachments conducted four week training programs for groups of 100 newly assigned constabulary troopers on the key individual and unit level tasks required during operations. Instruction also included familiarization on subjects such as the Office of the Military Government (United States) (OMGUS), interaction with military and civilian police organizations, and German language training. The Reinforcement Training Detachments were not included in the table of organization. Therefore they were not
resourced and filled with additional personnel by the Theater, but were manned out of
hide, further reducing personnel available for operations in an already under strength
organization.57

Operational Training

The entire constabulary did not conduct operations at once. Once the constabulary
became operational on 1 July 1946, units rotated through periods of operational and
reserve status. Constabulary troops remained in an operational status for one month,
followed by a period of at least two weeks as a break from the high tempo of operational
duties. During this period the unit served as the squadron reserve, and used the time for
maintenance on the vehicles and equipment, and training on new tactics, techniques and
procedures, or retraining on tasks they were less than proficient on.58 The training was
broken down into four phases: individual, unit, test, and review and consisted of practical
exercises, demonstrations, and on-the-job-training. Weapons qualification and
familiarization fire was also conducted during the operational training, ensuring all
troopers maintained qualification on assigned individual and crew served weapons. This
was intended as refresher training and helped to ensure high standards of discipline and
proficiency were maintained, and in fact “particular stress was placed military courtesy,
discipline, morale, and development of esprit de corps.”59 Other refresher tasks were
determined by study of the Troop during its operational period and by inspections by the
Constabulary Headquarters.60

MG Harmon wrote that “owing to the difficulty we had in obtaining expert junior
officers in sufficient numbers and to the sensitive nature of the Constabulary’s
assignment, I decided early that the force would need constant close supervision by its
commanding officer.” He set a program to visit each squadron at least once a month to ensure they measured up to the high standards he had established. His schedule necessitated the acquisition of a special train, painted in constabulary colors, allowing him to make the necessary inspections, while continuing to chip away at his heavy workload of meetings and paperwork, arriving at the inspection site rested and amid a bit of spectacle.

The constabulary also directed training in areas needing special emphasis, such as the Troop Information Program established in 1947. This consisted of group instruction and discussion on the trooper’s role in securing Germany, his relationship to the German people and the police, to the Military Government, and benefits of service. All of the training conducted by the constabulary was intended to maintain the constabulary’s professionalism, and helped to ensure their readiness for any type of operation, or situation. The environment did not remain static however, requiring a new orientation for the constabulary.

**Tactical Reorganization**

With the successful organization of the German police forces and in light of increasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, the constabulary began to reduce its internal security role and took on a more tactical organization. By summer 1947, Headquarters, U. S. Ground and Service Forces, Europe wanted to supplement the theater reserve composed of the 26th Infantry Regiment with a constabulary reserve. The constabulary reserve would be composed of one reinforced regiment freed from static duties and prepared for tactical requirements through training and field exercises.
The Constabulary Headquarters designated the 5th Constabulary Regiment as the constabulary reserve. The Constabulary then augmented the 5th Regiment with squadrons from the inactivating 2nd and 3rd Regiments. Two line troops were also converted to a recoilless rifle troop and a light tank troop to further increase the combat power of the reserve. These two troops were then combined with the headquarters and service troop to form a provisional squadron. In early September the reserve participated in a series of tactical exercises at Grafenwöhr. On 20 September 1947, the 5th Constabulary Regiment was redesignated the 2nd Constabulary Regiment, and the 35th and 74th Squadrons were redesignated the 42nd and 2nd Squadrons. At that time, the constabulary reserve was composed of five Squadrons, four stationed in Augsburg and the fifth in Deggendorf and three troops from each squadron were continually kept in training. In effect this reorganization removed the 2nd Constabulary Regiment from the constabulary’s original policing mission, changing it to a tactical organization prepared to act in defense of the United States Occupation Zone in Germany.

In early November 1947, Theater planners directed that the constabulary further prepare for tactical operations by forming field artillery battalions. Since there were no tables of organization for constabulary field artillery units, the 94th Constabulary Squadron and Troop D of the 14th Constabulary Squadron were inactivated and redesignated as the 91st and 94th Field Artillery Battalions. These Battalions were organized outside the constabulary organization again removing portions of the constabulary from its policing mission.

The tactical reorganization continued in 1948 as the United States European Command (EUCOM) directed the constabulary to reorganize roughly similar to an
The Constabulary Headquarters was also tasked with assuming the role of a corps headquarters in case of emergency, when it would assume control of both the constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division. To better provide command and control in an emergency, the 1st and 2nd Constabulary Brigade headquarters were reorganized as combat command headquarters. The constabulary began the reorganization before the Department of the Army had approved.

Under the reorganization the 2nd, 6th and 14th Constabulary Regiments were reorganized as armored cavalry regiments. The 2nd Constabulary Regiment was reorganized first and served as a training school for the other regiments. The light-tank troops were reactivated and additional units were added to increase combat power, including antiaircraft, additional field artillery, and combat engineer battalions and bridge companies.

EUCOM directed a further addition to the constabulary mission on 23 December 1949 when it directed that the Commander, Naval Forces Germany establish a Rhine River patrol between Bingen and Karlsruhe. This patrol was composed of small craft manned by seven-man crews, augmented by a three-man machinegun and demolitions team. The constabulary’s primary responsibility for this patrol was limited to providing and training the machinegun and demolition teams. While this reorganization was underway, unit training emphasized tactical training; including limited objective attacks, hasty defense, delaying actions, obstacles and demolitions. Most training time was devoted to platoon training while troop through regiment training was devoted to tactical control, communications, and mobility. This training continued into 1950 while other reorganizations occurred.
US Constabulary Noncommissioned Officers Academy

In an effort to increase the professionalism and knowledge of assigned noncommissioned officers, the constabulary established the US Constabulary Noncommissioned Officers Academy at Jensen Barracks in Munich in October 1949. Due to its location in Munich, the 2nd Constabulary Brigade commander was assigned supervisory and command responsibilities over all assigned and attached personnel. The academy was established as a leadership school, intended to provide training for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) on their duties and responsibilities as NCOs. The NCO Academy Commandant, Brigadier General Bruce C. Clark, stated it was to develop student NCOs “as leaders-to teach [them] how to teach others-how to reproduce for [their] men, the subject matter which [they were] taught [at the academy].” It was not intended as additional training on constabulary duties, but instead concentrated on those tasks that all NCOs, across all job specialties, required as leaders and to reaffirm the high standards required in the constabulary. In 1950, the Academy conducted 13 classes, numbered 4 through 17, each with a capacity of 150 students. The course of instruction lasted approximately five weeks, and covered basic leadership tasks such as map reading and land navigation, weapons instruction, and methods for military instruction, and supervision of subordinate personnel.

Light Tank Training

The reactivation of the light tank troops in the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Constabulary Regiments, as part of the 1948 theater reorganization, returned the M24 Chaffee tank to the constabulary organization. Since the light tank troops had been deactivated in February 1947, the reactivation necessitated training for tank crewmen. At the direction
of the Constabulary Commander, the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Constabulary Regiments each established programs to provide instruction on the operation and maintenance of the vehicle and tactics for the light tank troop. The initial instruction was organized at the 2nd Constabulary Brigade headquarters in Munich, on 29 July 1948. Each regiment was required to send a cadre to train and then return to their organization as instructors for the other crews in their troop. The training program consisted of classroom training in tactics, coupled with hands-on maintenance and operations training. This training program lasted until 24 March 1949, when the 2nd Armored Cavalry (US Constabulary) closed its school, replaced by a Constabulary level school in Vilseck.

**US Constabulary Tank and Unit Training Center**

In early 1949, the constabulary established a Tank and Unit Training Center at Vilseck Germany to train selected troopers on armored tactics and training methods for armored forces, qualify selected troopers as tank crewman and to assist the Constabulary Headquarters to administer tactical tests, competitions and exercises. Students were organized into tank crews to instill esprit de corps and the concept of the tank crew as a team, even sharing barracks space to reinforce the lesson. In order to gain experience and knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of each crew position the students rotated crew positions (tank commander, gunner, driver, loader, and radio operator). Those students who demonstrated superior performance were assigned leadership positions in the student class. Evaluations were hands-on, requiring the student to demonstrate proficiency in the evaluated task, and culminated with a constabulary stakes evaluation where students were required to perform all tasks required to operate and maintain the tank.
Final Reorganizations

The constabulary’s internal security mission continued despite the tactical reorganizations. In July 1950, USAREUR issued an Internal Security Directive giving the constabulary responsibility for suppression of civil disturbances when requested by a post commander, providing a squadron-sized security force for each military post, coordination of security plans with the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the Wiesbaden Military Post and security of the US Zone border. During security alerts, in preparation for or actual combat, the constabulary was also responsible for providing security and antiaircraft forces at the Rhine river bridges located at Mainz, Worms, Frankenthal, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe. The 1st Infantry Division also came under operational control of the constabulary, enabling the latter to alert and mobilize all tactical troops in theater.

By 1951 the constabulary experienced continued reductions as units were inactivated, transferred to other commands, or redesignated. In August the 1st Constabulary Brigade was inactivated and the three remaining regiments, the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments (US Constabulary) were placed directly under the command and control of Seventh Army. The constabulary still existed in these three regiments, operating as a mobile force under Seventh Army. In June 1952 the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment was assigned to VII Corps, while the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment was assigned to V Corps. By December 1952, however, the regiments were fully absorbed by Seventh Army. After six years of operations the constabulary was disbanded.
The constabulary was established in 1946 in an effort to provide security in the United States Occupation Zone with a minimum force. The constabulary provided security through a program of aggressive patrolling, roadblock and checkpoint operations, and check-and-search operations in coordination with military and civilian police. Seemingly, they were everywhere at once, providing a living representation of the power of the United States. The constabulary used different techniques for each operation, but all depended on the constabulary’s ability to move quickly and hit hard.

To achieve the high standards required by the force, the constabulary established a training program to bring the assigned Soldiers up to the standards required in a trooper. That they were successful is evidenced by the reduction of criminal activity in the zone, the successful reestablishment of the German police forces and the failure of an armed resistance to rise in Germany.

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2 Ibid., 330.


Pettigrew, 3.

Ibid., 4.


Pettigrew, 4.

Ibid., 7.

Ibid., 6-14.

Robert B. Franks, Unpublished Constabulary School Memorandum, subject Student Examination Failures, dated 12 December 1947, RG 0549, Entry Number 3022, College Park, MD: National Archives, 1.

Snyder, 35.

Ibid., 66.

Ibid., 67. Those units that did not successfully complete the course of instruction were those with late assignment to the Constabulary or late arrival to assigned locations causing late start on the training.

Ibid., 67.

Ibid., 68.

Ibid.

Ibid., 71.


Snyder, 71.

Ibid., 72.
25 Ibid., 72.

26 Ibid., 72.


28 Snyder, 73.

29 Ibid., 75.

30 Irzyk, "'Mobility, Vigilance, Justice'-a Saga of the Constabulary," 16.

31 Ibid. 13.


34 Harmon, *Combat Commander*, 291.


38 Snyder, 133.

39 C. J. Yatcak and D. Haugh, "'Mobility, Vigilance, Justice!' : the United States Zone Constabulary in Occupied Germany,” *Fusilier: A Quarterly for Military Historians* 2, no. 2


41 Thomas, 5.

Ibid., 69.

Ibid.


The Cavalry School, the Intelligence School, “Appendix 3: US Constabulary in the ETO,” *Reference Data, US Army Organization* (Fort Riley Kansas: The Cavalry School, the Intelligence School, 1 August 1946), 86.

Snyder, 137.

Ibid., 140.

Ibid., 142.

This data was found in the First Constabulary Regiment’s Report of Operations for August, October, November and December 1946, and February, and April-May-June 1947. The data for October, November and December 1946 did not separate the patrol data into area and border security, causing a consolidation of all months data into the vehicular, dismounted and horse categories. No patrol data was included in the September 1946 report and the March 1947 report was not available.

Snyder, 149.


Snyder, 153.


Ibid., 44.

Ibid., 44. This training corresponds closely to the training currently conducted by units returning from Iraq and Afghanistan in preparation for future deployments.


Harmon, *Combat Commander*, 286.

Ibid., 287.


Ibid., 29.

Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid.


Chase, 42.


Chase, 39.

74Chase, 40.

75Ibid.


79United States Zone Constabulary, *Command Historical Report, 1 January 1950-24 November 1950* (Historical Section, Headquarters United States Zone Constabulary), Unpublished unit history, 125.

80Chase, *Reorganization of Tactical Forces, VE-Day to 1 January 1949*, 43.


82These methods are still used today at Fort Knox Kentucky to train new tank and cavalry scout Soldiers (19K and 19D), new armor officers, and to further NCO training in the basic and advanced non-commissioned officer courses.


85Ibid., 43-44.

86Tevington, 45.
The worst thing we can do . . . is try to make yesterday perfect. We don’t have enough money to keep the old Army and transform to a new one.

MG(Ret.) Robert Scales Jr., “Playing Catch-up”.

The United States Zone Constabulary was established in response to the falling number of occupation forces available in the United States Zone of Germany. It was intended to provide security in the United States Occupation Zone with a minimum of personnel while the Occupational Military Government completed the tasks of disarmament and demilitarization of German society. Despite severe personnel issues, the constabulary successfully completed that mission through a program of strenuous training, and constant operations that made them a well trained force, highly mobile and visible throughout the US Zone, and prepared for mass operations in the event security in the zone was challenged.

The idea for the constabulary evolved over the summer and fall of 1945 as troop redeployment removed personnel from Europe for duty in the Pacific and for demobilization. In an effort to counteract falling discipline in the occupation forces, the constabulary was also intended to serve as an example of military bearing and professionalism for the occupation troops. It was planned as an elite organization composed of 38,000 high-caliber combat veteran Soldiers organized into three brigade elements under the command and control of the Constabulary Commander, directly subordinate to the Theater Commander. The organization did not remain static however,
changing to reflect the tactical situation in Germany, the strategic situation worldwide and due to the manpower situation as well. By November 1950 the situation in Germany had changed to such an extent that the constabulary was considered unnecessary and it was inactivated.

The constabulary never received the full number of troops required by the tables of organization nor the high-caliber Soldiers envisioned by the planners. Instead the constabulary was an under strength organization composed of whatever Soldiers were available within theater or as draftee replacements. The constabulary also lost assigned Soldiers through normal tour rotations. To counteract these issues, the constabulary sought out high-caliber soldiers wherever possible, even recruiting from other units in Europe and the United States, in an effort to provide the forces necessary to secure the US occupation zone.

These personnel issues influenced the constabulary’s training programs and operating methods. Prior to assuming operational responsibility for the occupation zone the constabulary relied on constant training, inspections and evaluations to ensure that those assigned could complete their mission to the high standards required. The constabulary also used high operations-tempo to cover their lack of personnel through constant and unpredictable visibility.

The constabulary’s mission was also affected by the strategic situation. Originally intended as a police organization responsible for providing security in the US Zone, it became a more tactical organization to counter perceived threats from the Soviet Bloc, and it was this threat that eventually caused EUCOM to inactivate the constabulary.
Conclusions

The constabulary’s success has implications for the current US Army in its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because there are those who argue that Iraq requires a constabulary force in order to free the Army as a whole from peacekeeping duties, the Army must relate the constabulary’s operations to the contemporary operating environment, to determine whether a constabulary type force is a viable option in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The biggest problem facing the constabulary was personnel strength, affected by the shortage of personnel in theater and the constant turnover of personnel due to end-of-tour rotations. Trained constabulary troopers were lost to rotation to the United States and were replaced by untrained Soldiers coming straight from basic training. This caused the constabulary to establish training units in order to train the incoming Soldiers, removing additional trained troopers from operational units to serve as instructors.

The United States Army faces a similar issue in personnel turbulence. Army personnel rotate in and out of units constantly, creating challenges in achieving a trained team within the unit. Further, units remain at approximately 85 percent personnel strength until shortly before they deploy to the theater of operations, and sometimes deploy under strength. The Army is working to alleviate this issue by stabilizing units for a three year cycle under the Lifecycle Management program under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. In this program a unit returns from a tour in Iraq or Afghanistan, and goes into a 90-day stabilization period. At the end of the stabilization period, Soldiers will transfer into and out of the unit during a 60-day period. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) will attempt to maximize reassignments out of all units during this
period, though Soldiers can reassign in to or out of units later if necessary.\textsuperscript{262} The unit then goes into a training period during which it concentrates on battalion and below level tasks. Once it completes this training period it will continue training, but is considered Ready in the event it were needed for a deployment.\textsuperscript{263} During this Ready period the unit will complete additional multiechelon training, live fire exercises, and situational and field training exercises that integrate support units to ensure the unit can complete designated theater specific tasks.\textsuperscript{264} Once this phase is completed the unit is Available for deployment for up to a year. At the end of the Available period, the unit goes back into a reset period and the cycle begins again. If the unit does not deploy, the reset period is shorter, but the cycle continues.\textsuperscript{265} Overall, the cycle lasts three years, with approximately one year required for the Army to consider the unit trained and ready for deployment.

The United States Army has also established the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). The MNSTC-I mission is to assist the Iraqi Government in the development, organization, training, equipping, and sustainment of Iraqi Security Forces capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment in which representative government, individual freedom, the rule of law, and free market economy can evolve and which, in time, will contribute to regional security in the Gulf Region.\textsuperscript{266} Composed of teams to train Iraqi military and police forces, MNSTC-I is a joint and interagency organization. The US Army element is composed of Officers and Soldiers selected for their operational experience. These are also the Soldiers best prepared to lead US Soldiers in the fight in Iraq. By removing them from operational units, the Army removes their experience from the warfighters, effectively weakening the Army.
However, in this instance it is better to weaken the Army in the short term, while
strengthening the Iraqi forces as this will enable the Iraqis to provide for their own
security, relieving the United States of this requirement.

Prior to taking responsibility for the United States Zone of Occupation in
Germany, the constabulary conducted a strenuous training regimen designed to bring the
troopers up to a required level of proficiency. The constabulary conducted training on
individual tasks that each trooper could expect to perform in the course of his duties, and
unit tasks that each unit would have to perform. Training was also conducted on the
German language and culture, German legal and political institutions, and the troopers’
role in securing Germany. These tasks were trained both at constabulary schools and at
home station, involved as much hands on training as possible, and involved all troopers.
Training was not a one shot affair, units trained while they were not occupied in
operations, learning the latest techniques and lessons learned by other constabulary units.
The Army currently follows a similar regimen in preparation for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

Today, the Army has established similar training requirements for forces
deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Soldier receives basic language instruction on
Arabic, Farsi or Pashto, and orientation training on the culture and civil and military
organizations on the country they are deploying to, and the United States’ and the
Soldier’s role in securing and reconstructing those nations. This will assist the Soldier to
communicate with and understand the population of that nation, and may increase the
success of the deployed unit in securing Iraq or Afghanistan. Further training is provided
on identifying and neutralizing improvised explosive devices, again looking to assist the
Soldier during the deployment. Lessons learned from theater are passed across the Army and incorporated into training to ensure all Soldiers know the latest operational tactics, techniques and procedures. Units receive training on the latest lessons learned while preparing for deployment, and utilize the same lessons to improve operations while deployed, helping to ensure security in their assigned areas of operation and responsibility in theater.

The constabulary ensured security in the United States Zone of Occupation by providing an observable armed presence within the zone. They moved constantly, ensuring that the population understood the constabulary was capable of appearing at any point day or night. They also shifted patrol areas to visit less secure areas more often, reducing crime in those areas, while reducing patrol visibility to a minimum in areas that were considered secure. They maintained close liaison with German and Allied civil and police organizations throughout the zone, ensuring the population understood they fully supported and reinforces these organizations. Their close liaison was assisted by the organization of the constabulary sectors divided along the lines of German civil government. This allowed the constabulary and Military Government to address issues in their area of responsibility knowing that their decisions or program would be felt throughout the civil population.

Today, US and coalition forces maintain a constant presence throughout the AOR to prevent antigovernment forces from reestablishing control in secure areas. Commanders in Iraq have noted the increase in anti-Iraqi forces in areas that are not patrolled or visited often. Forces are shifted as required to maintain a presence within each zone, working with security forces to maintain a safe environment in the country.
US and coalition sectors of responsibility are divided along ethnic or tribal lines, allowing commanders to address issues with the ethnic or tribal leadership, seeking buy-in and support from these leaders, ensuring decisions are implemented throughout the population. US forces maintain close ties with these civil leaders, as well as with indigenous military and civil security services. Again, this ensures the support of these organizations and allows them to assist coalition forces to maintain security in theater.

While there are definite similarities between the US Constabulary and the Army forces currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be a mistake to implement all methods of constabulary operations in the deployed environment. Currently, there is talk of reducing the length of deployment tours in Iraq and Afghanistan to six months, vice one year. Based on the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model mentioned above, it requires one year for a unit to be ready for deployment, and a second year to be fully trained and available. This means a unit can expect to be deployed for one year out of every five. If the Army begins deploying forces for six months, a unit can expect to deploy twice in the same period, though the period remains one year away from home. This assumes the reset and training periods remain one year each. If those periods were shortened to six months each, a unit could expect to deploy three times in five years, a longer period away from home in the same time frame.

Shortening the reset and training periods would reduce the level of proficiency of deploying troops however, so is an unlikely course of action. Unfortunately, units are still learning when they arrive in the deployment area of operations and responsibility (AOR). Upon arrival a new unit must become familiar with their AOR, learn the civilian personalities they will work with, integrate with the local security forces and adjacent
units, even learn the terrain. If the deployment period were reduced, the period a unit is able to orient to the environment is also reduced, which will impact operations.

Finally it is important to understand a major difference between the operating environment in Germany and the current areas of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The civil population in Germany was fully defeated and numb from the devastation they experienced during World War II. Any organization that wished to revolt against the occupation did not have easy access to arms and ammunition, and did not enjoy the support of an external organization or government. The Iraqi population was devastated by the rule of the Hussein government, but not by the actual fighting during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly, the Afghani population was controlled by the Taliban government but was not severely affected by the coalition offensive during Operation Enduring Freedom. Both populations are relatively well armed, both with personal weapons and heavier crew served weapons such as mortars and machineguns. Both can also expect support from Islamic fundamentalist organizations against the coalition forces.

With these similarities and dissimilarities in mind, it is important that the Army studies the constabulary and their operations. Despite severe personnel issues, the constabulary successfully completed their mission through a program of strenuous training, and constant operations that made them a well trained force, highly mobile and visible throughout the US Zone, and prepared for mass operations in the event security in the zone was challenged. The Army can not, and must not, blindly use their tactics, techniques and procedures as a blueprint of our current operations. However, by understanding their operating environment, techniques and challenges, the Army can
utilize their successes to guide our decisions in a complex environment, now and in the future. With careful preparation and planning the Army may be able to achieve an equal measure of success in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.


262 Army G1, Slide 8.


264 ATDL, Slide 13.

265 Army G1, Slide 7.


GLOSSARY

ACR. Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Autobahn. German highways similar to US interstate highways.

Bundesland or Land. A German political division that roughly corresponds to the US State level of Government. A Land will control several Regierungsbezirk

Geheimstatspolizei (Gestapo). Nazi German secret police.

Regierungsbezirk. Primary administrative division of a Land. A Regierungsbezirk will control several Kreise, and in turn is controlled by a Land. Corresponds roughly to a US district.

Kreis. A German political division that roughly corresponds to a United States county.

Kreisfreie Stadt. A town with the administrative rank of a Landkreis.

Schutzstaffel (SS). A Nazi German paramilitary organization. It was considered an elite unit and was initially open only to German citizens of strict Aryan ethnic backgrounds.

Sicherheitsdienst (SD). The intelligence service of the SS.

TOE. Table of Organization and Equipment. A representation of a military organization showing personnel and equipment required in wartime and authorized in peacetime to conduct the organizations assigned missions.
APPENDIX A

CONSTABULARY UNIT CONTROL DATES

The following units (tables 6-10) were identified for inclusion in the United States Zone Constabulary, here broken out by constabulary brigade and regiment. The charts depict the units by their original designation, their constabulary designation, and the planned and actual date they came under constabulary control.¹

**Constabulary Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. VI Corps</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, US Constabulary</td>
<td>10 Feb 1946</td>
<td>10 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 1st Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>5 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. Combat Command ‘B’, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 3rd Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>5 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. 11th Armored Group</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 1st Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>16 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Armored Infantry Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>12th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>91st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### 3rd Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>37th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>10 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>68th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>81st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### 15th Constabulary Regiment

Previously a District Constabulary Unit

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 15th Cavalry Group (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 15th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>25 Feb-5 Mar 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Tank Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>1st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Armored Infantry Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>14th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Separate)</td>
<td>15th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>25 Feb-5 Mar 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8. 2nd Constabulary Brigade

### 2nd Constabulary Regiment

Previously a District Constabulary Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. 2nd Cavalry Group (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 2nd Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>10-20 Feb 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Mechanized Cavalry Squadron (Separate)</td>
<td>2nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>15 Mar 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd Mechanized Cavalry Squadron (Separate)</td>
<td>42nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>10-20 Feb 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>66th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20-25 Feb 1946</td>
<td>20 Feb 1946</td>
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</table>
### 5th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
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<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. 6th Tank Destroyed Group</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 5th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>5 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>8th Constabulary Squadron Attached to 11th Constab Rgmt</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>5 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>35th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>5 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>474th Anti-Aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)</td>
<td>74th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
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### 11th Constabulary Regiment

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 11th Cavalry Group (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 11th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>20-25 Feb 1946</td>
<td>20 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>8th Constabulary Squadron Attached from 5th Constab Rgmt</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>5 Mar 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>51st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20-25 Feb 1946</td>
<td>20 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>94th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
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</table>

### Table 9. 3rd Constabulary Brigade

#### 6th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
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<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. 6th Cavalry Group (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 6th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>10-20 Feb 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Mechanized Cavalry Squadron (Separate)</td>
<td>6th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Tank Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>13th Constabulary Squadron Attached from 10th Constab Rgmt</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>14 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized)</td>
<td>28th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>10-20 Feb 1946</td>
<td>1 Apr 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>53rd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>5-10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>28 Feb 1946</td>
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</table>
## 10th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Original Designation</th>
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<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Co. 10th Armored Group</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 10th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Tank Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>13th Constabulary Squadron Attached to 6th Constab Rgmt</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>14 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Tank Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
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<td>25 Feb-5 Mar 1946</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
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</table>

## 14th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 14th Cavalry Group (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 14th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>10th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
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<tr>
<td>22nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 4th Armored Division</td>
<td>22nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
<td>25 Feb 1946</td>
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<tr>
<td>27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>27th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
<td>20 Mar 1946</td>
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## Table 10. Special Troops, US Constabulary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Designation</th>
<th>Constabulary Designation</th>
<th>Planned Date</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97th Signal Battalion</td>
<td>97th Constabulary Signal Battalion</td>
<td>10 Mar 1946</td>
<td>10 Mar 1946</td>
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<tr>
<td>465th Anti-Aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self Propelled)</td>
<td>Constabulary School Squadron</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>14 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Quartermaster Car Platoon</td>
<td>85th Constabulary Car Platoon</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
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<tr>
<td>114th Army Band</td>
<td>11th Constabulary Band</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
<td>15 Feb 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820th Military Police Company</td>
<td>820th Constabulary MP Company</td>
<td>10-20 Feb 1946</td>
<td>18 February 1946</td>
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</table>

## Constabulary Unit Inactivation Dates

Table 11 depicts the inactivation dates of constabulary units in chronological order.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constabulary Unit</th>
<th>Inactivation Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 3rd Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 1st Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 3rd Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 5th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Redesignated 42nd Squadron, 2nd Constabulary Regiment, 20 Sep 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Redesignated 2nd Squadron, 2nd Constabulary Regiment, 20 Sep 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 10th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Sep 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 2nd Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>Redesignated 2nd ACR (US CON) 16 Nov 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Reassigned to 2nd ACR (US CON) 16 Nov 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Reassigned to 2nd ACR (US CON) 16 Nov 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 11th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>Inactivated 30 November 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Dec 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 15th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>20 Dec 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Dec 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Dec 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Redesignated 14th Armored Infantry Battalion and reassigned to 1st Armored Division 20 Dec 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Dec 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 Dec 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 6th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>Redesignated 6th ACR (US CON) 20 Dec 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Reassigned to 6th ACR (US CON) 20 Dec 1948</td>
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<tr>
<td>28th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Reassigned to 6th ACR (US CON) 20 Dec 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 14th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>Redesignated 14th ACR (US CON) 20 Dec 1948</td>
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<tr>
<td>53rd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>20 May 1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 2nd Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>20 May 1949/15 Dec 1951</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, US Constabulary</td>
<td>24 Nov 1950</td>
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<td>15 Aug 1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>15 Dec 1952</td>
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</table>

Source: This table is a consolidation of information from 4 sources: US European Command, The Third Year of the Occupation, the First Quarter: 1 July – 30 September

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APPENDIX B

CONSTABULARY UNIT LOCATIONS

Unit Locations as of 1 July 1946

Tables 12-16 depict the location of constabulary units as of 1 July 1946. These locations were not permanent as units relocated to provide better area coverage, obtain better quarters, or were inactivated.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12. Constabulary Units</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, US Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 1st Constabulary Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 2nd Constabulary Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 3rd Constabulary Brigade</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13. 1st Constabulary Brigade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Constabulary Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 1st Constabulary Rgmt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Constabulary Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Constabulary Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Constabulary Squadron</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3rd Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 3rd Constabulary Rgmt.</td>
<td>Wetzlar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Weilburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Budingen</td>
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<tr>
<td>81st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Fulda</td>
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15th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 15th Constabulary Rgmt.</td>
<td>Seckheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Knielingen</td>
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<tr>
<td>14th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Darmstadt</td>
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<td>15th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Schwetzingen</td>
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Table 14. 2nd Constabulary Brigade

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 2nd Constabulary Rgmt.</td>
<td>Freising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Lenggries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Freising</td>
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</table>
### 5th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 5th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Augsburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Deggendorf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to 11th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Fussen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Augsburg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 11th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Regensburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Deggendorf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached from 5th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Regensburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Passau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Weiden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15. 3rd Constabulary Brigade

### 6th Constabulary Regiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 6th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Coburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached from 10th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Hof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Schwabach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**10th Constabulary Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 10th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Mohringen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to 6th Constabulary Regiment</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Boblingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Hessental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**14th Constabulary Regiment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 14th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Kitzingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Kitzingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Hammelburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Schweinfurt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 16. Special Troops, US Constabulary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, Special Troops, US Constabulary</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th Constabulary Signal Battalion</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unit Locations as of 3 November 1947

Tables 17-20 depict constabulary unit locations as of 3 November 1947.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constabulary School Squadron</td>
<td>Sonthofen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Constabulary Car Platoon</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Constabulary Band</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820th Constabulary MP Company</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17.  Constabulary Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, US Constabulary</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 1st Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 2nd Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Augsburg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18.  1st Constabulary Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 14th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Kitzingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Fritzlar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 15th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Seckheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Knielingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Boblingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Schwabisch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 2nd Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Freising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Augsburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Degerndorf</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 6th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Coburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Schweinfurt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Schwabach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, 11th Constabulary Rgmt</td>
<td>Regensburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Straubing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Landshut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Weiden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Special Troops, US Constabulary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Troop, Special Troops, US Constabulary</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th Constabulary Signal Battalion</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constabulary School Squadron</td>
<td>Sonthofen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Constabulary Car Platoon</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Constabulary Band</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820th Constabulary MP Company</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unit Locations as of 3 January 1949

Table 21 depicts constabulary unit locations as of 3 January 1949.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, US Constabulary</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 1st Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Trp, 2nd Constabulary Brigade</td>
<td>Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (US Constabulary)</td>
<td>Augsburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Armored Cavalry Regiment (US Constabulary)</td>
<td>Straubing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Armored Cavalry Regiment (US Constabulary)</td>
<td>Witzlar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Weiden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>West Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously independent of the Constabulary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Constabulary Squadron</td>
<td>Bad Hersfeld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously assigned to the 4th Constabulary Regiment in Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th Constabulary Signal Battalion</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Constabulary Car Platoon</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Constabulary Band</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820th Constabulary MP Company</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Rand, H.P. “The Constabulary Delivers the Money.” *The Army Information Digest* 4, no. 6 (June 1949): 30-32.


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**Other Sources**


Combined Arms Research Library
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Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

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<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
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</tbody>
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<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
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