Title: Improving Interagency Planning and Execution at the Operational Level: Creating a Stability and Reconstruction Component within a Joint Task Force

This thesis explores three distinct courses of action for improving operational interagency unity of effort and presents a cogent argument for creating a new component within a joint task force to address all stability and reconstruction tasks. This stability and reconstruction component would capitalize on the momentum gained by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (S/CRS) and utilize resources already in place or expected to be in place to support S/CRS' Advance Civilian Team concept. The component would be led by a civilian interagency representative and be staffed by both military personnel and interagency representatives pulled from S/CRS' Active Response Corps.
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Thesis Title: Improving Interagency Planning and Execution at the Operational Level: Creating a Stability and Reconstruction Component within a Joint Task Force

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Over the past fifteen years, many have argued that the military’s overwhelming battlefield successes stem from the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reformation Act of 1986. While few can debate the efficacy of joint US military operations in a high-intensity conflict, many still debate the effectiveness of the interagency community’s attempts at winning the peace. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the lack of interagency unity of effort at the operational level and cry out for an enduring solution similar to Goldwater-Nichols.

This thesis explores three distinct courses of action for improving operational interagency unity of effort and presents a cogent argument for creating a new component within a joint task force to address all stability and reconstruction tasks. This stability and reconstruction component would capitalize on the momentum gained by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (S/CRS) and utilize resources already in place or expected to be in place to support S/CRS’ Advance Civilian Team concept. The component would be led by a civilian interagency representative and be staffed by both military personnel and interagency representatives pulled from S/CRS’ Active Response Corps (ARC).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<td>ACT-T</td>
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<td>AO</td>
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<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>SRTO</td>
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<td>Tactical Interagency Support Party</td>
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<td>US</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

We are working to strengthen international capacities to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states. . . . President Bush already has charged us at the State Department with coordinating our nation's post-conflict and stabilization efforts.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 17 February 2005

In the wake of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Unified Assistance, joint interagency coordination became the catch phrase on almost every senior leader’s lips. Unfortunately, troops on the ground conduct too much of the “coordination” at the tactical level because operational and strategic interagency coordination lacks the support from the planners at joint task force (JTF) and unified combatant commander planning staffs. According to United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), “In the weeks following ‘9-11’ the Joint Staff gained approval by the National Security Council Deputies Committee, based on USJFCOM’s efforts to enhance interagency planning and coordination at the operational level, to establish a ‘limited’ joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) capability in each combatant command (COCOM). These JIACGs are an advisory element on a combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community” (USJFCOM 2004, 2). “With State, Justice and Treasury participation, this interim interagency planning capability has shown great value in prosecuting the war on terrorism” (USJFCOM 2004, Preface).

Even with this new organization and the direction provided by Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, interagency coordination
below the joint staff is poorly defined and even less understood. In practice, interagency planning is fraught with conflicting guidance, conflicting cultural differences, and a limited understanding by military planners about the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of other agencies. This bears a striking resemblance to the coordination difficulties the military services encountered prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

In his article “The Goldwater-Nichols Act Ten Years Later,” The Honorable James Locher III explains, “Planning was often fiscally unconstrained, and strategy and resources were weakly linked. Contingency plans had limited utility in crises, often because they were not based on valid political assumptions” (1996, 13). One can clearly see the parallels between joint planning prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and today’s interagency planning environment. Even with the many similarities between today’s interagency environment and the pre-Goldwater-Nichols environment, the problem of operational coordination is exponentially more complex. Despite the fact that every service falls under the control of the Secretary of Defense, it has taken nearly twenty years to improve interservice cooperation and it is still a work in progress. Even if Congress enacts Goldwater-Nichols-type legislation to improve interagency coordination between other governmental agencies (OGAs) and the Department of Defense (DOD), it will take years of diligent cooperation before one could expect to see substantial positive results.

Although OGAs do not plan for contingencies in a manner similar to DOD’s Joint Operation Planning and Execution System processes, it may be possible to coordinate “operational”-level tasks with agencies actively involved in a JTF commander’s area of operation (AO). The President’s recent approval of National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 44 makes the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (S/CRS) responsible for coordinating all of the federal government’s efforts relating to stability and reconstruction operations. This directive places stability and reconstruction efforts on par with military operations in terms of importance and charges all federal agencies to develop a planning process for stability and reconstruction that is compatible with S/CRS. Although this may be an important first step, the true test of interagency cooperation will be how agencies implement and adhere to the spirit of the directive.

A key tenet of military operations is unity of effort. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, states: “The fundamental of unity of effort demands that all undertakings be directed toward achievement of common aims. Unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations (NGO), international organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. National unified action is influenced by the Constitution, federal law, international law, and the national interest” (2001, Chapter 1). Furthermore, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, defines unity of effort as “Coordination and cooperation among all military forces and other organizations toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces and nonmilitary organizations are not necessarily part of the same command structure” (2003, Glossary-14). Traditionally, military leaders used unity of effort in terms of military units working toward a shared objective. The end of the Cold War, however, coupled with the threat posed by nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda, forced the United States (US) to reconsider how it should
orchestrate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

Although few would disagree with the concept of unity of effort, agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques exacerbate the problem of interagency coordination (JP 3-08v1 1996, vi). In 1994, President Clinton directed an interagency review of peacekeeping policies, programs, and procedures to establish a comprehensive policy framework to address post-Cold War realities. This review led to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on the reform of multilateral peace operations (Hamblet 2000, 1) and for the first time focused attention on the importance of improving coordination among government agencies. In 2001, President Bush further streamlined the interagency coordination process at the national level by trimming 102 interagency working groups into a three-tiered National Security Council (NSC) system for interagency coordination (Bogdanos 2004, 1).

While US presidents refined cabinet and deputy cabinet interagency coordination, DOD was slow to define its roles, responsibilities, and processes for interagency coordination. Until 1996, only JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, contained useful information on interagency planning and operations (Hamblet 2000, 1). Throughout the mid-1990s joint doctrine continued to evolve with the publishing of JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. Although this doctrine was a step toward defining the joint staff’s role in interagency coordination, it still lacks the details and direction to guide deliberate and contingency crisis planning at the unified combatant commander and JTF commander levels. Recently, JP 3-08 was updated and expands coverage of
intragovernmental and nongovernmental coordination and details the role of the Department of Homeland Security in civil support, as well as the role of the Homeland Security Council. Furthermore, it provides guidance for forming a JTF and organizing for successful interagency, intragovernmental, and NGO coordination. Even with this new publication, interagency coordination below the joint staff is still restricted. JP 3-08 Volume 1 still directs combatant commanders to “communicate with the Deputies Committee during development of the political-military plan with the Joint Staff in a coordinating role” (JP 3-08v1 2006, II-6) and to coordinate the Interagency Coordination Annex of the combatant commander’s operation plan with the relevant United States Government (USG) agencies via the joint staff.

In his annual Congressional testimony in 2005, General Bryan Brown, Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated, “As we transition to the post-election environment in both Afghanistan and Iraq, joint, combined, and interagency efforts will be more critical than ever to win the peace, as we continue on the path to a more stable and secure world” (US Congress 2005). Unfortunately, OGAs with which a combatant commander needs to coordinate either do not have a rigorous or deliberate planning process, lack the budget, manpower, and training, or are far too compartmentalized to have one representative coordinate on every plan that a combatant commander may produce. This “air gap” between the DOD and other federal agencies creates confusion, duplication of effort, and inefficiencies that can lead to problems ranging from misplaced humanitarian assistance to poorly planned stabilization and reconstruction efforts after a major theater war.
To close this “air gap,” combatant commanders may benefit from standing up an interagency presence at the operational level. This thesis will determine if a greater interagency presence at the operational level would improve interagency unity of effort and if so, it will explore the optimum model for fielding one. With a clear model for improving operational unity of effort, the thesis will finally delve into a few of the issues that must be addressed regardless of the approach selected, to inculcate an interagency mindset into the future leaders within the federal government.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

Although the US government has made great efforts to improve interagency coordination, a great deal of work remains. Recent PDDs laid the groundwork for closer coordination at the cabinet and unified combatant commander level, but gaps still persist at the operational level. Although researchers have conducted myriad research highlighting the ineffective bureaucracy at the operational level of conflict, this paper will extend that research to answer the question of what kind of interagency structure should be created in order to improve unity of effort at the operational level.

To answer this question sufficiently, the paper will answer several secondary and tertiary questions. First, what is the composition of the organization or organizations coordinating operations at the operational level and what authority will they have over those operations? Second, what is the relationship between the proposed organization or organizations and existing operational and strategic authorities? Third, what are the key tasks that must be performed in order to improve interagency coordination and are their enough resources to accomplish these tasks? Finally, will a new organization be acceptable to other members of the interagency community?
Significance of the Research

Although a great deal of research has gone into exploring the problems with interagency coordination, very little research has been completed or published on how to solve these problems. At the national and theater strategic levels, a number of PDDs and agreements among government agencies reorganized the structure of the NSC and formed the basis for JIACGs at each combatant command. Tactically, joint interagency task forces have existed for years to fight the war on drugs and to improve intelligence sharing in the war on terror. Furthermore, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been employed to great affect in Afghanistan to speed relief and stabilize the region. Despite these improvements though, there is still a void at the operational level between strategic guidance and tactical employment. This thesis will propose a solution to fill this void.

Limitations

Because this topic is so complex, one thesis could not hope to solve every issue related to the stand-up of JIACGs. The thesis will propose a standardized template for a doctrinal JTF. It will capitalize on experiences from recent conflicts, most notably Operation Enduring Freedom. Because this thesis will explore issues at the operational level of war, it will not delve into the many tactical issues that surround the integration of non-DOD agencies on the battlefield. Additionally, the thesis will not address the integration of NGOs or multinational forces at the operational level. Although this is an important subject, the integration of federal agencies at the operational level of war is already a very complex subject that the federal government must address before any attempt at incorporating NGOs can truly begin. Finally, this thesis considered articles
available on or before 31 December 2005. Interagency coordination is such a compelling subject, the researcher had to establish a research cutoff date in order to analyze the data and formulate conclusions in a timely fashion.

Despite the thesis’ limited scope, providing an optimal doctrinal template for formalizing interagency coordination at the operational level of war would fill a large void between the counterterrorism-focused JIACGs at the unified COCOM level and the operators on the ground throughout the JTF commander’s area of responsibility.

**Assumptions**

In order to facilitate research and develop a viable solution in a reasonable amount of time, the author made several basic assumptions about this subject. First, the current level of interagency coordination is insufficient. Although the status quo is a possible option, the cost of maintaining the status quo is far too high when one considers the wasted efforts and resources of uncoordinated plans. Second, federal agencies will provide additional manpower or resources to support this effort but only those personnel identified as part of the Active Response Corps (ARC). Finally, although the Secretary of Defense provided combatant commanders with funding specifically to support interagency counterterrorism efforts, combatant commanders could utilize this funding to improve operational interagency coordination.

This examination adheres to the scientific methods of research. The methodical process for the paper includes defining the problem and formulating research questions; reviewing literature in the field of study and validating the research question; selecting a research approach; collecting evidence; analyzing and interpreting evidence; drawing conclusions; and making recommendations. Chapter 2 will survey the extensive amount
of literature written on interagency coordination and demonstrate myriad problems in planning and executing plans at the operational level of a conflict. This will form the basis for addressing why unity of effort at the operational level can be improved. Chapter 3 will outline the methodology the researcher chose in order to focus his research and analyze the various COAs. Although it is necessary to demonstrate that there is a problem with interagency coordination at the operational level of conflict, merely identifying a problem exists is not sufficient. The researcher must also define the problem with operational interagency coordination and propose a course of action (COA) appropriate to solving that problem. Chapter 3 will explain the methodology chosen to research and analyze the problem, and propose a solution. Chapters 4 and 5 comprise the body of the thesis.

Chapter 4 analyzes several potential COAs using the methodology outlined in chapter 3 to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of each. First, the author will assess the status quo or “as is” option in order to reinforce that there is indeed a problem with interagency coordination and to serve as a baseline from which other COAs can be assessed. Next, the thesis will propose augmenting country teams within each embassy with additional personnel from OGAs and the combatant commander’s staff so that it could serve as a de facto civil-military operations center (CMOC) and oversee every facet of a civil-military operation (CMO). Finally, the thesis will explore the option of standing up a separate component within the JTF to facilitate interagency planning and execution. The chapter will conclude by explaining why one of these COAs, or a slight derivative of one, provides the reader with a broad, if not completely comprehensive range of options for improving interagency cooperation.
Chapter 5 begins by justifying the COA selected at the end of chapter 4 and exploring potential arguments against the adoption of the particular COA. Chapter 5 continues by looking at other issues that are certainly important to the subject of interagency unity of effort but are tangential to the central question of improving operational unity of effort. Finally, chapter 5 concludes by recommending areas for further research and analysis.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Joint interagency coordination is not a subject without a great deal of study. In fact, the real problem will be getting beyond the theory of interagency coordination and developing a useable template for JTF commanders that goes beyond extolling the benefits of coordination and provides real solutions to coordination problems. Most of the works listed below form a base of knowledge to frame the research. Presidential directives and joint publications provide the guidance and frame of reference for any potential interagency coordination group. Finally, several works delve into the operationalization of the ARC and ACTs and they will form the basis for two of the three proposed COAs.

In his annual testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2005, General Brown discussed the role of USSOCOM in the War on Terrorism. He explained that USSOCOM’s role was to “synchronize DOD efforts, coordinate and collaborate in interdepartmental and interagency efforts, facilitate the flow of information and intelligence, and foster cooperation with partner nations to shape the Global War on Terrorism” (US Congress 2005). General Brown expanded this statement by explaining how USSOCOM created the Center for Special Operations to fuse planning, operations, and intelligence functions by capitalizing on interagency liaison teams to streamline interagency coordination, communication, and processes. This testimony provides a glimpse of what interagency coordination may look like at the JTF level.

In the article “PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” William Hamblet and Jerry Kline discuss the historical issues that culminated in President Clinton’s PDD
56 in 1997. It provides the historical context leading up to the PDD and explains that other civilian organizations are not equipped to conduct expeditionary operations and lack the standard operating procedures to guide efforts at the operational level. The article then goes into the unique role that combatant commanders play at a regional level and details the implications, as well as execution, of PDD 56 on operations in Kosovo. Finally, the article highlights the shortcomings of PDD 56, specifically its significant lack of buy-in from senior leadership, as well as a dearth of support from OGAs and the underemphasized continuity during transition periods. Although several years old, this article lends credence to the thesis that better interagency coordination is required at the operational level of a conflict, and the JTF commander may be the only leader capable of providing the logistics, manpower, and planning expertise to support other agencies.

JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, discusses interagency coordination, interagency processes and players, the evolving role of the Armed Forces, and the functions of the NSC system. It also outlines both principles for organizing interagency efforts on the operational level and roles and responsibilities for JTFs. The publication contains guidance for coordination between geographic combatant commanders and agencies, as well as methodologies for interagency operations.

Although publication of joint doctrine was a welcome addition, it was not enough. Joint manuals did not adequately explain methods for interagency planning, coordination, and execution.

In their article “Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operation,” Mendel and Bradford discuss today’s contemporary operating environment and explain the interagency role in dealing with instability. The paper also highlights the
problem of “who’s in charge” and the lack of resources and planning acumen by other agencies. They argue that:

Decentralized operations in the field require cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of agency objectives, concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules, and operating areas. Yet, as long as the combatant commanders are the only US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership - even while in a supporting role. (1995, 87)

Again, this argument further illustrates the lack of operational leadership and planning within other agencies, but points out those synchronizing efforts may take more than simply better coordination at the operational level.

In the article “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” Colonel Matthew Bogdanos discusses USCENTCOM’s development of its JIACG. He reviews the evolution of the USCENTCOM JIACG from an obscure task force viewed with suspicion by most governmental entities into a task-organized, matrixed organization responsible for investigating Saddam Hussein’s exploitation of the United Nation’s Oil for Food Program, standing up the DOD’s Rewards Program, and seizing a large amount of US currency. He goes on to explain the USCENTCOM-specific mechanics of interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although quite successful, Bogdanos argues that the NSC hamstrung USCENTCOM’s JIACG by not providing funding, guidance, manning, or authority. To overcome these ingrained vertical planning structures, Colonel Bogdanos proposes clearer inter- and intra-agency guidance to promote truly horizontal interagency planning at every level of conflict. He argues for a staff of thirty-eight military members working for the combatant commander’s chief of staff or deputy commander. Second, he advocates an interagency
The executive steering group (ESG) to function as an operational-level policy coordination committee chaired by the deputy commander to guide the command’s interagency policy, review and initiate major interagency proposals, and manage competing priorities (2004, 1-9). Finally, he recommends that the NSC overhaul the current information-sharing domain by enforcing minimum standards of information sharing.

Although Colonel Bogdanos’ article incorrectly pins the blame for insufficient funding, manning, and authority on the NSC (a province of the US Congress), it does provide a foundation upon which to build a better interagency presence within a JTF. Although he advocates maintaining the JIACG at the COCOM level and deploying JIACG task forces down to the tactical level, he thinks through and articulates many of the tasks, organizations, and relationships one must address to develop an effective interagency coordination group.

Cardinal, Pangonas, and Marks take a different tack for implementing a JIACG. “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination” discusses United States Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) approach to implementing a JIACG. Like Colonel Bogdanos’ experience at USCENTCOM, USPACOM used its COCOM JIACG to support task forces at a more tactical level. Unlike Colonel Bogdanos though, USPACOM used its JIACG to augment embassy teams within a country. In both cases, the combatant commanders positioned JIACGs to advise the combatant commander, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans, and integrate interagency operations.

The difference may boil down to the fact that USPACOM’s counterinsurgency efforts are not as intense as the ongoing operations in USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility so it uses its JIACG to coordinate other instruments of national power.
However, it may be a reflection of the backgrounds of the personalities running each JIACG. Ambassador Marks (USPACOM) has extensive experience in the Department of State (DOS) while Brigadier General Harrell’s (USCENTCOM) background is special operations. Whatever the source of the difference, both models are worthy of consideration when developing a JIACG model for implementation at the JTF.

Patrick Kelleher addresses yet a third facet of interagency coordination at the tactical level of conflict in his article “Crossing Lines: Interagency Cooperation and the Military.” He asserts that combatant commands should more closely align efforts to provide developmental assistance with the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) efforts to provide humanitarian assistance at the operational and tactical levels. To this end, Kelleher makes two proposals to coordinate the combatant commander’s development efforts with USAID’s efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. First, he proposes the creation of an additional position on a combatant commander’s staff: a senior humanitarian advisor, equivalent in rank to political advisors. He also proposes an annual or biennial planning conference between the combatant commands and USAID regional experts (2002, 2). Although these ideas do not fit into the current JIACG model, Kelleher does raise interesting points about the disconnects among DOS, DOD, and USAID, even though USAID coordinates directly with DOS as an arm of US foreign policy. Furthermore, annual planning conferences among the DOD, country teams, and USAID’s newly established Military Coordination Office would go a long way toward harmonizing the efforts of the three largest players in humanitarian and developmental assistance.
Even with these two very different implementations, problems exist at the operational level. In his thesis titled, “Achieving Unity of Effort at the Operational Level Through the Interagency Process,” Major Christopher Jones researched the genesis of the friction among government agencies and its potential impact on interagency coordination. He utilized Graham Allison’s three models for government decision making to analyze where the disconnects in coordination originated and hypothesized as to why the various organizations approached interagency coordination the way they did. He concluded that the problem was threefold and all three facets must be addressed in order to improve unity of effort at the operational level of conflict. First, any solution must resolve the imbalance of representation at the operational level. Currently, this imbalance ensures that one agency can safeguard and promote its organizational interests at the expense of other agencies. This “lead agency” concept forces smaller agencies to resort to bureaucratic bargaining and deal making at the strategic and tactical levels to protect their interests. This lack of operational representation ultimately marginalizes operational planning and short circuits many of the strategic plans before they can be executed. Secondly, the lack of interagency guidance and doctrine, as well as a shared lexicon of terms, inhibits cooperation. Major Jones cites the delay in releasing NSPD “XX” as a key inhibitor of interagency coordination, because without it any coordination below the deputies committee is unofficial coordination and subject to individual motivations and personalities within each agency. Finally, Major Jones addresses the issue of overcoming conflicting agency cultures. He suggests a more comprehensive exchange program among the various agencies that expands beyond today’s status quo. Although he did mention a few solutions for addressing operational interagency coordination, his thesis
stopped short of proposing and defending a particular solution. This thesis will expand upon Major Jones’ research and incorporate his findings into the methodology for selecting a particular COA.

Nearly simultaneously, Major Thomas M. Lafleur wrote a School of Advanced Military Studies monograph titled “Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level,” which also explored the root causes of operational interagency friction. In his monograph, Major Lafleur used several case studies to illustrate how operational interagency coordination broke down despite the direction and organization laid out in PDD 56. Major Lafleur points to President Clinton’s specific leadership style and the lack of definitive interagency doctrine (2005, 22) as two major contributing factors in the breakdown of operational unity of effort among the participating agencies. Although Major Lafleur did not develop any specific COAs for improving unity of action, his insights into PDD 56 and analysis of several cases studies contextualized why so many interagency initiatives have failed in the past fifteen years.

As one can clearly see, interagency unity of effort has been a hot topic of discussion for over fifteen years. There are several presidential directives, numerous white papers and scholarly articles, and dozens of monographs and theses that highlight, emphasize, and propose solutions to the problem of interagency coordination at the national strategic, theater strategic, and tactical levels of conflict. That said, only a very small body of research is dedicated to highlighting and emphasizing the problem of operational unity of effort, and the researcher has discovered almost no research that proposes a solution to this glaring problem.
In the next chapter, the researcher will lay out the methodology and criteria for comparing and selecting a means for improving interagency unity of effort. This chapter will identify the key players involved, identify the source for the key tasks, and lay out in broad terms the three distinct COAs for improving interagency coordination. Chapter 3 will also detail how the author plans to assess each COA to determine which one, if any, is the most promising method for improving operational interagency coordination. This assessment will evaluate each COA’s feasibility, acceptability to each of the key players, and suitability to the task of improving operational unity of effort among agencies.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

In the last chapter, the researcher discussed the enormous body of research regarding interagency coordination. Although a great deal of research has gone into pointing out the flaws with interagency coordination, very little has been written on how to improve interagency unity of effort. Since the purpose of this thesis is to propose a practical solution that improves interagency coordination, a methodology for objectively recommending a particular COA must be developed. This chapter will describe the tasks required to improve interagency coordination, establish the criteria used to assess each COA, briefly explain each COA, and, finally, explain why the proposed COAs, or their derivative, sufficiently represent the three most likely possible solutions.

Key Players

Ideally, any solution would incorporate all federal agencies and provide a way ahead for incorporating NGOs, as well as multinational participants. It would be nearly impossible to reconcile the views and processes of the fifteen cabinet-level agencies and the handful of government agencies that make up the Executive Office of the President. Instead, this thesis will focus its attention on the permanent members of the NSC, as well as the Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, the USAID, and the Office for Disaster Assistance.

Key Tasks

Although specific tasks vary from operation to operation, the thesis will propose and justify a core set of specified and implied tasks that any interagency coordination
organization could reasonably expect to perform. Since the goal of this thesis is to
determine the best method for improving interagency coordination, this research will not
delve into every specific task required to conduct stability and reconstruction operations.
Instead, the tasks selected will focus on the management, coordination, and planning of
interagency operations required to improve the efficacy of interagency operations. This
list of essential tasks will be culled from joint doctrine, the DOD’s Mission Essential
Task List, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stability’s task list, and OGA planning and execution documentation.

The recent rewrite of JP 3-08 lists eleven different tasks a combatant commander
should perform when campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning is required.
Although the researcher assumes some risk in developing COAs derived from joint
d doctrine that is still in coordination, the tasks listed are certainly tasks that any
governmental agency would have to perform if charged with coordinating and managing
interagency operations. Furthermore, many of the tasks identified in the revision of JP 3-
08 are spelled out specifically in NSPD 44. These key tasks can be broken out into three
broad categories: planning, execution management, and assessment management.

At the core of improving interagency coordination is improving interagency
planning. Although a number of factors have traditionally inhibited this, recent conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq have formed the impetus for improving it. In keeping with this
renewed emphasis on interagency planning, the DOD has drafted a complete rewrite to JP
3-08. JP 3-08 tasks the combatant commander to “[r]ecognize all USG agencies,
departments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and NGOs that are or should be
involved in the operation” (2006, III-1). As JP 3-08 points out, in most cases, NSC,
DOD, the military services, and the joint staff will have already begun initial high-level planning and coordination with USG agencies. Each COA must explain the process for capitalizing on this high-level coordination to ensure all relevant OGAs are included in operational planning, coordination, and execution.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the combatant commander must “[u]nderstand the authoritative interagency, IGO, and NGO hierarchy, to include the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility.” Although the joint publication only asks the combatant commander to “understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Services in domestic and foreign operations” (JP 3-08 2006, III-1), all three COAs must detail the command, control, and coordination relationships among the various federal agencies.

Draft JP 3-08 also calls on the combatant commander to define the objectives of the response, and COAs for assigned military tasks, and cooperate with each agency department or organization, obtain a clear definition of the role that agency will play, and identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities (2006, III-1). Ultimately, this is the crux of the problem with interagency coordination. Each COA must address the mechanism for translating strategic conclusions generated by the NSC into objectives that can be coordinated and managed at the operational level. With roles and responsibilities laid out, the COA must also have a way to identify the resources each agency has committed to the operation. The draft version of JP 3-08, as well as NSPD-44, calls for military and civilian planners to identify resources relevant to the situation.
Ultimately, any viable solution must help all the governmental agencies to determine the desired end states, plan the efficient transition from USG to local authority, and develop the exit criteria for US involvement. To do this effectively, a solution must address the training with respect to the tools and processes it will use to plan and the experience that comes from habitual relationships resulting from collaborative exercises. To this end, NSPD-44 calls for all government agencies to designate appropriate senior USG officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant military JTFs, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, and after action reviews. The COA must address how it will foster these relationships and build the requisite experience in the interagency community.

As important as interagency campaign planning is, a successful operation must translate planning into coordinated execution. First, a feasible COA must define the process that will help the interagency organization to maximize its assets to support long-term goals. JP 3-08 explains that “[t]he military’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, national or international response to a crisis” (2006, III-3), but one could certainly extrapolate that this principle extends beyond the DOD and applies to all government resources and agencies. In fact, NSPD-44 calls on OGAs to “[a]ssist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated US response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts” (2005, 5).
Secondly, the COA must address the process for translating interagency strategy into specific tasks that can be coordinated, deconflicted, and resourced. Like the Air Force’s master air attack plan, which matches resources to specific battlefield tasks, a feasible COA needs to provide a method for clarifying each agency’s responsibility without dictating how that agency will complete that task. Furthermore, the process must have a method to identify each agency’s support requirements for each of its assigned tasks. NSPD-44 calls for OGAs to “[i]dentify and develop internal capabilities for planning and resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crisis” (2005, 4). A suitable COA must address the process for aiding OGAs with their operational planning efforts.

Third, the COA must detail how agencies will support real-time changes to an agreed upon plan. Once an interagency plan is approved and set into motion, there has to be a way to adapt that plan to compensate for the inevitable fog and friction of conflict. NSPD-44 tasks the State Department to “[c]oordinate USG responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases” (2005, 3). When combined with the joint publication imperative to provide a crisis action planning capability, the COA must address how to quickly draft and staff changes to an interagency plan simultaneously through its representative agencies and directly to the governing policy coordinating committee (PCC).

Fourth, a solution must address how it will aid in the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. According to JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental*
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I, these teams can include ad
hoc multiagency teams or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the

Finally, a solution must facilitate the collection of observations and lessons
learned at the conclusion of a conflict. According to NSPD-44, OGAs must “assist the
S/CRS Office with the collection of lessons learned” (2005, 3), but unless this is
addressed by the same organization that is planning and coordinating operations, the
observations may never translate into lessons learned.

In summary, a suitable COA must provide the functionality to satisfy the tenets of
the recently updated JP 3-08 and assist S/CRS with their monumental tasks codified in
NSPD-44. As the analysis shifts to detailing the three specific COAs, each COA must
successfully address each of the tasks listed above if the COA is to be considered suitable
for improving interagency coordination.

Courses of Action

This thesis will explore three distinct COAs. Each of these COAs will address
document, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel,
and facilities required to perform operational interagency coordination. COA 1 is the
status quo or “as is” option, which will function as the baseline for comparing the other
two COAs. Since the current interagency coordination process lacks the doctrine and
tactics, techniques, and procedures that discreetly define the process, the interagency
coordination process employed in Operation Enduring Freedom and described in Bush at
War by Bob Woodward, and American Soldier by General Tommy Franks will represent
the status quo. This COA will also explore the use of PRTs in Afghanistan and detail the use of CMOCs for coordinating and controlling multiagency operations in Afghanistan.

The second COA will approach operational interagency coordination by expanding the role of the State Department’s country team. This COA will describe the changes required to provide the country team with the authority and resources required to coordinate and control interagency operations. The third COA will address interagency coordination by standing up a new stability and reconstruction component within a JTF.

In order to determine which COA is most likely to succeed, criteria must be developed that assess the feasibility of each, its acceptability to the various stakeholders in the interagency process, and its suitability for improving interagency unity of effort at the operational level of conflict.

Criteria

According to the JP 1-02, feasibility is “The determination as to whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources” (2005, 203). Normally, planners assess the feasibility of a plan by matching available units to required tasks, determining what tasks do not have units assigned against them, and analyzing the operational risk of not accomplishing those tasks. In terms of this thesis, feasibility will assess if each agency will have the means necessary to accomplish the tasks specified in each COA.

The feasibility of a COA does not, however, mean it will be acceptable to a majority of the agencies involved in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. According to JP 1-02, acceptability is “The determination as to whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, materiel, and time involved; is consistent
with the law of war; and is militarily and politically supportable” (2005, 8). Since a particular COA’s acceptability is so subjective, the author cannot overcome his own military biases and objectively assess a particular COA’s acceptability to other government agencies. Instead, the author will capitalize on Graham T. Allison’s model for government decision-making to assess the acceptability of each COA. In his book *Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, he details three robust models for how government agencies make decisions. Although some have taken exception to portions of his models, they are still widely considered the foremost explanation for how government agencies make decisions.

Allison spells out three methods that a government agency will use to arrive at a decision. He begins by explaining the most logical and optimistic model for decision-making, the rational actor. He describes the rational actor model as an attempt to construct a calculation that shows how, in a particular situation, with certain objectives, an actor arrives at a decision, or, as Allison describes the rational actor model, “the attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments” (1972, 10). As table 1 illustrates, this model assumes a single rational actor is responsible for analyzing and selecting a COA, based upon a thorough knowledge of consequences and a comprehensive list of assumptions. Since it is unrealistic to assume that a single person within a particular government agency will be solely responsible for analyzing such a substantial change to the interagency process, this is not a suitable method for assessing the acceptability of a particular COA.
Allison’s second model for government decision making builds on the first model, but instead of relying on a single actor to analyze and make a deliberate choice, he recognizes that an organization will perceive inputs through organizational sensors. As issues and problems are directed at an agency, a typical government agency will break the issue or problem into smaller subordinate tasks and parcel those tasks out across its internal organization. Using preestablished operating procedures and years of following a familiar routine, inputs from the subordinate organizations are coordinated, consolidated, and homogenized to produce a solution that differs very little from the established status quo. Allison points out that this is the primary reason that dramatic change seldom happens in a large organization (1971, 68). Instead, he asserts, change must come from
years of more subtle change where the subordinate layers of the organization gradually learn a new set of routines and operating procedures.

Inertia is just one of the drawbacks that characterize organizational decision making. Again, Allison claims that organizations arrive at a decision by choosing the best alternative, taking account of consequences, their probabilities, and utilities, a process Allison refers to as comprehensive rationality (1972, 71). Like the classical decision-making process mentioned above, this requires a comprehensive list of alternatives, an assessment of probable consequences, and an evaluation of each set of consequences for all relevant goals. Unlike the classical method, Allison employs a concept called bounded rationality, which acknowledges the realistic limitations of identifying and processing every possible alternative, consequence, and problem. He asserts that organizations will resort to simplified models that extract the main features of a problem with capturing the problem’s complexity.

In practice, Allison identifies five deviations from comprehensive rationality that organizations will employ to simplify organizational problem solving. First, as discussed earlier, organizations will take a complex problem and break-up or factor that problem into semi-independent parts that organizations can deal with individually. Even more important than factoring is Allison’s concept of “satisficing,” as Allison calls it, or selecting a COA that is good enough or satisfies a requirement instead of selecting the action with the best consequences. Part and parcel with satisficing is his description of the search function, which looks for the first alternative that satisfies the criteria instead of searching out the best alternative. Finally, he explains how organizations try to avoid
uncertainty by emphasizing short-run feedback, that is, organizations look at the immediate impact of a decision more often than the long-term effects.

Allison’s third model for government decision-making extends the second model to include the governmental politics involved in any agency decision. He asserts that the leaders of the organizations detailed in the second model are “players in a central competitive game . . . [who] bargain along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government” (1972, 144). In what Allison calls the “push-pull” of politics, leaders balance their own personal views of national, organizational, and personal goals when making decisions. Since the analyses accomplished by each organization often differ, conflict among these leaders often leads to “a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power of the various leaders in conflict distinct from what any person or group intended” (1972, 145).

More specifically, Allison asserts that decisions in this model are always a result of compromise and bargaining along predictable lines that result from the compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence. He sees decisions as a zero sum ball game, with each player in a position armed with fixed responses to specified stimuli.

Allison sees model I as a means to analyze high-level strategic calculus, that is, finding a strategic response to a strategic problem. Model II focuses more on the organizational constraints in making a choice and the organizational routines in implementing that choice. Model III analyzes the actions of each agency’s leader in producing a final solution. This includes the bargaining among leaders, how each agency defines the problem, and the coalitions built among agencies that result in a final solution.
Although Models I and III are certainly valid and valuable models for analyzing government decisions, Model II’s focus on the organizational dimension of decision making is more in line with the purpose of this thesis and will form the basis for analyzing the acceptability of each COA.

According to the *Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*, suitability is a COA’s ability to accomplish the mission when carried out successfully; in other words, is the COA aimed at the correct objectives and does it comply with all governing guidance (AFSC 2000, 212)? The author will assess the suitability of each COA by analyzing how well it addresses the key tasks spelled out in emerging joint doctrine and other interagency guidance.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and policy and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.

John F. Kennedy

In the last chapter, the author detailed a methodology for determining if a potential COA would improve operational unity of effort. Answering this question really boils down to two fundamental questions. First, one must determine if operational unity of effort can be improved. Majors Jones and Lafleur answer a resounding YES. In fact, the release of NSPD 44 certainly seems to signal the President’s dissatisfaction with the efficiency of interagency operations.

The second question is a much more subjective question and is contingent upon the answers to several other subordinate questions. First, what is improved operational interagency coordination in real terms and what tasks must a successful COA satisfy to be successful. Second, improving operational unity of effort will require acceptance and cooperation from each of the affected agencies. Proposing a solution to a problem that has absolutely no hope of surviving first contact with the interagency community by definition will not improve operational unity of effort. Finally, a plan that lacks the resources to succeed is hardly a plan at all. In essence, these three questions equate to what military planners refer to as the feasible, acceptable, and suitable test.
Key Players Detailed

At the heart of improving interagency coordination is reconciling the differences among the various agencies. To do this though, one must understand how each of the agencies involved in the planning and execution of foreign policy operates. This next section will detail the functions, processes, and organizations within each agency that plan and execute US foreign policy.

Born out of the War Department in 1949, the DOD is the muscle of US foreign policy. With over 2.6 million men and women in uniform serving in 146 different countries, the DOD is by far the nation’s biggest employer (DOD 2006b). With such a large footprint it is no wonder that the DOD is divided into several different organizations to carry out its mission. At the top of the DOD is the Office of the Secretary of Defense which is responsible for “help[ing] the Secretary [of Defense] plan, advise, and carry out the nation’s security policies” (DOD 2006b). This office is broken into four major sections: policy, finance, force readiness, and purchasing. Although all four organizations play a critical role in formulating and executing DOD’s mission, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is the Secretary’s primary representative for interagency coordination below the Principals Committee.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his role as primary military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense and is responsible for helping the Chairman to “plan and coordinate military operations involving U.S. forces” (DOD 2006). Although the Chairman plays a critical role in advising the President and overseeing the planning and coordination of military operations, it is important to note that the Chairman is not responsible for conducting
military operations. Instead, this authority, referred to as COCOM (command authority), rests with one of nine combatant commanders who report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Empowered to plan and conduct military operations under Title 10 of US Code, the nine combatant commanders are granted COCOM to organize and employ forces, assign tasks and objectives, and provide authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. To do this effectively and successfully, unified command staffs must develop plans to deal with emerging or potential conflicts. Joint operation planning is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. Furthermore, it is conducted at every echelon of command, and performed across the range of military operations (JP 5-0 2002, 1-2b).

Within a unified command, the combatant commander has the authority to appoint a subordinate joint force commander to oversee operations in a specific AO. This commander, referred to as the JTF commander, is responsible for ensuring that his joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations (JP 3-0 2001, 2-3).

At the heart of US foreign policy is the National Security Strategy (NSS). This thirty-five-page document lays out in broad terms the eight overarching objectives of US foreign policy. This key document forms the basis for the strategies derived by every agency involved in US foreign policy without getting into specifics regarding the execution of the strategy. Guided by this strategic vision, each federal agency involved in the planning and execution of US foreign policy develops agency-specific strategies.
These plans explain at the strategic level how each of the agencies will leverage its agency-specific capabilities to meet the requirements set forth in the NSS. Within the DOD, the *National Military Strategy (NMS)* “derives objectives, missions and capability requirements from an analysis of the NSS . . . [to] provide a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power (2004, iv).” In essence, the *NMS* defines the end states, objectives, and capabilities that the military must deliver to meet the tenets of the NSS.

In an effort to standardize and streamline the planning process across commands and services, the DOD created the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is “a system of policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems that provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and combatant command-level commanders and their staffs. It is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations” (JP 1-02 2001, I-3). Using this system, combatant commanders and their staffs can systematically develop, staff, and gain approval for their operation plans within the DOD.

DOS is the USG agency primarily responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the US (JP 3-08 1996, 28). DOS is comprised of over 48,000 employees spanning over 190 countries (DOS 2006b) and is organized into a headquarters and six bureaus to support over 260 embassies and consulates overseas. Overseas, the US mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments.
DOS headquarters consists of six undersecretaries, with responsibilities ranging from political and economic issues to arms control, public diplomacy, and global affairs. Unlike the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which only has one undersecretary responsible for interagency coordination, all of the undersecretaries of state are responsible for “leading” interagency coordination and managing global US policy in their respective areas of expertise.

Immediately below the undersecretaries are six regional bureaus, a bureau for formulating and implementing multilateral policy regarding the United Nations, and eleven functionally oriented bureaus that deal with issues ranging from diplomatic security to political-military affairs. Below the bureau level are directorates that formulate and execute policy specific to a particular country or group of countries. Of note is the fact that responsibility for planning and “execution” of policy within a particular region or country rests within the bureaus located in Washington, DC. In July 2004, Congress authorized the creation of S/CRS to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations. COA 2 will discuss how DOS plans to employ S/CRS to improve interagency cooperation.

Like the DOD’s NMS, DOS’ Five-Year Strategic Plan has its roots in the NSS and details how DOS and USAID will implement US foreign policy and development assistance at the national strategic level. It defines the primary aims of US foreign policy and development assistance and details DOS’ and USAID’s priorities for the next five years. The Strategic Plan also outlines the agency’s four strategic objectives, which serve as the framework for the annual performance plans from each of the subordinate departments, bureaus, and missions.
While the Strategic Plan details the broad themes and strategies at the national strategic level, operational details are left up to the regional bureaus and agencies in Washington, DC. Bureaus and directorates, in coordination with the pertinent US mission, use the Strategic Plan to guide their development of plans specific to their region or country. DOS’ Yearly Performance Plans describe what the department plans to accomplish to achieve its mission, vision, long-term strategic goals, and performance goals during the fiscal year (DOS 2005, 1). Although these plans contain much of the same types of information, the plans themselves differ substantially from country to country. Finally, at the country level, each mission is responsible for executing the plans developed by the bureaus. Although each chief of mission is given broad discretion to implement plans as he see fit, most of the real decision making happens in the DOS bureaus in Washington, DC.

Even though most of the planning and decision making is centrally controlled in Washington, DC, a substantial portion of DOS’ capabilities reside in country. The US mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments overseas (JP 3-08v2 2006, A-G-4). This mission is headed by a chief of mission, the senior US official in the country. The chief of mission is responsible for coordinating, directing, and supervising all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country, except for US military forces operating under the command of a unified combatant commander. The mission is ultimately responsible for executing the performance plan developed by the bureaus and offices in Washington, DC.

At the country level, the mission or embassy is the basic unit for dealing with a foreign government overseas. Although the senior representative is a presidentially
appointed representative of DOS, a number of other federal agencies send representatives to embassies. In many cases, these representatives are the most senior members of their agencies in that particular country and are responsible for implementing their agencies’ plans, but may not have the authority or resources to respond to a crisis.

In order to fully field a robust civilian stability and reconstruction team in theater, DOS has embarked upon an ambitious program to create a ready-response capacity within the federal government. In 2005, DOS requested 100 million dollars to create a conflict resolution fund. This fund would establish a corps of ready responders with a range of political, economic, communications, security, and management skills who could train and exercise together and provide complementary capabilities to what the USG can obtain on a contractual basis.

This force, called the ARC, would be culled from employees already in the federal government and tasked to deploy as first responders. They would guide postconflict efforts, promote unity of effort among local communities, governments, and international partners or peacekeepers on the ground, augment the US embassy presence, and support other task forces already conducting operations in the region (DOS 2006c). Secretary Rice allocated fifteen positions as a pilot program for this concept, and DOS is backing those positions up with an ARC of an additional one hundred individuals to be trained and available as second responders by summer 2006.

While DOS is the coordinator for stability and reconstruction, USAID also plays a major role in US foreign policy interagency coordination. It is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the Secretary of State through the International Development Cooperation Agency, which is headed by the Administrator of USAID.
USAID administers the US foreign economic assistance program and acts as the lead federal agency for US foreign disaster assistance.

USAID is headquartered in Washington, DC, with subordinate geographic and functional bureaus responsible for administering a particular facet of USAID’s mission. Recently, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs to improve coordination with the DOD. USAID plans to place senior USAID representatives at each COCOM and at each of the DOD’s senior service schools so that they can improve planning and participate more readily in exercises with the DOD.

Like DOS, USAID’s strategy is derived from the NSS via DOS’ five year Strategic Plan. USAID’s bureaus use the Strategic Plan to develop the policies, strategies, and research and analysis papers to guide programs, promote discussion, and inform key decision makers about key tenets of US foreign economic assistance programs. Overseas, USAID’s organization and approach are tailored to meet the specific situation and are detailed in USAID’s country-specific Annual Performance Plan.

Although DOD, DOS, and USAID form the lion’s share of US foreign policy muscle, a number of other agencies play a critical role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. At first glance, the Department of the Treasury (Treas) seems like an unlikely agency for the DOD to synchronize operations with, but Treas brings a number of unique capabilities that require close coordination to achieve optimum effects. Although most people think of Treas as the tax collector and financier for government programs, it is also responsible for encouraging prosperous and stable domestic and world economies by promoting domestic economic growth and maintaining US leadership on global economic issues. With two such diverse responsibilities, it has nine
distinct offices ranging from the US Mint and Bureau of Public Debt to the Internal Revenue Service and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Within the Office of International Affairs exists a number of regionally or functionally focused offices that develop policies and guidance for the Department’s activities in the areas of international monetary affairs, trade and investment policy, international debt strategy, and US participation in international financial institutions (Treas 2005). International Affairs is also engaged with the international donor community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, on the reconstruction and development of the West Bank and maintains economic relationships with several countries that receive substantial US economic assistance and are critical partners in the war against terrorism.

Like many of the other agencies listed previously, Treas also has an intelligence office. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence gathers and analyzes information from the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial communities as to how terrorists and other criminals earn, move, and store money and can take a number of policy, regulation, or enforcement actions to disrupt illegal financial activities.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is responsible for collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence related to the national security, and directing and coordinating the collection of national intelligence outside the US through human sources. The role of the Director of the CIA changed when the Director of National Intelligence stood up in 2004, and the CIA now falls under the Director of National Intelligence. Although the intelligence community plays an extraordinarily important role in interagency operations,
the classification of most of its documents, fluidity of the national intelligence organization since the stand-up of the Director for National Intelligence, and the numerous preestablished agreements and relationships with intelligence agencies preclude any truly enlightening discussion about intelligence sharing in this thesis.

**Course of Action 1: Maintaining the Status Quo**

In order to assess the best way to improve operational interagency coordination, it is important to understand how interagency operations are currently executed. Armed with the rudimentary understanding of the roles and missions of the key interagency players, this section will explore the interaction among these players at the operational level and assess the suitability, acceptability, and feasibility of recent interagency coordination efforts.

According to JP 3-57, CMO are conducted to minimize civilian interference with military operations, maximize support for military operations, and meet the commander’s legal and moral obligations to civilian populations within the commander’s area of responsibility (2001, II-1). Currently, JTF commanders can employ a number of resources to synchronize CMO. Figure 1 details the relationship between many of these resources. This section will look at roles and missions of a JTF’s ESG, a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), a CMOC, and a PRT.
Within the JTF HQ, a JTF commander has several organizations at his disposal to coordinate support for CMO. The ESG is a group of senior-level representatives from the JTF, US embassy, NGOs, and IGOs in the AO that function as advisors to the JTF commander. The ESG also provides a forum for coordinating operations and resolving interagency conflicts. According to JP 3-57, the ESG also interprets and coordinates the implementation of the strategic policy and should be chaired or co-chaired by the JTF commander or the US ambassador in the affected country (2001, B-A-6). Another organization that a JTF commander can utilize is the civil-military coordination board. This board, usually chaired by the chief of staff or the deputy commander, is comprised of representatives from the staff sections working CMO, as well as a representative from...
the CMOC. The civil-military coordination board typically is the commander’s primary vehicle for integrating CMO planning into the JTF operation plans. In a crisis response situation, the JTF’s crisis action team may form a humanitarian assistance coordination center to facilitate planning and coordination during the early stages of a humanitarian response. This short-lived organization usually gives way to a more robust and longer-lived organization as the crisis response matures.

In most cases, synchronizing CMO requires substantially more coordination than the ESG, civil-military coordination board, or humanitarian assistance coordination center can provide. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.05A, the JTF forms a CMOC when a JTF is involved in operations that require significant interaction with the civilian populace, host-nation or foreign government officials, agencies, or organizations, and or international agencies or organizations related to JTF operations (2003, 234). The CMOC coordinates military support to humanitarian assistance efforts or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. It often serves as the focal point in the JTF HQ for matters related to interaction with the civilian populace and is the primary operational conduit for foreign government agencies, OGAs, and international agencies or organizations related to JTF operations.

To perform this extraordinarily complex tasking effectively, the CMOC has a number of specific tasks ranging from coordinating and executing interagency plans and coordinating logistics support to assisting in the transition from military-run operations to civilian control. These tasks force the CMOC to coordinate with dozens of extra-military organizations, ranging from OGA representatives in the local embassy’s country team to
NGOs and IGOs that may have few operational interests in line with US interests. In short, JTF commanders establish CMOCs to streamline US military support to other organizations in the JTF's AO. Typically, an Army civil affairs (CA) brigade manages the CMOC. The CMOC is comprised of a director and deputy director, who are normally the CA brigade’s commander and deputy commander, an operations section filled with representatives from the JTF staff, a CA section, liaisons to other organizations and agencies, and a small administrative staff. In short, the CMOC is a nonbinding clearinghouse where other government and nongovernmental agencies can come to coordinate operations and request military support for their operations. Most important to note, it has no authority to direct or control operations of other agencies.

In some cases, the joint forces commander may require a more robust organization to meet a specific CMO contingency mission or support humanitarian or nation assistance operations. Combined/JCMOTFs are comprised of units from more than one military department or US agency and provide the JFC with the command and control organization to carry out CMO in support of a theater campaign or other operations (JP 3-57 2001, ix). Specifically, JCMOTFs advise the JFC regarding CMO policy and effects, provide command and control over military advisory teams, and facilitate interagency relationships through coordination and direct liaison with other agencies and governments in the region. As the JFC’s lead organization for stability and reconstruction, the JCMOTF also assists in the planning and execution of civil information programs, assesses and coordinates the improvement of infrastructure civil services and infrastructure with military commanders and other agencies, and allocates resources to achieve the JFC’s intent. Unlike the CMOC, which can coordinate with
commanders to utilize excess military capacity to meet other agency’s requirements for military support, the JCMOTF has resources assigned to it specifically for CMO.

Like a doctrinal JTF, the JCMOTF is comprised of a commander and his personal staff, a deputy commander and senior enlisted advisor, a chief of staff to manage the directorates on the staff, and a CMOC to coordinate military support to other agencies (see figure 2). Typically, the JCMOTF will have combat support and combat service support units, as well as special operations forces. Engineering, aviation, and medical forces support stability and reconstruction efforts in the AO. Commanders will normally stand up JCMOTFs in the event of a large-scale humanitarian crisis, but do so knowing that they do not have any authority over other agencies operating in the region.

At the international level, a humanitarian operations center is primarily an international and interagency policymaking and coordinating body that seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants, but all members are responsible to their own organizations or countries. A humanitarian operations center is normally established by the host-nation, United Nations, or by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to coordinate the overall relief strategy and identify logistic requirements for other agencies, and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support through the CMOC. Although there can be a formal structure, the humanitarian operations center is typically tailored to meet the requirements of the specific response.
Although PRTs and disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) fall outside the scope of this paper, it is important to understand how they link into operations at the operational level. PRTs were first developed in Afghanistan in early 2003 as an effort by US commanders to “win the peace” by enhancing security, strengthening the reach of the Afghan central government, and facilitating reconstruction. Each PRT was headed by a US diplomat and a military deputy in charge of sixty to one hundred CA, special operations, or psychological operations soldiers. Afghan advisors and representatives from civilian agencies like DOS, USAID, and the US Department of Agriculture (McNerney 2005, 1) also augmented these PRTs. Operational leaders asserted control of
these PRTs by grouping them under the control of regional brigade commanders so that a senior colonel was in charge of all military and PRT actions with a specific area of responsibility (2005, 7). Like most new concepts, initial attempts at tactical interagency cooperation yielded limited success and interagency conflict, but as the program matured beyond the conceptual phase, success abounded. In fact, the US Institute of Peace issued a report praising the PRTs in Afghanistan that stated, “Despite the vague mandate and limited resources, PRT military and civilian participants were able to make helpful contributions” (2005, 14-15).

In many ways, USAID’s DART is similar in concept to the PRT. Although the exact size and make-up of a DART is dependent upon a specific situation, a DART is typically comprised of more than sixty humanitarian response experts from USAID, DOS’ Bureau for Population, Migration, and Refugees, and the Department of Health and Human Service's Public Health Service. DARTs couple their statutory grant-making authority with technical expertise in areas such as health, food, water, and shelter to enable the team to function as an immediate response mechanism for assessment and funding in the field. Finally, a DART serves as USAID’s central point of contact for exchanging information and coordinating humanitarian assistance among NGOs, U.N. agencies, IGOs, and the US military (USAID 2003a, 1).

Unlike PRTs, DARTs conduct their own planning and fall under the operational control of the OFDA assistant director for disaster response in Washington, DC (FM 100-23-1 Appendix G 1994, 2). Before a DART deploys to a disaster location, the DART leader coordinates support activities with the embassy or mission in the region. Once the DART is on the ground, the DART leader meets with the embassy staff to coordinate
objectives and receive last-minute updates. While in the affected country, the team leader advises and may receive periodic instructions from the embassy, but only follows them as long as they do not conflict with guidance from OFDA.

Feasibility

In this next session, the author will explore the manpower required to support this framework, the budget required to pay for operations, and the equipment and facilities required to support operational interagency cooperation. To do this, the author will explore the organizations, processes, and resources employed by the USG to synchronize operations during Operation Enduring Freedom.

In the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001, military planners struggled with striking a balance between repeating the Soviet mistake of creating an obtrusive and visible force in Afghanistan and having enough forces to accomplish the mission. The concept was to put as few military forces as possible on the ground while staging operations from military bases outside of the country. This would provide a smaller and more acceptable US presence in Afghanistan. As coalition and Northern Alliance forces turned the tide of the fight and the US role transitioned into a stability and reconstruction effort, the JTF employed a number of interagency coordination measures to better synchronize operations. Chief among these were the ESG, JCMOTF, and the CMOC, which eventually became the PRT.

In the earliest stages of the operation, OGA activities within Afghanistan were limited almost exclusively to CIA clandestine operations in concert with US special forces. Although there are certainly operational-level linkages to explore with this relationship, the sensitive nature of these operations do not lend themselves to an in-depth
As operations progressed and the US reopened its liaison office in Kabul on 22 December 2001, the role of the OGA grew significantly. Unfortunately, many of the mechanisms in place doctrinally were either unavailable to the military commander because of the security situation in Afghanistan or were just simply underutilized.

In his article “Interagency Lessons in Afghanistan,” Tucker Mansager explained that the ESG was established but did “little to help implement policy on the ground or deal with the overarching integration required of a joint force commander” (2006, 1). In terms of feasibility, the ESG was a small group of senior representatives collocated with the JTF commander. Temporary duty assignments for liaisons were insignificant, and these liaisons required a small office, secure connectivity back to their agency in Washington, DC, and the same logistics support as any staff officer serving in the headquarters.

In December 2001, USCENTCOM foresaw wide-scale famine and human suffering as the harsh Afghani winter set in. In response, USCENTCOM stood up a JCMOTF in Kabul, with liaisons back to USCENTCOM at MacDill Air Force Base. The Combined/Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) was staffed by representatives from OFDA and coalition and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations, and required the combined military resources of the 122nd Rear Operations Cell and the Army Reserve 377th Theater Support Command, along with personnel from the 352nd CA Command, the 511th MP Company, and the 489th and 96th CA Battalions (Oliker 2005, 50). It is important to note that although the CA battalions were assigned to the CJCMOTF, they were not part of the internal structure of
the organization. This subtle but very important point illustrated General Franks’ emphasis on the logistics behind humanitarian assistance and perhaps acknowledged the lack of CA active duty assets in the Army. Perhaps if more CA assets were available, the CJCMOTF would have had a larger CA presence and been better prepared to tailor humanitarian assistance relief efforts more effectively (Oliker 2005, 51). The Army’s Comprehensive Guide to Modularity explains that the newly reorganized CA brigade will have the resources and responsibility to form the nucleus of a CJCMOTF for the Combined Joint Force Land Component Command, JTF, or corps commander (US Army 2004, 4-13).

As successful as PRTs and CMOCs have been during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), neither organization was well defined in doctrine. Although the concept of a CMOC existed in Army doctrine, the organization, manpower, and tactics for employment did not exist as a table of equipment element (USASOC 2005, Slide 18). Furthermore, FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, states that “The civil-military operations center is an ad hoc coordination center established and directed by the commander’s civil-military operations officer. . . . The size, structure, and location of the CMOC are situation dependent . . . [and] is neither a unit nor an organization” (2003, A-15). Although no formal guidance exists for operating a CMOC, FM 3-05.401 details suggested equipment, reporting methods, and reachback requirements for running a CMOC at the battalion, brigade, or division level. Finally, OGA participation is not codified in any formal tasking or interagency doctrine within the USG. As Major Jones points out, “The success of the CMOC still rests in part on the desire of the civilian
agencies to participate. Without a requirement to do so, the interagency representatives are not bound to coordinate their activities with the CMOC” (2005, 4).

Like CMOCs, doctrine for operating PRTs does not exist. According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, “FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations needs to be updated to reflect new TTPs in which civil affairs units operate (e.g., provincial reconstruction teams)” (2005, Ch2). That said, PRTs have a tremendous potential for improving operational and tactical unity of effort with OGAs and NGOs operating in the region. As of June 2005, twenty PRTs operated in Afghanistan with thirteen staffed by the US-led coalition and seven by the International Security Assistance Force (USIP 2005, 1). From the OGA perspective, PRTs provide a means for packaging capabilities with coalition military capabilities in order to extend influence to the parts of Afghanistan without a substantial security presence. This arrangement required little in terms of additional resources or processes, and organizationally the PRT did not require the standup of additional organizations

Acceptability

Although this is a historical case study, one cannot assume that everything that happened was acceptable to the agencies involved. Quite to the contrary, many of the organizations and processes described above are quite unacceptable to the agencies involved and the unacceptability contributed to the unsynchronized execution of operations in Afghanistan. This next section will assess the acceptability of the ESG, CJCMOTF, and the CMOC to the OGAs.

In assessing the acceptability of the ESG, one must consider how the OGA factored the problem of supporting operations in Afghanistan, how their participation
differed from their standard operating procedures, what alternatives were available to them, and what short-term impacts of each alternative were on each of the participants. At the beginning of OEF, the USG did not have an OGA presence in Afghanistan. Since the military was the only real presence in Afghanistan, most military leaders and planners saw little requirement to coordinate operational plans with OGA representatives, especially since they were primarily focused on defeating Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. This single-minded view of OGA considerations continued until well after DOS opened the Afghanistan Liaison Office.

From the OGA perspective, the beginning of OEF was almost exclusively a military operation and stayed that way until the fall of Kabul and the opening of the liaison office in December. Once the liaison office opened, the OGAs began to function in much the same manner they do in other countries, with the ambassador overseeing operations but agencies and bureaus in Washington, DC drafting the operational plans and dispatching teams into Afghanistan to carry out those plans. Although this return to status quo was not the only option, the military’s focus on military operations, coupled with the distance between the embassy and the JTF headquarters, made the lack of coordination acceptable to all of the agencies involved in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this lack of interagency coordination actually played into the hands of all the agencies as well in the short term. First, it gave the military a free hand to conduct operations. Second, from the OGA perspective, this lack of coordination and synchronization freed them from the requirement to provide scarce personnel to act as liaisons to the military. This return to status quo, coupled with the distance between the military headquarters in Bagram and
the liaison office in Kabul, left the ESG in Bagram largely irrelevant to both the military and the OGA.

USCENTCOM stood up the CJCMOTF to coordinate US military humanitarian assistance operations in Afghanistan. Although it did have representatives from other organizations and countries, it was largely a military-run and dominated organization. According to Colonel Larry J. Clayton, Commander of the CJCMOTF in Afghanistan, the CJCMOTF was the command and control headquarters for the PRTs and the CMOCs “Support[ing] (Combined Joint Task Force-180’s) mission by promoting the legitimacy and stability of the Afghan national government . . . [and] promot[ing] international efforts for rebuilding Afghanistan’s economy” (2002, 1). Although the OGA had liaisons to and coordinated with the CJCMOTF, the CJCMOTF worked almost exclusively within the realm of the DOD. The CJCMOTF was solely responsible for administering the DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid funds. These funds went toward promoting peace and stability through low-level contacts where other programs would not be possible, and toward allowing US forces to respond rapidly and effectively when called upon to assist the victims of storms, earthquakes, and other natural or manmade disasters (DOD 2006a, 2). Although strategic application of these funds was coordinated with DOS, operational and tactical decisions about their use in Afghanistan were accomplished solely by the JCMOTF.

Again, early in the operation, this was completely acceptable to all agencies because the DOD was really the only agency with much of a footprint in Afghanistan. Once the DOS liaison office opened in December though, this dynamic changed. In a USAID field report from June 2003, USAID officials debated the utility of this program
“except in the most remote or unsafe areas of Afghanistan where other assistance has not arrived or where NGOs cannot travel safely” (2003b, 2). This debate about the DOD’s role in providing low-level assistance speaks precisely to the unacceptability of CMO in Afghanistan. As USAID officials factor out the problem of providing humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan they realize that providing low-level assistance in high-threat areas with little to no US presence is simply something they are not equipped to handle. Therefore, they are willing to cede that role to the DOD. That said, as the situation in Afghanistan stabilized and the security situation improved, if the DOD maintained this capability to provide low-level assistance unilaterally, USAID’s role in foreign policy execution would be threatened. USAID most certainly did not find this arrangement acceptable.

According to Eisenhour and Marks, “The portion of that joint pub that explains CMOC lacks structure and internal consistency. It is covered under the rubric of ‘Organizational Tools for the JTF,’ which implies that it exists to exercise control over nonmilitary organizations, and offers the following lead sentence in bold type: ‘Commanders should establish control structures that take account of and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the area.’ CMOC is a means to coordinate civil and military operations and plays an execution [vice policy] role” (1999, 1).

Instead, Eisenhour and Marks point to another coordination mechanism, the humanitarian operations center, as a “well written and sensitive to the independence of participants and need for cooperation . . . [because] . . . it outlines a leading role for the center in coordinating operations organized by a host government or the United Nations. Moreover, it notes that in the case of unilateral action, a representative of the Agency for
International Development would most likely be the center director. In these situations, the CMOC role would be subordinate or supportive” (1999, 2).

Suitability

The biggest problem with operational unity of effort is the lack of a single strategic voice to direct the actions across the interagency community. As previously articulated, the NSS provides the strategic framework with which the various government agencies build their own strategic guidance. Although it provides a common framework, it does not and cannot resolve the myriad issues that arise when any number of large organizations attempt to work toward a common cause. Furthermore, unity of effort is a concept often lost upon the interagency community in their quest to advance their own agenda. Each of the coordinating agencies listed in the previous section lacked the authority to mandate participation by other agencies or to task another organization to support another agency’s operation.

Although Washington has yet to codify and operationalize a formal coordination process, there are notable cases of operational unity of effort. In his article “Interagency Lessons in Afghanistan,” Tucker Mansager explained how the stand up of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) helped to overcome many of the barriers to operational unity of effort that had beset previous efforts (2006, 2). He points out that before the stand-up of CFC-A the cultural differences between foreign service and military officers, debate over which agency is in charge, and differences in span of control had the potential to hamstring operations. He explains that established but under-utilized coordination assets such as the ESG held some promise of improving unity of effort, but with so many of the obstacles well entrenched, operational unity of effort in
Afghanistan came down to personality-dependent attempts by the ambassador and CFC-A commander to work more closely together.

The CFC-A commander and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad began to forge a cohesive operational team through a series of incremental steps, beginning with the relocation of the military headquarters from Bagram Air Base to a location in Kabul near the US embassy and establishment the CFC-A commander’s office directly inside the US embassy. This small but extraordinarily important step helped to create a climate of cooperation. Ambassador Khalilzad took the next step by hosting a weekly “core group” meeting of the key players in the embassy to relay sensitive information and gain consensus for future operations in Afghanistan. In one example, military planners formulated a plan to improve stability in the southern and eastern provinces. In a series of iterative briefings to increasingly senior interagency representatives, the original concept was refined until it was ultimately acceptable to both the CFC-A commander, as well as Ambassador Khalizad. The resulting plan was ultimately briefed to the interim President of Afghanistan, who approved it without change (Mansager 2006, 3).

This example of interagency coordination still falls short of interagency collaboration. Although planners adjusted subsequent plans to accommodate inputs from successively senior interagency leaders, this was an inefficient way to plan an operation. This iterative process produced an acceptable plan but the lack of collaboration throughout the planning process may have limited the sophistication or ruled out solutions that an interagency representative might have contributed. Furthermore, the fact that even this modicum of cooperation was worthy of an article in *Joint Force Quarterly* underscores the exceptional nature of interagency cooperation.
Because this coordination only really aimed to deconflict operations, cooperation among agencies never really existed at the operational level. Resources from each agency were identified, but merely as a way for seeking interagency approval, not necessarily for assigning the best unit to a specific task. Support requirements were identified fairly well, but the method for doing so was normally done at a tactical level. Although collocating the CFC-A headquarters with the embassy in Kabul improved civil-military planning, it really did little in real terms to improve OGA operational planning. Also, by placing the CFC-A commander with the US ambassador, any changes to an operational plan could be worked quickly across the interagency community.

By standing up the CJCMOTF and subordinating the PRTs to it, the military did benefit from the OGA humanitarian assistance and reconstruction experience while the OGA representatives benefited from the military’s logistics, security, and planning capabilities. PRTs provided a superb mechanism for coordinating interagency assessment teams, and with the military’s superb ability to collect and disseminate observations from operations, PRTs provided the OGA community with a tremendous opportunity to assess observations and transform them into lessons learned.

In summary, OEF demonstrated the tremendous potential for improving operational unity of effort. PRTs, CJCMOTFs, and collocation of the CFC-A headquarters with the US embassy all vastly improved interagency cooperation. That said, the lack of doctrinal support, OGA mandate to support interagency efforts, and even a sense of operational planning within the OGAs substantially hampered interagency cooperation.
Course of Action 2: Bolstering the Country Teams within a Country

As a result of the US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as lessons learned from operations in Haiti and the Balkans, the US recognized the requirement for an interagency response capability to deal with failing nation states. On 6 January 2006, S/CRS released a forty-five-page draft interagency intervention concept detailing the strategic, operational, and tactical concepts of operation for improving interagency coordination during stabilization and reconstruction operations. This section will summarize this emerging interagency concept and assess its suitability, acceptability, and feasibility for improving interagency coordination at the operational level. The emerging concept is available at http://www.ndu.edu/ITEA/ (NDU 2006).

When S/CRS stood up in 2004, Congress charged the office with stabilizing and reconstructing societies in transition from conflict or civil strife by integrating planning with the military and civilian agencies, and deploying civilians quickly to undertake a mission in a postconflict environment (DOS 2005). This substantial new mission required a substantial investment in terms of manpower and resources. In his comments to the Association of the US Army Annual Conference, Ambassador Carlos Pascual anticipated a “requirement for up to eighty people to have the capacity to work on conflict prevention issues, on the preparatory issues, on the exercises, on the training, on the operational mobilization capabilities” (2005b, 1). Currently, S/CRS has about fifty-five people temporarily assigned from State, USAID, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command, the CIA, Department of Justice, and Department of Labor (2005b, 3), but currently does not have the funding to hire its own full time staff.
As figure 3 illustrates, S/CRS was designed to improve interagency coordination at the national strategic and theater strategic levels. Participants in S/CRS are pulled from the Standing PCC for Stability and Reconstruction, as well as specific regional PCCs, as required. S/CRS, in its role as Chairman of the Stability and Reconstruction PCC, reports to the deputies committee and coordinates interagency stability and reconstruction planning at the strategic level. S/CRS also manages the civilian teams collocated at the regional combatant command (RCC), as well as the civilian teams operating in theater.

Figure 3. S/CRS Proposal for Strategic Response Management


In this COA, an advance civil team headquarters (ACT-HQ) deploys to a specific country, where it reports to the chief of mission, who manages the preponderance of operational coordination and direction. The ACT-HQ is one of five twenty-person teams
dispatched into a particular country or region. Each ACT is comprised of civilians culled from across the interagency community and is charged with providing the unity of effort in the field among diplomatic, military, and economic activities. The ACT-HQ acts as the coordinator for synchronizing the other ACT activities and acts as the conduit for communicating strategies, priorities, plans, and programs developed by the country reconstruction and stabilization group (CSRG) and the RCC. At the tactical level, the ACT-Tactical (ACT-T) provides an immediate civilian presence to work with the military commanders, conduct assessments, initiate immediate programs in the field, and prepare for longer-term civilian programs.

The process for deploying an ACT-HQ is triggered by the CSRG PCC in Washington, DC. The CSRG will commission a humanitarian reconstruction and stabilization team (HRST) to deploy to the RCC headquarters to interface and integrate with military planning efforts for stabilization and reconstruction (DOS 2006a, 19). This team, tailored to address the relevant issues to the emergent crisis, assists RCC planners with the development of war plans in order to ensure unity of effort in the post-conflict phases, resolve assumption gaps about capabilities, and advise the military commander on the connections between the military plan and longer-term civilian plans. HRST will also act as a liaison to the CSRG for changes to policy guidance. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship among S/CRS, CSRG, HRST, RCCs, and an ACT-HQ.

Once an ACT-HQ is in theater, it functions in a manner quite similar to a JTF headquarters. According to the draft interagency concept, the ACT-HQ would be responsible for incorporating in-country assessments and consultations into the strategic interagency plan to develop the field component to the overall interagency plan. Armed
with this plan, the ACT-HQ is then responsible for coordinating, prioritizing, and managing the efforts of the other ACTs, upchanneling updated situation reports to the CSRG and the RCC, establishing an interagency communication structure, and managing the resources (including military financial resources) available for stability and reconstruction operations. In essence, the ACT-HQ becomes the de facto interagency commander for stability and reconstruction.

As the primary conduit for political-military coordination, the ACT-HQ will, according to the proposed concept, advise the military force commander about the missions, capabilities, and limitations of the ACT and will advise the HRST as to current requirements, mission, capabilities, and limitations planned for the military force to support civilian operations. In many respects, this role is similar to the role that the ESG played in the previous COA. However, the ACT-HQ goes beyond this advisory role and becomes responsible for coordinating and synchronizing efforts with CA units, to include attaching specific CA units to work with specific ACT-Ts, resolving or elevating civilian chain of command/authority problems to the CRSG, and setting conditions for transition from military to civilian control as rapidly as possible. Ultimately, the ACT-HQ would be absorbed into normal US embassy and USAID mission structures.

Within the ACT-HQ, S/CRS envisions three major subordinate organizations at the tactical level: the tactical interagency support party (TISP), national interagency reconstruction and stabilization organization (NIRSO), and the regional response group (RRG). Although these tactical organizations are slightly outside the scope of this study, it is important to understand the external linkages in order to fully understand the role of the ACT-HQ. The TISP is an extension of the ACT-HQ, designed to integrate civilian
capabilities into an Army corps, division, or brigade. Like a tactical air control party, a TISP exercises, trains, and operates with the unit to which it is habitually assigned and is operational control to the Army unit when it deploys to the field. This symbiotic relationship provides the Army unit with an efficient method for tapping into civilian capabilities while providing the ACT-HQ with improved situational awareness of the situation on the ground, as well as improved access to Army resources.

Unlike the TISP, which has a habitual relationship with an Army unit, the RRG is assigned to a specific region to provide support to civilian authorities in their particular area. Much like subordinate Army units, which structure their internal staff organization to match their parent unit’s organization, the RRG is organized like the CSRG in order to facilitate reporting and control by the higher level organization. Both the TISP and RRG fall underneath the purview of the NIRSO. The NIRSO, a component of the ACT-HQ, is responsible for managing the stability and reconstruction tasks at the national echelon of government and mentoring the affected nation’s authorities so they can govern and operate a self-sustaining economy as a peer nation. Like the RRG, NIRSO’s organization mirrors the organization of the PCC to facilitate the exchange of information, and draw upon the specific civilian and military core competencies that are needed for the stability and reconstruction tasks (US Department of State 2006, 27).

Manning this new organization will require a change in culture within the OGA. S/CRS is already well on its way toward accomplishing this Herculean task by standing up the ARC and technical corps. S/CRS believes that to accomplish its goal it will need personnel with four distinct backgrounds. First, it will need personnel with uniquely civilian competencies to manage and assist with infrastructure repair, economic
development, humanitarian assistance, and rule of law. S/CRS also sees a requirement for personnel with military competencies to assist with CA tasks, manage security and stabilization support, and provide training support to help rebuild the national security and intelligence apparatus. S/CRS also sees a requirement for military personnel to manage and provide logistics and communications support to the team. Finally, S/CRS sees a requirement for personnel with civil-military experience in national and international strategic communications, strategic intelligence, and resource management.

If this new interagency organization is to function with some semblance of cohesiveness, a new and more integrated planning process must be developed that provides strategic objectives, guidance, and direction to all of the agencies involved in the operation. The emerging interagency concept calls for a tiered system to facilitate integration of planning and execution, and the concept for USG intervention should establish a tier of interagency documents to guide department and agency-specific plans to support interagency objectives. Table 2 summarizes the proposed products, authors, and contents suggested in the emerging concept.

Unlike the current process, which has become a lose federation of independent agencies bounded at the top by the NSC, this new proposal for interagency planning goes a long way toward integrating capabilities across the interagency community. As table 2 illustrates, S/CRS envisions several increasingly detailed planning documents at the strategic-level to guide the development and integration of operational and tactical plans within each agency. At the national-strategic-level, planners develop the strategic objectives of the intervention, or as military planners like to call it, the end state. This five-to-seven-page paper sets the framework for the rest of the planning documents to
follow. Next, the national political-military plan provides the guidance to the HRST and RCC staff to lay out the specific strategic objectives, limitations, and timeline for the operation. Derived from the NPMP, the civil-military campaign plan (CMCP) begins to translate the strategic guidance from the national-level planners into more theater-specific tasks. It provides even more specific detail about the objectives and missions of each USG agency involved in the intervention, as well as the phasing, and command and control relationships. The annexes to the CMCP delve into the specific details of the plan for both the military and civilian agencies involved in the operation.

Table 2. Proposed Interagency Documentation to Support Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Objectives of the Intervention (SOI)</td>
<td>Drafted by the CRSG based on guidance from the NSC Principals; approved by the NSC Principals</td>
<td>One paragraph statement of the Strategic Objectives for the planned intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Political-Military Plan (NPMP)</td>
<td>Drafted by the CRSG and approved by the NSC Deputies Committee</td>
<td>Five to seven page plan outlining the major tasks to achieve the Strategic Objectives, key assumptions, the estimated timeline, and the collaboration and coordination architecture7 for the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Campaign Plan (CMCP)</td>
<td>Drafted jointly by the HRST and RCC staff; approved by the CRSG</td>
<td>The coordinated actions, phasing, the command and control/collaboration and coordination architectures, including coalition partners and the affected nation government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCP Annex A Civilian Operations</td>
<td>Drafted by the HRST and coordinated with the RCC staff; approved by the CRSG</td>
<td>The civilian tasks, resources, organizational arrangements, metrics, and reporting requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCP Annex B Military Operations</td>
<td>Drafted by the RCC staff and coordinated with the HRST; approved by the CRSG</td>
<td>The military tasks, resources, organizational arrangements, metrics, and reporting requirements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This process of increasingly detailed planning is certainly a step in the right direction but it falls short of the operational planning required for a truly synchronized plan. Although the production of the CMCP is supposed to happen at the operational level, conducting the planning at the RCC and not at the JTF ignores the “on the ground” perspective of the JTF commander and staff, as well as the perspective of the ACT-HQ and potential coalition partners, and is not consistent with current US joint doctrine. Furthermore, creating two separate annexes to the plan with only a loose coordination between military and civilian planners only pushes the problem of synchronization down to a lower level. Although this is certainly a step in the right direction, collaborative planning all the way to the tactical level should be the ultimate goal.

Feasibility

In this second COA, the author described a number of the organizations, planning processes, and coordination structures proposed by S/CRS to improve operational unity of effort. In this next section, the author will explore the manpower required to support this framework, and the equipment and facilities required to support operational interagency cooperation.

According to Emerging Doctrine for Interventions, a twenty-person ACT-HQ is the controlling or management layer for the other ACT-Ts deployed into a theater (US Department of State. 2006a, 17). In the emerging doctrine, the ACT-HQ would deploy into theater to augment the embassy staff, if one exists, and assume control over the ACT-Ts operating in the theater if one does not exist. This structure parallels the structure and relationship between the CJCMOTF and the CMOC/PRT in that a central
controlling body is responsible for the management and oversight of dispersed subordinate units in the theater.

First, let us assume that S/CRS is successful and does stand up the ARC and is able to field the ACT-HQ and ACT-Ts into theater. Although this unto itself would be cause for celebration, this structure is not nearly robust enough to provide the required oversight and control of the subordinate units. A quick look at military command elements that perform this centralized control/decentralized execution strategy will illustrate the shortcomings the ACT-HQ will encounter. During OEF, the CJCMOTF was initially responsible for coordinating the action of just a handful of PRTs and CMOCs distributed across Afghanistan. This required the efforts of numerous personnel from five different units and did not really attempt to coordinate with the interagency community at the operational level. In another case in point, the US Air Force operates joint forces air operations centers, which are responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing the air war for the joint force commander. Even the smallest air operations centers utilizing the most advanced information technology require the efforts of hundreds of airman to orchestrate hundreds of sorties per day successfully. Although coordinating stability and reconstruction will not require the same level of effort as running an air battle, orchestrating a stability and reconstruction campaign across an entire country will certainly require more than twenty people. Even if one argues that the ACT-HQ would augment an embassy country team, this additional handful of people could hardly be expected to carry such a heavy load, even with the support of twenty additional people from the ACT-HQ. Most embassy country teams are extraordinarily small, especially in failed or failing countries. Although this group would certainly have the home field
advantage and bring tremendous knowledge of the area, this would hardly offset the
mountain of work that they would be expected to perform. From a manpower
perspective, this potential COA simply is not feasible.

In terms of equipment and facilities required to support this COA, standing up the
ACT-HQ, even assuming the feasibility of a twenty person ACT-HQ, this footprint
would place a tremendous burden on most embassies in a failed or failing state. As
previously mentioned, most embassies in failed or failing states will have a very small
footprint. Although this was mentioned in the context of personnel earlier in this chapter,
it also applies to the physical space and equipment available to support operations within
that country. First, the logistics for providing life support for twenty people must be
addressed. Lodging, food, and other basic amenities, must be provided. Second, this
group will require a substantial communications infrastructure to support operations. This
would include secure and nonsecure telephone communications back to parent agencies
in Washington, DC, and the RCC, and secure and nonsecure network connections,
computers, and radio links to the ACTs in the field. Although an embassy certainly could
provide for some of these requirements, most US embassies simply do not have this
much excess capacity. Finally, in the case of an ACT-HQ assuming the role of a US
mission in a failed state, the ACT-HQ would have to provide for its own secure facilities.
Bottom line, although the idea of the ACT-HQ is good, it is simply not feasible for a
twenty-person unit to provide operational control over OGA stability and reconstruction
efforts and coordinate those actions with the JTF commander.
Acceptability

Although this COA may not be feasible in its current form, the ideas upon which it was based are certainly worthy of debate. One of the significant tasks in ultimately fielding any system that combines the various interagency capabilities together will be to persuade the OGA and DOD to accept the validity of the solution. This next section will forecast the just how acceptable this COA will be to the major OGA actors.

As with the previous COA the key actors in this COA are USAID, DOS, and the DOD with Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, and other agencies playing smaller roles for the OGA. In most every case, the OGA will factor the rubric of operational interagency coordination into three distinct problems. First, each agency will probably want to know if the COA will help them leverage the resources of another agency to help that agency complete its assigned mission. In virtually every case, the answer to this question is a resounding yes. As with the PRT at the tactical level, collocating the operational control elements of the OGA most certainly will aid in interagency communications and ultimately will improve coordination through deconfliction, economies of scale, and easier, more streamlined access to excess capabilities of another agency.

Secondly, each agency will want to know how this COA would impinge on the independence of the particular agency. Again, in virtually every case, independence remains the same, with the ambassador or ACT-HQ leader-retaining oversight over OGA personnel within a specific country or region while the bureaus in Washington, DC retain oversight over the missions those personnel will perform.
Although factoring the problem provides some insight into the COA’s overall acceptability, one must also consider the parochial priorities, perceptions, and short- and long-term goals of the agencies involved. In terms of priority, this COA is almost universally acceptable to the OGA and DOD. In the wake of the disconnects in Afghanistan and again in Iraq, the entire interagency community talks about the need for change and a better, more robust, interagency coordination process. Although most agencies would perceive almost any change to the status quo as a threat to their independence, this COA seems to provide a good mix of centralized and consistent oversight without getting into too many specific details regarding the execution of specific programs. S/CRS’ proposed COA provides enough independence for each agency to exert enough influence over its portion of the intervention to satisfy its need for control while providing a common framework from which every agency can try to synchronize efforts. Although some agencies, namely USAID and perhaps the DOD, may balk at a new process that adds yet another layer on top of a process that they have utilized successfully for a number of years, in the end the improved coordination and synchronization that this new process provides will probably outweigh concerns about added bureaucracy.

Suitability

Finally, the last test for this COA is to determine how well it fixes the problem of operational interagency unity of effort. By utilizing the criteria mentioned earlier in chapter 3, this section will weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses of this COA to provide an assessment of its overall suitability. First, for this COA to be suitable for improving interagency unity of effort, it must help the JTF commander to transform the
strategic plan developed by the RCC and interagency community in Washington, DC, into an operational plan. To do this, the COA must help the JTF commander to specify end states per phase, identify local factors that were not identified in the overall strategic plan, identify a method to transform strategic guidance into operational tasks, and identify a lead military component per phase in the operation.

Although this COA does not specify a lead military component per phase of the operation, the creation of a centralized interagency body to oversee stability and reconstruction operations and its subordinate assessment teams will help to identify local factors and aid in identifying specific end states. Armed with this information, the JTF commander certainly has enough interagency input regarding stability and reconstruction efforts to make sound decisions regarding military supported/supporting relationships. On the downside, this COA falls short of producing an operation plan that translates strategic guidance into operational tasks. Because the planning process detailed in this COA stops interagency collaborative planning at the CMCP by creating separate military and civilian annexes that require coordination instead of collaboration, it is quite likely that the resulting military and civilian plans will be merely acceptable to OGA and DOD representatives at the operational level. Although in the example of Afghanistan this certainly would normalize much of the coordination put in place by Ambassador Khalilzad and Lieutenant General Barno, it falls short of true unity of effort and civil-military synchronization.

Next, the COA should identify the USG agencies and NGOs that should be involved in the operation, identify what resources those agencies have committed, and establish some hierarchy, including lead federal agency and agency of primary
responsibility, to manage operations. Again, this COA dramatically improves the process of identifying agency capabilities, resources committed, and identifies a lead federal agency by creating the ACT-HQ responsible for managing and coordinating the actions of the subordinate ACT-Ts beneath it. Furthermore, embedding TISPs into Army divisions, brigades, and battalions will certainly improve interagency coordination at the tactical level. That said, however, like the fractured operational planning that potentially creates gaps between synchronized strategic guidance and operational planning, without a single entity responsible for overseeing both OGA and DOD stability and reconstruction efforts, true unity of effort will not be achieved.

Conceivably one could foresee a situation in which a report from an ACT-T operating within a country requests permission from the ACT-HQ to diverge from its specific mission for whatever reason. The ACT-HQ, operating divorced from the military situation save for a few liaison officers from the JTF headquarters, approves the change in mission and presses ahead with normal operations. At the same time, reports from military units operating in the same area also percolate through military channels requesting support to address the same situation the ACT-T identified. Although the COA does address the requirement for tactical liaisons (TISPs) embedded into each Army unit’s CMOC, it is possible that requests for support work their way up both the OGA and military channels and that both organizations would provide support or neither organization would provide support, thinking it fell into the other organization’s area of responsibility. Bottom line, unless a COA creates cohesion at every level, the opportunity for disunity of effort rises exponentially.
Finally, the COA must help to foster interagency relationships and build interagency experience, assist the OGA with operational planning, support interagency assessment teams and improve the ability to collect and assess observations and lessons learned. As this COA is described, it most certainly will bolster interagency relationships at the national-strategic, theater-strategic, and tactical levels immensely. Although operational relationships will be improved significantly, it is this author’s opinion that they will be limited to basic coordination and tacit approval of civil-military operational plans due to the segregation of the ACT-HQ from the JTF headquarters. This segregation most certainly will inhibit collaboration and require extraordinary efforts between the ACT-HQ leadership and the JTF commander.

In terms of supporting interagency assessment teams, again, this COA does a remarkable job at the tactical level, but may be inhibited at the operational level. By embedding TISPs with divisions, brigades, and battalions, tactical commanders will get interagency input for their specific tactical planning, while ACT-Ts will capitalize on the general understanding of military operations provided to them via the TISP. That said, again there is an operational disconnect to worry about. Although the TISP has a reporting chain through the ACT-HQ and subordinate military commanders have a reporting chain through the JTF, there does not appear to be a reporting or coordination link between the TISPs directly to the JTF and the tactical military commanders and the ACT-HQ.

Finally, the COA must address how it will help the interagency community collect observations and transform them into lessons learned. Unfortunately, the author has been unable to discover any details regarding the production of lessons learned from
the interagency community. In fact, in his speech to the US Army Annual Conference in October 2005, Ambassador Pascual discussed ten innovations and tools that S/CRS is putting in place to deal with conflict transformation. What is interesting to note is the lack of emphasis he placed on capturing observations and gleaning lessons learned. His six-page speech went into a fair amount of detail regarding the stand-up and rationale behind the ACTs or the ARC, but only had a handful of words regarding the collection of observations, “We’re putting in place mechanisms to capture lessons learned – that’s the ninth key function” (2005a, 6). Acknowledging the requirement for developing lessons learned is an important first step; this hand-wave shows just how far the interagency community has to go to formalize the process.

In summary, COA 2 provides a number of intriguing and promising new concepts and processes that have potential to raise interagency coordination to a new level. Creating the ACT-HQs, standing up ACT-Ts, and placing liaison elements into Army divisions, brigades, and battalions certainly should improve coordination. In order to realize this potential fully, additional resources must be committed to make the COA more feasible and stronger linkages at the operational level must be created. Without the resources and linkages at the operational level, this promising concept will have a difficult time accomplishing the myriad tasks it is expected to perform and never achieve the necessary level of synchronization with the DOD.

Course of Action 3: Standing up a Stability and Reconstruction Operations Center Subordinate to a Joint Task Force

In December 2005, the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense published DOD Directive 3000.05 to provide guidance on stability and reconstruction operations,
establish DOD policy and responsibilities for stability and reconstruction, and clarify conflicting guidance on the subject (2005, 1). Although the document contained a broad range of guidance, it specifically identified stability and reconstruction operations as a core DOD function and called for the creation of organizational and operational concepts for civil-military teams. This COA will propose the standup of a stability and reconstruction operations center (SROC) as a new component within a JTF to synchronize operations across the interagency community and achieve unity of effort.

This COA will combine many of the structures found in existing military doctrine and combine them with the planning processes, oversight, and OGA manpower analyzed in the second COA. In many ways, the management of non-DOD operations is very similar to the control of the US Air Force. Like the Air Force, OGAs have a limited number of resources that provide a disproportionate effect on the battlefield. This relative lack of resources, compared to the tremendous effects that OGAs have on the battlefield, make this ideally suited for centrally managing their resources and decentralizing actual task execution down to the tactical level. If the ACT-HQ expertise in stability and reconstruction operations is combined with DOD command and control elements, logistics, and communications assets, the combination has the potential to surpass the promise of S/CRS’ proposed intervention model. This COA will advocate the creation of an SROC, modeled after the air operations center, to plan stability and reconstruction operations, task units, manage operations, and assess results.

Like COA 2, representatives of the HRST would team with military planners and representatives from relevant US missions in the area to form a joint planning group and plan for the contingency at hand. This plan, referred to as the CMCP in the previous
COA, would form the nucleus of the JTF commander’s operation plan if military force were required. In the event of a military deployment, this cadre of experts would deploy with the RCC’s standing joint force headquarters to form the foundation of the JTF’s planning directorate. By including the HRST with the RCC commander’s joint planning group before the deployment into theater, both the military and OGA communities enjoy the benefits of the same type of collaborative planning that national-strategic level that planners enjoyed at the CSRG.

Planners would conduct a collaborative mission analysis and develop COAs to address the strategic guidance laid out in the NPMP and synchronize the efforts of each of the federal agencies. As a result, the CMCP would link strategic objectives to operational effects and synchronize the US government’s stability and reconstruction operations in the affected region. From here, the CMCP would be passed to each of the combat components, as well as the SROC, to develop detailed component plans. By pushing the formulation of the CMCP down to the operational-level, a distinction is drawn between the national and theater-strategic levels and the operational-level of conflict. By doing so, JTF commanders and their OGA counterparts retain the agility to respond quickly to operational conditions in the theater and provide a better opportunity to develop the operation plan collaboratively by collocating OGA and military planners and eliminates the requirement for separate military and civilian annexes to the plan.

At the heart of the SROC is the process of creating and executing the stability and reconstruction operation plan. Just as the air operations center is built around planning and executing the air tasking order, stability and reconstruction is built around the stability and reconstruction tasking order (SRTO). To efficiently produce, execute, and
assess stability and reconstruction operations, the process is divided across five distinct divisions manned by the units and personnel that used to comprise the CJCMOTF, as well as the personnel earmarked by S/CRS, to act as the ACT-HQ. Beginning with the development of the operational strategy in the strategy division, and moving through the development and execution of the stability and reconstruction plan in the plans and current operations divisions, the cycle concludes with assessing the results of the plan in the assessments division and feeding those results back into the strategy division.

With national and theater strategic strategy synchronized across the interagency community, the SROC’s operational strategy division can begin developing the stability and reconstruction operation plan. Like the planning at the JTF, the strategy division would conduct its own mission analysis, develop COAs, wargame those COAs, and propose one COA to the SROC component commander. During this process, specified and implied tasks, decision points, and information requirements would be identified by phase, and coordination with the other components would be completed. This stability and reconstruction component plan forms the foundation for the SRTO.

With the component plan complete, the next organization in the SROC is the stability and reconstruction plans division (SRPD). Like the air operations center’s combat plans division, the SRPD creates a master stability and reconstruction plan and the resultant SRTO that matches the specific interagency and military capabilities to specific stability and reconstruction “targets” in order to create the effects specified in the component’s operations plan. To make this happen, the SRPD should be broken into two teams: the stability and reconstruction planning team, and the SRTO production team.
During this phase, the stability and reconstruction planning team aggregates tasks from the component’s operation plan with tasks nominated by military components and requests from NGOs operating in the AO, and matches resources assigned to the component against specific stability and reconstruction targets. This consolidated list of tasks is prioritized, interagency resources are packaged into mutually supportive units, and those units are tasked against specific targets to create a master stability and reconstruction plan (MSRP). Resources to conduct these operations come from either OGA resources dedicated specifically to stability and reconstruction or from those military resources made available for stability and reconstruction by the JTF commander. The MSRP also details the activities of the NGOs operating in the region, but only as a matter of deconfliction and not actual tasking, since the US government has no operational oversight over these organizations. Coordination with these external agents will be further defined later in this section. This draft MSRP is submitted to a stability and reconstruction tasking board comprised of representatives from the other components, as well as the JTF commander and the CSRG Chairman, for final approval.

Once the MSRP is approved, the SRTO production team must transform this plan into a SRTO and distribute it to units in the field. The SRTO expands upon the MSRP to provide enough operational details so that units conducting stability and reconstruction operations can conduct their own planning. This would include specific communications details, reporting requirements, and special instructions that tactical units would require to be effective. Finally, with the SRTO complete, the team would be responsible for disseminating the plan out to units in the field.
Unlike air operations, where a sortie takes off, strikes a target, and lands, a single stability and reconstruction operation may last for weeks or even a month or more. Although it may seem unnecessarily bureaucratic to produce a new tasking order every single day, there are a number of good reasons for doing so. First, by producing a daily SRTO, changes to the situation on the ground can be accounted for in the tasking order. For example, if a military unit operating near an ACT-T moves forward to go on the offensive, the SROC can provide that ACT-T with the contact information for another military unit to provide on-call support. On the other hand, if a military unit submits a high priority stability or reconstruction task, an the SROC can divert an ACT-T operating in the area to assess and complete that task. Secondly, producing a daily SRTO will aid in identifying and justifying resources for subordinate stability and reconstruction forces. Finally, daily SRTOs provide a predictable battle rhythm for tactical units.

Once the plans division publishes the SRTO, responsibility for managing and monitoring the execution of the SRTO passes to the stability and reconstruction operations division (SROD). Like the plans division, the SROD is divided into two teams: stability and security, and reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. The stability and security team would be responsible for monitoring the security and stability situation on the ground and working with security apparatus in the region to adjust security as the situation warrants. In essence, this team would be responsible for monitoring conditions on the ground that permit reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations to proceed. This team would have liaisons from other components to help coordinate these requirements. The humanitarian and reconstruction team would work with the various reconstruction and humanitarian organizations in the region and
make real-time changes to the plan as required. This team would be responsible for working with the CMOCs to help coordinate requests for assistance from NGOs and military components.

At this point it makes sense to explain the relationship between the SROC and its management and coordination nodes in the field. Chief amongst these nodes are the ACT-Ts and CMOCs that were explained in the previous COAs. Although their functionality would remain largely unchanged in this COA, it is important to note that they become an important part of the feedback loop to the SROC. These agencies would help the SROC identify real-time changes required to the plan, provide input as to what NGOs are doing within their particular AO, and help to provide an assessment of how stability and reconstruction efforts are proceeding. These inputs would be fed back into either the SROD if immediate changes like additional security is required, or back into either the strategic operational plans or plans divisions to provide assessments or request changes to future tasking orders. This division will feed the assessments from the field back to the strategy and plans divisions so that the overall plan can be adjusted, if required, and the tasking order remains responsive to the situation in the field.

The final two divisions are support divisions for all stability and reconstruction efforts. Although they are not directly part of the tasking order process, both the intelligence support division and the logistics support division play a critical role in ensuring an effective tasking order. This next section will detail both of these divisions and their respective manpower requirements.

As a support division, the intelligence support division provides multiagency intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support to stability and reconstruction
planning and execution. Although there is potential for streamlining AO-wide interagency intelligence activities within the ISR division, the concept is well outside the limits established in chapter 1 and will not be addressed here. This ISR division would be responsible for pulling relevant all-source intelligence from the various military and interagency intelligence resources in the AO. This division would also require a sizeable foreign disclosure cell to provide actionable intelligence to agencies that normally do not work in a classified environment. Finally, this division would be responsible for consolidating intelligence gathered during stability and reconstruction operations and disseminating that information back into the larger intelligence system. Because of the requirement for handling classified information, this division will be primarily manned by USG personnel familiar with the appropriate security clearances.

Finally, the logistics support division is the component’s liaison between stability and reconstruction teams in the field and logistics resources that are not a part of the stability and reconstruction component. This could include logistics resources from other components within the JTF as well as resources from agencies participating in the intervention. This division is also responsible for providing the communications, network, and logistics support to the SROC headquarters.

Feasibility

In this third and final COA, the author described a number of the organizations, planning processes, and coordination structures required to stand up a SROC. In this next session, the author will explore the manpower required to support this framework and the equipment and facilities required to support operational interagency cooperation.
Like the HRST, the strategy division should be comprised of senior representatives from each of the federal agencies involved in stability and reconstruction who can speak authoritatively to their particular agency’s capabilities and led by a senior representative from DOS. Although the development of the initial component plan will require a tremendous level of effort, once the plan is complete it will only require periodic updates as the situation unfolds. The division will not require full-time, around-the-clock manning unless a major change to the overall strategy is required. Therefore, the division should be led by a School-of-Advanced-Military-Studies-caliber planner with at least another additional military planner with a CA background. The division will also require representatives from each of the agencies involved in the contingency, although they can probably work in other divisions once the overall plan is completed.

For the plans division, leadership for this division should come from the interagency community and should have sufficient seniority within their particular agency to provide credibility with the stability and reconstruction component commander. As with the component leadership, the deputy division leader should be a military planner with extensive stability and reconstruction experience. To effectively field this division, it will require representatives from each of the participating organizations with a working knowledge of how operations are conducted in the field. Like the air operations center, this division should scale up or scale down as the size and complexity of stability and reconstruction operations fluctuates. For small or short-duration contingencies, a single agency representative to aid in creating the MRSP and a representative for creating the SRTO may suffice. For large-scale contingencies involving an entire country or region, several representatives from each participating
agency may be required in each section. Although experience is most certainly required, seniority is not necessarily required since this group will be overseen by a senior OGA representative.

Given the managerial nature of the operations division, it requires a leader familiar with running stability and reconstruction efforts. Although a leader for this division could certainly come from either an OGA or the military, it makes most sense to make this a military representative. First, this function is very similar to the functions involved in running a CJCMOTF or CA brigade; therefore the corporate knowledge is already in place in the military. Secondly, as a combined civilian-military organization, half of the senior leadership positions should be given to military leaders. With an OGA representative responsible for the overall strategy, placing a military leader in charge of day-to-day operations allows the military to retain some sense of control over stability and reconstruction operations. Finally, since this division will most likely interact most with the other components, placing a military leader in charge of the division would provide the other components with a military leader who understands their specific requirements.

Since the operations division will be responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations, it should not require as many personnel as the plans division. In fact, other than liaisons from each of the components and an on-call representative from each of the OGAs, most of the personnel in this division will be command post representatives or battle captains capable of tracking the progress of stability and reconstruction forces and maintaining contact with forces in the field. Although CA and OGA representatives may not be required around the clock, if a situation arises that requires a change to the tasking
order, they must be available to assess the situation and make recommendations to the division leader.

The intelligence and logistics support divisions could be led by an OGA representative with the proper security clearance and background, but most likely would be led by a senior field grade officer from the military. For the intelligence division, a colonel with a military intelligence background seems to make the most sense. Manpower for this division would come largely from the intelligence and CA communities within the military. Manpower for the logistics support division would come primarily from the military in terms of signal, communications, and similar branches to support the operations center. Liaisons to the joint rear area commander, US Transportation Command, and other strategic transportation and logistics providers would also be welcomed. Leadership for the logistics support division most certainly would be a military officer, probably a senior lieutenant colonel, with experience in establishing and maintaining a deployed operations center.

Although the SROC incorporates the ACT-HQ described in the second COA, the organization relies heavily on the command and control systems, security, intelligence, manpower, and logistics elements of the military. If the SROC is collocated with the JTF headquarters, many of the command and control systems already in place to manage military forces could be used to coordinate with the ACT-Ts and CMOCs embedded with military elements. Furthermore, collocating the SROC allows for economy of scale by capitalizing on resources already supporting the JTF headquarters to help offset the cost of standing up a SROC. This is not to say that the SROC would not need any additional support resources, but simply that it would not need quite as many additional resources.
Finally, by collocating the SROC at the JTF instead of burdening an embassy with the bed down of an entire operations center. This also helps to reinforce that the SROC is focused on the entire AO instead of just one particular country. Finally, by placing the SROC outside the purview of any one particular chief of mission, it helps to reinforce the fact that the SROC reports to the CSRG and JTF commander.

Acceptability

Even if a COA is feasible, acceptability to the organizations involved in the contingency may be more important. Just as with COA 2, one of the critical tasks is combining the various interagency capabilities and persuading the OGA and DOD to accept the validity of the solution. This next section will forecast the just how acceptable this COA will be to the major OGA actors.

As with the previous COAs, the key actors in this COA are USAID, DOS, and the DOD, with Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, and other agencies playing smaller roles for the OGAs. In most every case, the OGA will factor the rubric of operational interagency coordination into three distinct problems. First, each agency will probably want to know if the COA will help them leverage the resources of another agency to help that agency complete its assigned mission. As with COA 2, the answer to this question is a resounding yes. By embedding the HRST into the JTF planning staff and standing up a stability and reconstruction component, agencies most certainly will benefit from deconfliction, economies of scale, and easier, more streamlined access to excess capabilities of another agency.

Secondly, each agency will want to know how this COA would impinge on the independence of their particular agency. This is the portion of acceptability that most
certainly will be most contentious and subject to the most heated debate. Subordinating OGA assets and personnel to the JTF commander will absolutely generate an initial hostile reaction. At first glance, this COA dramatically reduces the power and influence of the ambassadors in the region and substantially reduces the power and influence of mid- and senior-level OGA decision makers in Washington, DC. Upon further investigation though, many of these concerns may be allayed. First, the HRST will form a fairly large percentage of a JTF commanders planning group. This relatively senior group of decision makers will most certainly carry significant influence with military planners and will guide the JTF’s discussions and decisions toward a result that is both acceptable and feasible for the OGAs. (See Appendix B for observations from a 2006 Joint Interagency Planning Exercise conducted at the US Army’s Command and General Staff College.) Secondly, standing up a brand new component, led by a senior leader from the OGA community, emphasizes the importance of stability and reconstruction operations.

This decision places the stability and reconstruction leader on par with the other war-fighting components of the JTF. Furthermore, if the JTF does not contain an overt war-fighting mission, it is conceivable that the JTF commander could be a senior OGA representative. Finally, standing up a SROC with the lead strategist and planner coming from the OGA community increases their control over stability and reconstruction operations. From a military perspective, the land component commander may be concerned about losing control over land forces but if the land component commander gives the stability and reconstruction component tactical control over forces for stability and reconstruction, he can still retain operational control and have those forces available
if war-fighting tasks suddenly take a higher priority. The relationship would be quite similar to the relationship between the air component and Marine Corps aviation.

Although factoring the problem gives some insight into the COA’s overall acceptability, one must also consider the parochial priorities, perceptions, and short- and long-term goals of the agencies involved. Again, at first look, this COA may appear to run contrary to the OGA’s parochial priorities. USAID recently stood up an office of military cooperation and DOS has been appointed as the lead for stability and reconstruction. So why would a COA that subordinates the OGA to the JTF commander be in line with parochial priorities? Quite simply, congressional pressure is mounting in the wake of the disconnects in Afghanistan and again in Iraq, and a self-imposed solution is certainly more palatable than a solution imposed by congressional fiat. Although this COA may not give each agency in the OGA everything it wants, it does provide a measure of control for the OGA and may have the second-order effect of getting OGAs additional funding for their programs.

Like COA 2, most agencies will perceive almost any change to the status quo as a threat to their independence, this COA provides a good mix of centralized and consistent oversight and allows OGA planners familiar with their particular strengths and capabilities to plan operations collaboratively with other agencies and the military. This COA restricts OGA independence slightly but does allow each agency to exert influence over its areas of expertise at the operational strategy and planning level while providing a common framework from which every agency can try to synchronize efforts.
Suitability

Like the previous COAs, the last test is to determine how well it fixes the problem of operational interagency unity of effort. By utilizing the criteria from chapter 3, this section will assess the suitability COA to provide an assessment of its overall suitability. First for this COA to be suitable for improving interagency unity of effort, it must help the JTF commander to transform the strategic plan developed by the RCC and interagency community in Washington, DC into an operation plan. Clearly, by placing the HRST into a combatant commander’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters and then embedding it into the deployed JTF, the interagency community will certainly assist the JTF commander with achieving interagency unity of effort. During this phase, the JTF and HRST will be able to identify the applicable agencies and develop the hierarchy necessary to smoothly employ the interagency community.

Coordination is certainly one of the most important considerations for this particular COA. Unlike COA one, where coordination was ad-hoc, or COA two, where coordination was accomplished at the strategic and tactical levels, this COA ensures coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. By standing up the SROC, strategic decisions at the HRST and COCOM can be tailored to meet operational considerations and translated into tactical taskings to units. This collaboration and management at the operational level superbly links strategic guidance with tactical tasks. By centrally controlling stability and reconstruction assets and decentralizing the execution of the specific tasks, scarce OGA assets are used most efficiently. The process of producing the stability and reconstruction tasking order by its very nature deconflicts resources and identifies support requirements and ensures those requirements are met.
Standing up a stability and reconstruction operations component is consistent with NSPD 44 and DOD Directive 3500.05 because it places stability and reconstruction on par with combat operations by making it a separate component under the JTF commander. With a SROC stood up to direct the actions of the stability and reconstruction component, a clear hierarchy will be established at the operational level between the DOD and the rest of the OGA participants. Furthermore, by standing up an entire division to monitor and track the execution of the tasking order, real-time changes to that order can be made if the situation warrants.

Another significant benefit of this particular COA is its ability to identify available OGA resources. By embedding the HRST into the JTF headquarters and standing up a SROC, the OGA participates in every step of the planning and execution process. Since every OGA participating in the contingency would participate in the SROC, OGA resources are not just identified, but their use is optimized by combining or deconflicting them with other operations in the area. This level of integration and cooperation will only build interagency cooperation and provide participants with a great deal of planning experience, as well as interagency experience, at both the strategic and operational levels.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

We must improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war…and that means our government must be able to move quickly to provide needed assistance.

President George W. Bush, 17 May 2005

In the previous chapter, three distinct COAs were illustrated and analyzed to determine their feasibility, acceptability, and suitability with regard to improving interagency coordination. According to the analysis, the third COA was clearly superior to either the status quo or the proposal from S/CRS. This chapter will explain why COA 3 is the best solution for improving interagency unity of effort and highlight a few of the contentious issues that must be resolved. Finally, this chapter will touch on some of the critical issues that transcend any discussion regarding interagency coordination. These issues include contingency funding, interagency leadership development, incorporation of multinational representatives and NGOs into stability and reconstruction planning and execution, and optimum scaling of the leadership and management of stability and reconstruction when either the civilian community or the military does not have a large presence.

As chapter 4 demonstrated, COA 3 was the most feasible, acceptable, and suitable of the three COAs identified. That said, there are several legitimate questions regarding implementation, precedence, and resources that must be adequately addressed if this COA is to be implemented during a contingency. First, in regards to the implementation strategy for COA 3, some may question how the SROC component would deconflict
boundaries and missions with the joint forces land component commander (JFLCC) during operations. Again, much like the joint forces air component commander (JFACC), the AO for the SROC would be the combatant commander’s entire AOR. As such, it logically follows that coordination and deconfliction with components would be similar to the JFACC’s relationship with the JFLCC. Specifically, just as control measures are put in place to prevent fratricide and facilitate operations with the JFACC, the JFLCC and SROC would have to agree on a number of control measures to facilitate operations and protect forces of each component.

One approach would be to visualize the JTF commander’s AOR as a zero sum game between the SROC and the JFLCC, where portions of the JFLCC’s AO are ceded to the SROC as the situation matures and combat operations wrap up. The SROC director would then be responsible for all operations in that AO. Initially, the JFLCC would be responsible for almost the entire land AO and the SROC would make CA teams and ACTs available to the JFLCC to aid in his scheme of maneuver. As the operation progressed and operations migrated from major combat operations to stability and reconstruction, portions of the JFLCC’s AO could be turned over to the SROC. If the situation in a portion of the SROC’s AO deteriorates beyond that which he can handle, the SROC can request additional support from the JFLCC. In a sense, this is similar to the JFACC’s support to the JFLCC. In order for the JFACC to support the JFLCC’s ground scheme of maneuver, he must apportion a percentage of his sorties to conduct close air support missions, and make those assets tactical control to the ground commander. Typically, early in an operation, a relatively small percentage would be available to the CLFCC because the JFACC is busy establishing air superiority and conducting strategic
attacks. In fact, early in an operation, JFLCC forces may be made available to the JFACC
to aid in the JFACC’s scheme of maneuver. As the operation progresses though, an
increasingly larger percentage of sorties are made available to the JFLCC to support his
scheme of maneuver.

In much the same manner, early in the operation, the SROC will most likely
provide a number of its forces to the JFLCC to help with intelligence collection, handling
internally displaced persons, or repairing critical infrastructure. As the operations
progress though and portions of the JFLCC’s AO are transferred to the SROC, the
JFLCC (as well as the other components) would apportion an increasing percentage of
his ground combat forces to the SROC. Ultimately, as major combat operations conclude
and stability and reconstruction become the main tasks for the JTF, the SROC will
control the vast majority of the JTF’s AOR and have tactical control over the majority of
the JTF’s forces.

By modeling the SROC’s relationship with the JFLCC to the JFLCC’s
relationship with the JFACC, the JTF derives a number of benefits. First, the JFLCC is
relieved of most stability and reconstruction tasks and allowed to concentrate almost
completely on major combat operations. Second, stability and reconstruction
responsibilities are assigned to an interagency body (with JTF oversight) that has the
expertise and knowledge to plan and execute stability and reconstruction efforts
efficiently. This arrangement emphasizes the role of the interagency community in
stability and reconstruction and facilitates the transition from military to civilian control.
Finally, by keeping the SROC subordinate to the JTF commander, the JTF commander
retains a critical role in overseeing stability and reconstruction efforts and can adjust
military force allocation and apportionment to the SROC if the components disagree on weight of effort.

Even with every implementation issue addressed though, many people will continue to question the acceptability of COA 3 to the interagency community. A quick look at the recent history of interagency operations though points to an increasing willingness to work at a military operating location while retaining some modicum of agency independence. Throughout the latter end of the twentieth century, counterdrug operations were run out of Joint Interagency Task Forces-South, a military-run organization manned by both DOD and interagency representatives. Furthermore, recent operations supporting relief efforts in Mississippi and Louisiana illustrate the willingness of the OGA to cooperate in a military-run operation when the situation dictates. Even during the stand-up and operation of Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq OGA personnel deployed and supported a military-run organization. Although many will debate the effectiveness of these organizations, no one can debate the fact that the OGA provided personnel and resources, however reluctantly, to support these efforts.

Regardless of the chain of command established on paper, real power in the government lies with the organization with the financial backing to carry out its agenda. In essence, it is the golden rule: He with the gold makes the rules. Currently, each agency participates in a contingency using its own manpower and financial resources. Even if a single body were appointed the lead for all operations in a particular contingency, that body would have little say over many of the resources committed to the contingency.
Currently, funding for interventions is dispersed across multiple agencies. USAID gets its own funding for its own stability and reconstruction projects, DOS receives funding to promote good governance, stability, and rule of law, and the DOD can receive funding through supplemental funding bills to fund its own stability and reconstruction efforts. Unfortunately, these programs are not synchronized and the various appropriation limitations placed by Congress severely limits the flexibility and oversight that any one agency may require in an intervention. Although Congress has explicitly limited flexibility to ensure its own oversight over the process, these limitations also have the second- and third-order effect of preventing proper tactical oversight over intervention expenditures.

For any interagency organization to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed, it must be staffed with personnel capable of developing plans and explaining the operations of its particular agency. Furthermore, these representatives must have the ability to reach back to the appropriate decision-makers within their respective agencies to informally coordinate specific proposals and lay the groundwork for official interagency coordination through the NSC staffing process. But even more fundamental to the interagency concept is a shared understanding that must be developed from the ground up.

To do this effectively, a number of steps must be taken to inculcate all of the federal interagency organizations with the understanding of interagency operations. First, federal agencies must identify existing positions within their organization that could be filled by a representative from another federal agency. Although the exact number of positions is certainly open to debate, the number must be substantial enough to provide
significant crossflow with other federal agencies. For instance, if ten federal agencies decide to participate in a program, it makes sense that at least ten positions within each organization are made available for interagency crossflow. This would provide one position for each of participating agencies.

Creating positions is only the first step in inculcating interagency cooperation across the federal government. Once these positions are created, personnel must be identified, trained, and assigned to fill the positions. To do this effectively, one can look at the US Army’s foreign area officer program for clues in how to run the program effectively. In this program, officers are competitively selected for the program via a selection board. Once the officers are selected, they are sent to school to receive a relevant masters degree and to learn a foreign language. This process can take upwards of two years. Once schooling is complete, the officers are sent on an immersion tour into a foreign country to learn all they can about the people, country, and culture. Once that immersion tour is complete, the officer becomes a fully qualified foreign area officer and is available to function in a multitude of roles on a combatant commander’s staff, embassy staff, or JTF planning staff.

Like the foreign area officer program, an interagency staff officer program could also benefit from a three-tiered developmental approach. The interagency staff officer program should begin by providing new interagency staff officers with the opportunity to earn a masters degree in an intergovernmental-related discipline. Once the candidate has completed his degree, he should receive an eighteen-to-twenty-four-month immersion assignment in another agency. Here, the candidate would gain an appreciation of another agency’s culture and ways of doing business. Once the immersion tour is complete, the
candidate is now certified as an interagency staff officer and available to fill assignments on a combatant commander’s JIACG, an HRST, a CSRG, or PCC.

Finally, although COA 3 focuses on a major combat operation followed by a reconstruction effort, future interventions will not always follow this model. One can certainly envision a scenario similar to the tsunami relief operation in South Asia or the earthquake relief operation in Pakistan to see that a large combat force will not always proceed a large relief force. Even in these cases though, COA 3 provides a solid foundation upon which to build an interagency response.

As former S/CRS coordinator Carlos Pascual pointed out, “If we’re going to be effective as a government, we need an overall strategy as a government. The individual components have to have their own strategy that is consistent with the broader one. Our mandate is to try to make sure that all of these things are brought together in an effective way” (2005b, 2). At the national and theater strategic levels, S/CRS has a solid plan. Even if a proposed strategy does not contain a major combat operation, appointing a JTF commander to oversee operations and creating a stability and reconstruction component provide a continuous unity of effort from the national strategic level down to the tactical level. Although the JTF would have representation from the land, air, maritime, and special forces components, the preponderance of the forces available to the JTF commander would be in the SROC. Furthermore, just as JTF commanders are expected to perform tasks normally reserved for members of the diplomatic corps, it is conceivable that leadership of a JTF conducting a stability and reconstruction effort would be given to a nonmilitary official such as an ambassador or special US envoy. Although substantial research is required to ensure that the JTF complies with all pertinent codes and statutes,
this single act of breaking the military-run-by-military paradigm may be the catalyst for breaking the interagency logjam.
Since improving unity of effort has as much to do with integrating cultures as with integrating chains of command, it is important to establish a common lexicon from which one can articulate a particular point of view. For the sake of discussion in this thesis the following definitions apply (unless otherwise indicated, all definitions come from JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*).

Civil Military Operations Center: an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other USG agencies, NGOs, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent (US Government, 2005).

COCOM (command authority): Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), *U.S. Code*, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. COCOM (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in COCOM (command authority).

Interagency coordination: Within context of the Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged USG agencies, NGOs, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group: a NSC sanctioned and Department of Defense funded advisory element on a combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community (USJFCOM 2004, 2).
National Security Council: A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers.

Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this area link tactics to strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objective, initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

Operational Control: Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in COCOM (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Other Governmental Agencies: All Federal Agencies except for the Department of Defense.

Policy Coordinating Committee: Manages the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provides policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensures timely responses to decisions made by the President (JP 3-08 2006, 33).
Tactical Control: Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.

Universal Joint Task List: A menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission essential task list.
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