PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
OF WEST AFRICAN STATES STANDBY FORCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

RICHARD AMPONSEM-BOATENG, MAJOR, GHANA ARMY
Diploma in Advanced Intelligence, US Army Intelligence Centre, Ft Huachuca, 2001
Diploma, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, 2004
Post Graduate Diploma in Public Administration, GIMPA, Accra, Ghana, 2004

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2006

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Prospects of the ECOWAS Standby Force

Amponsem-Boateng, Richard, Major


The problems that transcend West Africa over the last decade have been economic deprivation and insecurity due to an increase in surrogate and civil wars. Political instability, conflicts and economic deprivation breeds failed states. In addition to wanton human sufferings, failed states can provide safe havens for terrorist and other international crime. The traditional conflict resolution mechanisms employed by West African leaders to solve the problems have proven futile. Thus, ECOWAS, in 1990, resorted to using the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a security model for peace support operations in the sub-region. This security mechanism has been described as the most advanced and tested in the sub-Saharan Africa. The African Union (AU) is working to live up to its expectation with respect to the maintenance of peace and security in the region by approving the “Roadmap to the Operationalization of the ASF” concept, which calls for establishment of standby forces to consist of standby brigades in each of the five economic regions. To make the dream of the ASF a reality, the sub-regions must meet the requirements in the roadmap. Though ECOWAS has made significant progress towards establishing a viable sub-regional peace support capability it needs to improve on its operational capacity. This research is therefore intended to make strategic and operational recommendations to the on-going process undertaken by ECOWAS to meet the requirements in the AU’s roadmap. The major recommendations are that ECOWAS should address the problems that it encountered during previous ECOMOG missions and also use the P3 initiative as a platform to synchronize external support for ECOWAS peace support operations.

ECOWAS, ECOMOG, Roadmap to the Operationalization of the African Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, the P3 Initiative

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

UU

86

UU

86

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
ECOWAS, ECOMOG, Roadmap to the Operationalization of the African Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, the P3 Initiative

14. ABSTRACT
The problems that transcend West Africa over the last decade have been economic deprivation and insecurity due to an increase in surrogate and civil wars. Political instability, conflicts and economic deprivation breeds failed states. In addition to wanton human sufferings, failed states can provide safe havens for terrorist and other international crime. The traditional conflict resolution mechanisms employed by West African leaders to solve the problems have proven futile. Thus, ECOWAS, in 1990, resorted to using the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a security model for peace support operations in the sub-region. This security mechanism has been described as the most advanced and tested in the sub-Saharan Africa. The African Union (AU) is working to live up to its expectation with respect to the maintenance of peace and security in the region by approving the “Roadmap to the Operationalization of the ASF” concept, which calls for establishment of standby forces to consist of standby brigades in each of the five economic regions. To make the dream of the ASF a reality, the sub-regions must meet the requirements in the roadmap. Though ECOWAS has made significant progress towards establishing a viable sub-regional peace support capability it needs to improve on its operational capacity. This research is therefore intended to make strategic and operational recommendations to the on-going process undertaken by ECOWAS to meet the requirements in the AU’s roadmap. The major recommendations are that ECOWAS should address the problems that it encountered during previous ECOMOG missions and also use the P3 initiative as a platform to synchronize external support for ECOWAS peace support operations.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Richard Amponsem-Boateng

Thesis Title: Prospects of the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Michael Mihalka, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
Douglas E. Lathrop, M.A.

______________________________, Member
Mark H. Lauber, M.S.

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The problems that transcend West Africa over the last decade have been economic deprivation and insecurity due to an increase in surrogate and civil wars. Political instability, conflicts and economic deprivation breeds failed states. In addition to wanton human sufferings, failed states can provide safe havens for terrorist and other international crime. The traditional conflict resolution mechanisms employed by West African leaders to solve the problems have proven futile. Thus, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in 1990, resorted to using the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a security model for peace support operations in the subregion. This security mechanism has been described as the most advanced and tested in the sub-Saharan Africa.

The African Union (AU) is working to live up to its expectation with respect to the maintenance of peace and security in the region by approving the “Roadmap to the Operationalization of the ASF” concept, which calls for establishment of standby forces to consist of standby brigades in each of the five economic regions. To make the dream of the ASF a reality, the subregions must meet the requirements in the roadmap. Though ECOWAS has made significant progress towards establishing a viable subregional peace support capability it needs to improve on its operational capacity. This research is therefore intended to make strategic and operational recommendations to the ongoing process undertaken by ECOWAS to meet the requirements in the AU’s roadmap. The major recommendations are that ECOWAS should address the problems that it encountered during previous ECOMOG missions and also use the P3 initiative as a platform to synchronize external support for ECOWAS peace support operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am most grateful to God for this opportunity and the favors He granted me to complete this study. It is my heartfelt acknowledgement that it is by His grace that saw me through this work. I am also grateful to the Ghana Army for sending me here to add this value to myself. This year in Fort Leavenworth has been a worthwhile experience for me. My sincere gratitude also goes to my committee chairman, Dr. Michael Mihalka for his patience and guidance. I owe him thanks for my reinforced knowledge in research methodology.

I also want to thank my other committee members Mr. Douglas E. Lathrop and Mr. Mark H. Lauber for their time. My special thanks go to Mr. Lathrop for his commitment, and guidance throughout the project. His abundant and rich experience in African affairs and meticulousness in proofreading my drafts contributed immensely to the successful completion of the project. My debt of gratitude will not be complete without the mention of the faculty of the Graduate Degree Programs for their selfless support to the study, and Mr. Michael Browne of CARL Library for his dedication to this academic work.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my dear wife, Mrs. Georgina Amponsem-Boateng for her patience, tolerance, love, and encouragement throughout this long and challenging process. May God bless you all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadmap to the Operationalization of ASF</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Review of the ECOWAS Concept of Conflict Resolution in the Sub-Region</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Community’s Support for ECOWAS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step One: Identification and Isolation of the Problem</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step Two: Review of Information Relevant to the Thesis</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step Three: Collection and Classification of Data</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step Four: Data Analysis</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step Five: Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrangements of Chapters</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS

AAP        African Action Plan
ACDS       African Chiefs of the Defense Staff
ACOTA      African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
ACRI       African Crisis Response Initiative
AFL        Armed Forces of Liberia
AMU        Arab Maghreb Union
APTSP      African Peacekeeping Training Support Program
ARPP       African Regional Peacekeeping Program
ASF        African Standby Force
AU         African Union
BMATT      British Military Advisory Training Team
COE        Contingent Owned Equipment
DDR        Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DOTMLPF    Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Finance
DPKO       (United Nations) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECCAS      Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMICI    ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOWAS     Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG     ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ESF        ECOWAS Standby Force
EU         European Union
GDP        Gross Domestic Product
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Government Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combine Exchange Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Main Brigade (of ESF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPMC</td>
<td>Mission Planning and Management Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mediation and Security Council (of ECOWAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFR</td>
<td>Operation Focus Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Observation and Monitoring Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMZ</td>
<td>Observation and Monitoring Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (of AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacites Africanes de Maintien de la Paix (Strengthening of African Peacekeeping Capabilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROEs</td>
<td>Rules of Engagements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRES</td>
<td>Special Representative of the (ECOWAS) Executive Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force (of ESF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOA  Transfer of Authority
TTP  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UN   United Nations
Table 1. Recommended Priority Matrix ..........................................................62
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

In Africa, surrogate and civil wars, ethnic conflicts, coup d’etats and territorial disputes are among the major threats to peace and stability in the region. “Often, such threats require a rapid response from a group of well-trained, well-equipped military, police and civilian experts to handle the situation. They must not only be willing to establish a secure environment within which peace can be built, such a force must as well, have the expertise and resources to protect civilians in armed conflict” (Kent and Malan 2003, 1).

The African Union (AU) is working to live up to its expectation with respect to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. So far, it has established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace, and also recommended the development of a common security policy and, agreed to the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. The ASF must be capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace in any part of the region (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 1).

After several meetings in Addis Ababa by the African Ministers of Defense, the “Roadmap to the Operationalization of the ASF” was approved by African Heads of State in Addis Ababa in July 2004. According to the roadmap, the ASF is to consist of standby brigades in each of the five economic regions. To make the dream of the ASF a reality, the economic regions must meet the requirements in the roadmap.
In the 1970s, regional economic groupings were formed in Africa to enhance economic development on the continent. Contrary to the hopes and aspirations of these subregional groupings, political instability engulfed the continent thereafter. These impeded on the attainment of the objectives of the economic groupings. The focus of some of these economic groupings was therefore redirected to the enforcement and maintenance of peace in their respective subregions (Aboagye 1999, 163).

One such grouping which became prominent and a pacesetter in peacekeeping on the continent is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS, in the 1990s, became better recognized for its mediation/intervention efforts in conflict areas than for its aspirations of economic integration. Starting from its first intervention in Liberia, through its military force, known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), ECOWAS became the first subregional organization to successfully enforce and keep peace in a member country, Liberia. This effort has since been repeated in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and, for a second time, in Liberia. Aboagye noted that: “notwithstanding its limitations, the ECOWAS security model is arguably the most advanced and tested in the sub-Saharan Africa, and offers many experiences and lessons that could inform continental security arrangements” (1999, 164).

ECOWAS has made significant progress towards establishing a viable subregional peace support capability, within the framework of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Its intention is to convert the ECOMOG model to an ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). It has approved an operational framework document to guide its planners in the establishment of the ESF. ECOMOG forces are an ad hoc assembly of troops from member states of the subregion with different background experience in
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, different levels of logistic support, and different
levels of training. This diversity in equipment, training, and tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) among the units from different backgrounds presented some problems
and challenges during previous ECOMOG operations. Also, most West African militaries
do not have the capability to raise, deploy and sustain a force to undertake or contribute
peace support operations.

With the concept of regional-subregional standby forces in place, how
successfully will West Africa meet the requirement in the roadmap to operationalize the
ASF? What has been achieved so far and what needs to be done? Even though ECOMOG
interventions in West Africa had associated problems and shortcomings, the interventions
managed to halt the carnage and created an atmosphere that encouraged the restoration of
peace and provided for a smooth takeover by the United Nations (UN). What accounts
for the relative success achieved by ECOWAS in subregional peacekeeping and
enforcement? Has Nigeria’s lead-nation role enhanced ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts?
How can ECOWAS donor partners support the ESF?

The author’s motivation to conduct this research has arisen from his experience
serving with the ECOWAS intervention forces in Liberia as a platoon commander, in
Sierra Leone as the military intelligence officer to the Ghana Battalion, and in Cote
d’Ivoire as a staff officer at the Multinational Force Headquarters. As an African, the
author also has a duty to make his humble contribution towards peace and stability in the
West African subregion by sharing his experiences and views with the interested public
whose aspirations, frustrations and hopes about Africa tally with his.
The purpose of this research project is to make an assessment of the “Roadmap to Operationalization of the ASF” with respect to the ESF. The study will analyze the roadmap vis-à-vis challenges facing West Africa and how successful the subregional body will be in meeting its requirements. The major portion of this research project will analyze the strategic and operational contributions to the ongoing process undertaken by ECOWAS with a view to making recommendations on how the ESF can become more effective and relevant for the West African subregion.

**Background**

Intrastate conflicts abounded in West Africa over the last two decades. Efforts by the subregion’s leaders to resolve these conflicts using various traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were not effective. Traditional mechanisms have included mediation by commissions, ad hoc committees, mediation by African Heads of State (mostly coup makers and former rebel leaders) and the use of the chieftaincy institution. Recent conflicts in the region have, however, revealed that the use of these mechanisms alone has not helped much in resolving the conflicts and preventing the outbreak of violence. Since 1990, ECOWAS has resorted to employing military intervention forces as a major part of its conflict resolution mechanisms. Though these interventions have created an atmosphere conducive for long-term political and diplomatic solutions to problems in the West Africa subregion, their legality is questionable (Gray 2004, 292-293).

ECOWAS has managed peace operations more than any of the other four subregional organizations in Africa, namely; Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa; Southern African Development Community...
(SADC) in Southern Africa; Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa; and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in Northern Africa. ECOWAS has so far authorized six missions since 1990. The ECOWAS member states have also been very active UN peacekeeping troop contributors. Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal have each participated in more than twenty-five UN missions. According to Cilliers and Malan, eight UN missions were deployed in Africa, as of October 2005, with a total authorized strength of 54,331 representing about 79 percent of the global authorized total of UN peacekeepers. Over 7,000 West African police, military observers and military personnel were committed to the three UN missions in West Africa. A further 1,192 were committed to DRC, and 1,267 more to other UN missions. While West Africa provides nearly 15 percent of the world's peacekeepers, the three West African missions required 40 percent of the global total of UN peacekeepers (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 6).

The existing West African capacity to mount and sustain peace operations is inadequate. Yet, it has been the desire of ECOWAS to build and maintain its own peace support operations capability. The ECOWAS Protocol on the “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security,” adopted in 1999, provides for the necessary political and military structures for peace and security in the subregion (ECOWAS Secretariat 1999, 4).

**ECOWAS**

ECOWAS, founded in 1975, is a regional group of fifteen countries as illustrated in Appendix A. Eight of the countries are French speaking while five of the remaining seven are English speaking and two speak Portuguese. Member states of ECOWAS are Burkina Faso, Benin, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The organization also includes the following institutions: the Authority of Heads of States and Governments, Council of Ministers, Community of Parliament, Economic and Social Council, Community Court of Justice, Executive Secretariat and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development. The organization has as its stated mission:

    To promote cooperation and integration leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standard of its people, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent. (ECOWAS Secretariat 1993, 4)

Political instability impeded ECOWAS in attaining its laudable economic objectives. ECOWAS leaders noticed, in the late 1970’s, that economic development and security were closely interlinked and therefore adopted two protocols to address this concern: “Protocol on Non-Aggression” in 1978 and protocol on “Mutual Assistance on Defense” in 1981 (Aboagye 1999, 163).

    The ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense obliges member states to respond to any member’s request during an internal conflict situation where the conflict has foreign involvement and likely is to affect security in the entire subregion (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 4). However, member states have been selective in their response to conflicts in the subregion. For instance, Senegal initially declined to contribute troops for the ECOWAS operation in Liberia in 1990. Similarly, Nigeria refused to contribute to troops for the ECOWAS operation in Cote d’Ivoire, likewise Ghana refused to partake in the ECOWAS operation in Guinea-Bissau.
ECOMOG


In 2000, an attempt to intervene in the conflict between Liberia and Guinea (Conakry) was aborted. ECOMOG has been operating as an ad hoc peacekeeping force and faced many operational difficulties and strategic challenges, yet Aboagye (1999, 164) described it as having many experiences and lessons that can enhance the effectiveness of any continental or subcontinental security model.

The ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau deployed at a time when there was an ongoing ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone. This challenged ECOMOG’s ability to mount and sustain two simultaneous missions. Despite funding and logistical support from France, deployment was delayed. Also, the required size of the force to fulfill its mandate was not met. The countries that contributed troops were Benin, Niger and Togo (IRIN 2004, 4).

ECOWAS member states agreed to make available to ECOWAS their military, police and civilian resources to partake in peace support missions. The Special Representative of the Executive Secretary (SRES) is designated as head of all ECOWAS missions (ECOWAS Secretariat 1999, 11). However, ECOMOG operations, after the protocol was signed and ratified, were mainly a military component under military
command and control. For instance ECOWAS operations in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, in which the author took part, were without a SRES and a civilian component.

Apart from the ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau, the exit strategy for ECOMOG has been to transition its troops into a subsequent UN peacekeeping force. Its modus operandi has been an initial emergency response, followed by the deployment of a multifunctional UN mission. Thus, ECOMOG operations have usually been an interim stop-gap measure with the expectation of handing over the lead to the UN. Here again the author was among the ECOWAS troops “rehatted” and transitioned into the various UN peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire.

Among the many difficulties ECOMOG encountered was its inadequate logistical support as well as interoperability and command and control issues. Despite all the difficulties, ECOMOG managed to halt the senseless carnage and restored temporary peace to conflict areas in which it has operated. It also assisted in some humanitarian efforts, which reduced the suffering of the civilian populace (ECOWAS Secretariat: 2005a, 11).

**Roadmap to the Operationalization of ASF**

The African Chiefs of the Defense Staff (ACDS) have approved, on behalf of the AU, the “Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force” document (hereafter referred to as the policy framework), which provides guidelines for the various subregional standby forces in the five regions. The policy framework stipulates that each of the regions will have a standby brigade composed of: a brigade (mission level) headquarter and support unit of up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles; a headquarter company and support unit of up to 120 personnel; four light infantry
battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 vehicles; an engineer unit of up to 505 personnel; a light signals unit of up to 135 personnel; a reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to 150 personnel; a helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, ten vehicles and four helicopters; a military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles; a light multirole logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles; a level II medical unit of up to 35 personnel and ten vehicles; a military observer group of up to 120 officers; a civilian support group consisting of logistical, administrative and budget components (AU 2005, A-3).

The structure of the ASF, as contained in the Policy Framework, is based on the following six missions and scenarios: **Scenario 1. AU/subregional military advice to a political mission:** Deployment required within thirty days of an AU mandate resolution; **Scenario 2. AU/subregional observer mission codeployed with a UN Mission:** Deployment required within thirty days of an AU mandate resolution; **Scenario 3. Stand-alone AU/subregional observer mission:** Deployment required within thirty days of an AU mandate resolution; **Scenario 4. AU/subregional peacekeeping force for UN Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (peace building):** deployment required within thirty days of an AU mandate resolution; **Scenario 5. AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers:** ASF-completed deployment required within ninety days of an AU mandate resolution, with the military component being able to deploy in thirty days; **Scenario 6. AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly:** here the framework demands that the AU have the capability to deploy a robust military force in fourteen days (AU 2005, A-1).
The framework document calls for the establishment of the ASF in two phases:  

*Phase 1* (up to 30 June 2005): The AU’s objective is to establish a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenario 1–2 missions, while the five regions would establish regional standby forces up to brigade size to achieve up to Scenario 4 capabilities. *Phase 2* (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): It is envisaged that by 2010 the AU will have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the five regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 involving AU/subregional peacekeeping forces (AU 2005, 1).

The policy framework also demands the establishment of a fifteen-person Planning Element (PLANELM) at the AU headquarters and an initial nucleus of five-person PLANELM at each of the five subregional headquarters. The role of the AU PLANELM is to provide for a multidimensional strategic-level management capability. The subregional PLANELMs would also expand to 15 persons over time. Their core functions are planning, preparation and training of brigade headquarters and standby elements (AU 2005, 6-7).

In terms of logistics, the policy framework provides that missions deployed for *Scenarios 1–3* should be self-sustainable for up to 30 days, while *Scenarios 4–6* missions and operations should deploy with up to 90 days self-sustainability. After the initial 30 days of sustainment, the mandate authority (AU or UN) must take responsibility for the sustainment of the missions or, lacking that capacity, the readiness and ability to start reimbursing troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in order to ensure continuous sustainment by the countries of the respective contingents (AU 2005, 10).
Funding was found to be a major challenge for the regional body. Consequently, the policy framework urged the AU/subregions to: assess the detailed cost of the structures of the ASF, including predeployment activities such as training and the activities of the PLANELMs and regional brigade groups; assess the cost of the types of ASF mission within a period which is long enough for the UN takeover (between six months and one year only); encourage AU member states to honor their contribution to the AU Peace Fund; and sustain negotiations with external partners for assistance (AU 2005, 12).

The ECOWAS has made significant advancement in the establishment of its standby force. It has come out with its policy framework, established a ten-person PLANELM and also the member states have pledged troops for the ECOWAS task force and the main brigade (AU 2005, 3).

Assumptions

There are four assumptions underlying this research. The first is that establishment of regional and subregional standby forces has come to stay. The second is that there will continue to be surrogate and civil wars in West Africa. These conflicts will have the capacity to spread if not rapidly contained. The third assumption is that the US and the European Union (EU) will continue to support West African militaries through training programs, like African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its follow-on, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) by the US and Renforcement des Capacities Africanes de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) by France. The US and the EU will also continue to assist in providing equipment and strategic transport for West African militaries during peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations in the subregion. The last assumption is that Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal, will continue to be politically stable and show political will and economic commitment to peace missions in West Africa.

**Definitions**

Some of the few terms and concepts that will be used in the research are defined below:

**Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI):** ACRI was a US government program to train selected African countries to enhance their capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief contingencies on the continent. The program, which took place during the period of 1996-2003, was based on common doctrine and equipment enabling multinational units to work together more effectively. It was originated by President Clinton but the US Congress, under President Bush, transformed it to ACOTA at the beginning of its final year 2003 (Evers 2003, 5).

**African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA):** ACOTA is a US follow-on program to ACRI. Its aim is also to build the peacekeeping capability of selected African countries. Though ACOTA has more specific objectives to individual countries based on their unique needs, it retains key components of ACRI. The concept of a tailored or individualized program, as well as a new emphasis on “training the trainer” are said to be the key differences between ACOTA and ACRI. ACOTA has been in existence from October 2002 and still on going (Berman 2002, 3-4).

**Collective Security.** The purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace” (UN 1992, 1). The Charter thus envisages that every member state would, subject to limited self-defense, defer to the world body responsibility for ensuring its security against aggression. This idea began in 1918 after the international balance of power was perceived by many nations to be no longer working correctly. A collective security system aspires to the maintenance of peace in which participants agree that any "breach of the peace is to be declared to be of concern to all the participating states," and will result in a collective response (Wight 1997, 149).

**Conflict.** Conflict, in this study, refers to any situation in which two or more social entities or parties (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals and behavior aimed at affecting such an opponent. It then follows that conflict resolution is the elimination of real or perceived incompatibilities which cause a conflict leading to a restoration of a harmonious relationship (Adu-Amanfo 1997, 89).

**Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME).** Countries use their elements of power to pursue national interests. The social determinants of elements of national power include such things as the diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of national power, commonly referred to as the DIME elements, and are particularly adaptable to use by the strategist. The elements of power are the basic means at the national level. From the elements of power are derived the resources for the strategy (Varger and Barber 1997, 1).

**DOTMLPF.** The US Army force development process brings together people and equipment, forms them into operational organizations to provide units with the desired capabilities for the various combatant commanders. This analysis composed of a
structured, four-phased methodology that defines capability gaps, capability needs and approaches to provide these capabilities within a specified functional or operational area. This is done within the domains of *doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities*, commonly referred to in the US Army as the domains of DOTMLPF (US Army 2005, 16).

**Global War on Terrorists GWOT.** The GWOT is a strategy to stop terrorist attacks against the US, its citizens, its interest, and friends and allies around the world, and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorist and all those who support them. It involves defeating terrorist organizations of global reach through direct or indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power (Bush 2002, 11-15).

**Lead Nation.** The lead-nation role exists where one nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad variety of logistical support for all or a part of the multinational force and or headquarters. Compensation and or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics for the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility (Adebajo 2002, 89).

**Peacemaking.** Peacemaking may be defined as the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their disputes. It normally requires the consent of the parties involved (UN 1995a, 9).

**Peace Building.** Peace building includes the identification and support of measures and structures, which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (UN 1995a, 9).
**Peace Enforcement.** Peace enforcement is a conflict management measure undertaken when all other efforts to achieve the peace have failed. Peace enforcement generally involves the use of armed force to maintain or restore peace and security in particular situations in which the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has been determined. It is the most coercive measure and the UN Security Council, until recently, has not been comfortable in directly using it to resolve conflicts. In situations requiring enforcement actions, the council usually authorizes member states to take such use of force measures on its behalf. On a number of occasions when peace-enforcement missions have had to be deployed, military units have tended to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces. They have to operate under clearly defined circumstances and rules of engagements (ROE) specified well in advance. These military units have tended to require extensive predeployment training. For these reasons it is not easy for a force originally sent as peacekeeping force to change to a peace-enforcement mission (Adu-Amanfoh 1997, 22-23).

**Peacekeeping.** Peacekeeping is a conflict control mechanism, designed with the principal objective to diffuse tension and create the peaceful environment conducive to the peacemaking process, through governmental, political and diplomatic machinery for the peaceful resolution of the dispute or conflict usually under a third party (UN, OAU, ECOWAS, Statesman, etc.). Where the dispute or conflict has not yet escalated into armed confrontation, peacekeeping will be aimed at containing the situation to prevent escalation into armed hostilities and thereby provide a congenial platform for the peacemaking process. Where the situation has escalated into open armed confrontation, cessation of hostilities would have to be called for by a Resolution (Erskine 2000, 16-18).
Peace Support Operations. Peace support operations are multifunctional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognized organization such as UN or ECOWAS, involving military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. They are designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include peacekeeping, peace building and humanitarian relief. Thus, while the military makes a major contribution to the success of any particular peace support operation, the end state is political and peace support operations are not exclusively a military undertaking (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 76).

P3: The P3 refers to Britain, France and the USA, and is used in the context of a joint initiative by these three permanent members of the UN Security Council to contribute to the enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities. The initiative emerged in the mid 1990s, with the French element known as RECAMP, and the US component as ACRI/ACOTA. The UK element, derived from ongoing programs of bilateral support for peacekeeping training for a number of African states and subregional groupings, was known as the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Program. The P3 initiative is an attempt at a more focused and systematic approach to the implementation of some of the ideas promoted in the UN Secretary-General’s November 1995 report to the Security Council on peacekeeping, and in support of emerging African capacities for the prevention and management of conflicts. It was born of the conviction that disparate donor activities need to be coordinated and, where possible, conducted jointly (Malan 2004, 200-203).

Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities / Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP): This is sponsored by the
French government. It is aimed at training selected African militaries to improve their peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacities. The RECAMP program includes: the creation of a training center for peacekeeping in Ivory Coast (now relocated in Mali), the pre-position of equipment for peacekeeping battalions, and the organization of Franco-African tactical peacekeeping field training exercises (Malan 2004, 203-204).

**Sovereignty.** This is the concept that accords a state the independence of action within its boundaries. In essence the government of each state has the power to make laws and enforce them within its territorial limits. The rights of a sovereign state are matched by the need for sovereign responsibility. The sovereign state must also exhibit the capacity to protect its peoples’ survival and the integrity of its boundaries as well as deal with other states (Bluwey 1998, 13).

**Surrogate Wars.** Surrogate wars are generated entirely from outside a country by neighboring governments that have a variety of reasons for wanting to take advantage of a regime’s weakness or fragility. In these weak states, the population may have grievances but are not inclined to resort to violence in order to redress their grievances. They do not necessarily welcome armed intervention, and in most cases reject it. Surrogate wars cannot take place in countries whose governments are fully in charge and whose military are professionally competent and are fully supported in terms of equipment and livelihood. Examples of surrogate wars in Africa include: Liberia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Cohen 2005, 1).
Limitations

It will not be possible to interview some African academics who could have been helpful for the study due to where the research is being conducted. However, this limitation will be offset by a selection of thesis committee members who are well versed in African security issues.

Delimitations

The study will only focus on a reappraisal of the AU Policy Framework to operationalize the ASF with respect to West Africa and conduct an analysis of it resulting in a strategic estimate of the applicability of the concept. It will consider the major challenges in the form of a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Maintenance, Logistics, Personnel and Force (DOTMLPF) assessment of ECOWAS military capabilities. It will rely extensively on official documents of the AU and ECOWAS including decisions of their meetings, protocols and treaties.

Significance of the Study

Political instability and economic deprivation breeds failed states. In addition to the unnecessary human suffering, failed states can also provide safe haven for terrorists and other perpetrators of international crime. Any initiative by a subregional organization like ECOWAS to solve the problem of instability is worth studying. This research project will make an assessment of the roadmap to operationalize the ASF with respect to the ESF. The study will analyze the roadmap vis-à-vis challenges facing West Africa and how successfully the subregional body is going to meet these requirements. It will also look into why ECOWAS seems relatively successful in its peacekeeping and enforcement
roles in its subregion. The major goal of this research project will be to make strategic and operational recommendations to the ongoing process undertaken by ECOWAS with a view to making recommendations on how the ESF can become more effective and relevant for the West Africa subregion.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

There has been some scholarly literature on the ECOWAS employment of ECOMOG for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the subregion. Issues on the ESF have also been covered in articles, reports, seminars and workshops organized by planners of the ESF, academic institutions and humanitarian organizations. The information reviewed is classified into two categories:

1. A review of the ECOWAS concept of conflict resolution in the subregion.
2. International Community efforts in support of the ECOWAS peace support initiatives.

A Review of the ECOWAS Concept of Conflict Resolution in the SubRegion

Dr Emmanuel Kwesi Anning’s paper entitled “Transitions from War to Peace: Dilemmas of Multilateral Intervention in Civil Wars” was presented in the Occasional Papers No. 27 sponsored by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Ghana. In that paper the author urges peacekeepers and management personnel to understand the root causes of the conflict as a first step towards forging appropriate strategies. This will enable the strategists to determine what elements of the DIME will be needed to be engaged to ensure lasting peace. He indicated that there should be a contextual analysis of the economic interests at stake. The work suggests proactive strategies that can contribute to resolving and preventing conflicts if the political will is present.
In his book *Peacekeeping Techniques for Africa’s Conflict Management*, Lieutenant General E.A. Erskine, a distinguished retired military officer from Ghana, examines the experiences of the OAU in Chad and ECOWAS in Liberia against the background of UN peacemaking experiences since 1948. He draws appropriate lessons and makes practical suggestions to guide peacekeeping in Africa. The author is of the opinion that peacekeeping techniques will be required in Africa for some time to come, since most of the factors generating interstate and intrastate insecurity, and thereby inducing instability, are endemic on the continent and will continue to persist for some time. He urged AU and the subregional organizations to assume more responsibility in the management of their conflicts since the UN and the international community is suffering from African peacekeeping fatigue (Erskine 2000, 92-93).

In his book *Peace Operations and Intra-state Conflict*, Thomas R. Mockaiti states that “civil conflict intervention has come to stay; the time for a new approach has come” (Mockaiti 1999, 125). The author analyzed peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa and noted that the new paradigm of conflicts require a multidimensional approach since each conflict situation is unique in its own right.

Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan identified a disturbing issue on the “Policy Framework” of ASF, in that “the AU will be entirely dependent on the sub-regions for force generation and operational capability.” They noted that the commitments of member states to current AU and UN operations will hinder their capacities to meet the requirements of the ASF. They therefore advocated for “universal standards to be developed as a matter of urgency, taking into account that regional/sub-regional standby forces are likely to operate as a bridging force for UN deployments rather than
replacement.” They endorsed ECOMOG’s exit strategy for a transition to UN, since according to them, only the UN can provide a response to the types of complex emergencies that characterize conflicts in Africa. They cited Burundi and ECOWAS’ experiences as examples (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 98).

In 1992, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali published “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping.” The publication was a report to the UN Security Council on peace operations in previous years. It also contains recommendations for strengthening the capacity of the UN to undertake preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. In the report, the Secretary General recognized that the sources of numerous conflicts are pervasive, hence the need for ceaseless efforts to prevent, contain and resolve them. The fact that intrastate wars have taken the center stage in world politics is given attention in the publication. For the first time, terms such as early warning systems, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building were given conceptual definitions that are relevant to an understanding of peace support operations (UN 1992, 1-6).

**International Community’s Support for ECOWAS**

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Denning, of the US Army, in his paper “A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force,” indicates that “the initiative to create regional-subregional standby forces in Africa is a unique opportunity for the international community to engage the region and achieve a consensus solution to a vexing problem.” He however, warned against any disengagement from the region by the international community, even if Africa is able to attain the capacity envisaged. He outlined many requirements that will still need the attention of the wealthier countries, to
include: early warning capability, strategic air lift, technical and logistic sustainment capacities and command and control gaps (Denning 2004, 6).

Many wealthier countries are already in Africa helping the various countries to improve their capacities for peacekeeping. These include: the French RECAMP program; the British Military Assistance Training (BMATT); the Netherlands peacekeeping training for some ECOWAS countries; and the US ACRI and the follow-on ACOTA programs. China is also extensively engaged in the region, though not directly involved in peacekeeping initiatives. Lieutenant Colonel Denning’s article indicates that “each of these countries’ programs has unique strengths. However, if individual countries continue with separate and nonintegrated proposals, the result will be redundant programs, nonstandard equipment and training, and lost efficiencies.” He posits that the current *ad hoc* and uncoordinated support from the international community to the region are not sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness required for the ESF, and advocates for “a venue to integrate these disparate activities under a single umbrella.” He concludes that availing ECOWAS of the necessary civil and military expertise to support the creation of the ESF, with guaranteed credibility and effectiveness under “a single synergistic initiative is an example of the leadership role the US should take” (Denning 2004, 7).

Francis V. Crupi in his article “Why the United States Should Robustly Support Pan-African Organizations” suggested a rationale for why the US should support pan-African subregional organizations’ self-help initiatives. He used ECOWAS as an example and reviewed the subregional organization’s goals vis-à-vis the US policy for peace in the subregion. He highlighted the guiding principles of ECOWAS and its past achievements relative to the US goals for Africa as stipulated in the US National Security
Strategy. He is of the opinion that “it is in the US interest to support subregional organizations, such as ECOWAS, as a viable way to promote a self-sufficient Africa.” A stable and prosperous Africa creates the atmosphere conducive for political and economic growth. This prevents the incidence of failed states which can serve as safe havens for terrorists. The author assessed that ECOWAS is worth supporting, considering its policies and performance as well as the extension of its relationship with other international organizations and sovereign states. Finally, the article recommends that the US provide financial and logistical support through third-party organizations and nations that have existing working relationships with ECOWAS (Crupi 2005, 1-3).

In his book *The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the case for American Empire*, Sebastian Mallaby re-echoed the problems that bisects sub-Saharan Africa and their effects on the region in particular, and the world as a whole. He feared that economic deprivation and insecurity in the region may give rise to failed states that can then become havens for terrorist activity. To reduce the international footprint in the subregion, the author advocates for ECOWAS to play an indigenous role through which the international community could channel their resources and support for the subregion. He was of the opinion that “when Western powers attempt remedial action in the form of political or military intervention in failed states, there is the risk of creating a perception of re-colonization or having other suspect motives. As an intermediary, ECOWAS can mitigate such perceptions” (Mallaby 2002, 81).

A lot of primary documents of the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS were also reviewed. The AU’s Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the
Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF, as well as, the ECOWAS Operational Framework for the Establishment of the ESF form the basis of the research.

In summary, this chapter looked at some of the materials on peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa and West Africa in particular. Most of the materials reviewed ECOMOG operations and recommended ECOWAS to use the experiences and challenges it faced to enhance the ESF capabilities. Some literature on the international community’s support to ECOWAS peace support operations and the rationale behind the support was also reviewed. The research also made use of a number of articles and reports on the internet.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The methodology used in the conduct of this research is the qualitative method. Qualitative research studies a problem by collecting information from several sources including both primary and secondary materials, which constitute the data pertinent to the study. This study is context-specific with the researcher’s role being one of inclusion in the situation. The researcher gathers the materials and then critically analyzes them to discover their relevance to the research question, how they relate to the subject, and the meaning of the information obtained (Wiersma 1991, 14-15).

Methodology
Materials for this research shall be from both primary and secondary sources such as books, journals, articles, protocols and treaties as well as minutes of relevant ECOWAS meetings. Information from the internet will be widely used. Data and materials collected on the study are basically conceptual clarifications of peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts at regional and subregional levels. After verifying facts and drawing conclusions from the data, a synthesis is constructed based on higher-order conclusions resulting from the analysis of the results in the context of the overall research question. This research aims to conduct a strategic estimate on how ECOWAS will face the roadmap to the operationalization of the ESF.

This chapter systematically identifies the activities involved in conducting this research. The research follows William Wiersma’s five steps of: identification and
isolation of the problem; reviewing of information relevant to the thesis; collection and classification of data; data analyzes; and drawing conclusions (Wiersma 1991, 8).

Step One: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

As indicated in chapter 1, surrogate and civil wars, territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and coup d’etats are among the principal threats to peace and stability in West Africa. The AU, on 20 January 2004, adopted the continental “Policy Framework” for the establishment of the ASF built on five standby brigades, one in each of Africa’s five economic regions. These standby forces should have the capability to respond rapidly to all types of conflict, and also be prepared for multidimensional peace missions on the continent. The complexities of peacekeeping require well trained and equipped military, police and civilian experts to make an impact (Kent and Malan 2003, 1).

However, most West African military capabilities are very limited and few countries have the capacity to undertake or contribute meaningfully to a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. Peacekeeping forces, apart from combat capability, need to have other capabilities to meet the multidimensional missions associated with peacekeeping. These missions include: humanitarian assistance; civil-military cooperation; respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; counter terrorism; and stability operations (Kent and Malan 2003, 1). This research intends to examine how ECOWAS can successfully meet the requirement of the policy framework with a view to making recommendations.
Step Two: Review of Information Relevant to the Thesis

Attempts were made to determine what others have learned about the subject matter. This put the problem in the proper context to allow the research to proceed effectively. The information reviewed identifies that establishment of regional and subregional standby forces is a concept that has come to stay. This is based on the analysis that current developments in the subregion seem to point to the fact that ECOMOG operations have become a pivotal instrument in conflict resolution because of its relative record of success in the subregion and that ECOWAS should convert the ECOMOG into the ESF in line with the AU Policy Framework.

It has also been identified that the international community should support ECOWAS in this effort to avoid the emergence of failed states in the subregion. This will help the Global War on Terrorism, as failed states may provide safe haven for terrorist’s activities. The information reviewed also suggests ways to synchronize international support to ECOWAS. As the specific objective of this research is to make recommendations towards enhancing the effectiveness of the ESF, this author noted many instances in which commentators made recommendations.

Step Three: Collection and Classification of Data

Data collected on the study are classified into two categories:

1. A review of ECOWAS concept of conflict resolution in the subregion.

2. International Community efforts in support of the ECOWAS peace support initiatives.
Step Four: Data Analysis

The overall appraisal will be based on elementary techniques of analysis. The goal is to conduct a strategic estimate that will determine how successfully ECOWAS will be achieving the end state of the roadmap to operationalize of the ESF using the DOTMLPF analytical framework. The data collected will be analyzed in four parts:

1. Part 1 will reappraise the factors contributing to the success of ECOWAS conflict management and resolution mechanisms.

2. Part 2 will examine how far ECOWAS has gone on the roadmap to operationalize of the ESF.

3. Part 3 will explore ways of making the ESF effective and relevant for the subregion, in a form of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis.

4. Part 4 will review the international community’s support for ECOWAS.

Step Five: Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendations

From the estimate of the data in step four, conclusions will be derived regarding how successful ECOWAS will be in meeting the requirements in the AU “Policy Framework.” Strategic inputs will also be given with a view to making some recommendations towards enhancing the effectiveness of the ESF in the subregion.

Arrangements of Chapters

The research study is arranged in five chapters. Each chapter covers a specific portion of analytical research as follows:
1. Chapter 1 identifies and isolates the problem and provides background to the establishment of the ESF.

2. Chapter 2 reviews materials on the background study of the concept of conflict resolution at regional and subregional levels and ECOWAS peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts in West Africa. Some articles on international support to ECOWAS peace support efforts were also reviewed in this chapter. A lot of primary documents of the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS were also reviewed. The AU’s Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF, as well as, the ECOWAS Operational Framework for the Establishment of the ESF form the basis of the research.

3. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology used in the study.

4. Chapter 4 will present an appraisal of the ECOMOG success story; what ECOWAS has done so far toward realizing the ESF; and what is left to be done to make the ESF effective and relevant to the subregion.

5. Chapter 5 is the conclusion and will summarize the major deductions made during the research and also suggest the way forward in making the ESF more effective and relevant in the West Africa subregion.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Introduction

As stated in chapter 3, the analysis of the topic will be done within the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). The analysis of the thesis is composed of a structured methodology that defines capability gaps and approaches to provide these capabilities within a specified functional or operational area.

This chapter of the research will analyze the data and material collected in four parts:

1. Part 1 will reappraise the contributing factors to the success of ECOWAS conflict management and resolution mechanism.

2. Part 2 will examine how far ECOWAS has gone on the roadmap to operationalize the ESF.

3. Part 3 will explore ways of making the ESF effective and relevant for the subregion.

4. Part 4 will review the international community’s support to ECOWAS.

PART I: Analysis of the ECOWAS Success Story

ECOWAS is considered as having “the most advanced and tested security model for conflict management and resolution mechanism in the sub-Saharan Africa.” Starting from its first intervention in Liberia in 1990, through ECOMOG, ECOWAS became the first subregional organization to successfully enforce and keep peace in a member state.
ECOWAS is also seen as having the best conflict prevention mechanism in Africa (Aboagye 1999, 164). This part identifies the contributing factors to include: treaties and protocols to regulate the member states; the lead-nation role played by Nigeria; the need for collective burden sharing; and the role of military culture in intervention operations.

**ECOWAS Conflict Prevention and Management Mechanisms**

ECOWAS was formed in 1975 with the objective to promote subregional economic integration. As such, its founding treaty was made with little thought given to subregional security. It was, however, realized by the subregional leaders that economic development could not be achieved in an environment abounding with insecurity and political instability. Two protocols were subsequently adopted, one in 1978 on nonaggression and the other on mutual assistance in defense in 1981 (Aboagye 1999, 163-164). According to Article 1 of the protocol on nonaggression, member states, shall in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the UN and OAU (now AU), against the territorial integrity or political independence of other member states (ECOWAS Secretariat 1978, 2). Under Article 2 of the protocol on mutual assistance on defense, member states declare and accept any armed threat or aggression directed against any member states as against the entire ECOWAS community (ECOWAS Secretariat 1981, 3).

These two protocols were found to be inadequate for conflict resolution management in the subregion partly because the political and military institutions needed to implement these protocols were not in place. A review process was carried out in 1998 aimed at recommending the necessary political and military institutions needed to
implement the two protocols. The review process brought about the ECOWAS “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” in 1999. This mechanism filled the gaps in the previous protocols. The key political institutions created by the mechanism include: the Authority; Mediation and Security Council (MSC); the Executive Secretariat; and other institutions established later by the Authority (Aboagye 1999, 164-165). The details of the mechanism are beyond the scope of this research. It can, however, be said at this stage that the mechanism provided for all the needed institutions to implement the two previous protocols.

ECOWAS went further to adopt the “Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” in December, 2001 to consolidate its efforts to enhance peace, security and stability in the subregion. The protocol provides for the armed forces and civil police forces of member states to be non-partisan and to be loyal to their countries and concentrate on their roles to defend the independence and territorial integrity of their various countries and democratic institutions. These institutions are also to be in readiness to participate in ECOMOG operations (ECOWAS Secretariat 2001, 13). It also provides for the armed forces and the police and other security forces to be under the authority of legally constituted civilian authorities (ibid, 14). These two provisions are very significant to this research due to their effect on ECOMOG past operations and the effects that they will have on the ESF force generation process. Previous ECOMOG operations lacked in-theatre civilian leadership. Also, placing the militaries of the member states under civilian authorities will meet the requirement for civilian control of the militaries thereby, enhancing their professionalism.
It is obvious from the preceding that ECOWAS was established for economic reasons. ECOWAS leaders quickly realized, however, that economic prosperity cannot be attained in an unstable environment. Though the protocols and the security mechanisms had their shortcomings, they have been described by Aboagye (1999, 164) as “the most advanced and tested security models in the sub-Saharan Africa.”

**The Lead-Nation Role of Nigeria and Collective Burden Sharing**

ECOMOG experiences underscore the indispensability of lead nations, which can provide political, diplomatic, and economic leverage toward conflict management and resolution. Though South Africa has recently embraced the role of superpower in southern Africa, it has in the past been reluctant to respond to this challenge. Subregions without lead nations normally suffer more in times of crisis, especially where no power outside the immediate neighborhood is able or willing to assist. Rwanda is a case in point where there was no such actor in central Africa to assume this role at the time that the international community was not willing to intervene (Adebajo 2002, 89-91).

Nigeria’s population of 128.7 million constitutes a very large economic market with a GDP of $125.7 billion (2004 est.). It has the second largest military, after Ethiopia, of approximately 80,600 (2004 est.) trained troops (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2006). These factors afford the country the massive political, military, and economic might in the subregion and Africa in general.

Nigeria bore over 70 percent of the collective manpower, logistical, and financial burden of ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria spent about $4 billion in Liberia. It made a similar effort in Sierra Leone and was expected to provide
about 46 per cent of the projected strength of the Guinea-Liberia-Sierra Leone interposition force (Aboagye 1999, 170).

It is interesting to note, however, that ECOWAS has been able to carry out two intervention operations without the involvement of the subregional hegemon (Nigeria): Guinea-Bissau (1998) and Cote d’Ivoire (1998-99). Though these two operations were short lived, it shows the commitment and determination of smaller countries such as Ghana, Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea. This determination imparted greater international credibility to ECOWAS interventions (ibid). If the dream of the ESF is to be materialized and sustained, ECOWAS will have to encourage the smaller countries to accept a greater degree of collective burden sharing.

The Effects of Military Culture in Military Operations Other Than War

The trend of ECOWAS military interventions in the subregion intrastate conflicts has followed the sequence of counterinsurgency, stability and reconstruction. The battle for the population is a major characteristic of counterinsurgency. The concept of counterinsurgency emphasizes winning the hearts and minds of the people, which implies isolating the insurgents from the local population to make the option of violence unviable to the insurgents and compel them to accept a peaceful settlement concerning the dispute (Galula 2005, 7-8).

Brigadier Aylwin-Foster stated in his article published in the November-December 2005 edition of the Military Review that Western armies, especially the US Army’s “strong organizational culture, which is focused on conventional war fighting, has discouraged adaptation to other roles.” He buttressed his point with a quotation from Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl that “the demands for conventional and unconventional
warfare differ so greatly that in extremis it may be difficult, if not impossible, for organizations optimised for one to adapt to the other, all the more when it has a strong organisational culture attached to its original role” (Aylwin-Foster 2005, 9-10).

On the contrary, most West African militaries have not seen major conventional combat but have been preoccupied with internal security operations in support of their national police forces and counterinsurgency operations. This has affected the organizational culture of the militaries of the subregion and has made them more of stability and reconstruction forces than robust conventional war fighting organizations. Peacekeeping and enforcement are associated with lengthy deployments which demands significant interface with indigenous populations. ECOWAS forces have been successful in peacekeeping and enforcement in the subregion due to their military culture and their knowledge, acceptance and understanding of the culture of the people.

Peace support operations suffer in an environment where there is cultural friction between the locals and the peacekeepers. Cultural awareness puts a premium on listening and understanding attitudes, behaviours and the intent behind others’ remarks. The culture of the people in the subregion gives strong recognition and respect for their clan leaders, village heads and chiefs. Intervention forces operating in such an environment need to be more tolerant and diligent in dealing with these societal leaders. The threat to peace in the subregion normally comes from nonstate actors or substate actors and units. Warring factions blatantly violate accords or agreements which prolong the conflicts. The military culture of decisiveness in most armies in the western world is not likely to tolerate such indecisiveness during military intervention operations (Agyapong 2005, 45).
PART II: Progress with the ECOWAS Standby Force

The AU has set up working groups to assist the subregions to coordinate and sequence their activities with the ASF. ECOWAS, which has been selected as one of the working groups, has made significant progress towards the development of its standby force. The idea is to convert the ECOMOG force into a credible subregional peace support institution in line with the AU policy framework. Protocols and framework documents have been approved by the appropriate authority and institutional structures are being established. The member states have also pledged to contribute units and personnel for the ECOWAS Task Force (TF) and the Main Brigade (MB). The major task remaining is how to support the operational capacity of the force (AU 2005, 3).

Operational Framework for the ECOWAS Standby Force

The AU policy framework requires the subregional organizations to establish Planning Elements (PLANELM) to be responsible for planning, preparation and training of the subregional standby brigades (AU 2005, 8). To meet this requirement, ECOWAS, with Canadian support, set up what they called the Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC) in February 2005 to be responsible for strategic and operational planning towards the establishment of the ESF. The MPMC is intended to be a permanent cell to plan for mission deployment and, after that, oversee their management with guidance from the ECOWAS Secretariat (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005b, par.12).

On 10 April 2005, the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff approved the military strategy developed by the MPMC and came out with a draft document called the Operational Framework for the ECOWAS Standby Force. This document will hereafter be referred to as the operational framework. It contains the strategic and operational
guidance to assist ECOWAS to sequence and coordinate its activities with the AU. It also provides some platform for coordinating donor support for the early and efficient establishment of the ESF. The operational framework provides for constant review and update of the document to reflect the realities of the time (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005b. par. 12(f)).

According to the operational framework, the ESF will be made up of “pre-determined standby formations that are highly trained, equipped and prepared to deploy as directed in response to a crisis or threat to peace and security.” The components of the ESF are a Task Force (TF), the Main Brigade (MB), and a Reserve. The TF will serve as a quick reaction force, which will comprise of 1,500 soldiers “within pre-determined units and, upon order, be prepared to deploy within 30 days and be self-sustaining for 90 days.” They can be deployed in peace support as well as humanitarian operations. Depending on the situation, the TF will be augmented by the MB, which will comprise 5,000 soldiers (3,500 troops will be added to the TF of 1,500). The MB will also be from “from pre-determined units and upon order be prepared to deploy within 90 days and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days.” The next in the order of response is the strategic reserve, which will comprise of 1,500 troops to be deployed when the need arises (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005b, par. 12-17).

Force Generation Process

The operational framework document based the force generation process on a tiered system in line with the AU Policy Framework. On the ESF readiness model at Appendix B, Tier 1 represents the baseline military and civil police capability of member states. For member nation pledges from this pool to be acceptable to ECOWAS, they
must be able to satisfy an entry level of operational readiness. The required levels of
readiness are yet to be produced by the MPMC, but it is likely to be in line with the UN
standard. Rotation to Tier 2 will be coordinated by the MPMC in consultation with
member states (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005b, par.16).

Tier 2 will consist of a pool of 3,000 ESF soldiers, from which the TF of 1,500
will be formed and given mission-specific training after strategic guidance from the
ECOWAS Secretariat. This approach is to provide the flexibility required to produce a
mission-specific TF within the likely constraints of national will. Under Tier 3, the
framework states that the TF must be able to commence its mission within 30 days.
Hence a permanent core Task Force headquarters will be established within Tier 3.
Operational capability will be achieved after the TF has assembled for a specific mission,
and it will be based on the operational requirements of that mission (ECOWAS
Secretariat 2005b, par. 17).

The idea behind this arrangement is for the TF to have the capacity to deploy
rapidly to meet initial contingency requirements. The MB will be subsequently deployed
in response to the dynamics of the situation, with the strategic reserve in readiness to
influence the outcome. The major planning assumption is that the TF will have the
capability to deploy for up to 90 days after which one of the following options will be
implemented: the TF elements will return to the troop contributing nations; the TF will
remain deployed as an element of the MB; the TF will become an element of an AU or
UN mission; or the TF will hand over the mission to a UN or AU force (ECOWAS
Secretariat 2005b, par. 21).
The successful establishment of the ESF is a critical measure of success on the “Roadmap to the Operationalization of the African Standby Force.” As identified earlier, the ECOWAS security model is considered the most advanced and tested on the whole continent and all the other subregions should be looking to ECOWAS as a solid model to emulate. ECOWAS needs to develop progressive guidance for the planners of the ESF in order to meet the needed operational capability of the force. The current operational framework needs further review to examine, in more detail, the requirements for the military component as well as the civilian component of the force. A great deal of work must also be done on defining and meeting the training and logistic requirements of the ESF.

PART III: Enhancing the ESF within the DOTMLPF Domain Structures

The planners of ESF should address the problems that ECOWAS has encountered during previous ECOMOG missions and explore new ways of operating. This is the surest way to make the ESF more relevant and effective. This part intends to tackle this within the structures of the DOTMLPF domains.

Doctrine

The ESF needs to develop a general guideline as to how it intends to conduct peace support operations in the form of doctrine in order to be efficient in its mission. Doctrine emanate from Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). ECOWAS’s past operations, at least those in which the author took part, operated without any formal doctrine. Individual countries operated with their own procedures thereby making standardization and interoperability difficult. The author saw confusion at the
multinational headquarters, where he served as a staff officer during the ECOWAS mission in Cote d’Ivoire, due to lack of standard operational procedures (SOP). There were a lot of misunderstanding, especially between the Ghanaian contingent (the only Anglophone troop contributing country) and the force headquarters, dominated by officers from the Francophone countries, due to differences in report writing, returns and reaction to incidents. TTPs and SOPs could be developed for the ESF if a force doctrine is in place. A standardized TTPs could be the basis for a force doctrine.

The operational doctrine of the ESF should incorporate the UN concepts and peacekeeping principles of legitimacy, consent, neutrality, impartiality, perseverance, and restraint in the use of force. However, the author’s experience with ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in which he saw direct combat between the ECOMOG forces and the main rebel groups, led him to the opinion that peacekeeping operations can only be conducted where there is peace to keep. The recalcitrant nature of rebels/insurgents in West Africa need troops to be prepared for robust peace enforcement operations when the need arises and therefore requires a complete peacekeeping operations doctrine to be prepared for any eventuality.

The doctrine and concept of operations for militaries of the ECOWAS member states generally follow French and British doctrine because of the colonial influence (Appendix C depicts the colonial and language distribution of ECOWAS member states). This must also be factored into the operational concepts and doctrine for the ESF. Greater consultation should be made with NATO and the EU in this regard for guidance. The doctrine for ESF operations must also reflect a stringent observance of both international and international humanitarian laws.
Organization

Organization of units has their beginnings from their missions, operational concepts and strategic settings. These architectures provide the basis for the structure of units to be able to address a unit’s mission and functions, in accordance with its capabilities. ECOWAS’ previous missions were without the necessary political, administrative and logistical supporting organs crucial to their operational proficiency. One of the vital mechanisms for effectively managing a peacekeeping operation is its command and control structure. Failure to institute a well-defined chain of command and a system of command and control was one of the significant shortcomings of ECOMOG (Erskine 2000, 113-114).

The author of this thesis has participated in both UN and ECOWAS missions and favours the UN unified command and control structure, with slight modification, to suit the ECOWAS context. In view of the fact that contingents are provided by the various countries, it is important that all these contingents report to and take orders from one well-defined authority. Again, the chain of command and system of control will have to be structured to free the Force Commander from political interference, especially from the troop contributing countries.

The ECOWAS mission readiness plans are currently focused on the military component of the ESF. The experience from previous ECOMOG operations has shown that, invariably, the force lacks the expertise of civil police components to handle civil security and enforcement issues. (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 62-63). Deploying a force without a substantial civilian component to cater for administrative, logistical, and stabilization issues will repeat past mistakes.
Article 32 of the “Protocol on the Mechanism,” defines the principal roles of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary (SRES), among others, as the chief of missions and responsible for the political orientation of the ECOWAS mission (ECOWAS Secretariat 1999, 11). Despite this provision of civilian political leadership, ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire were without an SRES. ECOWAS will require the other elements of the DIME to compliment the effort of the military and therefore need civilian political leadership of the missions to coordinate all these elements of power in order to achieve the desired results. It is in these regards that the structure recommended for peacekeeping operations by Erskine (2000, 117) is endorsed by this study. The recommended command and control structure for ESF is at Appendix D. The synopsis of the roles of the various appointments is as follows:

1. **Mandate Authority.** There is the need to establish an organ similar to the UN Security Council to authorize ESF missions. For the interim the Authority, which is the organ comprising the Heads of State of ECOWAS member states, can perform this function.

2. **Executive Secretary.** He directs all the functioning of all peacekeeping missions. Overall command and control are vested in him by the authorizing body.

3. **Political and Military Secretariat.** A small secretariat with political, legal and military staffs should be established within the Executive Secretary’s outfit to help him manage the ESF mission.

4. **ECOWAS Support Command.** The ECOWAS Support Command should be established to manage the designated logistics depots in Sierra Leone and Mali and also
to sustain ESF missions. A logistian with a rank of brigadier-general or above is recommended to head this outfit.

5. Special Representative of the Executive Secretary (SRSG). He would be responsible for the in-theatre political and diplomatic issues on behalf on the Executive Secretary, and be the senior most direct representative of ECOWAS within the operational theatre. He is analogous to the Special Representative to the Secretary-General in UN missions.

6. The Force Commander. The Force Commander is responsible to the Executive Secretary, through the SRSG, for the overall operation and administration of the mission.

7. Civilian Staff Advisors. The Force Commander should have principal staffs to advise him on political, legal and public relations issues.

8. Chief Administrative Officer. The Chief Administrative Officer is responsible to the Force Commander for all administrative issues affecting the mission.

9. The Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff is the principal staff officer to the Force Commander and responsible for coordinating the activities of the force staff.

10. Combat Service Support Units. The in-theatre logistic support units will be responsible for sustaining specific missions through the ECOWAS Support Command.

11. Contingents/Unit Commanders. Contingent/unit commanders will be appointed by contributing countries and placed under operational control of the Force Commander, while the former provides contingent-owned equipment (COE).

Training

Training should not pose a major problem for ECOWAS militaries because of the existing security cooperation the P3 countries have with West African military institutions.
Examples are the ACRI/ACOTA, Operation Focus Relief (OFR), The British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), and the RECAMP. Details of these programs are discussed in Part IV of this chapter. These programs have helped train a substantial number of West African militaries for peace support operations. Mention should also be made of the contribution of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program of which the author is a beneficiary. ECOWAS should take advantage of these programs to organize combined training for selected ESF units to put them on the same frequency and enhance their interoperability.

A problem with the training offered by the donors, as part of the peacekeeping building capacity package, is that it does not include logistics planning but mainly focuses on tactical operations (Agyapong 2005, 60-61). The emerging training requirements to be met by ECOWAS are not exclusively military. The designated training centers in Mali, Ghana and Nigeria should include training on logistics and administrative aspects. The overall training strategy and plan must also make provision for effective interfacing with the civilian component that emerges from the organizational structure of the ESF.

Previous ECOWAS missions witnessed Anglophone-Francophone-Lusophone language and cultural differences which posed a challenge to the force (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 40). Some form of language and cultural training should be obligatory for earmarked troops of the ESF. Conversely, ECOWAS can follow the UN, NATO and EU examples and come out with one official operational language.
Materiel

The majority of the early lessons from ECOMOG operations was related to issues of logistics and, implicitly, finance. . . . ECOMOG was plagued by problems such as: lack of standardization of equipment, arms and ammunition; poor sea and air lift capabilities; absence of vital air to ground support assets (particularly ground attack helicopters); lack of logistic support for most of the contingents; and inadequate resources to deal with humanitarian problems. (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 32)

Military operations cannot be conducted without a broad variety of materiel support. The recommendation made during the ECOWAS workshop in Accra, Ghana on 10-11 February 2005, with respect to the creation of the ECOWAS Support Command, is laudable. It is envisaged that the support command would maintain logistics depots in the ECOWAS subregion, which the ESF could draw on during emergencies. It was further suggested that member states should harmonize the procurement of certain categories of military equipment so that in future operations their various contingents can operate with a higher degree of interoperability (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 33).

The issue of materiel and finance are interrelated. According to Article 36 of the “Protocol on the Mechanism,” the Executive Secretariat shall make provision in its annual budget for funds to finance the activities of the Mechanism of which peace support operation is part. A percentage of the proposed Community Levy (of 0.5 percent of member states’ GDP), when conditions for its applicability is in force, is to be earmarked for these activities. Other sources for funds were identified such as the UN and other international agencies, the AU and voluntary contributions and grants from bilateral and multilateral sources (ECOWAS Secretariat 1998, 12).

Provision was made for ECOWAS member states contributing troops for ECOWAS missions to prefinance the cost of their contingents during the first three
months, after which ECOWAS shall refund the expenditure incurred by member states within a maximum of six months and then proceed to finance the operation (ibid). This reimbursement arrangement can be effective if member states contribute to the ECOWAS Peace Fund to make it healthy enough to deploy and sustain ESF missions. This will lessen the dependency of the subregion on a lead nation.

The subregion could continue to receive support from the international community, especially the P3, if the subregional leaders show political will and determination in their approach to operationalize the ESF. The P3’s continuous support to ECOWAS may also help to reduce the pressure on the smaller countries in the event of Nigeria’s refusal to commit troops and other resources to support ESF operations. A case in point is the ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire where Nigeria chose not to participate. The mission was still conducted with support from France, the US, the UK and Belgium.

Leadership and Education

The operational framework is silent on leadership and education. African countries have leadership problems. Good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights build nations. By contrast, political exclusion and repression, coupled with a lack of accountable leadership in Africa, have generated in numerous member states political polarization, economic underdevelopment, and human insecurity that have prompted rebel groups to try to wrest power from the center, and control and exploit strategic natural resources (Aboagye 1999, 65).

At the ECOWAS level, the absence of a SRES, tasked with providing political direction to ECOMOG’s force commanders, left the latter with a prerogative to make political and diplomatic decisions, in addition to strategic and operational decisions.
Arguably, a combination of these factors contributed to some of the major shortcomings during earlier West Africa conflict resolutions (ibid). What is least developed in the subregion are “civilian peace building capacities to lead and complement military efforts of the missions.” There is the need to develop a mechanism that will combine identifying persons with the appropriate education and background, training them in the relevant skills and providing them with functional knowledge, and placing them on a standby roster from where they can be deployed (Vogt 2005, 28-29)

Personnel

ECOWAS member states have pledged troops for the TF and the MB. The military component should not have much problem with force generation due to existing training programs by the donor partners, which have trained a substantial number of West African militaries. The author’s only apprehension is the control of operational availability of the designated standby units. There should be a control mechanism for this arrangement until proper civilian control of West African militaries is assured.

ECOWAS mission readiness plans are militarily focused. However, deploying a force for peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the subregion without civilian components may repeat past mistakes (ECOWAS 2005a, 62-63). ECOWAS should consider the required civilian personnel, especially for the SRES outfit and the ESF. The civilian components should be well versed on issues like: sustaining a force, civil-military cooperation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, and negotiation and mediation skills.
Facilities

ECOWAS has designated three centers of excellence for training at the strategic, operational and tactical levels respectively. These are the National War College in Nigeria, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana and the Tactical Training Center in Koulikouro, Mali. ECOWAS should use these facilities to maximum benefit. KAIPTC can be used to continue training needs analysis and assistance in developing doctrine, concepts of operation, SOPs and TTPs. These facilities should be maintained very well and not suffer Africa’s lack-of-maintenance culture which have left a lot of similar projects in Africa to deteriorate.

The ECOWAS Mechanism provides for an ECOWAS Early Warning System. This system consists of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria with four Observation and Monitoring Zones (OMZ) within the subregion. The OMC is supposed to be responsible for data collection and analysis on conflict indicators using the OMZs (ECOWAS Secretariat 1998, 8). ECOWAS has deployed a zonal head to a capital city in each of the zones. However, the zonal bureaus responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information are not yet functional. The problem is that ECOWAS lacks trained personnel and technology to support the facility (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 16). It appears ECOWAS also lacks the desire and intent to set up the zonal bureaus, as evidenced by its lack of resource commitments. ECOWAS should explore the possibility of concentrating its early warning effort at the Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria until the situation improves.
PART IV: International Community’s Support for ECOWAS PSO Efforts

This part of the research discusses the reasons why the international community should support ECOWAS’ efforts toward subregional peace and stability. The following discussion endorses ECOWAS’ resolve to promote a stable and prosperous subregion and identifies how this initiative can provide an atmosphere conducive for political and economic stability, thereby mitigating the incidence of failed states which can also serve as terrorist breeding grounds in the subregion. This part also examines how support for ECOWAS could be synchronized to achieve a higher degree of synergy.

Threats to Global War on Terrorism

ECOWAS interventions in four of its member states since 1990 show the organization’s resolve to prevent the rise of failed states in the subregion. Failed states can easily become sanctuaries for terrorist networks, organized crime, and drug traffickers as well as posing grave humanitarian challenges and threats to regional stability. Though conflicts abound in West Africa, it has been through the efforts of ECOWAS, with help from the international community, that the emergence of failed states has been averted in the subregion (Crupi 2005, 8).

West Africa’s Importance to the US and the EU

Apart from combating transnational terrorism, West Africa is also important for its economic contributions to the world. This economic contribution is gradually drawing the international community, especially the US, the EU and China to the subregion. An article published by the *Weekly Insight* (a Ghanaian Newspaper) entitled “Ghana to Host US Military Base,” stated that the US is considering the establishment of a military base
in Ghana for the purpose of protecting its access to West African oil. The article quoted from the 2001 report of the Presidential National Energy Policy Development group chaired by the US Vice President, which states that the African countries provide 14 percent of total US oil imports and by 2015, West Africa alone will supply 25 percent of America’s imported oil. Crupi (2005, 9) shares the same sentiment when he indicated that the US imports roughly 1.2 million barrels of Nigeria’s oil per day.

The nature of Africa’s importance to the EU is primarily economic. Africa is an important trading partner for the EU with primary prospects of greater trade. The imports from Africa were 76 billion US dollars in 2002, while exports amounted to 66 billion US dollars (EU 2004, 7-8).

The importance of peace and tranquility in Africa can also be viewed from the continent’s richness in land resources and raw materials, whose commercial exploitation has, to some extent, been hit by unstable political environments in most African states. The significant European communities in West Africa, especially in Ghana and Senegal, stressed the requirement in maintaining the link between Europe and West Africa to surpass economic issues to demographic factors (EU 2004, 7-8).

Existing External Initiatives in West Africa

Members of the international community have played significant roles to African states in expanding their peacekeeping capacities. The P3 initiative was established in 1997 to strengthen the abilities of some African countries to develop their own capabilities. In that same year, the French also introduced the RECAMP. The British initiatives include: the African Peacekeeping Training Support Program (APTSP) and the British Military Advisory Training Teams (BMATT), which have been in existence since
the 1970s in Ghana, the 1980s in Zimbabwe, and in South Africa since the mid-1990s. The US engagements in West Africa includes: the ACRI and its follow-on ACOTA, since 1996; the US International Military Education Training (IMET); the African Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARPP); the Joint Combine Exchange Training (JCET) program; and the Operation Focused Relief (OFR). The G-8 also created an African Action Plan (AAP) in 2002 to advance African peacekeeping efforts with financial and programmatic support (EU 2004, 20-30).

However, Denning noticed that the external initiatives have been *ad hoc* and uncoordinated and therefore insufficient to meet the peace operations challenges that faced ECOWAS. He advocated for an avenue to integrate all the activities to “achieve the synergistic result required to meet the numerous challenges face by ECOWAS” (Denning 2004, 6).

**ECOWAS Peace Operation Challenges**

The author of this thesis was a staff officer at the Multi-National Headquarters of the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (ECOMICI). There, he saw the main challenge of ECOWAS as its limited ability to mobilize adequate resources and sustain a high level of operational readiness within the troops who were deployed, so as to enable them to fulfill their mandate with the greatest efficiency. Before deployment, some inherent weaknesses observed included: slow responsiveness to troop mobilization, inadequate contingent-owned equipment (COE), poor logistic support facilities, and modest funding resources.

The challenges faced by ECOWAS in its peace operation efforts in the subregion have been highlighted in the previous discussions. These challenges are endorsed by Holt in her testimony to the Subcommittee on Africa, US House of Representatives, on 8
October, 2004. She summarized the challenges as the transition of the armed forces of the African states to a higher level of self-sustainability and establishing their own management and planning staffs, logistics capacity, and financial strength to organize and conduct missions (2004, 3).

Any international support for ECOWAS must be aimed at filling a gap in the challenges ECOWAS faces in its peacekeeping capabilities. The onus rests on ECOWAS to accurately assess its inherent PSO resources and capabilities and to clearly state the gaps to be filled by the international community. As a matter of urgency, ECOWAS has to publish its operational requirements, to include: what doctrine is to be used for training of its standby peacekeeping force; what equipment is needed for its missions; how it should enhance the ECOWAS Peace Fund; and the materiel needed for the proposed ECOWAS Logistics Bases. This is the first step in synchronizing international support toward filling the capability gaps.

**Synchronizing with the P3**

The P3 was formed to respond to the concerns raised by the African states that the external initiatives of enhancing the peacekeeping capacities of African militaries were uncoordinated. “The Africans complained that the western-led capacity-building for peacekeeping for the continent’s militaries were unconsultative in nature and therefore ineffective.” Thus, in May 1997, the US, UK, and France launched the P3 initiative and drafted some principles and proposals for institutional framework for coordination of peacekeeping enhancement efforts by all stake holders (Africans and donors). The P3 idea was for the three western powers to: “accept the necessity for long-term coordinated action under the auspices of the UN and the OAU; endorse and adhere to the principle of
open access for all African states to assistance; and ensure transparency through the creation of a multilateral body to supervise peacekeeping cooperation” (Malan 2004, 200-206).

This initiative contributed immensely to the ECOMICI operation through well-synchronized partnerships that were implemented simultaneously to guarantee logistical support for ECOWAS troops. Britain channeled its efforts through Ghana; Benin was supported by Belgium; France’s assistance was conveyed through Niger, Senegal and Togo. The US provided strategic transportation for the deployment, rotation and redeployment of the contingents. It also provided vehicles and communication equipment for in-theatre movement. The US funded 2/3 of the food requirements for the entire force (Fall 2004, 2). The ECOMICI example depicts how successful support for ECOWAS could be synchronized by the P3 to achieve the desired results.

ECOWAS has received greater benefit of the P3 coordinated assistance in subregional peace and stability efforts. ECOWAS can take advantage of this situation by sustaining negotiations with the P3 to coordinate their worthwhile initiatives to the greater benefit of the ESF. Resources are scarce, irrespective of how wealthy a country is. ECOWAS needs to provide the platforms where it can engage and share information with the P3 regarding the gaps where it needs external assistance to make the ESF truly effective.

Harmonizing with the UN

The UN has the primary role of maintaining international peace and security. As such, it has a considerable expertise and capacity for complex and resource-demanding peace support operations. As identified in Chapter 1 of this study, all past ECOWAS
operations, apart from Liberia (1990-98) and Guinea-Bissau, eventually transformed into UN operations. Greater collaboration is therefore needed with the UN in terms of doctrine, concepts, TTPs and transfer of authority (TOA) arrangements using the existing training centers in Mali, Ghana, and Nigeria in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1353, which encourages international cooperation and support of peacekeeping training, including the establishment of regional peacekeeping training centers and technical support from the Secretary General to such centers (UN 2001, 3).

ECOWAS has amply demonstrated its inability to sustain prolonged peace support operations, and lacks the ability to mobilize and deploy forces faster than the UN. The ESF should focus its peacekeeping capabilities on rapid deployment for a short duration, such as a maximum of twelve months for an eventual UN takeover of the operation. This will allow the P3 countries to tailor their assistance on well-defined criteria and requirements. The international community will also have criteria for judging the success of ESF operations.

Moreover, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) identified that taking over from ECOWAS forces was a major challenge especially during the start-up phases of the UN peacekeeping operations, due to the poorly equipped nature of ECOWAS forces during transition. It advocated that sufficient logistics should be organic to the unit/contingent and linked to a national support system that is easily adaptable to sustainment arrangements to be established by ECOWAS or the UN. “Achieving logistics capabilities that are compatible with transition to UN logistics arrangements should be one of the goals” (ECOWAS Secretariat 2005a, 34-35).
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions and Recommendations

West Africa has witnessed an increase in intrastate conflicts over the past two decades. The subregion’s leaders have tried to resolve these conflicts using various traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, but to no avail. ECOWAS has, since 1990, resorted to employing military intervention forces as a major part of its conflict resolution mechanisms. These interventions have created an atmosphere conducive to long-term political and diplomatic solutions to problems in the West Africa subregion.

The African Union (AU) is working to live up to its expectation with respect to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Consequently, it has established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. The AU also recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace in any part of the region. To make the dream of the ASF a reality, the economic regions must meet the requirements outlined in the “Roadmap to the Operationalization of the ASF.” ECOWAS has made significant progress towards establishing a subregional peace support model, but it still has its challenges and shortcomings.

Analysis of the ECOWAS Success Story

ECOWAS is considered as having the most advanced and tested security model for conflict management and resolution mechanism in sub-Saharan Africa. Starting from
its first intervention in Liberia in 1990, through ECOMOG, ECOWAS became the first subregional organization to successfully enforce and keep peace in a member state. ECOWAS is also seen as having the best conflict prevention mechanism in Africa. Some of the contributing factors were identified as treaties and protocols to regulate the member states, the lead-nation role played by Nigeria and the collective burden sharing by the weaker countries, and the role of member states’ military culture which favors peacekeeping operations.

**Progress with the ECOWAS Standby Force**

ECOWAS has made significant progress in converting the ECOMOG concept to an ESF in line with the AU roadmap. The ECOWAS Mission Planning and Management Cell, in conjunction with military advisors from Canada, developed the “ECOWAS Standby Force Operational Framework” on 10 April 2005. The operational framework aims to provide guidelines for the establishment of the ESF. According to the policy framework, the ESF will be comprised of predetermined standby formations that are highly trained, equipped and prepared to deploy as directed in response to a crisis or threat to peace and security in the subregion.

The ESF force structure is based on a three-tiered system in line with the AU Policy Framework. Tier 1 represents the baseline capability of member-states’ military forces and civil police. Tier 2 will consist of a pool of 3,000 ESF soldiers, from which the Task Force of 1,500 will be constituted and given mission-specific training. Under Tier 3, the framework states that the Task Force must be able to commence its mission within 30 days, and consequently provides for a permanent core Task Force headquarters to be
established within Tier 3. The current ESF operational framework, however focuses on the military elements of the ESF without due consideration to the civilian component.

Enhancing the ESF in the DOTMLPF Domain Structures

The measures that ESF planners could adopt to make it more relevant and effective must address the problems that ECOWAS has encountered during previous ECOMOG missions and explore new ways of addressing the requirement of fulfilling the DOTMLPF domains.

The ESF cannot conduct successful peace operations if the concept, doctrine and procedures for peace support operations are not in place. The author saw confusion at the multinational headquarters where he served as a staff officer during the ECOWAS mission in Cote d’Ivoire due to a lack of standard operational procedures (SOP). The author’s experience with ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone saw direct combat between the ECOMOG forces and the main rebel groups, resulting in the opinion that peacekeeping operations can only be conducted where there is peace to keep. The recalcitrant nature of rebels/insurgents in West Africa needs troops to be prepared for robust peace enforcement operations where the need arises and therefore requires the needed doctrine to cater for such eventualities.

The ESF PLANELM should develop a doctrine for the ESF. The doctrine should be based on current UN peace enforcement (Chapter 7) doctrine to provide general guidelines for ESF operations. The doctrine should reflect a stringent observance of international and humanitarian laws. The ESF should focus its peace support capabilities on rapid deployment to act as an interim stop-gap measure with expectation of UN takeover within twelve months.
Training should not pose a major problem for ECOWAS militaries because of existing training packages being provided by the P3 countries. The problems with the training offered by the donors, as part of the peacekeeping building capacity package include: lack of coordination, absent of logistic training, and lack of civilian component training. ECOWAS should take advantage of the existing training programs provided by the P3 to harmonize the interoperability of ESF units. The designated training centres in Nigeria, Ghana and Mali should include logistics and administrative aspects in their curriculum as well as to make provision for the type of civilian components that emerge from the ESF organizational structure.

Military operations cannot be conducted without a broad range of materiel support. Lack of adequate logistics seriously impacted upon ECOMOG’s four intervention operations thus far. Apart from the fact that logistics have been woefully inadequate, there is also a lack of coherent logistics planning. Lack of standardization of equipment, arms and ammunition; poor sea and air lift capabilities; absence of vital air to ground support assets (particularly ground attack helicopters); lack of logistic support for most of the contingents; and inadequate resources to deal with humanitarian problems were some of the problems ECOWAS faced and continues to face.

ECOWAS should actualize its Support Command concept and establish logistics depots in the subregion, which the ESF can draw on during emergencies. Sufficient logistics should be organic to the unit/contingents and linked to a national support system that is easily adaptable to sustainment arrangements established by ECOWAS or the UN. Negotiations with respect to funding and materiel support with the P3 countries should be sustained.
Civilian leadership to manage ECOWAS peace missions was seen as a major problem in its previous missions. The recent protocol has defined the role of the Special Representative to the Executive Secretary as head of ECOWAS missions, but failed to be actualized during the postprotocol missions in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. The appointment and office of the SRES should be strengthened to provide the needed political and diplomatic leadership to the ESF. A mechanism should be developed that will identify civilians with the appropriate education and background, train them with the relevant skills and provide them with the functional knowledge to be able to fill vacancies in the recommended structure for the ESF. The structure of the ESF should include a well-defined chain of command structure and a system of control, as well as balanced operational, administrative and logistical organs, as recommended at Appendix D.

ECOWAS should develop a strategy to ensure the control of operational availability of the standby units. Ensuring legal civilian control of militaries of member states would help streamline the operational availability of standby units. ECOWAS should also take cognisance of the problem of HIV/AIDS prevalence in the militaries of other subregions in Africa and develop policies to ensure that personnel of standby units are properly examined medically and also given HIV/AIDS education before employment.

The ECOWAS Mechanism provides for an ECOWAS Early Warning System. This system consists of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the Secretariat in Abuja with four Observation and Monitoring Zones (OMZ) within the subregion. However, it seems ECOWAS lacks the requisite personnel and technology to make these facilities functional. More must be done to make this capability viable.
Member states hosting the various donor-supported training and logistics facilities should also ensure proper maintenance of these facilities to extend their life span. Routine maintenance schedules should be drawn and adhered to in order to ensure a regular repair and replacement culture is established and maintained.

External Community’s Support for ECOWAS Peace Support Efforts

ECOWAS’ resolve to promote a stable and prosperous subregion has been endorsed by the international community. The establishment of the ESF is seen as an initiative that can provide an atmosphere conducive to political and economic stability, thereby mitigating the incidence of failed states which can also serve as terrorist breeding grounds in the subregion. Members of the international community have played significant roles in the subregion to expand the peacekeeping capacities of ECOWAS member-states militaries. However, these external initiatives have been uncoordinated and therefore insufficient to meet the peace operations challenges that faced ECOWAS. The major concern has been how to integrate these activities to achieve the synergistic result for the numerous challenges face by ECOWAS. The P3 initiative appears to have provided this avenue for a synchronized partnership that can increase the probability for proper logistic and training support for ECOWAS peace support operations.

ECOWAS should make use of the P3 initiative to negotiate for donor conferences to be held annually at KAIPTC in Ghana to facilitate coordination of logistics and training support for the ESF. The logistic support provided by the P3 and Belgium for ECOWAS troops in Cote d’Ivoire can be used as a model. Donor training packages could also be synchronized during such donor conferences. Training packages from the P3 countries should be worked out on the basis of battlefield operational systems
(intelligence, fire support, logistics, maneuver, etc.). Logistic and training supports from the P3 and other donors should be on a subregional, rather than bilateral basis.

**The Way Forward**

The study has identified that ECOWAS faces “web-net” challenges, which are connected and therefore difficult to separate. It is also very difficult to find solutions to all the challenges at once. Thus, there is the need to prioritize and implement the recommendations arising from this research under two scenarios: a prioritization of efforts if adequate resources are provided by ECOWAS external and internal partners, and the most critical things that need to be done if little or no resources are provided by ECOWAS partners. Table 1 depicts the priority matrix recommended by this study for the establishment of the ESF under the above two scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
<th>IF LITTLE OR NO RESOURCES (EXTERNAL &amp; INTERNAL) ARE PROVIDED</th>
<th>IF ADEQUATE RESOURCES (EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL) ARE PROVIDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Develop national level response mechanism to include generation of contingent-owned equipment</td>
<td>Negotiate with donors especially the P3 for annual donor conference to coordinate external support to the ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Member states to contribute to the ECOWAS Peace Fund</td>
<td>Identify capability gap to be filled by the donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Actualize the ECOWAS Logistic Support Command concept and establish logistics depots</td>
<td>Develop procedures for quick access to strategic transport to enhance quick reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Encourage local manufacture and procurement of materiel (non-lethal)</td>
<td>Develop ESF Operational Concept, TTPs, SOPs, and Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Develop ESF Operational Concept, TTPs, SOPs, and Doctrine</td>
<td>Generate ESF based on the recommended structure at Appendix D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Generate ESF based on the recommended structure at Appendix D</td>
<td>Develop national level response mechanism to include generation of contingent-owned equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Develop joint training exercises to enhance interoperability</td>
<td>Actualize the ECOWAS Logistic Support Command concept and establish logistics depots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Adopt a joint planning approach with the UN to enhance smooth take-over of missions</td>
<td>Establish and resource the SRE outfit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Establish and resource the SRE outfit</td>
<td>Develop a multi-functional standby capability to include the civilian component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Establish ECOWAS Early Warning System (OMC &amp; OMZs)</td>
<td>Adopt a joint planning approach with the UN to enhance smooth take-over of missions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendations for Future Study

This research identified that there is a critical bias in the study of the military component of the ESF as against the civilian components. Further study needs to be conducted on the required civilian components for the ESF to include modes of recruitment, training needs analysis and modalities for their standby arrangements.
APPENDIX A

ECOWAS REGION OF AFRICA

Source: ECOWAS Secretariat 1993, 5.
ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE READINESS MODEL

Tier 1 Pool
(Baseline Capability)
Complete ECOWAS Forces Mil Troops and CivPol

Tier 2 Pool
3000 Troops

Tier 3 TF
Operational Specific Capability

Operational Readiness

Formal Decision

Entry Level

## APPENDIX C

### COLONIAL AND LANGUAGE DISTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>PORTUGUESE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BURKINA FASSO</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>GUINEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>IVORY COAST</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ECOWAS Secretariat 1993, 4*
Source: Adopted from Erskine’s Structure for Peacekeeping Operations with modifications to suit the ESF (Erskine 2000, 117).
REFERENCE LIST


68


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Michael Mihalka
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. Douglas E. Lathrop
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr Mark H. Lauber
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Chief of the Defense Staff
Ghana Armed Forces
General Headquarters
Burma Camp
Accra, Ghana

Chief of the Army Staff
Ghana Army Headquarters
Burma Camp
Accra, Ghana

Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
Out Barracks
Teshie
Accra, Ghana
1. Certification Date: 16 June 2006

2. Thesis Author: Major Richard Amponsem-Boateng

3. Thesis Title: Prospects of the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force

4. Thesis Committee Members: 
   Signatures: 

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

   A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Support (10)</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

   Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)

   __________________________ / __________________ / __________________
   __________________________ / __________________ / __________________
   __________________________ / __________________ / __________________
   __________________________ / __________________ / __________________
   __________________________ / __________________ / __________________

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: __________________________

74
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:


2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.


6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).