The United States has a historic cultural reluctance to embrace war planning in a greater political context. Nineteen years ago global pressures forced the United States to seek radical military improvement. The military did not initially embrace this effort. The catalyst for change was legislated through the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Recent experience in war has revealed inadequate war planning at the national strategic level, and lack of coordinated supporting planning at the interagency level. To what extent are these recent problems reflective of more serious, systemic flaws, indicative of a dangerous civil-military seam in the United States? This paper will seek to discover through discussion of theory and doctrine, culture, recent historic evolution, and current counterargument how serious this apparent seam really is. The paper will conclude by considering whether permanent change through legislated action is warranted to close the strategic “war planning” seam.
The Evolution of Command and Control: Finding the Missing Link

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY AND DOCTRINE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL DIVIDE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECENT HISTORIC EVOLUTION</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERARGUMENT</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

The United States has a historic cultural reluctance to embrace war planning in a greater political context. Nineteen years ago global pressures forced the United States to seek radical military improvement. The military did not initially embrace this effort. The catalyst for change was legislated through the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Recent experience in war has revealed inadequate war planning at the national strategic level, and lack of coordinated supporting planning at the interagency level. To what extent are these recent problems reflective of more serious, systemic flaws; indicative of a dangerous civil-military seam in the United States? This paper will seek to discover through discussion of theory and doctrine, culture, recent historic evolution, and current counterargument how serious this apparent seam really is. The paper will conclude by considering whether permanent change through legislated action is warranted to close the strategic “war planning” seam.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategic level war planning process within the National Security Council (NSC). Specifically, does it ensure unity of effort across the interagency? The United States has a historic cultural reluctance to embrace war planning in a greater political context. To make matters worse, since Vietnam the political and military societies within the United States have harbored a mutual distrust. Nineteen years ago global pressures forced the United States to seek radical military improvement. The military did not initially embrace this effort. The catalyst for change was legislated through the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Inevitably, however, the military gradually accepted introspection and change as it sought to study and evolve into a more effective fighting force--through the institution of joint education and revised joint doctrine based on sound war theory. However, recent experience in war has revealed inadequate war planning at the national strategic level and lack of coordinated supporting planning at the interagency level. To what extent are these recent problems reflective of more serious, systemic flaws, indicative of a dangerous civil-military seam in the United States? This paper will seek to discover through discussion of theory and doctrine, culture, recent historic evolution, and current counterargument how serious this apparent seam really is. The paper will conclude by considering whether permanent change through legislated action is warranted to close the strategic “war planning” seam.

THEORY AND DOCTRINE

The importance of strategic assessment and planning for war at a nation’s highest levels has been emphasized for over 2,000 years. In China, the writings of ancient warrior and military theorist Sun Tzu professed, “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life
or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.\textsuperscript{1} Sun Tzu’s writings emphasized the importance of assessment and planning prior to conflict in an entire chapter devoted to “Estimates.”\textsuperscript{2}

In the West at about the same time, Thucydides foreshadowed the eventual demise of the Athenian democracy in a similar manner stating, “. . . but consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter.”\textsuperscript{3} More recently following the devastation in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, Prussian military theorist Karl Von Clausewitz probably gave the most clear and concise guidance on the essential link between politics and War in his chapter titled, “War Is an Instrument of Policy.”\textsuperscript{4} He cautioned that, “. . . war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.”\textsuperscript{5} Clausewitz also saw the vital importance of clear and congruent assessment and planning, “War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”\textsuperscript{6} He based his studies on what he perceived was the most horrific violence in war that mankind had ever seen and believed the Napoleonic Wars had come as close to his idea of “Total Warfare” as mankind could get. There is an undertone in his theories warning future generations of the danger in ignoring basic truths regarding planning for warfare.
Now, many generations later, the United States has witnessed events in its own history where the level of totality and danger in the conduct of war far exceeded anything even Clausewitz could have imagined. Contemporary theorists, such as Professor Milan N. Vego, expound even more broadly on the same theme, “. . . there is an increasingly strong tendency in recent years not only to dismiss the critical importance of operational warfare, but also to ignore strategy and even policy in preparing and employing combat forces . . . Such an approach has proven false in the past and will fail in the future. . . . Military history shows conclusively what happens when there is a serious mismatch or disconnect between ends and means at the strategic and operational level.”7 It has become obvious that anticipating and planning for war becomes even more prudent in today’s highly complex environment given the size, power, speed, and technological sophistication of the modern battlefield. Therefore, joint doctrine for the U.S. military has taken theory a step further and directs in great detail time tested successful methods for military forces to assess, plan, and execute. Specifically, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, and Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, all contain warnings that assessment and planning must begin at the national strategic level, must coordinate all instruments of power, and, therefore, must include other interagency representatives. These warnings also clearly explain that national strategic policy, end state, and objectives must proceed the development of successful plans.

The United States military is specifically directed by the President and Secretary of Defense to conduct assessment and deliberate planning for potential war.8 Unfortunately, today no formal document, doctrine, or organization directs the administration or interagency representatives to assess, create, and integrate national policy and objectives to support military war planning. Therefore, joint planning doctrine reflects the requirement for national level
guidance through the use of the ambiguous wording like “should,” instead of shall or will. That ambiguity of authority and responsibility at the national level does not remove the responsibility of the combatant commander to seek out and determine policy requirements critical for war planning. It is, however, indicative of a civil-military disconnect. This disconnect appears to be the result of an aversion to war planning outside of the military.

**CULTURAL DIVIDE**

An aversion to war and military power as means for political ends in the United States is reflected in this nation’s founding documents. The Constitution of the United States neither recognizes nor defines the requirement for national security and the military (born through revolution). However, throughout the Constitution, and Declaration of Independence, the spirit of the founding fathers reflects an undertone of moral justification through a clearly stated connection to God, and a desire for justice, domestic tranquility, and the pursuit of happiness. It alludes to the inherent distrust of military oligarchy as it directs separation and subordination of military powers to both congressional and presidential oversight, and the allusion of “informality” through a part time “militia.” More important culturally, is that the Constitution clearly delineates any military response must have the support of the Congress, who represents the people, “unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

The last part of that sentiment has become important in the past sixty years, because it has identified a circumstance where the President can, and has, activated a military defense prior to or without congressional declaration of War, based on attack or threat of imminent danger. The inherited cultural result of this constitutional statement is a strong belief that the United States only goes to war in defense or as a last resort. The subsequent expression of the informal
Weinberger and Powell Doctrines are an example of this belief clearly reflected in Administration policy.  

The separation of powers within the Constitution creates another cultural divide in the decision making process. The Constitution favorably creates unity of command by directing the responsibility for leading the nation’s military to war in a single leader, the President.  His assistant advisors and leaders for national security and the military, prior to the National Security Act of 1947, were the Secretaries of War and the Navy, which Congress legislated into a single civilian assistant, the Secretary of Defense. The President is also charged in the Constitution with the leadership responsibility for conducting foreign affairs through treaties and ambassadors.  His right hand assistant for that task is the leader of a separate agency, the Secretary of State. The advice provided by these two important Secretaries to the President has been another source of cultural division. Historically, the cultures of Defense and State have been at odds with each other. Typically, the President and Secretary of State try to exhaust all avenues of diplomacy until the last possible moment, and then conduct a “hand off” to the military. In fact, the aversion by State to consider war has historically been strong, as in the example of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s statement to the Secretary of War Henry Stimson a few days before Pearl Harbor, “I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox--the Army and Navy.” Historically up to the last minute, the President and non-military members of the President’s cabinet have hesitated to discuss how policy must change when using the military instrument. In fact, the purpose of the 1947 National Security Act was to eliminate any more surprise attacks like “Pearl Harbor.” Though the primary target of that act was better interagency integration (state, defense, and intelligence), as we know now over fifty years later, the Act signaled the beginnings of an essential evolution toward greater unity of
effort among the military services. Unfortunately, the changes did nothing toward resolving assessment and planning disconnects between the civil and military leadership establishments. In fact, that seam remains unresolved to the present day, and as joint military capabilities evolve and improve, that seam begins to stand out as a deficiency in assessment and planning.

Three major events following World War II would expand the cultural divide between the civil and military members of the government. The first was the advent of nuclear proliferation and the Cold War. During this period, General Omar Bradley, USA, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, pushed the idea of a joint force to the extreme by publicly supporting a long term procurement plan called “Dropshot.” Under that plan, the Navy and Marine Corps would be eliminated. The reasoning at the time was based on the advent of nuclear war and pre-eminence of the recently independent Air Force. Although Bradley’s twist on the future force structure was wrong and short lived, it strengthened the suspicions and distrust of an already stove-piped set of military services. This suspicion and distrust would detract from any thorough joint service integration for many years. The second major event was the Korean War, where the supporting predictions of “Dropshot” were proved false, and it was immediately obvious that the requirement for full spectrum military campaign planning and operations would remain vitally important. In fact, the Korean War proved two things: one, though it was not a “Pearl Harbor,” it was close, and the changes made since 1947 had not eliminated the ability of belligerents to strategically surprise the United States, and two, the United States would need both full spectrum planning and forces from all the services--air, sea, littoral, and land forces were required to synchronize efforts strategically and operationally to achieve victory. This required clear policy, detailed assessment, and planning. The third major event was a consecutive series of significant military failures resulting directly from civil-military
disconnects. The first in the series was the Vietnam War. This costly loss to U.S. prestige was a classic case of disconnected political and military policy, end state, and objectives. The next two events in the series were the aborted Iranian Hostage Rescue and the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In each of these events the military leaders took away the lesson that when national policy and military strategy do not match, the result is disaster. Failure of the administration to understand the limits of military usefulness or to clearly identify policy, combined with a failure of the military leadership to demand clear policy, or to translate their limits effectively to the civilian administration, stretched the civil-military cultural seam to its widest point. Examples of future political or military leaders representing opposing sides of the expanded cultural civil-military seam were those with distrust and little first-hand military experience, like George Shultz and Bill Clinton or, on the other side, leaders who had significant military experience, like Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell. The informal “Weinberger” and “Powell” doctrines were created as rule sets in order to minimize the presence of the civil-military seam. This turbulent period for the military would be a catalyst toward new legislation forcing the military to assess internal weaknesses and make improvements.

**RECENT HISTORIC EVOLUTION**

Following the civil-military failures noted above, and the fact that the Cold War was heating up during the Reagan administration, the civil and military establishments began to take a long, hard look at military deficiencies. Years of military funding cutbacks were being reversed by the Reagan administration whose emphasis was clearly on “winning” the Cold War. Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense (his military assistant was Colin Powell), and faced with the recent string of military failures since Vietnam, he intended to fix the U.S. government propensity for ill-considered intervention. He initiated an informal set of rules, later to be coined
the “Weinberger doctrine,” and instituted a proactive approach to revitalizing the military. His military assistant at the time would build upon this approach eight years later as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), with his “Powell doctrine.” Comparing the two rule sets, the following three commonalities focus on closing the civil-military command and control seam: the requirement for thorough and continuous assessment, clear attainable objectives, and overwhelming force.\(^{19}\) The first test for this new approach was the invasion of the island of Grenada. This operation included some elements of all the services, and in the end was successful. However, key military weaknesses were identified regarding the conduct of joint operations. Subsequent assessment revealed that despite three previous congressional amendments, service stovepipes continued to cause serious disconnects in leading, planning, and integrating joint operations. The services were not making sufficient progress toward joint warfare. It was evident to Congress that something would have to be directed by law to expand on previous amendments.

As stated previously, the purpose of the 1947 National Security Act was to create a more integrated U.S. government response to national security, including joint military unity of effort, under a clear military chain of command to the President. It was also expected that institutionalizing unity of command in law would eliminate the requirement for each new president to depend upon a personalized working relationship with the military. This concept was further amended by subsequent congressional legislation in 1949, 1953, and 1958 that consolidated the power of the service chiefs under a single military chairman to further enhance military joint integration.\(^{20}\) Those congressional amendments signaled the beginning of a new more unified military command structure, though varying changes to the law over the next twenty years complicated the simplicity and clarity envisioned in the original act. The
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clarified the warfighting chain of command from the Combatant Commanders, to the Secretary of Defense, to the President.\textsuperscript{21} This legislation enabled true joint unity of effort in the planning and conduct of war. Military successes followed in Panama’s Operation JUST CAUSE, followed by an even bigger combat success in Iraq during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Based on these military successes, which were enabled by both Goldwater-Nichols and the informal Weinberger-Powell doctrines, it appeared that the civil-military seam might be closing. Unfortunately, Weinberger and Powell’s ideas did not resolve the underlying civil-military gap between the national civil leadership responsibility to anticipate and provide attainable war policy, and the military leadership responsibility to ensure war plans are consistent with national policy. Unfortunately, those informal personal guidelines were never expanded upon or institutionalized for succeeding administrations. It would also become obvious through future events that a key element was still missing. It would be the lessons learned from DESERT STORM post war complications that would identify that key element.

Euphoria in both the political and military establishments immediately followed the decisive military victory attained by the United States-led coalition against Iraq during DESERT STORM. After much deliberation, assessment, legislative change, and focus by the Department of Defense, three administrations, and Congress following the Nixon administration, it finally appeared the military was back on track.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, though, by 1992 there were three important deficiencies that occurred during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM that were directly attributable to the seam. First, though progress had been made toward joint military planning, there were still many improvements needed.\textsuperscript{23} Second, despite the Weinberger-Powell policy clarifications, there was still a serious civil-military planning seam.\textsuperscript{24} Third, one important
deficiency that had not been adequately addressed was the lack of a clear political end state. This resulted directly in no war termination strategy and inadequate post-conflict planning and resolution in Iraq.\textsuperscript{25} These same lessons learned would become acute issues again during the following Clinton administration and its efforts at military intervention in the complex contingencies of Somalia and Haiti. After Haiti in 1994, and in contrast to previous administrations, the Clinton administration decided that more political influence and a dedicated process were required to plan and execute complex contingencies. Thus, through follow-on deliberations by the Principals Committee of the National Security Council, it was determined that a political-military plan was required to resolve gaps and lack of sufficient coordination in civil-military planning.\textsuperscript{26} Subsequent operations in Bosnia, Eastern Slovenia, and Central Africa used the political-military planning process and built upon it through continuous adaptation and improvement. This guidance seemed to resolve the issue of interagency integration, which was now directed by the NSC, and in 1997 it was instituted within the Clinton administration by Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” This PDD seemed to provide answers to the civil-military seam because it directed continuous assessment, clear political-military end state, objectives, and other critical planning policies throughout the interagency.\textsuperscript{27} It would have two significant shortfalls, however, with regard to U.S. war planning and execution. The first was that it did not apply to either military planning for peacetime engagement or to aspects of the war planning process, only to “complex contingencies,” defined as crises involving human tragedy and an element of security. Second, it was not fully institutionalized, as was exhibited by the cancellation of PDD-56 by the incoming administration following elections in 2000. A National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) “XX” had been projected by the new administration to replace PDD-56; however, it is still not signed
or approved. Currently, the process is captured and informally managed by the National Defense University in its latest version of the “Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook.” Examples from the next phase of U.S. warfare history will show that this complex contingency political-military process is directly applicable to war planning as well.

In 1997 after the Clinton administration approval of PDD-56, General Zinni, the newly assigned combatant commander for Central Command began to run up against the same old historic civil-military seam. With global complexity increasing, it became readily apparent in the 1990s that “Theater Engagement Planning (TEP)” was required to coordinate theater engagement and conflict avoidance strategies within combatant command (COCOM) Areas of Responsibility (AOR). As General Zinni soon discovered, “The Washington bureaucracy was too disjointed to make the vision of all the strategies, from the President to the CINC’s [Commanders-in-Chief], a reality. There was no single authority in the bureaucracy to coordinate the significant programs we CINCs designed. The uncoordinated funding, policy decisions, authority, assigned geography, and many other issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security Council, and other government agencies and made it difficult to pull complex engagement plans together.”

General Wesley Clark, combatant commander for the European Command, would find out first hand in 1999 the shortfalls in PDD-56 as they related to a complex contingency expanding into war. There is a serious problem with the complex contingency process as it relates to war. The complex contingency process is incomplete. As existing theory and doctrine clearly contend, continuous national strategic level assessment and planning should seamlessly be applied using all instruments of power through peace, conflict, war, war termination, and post conflict. As Clausewitz stated, “Once again: War is an instrument of policy.” Without full national assessment and planning for war, the
resulting tendency is interference and micromanagement at the national strategic political level. This was the case in Kosovo in 1999, when a “complex contingency” erupted into a war the prosecution of which suffered from political micromanagement that was the product of incomplete war planning.  

PDD-56 guidance seemed to be working quite well in the Balkan theater from 1995 through 1998. The NSC was actively involved in providing policy and guidance derived through the PDD-56 mandate. The administration and agencies worked together well until war was inevitable, at that point the process broke down because it was designed to prevent or deter conflicts. As General Clark stated, “The political and legal issues resulted in obstacles to properly planning and preparing military forces and, coming full circle, reduced the credibility of the threat.” Clark supplies numerous examples of the civil-military disconnects regarding national strategic planning problems, and those same assertions are supported in The Mission, by Dana Priest, and in the Vego article, “Wake-Up Call in Kosovo.” Kosovo was successful, but primarily through the tremendous efforts of what Clark coined as “adapting during war.” The only planned strategy was a limited PDD-56 diplomatic-political product that considered only military coercion. Nothing was planned beyond that until it became obvious that the coercion strategy would not work. Suddenly, the unexpected occurred (war) and “... the Clinton administration left Clark nearly alone in the critical opening days of the air war to persuade the alliance’s nineteen nations that the short fight they—and he—had planned now required a rapid, major overhaul.” From that point, the execution would be running immediately on the heels of “strategic adaptation” until completion. In Clark’s own words: “But in the case of Kosovo, there simply was no detailed planning. There was no strategic consensus in Washington.” Also well documented in the Kosovo example is what happens when political restrictions and interference
severely hamper planning. Some administrations may be more prone to micromanagement than others. However, in the case of Kosovo, where strategic policy and agency planning took place nearly simultaneous to execution, inadequate prior planning exacerbated the tendency for administrative micromanagement. As communications and information technologies expand, the temptation to micromanage will be even harder for our nation’s leaders to resist. The next two major conflicts--Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)--provide even more examples that illustrate U.S. inability to resolve national strategic planning inadequacies.

Just as occurred at Pearl Harbor, in South Korea, and in Kuwait, the events of September 11, 2001 once again proved that the United States can still be strategically surprised. The United States’ reaction to that attack would also reveal that the civil-military seam still existed and national strategic planning remained a serious problem. Professor Vego pointed out in 2002, during OEF, that “the conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan reinforced the trend toward further centralization of command and control in the U.S. military.” He noted that full campaign planning is required and that “objectives and tasks—not targets—should dominate the planning process at any level of command.” His major point of emphasis focused on the need for thorough planning, with centralized direction (planning) and decentralized execution. He highlighted the extremely poor ability of the United States to assess and plan thoroughly at the highest levels, specifically noting the lack of war termination and post conflict planning. The successes of Kosovo, OEF, and OIF were obtained through overwhelming U.S. force, technological advantage, and tactical prowess against militarily weak nations and poorly trained forces. The point being that one day when the United States finally faces a strong and proficient foe, the missing political-military planning elements will be critical for success. It should be
noted that the conduct of OIF reflected tremendous progress in the evolution of joint military warfare. One important effect though, has been a clearer picture of the shortfalls of the war planning process at the national strategic level. Recently, both the former National Security Advisor, Dr. Rice, and Vice President Cheney acknowledged that there was a lack of adequate planning guidance for post conflict Iraq. Also, the Defense Science Board, and Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently published studies on the lack of war termination and post conflict planning, certainly aggravated by a lack of interagency integration, as a result of OIF. The problems are obvious, but so is the solution. The answer is institutionalizing a war planning process at the NSC level. Such would direct full spectrum assessment and planning of all necessary agencies, from potential crisis identification, through war, to an acceptable end state. This seems obvious to the military planner, but there are two recurring counterarguments to this recommendation.

**COUNTERARGUMENT**

The first counterargument is expressed in Professor David Tucker’s article, “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth.” He suggests that legislation (a new national security act) will create an interagency hierarchy. There is some cultural fear among administration departments that legislating a national strategic planning process would eliminate agency flexibility and effectiveness by impeding current decentralized processes. He specifically references infringement upon agency “freedom to respond” that allows for their existing “decentralized networks,” which are more “sensitive, agile, and adaptive.” Inception of a national planning process will displace the current consensus-based process with a rigid hierarchical process. This loss of flexibility he contends will reduce the variety of viewpoints for Presidential decision, and therefore be less effective. He writes primarily from a State
Department perspective that is well analyzed in a National Defense University article, “Defense Is from Mars State Is from Venus.” This article discusses in detail the cultural differences between Defense and State. Because there are a multitude of separate cultures and processes among the various interagency offices, there is a fear that a centralized, dictatorial hierarchy may be established that would diminish their respective agencies’ perceived effectiveness in execution. This counterargument seems to completely miss the point. In fact, there is a significant lack of understanding outside of the military regarding planning. If planning theory were studied and understood among non-military agencies it would be seen that centralization of command does not change, it remains Presidential, and that effective decentralized execution should be the ultimate goal of proper planning for all agencies. Tucker’s article captures very well the misunderstanding of “joint interoperability” that is currently missing among the interagency “players.” The same “stove-pipe” fears, of directed legislation that might eliminate or diminish a military component, were expressed by the services prior to both the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In fact, no permanent hierarchy is intended in currently suggested legislation for national planning. The President establishes agency hierarchy for crisis reaction based on specific goals and objectives. Sometimes in complex crises the lead is State, while in war it is usually Defense; however, a national war planning process would not mandate a permanent hierarchy. The intention of legislation under consideration is to gain interagency priority of focus on planning for something many agencies culturally prefer not to consider--war. It is the variety of non-military interagency functions and attendant specialized expertise that is desired by the military. It is not the desire of the Department of Defense to command these agencies, but only to ensure that each
agency is properly represented, prepared, and is coordinating and executing its respective function to achieve national unity when a serious crisis erupts.

The second counterargument comes primarily from the Department of Defense itself. There are those in the military who believe that greater involvement by Department of Defense political leadership in the planning process will lead to excessive political interference or micromanagement during execution. This same belief also resides among some key politicians. Examples of this belief can be found in both DESERT STORM and Kosovo. Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor explain in *The General’s War* an official mythology from DESERT STORM that “... civilian and military officials in Washington, mindful of the errors of the Vietnam War, took a virtual hands-off approach toward the planning of the war in the Gulf.” Arguably, when planning is deficient at the national level, due to a civil-military disconnect, the likelihood of execution micromanagement is the greatest. This was especially true in the example of Kosovo. General Clark notes that he accepted what some argue was an excessive amount of tactical meddling by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, who expressed great reluctance on entering into any conflict fraught with political limitations. Of course, Professor Vego’s article clearly connects the tendency for micromanagement in Kosovo with the lack of proper planning at the start and throughout the war. Just as the State Department has a cultural revulsion to military interference, so the Defense Department has a parallel fear for political interference. These fears are irrational and must be eliminated. Planning must be conducted with equal importance, both politically and militarily. Decentralization during execution is about senior leadership understanding and trust. The interagency holdouts must comprehend that only through national strategic political
understanding, assessment, and planning direction (continuously re-assessed) for war, can political micromanagement in execution during war be eliminated.

CONCLUSION

There will continue to be those individuals skeptical of any suggestion to “legislate” or “institutionalize” anything at the national level. The Department of Defense has worked very hard for the past sixty years evolving to become the dominant global military force. In the past nineteen years, as the United States continues working to improve joint military cooperation, a missing key has been the lack of a cohesive strategic interagency planning process. To sew the seam shut requires one final step. Many of the past’s national-level planning problems can be resolved by merging the “Complex Contingency Planning” concept with a national-strategic version of the military’s joint operational planning process known as the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The benefits of merging these processes include the close and continuous interaction with the political leadership seen in the complex contingency process, combined with thorough campaign planning, directed across all agencies. The requisite political inputs for both types of planning are identical: continuous assessment, as well as clear policy, end state, and objectives. Unfortunately, historically the United States exhibits an extremely poor ability to accurately assess potential risk of war. WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugoslavian countries, and OEF and OIF are all examples of poor U.S. assessment of costs and means and inadequate planning for war at the national strategic level. Because war is the most dangerous and costly endeavor of the state (as Sun Tzu pointed out), it is not only prudent that each potential crisis be identified and engaged upon as early as possible, but also that the worst case--war, be assessed and planned for at the highest levels and across the administrative agencies. The best solution is to institutionalize a
JOPES-like war planning process at the NSC level. Based on past tendencies of administrations and agencies to ignore and resist organizational and process improvements with regard to war planning and integration, institutional change appears to be effective only when it is congressionally mandated. Therefore, this paper highly recommends institutionalizing a JOPES-like war planning process directing responsibility at the NSC level through legislated action.

2 Ibid., 63-71.
5 Ibid..
6 Ibid., 579.
9 Ibid., II-1, II-3.
10 U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8. and art. II, sec. 2.
11 Ibid., art. I, sec. 10.
13 U.S. Constitution, art. II, sec. 2.
17 Ibid., 324.
18 Mokhiber and Young, “The Uses of Military Force,” 1, 2.
19 Ibid., 2, 3.
21 Ibid., 34.
23 Ibid., 473.
24 Ibid., 32, 45, 46, 65, 77.
25 Ibid., 432, 433, 460, 461, 476, 477.
27 Ibid., 11.

29 Clausewitz, *On War*, 610.


34 Priest, *The Mission*, 47.


37 Ibid., 32.


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