Contemporary Army Solutions to the JFC’s Seabasing Challenge

The Joint Seabasing concept as articulated in the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) is currently proposed as a solution to overcome current and future access challenges. Regional Combatant and Joint Force Commanders (RCC/JFC) have the expectation that the services will provide forces capable of conducting the full range of military operations (ROMO) in support of their regional requirements. The more demanding and imposing of these challenges is joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) in support of major combat operations (MCO) from a Seabase in the absence of a supporting land bases. The Army has developed several solutions to employ its current and future force to help the JFC overcome these challenges and dominate in MCO from the Seabase. Even though each solution offers the JFC with greater capabilities than previously harnessed, neither concept consummately adapts itself to the JIC’s measures of performance nor the Army’s Seabasing force capabilities criteria as outlined in its capstone and concept documents. The Army should modify its current solutions and concepts with innovative applications using current capabilities to provide the RCC’s with a robust MCO forcible entry Seabasing capability today.
Contemporary Army Solutions to the JFC’s Seabasing Challenge

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The Joint Seabasing concept as articulated in the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) is currently proposed as a solution to overcome current and future access challenges. Regional Combatant and Joint Force Commanders (RCC/JFC) have the expectation that the services will provide forces capable of conducting the full range of military operations (ROMO) in support of their regional requirements. The more demanding and imposing of these challenges is joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) in support of major combat operations (MCO) from a Seabase in the absence of a supporting land bases. The Army has developed several solutions to employ its current and future force to help the JFC overcome these challenges and dominate in MCO from the Seabase. Even though each solution offers the JFC with greater capabilities than previously harnessed, neither concept consummately adapts itself to the JIC’s measures of performance nor the Army’s Seabasing force capabilities criteria as outlined in its capstone and concept documents. The Army should modify its current solutions and concepts with innovative applications using current capabilities to provide the RCC’s with a robust MCO forcible entry Seabasing capability today.
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Introduction

Contemporary challenges present Joint Forces Commanders (JFC) with a growing need for vastly different responses than previously required. The services must provide JFCs with viable contributions to meet those regional responsibilities. The Seabasing concept, which addresses solutions for conducting the full range of military operations (ROMO) from which reliance on land bases is denied, is supported by the Army with several solutions. To support the JFC with forcible entry from a Seabase during major combat operations (MCO), the Army developed three concepts, all of which have shortcomings. This paper will explore the Army’s solutions to assist the JFC in executing MCOs from a Seabase; it will analyze the solution shortcomings; and offer recommendations to make Seabasing a more joint and viable option to conduct contemporary MCOs in the absence of permissive access to land bases.

Seabasing and the Joint Integrating Concept

Although it is currently in vogue to analyze and prepare for smaller wars and asymmetric challenges, one of the more imposing JFC responsibilities is to employ and sustain forces in joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) in an MCO without reliance on land bases or Ports of Debarkation (PODs). One visualization of how such a scenario might unfold is articulated in the Joint Staff’s Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC). Joint Concepts are designed not only to offer the JFC a visualization of future operations, but they also integrate military science and art in order to achieve an objective or desired end state. The Seabasing concept illustrates how a commander can project,

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compliment, integrate, sustain and enable joint combat power throughout the littorals without the reliance on land bases in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). ² Specifically, the JIC defines seabasing as:

“The rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases with the Joint Operations Area (JOA).” ³

Key to this paper are several assumptions articulated within the JIC as top-level measures of performance. The sea base:

- Must be able to assemble and integrate joint capabilities at the sea base to support major combat operations within 24-72 hours of arrival within the JOA.

- Must be able to project combat power from over the horizon (OTH) to inland objectives; specifically, to employ one brigade for Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) within the hours of darkness (8-10 hrs) from the sea base.

- Must be able to sustain from the sea base up to at least two joint brigades operating ashore for an indefinite period using secured advance bases up to 2,000 nm away. ⁴ (boldface added for emphasis)

Potential solutions to Seabasing operations must be examined against these threshold measures of performance. Those solutions that do not contribute to mitigating the JFC’s challenges in the absence of land bases in the JOA may not be suitable for employment and may require further refinement or consideration.

Army Seabasing Solutions

The Army is developing concepts to support current and future Seabasing requirements. Elements of these concepts are articulated in the JIC as well as numerous

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³ IBID., 5.
⁴ IBID., 8.
other Army documents and at least one regional Operation Plan. The Army’s capstone concept for future forces, which supports future JFC requirements across the ROMO, is articulated in the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0 titled “The Army in Joint Operations”. There are several key points or assumptions that link the Army with Seabasing and define the force and capabilities to be applied. They are:

- The Army must reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with staying power and provide sustained land combat power to joint operations.
- The Army must respond effectively and seamlessly to any conflict regardless of character or scale.
- The purpose of the force is to execute emerging JICs as an interdependent land component of the joint force.
- The future force will conduct JFEO from strategic distances with mounted and dismounted forces, employing strategic assets.
- The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) will be employed as the Army’s primary capability for mission tailoring to achieve its future aims. The BCT offers improved strategic responsiveness and greater flexibility to the JFC across the range of military operations.
- “Prompt Response” requirement in the future will be addressed by current light formations, Stryker BCTs (SBCT) and Future Combat Systems (FCS) equipped Units of Action (UA). Finally operational maneuver will be conducted by air and vertical maneuver.

_Analysis of Shortcomings_

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6 “Prompt Response” is understood to be immediate or rapid reaction responses to emergent crises.
The Army Seabasing concepts under current consideration offer the JFC a MCO forcible entry force with the capability to achieve an operational level effect from the sea by destroying, dislocating, or disintegrating the enemy force. The first of two innovative options being examined is the ability to stage a combat ready light brigade combat team (BCT) from an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB). The second concept employs combat ready formations, of any configuration, from a squadron of Austere Access High Speed Ships (AAHSS). The third option, albeit more limited and traditional, is airdropping an Airborne BCT (ABBCT). These concepts exploit both proven and innovative approaches to employ and sustain combat forces without relying on advanced bases within the JOA. However each of the options has operational limitations that may diminish their utility to the JFC for MCOs. Whereas the AFSB and airborne operation concepts are employable with today’s equipment and forces, the AAHSS requires development of a new type of vessel that is under joint development with the Navy. It is neither the intention nor scope of this paper to address future systems and programs, but rather the Army component’s capability to prevail over the challenges that the Seabasing concept is designed to overcome. A review of these capabilities offers an accurate evaluation of the current and proposed capabilities.

AFSB

Through the Army Sea Based Early Entry Capability Limited Objective Experiment, the Army assessed that a sea based Air Assault Brigade Combat Team (AABCT) would have utility to achieve operational significance in major combat
operations against a regional competitor as a forcible entry force. Subsequently, the Army introduced the AFSB concept designed to provide the JFC with additional vertical maneuver, thereby offering greater flexibility when conducting operations, including JFEO, from the littorals. The concept centers around four large ships that provide transport and operational space to employ one AABCT, with organic Army aviation, from the sea to forward locations ashore. The four ships could be modified cargo vessels or ships from the existing Navy carrier or amphibious fleet capable of landing helicopters. The AFSB would be employed as part of the sea base or independently in a synchronized, supporting role to a JFC’s operation. The AABCT is comprised of three light infantry battalions plus the “slice elements” or reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, support and headquarters elements of the full Brigade Combat Team, all of which are intended to be employed by vertical lift. The Army AABCTs could also compliment a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to achieve the JIC’s two brigade force. Moreover, the MEB offers the JFC with the ability to employ one infantry battalion by air (thus achieving some degree of operational depth inland) and the other one by surface, with a third in reserve which can be employed by land, sea or a combination of both.

While the Army’s AFSB concept appears to offer the JFC with an additional forcible entry force yielding greater operational flexibility, it is not a perfect solution. The Army concluded that employing an AABCT via vertical lift from the sea base at an operational distance up to 110 nautical miles (nm) is feasible with current technology.

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9 During the joint exercise Unified Course ’05, TRADOC established that the aviation unit to support the AABCT aboard the AFSB would be an Aviation Brigade (Medium) with full compliment of TOE equipment.
However, there are two key challenges to be overcome. First, Army helicopters are currently not “marinized”; there is no Army anti-corrosive program established for employing helicopters at sea.¹⁰ The result is that the aviation element of the AFSB would have to establish its base of operations ashore as quickly as possible or run the considerable risk associated with corrosive effects on the helicopters’ systems. Thus, operating from ashore is the current concept of operation envisioned in the AFSB studies. The second, and perhaps greater challenge, is that much of the AABCTs and Aviation Brigade’s mission essential equipment is too heavy to be lifted by current rotary lift capabilities. The largest helicopter available to the AFSB is the CH-47 (Chinook) with a maximum lifting capacity of 25,000 lbs, in ideal environments. For example, the current AABCT and Aviation Brigade (MED) modified table of equipment includes mission essential equipment such as the FOX reconnaissance vehicle (38,500lbs) (SRI capability), the wrecker and fuel HEMMTS (38,900 lbs) (forward battle damage assessment and repair and mobile fueling capability), and the MTV Cargo Trucks (23-29,000 lbs)¹¹ (troop and equipment mobility). Even if the lighter elements of the AABCT did employ by vertical lift, the BCT could not function as designed as a self-sufficient, self-sustaining fighting force – which is one of its critical strengths. Furthermore, the lift requirements to employ the forcible entry force are enormous.

In a parallel study conducted by the Navy Warfare Development Command (Unified Course 05), they determined it would take approximately 177 CH-47 and 44 UH-60 (Blackhawk) lifts just to move the AABCT ashore and another 275 CH-47s and

¹⁰ DAMO-SSW, “Information Paper, Army Regional Flotillas (ARF) and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), 22 July 2003: 5.
11 UH-60s to move the Aviation Brigade’s (MED) equipment. According to the TRADOC study, the employment of the AABCT from the AFSB to its objective at 110 miles would take approximate 56 hours. This assumes 24 hours of continuous deck operations, by comparison to the Navy standard for deck operations of 12 hours within 24 hours. The JIC measure of performance for employing the forcible entry force is between 8-10 hours or during the hours of darkness. ‘Non-marinized’ equipment, weight constraints and self-employment requirements seem to press up against the challenges imposed by the JIC’s measures of performance.

TRADOC considered the option to leave the BCT’s sustainment elements aboard the AFSB but concluded this option was too problematic. Current air assault doctrine (based on equipment capabilities), as revealed in the study, limits air assault operations to about 90 nautical miles (nm) beyond where sustained forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations can be established. Assuming that the AFSB is in a modified location 110 nm offshore, secure from potential land based threats, refueling aboard the AFSB exceeds operationally useful limits. Hence, a land base FARP must be established. Furthermore, the lack of “marinized” equipment necessitates the employment of organic maintenance resources ashore as well. The study further supported the necessity of establishing a base of operations ashore because of the AFSBs limited deck space for operations. Additionally, what space was available was required for higher priority requirements other than refueling. Consequently the need for land based FARPs and maintenance unit’s leads to the requirements for some sort of a semi-permanent logistics

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13 Conrad, George, “LOE”: 9
14 IBID., 13.
footprint ashore supported by unit equipment that is too heavy to be air-lifted by unit organic airlift.

Even assuming the AABCT could successfully employ ashore via vertical lift, the JFC’s logistics structure would be challenged with an overwhelming sustainment requirement in supporting this force. The TRADOC study recognized that the organic assets of the AABCT would be insufficient to resupply their fuel needs. The study determined that the fuel requirement for the 55 hour air assault at 110 nms is approximately 260,000 gallons. Due to space limitations aboard the AFSB, refueling for the air assault helicopters must be done ashore. The fuel quantities alone call for 100 sorties of CH-47s carrying three Robertson Fuel tanks (temporary fuel bladders installed aboard the CH-47 for the purpose of carrying increased volumes of fuel). However, to support the operational aspects of the mission, the organic CH-47s would also be required to move and maneuver forces and equipment as well as provide them sustainment and fuel. Applying the same aircraft assets against both the sustainment and operational requirements leaves one or the other unresourced. Therefore, the BCT will require non-organic support options from the Seabase or from other strategic assets. The only option considered currently feasible is to resupply the FARPS with approximately 28 sorties of C-130J aircraft. Furthermore, the study concluded that the mission requirements, as opposed to the assault requirements of employing the force to the shore, equated to approximately another 28 sorties of C-130J aircraft. Receiving fuel from a C-130 requires a secure forward aerial port of debarkation (APOD), thus locking the JFC into a static forward position on the battlefield and contrary to the JIC’s threshold goal of operating without reliance on forward operating bases. Furthermore, their static ground
position increases their exposure and vulnerability to enemy forces placing the JFC’s land based force at greater risk. With the added requirement of securing the APOD, the AABCT’s capacity to conduct decisive maneuver and execute simultaneous, distributed operations throughout the operational area is diminished. In effect, this reduced AABCT is no longer operationally significant and may not be suitable for employment as one of the brigades envisioned in the JIC for MCOs.

The AFSB offers an interesting concept for further Army exploration into the challenges of Seabasing but it is fraught with problems and realistically offers the JFC with limited options for employing brigade-sized Army forces as a forcible entry force for major combat operations. The JFC may get the Air Assault Brigade to the JOA, and may be able to employ the infantry units into the fight, from up to 110 nm, but with current resources it can not sustained or function as the BCT is designed and equipped. Additionally, even if the JFC was able to employ the BCT’s support elements via surface connector (not currently considered an option in the AFSB concept), the mobile BCT would be fixed to a forward APOD with fewer available forces to conduct offensive operations. This concept, as currently envisioned cannot satisfy the top level measures of performance as articulated in the Seabasing JIC.

\textit{AAHSS}

Another solution for introducing an Army BCT into the fight without the legacy use of fixed, improved ports relies on a conceptual platform still in the early stages of research and development -- the Austere Access High Speed Ship (AAHSS)\textsuperscript{15}. If this

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{15} The AAHSS is also described in other references as the Joint High Speed Ship (JHSS). Throughout this paper the term AAHSS will be used to avoid confusion with the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).
capability comes on line, one AAHSS is designed to deliver a reinforced battalion task force. As described in a TRADOC White Paper it is “envisioned as an intertheater sealift capability that can deliver troops, equipment, and sustainment together in combined arms configuration in sufficient size and at a considerable speed to provide immediately employable combat power from strategic distances to the joint force commander.”\textsuperscript{16} The AAHSS, in essence, modernizes the ship-to-shore employment of forces via surface connector by providing the JFC the capability to employ “fort-to-shore” forces from beyond the JOA. A combat ready BCT, requiring three AAHSSs, can pass through the seabase (if required) to land at an austere beachhead or unimproved port. Using three different discharge points the force can present the enemy with multiple dilemmas and reduce predictability. Also, since the AAHSS will carry both troops and their equipment on the same ship, in combat configuration, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) requirements will be significantly reduced. Furthermore, this solution can employ an entire battalion task force with its full compliment of heavy support equipment thus offering the JFC with a Stryker or Future Combat System (FCS) BCT. While the AAHSS reduces the need for an improved port facility, it is extremely vulnerable to any opposition on the shoreline. At sea the AAHSS’s high speed decreases its vulnerability to many threats but when it slows down to approach the beachhead or port to disembark the battalion task force, it presents opposing forces with a slow moving, poorly defended inviting target. The loss of a single fully loaded AAHSS potentially equates to one third of the JFC’s Army forcible entry force. Because of the vulnerability and risk of taking the AAHSS into a non-permissive shoreline it is not likely

to be employed until the JFC has eliminated the bulk of anti-access and shore-based threats. In and of itself, the AAHSS does not present the JFC with a viable forcible entry force; however it may be employed in synchronization with other forces that secure access to a lodgment for a period long enough to safely offload. The AAHSS eliminates the JFC’s dependency on improved SPODs, but does not realistically offer the commander with an Army forcible entry force in a non-permissible environment as the Seabasing JIC proposes.

**Airborne Forcible Entry**

The Army’s capstone document exhorts the Army to provide “prompt response” to emergent requirements and operations with a variety of formations; one of which is the Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABBCT). In some respects the ABBCT closely resembles the description of a second brigade supported by Seabasing as is proposed in the JIC. This traditional mode of employment satisfies the vision of providing a forcible entry force in support of a seabased operation. An airborne operation is not limited by the constraints of the Seabase or littorals and for a period of time may be sustained by resources outside of the Seabase. However, as with the other solutions, this one also offers considerable challenges and limitations. The JFC must sacrifice theater and strategic movement during a crucial window while attempting to achieve operational dominance with the use of this force. An ABBCT requires ninety-three C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to conduct an airborne operation.\(^1\)

Currently, the Air force has 150 C-17s, 134 on active duty and sixteen in the Air Guard and Reserves (the current,}

\(^1\) U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Army Employment Data, December 2005 Revised by John A. Bonin COL, USA (Retired) Prof., Concepts and Doctrine U.S. Army War College: 32.
projected future capability will total 189 C-17s). Today, deploying the AABCT would consume sixty-two % of the nation’s C-17 fleet to execute the operation. Dedicating sixty-two % of the Air force fleet would not only impact on the nation’s ability to satisfy concurrent routine sustainment missions around the world, but considerably impact on the JFC’s own ability to deploy follow-on forces. The secondary effect would be operationally significant not only to the other Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC), but to the seabaseed JFC as well. While the JFC, based upon a threat analysis, may find merit in supporting this option, the Army’s solution to help address the JFC’s Seabasing challenge may be too ‘expensive’ to employ. Furthermore, the AABCT is lightly armed and has limited maneuver capability. It too, would be relegated to a fixed or narrow mission until other aviation or armored vehicles could be introduced into their operational area. This paper has already presented the challenges of employing and sustaining Army aviation supported force from the sea base. While this remains a viable option for limited low threat scenarios, it may present limited utility to the JFC for JFEO in a MCO from a Seabase.

Recommendations

Whether exploiting traditional concepts of employment, such as the airborne operation, or applying the new and innovative AFSB and potential AAHSS, the JFC is presented with a range of Army tools to help address his Seabasing challenges. Either option described above may also be suitable for use in lesser contingencies where access might be denied or limited, but there is much room for improvement. To further evolve

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the Army’s seabasing concepts there are a series of improvements and actions that may mitigate current technological challenges and increase the synergistic effect of employing the Army forces in conjunction with other sea based forces. Below are several non-technological recommendations that could be implemented today to help the JFC integrate his current joint resources into a more capable joint Seabasing force.

➢ Currently, the Army has a large number of watercraft that could be employed as surface connectors to move the heavy support equipment ashore from an AFSB. Although the use of army water craft is often reviewed in many other documents, it is not part of the current AFSB concept. Until heavy lift vertical take-off and landing aircraft are available, the AFSB concept should be amended to employ Army watercraft. To use Army watercraft in this capacity requires the development of joint doctrine and training exercises employing Army water craft in conjunction with Navy amphibious ships. These events would train current crews on Navy well-deck and integrated landing platform (ILP) operations in support of AFSB operations. While the concept is viable on paper it can only be effective when joint standards are developed and crews trained to those standards.

➢ The AFSB concept is inadequate without a dedicated aviation force capable of routinely operating from the sea. The Army should designate a maritime capable force from the current light and aviation formations available today. This would include “marinizing” their equipment, developing joint doctrine, memorandums of agreement/understanding and conducting Army and Navy exercises at sea. In addition to
maritime capable equipment, the unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) should include a Deck Landing Qualification (DLQ) minimum standard. It is pointless to offer a JFC with a concept to support Seabasing operations without having the forces that are equipped, trained and ready to execute under those conditions. By adding trained and equipped aviation units, as well as surface connectors to offset the limitations of air-lift capacity, the Army’s AFSB concept for Seabasing operations could be executed today.

➢ While it is beyond the scope of this paper to recommend detailed force structure or equipment changes, it may prove beneficial to AFSB operations to make use of current light weight systems to replace the heavier table organization and equipment (TOE). Innovative approaches such as placing maintenance/contact equipment and fuel pods on lighter vehicles may make it possible to employ the entire BCT as designed, by vertical lift under current Army helicopters.

➢ The Army should publish Army doctrine on Seabasing operations. While there is currently a plethora of white papers, concepts and experiments discussing future Seabasing solutions, there are a number of current capabilities that could be applied in Seabasing operations today. The Army’s history of conducting Seabasing operations is considerable yet there is dearth of Army documentation available that integrates the available skill sets to perform under sea based environments. Current techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs), integrated and codified in useable doctrine, would set the stage for units to dedicate necessary resources to improve on those skill sets. Furthermore, it would provide the basis for future joint interoperability. An Army Field Manual on
Army Seabasing practices would inform RCCs on the capabilities and limitations they could expect from their assigned Army forces and help establish regional joint exercises to develop greater joint integration and competencies.

- The RCCs should identify likely POD requirements from which support would be required in future fights (PODs within an operationally significant distance from potential future JOAs). They should then further strengthen, focus and resource their security and cooperation programs with the intent too ensure the U.S. is in a position to rely on those PODs when the necessity calls.

- The Joint Staff should develop Joint Seabasing exercises along the same lines as the Joint Logistics over the Shore (JLOTS) exercises. These series of training events should incorporate Command Post Exercises (CPX) to help develop and train command and control procedures as well as Field Training Exercises (FTX) that actually employ an Army BCT with Army aviation support in conjunction with Navy amphibious platforms. This will force both the Army and Navy through a “crawl, walk, run” learning curve on joint seabasing interoperability and result in joint techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP), which are currently lacking.

Although the Army history of conducting operations from the sea is long, very little of its experience is recent. The experience that is recent is not of the scope or scale that significant lessons can be drawn to adequately inform planners to execute contemporary, sustained forcible entry operations during a MCO; thus relevant Army
doctrine on the subject is required. Throughout the joint arena many units, organizations, agencies and contractors are actively engaged pursuing new Seabasing concepts and equipment. Although the Seabasing JIC does provide some framework for their efforts, regrettably, much of it is stove-piped and poorly focused towards giving the JFC immediate solutions to resolve his anti-access challenges. The result of much of the tangential efforts is a squandering of valuable, yet limited resources towards negligible, useful ends. Hence, it is incumbent upon the services to provide current solutions, with current forces, with innovative, yet proven TTPs to support the JFC’s responsibilities. The Army is developing concepts to support the JFC’s Seabasing requirements yet this paper has demonstrated that while these concepts may by applicable to lesser contingencies, these concepts are not yet suitable for JFEO in an MCO. The limited ability of today’s JFCs to conduct MCOs from a Seabase leaves this nation more vulnerable than would be desired. However, much can be accomplished with the resources available today, but little of it will be of value to the JFC until the services actually establish service and joint doctrine and engage in exercises to learn what needs to be learned, and relearned, about operating as an integrated, joint force at and from the sea.
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