The Planning Process for Commanders: Leveraging Interagency Law Enforcement Capabilities for Stability Operations

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by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

Signature: _________________________

23 October 2006
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Abstract

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The world has found through bitter experience that success often depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a functioning justice and penal system.¹

President George W. Bush
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America March 16, 2006

I. Introduction

America’s activism and engagement in world affairs has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War crystallized and defined the United States as a superpower bent on defeating communism utilizing strategic concepts such as “mutually assured destruction”² to achieve its global aims. The last fifteen years, however, have seen a transformation in the use of America’s military and diplomatic power as world events and Islamic extremism have dramatically altered the global landscape. Since 1993, the U.S. has deployed the conventional military all over the globe with objectives routinely evolving into peacekeeping missions. Adapting the conventional forces to the complex nature of these operations is the military’s greatest challenge in the 21st century. The term “nation building”, which once held a negative connotation in American politics, has emerged as a cornerstone of American foreign policy today that continues to be shaped by events from Baghdad to Kabul. President Bush’s national security strategy of promoting freedom and democracy around the world is predicated on America’s proactive engagement in regions where nations face internal chaos, misery and tyranny. While U.S. military force can achieve a short-term

objective (often in an overwhelming manner), President Bush noted lasting success of America’s aims must focus on post-conflict establishment of security utilizing traditional law enforcement concepts. The critical challenge currently facing United States leadership across the government spectrum is the nature, manner and application of bringing about stability in countries wherein the very fabric of economic, security and social institutions has been torn apart.

The military has responded decisively with guidance in a number of publications. Joint Chiefs of Staff publication 3-0, Joint Operations, identifies six phases of an operation now. The phasing model now reflects the progression as follows: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. The stabilization phase occurs as combat operations are winding down and U.S. forces attempt to mitigate the threat and resurrect limited host nation governance of the populace. In the enable civil authority phase, U.S. forces take a secondary role to civilian authorities. Efforts are centered on supporting a completely independent civilian authority allowing the military to redeploy.

My analysis will examine how the U.S. military can plan for the stabilize and enabling civil authority phases with respect to security. Within the framework of security, my focus will address the use of law enforcement expertise in planning to achieve the stability necessary for the military to ultimately redeploy. It should be noted the law enforcement planning process I am addressing is in reality one of three critical facets of the security triangle. Overall planning requires the joint force to tightly coordinate law enforcement efforts with the judicial and correctional efforts in restoring stability. Apprehending

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5 Ibid. p.139.
criminals and maintaining order require a judiciary and penal system to complete the process of maintaining order. I do not address these two sides of the security triangle simply for brevity purposes of this research paper.

The key theme in this analysis is military planners must integrate interagency personnel and their capabilities into the initial creation of plans for stability operations. A commitment to true interagency planning for these exceptionally complex operations is essential for the successful completion of the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. This planning is not so much “to whom to turn affairs over” but how civilian agency contributions in planning can enable military commanders to achieve end state objectives more effectively. I’ll first discuss current methodologies that have been implemented within the last few years by the United Nations and various U.S. government departments such as Defense, State and Justice. I will briefly review the evolution of doctrine on these matters for the military and then provide key factors and recommended options for military commanders to consider in creating viable security plans. These plans should reflect the true depth of expertise available across the breadth of U.S. government agencies. Achieving this objective is vital to our national strategy.

II. Current Planning Efforts for Stability Operations

The future doctrine for the military is obviously based on embracing the concepts of jointness and interagency cooperation as envisioned by President Bush when he issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 on December 7th, 2005. As outlined in the Directive, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State will ensure “harmonization” in all facets of stability and reconstruction efforts as the Secretary of State is the lead agency.
during the post-conflict phase. Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05 provides specific guidance in transforming the military’s handling of stability and reconstruction operations. This directive states “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission” and identifies “the rule of law” as a vital objective to achieve in support of our national strategy. This policy clearly states the integration of civilian representatives from counterpart U.S. agencies are critical to achieving sustained stability when the military is tasked to undertake these type of operations.

How we arrived at this point from a doctrinal perspective can be traced to U.S. military operations in Haiti and Somalia and subsequent interventions in the Balkans during the 1990’s. The military’s first foray into establishing doctrine was Army’s Field Manual 100-23 titled “Peace Operations” published in 1994. Guidance outlined the objectives of “restoration and maintenance of stability” and “defined peace enforcement operations” for the commanders. The concept of interagency cooperation with Department of State and other agencies is recommended in the manual but not with the sense of importance we see in today’s current policy guidance. The cooperation and coordination aspect appears while the operation is ongoing vice any specific language with respect to the planning of such operations. It suggests the “Combatant Commander may establish an advisory committee to link his theater objectives to national policy goals and objectives of DOS and concerned ambassadors”. Doctrinal efforts in the last twelve years have culminated in two recent publications of Joint Publication 3-07.3 titled “Peace Operations” and Joint Forces

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8 Ibid. p. 3.
10 Ibid. p. 29
Command Publication titled “Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept”. The concept of interagency coordination for the conduct of stability operations is far more pervasive. Joint Publication 3.07.3 cites unity of effort and the need for Commanders to integrate military activities with civilian counterparts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to achieve end state goals.¹¹ The Joint Force Command publication emphasizes the importance of synchronizing civil-military efforts to achieve unified action in preparation for stability operations.¹² Critical capabilities for stability operations now specifically cite the rule of law and the fact key functional capabilities for the military reside in civilian agencies outside the military’s control.¹³

From an interagency perspective, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has provided law enforcement training in foreign environments for the last twenty years. The DOJ’s planning and execution capacity on the international stage resides in the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). ICITAP was created in 1986 initially to improve human rights capabilities among Latin American police forces. It gradually expanded its role via congressional legislation to address training police in countries where the U.S. military intervened.¹⁴ In the 1990’s, ICITAP gained extensive experience in stability operations in Panama, Haiti, El Salvador, and the Balkans. In 1998, U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke negotiated an agreement with Slobodan Milosevic allowing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to establish an

¹³ Ibid. p. vii
international police force and observers. OSCE relied upon ICITAP to create a police training program and additional plans related to establishing a police force. After hostilities ended in 1999, the United Nations and OSCE relied upon this prior planning to establish the Kosovo Police Service School within two months after the Kosovo Force (KFOR) arrived in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{15} In East Timor, ICITAP was again instrumental in establishing curriculum for police officer training ranging through all levels of management and all aspects of policing principles.\textsuperscript{16}

In examining efforts in Iraq, ICITAP was brought into the planning process for post war Iraq in March 2003 to conduct an assessment of the state of Iraqi police capabilities and develop a plan to raise their capabilities. The final assessment indicated the Iraqi National Police were severely untrained, under funded and lacked professionalism. The militarization of the police forces under Saddam Hussein had degraded its effectiveness and legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis as well.\textsuperscript{17} A critical aspect of ICITAP’s analysis is the timing of the assessment. It occurred too late to impact the planning process when plundering and looting of the country spiraled out of control during the spring and summer of 2003. The idea of conducting an ICITAP assessment earlier in 2003 prior to the war was discussed within the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) but was never acted upon by senior leadership within the State Department or the Department of Defense. This lack of preparation is consistent across many facets of pre-war planning for post conflict activities in


\textsuperscript{16}Ibid. p. 91

Iraq as many believed an expedited transition to an Iraqi interim government would negate the need for detailed post war planning.\(^{18}\)

The United States Department of State (DOS) role in stability and reconstruction operations has undergone significant change within the last few years. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in 2004 as a dedicated means for the State Department to focus civilian agency efforts in rebuilding countries into stable and democratic societies after conflict had subsided. S/CRS functions can be broken down into the following: define and monitor all U.S. civilian government capabilities available for post conflict efforts; determine and plan the appropriate civilian response to the crisis; and coordinate the interagency training and response to those crisis.\(^{19}\)

Initial funding and manning for this entity has slowly developed in the last two years. Current staffing is at approximately forty individuals with legislation pending that would increase personnel to one hundred.\(^{20}\)

The emergence of S/CRS is probably one of the most significant decisions the U.S. government has enacted this decade to address post conflict stability efforts. The State Department’s expertise in diplomacy and in the machinations of the complex web of social, economic and political realities faced in countries on the edge of failure is found no where else in the United States government. Combined with the military’s expertise and perspective on these realities, the U.S. brings to bear the full weight of our country’s capabilities. By dedicating personnel specifically to the issues the United States faces in post

\(^{18}\) George F. Oliver, Professor at the Naval War College, Newport, RI. Interview by author conducted September 27, 2006. Professor Oliver served with ORHA during 2003.


\(^{20}\) Ibid. p.11.
conflict security, the State Department is adapting its mission to the national strategies outlined by President Bush. S/CRS focuses on detailed interagency planning in responding to conflicts and can identify civilian related problems and potential solutions for national decision makers to address far sooner than accomplished in past history. S/CRS is uniquely positioned to deal with the United Nations and coalition countries from a different perspective that can support the military’s partnership with these entities.

Within the Department of State, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has the responsibility of supplying police officers for international police missions. Currently, no U.S. law enforcement agency has authority to recruit police officers for service in such a capacity. The INL contracts out for police officers and monitors U.S. support to international policing efforts. In Iraq, the INL supports Central Command’s “Civilian Police Advisory Training Team” (CPATT) to train and develop Iraqi Security Forces. INL also operates a police training center in Jordan for Iraq Police personnel.21

On the international stage, the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts have evolved over time as the dynamics of engaging sovereign nations has changed since its creation after World War II. The pace of UN peacekeeping operations has intensified in the last fifteen years spanning the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa. UN peacekeeping forces deploy for the following pertinent missions: maintain law and order; establish and train a credible and professional police service; and monitor the activities of the host nation police force with respect to human rights and appropriate behaviors.22 The UN does provide

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a resource for military planners in preparing phasing concepts for peace operations. The UN possesses four distinct phases of civilian police operations similar to U.S. military doctrine. Phase I is called “Initial Development or Standby Phase”.\textsuperscript{23} A review of phase I provides instructive guidance in planning the deployment for policing objectives. A sampling of topics include force ratios, determining functions necessary for the mission, aligning efforts with judicial and prison institutions, and planning transitions to local authorities. Subsequent phases offer additional guidance in successfully addressing post-conflict security issues.

\textbf{III. Key Factors to Address in Planning}

There are a number of pivotal issues to examine in planning for post-conflict stability operations from a law enforcement perspective. Of particular concern is the transition from the dominate phase to the subsequent phases of stabilize and enable civil authority. The deployment gap is that seam in transition wherein substantive hostilities have ceased and the mission quickly evolves into a traditional law enforcement requirement tailored for a police or paramilitary unit.\textsuperscript{24} Significant delays bringing in civilian police capabilities or reconstituting the indigenous law enforcement entity have occurred in past conflicts. Shortfalls in either staffing of a civilian police capability or the inability of the U.S. military’s own forces in handling this task can significantly erode the hard fought success achieved during the dominate phase.

Military planners need to pursue a two-pronged approach to this issue in creating an operational plan. First, identify what civilian capabilities may be available within the nation-

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state, at a regional cooperative level or from the United Nations, that can be readied and deployed as combat operations wind down. Second, contingency plans have to be prepared simultaneously for U.S. military forces to fulfill a constabulary role as was accomplished in Germany and Japan after World War II. Post 1945, entire brigades were reconstituted and trained in police skills. These military constabulary units performed their law enforcement functions effectively until they were deactivated by 1952. As each new conflict arises, planners have to assess the degree with which international or U.S. interagency capabilities can be integrated into the law enforcement requirements during the stabilize phase. Non-permissive environments or unilateral action on the part of the United States will shift the responsibility primarily to U.S. troops who must be trained to perform these law enforcement functions. Given that stability missions are a core mission now on equal footing with combat operations, the focus on minimizing the deployment gap is critical.

Possibly a greater threat than the deployment gap is the enforcement gap. Annika Hansen describes this issue as “where moral authority of the civilian police is not sufficient to enforce the law, military forces can contribute muscular back-up, engage in counter-terrorism work or help in crowd control”. This is the enormous task currently faced by military leadership in Iraq. Providing this back-up can create contradictory results. The successful employment of force to quell a situation is tempered by the local civilian police department’s lack of credibility with the populace in the first place to handle the task. The community then perceives the police as weak and ineffectual as this cycle is depressingly

25 Robert S. Perito. Where Is the LONE RANGER When We Need Him? p. 60-68.

26 Hansen. Civil-military cooperation: the military, paramilitaries and civilian police in executive policing. p. 87.
repeated. Unless this cycle is broken, it fosters an unhealthy dependence on the military and leads to even more erosion of the authority of the local police.

One way to address this dilemma is the approach used in Haiti. The planning for establishing a viable police force utilized a partnership concept instead of simply backing up the local police force. The Chief International Police Monitor in Haiti, Raymond Kelly, called this partnership “four men in a jeep”. In the jeep were a local Haitian police officer, an international police monitor (who had assisted in the training of the Haitian interim police), a U.S. military member and an interpreter. This small unit approach allowed for constant training and supervision of Haitian forces and yet allowed the Haitian police officer to appear as the authority among the group when interacting with the populace. This innovation contributed to Operation Uphold Democracy achieving its objectives in six months. Insuring the rule of law is quickly and properly enforced will prevent lawlessness and chaos from overwhelming the societal institutions.

Associated with the enforcement issue is the institutional gap military forces will face in the stabilize phase. Quite often, the institutions related to public security such as the police and judiciary have ceased to protect the public or even exist in some instances. A critical goal for planners is devising methods to resurrect these institutions and ultimately position these entities to recapture the public’s confidence. This challenge is essentially the most daunting for the long term health of the nation. The main effort for this challenge lies during the enable civil authority phase and beyond. The military does not need to solve the institutional gap within the stabilize phase but establish the conditions to foster future efforts in this arena.

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27 Perito. *Where Is the LONE RANGER When We Need Him?* p. 111.
28 Ibid. p. 111.
One factor military planners cannot assume is interagency partners committing significant resources to parallel planning for their role in future stability operations. They have neither the budget, manpower, nor the ingrained culture to build a complex, labor intensive military style operational plan to unilaterally implement during the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. What they do possess, however, are pockets of excellence and expertise that can augment military capabilities and exponentially increase success when applied at the right levels. Some experts in the field of stability operations call for a significant build up in capabilities of the civilian departments to include a civilian lead stability force.\textsuperscript{30} The problem lies in insufficient funding and congressional will to shift U.S. resources in such a dramatic direction. Absent a dynamic shift in executive and congressional perspectives on the matter, there are a number of options military planners can pursue to gain a greater edge in preparation.

IV. Recommendations for Planning

“Currently, all governances are conducting their own training, utilizing different training plans and curriculums. Finally...the Iraqi police are unsure of their powers of arrest and what the Iraqi Law is”\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{LtCol M.A. Lopez, 
Commanding Officer 3d Bn, 7th MAR 
August 24, 2003}

\textsuperscript{30} Perito. \textit{Where Is the LONE RANGER When We Need Him?}  p. 335
\textsuperscript{31} Lopez, M.A. United States Marine Corps, Commanding Officer 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion, 7\textsuperscript{th} Marines, 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Division. After-Action Report, Memo 3000, S-3, 24 August 2003. p.3.
Colonel Lopez made these comments in his after action-report in August 2003. The goal of every planner in future operations is to provide the clarity, purpose and guidance to ensure this type of situation is not repeated. The most effective way to accelerate the planning process for stability operations is to incorporate the limited interagency civilian capability into regional combatant commander’s planning processes. The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) initiated a program to incorporate S/CRS input and participation in a series of exercises during 2005 and 2006 that are critical to SOUTHCOM’s greater strategic objectives. Gary Dekay, Joint Interagency Training Specialist at SOUTHCOM, began immediate dialogue with S/CRS soon after its creation in 2004.  

Despite its limited resources, S/CRS participated in planning conferences and linked with the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and Joint Planning Group. S/CRS fully integrated into exercise development and the joint exercise control group (JECG) to better exercise their Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams (HRST) and their Advanced Civilian Team (ACT) concepts.

SOUTHCOM smartly educated S/CRS on the military planning process to include deliberative and crisis action planning. In 2005, S/CRS fully participated in a planning exercise that resulted in significant progress on both sides of the military and civilian partnership. Integrating State Department economic, humanitarian and diplomatic objectives throughout the military planning from assumptions to the operations plan execution created a more refined common operating perspective for all concerned. The 2006 exercise built upon the successes of 2005 as the ACT teams were deployed with the Joint Task Force and in a simulated manner with Brigade Combat Teams. Dekay advises these exercises have been “a  

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32 Gary Dekay, Joint Interagency Training Specialist at United States Southern Command. E-mail to author 26 September 2006, dekayg@hq.southcom.smil.mil. Mr. Dekay provided extensive comments regarding S/CRS’s participation in SOUTHCOM’s exercises.
real success story for S/CRS and SOUTHCOM”. While S/CRS has limited resources, other regional combatant commanders should integrate S/CRS capabilities into their planning process.

Another resource for planners is ICITAP’s Comprehensive Strategic Planning process. ICITAP possesses a detailed planning process to assist reconstituting or creating a law enforcement organization. ICITAP’s planning goals include the following:

- Develop long- and short-term goals
- Focus on the partnership between the police and the populace
- Develop a strategy/task list and assist in implementing the plan
- Develop skills to monitor and modify efforts as needed
- Develop measurements of effectiveness

ICITAP current efforts in over fifty countries have resulted in a wealth of best practices and strategies that military planners can utilize now for shaping existing and future plans.

ICITAP does possess the same challenges as S/CRS or INL in staffing and funding. The military planner faces the same challenge with all of the civilian agencies that possess subject matter expertise germane to stability operations. The key is linking a particular civilian agency to an operational plan where it can have the greatest impact on the law enforcement planning and execution of an operational plan. The civilian agencies simply cannot participate or review every plan. Initial focus should be on the top tier operational plans and convincing S/CRS, INL or ICITAP to participate in the planning process. The degree of participation will vary. It may range from a relatively superficial review of a plan with recommendations to total engagement as SOUTHCOM has achieved with S/CRS.

Rigorous prodding of these agencies to participate in the planning process versus waiting for

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33 Ibid.
a crisis will enhance the depth of law enforcement planning efforts and subsequent execution of the plan.

An additional option worthy of examination is the hiring of contractors for planning purposes. In the last 15 years, the INL deployed many law enforcement officers with experience in international policing from Haiti to Iraq. These officers often are inactive awaiting a United Nations or regional mandate to become involved in the future. Hiring them now to utilize their experiences in planning exploits their knowledge base. It is quite possible the contracted planner today will actually participate in the operation he helped plan tomorrow. Utilizing the contractor route should occur when all other avenues within the United States government have been exhausted. The civilian agencies should be the priority to imbue them with the corporate knowledge necessary to expand their planning abilities for the long-term sustainability of the national strategy. It also creates a greater sense of urgency at the interagency level for funding and resources to address the planning process if it is constantly pushed by the Department of Defense (DOD). A Defense Science Board analysis of post-conflict stabilization efforts stated the

> planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations, to be effective, must occur prior to actual conflict. Since State and Defense will be both supported and supporting “commanders”, it is important that collaboration between State and Defense begin early, prior to formalization of plans. It is in this early process that assumptions can be challenged and strategic objectives can be refined to more closely match U.S. capabilities.\(^{36}\)

Constant pressure on the civilian agencies to adapt will ultimately shift their priorities appropriately to achieve this planning goal. A tertiary option could be engaging DOS regional bureaus that possess in depth cultural knowledge or leveraging Joint Interagency

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Coordinating Groups for participation in the planning process. Ultimately commanders should build specific plans through the lens of the key gaps cited and merge the capabilities of the civilian agencies reviewed with the military forces available. The result will reflect a more comprehensive product through all phases of an operation.

V. Conclusion

Colonel Richard Lacquement, United States Army Strategist, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations states “the planning aspect for stability operations remains one of our greatest challenges”. The military retains the largest capabilities in the United States government in terms of credibility and deterrence in a post-conflict environment. We cannot view the phases of operation plans as being either the military or civilian domain. That paradigm has ceased to exist. Our national and military strategies place it squarely on the shoulders of the military and civilian departments in a partnership requiring coordination through all six phases of an operation. The shift is clearly evident in the multitude of doctrinal documents being produced that heavily emphasize the interagency response to the challenges the military faces in the 21st century. Stability and Reconstruction operations pose exceptionally difficult challenges spanning the economic, social and political landscape. Achieving security and functioning law enforcement capabilities as hostilities wind down acts as a foundation for movement forward in this landscape. A variety of civilian agencies and departments possess the knowledge and core competencies military planners need to fully capture the law enforcement requirements necessary for the job. Commanders should examine the key factors and recommendations cited in this paper to tailor their planning strategies to their operating environments.

37 Richard Lacquement, Colonel, United States Army. Telephonic interview conducted by author on 29 September 2006.
Aggressively reaching out to organizations like ICITAP, S/CRS or INL will ultimately lead to a better plan and achieve the collaborative process envisioned by our leadership.

Interagency limitations in manpower and funding for planning are the greatest obstacle for military planners at this time. Agility and imagination will require commanders to consider other options such as contractors or reaching out to UN experts in this field as necessary.

Our strategic objectives require the planning process for stability operations be adapted to this paradigm. True integration of interagency and military planning will create the institutional capacity needed to achieve the aims of stabilizing and rebuilding a country.
Appendix A


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**Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment**

**Figure IV-7. Phasing Model**
Selected Bibliography


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