# Interagency Challenges and Solutions to Nationbuilding

The United States has conducted nationbuilding operations every two years since the end of the cold war. Despite these experiences and the lessons we have learned, interagency integration and execution below the theater strategic level continues to yield mixed results. The challenges in this area have reached their height during OIF. Although significant effort has been made to improve these shortcomings, the long term solution requires a dramatic institutional change that requires interagency individuals and units to be formed, trained, and deployed in a manner similar to their military counterparts.

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Abstract

The United States has conducted nationbuilding operations every two years since the end of the cold war. Despite these experiences and the lessons we have learned, interagency integration and execution below the theater strategic level continues to yield mixed results. The challenges in this area have reached their height during OIF. Although significant effort has been made to improve these shortcomings, the long term solution requires a dramatic institutional change that requires interagency individuals and units to be formed, trained, and deployed in a manner similar to their military counterparts.
Planning and execution of post conflict operations, also known as nationbuilding, has become the centerpiece of discussion among professionals whether in the political, military, or diplomatic realms of national power. Much of the public discussion focuses on the joint-interagency challenges in developing a solution to avoid the enormous difficulties faced by the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) since the capture of Baghdad. The United States will continue to risk failure in nationbuilding efforts until we implement institutional changes to effectively form, train, and deploy interagency individuals and organizations to integrate with joint forces to achieve our objectives.

Despite a great deal of recent experience in nationbuilding since the end of the cold war, we continue to deploy interagency organizations on an ad hoc basis that are inadequate to the task. We have the advantage of volumes of lessons learned, a highly developed doctrinal base for Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs operations at the tactical level, emerging doctrine at the operational level, and recent experience in wholesale structural change at the interagency level. Unfortunately we are still searching for a long term solution to the problem and in the meantime we continue to apply short term solutions to long term institutional problems. A large scale institutional change is needed that forces the agencies in the executive branch to perform Title X functions similar to the armed forces. Otherwise our nationbuilding efforts will continue to exceed expectation in terms of blood and treasure for all involved.

The majority of the public discussion and even a good deal of the professional discussion among military leaders has unfortunately focused on policy disagreements at the strategic level or assigning blame to key participants at the personal level. This paper will not delve into these arguments. Beyond the strategic decisions that led to the
The doctrine of preemption will remain a cornerstone of our National Security Strategy for the foreseeable future. Implicit in preemption doctrine or its associated concept of regime change is the supporting requirement for the United States and its allies and international organizations to conduct nationbuilding on a large scale. This requirement is not only implicit in situations where military operations are the primary means, at least initially, to achieve strategic objectives but it is also implicit in another category of threats to national security – failed states. For example, any plan to reverse the humanitarian crisis caused by a failed state (such as the Darfur region in Sudan) that does not include a long term plan for security, economic development, law and order, and other components of nationbuilding is doomed to fail in the long term or at a minimum result in an endless humanitarian assistance mission. Effective command and control doctrine and policy at the joint and interagency level will be indispensable at the theater-strategic level of military operations now and in the future.

**Background**

The evolution of the scheme for the planning, coordination, and execution of the post conflict phase in OIF exemplifies the current state of our policy and doctrine. As the development of the plan for the invasion of Iraq began in earnest, the guidance from the CENTCOM Commander (General Franks) to his planning staff was that the planning and execution of the post hostilities phase would be the responsibility of the State Department. Once planning and coordination for Phases I through III reached its height in the latter part of 2002 and early 2003, the much publicized revisions to the plan directed by the Secretary of Defense consumed the operational planners at CENTCOM and planning for phase IV at the theater strategic level did not receive a great deal of
attention. As the nexus of the development of the plan for the invasion centered between
the Secretary of Defense and the CENTCOM Commander, the Joint Staff played less of a role.
Nevertheless, the Joint Staff conducted its own wargaming exercise and one of the
major lessons learned was the need to design a military headquarters that would be
responsible for the postwar administration of Iraq. The need was obvious but by the fall
of 2002 the planning, coordination, and resourcing of this organization was a mere
concept. By October, the Joint Staff had developed a plan for the organization. The
headquarters would be led by a three star general and would have interagency
representation in twenty-one areas. This organization would eventually work for the new
Ambassador to Iraq and would eventually be replaced by a civilian commissioner or an
Iraqi interim government. The concept reflected an assumption that the State Department
would take the lead in the postwar administration of Iraq and that the Department of
Defense would provide the appropriate personnel and capabilities to support such an
organization.

At the direction of LTG George Casey, who was serving as the J3 at the time, the
planning cell that would form the basis of the headquarters responsible for the postwar
administration of Iraq began to take shape under the leadership of BG Steven Hawkins.
This organization, designated JTF-4 would begin planning for Phase IV and coordinate
directly with CENTCOM. This organization would not be responsible for Phase IV but
would form the nucleus for the follow on headquarters designated initially as CJTF-I.
An alternative plan proposed by LTG John Abizaid, who was the Director of the Joint Staff
at the time, was to designate an Army Corps as the follow on headquarters to perform this
function. Although this idea never gained approval, the eventual organization that was
created immediately following the fall of Baghdad (CJTF-7) was a hybrid of both
concepts. Another concept that was gaining support throughout the joint community was
under development at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) seemed to be the type of organization which would be ideal to perform the functions assigned to JTF-4. The SJTF was intended to be a small, but highly trained, and capable JTF staff that could be marshaled and deployed in an emergency. The two organizations seemed to be closely related in theory and the Joint Staff directed that the personnel for JTF-4 would come from JFCOM. BG Hawkins and his staff visited JFCOM with the idea of absorbing the personnel and organizational structures that existed in the SJTF. Unfortunately the SJTF was more concept than reality. The organization was undermanned and many of the personnel were contractors or otherwise nondeployable. Ultimately, BG Hawkins recruited a mixed bag of personnel for JTF-4 and underwent training in the form of a Millennium Challenge exercise and was ultimately absorbed into the CFLCC staff at Camp Doha, Kuwait to begin detailed planning and coordination for Phase IV.

Meanwhile the policy of State Department leadership with Defense Department support for the administration of postwar Iraq underwent a dramatic change in October, 2002. The Secretary of Defense, after a briefing from the Joint Staff on the JTF-4 concept of the operation directed that the Defense Department would take the lead in all respects for the postwar administration of Iraq. The military component, specifically the organization for which JTF-4 formed the nucleus would be responsible for security and the recreation of the Iraqi Army. A second, parallel organization would be civilian led and responsible for all other aspects of postwar reconstruction and governance. Both organizations would report to CENTCOM which in turn would report to the Secretary of Defense. This change in the organizational construct for the administration of postwar Iraq received concurrence from the Director of the NSA, Condoleezza Rice, and the Chairman of the JCS, General Richard Myers, and approval from President Bush.
Planning at CENTCOM and CFLCC continued to focus on Phase III but as the plans developed and the need to begin the planning and coordination for the transition to Phase IV became the focus of the planning effort progress slowed. The decision to create a civilian-led, parallel organization to plan and execute the litany of functions beyond security and retraining the Iraqi Army was not immediately followed by guidance on the command and control of this organization and how it would be organized. This issue was further complicated because the functions specified for the organization at the theater strategic level were beyond the scope and experience of any individuals or organizations resident in the Department of Defense and required a Presidential Directive to incorporate interagency personnel and organizations not to mention the need for specific guidance on mission, scope, functions, and budget authority. Finally, in January, 2003 Stephen Hadley, the Deputy National Security Advisor, drafted National Security Presidential Directive 24. This directive specified the mission and scope of the organization that would perform the majority of the nationbuilding tasks in OIF. The President signed the directive on 20 January, 2003 – less than two months prior to the start of the invasion. Thus began the monumental effort initially led by LTG(R) Jay Garner to form, train, and deploy the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and which was eventually absorbed into the Coalition Provisional Authority.

**Analysis**

The ad hoc nature of the forming, training and deploying of this organization reveals the enormous need at the theater strategic level for a joint/interagency organization that can plan, coordinate and execute nationbuilding on the scale necessary to achieve success in a country of the size and diversity of Iraq. As stated in the
introduction, the ability to accomplish nationbuilding at this scale is essential to the successful accomplishment of our current National Security Strategy. Without this capability we will continue to form and deploy these types of organizations on an ad hoc basis and continue to endure the consequences we have experienced in Iraq over the past three years.

Critics of the Administration and the military point to the ad hoc nature of the creation and deployment of ORHA and conclude that the entire planning effort was an afterthought and that the military was unprepared for the post hostilities phase. This assessment is not entirely accurate. Planning and coordination for humanitarian assistance at the tactical and operational level, though challenged, was largely successful. USAID deployed Disaster Assistance and Reconstruction teams (DART) to assess the immediate needs of the Iraqi population along with military assessments conducted by Civil Affairs units. Although the anticipated number of displaced persons was smaller than projected, these assessments formed the basis for immediate post conflict phase support and resulted in the successful mitigation of a humanitarian crisis. Army and Marine Corps doctrine and organizations designed to plan, coordinate, and execute Civil Affairs at the tactical and operational level are highly developed. These organizations and their supporting doctrine have their roots in the extraordinarily large and complex civil affairs and military government operations conducted in WWII in both Germany and Japan. Civil Affairs units are trained and organized to perform a wide range of activities including support to foreign nations, populace and resource control, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, emergency services, and support to civil administrations. However, their primary role is to coordinate non-military efforts with ongoing military operations. For this purpose they have the capability of tailoring their organizations to integrate at every level from battalion through country team and can
integrate with NGOs, IGOs, interagency, and local populations to coordinate activities. Civil Affairs units in their current numbers are inadequate to perform nationbuilding tasks on the scale required in OIF without significant augmentation. Nevertheless they are highly capable and an important component of nationbuilding efforts at the tactical and lower operational levels. Additionally, they are most effective, and their doctrine presumes, a reasonable level of security in the environment as well as existing (though disrupted) civil institutions that they can complement and reinforce in order to restore them to an acceptable level of effectiveness. However, rebuilding a nation, its institutions, and restoration of basic services on the scale that Iraq needed was beyond the capability of the existing Civil Affairs force structure.

The decision to establish the Department of Defense as the lead agency for the postwar phase of OIF embodied in NSPD-24 was a major departure from the interagency structure of nationbuilding operations undertaken by the United States in the recent past. The DOD was not the lead agency in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, or even Afghanistan for postwar efforts. Not since WWII has the military been the executive agent for postwar reconstruction. The decision reflected a disdain for nationbuilding in the style of those undertaken during the Clinton Administration voiced by President Bush and his key leaders during the 2000 presidential campaign as well as dissatisfaction with the progress of nationbuilding ongoing in Afghanistan where the Department of State was the lead agency. The policy disagreement centered on a belief that the recent nationbuilding operations developed a culture of dependency within the governments, institutions, and populations of the affected states. Additionally, the President, and in particular the Secretary of Defense viewed the employment of U.S. forces in these endeavors as a drain on the U.S. military and that the military component of these operations should be resourced by regional organizations – NATO in particular in regard
to the Balkans.\textsuperscript{21} The policy disagreement was highlighted by the decision soon after the administration took office in 2001 to rescind PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations. This directive not only prescribed the interagency process for planning, coordination, and execution of interagency functions at the national strategic level, it was also the foundation for joint doctrine, particularly JP 3-57 \textit{Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations}.\textsuperscript{22} PDD-56 was in effect the interagency command and control doctrine for all aspects of planning, coordination, and execution of the myriad of nonmilitary tasks and functions of the kind expected of the Coalition Provisional Authority in OIF. PDD-56 was not the Rosetta stone of interagency planning but it was a structured approach to planning at the national level to develop interagency solutions for crises on the scale of nationbuilding in Iraq.

Iraq may be the first preemptive regime change conducted by the United States but it is certainly not the first nationbuilding effort we have attempted on a large scale. Japan and Germany are the obvious examples of large scale, successful nationbuilding efforts but in addition to those, it is important to point out that since the end of the Cold War the United States has taken on nationbuilding efforts large and small in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. On the average, we have embarked on nationbuilding efforts every two years since the end of the cold war regardless of the administration in control of the White House.\textsuperscript{23} All of these efforts were complex, enduring, costly, and frustrating to one degree or another yet we have not created the organizations and supporting doctrine – not to mention funding – to bridge the capability gap between the military tactical and operational capabilities to conduct nationbuilding and interagency planning at the national level. The coalition experience in Iraq has highlighted this deficiency: Ad hoc interagency organizations created at the last minute
to conduct nationbuilding at a grand scale without adequate resources, force structure or doctrine to accomplish little more than planning at the theater strategic level.

**Recommendation**

The long term solution to solving the problem of interagency effectiveness at the operational-tactical level is the creation of permanent organizations that are funded, trained, and deployable. To do this, we need to develop an interagency doctrine that specifies the functions these nationbuilding organizations perform, how they are organized, how they interact with other organizations (particularly the Army), the standards to which they are trained both as individuals and organizations, and how they are deployed. The United States Army provides an example of how doctrine and its evolution can be a guidepost for the transformation of a large complex organization.

Army doctrine has evolved dramatically over the past thirty years from a functional approach to a combined arms approach to warfighting at the tactical level to a joint approach to warfighting at the operational level. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Army branch schools and organizations dominated the development of tactical doctrine similar to how agencies in the executive dominate selection, training, and employment of their personnel. Branch schools had proponency for not only how functional organizations such as armor and infantry would fight but also how these units would be organized and employed. Although combined arms tactics existed previously, they were rarely employed below the level or large tactical units. Only after the creation of the operational doctrine of Active Defense (codified in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 Operations) were these functional alignments diminished and a holistic approach to tactical combat was created and institutionalized throughout the force. This concept of
combined arms was embedded into the Army warfighting culture only after the creation of the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California in 1982. There, using the vehicle of brigade level tactical exercises against a well trained opposing force, Army units at the lower tactical level mastered and revised tactical doctrine to support the operational concepts embodied in FM 100-5 *Operations*.

Army operational doctrine also underwent a dramatic change to the Airland Battle concept which integrated not only ground tactical functions in a reinforcement of combined arms doctrine but also integrated the use of Army and Air Force tactical air concepts in an effort to complement and reinforce the dramatically improved ground tactical capability of the Army. In addition to these doctrinal concepts the Army developed and fielded equipment that improved the Army’s warfighting capability such as the M1 tank, the M2 infantry fighting vehicle and the Apache helicopter. Among the high points in the vindication of this process doctrinal emphasis as a guidepost for transformation was the performance of the Army in combat since the Gulf War. Other developments in joint doctrine starting with the Goldwater-Nichols legislation through the creation of Joint Forces Command and the Joint Warfighting Center are a repeat of the same process at the operational-strategic level. The same can be accomplished with interagency individuals and organizations at the tactical and operational level designed to conduct nationbuilding tasks in coordination with the military.

The nationbuilding lessons of the past several years and in particular the experiences and lessons learned from Iraq can be the basis of a new interagency doctrine for nationbuilding. The doctrine must include not only on how the various agencies integrate into the joint force at the theater strategic level but also how these agency structures should be formed, trained, deployed, and sustained. The solution requires a dramatic institutional change. We need a process similar to the Title X responsibilities of
the Armed Forces for other federal agencies which will require them to provide trained and equipped organizations that are modular and can integrate into the armed forces down to the tactical level. This effort will require congressional legislation that will fix the responsibility for the requirement at the National Security Council in a manner similar to how the armed forces accomplish the need for providing trained forces to the Regional Combatant Commanders through the Joint Forces Command. This process would envision an authority for the NSA to distribute funding, set requirements, develop doctrine and hold the various supporting agencies in the executive department accountable for results. This concept would also envision a system for forming, training and deploying interagency organizations in concert with joint forces in a manner that builds, prior to deployment, the necessary teamwork, mutual trust, and confidence that military forces develop during pre-deployment preparations. The individuals and organizations that constitute these interagency structures must be able to perform their functions to a standard set by interagency doctrine and validated through a process of training and evaluation similar to that which Army forces undergo in the form of Mission Rehearsal Exercises at the various training centers prior to deployment. This process has proven itself in recent wars as a means to create competent forces to accomplish military strategic objectives and can do the same for interagency organizations to accomplish interagency strategic objectives in a similar fashion.

**Counterargument**

Some may argue that adequate initiatives are underway and have taken shape in the form of the new Joint Publication JP-08 *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint*
structure at the National Defense University designed to integrate into the joint force to enhance planning and coordination between joint and interagency elements. The emerging doctrine these initiatives represent are certainly an improvement of previous efforts to integrate joint and interagency functions. Unfortunately these efforts are not as comprehensive as those envisioned here although they may form a solid foundation for the type of doctrine and organizations that will be part of a comprehensive institutional transition. These initiatives focus at the theater strategic level and address the problems of joint and interagency planning and coordination at that level. They do not address the interagency organizations and functions at the operational or tactical level necessary to ensure that strategic plans and policy are implemented effectively. The ongoing difficulty in accomplish nationbuilding objectives at the local level in such areas as development of local security forces and institutions, agriculture reform, banking, transportation, infrastructure development, and the creation of local political structures are a result of a lack of interagency participation at the tactical level. These problems and issues are addressed and policies implemented by tactical military commanders and their units. Although these military forces are obviously necessary to create security conditions necessary for nationbuilding efforts to flourish, they are not trained and equipped to implement all of the plans and policies contemplated at the theater strategic level. Joint and interagency coordination initiatives do not ensure successful execution. This can happen only when we create a system designed to train and deploy interagency structures at the tactical level can we maximize our ability to affect change below the national level.

Another effort designed to address this problem is National Security Presidential Directive – 44 dated 7 December, 2005. This directive reverses the decision during the
preparation for OIF to make the department of the Defense the lead agency for
nationbuilding. It also supercedes NSPD -56 which was rescinded four years previously
and assigns responsibility for nationbuilding to the Department of State with coordinating
instructions for the other executive agencies to provide support in programming and
budgeting as well as providing trained personnel on a “nonrefundable basis.” This effort
reinforces the need for a cooperative effort for interagency efforts at the national strategic
level but does not assign or enforce accountability for forming, training, and deploying
organizations. The directive merely puts us back to where we were during the Clinton
Administration prior to NSPD – 56 with the State Department assigned responsibility for
nationbuilding with little in terms of institutional structure to ensure success. Like the
JIACG initiative and the revised JP – 08, neither effort envisions a holistic approach to
the forming, training, and deploying of functional organizations designed to execute
plans and policies for nationbuilding below the strategic level.

Conclusion

All of these efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination at the
national or theater strategic level are welcome and reflect the comprehensive need for
improvement advocated here. What these efforts do not address is the need for a system
to create individuals and organizations that do more than plan and coordinate. We need
individuals and organizations that share the service and deployment culture of our armed
forces and are formed, trained, and deployed in similar respects. This has been done
before. During WWII the United States Army created an Institute for Military
Government at the University of Virginia in 1942. The institute trained and organized
the legions of individuals and organizations we deployed to Japan and Germany to
execute the nationbuilding programs planned and coordinated both before and during the occupations. In fact these individuals and organizations, specifically in Germany, began their work before the war ended. The first of the military government organizations arrived in Roetgen, Germany and began their work shortly after U.S. forces arrived in September, 1944 - a full eight months before the surrender of Germany. Creation of interagency structures for nationbuilding at the scale of WWII would far exceed the requirement contemplated here. This point is that it is not a new concept and we have the benefit of 60 years of nationbuilding experience to draw on for lessons learned. We also have the experience of a system to implement the required improvements by using a similar system of training and doctrine development the Army has used to great success since the Vietnam War.

The changes recommended here will require comprehensive congressional legislation on the scale of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security or the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Relying on the executive branch agencies to cede power and resources voluntarily to this effort will be a time consuming and inefficient failure. A forcing function is necessary to institute necessary changes. Clearly, implementing any institutional change on a grand scale requires extraordinary effort and time. The scale of the problem has been recognized at all levels and anyone who has participated in nationbuilding efforts at the operational level will have any number of experiences to share about interagency challenges and failures of the past and present. The restructuring changes proposed here are absolutely necessary if we are to improve our ability to conduct nationbuilding on scale demanded of the current National Security Strategy.

2. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., pp. 143-144.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 141.

10. Ibid., pp. 143-144.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 140-141.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

15. Ibid., 147-149.


20. Ibid., pp. 151-152.

21. Ibid.

22. Joint Publication 3-57 uses PDD – 56 as a reference document and it is included in an appendix.


25. Ibid., p. 133.
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