Historically, the United States (U.S.) has inadequately planned for and poorly set the conditions for successful war termination. Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM serve as two recent examples where civil and military leaders at the national and theater strategic levels of war failed to link national objectives with clear, timely policy guidance and sufficient resources to enable the commander at the operational level to set the conditions for a stable peace in both conflicts with Iraq. During Operation DESERT STORM, the ambiguity of the objective “promote the safety and stability of the Persian Gulf” led to missed opportunities to influence the post war settlement, possible regime change and produced the residual effects of increased Islamic extremism. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the lack of planning between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) led to an inadequate command structure and insufficient number of ground forces to effectively provide security and stability once major combat operations ended in Iraq. These examples show that planning for war termination should begin as early as possible and must be an interagency, multinational, and integrated effort. To ensure that this occurs, legislation is needed to force interagency planning for Governance, Stability and Support Operations while also establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for each Combatant Command (COCOM). Joint Doctrine must also be updated to include the role of the National Security Council (NSC) in the war termination process and redefine the role of the military in Governance, Stability and Support operations.
WAR TERMINATION PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS DESERT STORM
AND IRAQI FREEDOM, FAILURE TO SET THE CONDITIONS FOR A STABLE
PEACE.

By

Christopher V. Moylan

Colonel, U. S. Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

17 May, 2005
Abstract

Historically, the United States (U.S.) has inadequately planned for and poorly set the conditions for successful war termination. Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM serve as two recent examples where civil and military leaders at the national and theater strategic levels of war failed to link national objectives with clear, timely policy guidance and sufficient resources to enable the commander at the operational level to set the conditions for a stable peace in both conflicts with Iraq. During Operation DESERT STORM, the ambiguity of the objective “promote the safety and stability of the Persian Gulf” led to missed opportunities to influence the post war settlement, possible regime change and produced the residual effects of increased Islamic extremism. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the lack of planning between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) led to an inadequate command structure and insufficient number of ground forces to effectively provide security and stability once major combat operations ended in Iraq. These examples show that planning for war termination should begin as early as possible and must be an interagency, multinational, and integrated effort. To ensure that this occurs, legislation is needed to force interagency planning for Phase IV Governance, Stability and Support Operations while also establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for each Combatant Command (COCOM) to facilitate the interagency planning and coordination process. Joint Doctrine must also be updated to include the role of the National Security Council (NSC) in the war termination process and redefine the role of the military in Phase IV operations.
INTRODUCTION

“War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particle aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. . . . Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

Historically, the United States (U.S.) has inadequately planned for and poorly set the conditions for successful war termination. Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM serve as two recent examples where civil and military leaders at the national and theater strategic levels of war failed to link national objectives with clear, timely policy guidance and sufficient resources to enable the commander at the operational level to set the conditions for a stable peace in both conflicts with Iraq. Although the coalition achieved its objectives of withdrawing all Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoring Kuwait’s government during Operation DESERT STORM, ambiguity of the objective “promote the safety and stability of the Persian Gulf” led to missed opportunities to influence the post war settlement, possible regime change and produced the residual effects of increased Islamic extremism.

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the lack of planning between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) led to an inadequate command structure and

2 War Termination and Conflict Termination are synonymous for this paper.
insufficient number of ground forces to effectively provide security and stability once major combat operations ended in Iraq.

**WAR PLANS**

*Before forces are committed, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) must know how the National Command Authorities (NCA) intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level...because the nature of termination will shape the futures of the consenting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and end state conditions...conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as operations moved advantageous termination.*

*Joint Publication 3-0*

In developing war plans, Clausewitz and Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations remind military planners how important it is that they consider every aspect of war including war termination and transitioning to stability and support operations. It is essential that civil and military planners understand that conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, but not the end of the conflict. The military fight might stop but, civil disorder might continue without the causes of the conflict being resolved. Although some would argue that this is primarily a civil problem that may require military support, it should not be ignored. War plans must include an end state for termination of decisive operations that not only sets the conditions for successful conflict resolution but also sets the conditions for successful transition to stability and support operations.

In both operations against Iraq war termination planning did not occur. The military continued to focus on decisive operations with little thought to winning the peace. For

---


example, before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a U.S. Army War College report stressed that “Phase IV “post conflict” planning absolutely had to start as early as possible, well before Phase III “decisive operations”. But neither the Army nor the other services moved very far past Phase III thinking.” Planning for termination and post-conflict operations should begin as early as possible. It must be an interagency, multinational, integrated effort to establish an achievable end state based on clear objectives, unity of effort and include all the elements of national hard and soft power (diplomatic, military, economic, and informational). This planning must also be flexible since the strategic environment can change over time. I would argue that adherence to these planning principles could have changed the outcome of both wars. Each war was launched in violation of Clausewitz’s and Joint Publication’s planning guidance without a good idea about war termination and the post-conflict environment.

**OPERATION DESERT STORM**

On 27 February 1991, President Bush unilaterally declared a cease-fire, proclaiming that "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army is defeated. Our military objectives have been met." The President, however, did not mention U.S. political objectives. Did the U.S. achieve its political objectives including “promote the safety and stability of the Persian Gulf”? Did the military really achieve its objectives? Some would argue that the war was terminated prematurely, denying the coalition the opportunity to achieve those objectives. “In terms of Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) military objectives, the decision to terminate the ground war at 100 hours was too hastily made…. CENTCOM’s objective was not just to defeat the Republican Guard, but to destroy it.” Also, “there was little question that coalition forces

---

could have taken Baghdad, and done so quickly.”9 I would argue that, using Clausewitz’s “Rational Calculus of War”, the cost of destroying the Republican Guard, continuing to Baghdad and the possible negative impacts (highway of death, more casualties) on U.S. and Coalition political will / Center of Gravity (COG) far outweighed the benefits of continuing the offensive to remove Saddam Hussein from power. This was a limited war with limited aims. The Coalition had achieved its primary objective of liberating Kuwait. Clausewitz reminds us that the political object is the goal and that war is merely the means of reaching it.10

Although the military had successfully set the conditions for a cease fire, the coalition was not prepared to successfully negotiate the terms for a durable peace. Why? First, the coalition did not understand the end state conditions for decisive operations and the conditions required for the successful transition to Phase IV and the linkage of the vague objective of “promote the safety and stability of the Persian Gulf” to military objectives. The coalition simply failed to plan for it. Gordon Brown, CENTCOM’s chief foreign-policy advisor admitted, "We never did have a plan to terminate the war."11 Second, they never expected the rapid pace of the ground war. President Bush and Brent Scowcroft, his national security advisor, acknowledged that "the end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking."12

On 3 March 1991, at Safwan, General Norman Schwarzkopf as the theater strategic and operational commander, with little preparation and policy guidance from Washington,

10 Clausewitz, 87.
11 Gordon, 461.
12 Bush, 488.
conducted a formal cease-fire meeting with his Iraqi counterparts. General Schwarzkopf stated, “It never crossed my mind that I’d have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals – and we spend a couple of minutes discussing how this might be arranged.”\textsuperscript{13} As the chief negotiator, General Schwarzkopf was responsible for setting the terms of the cease fire agreement which would later impact the U.S. final United Nations (UN) cease fire agreement. Going into the meeting, the coalition was in a strong bargaining position which General Schwarzkopf failed to recognize and exploit. The military had captured the Rumaila oil fields which Margaret Thatcher had suggested the allies use to “recoup the cost of the war and meet other demands met.”\textsuperscript{14} He could have used “the occupation of southern Iraq to press for further demands including a new political accommodation with the Shiites and Kurds.”\textsuperscript{15} The coalition was also positioned to conduct a ground campaign against Baghdad but, General Schwarzkopf had already taken that option off the table announcing at an earlier news conference, “the allies were not going to Baghdad.”\textsuperscript{16} He did not understand the national strategic political objectives and the military strategy to support. He focused more on immediate military issues i.e. release of prisoners of war; information on personnel missing in action; return of the remains; information on mines and booby traps, etc. rather than keeping the pressure on Iraq until a UN cease fire resolution could be negotiated. “Safwan had been a lost opportunity….the military’s attitude was we have won the war….the Army generals were preoccupied with drawing cease fire lines in the sand and establishing terms for troop withdrawals…they were blind to the broader political ramifications of the Iraq conflict.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Gordon, 447.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 447.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 444.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 448.
As the theater strategic and operational level commander, General Schwarzkopf failed to clarify the conditions required to achieve national and military objectives. I would argue that General Schwarzkopf’s actions at Safwan violated operational art as stated in Joint Publications 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations and 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning by not having a clear understanding of the desired end state and the linking of ends, ways, and means to achieve those objectives. First, General Schwarzkopf allowed the Iraqis to use their helicopters including armed gunships without thinking through the ramifications. “As should have been expected, the Iraqis began using their gunships to attack rebels, and the U.S. could have prevented the Iraqis from doing so.” Second, General Schwarzkopf’s concessions to Iraq led to the promise of troop withdrawals from southern Iraq before UN cease fire resolution 687 was finalized thus, “removing the gun from Saddam’s head.” Finally, fear had been removed from the negotiation process. Saddam refused to accept defeat setting the conditions for the next decade of containment, limited response and eventually unlimited war. As Clausewitz states: "Even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”

Failure to set the conditions for successful war termination in DESERT STORM left Saddam Hussein in power. For the next twelve years, he would be a political and military thorn in the side of the U.S. and the United Nations (UN). This failure caused tremendous expenditure of resources conducting Operations NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) and

---

19 Pollack, 48.
20 Ibid, 53.
21 Clausewitz, 16.
Southern Watch (OSW) to contain Saddam Hussein’s power and bring stability to the region. Some would also argue that failure to execute an effective end state for Desert Storm fueled Usama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and other extremists by “occupying the lands of Islam…..and using its bases as a spearhead to fight against Islamic people.” Also, failure to support Shiites and Kurds during the Iraqi intifadah caused a mistrust of the U.S. and could have fueled the insurgency in Iraq today. If the U.S. and the coalition had been prepared and given a thorough analysis to war termination, would Saddam have been overthrown? Would Saudi Arabia have been occupied by U.S. military? Would Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have been identified? Would the traffic events of September 11th have happened?

**Operation Iraqi Freedom**

“The study of previous wars is essential because it provides political and military leaders with valuable insight into why certain policies and strategies either failed or succeeded but, Clausewitz warns us “Historical examples are, however, seldom used to such good effect. . . . There are occasions. . . . where nothing will be proven by a dozen examples. . . . If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with divided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed. Obviously this is no way to reach a conclusion. And if the author or lecturer has never mastered the events he describes, such superficial, irresponsible handling of history leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing.”

*Carl Von Clausewitz, On War*

On 9 April, 2003 Iraqi civilians were dancing in the streets of Baghdad, while the U.S. military consolidated efforts to secure the city. “Within hours of the liberation of Baghdad, amid spreading disorder and growing expectations, debate began over the reconstruction challenges ahead. Criticism and frustration with the chaos on the ground intensified over the apparent failure of the U.S. to plan adequately for the restoration of

---


23 Clausewitz, 170-173.
political and economic order once major combat operations had ended.”24 By late spring a significant insurgency operation began and continues today. What went wrong?

First, in developing plans for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the DOD relied heavily on strategic and operational lessons learned in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan, Operation ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo Air War), and the Air Campaign conducted during Operation DESERT STORM. The war in Afghanistan used an unprecedented combination of overwhelming air power, special operations forces, and local allies on the ground to rapidly defeat and replace the Taliban regime. Though airpower enabled the coalition to quickly defeat the Taliban, it also demonstrated that there are still limitations to the ability of air power to win a campaign in the absence of ground forces, although some would argue that it was airpower alone that won the war in Kosovo. In reviewing the Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1003 for Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld said; “I’m not sure that that much force is needed given what we’ve learned coming out of Afghanistan.”25 The overwhelming success in Afghanistan became the template for operations in Iraq but, as Clausewitz warns us, “Historical examples are, however, seldom used to good effect.” The conditions in Iraq were not the same as the conditions in Afghanistan.

U.S. political leaders ignored warnings from intelligence, military, and regional experts that the Coalition forces would not be greeted as liberators, and should expect to deal with anti-U.S. sentiment and deep ethnic and religious tensions and divisions. Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy said, “The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that everything was going to be swell…..the Iraqis will greet

This intelligence assessment/script writing produced invalid planning assumptions that became the basis for all strategic and operational planning and the primary cause of tension between DOD and other interagency planning efforts. I would argue that DOD’s wishful thinking was more focused on not arousing the negative passions of the American people, the friendly COG, who might not be willing to risk American casualties and dollars for the value of Iraq which had been effectively contained for the past decade. I would also argue that CENTCOM as the theater strategic and operational command in coordination with 3rd U.S. Army as the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) should have developed a detailed branch plan to deal with insurgency and lawlessness for Phase IV rather than wishing away the problem. “Planning for military and combat postwar operations in Iraq lacked the flexibility necessary to enable the U.S. military to respond to the situation that emerged after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. Post conflict stabilization and reconstruction were addressed only generally, largely because of the prevailing view that the task would not be difficult.”

Some would also argue that the National Security Council (NSC) failed to galvanize the institutional and international dimensions of strategy to conduct an unlimited war with unlimited aims of regime change and nation building. With no interagency planning directives like Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) – 56, the NSC failed to force DOS, DOD and other agencies to coordinate any effective planning and execution of conflict termination and nation building. “I never once heard someone say "We took this step because the President indicated ..." or "The President really wanted ..." Instead I heard "Rumsfeld

---

26 Fallows, 2, 33.
wanted," "Powell thought," "The Vice President pushed," "Bremer asked," and so on."28

The NSC also failed to secure UN and Allied support getting only 17 thousand soldiers of a
projected 50 to assist in peace operations.29

The NSC failed to capitalize on a DOS planning effort “Future of Iraq Project.”

Thomas Warrick had organized “seventeen working groups, designed systematically to cover
what would be needed to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of the country.”30

Most of DOS’s planning efforts were ignored due to policy differences with DOD over threat
assessments, risks (DOS perceived as anti-war) and how to plan for peacemaking and nation
building. When President Bush designated DOD responsible for the nation building effort,
DOS and other interagency planning efforts were dropped or ignored. The new DOD, Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) director, retired U.S. Army
Lieutenant General (LTG) Jay Garner “was affected by the tension between DOD and the
rest of the government…he had heard about the Future of Iraq project…Rumsfeld told him
not to waste his time reading it…Rumsfeld also asked him to kick Warrick off his staff.”31

Some would argue that DOD’s failure to support Garner with proper resources and mission
guidance led to his eventual replacement by Ambassador Paul Bremmer and the Coalition
Provision Authority (CPA).

The most critical failure was NSC’s failure to recognize the importance of historical
lessons ignoring the U.S. Army War College report on “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights,
Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario.” The report
highlighted U.S. experience in Japan, Germany, Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and the

29 Richard A. Lacquement Lecture, “Making the Result Final.” Lecture. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI:
14 February 2005.
30 Fallows, 6.
31 Ibid, 30.
importance of “Phase IV, Post Conflict” planning for Iraq. DOD leadership ignored the report opting to rely on recent successes in Afghanistan (fighting the last war) using Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in targeting and maneuver for a quick decisive victory (QDV) successfully conducting an unlimited war with limited means. However, Iraq was not Afghanistan.

I would argue that the Coalition did not have sufficient ground forces in Iraq to set the conditions for peace operations and nation building. “In this transition from decisive to peace operations the first 30 days are the most critical.”32 With the speed of the campaign and numerous by-passed urban areas to quickly get to Baghdad, 150,000 troops were not enough to stop the chaos that followed. “For five million Bosnians we had 200,000 troops to watch over them. Now we have twenty-five million Iraqis to worry about, spread out over a state the size of California.”33 I believe that General Shinseki’s estimate of 400,000 based on the Army’s troop to task planning analysis was more accurate. Some would argue though that the conditions in Iraq were different than Bosnia and drawing comparisons from previous operations before the post-war situation unfolds would be as Donald Rumsfeld states “a wasteful use of a large force…Rumsfeld's idea of the right force size was more like 75,000.”34 I would argue that Rumsfeld’s challenging of the tactical details and force sizing violates Clausewitz’s principle of “policy will not extend its influence to operational details…do not determine the posting of the guards.”35 By ignoring U.S. Army planning, Rumsfeld violated the Weinberger doctrine principle which had been so successful during Operation DESERT STORM: “We should have clearly defined political and military

32 Lacquement, 14 February 2005.
33 Fallows, 21.
34 Ibid, 19.
35 Clausewitz, 606.
objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish these objectives. “The moment he tore up the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), Rumsfeld crossed the line. His embrace of uncertainty became a reckless evasion of responsibility.”

Finally, The U.S. failed to create an effective command structure for synchronizing and coordinating peace operations and nation building efforts. The ORHA, later the CPA and military both reported directly to the SECDEF with no unity of command/effort in Iraq. “The ORHA was not subordinate to General Franks but was given equal status. General Franks, as the commander, with all of the troops and experience was not in charge.” Also, “General Garner and his team refused an invitation from the land forces commander, Lt. General David McKiernan, to collocate with the U.S. military forces that would advance into Baghdad, and instead stayed in the Hilton Hotel in Kuwait, out of touch with conditions in the field and waiting for a humanitarian crisis that never came.” The military gave priority to security and only limited support to nation-building while the nation builders had no real security capability or safe transportation of their own. As Nadia Schadlow correctly addresses in her article "War and the Art of Governance," cleaving responsibilities between agencies during the initial conduct of an occupation is a mistake. Physical security underlies all efforts to conduct the three vital tasks of occupation--averting humanitarian crises, fielding domestic security forces, and establishing a legitimate government. These tasks are a prerequisite to reconstruction.

---

37 Fallows, 34.
38 Woodward, 413.
40 Schadlow, 89.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Planning for conflict termination and execution of Phase IV stability operations are just as important as planning for decisive combat operations. Conflict termination and Phase IV planning must be timely and include all the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic) to develop clearly defined and achievable political and military objectives. To facilitate this process, it is also essential that unity of effort exists from the national strategic to the operational levels of command. However, as Fred Ikle states, “…various agencies and individuals in each nation compete in shaping policy, while pursuing their own interests and relying on their divergent estimates of friendly and enemy strengths…those involved focus on the means, rather than on how the over-all effort will accomplish some national ends.”41 Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM serves as examples where lack of unity of effort at the national and theater strategic levels of command led to vague objectives, faulty assumptions, lack of timely interagency and military conflict termination planning, missed opportunities on the battlefield, and the loss of American lives. Following are recommendations which should promote unity of effort and increase the Theater Strategic and Operational commanders’ ability to set the conditions for successful Phase IV operations and create a stable peace.

Implement a Goldwater/Nichols type act for planning Governance, Stability and Support Operations and establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for each Combatant Command (COCOM). The intent of this legislation is to provide the National Security Council (NSC) with the legal authority to direct interagency planning and cooperation. During the Clinton administration, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) was developed to increase the effectiveness of interagency coordination by addressing the

---

need for decisive authority (who is in charge), a balance between institutional cultures, and approaches and requirements for planning. Specifically PDD 56’s aim was “to reduce clashes between civilian and military methods, incorporate into the interagency process proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms, and address the lack of training and expertise in interagency work across the government.”

Former Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff (CJCS), retired U.S. Army General Henry H. Shelton had it right when he testified before Congress:

“The first step in establishing dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes needed to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises was the publication of Presidential Decision Directive – 56... The President directed the Secretary of Defense to forward to the National Security Council those politico-military issues deemed necessary for interagency review and appropriate action. This will be accomplished by the development of an Interagency Coordination Annex (Annex V) to all CJCS-approved plans. These Annex Vs, when approved, will be repackaged into politico-military strategic concepts and forwarded through OSD to the NSC...Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity to ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensive planning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decision-makers.”

General Henry H. Shelton

PDD 56 led to the development of Annex V in support of COCOM deliberate and crisis planning and the creation of Joint Interagency Working Groups and Task Forces which set the stage for the establishment of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to facilitate interagency planning. However, PDD 56 as a presidential directive did not have the teeth to enforce interagency cooperation and was not adopted by the Bush Administration.


43 Posture Statement of General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the 106th Congress Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 8 February 2000, 28.
The NSC needs procedures like PDD 56 backed by legislation to force interagency cooperation.

Support the activation of a JIACG at each COCOM with the capability to support a Joint Task Force (JTF) and CFLCC when required. The purpose of a JIACG is “provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counter-terrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host nation efforts.”44 The CENTCOM JIACG was very effective supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan but was not as successful in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. “This was largely due to leader turbulence and the resultant shifting of mission and focus, rotation of personnel, and lack of involvement in drafting the Interagency Annex (Annex V) to the Campaign Plan. What is more troubling is that the military reverted to “when required” interagency planning and coordination during the run-up and execution of phases I through III (Deter, Seize Initiative, Decisive Operations) of the campaign, and looked late to the interagency for assistance with phase IV (Transition) of the campaign.”45 Early involvement of the JIACG in the planning process is essential for successful interagency planning and coordination. One drawback of the JIACG is though approved by the NSC, it remains an ad hoc organization with few permanently assigned personnel. The JIACG needs legislation to force agencies to fill permanent positions, develop doctrine, and establish professional training programs.

Update Joint Doctrine to include the role of the NSC in the war termination process. Current Joint Doctrine provides general guidance on war termination during the planning process. Joint Publications provide little guidance to the conditions that must be set

---

45 Stopher, 11.
for successful war termination and the role of the NSC in developing political objectives in the war termination process. This is especially critical in an environment where vague political objectives are the norm. “It should not be left to the theater strategic and operational commanders alone to translate vague political objectives into a military strategy with viable end states that hopefully meets the criteria for successful war termination. Joint Doctrine should require that Commander’s Estimates and military operational plans address war termination considerations and Phase IV in sufficient detail including all the elements of power. This will drive interaction early in the planning process between policy makers and military planners aimed at reconciliation of political objectives and military strategies for war termination.”

**Redefine the role of the military in Governance, Stability and Support operations.** Leading up to the war in Iraq, the U.S. military was reluctant to plan for and participate in nation-building and peace operations. This stems from President Bush’s desire to avoid over extending American resources and commitments and the U.S. military’s focus on decisive operations. Some would argue that this mind set coupled with faulty planning assumptions on the threat and the belief that civil authorities should not be subordinate to the military during Phase IV operations directly influenced the planning failures during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Nadia Schadlow in her article “War and Governance” suggests that three vital tasks of occupation--averting humanitarian crises, fielding domestic security forces, and establishing a legitimate government should remain the responsibility of the military until a reasonable level of physical security is achieved. She also states, “History suggests that leadership over reconstruction efforts should run through US military channels.

---

and that the military should have direct responsibility for implementation. Unity of command should prevail. This in turn suggests that the conventional wisdom of allowing greater civil control is wrong and that the tendency to bring in civilian and international organizations too quickly should be carefully considered.\textsuperscript{48} A recent Rand study also recommends that, “For the future, the U.S. military cannot assume that some other organization, either within the U.S. government or in the host country, will take responsibility for providing law, order, and security through the transition period from the end of conventional military operations until a generally secure environment has been established.”\textsuperscript{49} As the U.S. Army goes through transformation, it must reassess its capabilities and training to ensure that proper emphasis can be placed on governance, stability and support operations.

**CONCLUSION**

Successful conflict termination, post-conflict peace operations, and conflict resolution depend on the civil and military leadership recognizing that war termination is as critical as the conduct of war. Supporting plans must be developed early as possible to synchronize the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational aspects of the operation as well as the interagency, international, and civilian participants. Winning the peace is as important as winning the war.

\textsuperscript{48} Schadlow, 91.

\textsuperscript{49} Rand Study, 6.
Bibliography


Dalbey, Steven W. “The March to Baghdad: Did We Stop Too Soon?” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 7 April 1997.


Sopher, Terry R. Jr., Joint Interagency Cordiantion Groups (JIACGs), A Temporary Solution to a Long Term Requirement, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013, 19 March 2004


