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In today's operational environment the impact and influence of the public is becoming more relevant. With the ability to monitor daily operational decisions and actions, the public response can change the direction or outcome of a battle. This shift in influence has been a direct result of the advances in information technology during the past decade. These advances have reduced operational space, deceased the decision cycle, and added information collection and dissemination capabilities to the individual service member.

The result is more information available to the public and an increased importance of public affairs management. The operational impacts of new media and command information concepts and capabilities have placed commanders in a reactive operational posture, struggling to counter perceptions and maintain public support, based on the fragmented operational snapshot provided by the media. In essence, today's informational environment has transformed public affairs into an operational function that commanders have failed to effectively synchronize. Unless operational commanders fully incorporate all public affairs capabilities into their operations, develop procedures to harness the information technology within their commands and establish habitual relationships with the media, they will not possess the ability to maintain the public will and operational tempo necessary to sustain and win on today's battlefield.

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# Operational Implications of Public Affairs—Factors, Functions, and Challenges of the Information Battlefield


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Professional Education II.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.


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**<u>Abstract</u>**

Operational Implications of Public Affairs—Factors, Functions, and Challenges
of the Information Battlefield


In today's operational environment the impact and influence of the public is becoming more relevant.  With the ability to monitor daily operational decisions and actions, the public response can change the direction or outcome of a battle.  This shift in influence has been a direct result of the advances in information technology during the past decade.  These advances have reduced operational space, deceased the decision cycle, and added information collection and dissemination capabilities to the individual service member.  The result is more information available to the public and an increased importance of public affairs management.

The operational impacts of new media and command information concepts and capabilities have placed commanders in a reactive operational posture, struggling to counter perceptions and maintain public support, based on the fragmented operational snapshot provided by the media.  In essence, today's informational environment has transformed public affairs into an operational function that commanders have failed to effectively synchronize.  Unless operational commanders fully incorporate all public affairs capabilities into their operations, develop procedures to harness the information technology within their commands and establish habitual relationships with the media, they will not possess the ability to maintain the public will and operational tempo necessary to sustain and win on today's battlefield .

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## Operational Implications of Public Affairs—Factors, Functions, and Challenges of the Information Battlefield

It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

As we prosecute the Global War on Terror, and as military experts postulate that the future involves more "clashes with civilizations" than outright war, it becomes imperative that we develop a more effective non-kinetic operational capability.[1] For many this panacea of non-kinetic operations lies in the realm of information operations (IO). In September 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed the Information Operations Roadmap.[2] This roadmap is designed to make IO a military core competency on par with ground, air, sea, and special forces.[3] The functions of IO are designed and directed at the enemy decision-making apparatus, not his alliances. While some might argue that effective and synchronized IO does target allies, that issue is not the focus or contention of this study. The facts are clear: IO is designed to impact the enemy's information and information system and protect our own.[4] There is no argument that some IO capabilities produce ancillary effects which impact enemy alliances, like psychological operations (PSYOP) leaflet drops or Commando Solo broadcasts. But, only public affairs is specifically directed at the internal and external audiences and stakeholders who support our operations.

It has been proven time and again that maintaining public support and will is a critical component, in many cases the critical component, to successful military operations. Commanders can claim victory though it is the public who will determine if and when victory is achieved. While it has many components and capabilities, public affairs is the only tool in

the IO arsenal specifically focused and directed to maintain public support.  As a supporting

capability to IO, public affairs is designed to quickly and accurately create awareness and

understanding concerning campaigns and operations.[5] It links the public with the military and

establishes the conditions that lead to operational success.[6]

In today's operational environment, public affairs involves more than facilitating

media pools or managing press briefings.  It impacts each operational planning factor and to

be effective this function must consider the relationships between media relations, command

information, and community relations.  Unfortunately, most commanders are consumed by

the overwhelming and instantaneous impact of the media relations leg of the public affairs

triad.  The operational impacts of new media and command information concepts and

capabilities have placed commanders in a reactive operational posture, struggling to counter

perceptions and maintain public support, based on the fragmented operational snapshot

provided by the media.  In essence, today's informational environment has transformed public

affairs into an operational function that commanders have failed to effectively synchronize.

Unless operational commanders fully incorporate all public affairs capabilities into their

operations, develop procedures to harness the information technology within their commands,

and establish habitual relationships with the media, they will not maintain the public will and

operational tempo necessary to sustain and win on today's battlefield .

**Public Affairs Impact on Operational Planning Factors**

With an asymmetrical battlefield our adversaries no longer require large armies or

unlimited resources to be successful.  As witnessed in Somalia, if our enemy can manage the

information flow he can control the tempo and outcome of the operation.[7]  So, how a

commander assesses and applies the information he receives and sends is critical to the

successful synchronization of space, time, and force.[8]  Therefore, how and when public affairs is used to impact or influence these factors becomes a decision point for the commander.

One decision centers on managing the blurred distance between home and the battlefield.  With the public now capable of monitoring operations, in many cases as they occur, commanders are finding it difficult to stay ahead of the "rumor" mill.   While Vietnam was the beginning of televised war, today's technology allows anxious families to remain constantly immersed in images of live combat and in contact with their loved ones, adding stress on soldiers by "miring them in domestic problems that distract from the mission."[9]

Some commanders are turning to public affairs to help mitigate the new stresses and strains caused by this evaporation of the tyranny of distance.  For example, when the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed into Kirkuk, Iraq they took along two American Forces Network broadcasters.[10]  These troops were equipped with video phones, INMARSATs, and cell phones.  They provided daily radio and television news and information stories to families and friends located in Europe and the U.S.  This reduced the need for constant communications home by soldiers and provided the commander with a tool to broadcast an unfiltered message to his audience.  The success of this employment of public affairs assets was emulated by 3rd COSCOM and 1st Armored Division (AD) when they deployed to Iraq.[11]

Even more critical than the evaporation of space is the immediacy with how information now flows.  Today, commanders and public affairs officers no longer have the luxury of operating in a passive manner.  The speed at which information flows, combined with its global reach, means that many issues and situations "go public" well before enough information is present to make a proper assessment.  As one public affairs officer who worked on the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse case put it:

[We] realized quickly that the only way we could keep pace with the situation was to go public right away with everything we had. We had only to consider SECRET reports and copies of the damning photographs floating around the internet to tell us that we were already hopelessly behind the power curve. Everyone I knew recommended that the Army publish all the photos and reports we had or else every time another was unofficially released, we'd go through the same painful process… the issue of control of information (in the traditional or pre-information age, sense) needs to be re-defined at least. The simple fact is the ability to "control information" is gone forever.[12]

In an information centered environment, public affairs must be actively employed to reduce the impact of the information flow of the operation. The instantaneous nature of information dissemination means both the operational commander and his adversary can modify actions and decisions in real-time.[13] While the fluid nature of the information may prevent it from being controlled, it can be managed through coordinated and synchronized releases designed to shape the information battlefield.

The actions on 9/11 of passengers on flights and people in the World Trade Center show how information impacts behaviors and influences outcomes of operations and events.[14] Now, more than any time in history, the ability of commanders to manage troop perceptions is a critical element of success. The fact that every base in Iraq and Afghanistan is equipped with American Forces Radio and Television Service attest to the importance commanders place upon the operational implications of troop morale. Prior to going into Iraq the 1st Armored Division commander bought hundreds of portable transistor radios to provide to his troops.[15] This action served two operational purposes. First, it helped to maintain morale by providing an "escape" from the realities and stresses of war. But, more importantly, by using his deployed public affairs broadcasters, the commander could broadcast local command information over the radio to ensure needed information filtered down to the troops. While public affairs will not physically reduce the impacts of space, or increase the size of the force,

their operations have a direct impact on time. They allow the commander to shape the battlefield by managing the effects of the information flow.

**Public Affairs As An Operational Function**

Even recognizing the public affairs impacts on operational planning factors, some commanders and planners still see the value of public affairs lying somewhere between PSYOP and civil affairs. Since information flow is central to public affairs, many commanders see it as an integral capability in support of information operations but not as an outright function. They feel synchronization and flexibility of IO occurs only when public affairs, PSYOP, and civil affairs operations are combined.[16] Their objective is to create a strategic communications capability at the operational level.[17] In reality this alignment only results in diluting the public affairs message.[18] Additionally, some senior military leaders fear IO has placed more responsibility on PSYOP information dissemination at the expense of public affairs credibility.[19] Doctrinally public affairs is, and must remain, part of the IO planning cell. However, the public affairs objectives of providing timely and accurate information are constant. These objectives must be met for every operation regardless of type or duration and, as a result, must be planned as a separate function.

Historically, IO was a subset of the operational functions of Command and Control Warfare (C2W).[20] With the publication of the Information Operations Roadmap, IO has emerged as a core competency and a separate battlefield function.[21] By developing IO as a military core competency, and combining all supporting and related functions, commanders are attempting to develop and operational framework that will help them generate and act upon specific information requirements.[22]

One problem with the Roadmap is the treatment of public affairs only as a supporting or related capability of IO.[23] In today's operational environment, public affairs is always

required.  Operations may occur and be successful without the need for PSYOP, civil affairs, or computer network operations.  In fact, not every operation will require these actions.  Like the operational functions of logistics, C2, intelligence, and force protection, public affairs must be organized and controlled in every operation.  In fact, instead of combining public affairs into information operations, it should be equated to operational fires.  Effective operational fires must be sequenced and synchronized with other operational functions but this is difficult since "their theoretical underpinnings and practical utility have not always been well understood."[24]  This same lack of understanding by commanders hinders public affairs operations.

Like operational fires, public affairs is a capability that must be sequenced and synchronized with every operational function in order for the commander to be successful.  Army Doctrine points to the fact that public understanding is critical to operational success:

> Soldiers, participants and the public must understand objectives, motives and the nature scope and duration of friendly actions.  The relevant audiences important to the commander are not limited to soldiers and the American public, but are also international as well as local to the operation.[25]

Here lies the biggest difference between public affairs, PSYOP, and civil affairs.  Whether an internal or external audience, the public affairs objective is to ensure factual information is presented and understood.  The goal is to maintain or garner support of our operations and motives through a free flow and exchange of information.[26]  When these objectives are intertwined with deception, propaganda, or misinformation the lines of truth are blurred.[27]  Ultimately we create a gap in our information capability that our enemy can/will exploit.

Though most joint commanders may not see public affairs as an operational function, they do recognize the importance of public affairs and the role it plays in shaping and influencing operations.  Of particular concern to commanders is how public affairs controls,

or interfaces with, the media. Many commanders feel the news cycle and news outlets are a resource that can be influenced and controlled. It is for this reason that many have lumped public affairs and PSYOP together in the perceptions management arena.

> Advocates of these programs (strategic influence) said that the advent of a 24-hour news cycle and the powerful influence of Arabic satellite television made it essential that U.S. military commanders and civilian officials made the control of information a key part of their battle plans. Information is part of the battlefield in a way that it's never been before. We'd be foolish not to try to use it to our advantage.[28]

Unfortunately, some have drawn a very rigid nexus between public affairs and PSYOP control and use of information.[29] What appears to be occurring is a blending of the public affairs role to inform and the PSYOP role to influence behavior. In fact, while PSYOP previously focused only on the enemy population and C2 mechanism, it now includes friendly and neutral nations.[30] This clearly crosses into public affairs responsibilities and audiences.

However, even though public affairs and PSYOP messages may be coordinated and similar, their audiences and objectives are vastly different. Public affairs is focused on control in order to inform and educate friendly troops and allies based on facts and knowledge gained through insight, investigation, or study. On the other hand, PSYOP are designed to discourage or dissuade the enemy through, in most cases, the use of deception and misinformation. The dilemma occurs because both often use the same mechanism, the media, as their main source of communication. Even when messages are synchronized the potential for confusion and misunderstanding is inevitable.

While public affairs and PSYOP principles may be conflicting, to some leaders, the effects are all that matter. This view is supported by Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, former deputy director of plans for CJTF Iraq.

> Are we trying to inform? Yes. Do we offer perspective? Yes. Do we offer military judgment? Yes. Must we tell the truth to stay credible? Yes. Is there a battlefield value in deceiving the enemy? Yes. Do we intentionally deceive the American people? No.

> There is a gray area. Tactical and operational deception are proper and legal on the battlefield….in a worldwide media environment how do you prevent that deception from spilling out from the battlefield and inadvertently deceiving the American people?[31]

As commanders struggle to manage perceptions they are attempting to gain unity of effort by synchronizing all information functions.  The problem is not the use of deception or propaganda but the use of public affairs assets to facilitate those efforts.  For example, instead of using assigned AFN broadcasters to gather and report information to families and audiences in Italy and the U.S., the 173rd Airborne Brigade used these assets to run the USIA radio station in Kirkuk.[32]  This action resulted in little command information filtering back to counter wrong or limited information being presented by the mainstream media.  While tactically this use of assets seems logical, operationally and strategically it had major implications on broadcast and public affairs support to other units.[33]

The solution to this information management dilemma rests with very simple concepts that are the bedrock of public affairs - truth and honesty.  In fact, to be effective all IO campaigns must be grounded in truth. [34]  By integrating public affairs with PSYOP and using the same delivery means, the media, we muddy the waters of information.  In essence we lose control of the information source because the creditability of the information is placed in question.  If the goal of information operations is not to convey the truth, or provide the public access to information, then the use of public affairs assets is not appropriate. [35]  By incorporating public affairs as an operations function we ensure clear/consistent messages across all spectrums of our operations.  More importantly, commanders establish an effective framework to manage the challenges of the information battle space.

**Coping With New Public Affairs Challenges**

How information is obtained and disseminated has long been the sole responsibility of

public affairs officers.  While this is still true, advances in technology now require more direct input, influence, and management by operational commanders. The best examples of this are the development and institution of media embeds, military blogs, and digital cameras on the battlefield.  More than any other public affairs challenge, these information exchange capabilities have had the most significant impact on operational commanders.

As the 3rd Infantry Division motored toward Baghdad, the world sat captivated by the live images being transmitted from atop a M88 by NBC News reporter David Bloom.  Since the American Revolution the U.S. military has dealt with media on the battlefield and their accounts of troop exploits.[36]  Yet, not until Operation Iraqi Freedom had the military provided such an unfettered access to information.  The media embed program, as it became known, was a product of years of frustration and consternation between military leaders and the media.[37]  One of the biggest concerns and challenges facing commanders centered on operational security.  Operational commanders were concerned that, like Somalia where the media met Navy Seals as they came ashore, if the media were given too much information the ability to gain the initiative through surprise would be hampered.  Knowing the enemy was watching the same live news feeds being sent by Bloom, and other embeds, commanders had to make critical decisions concerning the type and amount of information conveyed.  There is little evidence that operational security was comprised by embeds, but there were close calls.  For example,  while it was underway, the world knew exactly where and when the rescue of U.S. Army PFC Jessica Lynch was occurring because of television news reporting.[38]

This example points to the need for commanders to plan for the effects of media coverage of their operations.  Whether a reporter is embedded or not is irrelevant.  In fact, the ability of a commander to control or manage embeds actually reduces his operational security vulnerabilities.  It is the unilateral reporter, or the "man on the street," capable of transmitting

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instantaneous images of on-going operation, who posses the biggest threat.  The media are going to be present during every operation and while we can not regulate how or what the coverage is going to be, like the weather, we can plan for its impact.[39]

What commanders must begin to incorporate into their planning cycle is the development of habitual relationships with the media.  The old Army adage "you train as you fight" is more than apropos. How commanders incorporate national, international, affiliated and unaffiliated media into their operations has become a critical planning factor.  No longer is "dealing with the media" simply a public affairs role and responsibility.  It is a factor which influences the operation and impacts the objective, therefore pushing public affairs into the role of a function that must be coordinated and synchronized to gain maximum effect on the battlefield.  While the report of an operation or a successful delivery of a message to a target audience may not make an operation successful, it can cause it to fail.

One only needs to recall the impact of the Abu Ghraib images to see how information can negatively affect an operation.  The tool used to transmit these images, the internet, has emerged as one of the most significant information management challenges now facing the commander and public affairs officers.   Soldiers have always written letters home. However, their ability to instantly send messages or post their exploits for the world to see is a new phenomenon.  Not only do commanders have to plan for embedded media, now they must account for the "entrenched" media - the service member.  In many cases, it is the individual service member who is now setting the agenda for national debate and establishing the conditions for effective information exchange.

In instances like Abu Ghraib, the images taken and distributed by soldiers severely undermined the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. operations.  It is not that the photos were

taken, or even released, it is now and when they were released that had the most significant

impact. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld put it:

> We're functioning with peacetime constraints, with legal requirements, in a wartime situation in the Information Age, where people are running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off, against the law, to the media, to our surprise.[40]

Secretary Rumsfeld's statement provides two points of concern - "passing them off, against

the law" and "to our surprise." It is for reasons like the release of Abu Ghraib images, that

commanders have developed elaborate control measures for their internet warriors. Some

commanders have restricted soldiers from carrying cell phones or digital cameras on

deployments.[41] But, in the long run, just like the media will find a way to get their story, a

service member will find a way to speak his mind. So, to address the "passing them off,

against the law" concern, education becomes the key to success. Simply making sure service

members understand the requirements will prevent the "against the law" concern.

Operationally, the "passing them off" issue should never be a concern. If service members

can obtain proof of wrong doing they should always "pass it" to the appropriate authorities.

What they need to understand is how, when, and where the use of cameras are appropriate.

As for "surprise," commanders and leaders should never let this happen. With proper

operational planning the "surprise" scenario is avoidable. Digital photos, video cell phones,

and web pages are all part of the "Information Age." Soldiers and the public have become

accustomed to a free flow and rapid exchange of information. Many of today's leaders grew

up during the information age. However, our privates, specialist, petty officers, corporals, and

sergeants were born in the information age. The information tools and manner in which they

are used to communicate is as natural to them as reading a book. While leaders could control

the information flow from their units by implementing a World War II version of censorship

into their operations, today's public would not tolerate this infringement on free speech.[42]

In fact, instead of developing measures that prevent or limit this information exchange, commanders must find ways to harness its capabilities. In a way, these new information challenges offer commanders the ability to gain valuable insight into operations. Each service member becomes a sort of quasi combat cameraman offering a first hand perspective of the facts. If incorporated into the overall operation, the insight gleamed from "unofficial" photos and after action reports (blogs) can become a tool to eliminate or prevent inefficiencies or inadequacies. For example, some have discovered that "soldier blogs" offer a venue to tell the "Paul Harvey" version of their operation. Many see this "new era of news gathering" as a way to "fact check" the media, with soldiers providing the first hand, factual, and unfiltered account of what is happening in the war.[43]

Like embeds, the operational challenges facing commanders deal more with mission security than the actual conveying of the information. With no specific guidance to control/limit blogs or internet use, each command has taken a different approach to managing this information exchange function.[44] The result is a failure to capitalize on what potentially could be one of our greatest informational assets – the service member with his digital camera and his website.

**Meeting the Challenge**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mr. Larry Di Rita quite clearly sums up the challenges joint commanders face.

> Communication is becoming a capability that combatant commanders have to factor in to the kinds of operations they are doing. Our job is to put out information to the public that is accurate and to put it out as quickly as we can.[45]

Ensuring the accurate and timely flow of information to influence and maintain public support

is the role of public affairs.  Until commanders recognize that media relations/facilitation is but one aspect of public affairs we will continue to have a conflict between public affairs and IO.  Unless public affairs is seen as an operational function and all of its capabilities exploited to the fullest, commanders will never achieve a fully integrated and synchronized operation. The non-kinetic impacts or effects of public affairs are clear. Yet, its full capabilities are rarely understood.  Therefore, to assist commanders in their effects-based information operations, the following recommendations are postulated.

First, recognize the full capabilities of public affairs before troops are deployed.  Some military leaders feel information superiority was lost when the media departed Baghdad and that due to a lack of public affairs officers "good news" stories stopped being told.[46]  While it is unrealistic to think public affairs assets could produce anywhere near the volume of 6000 stories a week filed by nearly 800 embeded reporters, it does not mean that when the reporters depart commanders lose the information advantage.[47]  While the embeds offer the best method to reach the widest audience, they are not the only method.  Just as every unit has some means to acquire fire support, every unit should plan and use public affairs throughout their operation.  Using public affairs broadcast teams to acquire and distribute news and information stories via AFRTS is but one means to guarantee distribution of the "good news." With the Pentagon Channel, managed by AFRTS and the Defense Media Center, now reaching more than 200 cable distribution outlets and available on the DISH Network secondary service, DoD has the ability to reach more than 2 million plus viewers.[48]  With the exception of the stove piped efforts by AFN Europe to embed military reporters into units, AFRTS assets were not even considered until nearly six months into operations in Iraq. [49] Even then the focus was simply distribution of AFRTS services to soldiers in Iraq and not acquisition and distribution of news and information back to CONUS.

Second, use technology as an information multiplier not a hindrance to operational security. Soldiers possessing digital cameras or operating blogs should be organized, not disbanded or restricted. These soldiers should be viewed as a new version of combat camera. They should be encouraged to take photos and develop their blog sites. However, procedures must be developed to ensure these tools are maximized. Security at the source has long been the mantra of the intelligence community. With detailed procedures of what is allowed for public release and what must be cleared, commanders could easily allow the soldiers freedom of expression while at the same time prevent violations of operational security. Additionally, the popularity of soldier blogs shows that this mechanism offers one of our best opportunities to tell the "whole story" to the public.[50] Soldiers have long been our best credentials. We should not stifle the initiative nor diminish the impact these creative warriors possess.

Third, build relationships and alignments with media before conflicts occur. If public affairs is incorporated as an operational function commanders will expect media as a normal part of daily operations. Embedded media accompanying units during live fire exercises, training center rotations, or normal operations and intelligence briefs at bases are a few ways to build the relationships needed to continue the good news long after major combat subsides. While you can not expect the Washington Post, New York Times, CNN, or Fox News to cover every event, they must never be discounted. The media is eager to cover our operations and want more opportunities to train with us and learn more about how we operate.[51]

Finally, as a function, public affairs must become synchronized internally. The development of the Joint Public Affairs Operations Center is a good first step.[52] Next, we need to incorporate this element at each Combatant Command. Then, we need to combine all service public affairs at the DoD level. Look at the Time magazine person of the year cover for 2004 where Soldiers represented all branches of the military.[53] While we still need to

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manage individual service issues, as a function and as a whole, the world sees us as one entity. When there is a Navy tail hook scandal, an Army drill sergeant abuse case, an Air Force Academy sexual assault, or a Marine hazing, the world sees one service - the military. Our public affairs operations must begin to function more like a public relations firm. We can have different management teams but we all collaborate for the good of the company.

Additionally, we must reorganize and redistribute AFRTS and combat camera assets. When Major General Mark W. Clark established the Blue Danube Network in 1945, what became today's American Forces Network South, he stated he did not want just another AFN.[54] He saw the need for a tool that would provide more than radio entertainment. Today, each Service has its own robust information acquisition and distribution systems. The Air Force News Service, Navy Media Center, Army Broadcasting Service, Soldiers Radio and Television, and combat camera all acquire and produce video, audio, and photo products. With this immense broadcast capability, the military can compete with, or is capable of supplementing, the mainstream media coverage. By combing assets under a single command and assigning broadcast teams (three people) to each Brigade Combat Team, Carrier Strike Group, Marine Expeditionary Force, and Air Wing, the operational commander would possess the organic capability to communicate globally via radio, television, or the internet.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that today's information environment has created a new operational function that commanders must understand and synchronize in order to maintain the public will and operational tempo necessary to sustain and win on today's battlefield. Public affairs is a function that has long been a part of every military action. It impacts perceptions and public opinion to the point that every operational planning factor is influenced by it in some way. It provides the commander with a non-kinetic fire capability that, if and when synchronized and

coordinated with other battlefield functions, can produce substantial operation effects. While these effects may not win a battle evidence is clear that they can cause a loss of public support and change perceptions to a point that operational objectives are altered or not achieved.

Commanders are faced with many challenges on today's asymmetric battlefield. As we have seen, no longer will operations be carried out without media coverage. The speed of and access to information transmission capabilities by the media, service members, and our adversary means commanders must plan for the impacts and synchronize the effects of public affairs. They must develop procedures to incorporate the capabilities of their service members and the media. Commanders must recognize that public affairs operations involve more than facilitating media pools or managing press briefings. To achieve a fully integrated effects-based information program, commanders must consider the relationships among all public affairs functions and how they support other operational functions.

What the public thinks and perceives about the operation is as important as influencing the adversary through deception or propaganda. By increasing and combining public affairs functions, a synchronized broadcast capability can be established that provides a broader operational perspective and effectively counter the fragmented operational snapshot provided by the media. In order to maintain information superiority and meet the information challenges, commanders must begin to consider and manage public affairs as an operational function not just another IO capability.

**Notes**

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, <u>Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order</u>, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 58-59.

[2] Christopher Lamb, "Information Operations as a Core Competency," <u>Joint Force Quarterly</u>, Issue 36, 2005, 89.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Department of Defense, <u>Joint Doctrine for Information Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-13, viii.

[5] Joint Pub 3-13, II-6

[6] Department of the Army, <u>Operations</u>, FM 3-0, 11-20.

[7] LaWarren V. Patterson, "Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare…Are We Ready," (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2002), 10.

[8] Milan N.Vego, <u>Operational Warfare,</u> (Naval War College publication NWC 1004. 2000), 95.

[9] Irene M. Wielawski, "For Troops, Home Can Be Too Close," <u>New York Times,</u> (March 15, 2005); available from http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050315357662.html>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

[10] Based on personal experience of the author. As Commander for American Forces Network South, Vicenza Italy, 2002-2004, the author planned and coordinated broadcast public affairs support to the 173$^{rd}$ Airborne Brigade for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

[11] Ricky Sims, Commander, American Forces Network Europe, <ricky.sims@us.army.mil> "Info." E-mail response to question 2 May 2005.

[12] Scott Malcom, Commander, American Forces South, <scott.malcom@afns.vicenza.army.mil> " Abu Ghraib—you'll never live it down."   [E-mail to author derik.crotts@nwc.navy.mil>] 30 March 2005

[13] S. Venkatraman, <u>Media in a Terrorized World: Reflections in the Wake of 911</u>, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 25.

[14] Ibid., 24.

[15] While serving as Commander of American Forces Network South from 2002-2004, author worked with American Forces Network Europe as methods of communication were determined.

[16] Leigh Armistead, <u>Information Operations: Warfare And The Hard Reality Of Soft Power</u>, (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2004), 159-160.

[17] Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Weights Use of Deception In A Broad Arena," <u>New York Times,</u> 13 December 2004, Late Edition, Section A, Page 1.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Mark Mazzetti, "PR Meets Psy-ops In War On Terror," <u>Los Angles Times</u>, 1 December 2004, Section A, Page 1.

[20] Vego, 185.

[21] Lamb, 89.

[22] Ibid., 92.

[23] Ibid., 89.

[24] Vego, 239.

[25] Department of the Army, <u>Public Affairs Tactics, Techinques, and Procedures,</u> Field Manual 3-61.1, 9-12.

[26] Department of the Army, <u>Information Operations</u>, FM 100-6, 3-15.

[27] Venkatraman, 58-59.

[28] Mazzetti, 1.

[29] Armistead, 202-203.

[30] Michael Knights, "US Psychological Operations Escalate Against Iraq," <u>Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily</u>, Volume XXI, No. 8, 29 January 2003.

[31] Shanker, 1.

[32] As Commander of AFN South, the author had several discussions with the Command group of the 173rd concerning their use of broadcast assets. The 173rd felt these assets were of more benefit conveying information to the local population. While this was a very accurate tactical assessment it had major operational and strategic impacts.

[33] As a result of the 173rd's decision no additional AFN broadcasters were Opconed to any operational unit in OIF.

[34] Andrew Koch, "Hearts and minds' key to US Iraq strategy," <u>Janes Defense Weekly</u>, 19 March, 2003.

[35] William M. Darley, "Why Public Affairs is not Information Operations," *Army,* January 2005, 9-10.

[36] Lewonnie Everett Belcher, "Media Access To Military Operations an Evaluation Of The New DoD Instruction, "Procedures For Joint Public Affairs Operations," (Graduate thesis submitted to Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado), Published by Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson, 1997), 17.

[37] Alicia C. Shepard, "Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media and the Iraq War." (Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2004), 1.

[38] Ibid., 46.

[39] Ibid., 76.

[40] Robert Plummer, "US Powerless to Hault Iraq Images," available from BBC News online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3695897.stm> Internet: accessed 28 March 2005.

[41] Paul LaCamera, former Infantry Battalion Commander for 10th Mountain Division during Operation Anaconda, Afganizatan, stated in discussion with the author on 05 April 2005, that cameras where not authorized and listed on any deployment packing list. Under these procedures, soldiers who packed camera were potentially subject to UCMJ action.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Christopher Nichols, "Search: The Blog Alternative," <u>Proceedings,</u> (U.S. Navy Institute, Nov 2004), 74-75.

[44] Joseph R. Chenelly, "The Blogs of War," *Army Times,* 14 March 2005, 14.

[45] Shanker, 1.

[46] Katherine M. Skiba, "Journalist embodied realities of Iraq War," <u>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</u>, 13 Sept 2003, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/editorials/sep03/169262.asp>, Internet; accessed 15 April 2005.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Andreas Friedrich, Chief, Plans, Policy, and Operations, American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS),Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs < afrtpln@hqda.afis.osd.mil> "Cable Info." [E-mail to Derik W. Crotts derik.crotts@nwc.navy.mil], 1 May 2005.

[49] CENTCOM has no AFN support organic to it AO.  AFN reporters were in place on the USS Cooke to capture the first TLAM shot of OIF; positioned with the 173rd to capture the insertion of troops into northern Iraq; placed in Turkey to cover any operations from this location; and with 3rd COSCOM to cover air support to the advance toward Baghdad.  All of these assets were only there because of operational stove piping by AFN Europe and AFN South commanders.  Once the value of these assets was recognized, CENTCOM established, through Air Force News Service, AFN Baghdad.

[50] Chenelly, 15.

[51] Shepard, 79.

[52] JPAOC was established in 2004 at Joint Forces Command as a standing element to facilitate the transition and synchronization of public affairs operations at the Joint level.

[53] Nancy Gibbs, "Time Person of the Year: The American Soldier," Time,  29 December 2003 – 5 January 2004, cover and 32.

[54] Dr. John Provan, "Afn Story." (Frankfurt: Luftschiff-Zeppelin Collection, 2001), 93.

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