CONSOLIDATING CHANGE:
TRANSITIONAL SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL ART

The U.S. Government approach in post-conflict environments in recent decades has been too often marked by last minute improvisation, misaligned efforts and/or strategic inattention with mistakes made in one intervention repeated in later crises. Greater focus on certain core concepts such as security in a transitional environment would help to ensure both civilian and military leaders and planners share assumptions, definitions and desired end-states. The paper presents a preliminary effort to outline some of the factors involved in developing an operational useful definition of transitional security. Review of the literature and theoretical discussion is weighed in light of personal observations from Afghanistan.
CONSOLIDATING CHANGE:
TRANSITIONAL SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL ART

By

Donald S. Boy
CIV, Department of State

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________

February 13, 2006
Abstract

The U.S. Government approach in post-conflict environments in recent decades has been too often marked by last minute improvisation, misaligned efforts and/or strategic inattention with mistakes made in one intervention repeated in later crises. Greater focus on certain core concepts such as security in a transitional environment would help to ensure both civilian and military leaders and planners share assumptions, definitions and desired end-states. The paper presents a preliminary effort to outline some of the factors involved in developing an operational useful definition of transitional security. Review of the literature and theoretical discussion is weighed in light of personal observations from Afghanistan.
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past decade, the United States government has been frequently involved in complex contingency operations across the globe and there is every indication that this situation will continue. This has significant implications for all U.S. governmental agencies, who are seeking to adapt their organizations and methods to this environment.\(^1\) The thesis of the paper is that in analyzing any post-conflict situation there are certain core concepts (including security, legitimacy, governance, etc.) that can be applied across any set of conflicts or crises, despite manifest differences in antecedents, context and direction. The use of these core concepts can guide better implementation and operational campaigns of military and civilian leaders/planners. Specifically, this paper seeks to delineate a preliminary set of operational definitions and analytic principles related to transitional security, focusing on Afghanistan and utilizing a partial review of the literature and personal observations.\(^2,3\) It is hoped that this will be of use to both combatant commanders and their planners on the military side and senior civilian leadership (such a special envoy) faced with designing civil/military operations in an complex humanitarian/political environment (in essence, a non-combat campaign).

Although complex contingency operations span a range from natural disasters to humanitarian emergencies to the global war on terrorism, the most complex, difficult, and lengthy contingencies are those that occur at the transition between war and peace. These


\(^2\) Transitional security is here defined as the establishment of functioning legitimate security apparatus, balanced judiciary and effective rule of law in state/nation where institutions have collapsed or been destroyed.

\(^3\) Author, Personal Observations, Kandahar Afghanistan, 10/03-7/05.
transitions can occur where there has been state failure, post-conflict and situations where there is an ongoing threat of violence through an active insurgency, criminalized society or continued simmering ethnic/religious tensions. There is a growing recognition that far from being outside the realm of statecraft and grand strategy, failed states and chronic instability triggered by war, civil war, bad governance and the like, can have a direct and immediate impact on national interests and the international system.4 Concurrently, given the numerous interventions over the past three decades, there is also some extensive experience in what works (and what doesn’t). Much of that experience resides within the United Nations (UN) and the United States government (particularly the military and the U.S. Agency for International Development) who often are the direct implementers. One unfortunate constant in U.S. humanitarian and stabilization interventions has been the imperfect coordination between the U.S. military and civilian agencies.

Joint Operations doctrine defines Military Operations other than war (MOOTW) as those where “the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war” and provides a framework in which planning and implementation can take place. 5 U.S. civilian agencies generally do not have “doctrine” or the same commitment to planning as does the military. That situation may be in the process of changing. Among the goals of the recently created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (S/CRS) is to develop “doctrine” (denoted best practices) for U.S. government intervention. S/CRS will have the USG lead on issues such as transitional security, humanitarian assistance,

---

5 Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter V, p: V-1. Note that as doctrine is revised, the term MOOTW will be replaced by Range of Military Operations (ROMO).
reconstruction, and as coordinator for U.S. efforts in failed states and post conflict situations.\textsuperscript{6} The following discussion is therefore intended to serve as a starting point for the development of a combined or joint military doctrine and civilian “best practices” in approaching transitional security with a particular focus on the intersection of counter-insurgency operations and the establishment of a stable, effective security environment.

CATEGORIES OF INTERVENTION

Each complex contingency will have different demands and requirements. However, beyond the idiosyncratic nature of each individual crisis, there are certain broad categories that will shape security needs. We will exclude natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies, as security will be a lesser component of planning -- with an understanding that there will be humanitarian emergencies where security may become a critical aspect.\textsuperscript{7} A non-exhaustive set of categories is outlined below. Each of these could come about through a number of different mechanisms: following inter-state conflict; state failure; intra-state conflict; and/or the decision of the international community, regional organization or great powers to intervene.

--\textit{Peace-keeping} (Sinai, others): Implies some level of political agreement or peace treaty; primary task of peace-keepers is to provide a buffer between the parties to the agreement; can be successful without final determination (e.g. Cyprus); security is usually not a determinative planning factor; Usually UN lead.

--*Peace-enforcement* (Sierra Leone): Intervention requires some level of coercion of at least one of the parties involved in conflict; protection of international organizations and humanitarian agencies may be necessary; some level of local governance by intervening actors is likely; security of local population and restoration of economy and infrastructure may be necessary; UN or Un-sanctioned.

--*Post-Conflict* (Bosnia, Kosovo – although some of these activities occurred prior to the end of hostilities): Can have elements of both peace-keeping and peace-enforcement; significant damage to civil society and institutions; long-term international governance likely; security for ethnic/religious/other groups critical;

--*Counter-insurgency* (Iraq, Afghanistan): May develop internally or as a consequence of outside intervention; security and legitimacy key components to successful termination; lack of national government capacity in governance, security, and conflict management critical weaknesses.

**DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES**

In reviewing military/international interventions over past several decades, among the variables that researchers have found to be most predictive of success or failure are security and legitimacy. 8 In order to stabilize, reconstruct and integrate/reintegrate failed or broken

states into the global community, there must be sufficient security for the recognized
government to exert and extend its authority, the international community to help as needed
and the private sector to invest and develop. However, despite broad agreement on the
fundamental need for security, concepts of security vary according to organizational
mandate, resources, and context.

This is not meant to imply that other aspects/variables are not important, only that these two
consistently appear in the literature across a broad range of situations. This appears to be the
case whether one is discussing post-conflict (Bosnia, East Timor), state failure (Somalia,
Balkans) or some combination thereof. Hence, it can be argued that security and legitimacy,
however defined, must be seen as core concepts for an accurate, timely analysis of instability,
intervention and nation-building. This can be particularly acute in cases where a post-
conflict nation continues to be wracked by or faces an armed insurgency (Iraq, Afghanistan).
It is clear that the ability of the recognized government, international forces and/or allies to
protect the populace, deliver/resume key public services, and/or provide a sustained
economic base, is critical to the establishment and continued perception of the legitimacy of
the new government. The absence of host nation security forces, either military or police,
creates significant additional hurdles. However, despite the centrality of security, useful
definitions are often elusive. Actors in a conflict or post-conflict situation often define
security narrowly in terms of their own needs and objectives. As a starting point, among the

---

James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga
Timilsina. *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.;
Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley. *Establishing Law and Order after
many potential actors in an insurgency/nation-building/peace-enforcement, three are discussed below, with additional observations derived from Afghanistan.

**Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)**

*Definition of Security:* Given the enormous variation in philosophy, organization and personnel, generalizations about NGO’s are difficult. Nonetheless, in the broadest terms, NGOs define security as the ability to deliver their services, either emergency humanitarian or development assistance. If they cannot ensure the safety of their personnel, that food and material assistance is not stolen, and that their staff is not subject to coercion by armed groups, then the country/region/area will be seen as insecure. Although they will keep close track of crime levels and the existence of an insurgency, security will be measured in direct proportion to the mission. International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and its umbrella of agencies, are likely to define security in a similar manner. However, the UN’s often lead role in peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and nation-building operations, means that the UN response may differ from that of NGOs, with the UN willing to incur certain risks to achieve political goals.

*Security requirements:* To achieve their stated missions international NGOs and International organizations will focus on certain key elements of security including: protection of facilities; freedom of access to most, if not all, of their area of responsibility; and protection of staff and projects from coercion. For the UN and other international organizations this security support would normally be provided by the host government and
there is a general reluctance to use private security. In either case, qualified and trustworthy police or gendarmes are often in short supply post-conflict leading either to competition with local government for police or hiring militia who are often still involved in destabilizing or criminal activity. Access to remote areas can become a source of considerable friction both within and outside the assistance community. Different organizations will take very different approaches on whether they will travel with military or police units, work in the same area or even have direct contact with the military. Beyond obvious coordination issues, this can greatly complicate planning and implementation of security. Political events such as elections, with timelines, specified processes and clear outcomes, may actually present more manageable security challenges than day to day policing (Iraq, Afghanistan).

**Afghanistan observations:** Following the murder of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employee Richard Mungia in March 2003 in northern Kandahar province and the bombing of the UN regional headquarters in Kandahar in November 2003, the number of international NGOs with expatriate staff in Kandahar dropped from over 30 to six. As of July 2005, none of the organizations that had drawn down had returned and those that remained largely focused their efforts in a tight circle around Kandahar city. The UN and its agencies have remained but also restricted their activities (including those associated with elections, building civil society and human rights). Although the Taliban insurgency remained at a relatively low level prior to mid-2005, most International Organizations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) remained convinced that that the security situation was too dangerous to either return or significantly restart projects and assistance. This has had the effect of dampening reconstruction and stabilization, with aid moving in an
uneven, off-and-on pattern: not the most effective way to “win hearts and minds.” This pattern often led to puzzlement and frustration among Coalition military whose perception of security differed (see below).  

---

**International Military**

*Definition of Security:* In a post-conflict environment with no effective national government or an insurgency aimed at that government or extensive criminalized violence, key security issues for any international military force (U.S. or other) will be force protection and containing/destroying forces that threaten stability. The manner in which the military commander balances these objectives will depend, among others, on national strategic policy, existence of an international mandate, force levels and the relative legitimacy of the military, host government and insurgents/belligerents. Given the difficulty and complexity of these tasks, the combatant commander (or equivalent) is likely to resist additional tasking/missions, even those related to a broader definition of security. Nonetheless, the higher the level of violence, directed at the intervening troops, host government or local populations, the greater the emphasis will be on direct action and response. This will be so even where it is clear that the other aspects of national power need to be fully utilized and the critical importance of removing the support for continuing violence is recognized.

In U.S. Joint Doctrine, security is recognized as a key principle but is primarily focused on information security and force protection with protection of civilians or other agencies.

---

9 Author, Personal Observations, Kandahar Afghanistan, 10/03-7/05.
mentioned only as a possibility. Although the discussion of key security variables is broader in Joint Peacekeeping Doctrine, that discussion still does not appear to be embedded within a larger conception of security.

**Security Requirements:** The combatant commander needs sufficient forces to protect his lines of supply/communication, bases (operation and forward-based) and other key assets that cannot/will not be covered by national forces. If an insurgency has developed, the commander will need to balance those forces with offensive operations. A full discussion of counter-insurgency doctrine is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is clear that a narrow definition of security or of the military role in security can have important consequences. The legitimacy, capability and size of host government security forces (military, police, paramilitary) then becomes critical as the end-state is likely to involve a hand-over of some or all responsibility to those forces. In a failed or broken state, national security forces may be functionally absent and their establishment becomes a key priority for the intervening nations/organizations. In addition, use of local militias to provide security for bases, headquarters and assistance projects can be a useful interim measure although care must be taken to avoid those forces acting as a tribal or ethnic “filter” for access and support.

**Afghanistan observations:** Following the successful overthrow of the Taliban regime, both the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi and the U.S. government agreed on the need for a “light footprint” in Afghanistan, with concerns over

---

stirring latent Afghan xenophobia and the need to deconflict the battle space with ongoing
efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. In southern Afghanistan repeated clashes between
the Taliban and Coalition led to significant Taliban loses. The Taliban shifted into
insurgency mode targeting international organizations (see above), assistance projects,
national security forces, selective assassinations of opinion leaders and, increasingly in 2005-
06, suicide bombings. Coalition forces in the south--operating within “light footprint” force
levels, a very slow buildup of the Afghan National Army, and focus on international
“terrorists—oscillated between “kinetic” operations (sweeps, decapitation strikes, use of air
mobility) and efforts to engage the local population. The long-term success of these
operations is still unclear.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Local Populace}

\textit{Definition of Security:} Even more than NGOs, local people can have wildly variant views
of what constitutes “security.” Perspectives depend, among others, on tribal, ethnic, religious
regional identities, associations with previous and former regimes, and economic interests.
Nonetheless, certain broad statements may be applicable. The local populace in a post-
conflict environment is likely to have a much more expansive view of security than other
actors. Security will not be a singular quantity but a broad measure of the “quality of life.”
As such it may include some or all subjective evaluations of crime, governance (corruption),
government/international legitimacy, economic prospects, and violence as a political tool.

With this complex background, “getting the analysis right” as a fundamental to successful

\textsuperscript{11} Author, Personal Observations, Kandahar Afghanistan, 10/03-7/05.
counter-insurgency becomes even more difficult.\textsuperscript{12} All governmental, regulatory and military measures will be seen through the impact on the daily lives of the population and identifying “objective” metrics for these impacts is an immense challenge. An insurgency or armed group will have, at least in the initial stages, multiple avenues of attack, stretching the government and supporters, inducing instability and destroying legitimacy.

\textit{Security Requirements:} The ability or inability of the government (or the UN or international military forces) to ensure safe passage on the roads, control corruption, and/or address long-term, underlying social inequities will have a direct impact on the domestic legitimacy of the national government.\textsuperscript{13} Even more important is to identify the priorities that various groups place on all the different aspects of security: freedom of movement; suppression of illegal roadblocks and extortion; non-corrupt police/judiciary; ethnic/tribal/religious-neutral military; responsive local government; non-criminalized economy (replacing narcotics, smuggling, banditry, blood diamonds, etc.); and ending the arbitrary use and abuse of power/violence. Given the difficulty in eliciting honest answers in what are often traditional and deeply traumatized societies, the temptation will be to use variables amenable to quantification (whether they measure the critical priorities or not).

\textit{Afghanistan observations: } When asked what they most want to see, Afghans consistently cite the need for greater security. However idiosyncratic their personal views might be, they want to be free from: armed gangs (some of whom are the police, some outright bandits) who continue to shake them down on the roads at night; government run as a tribal/ethnic zero-


\textsuperscript{13} Corruption in the broader sense of an abuse of power, not simply pecuniary gain.
sum game, and an uncertain future for their children.\(^{14}\) The degree to which the Karzai government, the international community and the U.S. have not made sufficient progress on these, the Afghan project will remain unfinished. Although the re-emergent Taliban have been unable to derail the political process laid out under the Bonn Accords, their continued actions both feed and reinforce the perception of instability and lack of security in the largely Pashtun south and east.\(^{15}\)

**IMPLICATIONS**

Other examples could be cited for each of the actors mentioned above, while there are other important actors that we have passed over for the moment (government officials, businessmen, neighboring states, etc). Nonetheless, as can be seen above, the expectations and perceived requirements of the actors differ enormously. “Security” then it is not a unitary or easily measurable quantity. For contingency planners and decision makers, it becomes difficult to create and implement a coherent, coordinated security policy out of such a welter of ideas and priorities. Complicating the problem is devising measures of effectiveness that will work across the spectrum. Two examples will suffice. Measuring the level of insurgency by the number of attacks on international troops may show a marked decline while the insurgents are waging an effective campaign of assassination and


intimidation against local elites and decision-makers – who is winning that exchange?
Similarly, counting the number of jails and courthouses built does little to measure abuse of
power and corruption of the police and judges who man the buildings. Nonetheless, Jones et
al, have provided a useful matrix that identifies many of the key variables (Table 1, p. 18)
and also provides a set of output variables for measuring effectiveness. In an ideal world,
there would be sufficient resources to approach all these tasks simultaneously and
effectively. Inevitably, however, there will not be enough money, personnel, capacity or,
possibly, commitment to cover all the areas. Wise choices with limited available resources
will become even more important as both military and civilian branches of the U.S.
government continue to be confronted by the need to bring stability and security in complex,
vioence-wracked, institutionally-challenged parts of the world.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Government approach in post-conflict environments in recent decades has been too
often marked by last minute improvisation, misaligned efforts and/or strategic inattention
with mistakes made in one intervention repeated in later crises. Given the strong possibility
of recurrent USG involvement in similar future circumstances, it is important to work toward
greater inter and intra-agency coordination, based on certain shared assumptions and
methodologies. The greater the level of damage (physical, societal, political) to the nation
where intervention occurs and the higher the strategic importance of the mission, the more
critical it is that initial assumptions and planning accurately map the situation on the ground.
Institutional reorganization and increased opportunities to work together will certainly be useful in moving the U.S. government to greater interagency coordination. In the long run, however, success in post-conflict environments will occur when both civilian and military leaders, implementers and planners have a common framework and at least the rudiments of a common language to organize, analyze and describe the situations we will face (just bringing people to the table is not enough).

Towards that goal and as an element in the planning and implementation of U.S. interventions in post-conflict/failed states, we need a finer grained understanding of the core concepts which will be the building blocks: in the case above, security. Security is vital to success and cannot be treated as something someone else will do, that will take care of itself or an after-thought to more immediate issues. Although not discussed in this paper, the interaction between security and legitimacy is active and profound. The degree to which the intervenors get security right will have a fundamental impact on the legitimacy (both internally and externally) of the mission. Without sustained and constantly refreshed legitimacy, it is almost certain that the mission will fail. As a complex, multi-faceted and evolving phenomena, security must be defined through the views of all relevant actors and the costs and benefits of courses of action weighed against national/operational goals in accord with all elements of national power. That of course is no guarantee that future interventions will be easy or will automatically succeed. It may however, provide a framework for more consistent, measured decision-making across all U.S. government agencies and departments.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Whether planners have months to work up contingencies or hours to respond to a crisis, it is fundamental that they understand the nature of the situation for which they are preparing, just as Clausewitz insists is imperative at the commencement of any war.\(^{16}\) What follows are some tentative suggestions for operational-level planners and commanders trying to devise and implement security policies in a post-conflict environment.

*Understand the context* – There is no substitute for expertise. A combatant commander or special envoy may not have personal knowledge but he/she must have it available and listen to it. This is more than simply intelligence gathering or linguistic competence and requires true interagency understanding and leadership. Example: Conflicts may have multiple causes and antecedents. Tribal/ethnic conflicts, control of scarce resources, business (legitimate or otherwise) disputes and sectarian differences can all occur in a single limited area. The extent to which the actors resort to violence or call upon outside actors for assistance may influence whether these are labeled “insurgent activities,” “local friction,” or “banditry.” Radically different and possibly contradictory approaches may well be developed depending on where the analysis leads.

*Review the tradeoffs* – There will never be enough troops, development experts or money to do everything at once. Selecting one course of action may have negative impact on other priorities. Example: “Hard knock” entry into a village may be an appropriate counter-

terrorist measure, but by offending cultural norms can have a significant impact on counter-insurgency efforts: “winning hearts and minds.” It may still be the course of action chosen but the leadership needs to clearly weight the relative costs and benefits.

_Catch Mistakes early_ -- Misjudgments made in the initial stages of an intervention, just as in the deployment phase of a major campaign, can have serious, ongoing consequences for both military and civilian leaders.¹⁷ Example: mistaking the inception of an insurgency for a simple rise in lawlessness, incitement of ethnic genocide for political posturing or the calculated murder of an international aid worker as a one-off event. There is no way to get everything right from the beginning and flexibility must be an integral part of the planning process. Nonetheless, a pervasive and prolonged sense of insecurity will have a corrosive effect on any incipient political process or reestablishment of stability.

_Ask about the police (and keep asking)_ – In many post-conflict and failed state situations, the collapse or disappearance of the police and justice system has presented fundamental problems of public order.¹⁸ In such situations, building an effective and representative police force and functioning, fair justice system is one of the imperative tasks.¹⁹ Yet, what are the tools to achieve this? U.S. military forces are not trained as policemen and there are legal issues with military involvement in training and equipping of police. Deployment of civilian police trainers can be slow and insufficient. In order to avoid the ad hoc nature of earlier CIVPOL deployments, there have been calls for the formation of an international rapid

---

reaction force modeled on para-military forces such as the Italian *carabinieri* or a standing corps of U.S. law enforcement professionals. The wisdom of creating such a force is beyond the bounds of this paper but it may well be the case that the U.S. government needs to review what range of operations military units can be undertaken in the absence of alternatives. The combatant commander/special envoy will need to carefully weigh the length of time until non-corrupt and competent police and courts are in place, what the impacts will be, and what will fill the interim void: use of local militias or armed groups is an option that has its own set of consequences.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Objectives</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Military/Other</th>
<th>Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Establish basic law and order</td>
<td>• Establish security against major threats to the state</td>
<td>• Establish rule of law</td>
<td>• Eliminate corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protect population</td>
<td>• Demobilize, disrupt, and deter militia and other paramilitary</td>
<td>• Provide oversight and accountability for police and other security forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Control border, ports of entry</td>
<td>organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protect vital infrastructure</td>
<td>• Ensure freedom of movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish rule of law</td>
<td>• Eliminate corruption</td>
<td>• Provide oversight and accountability for police and other security forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demobilize, disrupt, and deter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• militia and other paramilitary organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure freedom of movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Actors (U.S.)</td>
<td>Lead actor:</td>
<td>Lead actor:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State Department (especially International Narcotics and Law</td>
<td>• Defense Department (CJTF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enforcement, INL)</td>
<td>Supporting actors:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting actors:</td>
<td>• Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Justice Department</td>
<td>• State Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defense Department</td>
<td>• Foreign governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF)</td>
<td>• NGOs and international organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USAID</td>
<td>• Private contractors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Private contractors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Actors</td>
<td>Lead actors:</td>
<td>Support actors:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State Department</td>
<td>• USAID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Justice Department</td>
<td>• Defense Department (CJTF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign governments</td>
<td>• Foreign governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NGOs and international organizations</td>
<td>• NGOs and international organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Private contractors</td>
<td>• Private contractors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input Metrics</td>
<td>Police assistance and expenditures</td>
<td>Military assistance and expenditures</td>
<td>Justice assistance and expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International civilian and military police and advisors</td>
<td>• International troops and advisors</td>
<td>• International justice advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lethal and nonlethal equipment</td>
<td>• Lethal and nonlethal equipment</td>
<td>• Equipment, such as computers and law books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Intelligence assistance and expenditures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Intelligence advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


