### Report Details

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### Abstract

In the global "war of ideas" currently being fought, defense support to public diplomacy, (DSPD), an enabling element of strategic communications, is a means that can contribute to the notion of countering ideological support to terrorism (CIST) by reinforcing U.S. strategic communication objectives in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy and regional engagement initiatives. This is difficult at best to implement at the strategic level, especially in the media environment and internet age. At the operational level, there is a lack of doctrine, policy, existence of "best practices" or indeed agreement on how defense support to public diplomacy should be done. This paper examines recent operational cases where military operations supported public diplomacy objectives to achieve U.S. desired outcomes. It will analyze key success factors for consideration by operational level commanders, and offer recommendations on supporting public diplomacy as an important enabling military capability.
OPERATIONALIZING DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:  _J.M. Gannon_

23 October 2006
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INTRODUCTION

In the global "war of ideas" currently being fought, defense support to public diplomacy\(^1\), (DSPD), an enabling element of strategic communications, is a means that can contribute to the notion of countering ideological support to terrorism (CIST) by reinforcing U.S. strategic communication objectives in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy and regional engagement initiatives. This is difficult at best to implement at the strategic level, especially in the media environment and internet intensive age we live in. At the operational level, there is a lack of doctrine, policy, existence of "best practices" or indeed, agreement on how defense support to public diplomacy should be done. The defense role in CIST involves five elements; security, information operations (with DSPD being a related activity), humanitarian support, military to military contacts, and conduct of operations.\(^2\) It likely requires significant interagency cooperation and unity of effort, and is dependent upon policy, guidance and credible message "themes" from the national political leaders to have any degree of success. The challenge with implementing defense support to public diplomacy is that it is currently a vaguely defined construct, not widely understood or appreciated within the Department of Defense; and that U.S. strategic communication across the U.S. government at the present lacks effectiveness in Muslim and Arab countries. Yet U.S. public diplomacy, with DOD support, is critical to America's and coalition success in enabling regional stability and fighting insurgencies. A significant number of studies and literature suggest that U.S. strategic communication requires overhaul of national level direction and resources, that there have been some false starts within the past four to six years, but policy and organization are just now being implemented within the Administration, Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD). With an understanding of
the current strategic level efforts and initiatives in progress, the scope of this paper is analysis and recommendations for operational art; considerations for the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC), Component and Joint Task Force (JTF) for implementing defense support to public diplomacy applicable to military operations. This report is not intended to directly address existing Information Operations (IO) elements focused on offensive operations, (those actions aimed at influencing an enemy's decision process), but rather to focus on an the portions of the population in which an insurgency exists. Whereas IO activities target the violent extremists and committed supporters who cannot be influenced; public diplomacy should address the two other general groups of the population living amidst an insurgency, 1) those that are sympathetic to the extremists but unwilling to actively support them, and 2) those who might be convinced to support a path of peace, security and stability, the so-called "moderate Muslims" which notionally comprise the majority of the "Islamic World." Ultimately the battle of ideology should be won through telling the truth, credibly in the minds of the "Muslim world," that conveys the advantages of the principles of democracy over extremist ideology.

BACKGROUND

Winning the War of Ideas.³ Since 9/11, the imperative for improvement to U.S. strategic communications efforts is documented in a number of studies initiated by Congress, DOS and DOD. The U.S. government has implemented several policies, programs and other initiatives in response to hatred of U.S. policies, negative U.S. "image problems," and other symptoms attributed to the recognized decline of public diplomacy.⁴ Although the notion of public diplomacy itself has its critics,⁵ in the context of this paper, PD is held up as those
positive aspects of "engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences in ways that support U.S. strategic interests."

The September 2004 report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) on Strategic Communication was directed as part of a program which studied transition to and from hostilities. The report emphasized the need for a strategy to prevent crisis and to "win the global battle of ideas," and made nine major recommendations. It emphasized the need for unifying national policies, understanding the cultures and the effects of US policy and messages, revitalizing strategic communication, and interagency cooperation and government/private sector cooperation on a scale not seen since post-WWII in order to bring all elements of national power to bear on the current war of ideas. The DSB Task Force report is cited in numerous other studies, literature and reports that reinforce its recommendations.

**U.S. Government Initiatives.** The White House established the Office of Global Communications (OGC) in January 2003 to facilitate coordination of the United States’ global public diplomacy efforts, but according to the GAO and other literature, it has not fulfilled its intended purpose. Public diplomacy efforts were previously managed by the former U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which developed country-by-country plans, communication strategies and themes in support of U.S. foreign policy. The USIA was disestablished in 1999, presumably as it was viewed as a Cold-War legacy, and elements of its former mission were absorbed into DOS. The downfall was that the detailed planning and coordination was decentralized from an overall U.S. policy perspective, and programs had to be absorbed into the Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) at embassies, but without the resources and expertise available prior to 1999. In September 2004, the Department of State created a new Undersecretary of Planning Policy and Resources for Public Diplomacy...
and Public Affairs to reinvigorate U.S. public diplomacy efforts. This action was one of the recommendations in a Report to Congress by Edward P. Djerejian, "Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World." Within this new office, the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, has the challenge of implementing three broad strategic objectives involving communicating the U.S. vision of freedom and hope, marginalizing violent extremist ideology, and fostering a sense of common values and interests throughout the world. Presumably in response to the Djerejian report, the White House initiated a Muslim Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee, and a Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee which focus on implementing many of the themes and recommendations of that report and seek to address the demands for national level policy and guidance. There remains difficulty on interagency coordination because of a lack of a national communications strategy.

**Failed Programs.** Over the past several years, some programs have backfired, such as the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), started in late 2001 and effectively disbanded in 2002, which was charged with planting what amounted to positively focused propaganda stories in the Iraqi press. Additionally, the State Department's "Shared Values Initiative" was an attempt to employ practices from the advertising industry to help promote the U.S. image and improve the way the U.S. messages, particularly in regards to how Muslim Americans were portrayed in the Muslim world. Charlotte Beers was brought in to head the Shared Values Initiative (SVI) project, which lasted from October 2001 to March 2003. The SVI has generally been labeled as a failure, although there are some valid lessons
learned that can be applied at the operational level when implementing defense support to public diplomacy.

In September 2006, the Secretary of Defense published the "QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication," aimed at "improving the integration of information as a vital element of national power..." The roadmap establishes a plan of action and milestones within DoD to institutionalize strategic communication processes, policy and organization. The Strategic Communication Roadmap includes objectives that will develop responsibilities and doctrine for strategic communication, including Defense Support to Public Diplomacy as one of the supporting capabilities. According to the POA&M, specific policy on Military Diplomacy and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy is due in November 2006, thus was in staffing at the time of this writing.

In summary, there has been growing consensus that the War on Terrorism will not be won exclusively through military means, but rather by battling the ideology of violent extremism using all elements of national power. The challenges in the battle include achieving agreement on defining effective public diplomacy, an overall lack of strategic guidance, the complexity of mass communications in this era, and hesitancy to invest significant resources in new programs because of the failures of recent initiatives that backfired on U.S. credibility. The U.S. government has been taking steps to address the organizational, resource and policy deficiencies needed to better promote and communicate America's interests. These are cumulatively positive steps, but it is hard to win a war of ideas at the national level, much less at the operational level if ideas are not coordinated and reinforcing to foreign populations.
DISCUSSION

The notion of defense support to public diplomacy is first about communication to the correct audiences, and understanding of the operating environment. While there is no single document defining DSPD at the operational level, much of the literature discusses strategic communications, information operations, Theater Security Cooperation Programs, and humanitarian operations. Key success factors found in related literature and operational examples involve gaining thorough "cultural intelligence" about the operating environment and adapting operations to the culture. The factors include "building capacity" and creating economic incentives that address underlying grievances. Several studies discuss the need to reinforce credible themes about U.S. and Western values, and using media appropriately to counter misinformation about U.S. agendas; appropriate planning - informed by proper training and education. Common in most recommendations is stressing an interagency cooperation to leverage the full support of diplomatic, information and economic support. Finally, current studies emphasize proper conduct of operations - where the actions of U.S. or other coalition forces must uphold the principles of democracy; and employing a proportionate use of force when force is required.

Operationalizing defense support to public diplomacy should apply the principles of operational art to planning. The analysis of centers of gravity and critical factors applicable to counterinsurgency operations (COIN) constitute the overarching analysis to application of defense support to public diplomacy activities. Understanding of the ideological factors underlying the insurgency for example, will highlight critical vulnerabilities in the ideology that can be addressed through diplomatic and economic means. Unlike purely conventional operations, the factor of time may be much longer to realize desired effects, so patience,
endurance and above all U.S. public support are critical requirements. The use of "proportionate force" should be emphasized to break the cycle of extremist response to U.S. presence, as Dr David Kilcullen discusses. Much of the "force" may be in the form of "soft-power" against support for an ideology, which can in some cases, such as humanitarian operations to be discussed, be more effective than kinetic force. The traditional principles of war must be carefully applied, as the objective of defense support to public diplomacy is to change the perception of individuals in order to erode or eliminate support for violent extremist ideology.

**Distinguishing Between Information Operations and Strategic Communications.**

Significant efforts are needed by the US Government in order to change, much less win, the hearts and minds of populations where terrorists and insurgents have ideological sympathy. The majority of the literature to date relevant to implementing the battle for the war of ideas at the operational level of warfare focuses on Information Operations (IO), public affairs and theater security cooperation programs. However there is little if any guidance or literature that ties the notion of defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) to countering ideological support to terrorism, except the fact that DSPD is listed as an enabling element within strategic communications, and is a "related activity" of information operations.

Establishing a strategy for countering ideology must recognize that there are basically three major objective populations to which U.S. messages must be communicated. The first group is violent extremists and those who support, or are sympathetic to their cause and cannot be changed. This is the group at which Information Operations are directed, mainly during shaping and combat operations. Information Operations are inherently offensive in
nature, and are directed against an adversary's decision process, emphasis on the word adversary. In contrast, influencing non-adversary foreign audiences is the objective of effective strategic communications and public diplomacy; that is, to those segments of the population that includes both sympathetic groups and individuals who may passively support or enable violent extremists, and those who may share sympathy but are unwilling to translate their actions into support or hospitality to extremists. The second audience is where the operational commander should focus efforts related to public diplomacy - to erode the base in which the insurgent ideology exists. Communication with such populations should not use military principles employed against an adversary, yet much of the literature and military jargon tends to group all such activity along the "IO" line of operation. Joint Publication 3-13 lists core functions of IO include PSYOPS, Military Deception, OPSEC, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations. One would hope that the U.S. military would not conduct any of these types operations against friendly population, or against a population which the U.S. requires support. The U.S. should not in any way convey IO offensive principles to friendly or non-adversarial audiences, or risk credibility problems and generating (additional) anti-U.S. sentiment. Thus, there is a need for military planners to understand principles of strategic communication, and nested within are actions that support public diplomacy.

**Challenges.** Public diplomacy, generally defined as “promoting the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad,” is functionally the responsibility of the U.S.
Department of State (DOS). Effective military support to public diplomacy will require significant interagency support and coordination at the operational level.

The current U.S. image problem in Muslim countries,²⁰ lack of national U.S. public diplomacy themes,²¹ and the lack of current guidance related to defense support to public diplomacy are challenges faced by the military when planning or operating in predominantly Muslim countries in support of the Global War on Terror.²² The difficulty for operational planners is identifying the cultural and ideological factors that shape effective military strategies, and our ability to convey the right messages to the right audiences to achieve our objectives. Evidence of the impacts of anti-U.S. sentiment and perception of U.S. policy is our current experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there are many other countries where the U.S. military is or could be engaged in the GWOT, in what may be called "Phase 0" operations that require effective, well planned and coordinated engagement strategies.

**Academic Projects and Findings.** The Defense Science Board Task Force report on Strategic Communications and the GAO reports on public diplomacy mentioned earlier offer strategic level recommendations that can inform operational level implementation. Djerejian's 2003 report on "Changing Minds, Winning Peace" provides a comprehensive analysis of the ideology and culture of the Muslim world that the U.S. seeks to positively influence. His report makes strategic recommendations for the U.S. government, many of which are being implemented. It stresses public diplomacy and related programs, most of which are directed at the U.S. State Department. As a prevailing theme among the body of research work on public diplomacy, the key takeaways emphasize increased interagency cooperation; in this report he emphasizes close ties between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD.²³ USAID has recently created the Office of
Military Affairs (OMA)\textsuperscript{24} and is in the process of recruiting and staffing towards the recommendations in Djerejian's report. This has promise to be a critical enabler of much needed interagency coordination. The 2004 Brookings Project on U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World by Hady Amr offers in depth insights on Arab culture, understanding effective communications and emphasizes values based policies.\textsuperscript{25} Amr's study examines six authoritative studies in the area of public diplomacy and Muslim dialog and understanding, reinforcing earlier statements about the importance of cultural intelligence and understanding of the operating environment. As in the other reports mentioned here, Amr also concludes that public diplomacy and significant interagency coordination are critical success factors. Many of Amr's recommendations are being implemented at DOS and are recognized in the DSB Task Force and GAO reports.

Lieutenant Colonel David Baker in his paper "Possibilities for Military Support to Public Diplomacy" discusses the use of IO and especially PSYOPS in their ability to influence foreign audiences.\textsuperscript{26} He discusses the "related activities of civil-military operations and public affairs" in the context of theater security cooperation activities. He also reviews key theater security cooperation activities that can support public diplomacy objectives, including civil-military operations, humanitarian assistance, and various military-to-military contact programs and training exchanges. The findings appear to lean heavily on IO aspects, and "admits that PSYOPS and Public Affairs are not always compatible," which understates some opinion that PSYSOPS and PA are not at all compatible, but themes should be coordinated and mutually vetted to avoid unintended consequences. Baker cites authoritative limitations in employing PSYOPS, in that DoDD S-3321.1 requires themes to be vetted by the U.S. Ambassador of the country where it is to be employed. There is a
danger to U.S. credibility when IO effects are not carefully and deliberately coordinated with public affairs and public diplomacy objectives. The operational approach to DSPD must very carefully consider the relationship between IO functions and public diplomacy: IO often requires intentionally misleading an adversary, public diplomacy should be centered on winning the battle for ideas with the truth, which is to emphasize the principles of democracy. As Senator Lugar stated in a hearing before the 2003 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "successful public diplomacy is not about manipulating people into liking us against their interests. Rather, it is about clearly and honestly explaining the views of the United States, by displaying the humanity and generosity of our people, underscoring issues of commonality, and expanding opportunities for interaction between Americans and foreign peoples." By focusing on IO aspects such as PSYOPS, the U.S. military gets trapped into a counter-propaganda campaign, one not likely to succeed now in the internet age. Like the other literature, his recommendations stress the need for strong interagency cooperation.

**Relevant Operational Level Cases.** A review of selected literature, recent operations and exercises provides insight on ways to "operationalize" defense support to public diplomacy that can be linked to countering ideological support to terrorism. USEUCOM has several effective theater security cooperation programs aimed at promoting stability and peace by building capacity in undeveloped countries, through information programs that counter negative underlying perceptions among key anti-U.S. audiences. Several websites aimed at both Eastern European and African states in EUCOM's area reinforce embassy public diplomacy efforts. Principle topics on websites and magazines, such as the *Southeast European Times* stress principles of democracy, such as the rule of law, unbiased media, civilian control of the government and strong institutions. The article
identifies the extremist ideology as the enemy center of gravity, which is where EUCOM's IO and public diplomacy efforts are focused. Again, they list a critical success factor in the battle against extremist ideology being interagency cooperation - especially in coordinating themes and messages among U.S. forces in the EUCOM AOR.

US Pacific Command (USPACOM) has a Public Diplomacy coordinator within the Political Advisor Section. Additionally, PACOM has a robust "Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance" (COE DMHA) department that uniquely provides training, coordination and planning support involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The organization provides a model and "best practices" for a theater operational level organization constructed to meet a gap in capabilities not found in other regional combatant commands.

**Humanitarian Assistance Missions.** In contrast to negative perceptions cultivating in Iraq and Afghanistan, two major humanitarian assistance operations demonstrated success in changing perceptions of America and the U.S. military in Muslim countries. The December 2004 tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and the October 2005 earthquake relief efforts in NorthWest Pakistan both emphasized defense support to public diplomacy concepts, albeit under other names, provide useful case studies to examine success factors and opportunities to improve other military public diplomacy operations.

**USCENTCOM Earthquake Disaster Relief.** The 10 October 2005 earthquake near Muzaffarabad, Pakistan killed 73,000, injured over 69,000 and left half a million people homeless just prior to the onset of the Himalayan winter in Northern Pakistan. It was the largest disaster the country experienced. USCENTCOM immediately deployed a disaster relief task force, organized under an Expeditionary Strike Group headquarters, with a large
coalition helicopter task force, Navy SeaBee (engineer) battalion, an Army MASH hospital, and III MEF sourced field medical unit reinforced with other logistics capabilities. The military aerial lift capability, expeditionary engineers, command and control and medical capability was crucial to early life-saving efforts, and later in sustained life support to remote and isolated communities in the mountains. Helicopters moved over 20,000 passengers, lifted over 14,700 tons of humanitarian supplies to remote mountain areas. The U.S. and Australian military medical efforts treated over 34,000 patients including 500 life saving surgeries.

Success factors included the speed and capacity of response, interagency, international and coalition relationships, and ability to operate in an austere environment through the winter characterized the operation.\textsuperscript{31} Besides the humanitarian nature of the operation, there was an integrated and overarching communications strategy specifically to reinforce the mutual relationship between the U.S. Government and the Government of Pakistan. The guidance from the Commander, Combined Forces Afghanistan (CFC-A) LTG Karl Eikenberry was to achieve two strategic effects, a physical effect (HA support) and a public diplomacy effect, to "demonstrate U.S. willingness and ability to aid Pakistan under tragic circumstances, to strengthen U.S.-Pakistan relationships... if executed properly, we not only do the right thing by alleviating human suffering, but also to demonstrate our commitment to a strategic partner."\textsuperscript{32} LTG Eikenberry later commented on the importance of vocabulary and understanding differences between IO and Public Diplomacy, using what he called "soft IO" to amplify themes and messages. His guidance was "don't assume presence and contributions will be known - developing an integrated communications strategy is key to support of the public diplomacy effort and winning the hearts and minds
campaign. Further, General Abizaid's remarks on a command visit on 30 October 2005 to Islamabad was "What you are doing here is just as important as what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan in the global war on terror. Polls taken by the Pew and AC Nielsen regarding public sentiment for the U.S., prior to and during the six month evolution had shown that public perception about the U.S. had changed from an initial 23% pro-U.S. to a 46% pro-U.S. climate following relief efforts. Indeed, often dialog was focused on correcting outright mis-information that had been spread about U.S. values and other agendas related to democracy and the West. In Bret Stephen's Wall Street Journal article "Chinook Diplomacy," he praises the effects of the U.S. efforts on the "hearts and minds" of the Pakistani people affected by the earthquake, and notes that DoD is often the biggest contributor of foreign aid of any department in the government. Key success factors prior to deployment were gaining cultural intelligence and training the troops in the customs, courtesies and other regional factors, and tailored capabilities to account for local custom. For example, the 3rd Medical Battalion hospital deployed extra female doctors, nurses and corpsmen out of cultural sensitivity for treating female patients in the tribal areas. Use of military translators and hiring local translators to help with patients was essential for success. All forces under CDAC-PAK were directed to maintain a humanitarian posture, therefore no body armor or helmets were authorized as that posture could have been used as propaganda against the U.S. presence. Upon news of the U.S. redeployment, many the locals had begged the U.S. hospitals to stay, beyond the deployment duration anticipated in earlier deployment orders. This was seen as an indicator of the effectiveness of the public diplomacy mission.
Notably, despite the high threat in the area from extremist groups, there were no security incidents against coalition military units providing relief. This can mainly be attributed to Pakistani security, but also to the popular support of the people in the region. Any attacks would have been counterproductive to the cause of extremist accusing the U.S. of anti-Islamic bias.

Among the lessons learned was the criticality of interagency and coalition operations in humanitarian relief. "The strategic communications program was aligned with U.S. strategic goals for Pakistan and played a critical role in generating public support for the U.S. and military relief and reconstruction effort." Another key lesson was the need for U.S. Government efforts to be nested and reinforcing, namely between USAID and U.S. military operations, and among other implementing partners (particularly American funded NGOs) in such a way that emphasizes the commitment of U.S. economic power. The speed of delivery and the types, quantity and quality of donations should clearly communicate U.S. economic generosity, and maximize our ability to build the capacity of institutions towards security and stability. Portraying a unity of effort demonstrates resolve and reinforces themes about U.S. objectives.

**Tsunami Disaster Relief in Indonesia.** Following the December 2004 Tsunami that devastated the coasts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand the U.S. also rapidly deployed a large humanitarian relief task force to provide immediate humanitarian relief to a largely Muslim populated region. Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE was also successful in changing Muslim perceptions about the West, and our commitment to supporting these governments. Key success factors included cultural intelligence preparation, interagency unity of effort rather than creating a perception of the U.S. military "taking charge" of
operations. Like the USCENTCOM commander's goals, USPACOM guidance was also to portray positive U.S. themes to partners in the region, with Indonesia having the largest Muslim population in the world. Diplomacy was critical to operations in Indonesia, where relations had been tenuous after ceasing certain TSCP programs following human rights issues in East Timor in 1999. The Tsunami relief operation clearly warranted reestablishing military-to-military relationships with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Takeaways from the operation were similar to others, to coordinate themes, and to emphasize interagency operations, some reports held UNIFIED ASSISTANCE up as a model of interagency cooperation. Key successes were cultural planning and use of military and locally hired translators. According to BGen Frank Panter, commander of the Combined Support Group Sri Lanka (CSG-SL), more work needs to be done in mutual understanding between USAID and the military in building relationships and understanding each other's capabilities to best support U.S. interests.

In an article by the Joint Information Operations Center, Richard Josten quotes international political analyst John W. Rendon noting, "The U.S. Military operation for Tsunami relief is the only strategic victory in the GWOT in four years." The article notes that "the relief effort itself was effective strategic communication, both in message and demonstrated action done on very short notice with little preliminary coordination among the government agencies." Josten speculates what "we could accomplish on a global scale with dedicated effort, earlier planning, sustained coordination among DoD, DOS, the interagency and coalition partners."

The military response to both the Indonesia Tsunami and Pakistan Earthquake relief were guided by Defense Security Cooperation Guidance that encourages "activities that
support U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts by engaging key foreign audiences to advance U.S. interests\textsuperscript{45} and served to undermine claims that the "War on Terror" is equal to a War on Islam.\textsuperscript{46}

**Other Implications in the Battle of Ideas.** Two notable sources describe a way of characterizing the global environment and the impact of violent radical Islamic ideologies. Both offer recommendations for the U.S. Government along similar themes. Comprehensive summaries of the books are beyond the scope of this paper, but their recommendations are informative for implementing aspects of how the military can support public diplomacy initiatives. In Thomas Barnett's *The Pentagon's New Map,* he argues for bifurcation of DoD efforts: creation of two sets of defense capabilities - one warfighting focused force to contend with large traditional military threats, which he calls the "Leviathan force;" and another to deal with asymmetric threats from within a large part of the world that either rejects globalization or was left out of globalization that he calls the "non-integrating gap." Such a "peacekeeping-oriented Sys Admin force" he argues is necessary to succeed in the range of operations that defense planners had characterized as the "lesser included" problems, where the assumption had been that the large Leviathan force designed to handle the Soviet threat could therefore handle anything smaller. Barnett argues that specialized expertise and capabilities are needed to interact with allies and "assure globalization's smooth functioning."\textsuperscript{47} Barnett argues for "interagency" cooperation within federal agencies as being as if not more important than military "jointness" among service branches, with an emphasis on State Department capabilities to promote the process of "shrinking-the-gap" (those countries not integrated into globalization).
In "The Battle for Peace," retired General Anthony Zinni also argues for more interagency efforts and coordination, and creation of something like an "America's World Service Corps," with capabilities similar to what military humanitarian task forces do in disaster relief or in security and stabilization missions, that is better prepared to rapidly deploy and seamlessly operate with non-governmental organizations and coalition governments. In his chapter on strategy, he strongly advocates for permanently established, robust joint interagency task forces/coordination groups (JIATF/CGs) at the regional combatant commands for managing and implementing programs aimed at preventing crises. Among the JIATF/CG tasks would include coordinating nonmilitary aspects of development programs, humanitarian aid and reconstruction.48

A key point that both authors stress is that to be successful in the current environment, the military either needs to transform forces or divest (or both) to meet the challenges of global threats today. Both books emphasize the importance of fully understanding our environment, the culture and the underlying conditions breeding ideological radicalism. Both argue for the need for mandatory interagency coordination on a degree larger than ever known.49

CONCLUSIONS

Prevailing in the global war on terror, and countering the ideology of radical extremist adversaries requires coordination of all elements of national power focused on common objectives along common themes. Use of well coordinated and cohesive strategic communications is a critical enabling element of that strategic framework. Translated to the operational level, defense support to public diplomacy can help provide some of the ways and means that counter ideological support for terrorism. Strategic communications and
DSPD require further development and understanding within the military, and require significant interagency cooperation and planning to be effective. Operational art must employ the "soft power" of strategic communications and public diplomacy towards the mindset of the "moderate" Muslim populations to influence them into supporting stability, and to prevent them from following destructive ideology. In the short term, interagency focused, theater security cooperation programs, with strong Department of State influence have proved to be key success factors. In the long term, new doctrine, organizations and other structures may emerge that will be tailored to promoting principles of democracy and countering radical ideology that threaten peace and stability in undeveloped regions.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Assuming that the tasks listed in DoD's QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communications will be implemented, this paper offers the following operational level recommendations:

1. **DoD should task** regional combatant commands with missions and assign forces responsibility for defense support to public diplomacy activities and programs. Specific guidance on DSPD policy is due in November 2006 as part of the QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communications. While Defense Transformation in the future may be organized to achieve Zinni or Barnett's vision, the Regional Combatant Commanders and their Components have the authority to task subordinate commands having the capabilities to enable public diplomacy now. The Department of State, who has the lead for U.S. Strategic Communications, does not currently have the capacity and resources to fulfill its mandate; DoD currently has the structure and resources, not only in military power but in academic,
intelligence, scientific, logistics and bureaucratic structure to reinforce U.S. public diplomacy. DoD Directive 3000.05 mandates planning emphasis on military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and should contribute its resources to supporting strategic communications among foreign audiences. Regional combatant commands should establish a public diplomacy cell, resourced to provide policy, training and coordination with Components, other U.S. government agencies, multinational and coalition organizations.

Where appropriate, increase funding for effective theater security cooperation programs, especially ones that build relationships, improve information flows, reinforce U.S. goals and build capacity for security and economic development.

2. Throughout doctrine, training, policy and planning, carefully consider the relationships and potential effects between Information Operations and the core IO functions, including psychological operations, from the "related activities" of Civil Military Operations, Defense Support for Public Diplomacy, and Public Affairs. The goal should be to counter ideological support for terrorism with facts and truth, emphasizing the ideological benefits of the principles of democracy. Because of widespread perception that PSYOPS means lying or propaganda, PSYOPS is functionally separated from public affairs, but themes and messages must be coordinated. Stress the importance of values, access to public information, polling, create opportunities for dialog and exchange programs, and other key recommendations outlined in recent studies and analysis, including Hady Amr's paper on "How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," and Edward Djerejian's report on "Changing Minds, Winning Peace." Both emphasize the need for credibility of U.S. messages, and treating Muslim audiences with dignity and respect with regards to the forums used to
communicate. IO is associated with influencing adversaries; military efforts supporting public diplomacy are associated with all other audiences.

3. **Emphasize interagency cooperation and unity of effort.** As the richest nation in the world, when the U.S. decides to engage or support an operation in the name of promoting U.S. interests, its commitment and resolve should be noticeable and the level of support unquestioned. Activities and information among U.S. aid and military organizations should be nested and reinforcing in order to maximize our ability to build the capacity of institutions towards security and stability. Operations should be focused on high value, high payoff population areas where our efforts stand a chance of positively influencing perceptions of U.S. goodwill and reinforcing principles of democracy. Regional Combatant Commanders should establish joint interagency coordination groups/task forces as given in the recommendations of the GAO reports and Defense Science Board task force report cited earlier in this paper.

The JIATFs should explore opportunities for theater engagement beyond military aspects of theater security cooperation planning that may not be occurring, due to limitations in cross-department authorities, information or access within selected countries. The JIATFs should have regular liaison not only with the defense attaché/country teams in the embassies, but with the key planners at the component staffs, and with other regional international forums (NATO, ASEAN, UN/OCHA, etc.). They should ideally be staffed with "A-team" players from each agency.

4. **DoD continue to invest in training and education supporting public diplomacy.** Deploying troops should continue to be given cultural awareness training, but should also get periodic "U.S. principles of democracy" reinforcement to what they may have only received
in high school courses. Most often, our young Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are the first face of America that foreign audiences see. It is important that the U.S. present the best possible image when operating in environments not necessarily supportive of U.S. values and policies. Services should step up efforts to recruit and groom individuals from the "Islamic world" where the U.S. military lacks cultural specialists and linguists. Use of scholarships and officer accession programs should be aggressively pursued, much like the academic world does with talented individuals from key countries. Qualified individuals from target regions should be groomed for higher leadership positions that can have a profound influence on Muslim perceptions about U.S. culture and values.

Notes:

1 Defense Support to Public Diplomacy is defined in JP 3-13 as "those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government." JP 1-02, 17 Sep 06.

2 JCS, J-7, Special Areas Interest Brief, Military Education Coordination Committee, PowerPoint, Nov 2005, slide #7-10.


5 SourceWatch article, calls public diplomacy a euphemism for public relations as a throwback to policies in Latin America to cover actions by the CIA, and in efforts to defeat communism and the fall of the U.S.S.R. The article and others doubt the effects of "Brand USA" or other PD measures, citing anti-U.S. sentiment being caused by U.S. foreign policy. From an article in SourceWatch, the Center of Media and Democracy, /http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=SourceWatch/ (accessed 1 Oct 2006).


12 GAO, "Interagency Coordination Efforts, p.17.


16 According to the CJCS JCA Progress Report on SECDEF Action Memo Tasks, CJCS J-7 JETCD, 24 Aug 2006, CJCS may not meet this deadline. At issue is whether Strategic Communications, including DSPS is in the Joint Shaping or Joint Public Affairs Joint Capability Area (JCA). This is an unresolved issue requiring flag/SES adjudication at the JROC, and will likely delay any policy related to DSPD. /http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/jcaprogrep_jroc2.ppt#1/ (accessed 30 Sept 2006).


18 JP 3-13, p.ix.


20 Edward Djerejian Changing Minds, Winning Peace, p.15


23 Djerejian, p.9.


31 Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan, *OPERATION LIFELINE, Commanders's VIP Brief for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations*, After Action Briefing, RDML Lefever, Expeditionary Strike Group 1, San Diego, CA, July 2006.


33 LTG Eikenberry, CDAC-PAK VIP After Action Report, slide on "Strategic Significance", July 06.


37 Author's personal anecdote, as the commanding officer of the III MEF medical detachment that deployed.

38 CDAC-PAK After Action report

39 Although much of the goodwill was later un-done by both the Denmark newspaper cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad followed by ensuing riots; and an alleged cross border missile strike on a "high value target" that killed 18 civilians in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, in a town roughly 30 miles from our field hospital.

40 CDAC-PAK After Action report, p. 70.

42 Senate, Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 109th Congress, First Session, 10 Feb 2005. p.32

43 BGGen Frank Panter - personal e-mail to author on 26 Sept 2006. BGGen Panter was the Commander, Combined Support Group Sri Lanka in support of the Tsunami Disaster Relief mission from December 2004 to March 2006.


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U.S. Chief of Mission Indonesia, "Mission Performance Plan for FY07," Jakarta, Indonesia, April 2006. Taken from NWC 2-06. (secret)

