JAPAN AS A PARADIGM FOR U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

by

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The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States were the impetus for change within the U.S. homeland security establishment. Despite these changes, deficiencies still exist. In addition to these deficiencies, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is in full swing and the United States is engaged around the world. These factors provide valid reasons for the United States to research other countries' homeland security paradigms to provide a contrast in methods of combating terrorism. This thesis investigates the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. reactions in response to these attacks. As a country that has combatted terrorism in the past, Japan’s experiences with the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and Aum Shinrikyo, indigenous terrorist groups, are elucidated. The U.S. responses to 9/11 are compared to Japan’s responses to the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo and 9/11. These comparisons are analyzed and used to describe the Japanese homeland security paradigm. This paradigm is applied to the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism to identify aspects of U.S. strategy that should be improved by implementing the Japanese homeland security paradigm. This thesis was written in the hope that the United States can learn from another country’s successes and failures in combating terrorism.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered through terrorist attacks that used airliners as weapons to destroy the World Trade Center towers and severely damaged the Pentagon. This event launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) that is still being waged as this thesis is being written. While the 9/11 attacks on the United States were horrible, it is not the only country in the world to experience terrorist attacks. In Asia, several countries have suffered terrorist attacks. Jemaah Islamiah (JI) killed 202 people in its 2002 attack in Bali, Indonesia and killed another 26 people in the 2005 Bali bombings.\(^1\) Terrorists killed at least 174 people in 2006 by a series of seven bombings in Mumbai, India. These are just the latest terrorist attacks that India has faced.\(^2\) Abu Sayyaf terrorists bombed a ferry in 2004 that killed 100 or more passengers in the Philippines.\(^3\) Japan has suffered since the 1960s from attacks by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and Aum Shinrikyo.

With the GWOT currently in full swing, the deficiencies that still exist in the U.S. homeland security systems merit an objective review. In this situation, it may be instructive to analyze other countries’ experiences with combating terrorism. Despite cultural differences, the Japanese homeland security paradigm presents an opportunity for comparison and contrast vis-à-vis the American model. Like the United States, Japan is a democracy and a global economic power. Similarly, Japan has experienced terrorist attacks both domestically and internationally. Even though the leaders of Japan have been constrained by their constitution in pursuing a global war against terrorism, they were able to use international police cooperation and economic aid as instruments of national power in their battle against terrorism.\(^4\) In addition to international police

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cooperation and economic aid, Japan’s domestic policing policies are also significant.\textsuperscript{5} The United States recognizes the importance of these instruments in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. International police cooperation, economic aid and domestic policing are key components of both U.S. and Japanese policy and merit applying the Japanese homeland security paradigm to the United States.

This thesis will review the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the terrorist threat that was posed by the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo to Japan. The responses by both countries to these terrorists will be compared and the Japanese homeland security paradigm will be elucidated. This paradigm will be applied to the United States in the hope that it can learn from another country’s successes and failures in combating terrorism.

B. ORGANIZATION

This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II evaluates the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Included in this assessment is an analysis of the U.S. perspective on Asia’s role in terrorism pre-9/11 and post-9/11. Following this analysis, pre-9/11 terrorism against the United States and the missed opportunities in preventing it are investigated. These missed opportunities are compared to the 9/11 missed opportunities after reviewing the background of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the missed opportunities in preventing it. Based off of pre-9/11 and 9/11 terrorist attacks, the future terrorist threats that the United States may face is elucidated. Chapter II provides the background against which Japan’s experiences are compared.

Chapter III provides an examination of two terrorist groups that originated in Japan, the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and Aum Shinrikyo, and investigates Japan’s historical experiences with terrorism. The activities of each terrorist group are presented to provide the background necessary to investigate the Japanese responses to each group.

Chapter IV is a comparison of the U.S. and Japanese responses to terrorists. The U.S. response is to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while the Japanese responses are to the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo, and 9/11. Japanese responses to other terrorists threats are also examined.

\textsuperscript{5} Katzenstein, 53.
Chapter V presents the Japanese homeland security paradigm. This paradigm consists of the successful and unsuccessful responses that Japan has used in its battle against terrorism. Japan’s perception of their homeland security paradigm is analyzed as well as how the paradigm applies to other terrorist threats in Asia.

Chapter VI elucidates the deficiencies that existed in the U.S. responses to the 9/11 attacks. Deficiencies in the U.S. responses highlight the need for the United States to research other countries’ paradigms. Therefore, the Japanese homeland security paradigm is applied to the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism.

Chapter VII examines U.S. priorities and strategy for combating terrorism and claims made by the Bush administration that measure progress in homeland security. Although the administration claims that progress is being made, problems with measuring counterterrorism progress raise doubts about these claims. In light of this dilemma, the Japanese homeland security paradigm is summarized to provide a contrast in methods of combating terrorism.
II. 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

The 9/11 attacks on the United States have perhaps been the most investigated terrorist attacks ever against the country. This chapter analyzes the U.S. perception of Asia’s role in terrorism, both pre-9/11 and post-9/11. It also investigates U.S. experiences with terrorism before 9/11 and analyzes the missed opportunities that might have prevented these events. Following the pre-9/11 analysis, this chapter also analyzes the 9/11 terrorist plot and the missed opportunities confronted by the U.S. homeland security establishment to stop the attacks. The pre-9/11 missed opportunities are compared to the 9/11 missed opportunities. U.S. experiences with terrorism are used to assess the future terrorist threat that the United States may face. This information will be used to provide background for assessing the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks in Chapter IV.

B. ASIA’S ROLE IN TERRORISM

The U.S. perception of Asia’s role in terrorism can be determined by examining the emphasized items in the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2000 (pre-9/11) and 2005 (post-9/11).

U.S. perceptions of terrorism in Asia, pre-9/11, focused primarily on the trend of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to South Asia as the Taliban was providing a safe haven to terrorists in Afghanistan. Northeast Asia was recognized for efforts against terrorism, while Southeast Asia was perceived as a growing threat with terrorist groups active in Indonesia and Philippines.6

A post-9/11 look at U.S. perceptions of terrorism in Asia shows a much greater concern with terrorist activities in that region. South Asia is most likely perceived as the greatest threat as it received its own chapter and efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan receiving the most priority.7 Southeast Asia is also recognized as being extremely

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important in GWOT with regional terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiah, being primary concerns. The governments of Southeast Asia are recognized for their efforts as reliable partners in GWOT. East Asian countries and Australia are recognized for their progress against terrorism.  

C. PRE-9/11 TERRORISM AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

El Sayyid Nosair, a 35-year-old Egyptian-born militant, assassinated Rabbi Meir Kahane, the 58-year-old founder of the Jewish Defense League and former member of the Israeli Parliament, in 1990. After the Kahane assassination, Neil Herman, a supervisor of an elite group of FBI agents and New York police officers called the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), reflected that it appeared obvious that Nosair was part of a larger movement and that the FBI needed to make an aggressive attack on terrorism. However, jurisdiction issues meant that the investigation would belong to the New York Police Department (NYPD). On February 26, 1993, the first World Trade Center bombing occurred. In the final days leading up to this attack, the JTTF was “just a whisper away from the World Trade Center plot,” but their investigation was killed for administrative reasons. On April 19, 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing occurred. According to the “Final Report on the Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building April 19, 1995,” there was evidence that suggested the U.S. government could have prevented the bombing. On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. One opinion on the U.S. embassy bombings is that, “Though, as any law enforcement official will remind you, intercepting 100 percent of all terror attempts is an impossibility, no one can seriously argue that the horrors of August 7, 1998, could not have been prevented.” On October 12, 2000, a small boat, filled with explosives, attacked the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in Aden, Yemen. Some have argued that if analyses and information from the U.S. Intelligence Community was given greater

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9 Miller, 38.
10 Ibid., 55–56.
11 Ibid., 90–91.
13 Miller, 195.
consideration or more quickly disseminated, the attack may have been prevented.\textsuperscript{14} Each of these events should have served as wake-up calls to the U.S. government.

\textbf{D. PRE-9/11 U.S. REACTIONS TO TERRORISM}

This is not to say that changes did not occur in the United States. U.S. policy was affected. Past administrations used a variety of methods to combat terrorism. These included diplomacy, international cooperation, constructive engagement, economic sanctions, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, covert action, protective security measures and military force.\textsuperscript{15} Diplomatic and constructive engagement measures include the active role of the United States during the March 1996 Sharm al-Sheikh peacemaker/anti-terrorism summit and efforts to have other countries join with the United States in imposing trade and economic sanctions. International conventions were also used. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United States was involved in developing all of the major anti-terrorism conventions including the Convention for the Marking of Plastic Explosives, U.N. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the U.N. Anti-Terrorism Financing Convention.\textsuperscript{16} These conventions obligate signatories to prosecute or extradite offenders for hijacking vessels and aircraft, taking hostages, and harming diplomats among other terrorism-related crimes.

In addition to these measures, specific economic sanctions were invoked. President Bill Clinton used executive orders to freeze terrorists’ and their associates’ assets. On August 20, 1998, President Clinton froze assets owned by bin Laden, “specific associates, and their self proclaimed Islamic Army Organization, and prohibiting U.S. individuals associated with those organizations.”\textsuperscript{17} The Clinton administration had previously frozen assets of 18 individuals associated with Middle East terrorist organizations and 12 alleged Middle East terrorist organizations. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevents support to foreign terrorist


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 12.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 8-9.
organizations listed by the U.S. State Department and denies their members entry visas into the United States.\textsuperscript{18}

The rewards for information program has been a successful U.S. State Department program used to combat terrorism. This program is supplemented by the aviation industry and offers rewards to those who support efforts to combat international terrorism against U.S. citizens or U.S. property. These efforts include information that prevents or resolves such terrorism or leads to the arrest or conviction of terrorists committing these acts. The rewards for information program was partly responsible for the arrest of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Although established in 1984, it was supplemented in 1994 in a reaction to terrorist attacks with a “crime bill” that helps relocate reward recipients and their immediate family members.\textsuperscript{19}

Extradition efforts and rendition were also used in response to terrorist attacks. The U.S. State Department was proactive in limiting political offense exceptions found in most extradition treaties between the United States and other countries. This exception has limited extradition for terrorist activities as terrorism involves politically motivated violence. Rendition was also employed to bypass restrictions on extradition to gain physical custody over terrorist suspects.\textsuperscript{20}

Military force was another measure used. President Clinton authorized the bombing of Iraq’s military intelligence headquarters by U.S. forces in 1993. This was technically in response to Iraqi efforts to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush, but it was assessed that President Clinton also used this military force in response to Iraq’s participation in the first World Trade Center bombing.\textsuperscript{21} Another example of the use of military force was when U.S. cruise missiles pounded targets in Afghanistan


\textsuperscript{19} Perl, \textit{Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy}, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 11.

and Sudan during responses to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. President Clinton stated, “there will be no sanctuary for terrorists.”

These measure focused U.S. policy on bin Laden and terrorist groups operating out of Afghanistan with the permission of the Taliban. Focus also remained on the financing of terrorist groups through non-state sources. These sources include charitable contributions, kidnapping and drug trafficking.

E. 9/11 TERRORISTS

Since 1992, Usama Bin Ladin has been calling for attacks against the United States and the plans for these attacks have been extensively developed starting in the 1990s. In August 1996, Bin Ladin issued his personal declaration of Islamic war, a fatwa, on American soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia. This fatwa called on Muslims to drive out the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, condemned the Saudi monarchy for defiling an area of the world with sites sacred to Islam by allowing the U.S. presence, and praised suicide attacks and bombings of targets that affected the United States. In February 1998, Bin Ladin announced the formation of a World Islamic Front. There was little new as far as rhetoric goes in the announcement, but it did focus more strongly on the United States and contained a fatwa that stated “to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa mosque and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” In an interview three months later Bin Ladin elucidated his points by saying, “We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets.” These ideas and the 1998 bombings of the Nairobi and

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23 Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5.


26 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 47–48.
Dar es Salaam U.S. embassies proved to be the turning point in the evolution of the 9/11 plot.27

In mid-1996, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed met with Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. At this meeting, Bin Ladin was briefed on the first World Trade Center bombing, the Manila air plot, the cargo carriers plan, and other schemes that Mohammed and his affiliates had pursued while in the Philippines. One of these other schemes was a proposal to train pilots to crash airlines into buildings inside of the United States. As early as 1996, the 9/11 plot had been hatched, but it was not pursued until 1998 when the U.S. embassy bombings were conducted by al Qaeda. These attacks convinced Mohammed that Bin Ladin was committed to attacking the United States and permission for the 9/11 operation was given to Mohammed in late 1998 or early 1999 with the planning of the operation beginning at the same time.28

By mid-1999, the first participants in the 9/11 operation had been selected. Two of these, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi were selected to attend pilot training in the United States in part because they had already obtained U.S. visas. Others did not receive visas for a variety of reasons and supported the operation from several different countries. These operatives attended special training in Afghanistan and Pakistan that focused on “physical fitness, firearms, close quarters combat, shooting from a motorcycle, and night operations” as well as American culture, basic English, flight simulator programs, and a variety of other necessary items.29 Mihdhar and Hazmi arrived in the United States at Los Angeles on January 15, 2000 as four more operatives were selected by al Qaeda for the operation.

These four, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, had moved to Hamburg, Germany to study at Western universities and met each other through the university, part-time jobs or the al-Quds Mosque. Mamoun Darkanzali, a Muslim businessman, also appeared to play a role in connecting the hijackers. He was linked to al Qaeda through his connections to Bin Ladin’s key financial advisor, Mamdou

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27 Ibid.
28 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 149.
29 Ibid., 157.
Salim.\textsuperscript{30} Regardless of how they met, they became friends and their religious beliefs evolved into radical Islamic fundamentalism. Depicting the United States as an invader into the Muslim world to undermine Islam marks this brand of radical Islamic fundamentalism. If the United States is an invader, real Muslims, those who recognize the true threat, must undertake a raid, a \textit{ghazwah}, against the superior foe. This depiction mimics the small bands of early Muslims that defeated larger Meccan forces. In this way, believers can hope to inflict serious damage on the “21\textsuperscript{st} century Mecca of the West.”\textsuperscript{31} By late 1999, they decided to abandon their studies in Germany and join the jihad in Chechnya. A chance meeting on a train in Germany led to the young men being recruited by al Qaeda and all four ended up in Afghanistan. There they met with Bin Ladin, swore their loyalty to him and were assigned to the 9/11 operation.\textsuperscript{32} They were instructed to return to Germany and attend flight training school, but it quickly became apparent that the fastest and cheapest training was available in the United States. All four applied for U.S. visas, but Binalshibh was unable to obtain his visa. Shortly after the first two 9/11 operatives arrived in the United States, Atta, Shehhi and Jarrah also arrived.\textsuperscript{33}

The first two operatives to arrive in the United States, Mihdhar and Hazmi, were poorly chosen for the operation. They had no experience in the West and spoke no English. Although the local Islamic communities in Los Angeles and San Diego assisted Mihdhar and Hazmi, they were unable to overcome the language barrier and did not learn how to fly despite some flight schooling from an Arabic speaking instructor. The instructor, Rick Garza, said, “It was clear to me they weren’t going to make it as pilots,” and that “It was like Dumb and Dumber.”\textsuperscript{34} He told them that they needed better English fluency and that he would not fly with them again until then. By June, Mihdhar had returned to Yemen and by the fall of 2000, Hazmi was no longer studying English or attempting to learn how to fly. Instead he patiently awaited the arrival of a new

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 160–66.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 168.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Miller, 273.
\end{itemize}
companion, Hani Hanjour, who arrived in San Diego in December 2000. A few days after his arrival, the two left San Diego.\textsuperscript{35}

In contrast with Mihdhar and Hazmi, the Hamburg contingent had better results. After arriving in the United States, Mohamed Atta pursued a $650,000 loan to purchase a twin-engine, six-passenger plane for crop dusting at a Farm Services Agency office in Homestead, Florida. It appears that the September 11 plot may not have been completely decided upon until Atta was told that the U.S. Department of Agriculture did grant individual loans, but not for crop dusters.\textsuperscript{36} Despite this setback, the plot evolved and Jarrah arranged to attend the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) in Venice, Florida and after arriving in Newark, New Jersey on June 27, 2000, he moved to Florida and started training. Atta and Shehhi had not decided upon a school and after checking out a school in Norman, Oklahoma, they decided upon Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida and started training. Jarrah obtained his single-engine private pilot certificate in early August, while Atta and Shehhi had soloed and passed the private pilot airman test by mid-August.\textsuperscript{37} The fourth and final pilot, Hanjour, attended flight training in Arizona after arriving in San Diego and meeting with Hazmi.

Hani Hanjour fell into the laps of al Qaeda. He studied English in the United States in 1991 and attended flight training in the United States intermittently from 1996 through 1999 that culminated in obtaining a commercial pilot certificate. Although his past involvement with al Qaeda is difficult to ascertain, he was in a training camp in Afghanistan in 2000 when either Bin Laden or his deputy, Atef, realized that he was a trained pilot and familiar with the West. He obtained his U.S. visa in September 2000 and arrived in San Diego by December. Although he was experienced, his previous instructors considered him a poor student and not committed enough to become a professional pilot. Based upon this, his old flight school in Scottsdale, Arizona turned down his request to resume his pilot training.\textsuperscript{38} Despite this setback, by March 2001 he had completed his initial Boeing 737 training and was headed to Virginia with Hazmi.

\textsuperscript{35} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 215–23.
\textsuperscript{36} Miller, 269–70.
\textsuperscript{37} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 224.
\textsuperscript{38} Miller, 277.
The Hamburg contingent had received their commercial pilot licenses by mid-December 2000 and started large jet simulator training. By May 2001, Hanjour and Hazmi were settled in New Jersey and the Hamburg contingent was in Florida awaiting the arrival of the muscle hijackers, the hijackers that stormed the cockpits of the airliners and controlled the passengers.

Bin Laden personally selected the muscle hijackers between the summer of 2000 and spring of 2001. Most of these operatives attended special training in Afghanistan camps and returned to their home countries to obtain U.S. visas. After acquiring the visas, they returned for more training before departing for the United States. The hijackers began arriving in the United States by late April 2001 and were met either by Atta and Shehhi in Florida or Hazmi and Hanjour in the American northeast. Mihdhar was the last hijacker to come to the United States, arriving in New York on July 4, 2001.

During the time the hijackers were preparing for the 9/11 attacks in the United States only two of the terrorists were known to establish ties within U.S. Islamic communities. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told all of the hijackers, except Hazmi and Mihdhar, to avoid establishing personal contacts and to stay away from mosques. Al Qaeda frequently encouraged operatives to act in ways contrary to Islamic beliefs to include hanging out at strip clubs and with fast women. Mohammed was notorious for being a playboy during his time in the Philippines and several of the hijackers drank heavily and went to strip clubs. This behavior served several purposes for al Qaeda. Antinomian behavior was a cover for the operatives, throwing off intelligence agents that might be tracking them. It also was a way for the young men to live out their fantasies and feel they had lived a full life. More than likely, al Qaeda encouraged this behavior to institute a measure of control over the hijackers. As Muslim fundamentalists, their libertine behavior would ensure feelings of guilt and encourage the terrorists to give up their soiled existence and be born again after death.

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39 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 227.
40 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 235–37.
41 Ibid., 215.
42 Cole.
Mihdhar and Hazmi, due to their inexperience with the West, posed as Saudi students and likely received assistance from the Muslim community centered around King Fahd mosque in Culver City. They met Omar al Bayoumi, a Saudi business student, while in Culver City and learned that San Diego might be easier to live in than Los Angeles. Mohdar Abdullah, a Yemeni university student, likely drove them to San Diego when Hazmi and Mihdhar relocated. Bayoumi assisted them in San Diego. He found them an apartment, set up the lease and helped them open a bank account. This apartment did not work out and another acquaintance, which Hazmi and Mihdhar met in a San Diego mosque, found them a room to rent in a house. During their stay in San Diego, members of the Islamic Center of San Diego supported the two hijackers, as did Abdullah. Abdullah introduced Hazmi and Mihdhar to his circle of friends that lived near the Rabat mosque in La Mesa. An imam at the Rabat mosque, Anwar Aulaqi, developed a close relationship with the two hijackers and later may have supported them in Virginia. While Hazmi and Mihdhar’s motivations are unknown, they were supported by ideologically like-minded Muslims and lived openly in San Diego without attracting excessive attention.43

Until the 9/11 attacks, the terrorists kept busy by surveilling flights, traveling or training. The pilots primarily accomplished the surveillance, but others did participate. A couple of the operatives flew to the Bahamas, but were denied entry and immediately returned to the United States. This was most likely accomplished to renew their immigration status.44 The pilots received additional training and practiced flying, requesting to use the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude route located along the Hudson River and close to the World Trade Center. The hijackers opened gym memberships to stay in shape for the hijackings, but most were indifferent to conditioning with the exception of Atta. The gym owner, Jim Woolard, said, “Atta was working out intensely, spasmodically... He was crazy.”45 In the days prior to the attack, all operatives wired transferred unused funds to the United Arab Emirates and traveled to their final

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43 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 216-21.
44 Ibid., 242.
45 Miller, 287.
deployment locations. On September 11th, they carried out their fateful attack on the United States. Despite the difficulties inherent in preventing attacks of this type from occurring, there were opportunities that may have led to the prevention of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

F. 9/11 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The first opportunity was the interception of communications in late 1999 that members of an al Qaeda cell were planning to travel to Malaysia. The CIA tracked both Hazmi and Mihdhar (initially selected as pilots for the 9/11 attacks) in January 2000, but lost them in Bangkok. Thai authorities were notified of the operatives’ presence in Thailand and reported in early March 2000 to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), created in the mid-1980s to circumspect the bureaucracy of the CIA and combat the transnational nature of terrorism, that Hazmi had traveled to the United States on a plane that departed January 15. Only the CTC was notified and this information was not shared outside of the center, which resulted in the two terrorists not being listed on the State Department’s TIPOFF watch list, a list of over 100,000 potential terrorists. Additionally, this information was not shared with the FBI. Thai authorities did not report Mihdhar, despite being on the same flight. Shortly after arriving in San Diego both operatives returned to Malaysia for an al Qaeda meeting to supposedly discuss the USS Cole bombings and 9/11 attack. The CIA and FBI both knew about this meeting and the CIA even knew that Hazmi and Mihdhar were supposed to attend, although the CIA did not know who they were at the time. Additionally, Mihdhar had obtained a U.S. multiple entry visa, which should have made him a candidate for surveillance if he had been put on the TIPOFF watch list. However, the CIA failed to pursue any follow-ups after passing this information on to the FBI. Mihdhar was tied to another member of al Qaeda in January 2001 and again the CIA did not share this information with the State Department or the FBI. This was critical considering that Mihdhar returned to Yemen in

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46 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 252–53.
47 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 181.
49 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 181–82.
50 Miller, 271.
June 2000 and applied for a new U.S. visa in June 2001, returning to the states on July 4, 2001.\textsuperscript{51} This was not the only missed opportunity.

Throughout 2001, leading up to the attacks, the U.S. intelligence community was receiving and passing on information of the increasing chances of a terrorist attack against the United States within the community and to organizations outside of it. Even though this intelligence generally pointed towards an overseas attack, the possibility of an attack in the United States was discussed. Despite these discussions, little was done domestically.\textsuperscript{52} The conclusions of the 9/11 Commission Report state, “In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts. The public was not warned.”\textsuperscript{53} With the repeated terrorist attack warnings, CIA director George Tenet had investigators reexamine their files for clues about any upcoming attacks. This resulted in the CIA checking with the INS about Mihdhar and Hazmi. After learning that they were both already in the United States, the CIA alerted the State Department, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and the FBI. Finally, they were placed on the watchlist and the FBI began the process of tracking them down. However, the FBI claimed that by August 23, it was too late to locate the operatives. This is despite the fact that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had bought tickets with credit cards and obtained identity cards in their own names just days after the FBI began its search.\textsuperscript{54} In addition to this reevaluation by the CIA, an analyst at the FBI involved in the USS Cole investigation became involved with information regarding Mihdhar. Along with the CIA agents, she showed pictures containing Mihdhar to FBI agents working on the Cole case. She determined that due to caveats, important National Security Agency (NSA) reports regarding the photos could not be shared with the FBI agents. These photos would probably have tied Mihdhar to a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle

\begin{footnotes}
\item[51] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 266–67.
\item[52] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 263–64.
\item[53] Ibid., 265.
\item[54] Miller, 304–305.
\end{footnotes}
East. This may have raised the interest in Mihdhar. One of the CIA analysts at this meeting had all of the relevant facts, but failed to share any of the information resulting in no one looking for Mihdhar when he returned to the United States in 2001.\textsuperscript{55} More resources may have been put into the search for Mihdhar in New York once the FBI analyst put all of the pieces together, but a misinterpretation of the rules regarding information sharing prevented this from happening.\textsuperscript{56} Another missed opportunity involved Zacarias Moussaoui.

Moussaoui appeared to have been selected as a pilot for a second wave of attacks by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. He had been training at a flight school in Norman, Oklahoma from February to May 2001, but quit the school at the end of May after flying over 50 hours and not progressing enough to fly solo. Due to concern over whether or not Jarrah (one of the pilots in the 9/11 attack) would withdraw from the operation, the backup, Moussaoui, was wired $14,000 to start training again at the end of July. By August 10, he began training in Boeing 747 simulators in Minnesota, but quickly raised suspicions due to his limited flying experience and conduct. Although many hobbyists take this type of training without a pilot’s license, Moussaoui’s questions about things like communication with air traffic controllers caused the staff to worry. After an instructor reported him to the authorities, the INS arrested Moussaoui in mid-August 2001 on immigration charges.\textsuperscript{57} The Minneapolis FBI field office initiated an investigation immediately and quickly learned of Moussaoui’s jihadist beliefs. The investigating agent came to the conclusion that Moussaoui was “an Islamic extremist preparing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist goals” and that some of his plan would involve the flight training he was attending.\textsuperscript{58} Due to legal difficulties, the FBI did not obtain a search warrant to search Moussaoui’s laptop computer despite foreign intelligence received from France linking him with a Chechen rebel leader. The FBI also requested assistance from the U.S. legal attaché in London and the CIA sent a cable and requested information from France and Britain. The FBO

\textsuperscript{55} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 268–69.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 270–71.
\textsuperscript{57} Miller, 299.
\textsuperscript{58} National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 273.
sent a teletype to the CIA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Customs Service, the State Department, the INS, and the Secret Service regarding Moussaoui, but did not include the investigating FBI agent’s conclusion that the terrorist may have been planning to use the flight training in an attack. The FAA did not receive a complete report due to sharing issues, but the case agent briefed the local FAA office on the gaps in the report. However, the FAA did not take any special steps in response to this briefing. Although the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was briefed on Moussaoui, no connection to al Qaeda was mentioned and the matter was not pursued up the chain of command in the FBI. All of the information tying Moussaoui to al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot was put together after September 11th. British intelligence received on September 13, 2001 put Moussaoui in an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and the FBI learned from another incarcerated terrorist that Moussaoui had been in the Afghan camps. Either source of information could have resulted in a search warrant being issued and a full investigation being conducted. Yet another missed opportunity involved Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Although U.S. intelligence agencies knew that Mohammed was a terrorist, he was not tied to al Qaeda before 9/11. However, there were several sources of information that could have led the CIA to this conclusion. The first was a September 2000 report that Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was an important figure in al Qaeda. The Bin Ladin unit in the CIA recognized that this name translates to “Khalid from Baluchistan,” Mohammed’s homeland and attempted to obtain more information without any results. The CIA also began analyzing information about a “Mukhtar” that was associated with an al Qaeda lieutenant in April 2001. On June 12, 2001, another piece of intelligence led to Mohammed being identified as Khaled, a terrorist that was recruiting people to travel outside of Afghanistan to conduct terrorist activities for al Qaeda. It was also reported that colleagues were already in the United States waiting to meet these new recruits. The CIA received the intelligence that Mohammed’s nickname was Mukhtar on August 28, but no connections were made. If this information had been tied together, it would have

59 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 274.
60 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 275.
61 Ibid., 275–76.
been possible to tie Mohammed to Binalshibh (the only member of the Hamburg contingent not to obtain a U.S. visa) and Binalshibh to Moussaoui. This would have resulted in a more thorough investigation. These missed opportunities highlight some of the shortcomings and difficulties that existed in enforcing U.S. homeland security before the 9/11 attacks, but why did these problems exist in light of the terrorist activities in the United States and abroad against U.S. interests throughout the 1990s?

G. COMPARISON OF PRE-9/11 AND 9/11 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The primary problems that led to pre-9/11 terrorist activities were the lack of information sharing between U.S. government agencies due to communication failures and legal issues, and failure of leadership to provide an overarching guidance. Unfortunately, these same problems led to the 9/11 attacks.

Many argue that the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane was the birth of Islamic fundamentalist terror in the United States. Neil Herman, the JTTF supervisor, felt that the United States needed to heed this notice, but that did not happen. The NYPD and the District Attorney that tried the case wanted a quick conviction and refused to look at the broader picture. 47 boxes of military manuals and notes were taken from El Sayyid Nosair’s, Kahane’s assassin, residence, but this valuable evidence was not looked at until after the first bombing of the World Trade Center. The JTTF had two associates of Nosair in custody after Kahane’s assassination, but were told by the NYPD to let them go. These two men ended up participating in the first World Trade Center bombing. Already, information sharing was an issue and the lack of leadership resulted in divergent opinions.

The first World Trade Center bombing reiterates these points. The bombing again signaled the rise of the Islamic terrorist threat, but the success of the investigations, arrests and prosecution obscured the threat and contributed to the widespread

62 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 276–77.
63 Miller, 55-56.
underestimation of the true threat. The successful investigation and prosecution also created the impression that the U.S. law enforcement was efficient enough to deal with terrorism.66

Prior to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, problems with information sharing and guidance from U.S. leadership continued. Until 1996, senior U.S. leadership, let alone most anyone in the U.S. government, did not understand the bin Laden was behind the new terrorist threat the United States was facing. The lack of communication between U.S. agencies is partly to blame. The CIA knew that bin Laden financed terrorists in Sudan in 1993 and the State Department noted bin Ladin’s involvement in aiding Yemeni terrorists in 1992. The State Department tied some the first World Trade Center bombing participants to bin Ladin and put him on its TIPOFF watch list in 1993 after the State Department designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, as late as 1997, CIA’s CTC still described bin Ladin as an “extremist financer.”67 In 1996, the CIA established the bin Ladin unit to analyze intelligence and plan operations against bin Ladin. This unit learned about the availability of a bin Ladin and al Qaeda communications conduit prior to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, but another U.S. intelligence community agency refused to exploit it and threatened legal action against any CIA officer that attempted to.68 It did not help that the head of the bin Ladin unit, Michael Scheuer, had an abrasive style and did not work well with counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke or John O’Neill, the FBI’s expert on bin Ladin. Due to these relationships, the bin Ladin unit rarely shared information with the FBI and led to an FBI agent stuffing files under his shirt to get them to O’Neill.69 Even the U.S. response to the U.S. embassy bombings, firing cruise missiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, failed in part due to the lack of information sharing and leadership guidance. CIA and U.S. military operations to detain or kill bin Ladin were all cancelled in part because of U.S. senior leadership guidance and interagency

66 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 72-73.
lack of cooperation. This led to cruise missiles being launched and bin Ladin escaping unharmed.70

The final events that exemplify U.S. shortcomings covered in this thesis are the events that led to the attack on the USS Cole. The arrest of Ali Mohamed, a participant in the U.S. embassy in Kenya bombing, almost did not happen due to the legal wall that contributed to the lack of information sharing. Prosecutors did not have access to intelligence information until the suspect was arrested. Obviously, this situation led to delays in arresting suspects or the suspects not being arrested at all. Mohamed was released and not arrested until later that day. He had planned on fleeing the country the next day.71 The CIA did not support Able Danger, a U.S. military intelligence operation that targeted Al Qaeda established in 1999, and information was not shared despite the fact that Able Danger was procuring useable intelligence. Able Danger personnel also did not share information with the FBI due to legal concerns of U.S. military lawyers.72 Additionally, Able Danger knew of increased al Qaeda activity in Aden, Yemen three weeks prior to the USS Cole attack and did not inform anyone outside of the U.S. military.73 After the attack on the USS Cole, the FBI had troubles with the U.S. ambassador in Yemen and eventually withdrew their investigators.74 It is amazing that the same problems with information sharing and leadership guidance were present in the missed opportunities for stopping the 9/11 plot.

Many missed opportunities due to the lack of cooperation for information sharing occurred. Khalid al Mihdhar was allowed to get a new U.S. visa in June 2001 after the CIA had tied him to another al Qaeda member, but did not share this information with the


71 “Complete 9/11 Timeline.”


State Department or the FBI. Throughout 2001, despite intelligence that chances of a terrorist attack against the United States were increasing, little was done domestically. The FBI did not include critical information regarding Zacarias Moussaoui in teletypes to the CIA, FAA, Customs Service, State Department, INS, and Secret Service resulting in him not being tied to al Qaeda until after 9/11.

Missed opportunities due to legal issues for information sharing also occurred. Khalid al Mihdhar may have been detained in New York, but the CIA did not share NSA reports with the FBI due to legal caveats. Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer could not be searched due to legal difficulties in obtaining a search warrant.

The lack of U.S. senior leadership guidance also contributed to the 9/11 attacks not being prevented. When the FBI received the intelligence that Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi were in the United States, the FBI claimed that it was too late to locate the operatives despite it was only August 23, 2001. With more definitive counterterrorism guidance, the FBI may have conducted the search. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that, “They (domestic agencies) did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute.”

While these are just a few examples, the comparison between pre-9/11 and 9/11 missed opportunities shows that necessary changes in the U.S. homeland security establishment did not occur.

H. FUTURE OF TERRORISM

It is difficult to forecast with accuracy what the future of terrorism will involve, but based off of the attacks that the United States has faced in the past, it is possible to conjecture where fundamental Islamic terrorism is heading.

Past attacks by al Qaeda have shown the ability of terrorists to utilize technology in new ways and take advantage of the open society of the United States. The most

75 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 266-67.
76 Ibid., 263-64.
77 Ibid., 275-76.
78 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 274.
79 Miller, 304-305.
80 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 265.
obvious example is the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda utilized airplanes as bombs, trained their pilots in the United States and staged the important phases of the attacks from the United States. Another example is the attack on the USS Cole. The terrorists, instead of using a car bomb, used a boat bomb to take advantage of the vulnerability of the warship. Additionally, the terrorists made their boat appear that they were one of the many helping with the USS Cole. They even stood at attention while detonating their explosives.

Al Qaeda has also utilized traditional methods of terrorism. Although they utilized technology to bomb two U.S. embassies almost simultaneously, the terrorists still used the age-old method of bombing the buildings. The same held true with the first bombing of the World Trade Center.

Based on this information, it would appear that future attacks by al Qaeda will utilize both traditional means and new twists on these while maximizing new technologies and leveraging the open society of the United States. Al Qaeda will most likely continue to attack where the U.S. defenses are weak and avoid operations that have become too risky based on U.S. responses to the 9/11 attacks.
III. TERRORISM IN JAPAN

A. INTRODUCTION
To understand the Japanese and their efforts against terrorism, this thesis investigates two terrorist groups that originated in Japan: the Nihon Sekigun, Japanese Red Army (JRA), and Aum Shinrikyo, Aum Supreme Truth. Prior to these case studies, Japan’s historical experiences with terrorism are briefly investigated.

B. JAPAN'S PAST EXPERIENCES WITH TERRORISM
In addition to the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, Japan has a long history of terrorism. During the Showa Restoration that preceded World War II, Japan experienced a period of political instability and social upheaval that led to ultra-nationalists taking charge of the government.81 This period was highlighted by several terrorist attacks. The period after World War II was also characterized by political instability and social upheaval and resulted in terrorist groups like JRA and the Chukaku-ha, Middle core faction.82 Japan in the 1990s was in recession after the booming economy of the 1980s, again causing social upheaval. Religion helped the Japanese cope with their reversal of fortune, but many of these new religions were and are cults. This spawned Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist group based on religion. Hopefully, none of Japan’s numerous other fringe religious groups choose the same path as Aum Shinrikyo.

The Showa Restoration was marked by terrorist attacks. The Ketsumeidan, Blood Oath Corps, carried out several of the attacks. Inoue Nissho, the leader of this terrorist group of ultra-nationalists, masterminded two assassinations before his arrest. His terrorist organization assassinated Japan’s prime minister after his arrest. This resulted in the end of party-based politics in Japan and led to military control of the government prior to World War II.83

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83 Victoria, 4-5.
The period after World War II also spawned terrorist groups. In addition to JRA, the Chukaku-ha also emerged during this period. Initially a division within the Japanese Communist Party, the Chukaku-ha split from the party in 1957 and then divided into two groups in 1963, the Chukaku-ha and Kakumaru-ha, Revolutionary Marxist Faction. The Chukaku-ha has conducted terrorist actions against the government of Japan, U.S. military and facilities within Japan, the United Nations (UN), and the G-7 Summit.84

While not a comprehensive list, this brief review of terrorist groups from Japan’s past demonstrates Japan’s historical experiences with terrorism. This thesis analyzes two primary and radically different terrorist groups that Japan has had to combat, the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo.

C. JAPANESE RED ARMY

The first case study covers the JRA. This case study will assess its origin and history, and analyze specific terrorist acts committed by the JRA.

The JRA originated from the social upheaval and turmoil in Japan following World War II. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, wanted to instill the seeds of democracy in Japan and in doing so, increased the opportunities for higher education at universities. He also encouraged increased enrollment so as to challenge the old way of doing things in Japan with the new.85 While this may have helped the cause of democracy, it also increased the number of protests and debates as the young university students flexed their political muscle. One of the first concessions the students won was autonomy to determine dormitory issues, food menus, and other mundane issues affecting university life. Prior to receiving autonomy, students did not have the “freedom to make their own decisions on university matters.”86 After receiving autonomy, student associations began to grow in power. The Zengakuren, the All-Japanese Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations, was a successful attempt by the Japanese Communist Party to gather all of the separate student associations into one group. Towards the end of 1948, the Zengakuren consisted of

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85 Gallagher, 6-8.
86 Ibid., 8.
almost 60% of Japan’s student population. The Sekigun-ha, Red Army Faction, developed out of the Zengakuren and the United Tokyo-Yokohama Struggle Council Against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, two of the most radical elements of the student movement of the late sixties. The Red Army Faction’s first training session on November 3, 1969 resulted in a police raid that netted 53 participants at Daibosatsu Pass. From this point, the Red Army Faction developed into the Japanese Red Army.

The JRA developed into three different factions and the activities of each merit attention. The first faction was headed by Takamaro Tamiya, who joined a splinter group from the Red Army Faction that later became the Japanese Red Army. This faction was responsible for the JRA’s first terrorist act, the hijacking of a Japanese domestic flight. On 31 March 1970, nine members of the JRA, armed with samurai swords, hijacked Japan Airlines Flight 351 from Tokyo to Fukuoka, known as the Yodo-go, and forced it to land in North Korea. The JRA took the 122 passengers and seven crew members as hostages. Because the plane did not have enough gas to fly directly to North Korea, the plane landed in South Korea and the passengers were allowed to disembark in exchange for a Japanese deputy transport minister who offered himself as a hostage. After landing in North Korea, the nine members of the JRA were welcomed by Kim Il Sung and described by him as “golden eggs.” The terrorists were not seen again until 1972 when they appeared wearing suits with Kim Il Sung’s badge on their lapel. The terrorists claimed that they had changed their philosophy to that of North Korea’s Juche ideology. In response to their re-appearance, the Japanese government stated that the

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87 Ibid., 8.
89 Gallagher, 12.
90 Ibid., 13.
92 Smith, 2.
94 Box, 95.
hijackers “had confessed their errors and had become good workers.”

This was Japan’s method of saying that this faction of the JRA had been “taken care of.” However, members from this group of terrorists would go on to carry out terrorist activities for the next eighteen years throughout the world. During these years, the Japanese police would claim that the terrorists lived as guests of North Korea.

The second faction of the JRA stayed in Tokyo and was led by Tsuneo Mori and Hiroko Nagata. They met increasing police pressure and suffered many failures during their domestic operations leading to a sense of dissatisfaction and the need to reorganize. This second faction of the JRA was disgruntled to the “point where it had lost all sense of reality. They were so frustrated that they turned violence in on themselves.”

This violence occurred at Haruna, a mountainous region in central Japan, where the JRA fled the 1972 Tokyo police crackdowns. Mori and Nagata urged the members to “purify their revolutionary thoughts and to create unity”, but the process of “criticism, self-criticism and group criticism” quickly escalated and resulted in the torture and death of fourteen Red Army members. The police eventually tracked down the location of the group and after a nine-day siege, stormed the facility and with two police fatalities, took five prisoners. The storming of the facility was televised live. Mori later committed suicide and Nagata was sentenced to death. The fourteen dead members were later discovered and sixteen JRA members were imprisoned, shocking Japan’s public.

Fusako Shigenobu led the final faction and was convinced that the revolution the JRA wanted could not be started in Japan. Therefore, they went to Lebanon and joined forces with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). While abroad this group committed many terrorist acts, such as attacking the Lod Airport in 1972.

95 Smith, 2.
96 Gallagher, 18.
97 Smith, 2.
98 Ibid., 2.
99 Box, 100.
100 Ibid., 101.
101 Smith, 3.
102 Box, 105.
holding the Japanese Embassy staff in Kuwait hostage in 1974, taking fifty hostages from the American Consulate and Swedish Embassy in Malaysia in 1975, and the 1977 hijacking of a plane. While not all inclusive of this faction’s endeavors, these acts are significant either in scope or in the reaction of the Japanese government.

This faction of the Red Army first attacked the Lod Airport in Israel. On May 30, 1972, three Asian men in the baggage claim area of Lod Airport picked up their bags and pretended to be going through them. They then opened fire on the crowded baggage claim area with submachine guns and grenades. They also threw grenades at planes and attacked a waiting room. Friendly fire killed one terrorist, while another was killed by his own grenade. The third was captured trying to throw a grenade at a plane. The attack resulted in 24 dead and 80 wounded. Although the captured terrorist, Kozo Okamoto, received an Israeli life sentence, he was released in a 1985 prisoner exchange between Israel and Palestinian militant factions. The Japanese government protested Okamoto’s transfer to Libya as a condition of the exchange, but could not change the outcome. He was arrested again in Lebanon for forgery and Lebanese authorities granted him asylum when he was released in 1999. Although Okamoto was granted asylum, four other JRA members released at the same time were deported to Jordan and sent to Japan where they were arrested.

JRA committed another act of terrorism in 1974. Two members of the JRA, supported by two members of the PFLP, attempted to destroy a Shell Oil Company refinery in Singapore on Jan 31 that only resulted in one oil storage tank being set on fire. During their escape, the terrorists captured a ferryboat and took eight hostages. Five of the eight hostages were released during negotiations with Singaporean officials for the exchange of the remaining hostages for safe transport to an Arab country. On February 6, during the on-going negotiations, other JRA members stormed the Japanese

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103 Gallagher, 26.
Embassy in Kuwait and held about twelve members of the embassy staff, including the ambassador, Ryoko Ishikawa, hostage to apply pressure to the Japanese government. Japan capitulated to the terrorist demands by providing a Japan Airlines plane that transported the terrorists in Singapore to Kuwait and then all of the terrorists to Aden, Southern Yemen, on 8 February. Southern Yemen authorities released the terrorists on 10 February. In addition to the plane, Japan also paid a ransom for the release of the hostages in Kuwait.107

Following the same basic plan, the JRA struck again in August 1975 by taking about fifty hostages from the American Consulate and the Swedish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to include the U.S. consul and Swedish charge d'affaires. The demands of the terrorists included the release of seven JRA members imprisoned in Japan and a Japanese airplane to fly them to their destination of choice. Japan met the terrorist demands, but only five of the imprisoned JRA members chose to leave jail. These released prisoners were put on board a Japan Airlines flight to Kuala Lumpur with a crew of nine. Once the plane landed in Malaysia, the hostages were exchanged for two Japanese government officials and two Malaysian government officials who traveled with the terrorists to Tripoli, Libya. These officials were released after arriving in Libya.108 Malaysian officials were frustrated by Japan’s slow response to the situation. They felt that the delay in getting a Japan Airlines plane to Malaysia was a ploy and that the Japanese negotiator, the Japanese minister of transport, was disagreeable. Malaysian officials also felt that the Japanese ambassador to Malaysia was “clumsy”.109 During the negotiations, a Malaysian commando team was in place with snipers, but they were not allowed to act.110

The final act of terrorism committed by the JRA covered in this case study occurred in 1977. Five members of the JRA hijacked Japan Airlines Flight 472 en-route from Paris to Haneda Airport, Tokyo, Japan. After a stopover in Mumbai, India, the

107 Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.
108 Gallagher, 43.
110 Ibid.
terrorists took over the flight and forced it to land in Dacca, Bangladesh. With the 156 passengers and crew as hostages, the JRA demanded the release of nine JRA prisoners in Japan and a $6 million ransom.\textsuperscript{111} The then Japanese Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda, responded that Japan would meet the JRA demands because “human life is more important than the world.”\textsuperscript{112} A Japan Airlines flight was chartered and loaded with the ransom money and six of the nine released JRA prisoners. After arriving in Dhaka, 118 passengers and crewmembers were exchanged by the hijackers. The remaining hostages were flown to Damascus via Kuwait City where eleven more were released. The plane was then flown to Algeria where the authorities impounded it and the last hostages were freed.\textsuperscript{113}

D. AUM SHINRIKYO

Aum Shinrikyo provided Japan with a different challenge compared to JRA. The following case study covers the history of Aum Shinrikyo and the terrorist acts they committed.

Chizuo Matsumoto founded Aum Shinrikyo in 1987. Matsumoto was the leader of this religious cult and grew up in poverty. Because he was blind in one eye and only had partial vision remaining in his good eye, he was sent to a special school for the visually impaired. While in school, Matsumoto took advantage of other, more seriously disabled students by making them do favors for him and charging them money for helping the students with various tasks.\textsuperscript{114} However, he was also remembered for his ability to reach out to unpopular children. He ran for student council president in elementary, middle and high school, but always lost. The children thought that although he would “show concern for people sometimes,” Matsumoto was also scary.\textsuperscript{115} At the school for the blind, he studied acupuncture and herbal medicine, and when he graduated in 1977, he moved to Tokyo in an attempt to enter a university. Although he wanted to

\textsuperscript{111} Smith, 7.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
graduate from the university and enter into Japan’s elite, Matsumoto was unable to pass the entrance exams and moved back to his hometown.\textsuperscript{116} He later moved back to Tokyo, opened a store that specialized in acupuncture and herbal medicines, and married. His 1982 arrest for selling fake medicine gave rise to his and his wife’s dislike of the police and the media.\textsuperscript{117} While in Tokyo, Matsumoto began to develop an interest in religions and joined Agonshu, a relatively new religion established in 1978. Agonshu is based on the belief that acts of sad spirits of the dead cause the everyday problems of the living and emphasizes liberation from stress through meditation.\textsuperscript{118} In 1984, he and his wife started giving yoga lessons and attracted a following. In 1986, during a trip to India, Matsumoto claimed to receive enlightenment in the Himalayan Mountains and upon his return to Japan in 1987, changed his name to Shoko Asahara and founded Aum Shinrikyo.\textsuperscript{119} Aum is Sanskrit for the “powers of destruction and creation in the universe,” and Shinrikyo is the “teaching of the supreme truth.”\textsuperscript{120} The goal of Asahara’s religion was to teach the truth about the creation and the destruction of the universe.\textsuperscript{121}

Aum Shinrikyo’s troubles began in 1989. In Japan, the Religious Corporations Law is used to determine which groups will receive the special benefits of being recognized as a religion. These benefits include tax breaks, protection from government interference and the right to own property as a group. There are three requirements that a group must meet to qualify for this status: having at least a three-year history, owning their own facilities, and freedom of members to join or leave of their own accord.\textsuperscript{122} When Aum Shinrikyo applied to be recognized, they initially were denied based on complaints filed by families of group members. These complaints were filed because members had to give up all ties and sever communication with their families upon

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Holley, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Raymond Lamont-Brown, “Japan’s new spirituality,” Contemporary Review, \url{http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2242/is_1603_275/ai_55683935} (accessed September 7, 2006).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Kaplan, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{120} University of Virginia, “Aum Shinrikyo,” The Religious Movements Homepage Project, \url{http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/aums.html} (accessed December 6, 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Kaplan, 24.
\end{enumerate}
entering the cult. Aum Shinrikyo protested the denial by filing lawsuits, protesting and demonstrating. Later that year, the government of Japan approved and recognized Aum Shinrikyo as a religion.\textsuperscript{123}

In addition to problems with the Religious Corporations Law, Aum Shinrikyo also had problems with Sakamato Tsutsumi, a lawyer. The Sunday Mainichi, a popular Japanese newspaper, ran a series about Aum Shinrikyo called “The Insanity of Aum Shinrikyo.”\textsuperscript{124} Aum Shinrikyo responded by harassing the editor, Taro Maki, until the journalist suffered a severe stroke.\textsuperscript{125} This article generated a large response and ended up with Sakamoto helping out families concerned with the treatment of their kin involved with Aum Shinrikyo. Aum Shinrikyo responded by threatening to sue the paper, but Sakamoto continued his investigation into the group. He later discovered that a claim of Asahara was false. Asahara had claimed that he had his blood tested and that his DNA was special in a different way from other human beings. In a meeting with Aum Shinrikyo’s lawyer, Yoshinobu Aoyama, Sakamoto brought up this claim and was told that a graduate of the medical school had conducted the research at an Aum Shinrikyo facility, but no evidence of this was provided. The meeting quickly degenerated into a shouting match and left Sakamoto with an “uneasy” feeling.\textsuperscript{126} Two days later, six members of Aum Shinrikyo crept into Sakamoto’s house and murdered Sakamoto, and his wife and baby. For the next three days, Aum Shinrikyo members drove across Japan and buried the bodies in various mountain locations. Asahara justified these killings to his members and had the Japanese penal code for murder read to all involved members. They were all in this together and would suffer the penalty of death if any of them betrayed the group.\textsuperscript{127}

In 1990, Asahara began to believe that political action was necessary to save the world and created the Shinri-to, Party of Truth, political party. Under this party, twenty-

\textsuperscript{123} Kaplan, 24.
\textsuperscript{125} Kaplan, 24.
\textsuperscript{126} Kaplan, 39-40.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 41-42.
five members of the cult ran for election and all lost. This attempt to broaden their message to the world was expected to succeed and proved to be a large blow to Aum Shinrikyo. In addition to spending around $7 million on the elections, members being reintroduced to society, fled the cult in large numbers. Another result of the lost elections was the increase in Aum Shinrikyo-bashing as Japanese began to ridicule the cult. This started a disastrous sequence of events where the group’s goals moved from teaching about the truth of the universe’s creation and destruction to preparation for the coming apocalypse. These preparations included building nuclear shelters and commencing a biological and chemical weapons program.

Aum Shinrikyo first established a biolab with the intent of producing botulinus. From this starting point, a militarization of the group began. They built a larger lab and began the process of producing sarin, a Nazi nerve gas, and anthrax. Aum Shinrikyo members received military training and produced or procured conventional weapons. In June 1994, the group’s first sarin gas attack took place. This attack killed seven people and wounded over 200 in a Matsumoto residential area. This attack injured three judges that lived in the area and were set to hear a case against Aum Shinrikyo. Unfortunately, a local gardener was accused of the attack diverting attention from Aum Shinrikyo. In July 1994, several members of Aum Shinrikyo were seen running from a building on their compound in gas masks, but it was not until January of the next year that Aum Shinrikyo was linked with the gas attacks in Matsumoto. In March, the police stormed Aum Shinrikyo’s headquarters in Osaka and arrested three members on charges of abduction. The cult responded by gassing the subway station below the police headquarters in Tokyo with sarin gas. This attack on 20 March 1995 resulted in twelve dead and thousands incapacitated.

128 Kaplan, 47.
129 University of Virginia.
130 Ibid.
131 Kaplan, 52.
132 Kaplan, 85-88 and 95.
133 Schaefer.
134 Dorman.
135 University of Virginia.
Following the March subway attack, 2,500 Japanese police began investigating and searching twenty-five Aum Shinrikyo facilities in Shizuoka and Yamanaki prefectures. The justification for these actions was not the subway attacks, but the disappearance of a Tokyo notary public, Kariya Kiyoshi, in February 1995 that was tied to an Aum Shinrikyo official. Shortly after the investigations began, Aum Shinrikyo attempted the assassination of the head of the National Policy Agency (NPA), Director Kunimatsu Takaji. Although he was seriously wounded, he was not killed.\textsuperscript{136}

Following the subway attacks and assassination attempt, Aum Shinrikyo followers were arrested by the NPA. Despite the arrests, Aum Shinrikyo remained active. In April 1995, a series of attacks hit the Yokohama railway system. On 11 April, twenty people complained of sore throats and foul odors. On 19 April, 500 people were hospitalized due to mysterious fumes. On 21 April, fumes in a store near a Yokohama rail system station overcome twenty-seven people.\textsuperscript{137} In May, Aum Shinrikyo-related events continued to occur.

On 5 May, 1995, two bags of poison gas were found in a restroom in the Tokyo Shinjuku subway station. After two months of searching, Shoko Asahara was finally found on May 16, 1995 hiding in a secret room in Aum Shinrikyo’s main facility at Kamikuishiki village with large amounts of cash and gold bars. Several comatose followers were also found at the facility. Asahara was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death. Japan’s supreme court denied his final appeal in September 2006 and he will remain on death row until put to death.\textsuperscript{138} Aum Shinrikyo still operates in Japan, but has changed its name to Aleph and removed doctrines that justified using murder.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{136} University of Virginia.


\textsuperscript{139} Apologetics Index, “Aum Shinrikyo,” \url{http://www.apologeticsindex.org/a06.html} (accessed September 6, 2006).
IV. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

A. INTRODUCTION

The 9/11 attacks on the United States generated responses, just as the Japanese Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo and the Global War on Terrorism did in Japan. In addition to the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo and the GWOT, Japan’s responses to other terrorist threats are briefly assessed. U.S. responses involve law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, finances and the military. Japan responded by relying on domestic policing, giving in to terrorist demands, and also passing new laws to combat terrorism. This comparison highlights the differences and similarities in their responses.

B. U.S. RESPONSES TO 9/11 ATTACKS

The immediate responses to the 9/11 attacks indicated the need for change in the U.S. system. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had to improvise during the complex events that played out on the morning of September 11th. They did not follow established protocols and struggled to ensure the integrity of the U.S. homeland defense against a threat they had not trained to meet. The emergency response to the attacks was also improvised. The first responders and all others involved with the rescue were not sufficiently trained nor prepared for this type of event. It must be emphasized that the U.S. system (law enforcement, legal, intelligence, and others) for dealing with terrorism had changed in response to the pre-9/11 terrorist threats and that some of these changes resulted in success, in one form or another. However, it obviously did not change enough to prevent the same errors from occurring in the events leading up to 9/11. So, what changed after 9/11?

There have been many changes to the U.S. system since the 9/11 attacks. Changes related to law enforcement have been significant. In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was established and President George W. Bush issued a strategy for

140 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 45.
141 Ibid., 315.
homeland security. This department now has the responsibility for many of the areas that were problematic prior to 9/11 including: “protecting borders, securing transportation and other parts of our critical infrastructure, organizing emergency assistance, and working with the private sector to assess vulnerabilities.” The Patriot Act was instituted immediately after 9/11. This law has allowed the security and intelligence agencies of the United States to act with greater freedom. Another law that was passed in the aftermath of 9/11 was the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The Homeland Security Act and the Maritime Transportation Security Act followed this in 2002. The first law created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which became a part of the Homeland Security Department, while the other two laws “required the development of strategic plans to describe how the new department and TSA would provide security for critical parts of the U.S. transportation sector.” Border security and procedures have also changed. The first phase of a screening program that uses biometrics, United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (USVISIT), has been implemented along with an integrated watchlist that “makes terrorist name information available to border and law enforcement authorities.”

Changes have also occurred in the U.S. intelligence community. In August 2004, President Bush enacted four Executive Orders that changed and refortified the U.S. intelligence community without legislation. In December 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). John D. Negroponte was sworn in on April 21, 2005 as DNI and the Office of the DNI (ODNI) began operations the next day. In addition to bureaucratic change, there are several times as many analysts that look at all types of intelligence that focus on terrorism as there existed prior to 9/11. Human intelligence

143 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 395.
144 Ibid., 394.
145 Ibid., 391.
146 Ibid., 385–88.
collection has also been increased on targets of primary concern. Additionally, sharing of intelligence with other countries has been increased. To ensure that those who need this intelligence see it, stovepipes that existed have slowly been eliminated. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been strengthened and now integrates twenty-eight intelligence networks. Access to its data has been increased from the hundreds to the thousands. The newly created National Counterproliferation Center was co-located with the NCTC to increase information sharing. The National Security Branch was created at the FBI to expand and connect their intelligence, counterterrorism and counterintelligence capabilities. State and regional fusion centers are being linked with Joint Terrorism Task Forces to create a national network to increase communications and information exchange. The FBI has also created a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Division to ensure that counterterrorism efforts include WMD expertise.148

U.S. responses to 9/11 also include diplomatic efforts. One major part of this effort is from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). “USAID promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries.”149 Since 9/11, USAID has been carrying out this mission in support of the GWOT. Another effort has been the Millennium Challenge Account that was created to reward countries that champion the U.S. values of governing justly, investing in their people, and allowing free markets.150 The account was established in January 2004 and the U.S. Congress provided nearly $1B in FY04 and $1.5B in FY05.151 A third response has been the Partnership for Progress and a Common Future. The G-8 launched this program in 2004 to support political, economic and social reform in the Middle East and North Africa. This program consists of a Forum for the Future, Democracy Assistance Dialogue, literacy and education initiative, and entrepreneurship centers.152 In addition


152 9/11 5 Years Later: Successes and Challenges, 5.
to these high-visibility programs, the U.S. government also provides countless training and assistance programs for foreign government officials and militaries. This includes the U.S. State Department’s anti-terrorism assistance training and U.S. Department of Defense anti-terrorism conferences.\footnote{David A. Denny, “U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program Making Its Mark Overseas,” \url{http://www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2005/ATA24jun05.htm} (accessed September 7, 2006).} The United States has responded to 9/11 through efforts to combat the spread of WMD. Major initiatives include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and the Global Threat Reduction Program.\footnote{9/11 5 Years Later: Successes and Challenges, 12.}

Since 9/11, the United States has attempted to disrupt the financing of terrorists. President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 that blocked over 400 individuals and entities from their assets and isolated them from the U.S. financial system. The Secretary of State has designated forty-two groups as foreign terrorist organizations. This action blocks travel of group members to the United States, freezes their assets held in U.S. financial institutions and makes providing them material support illegal. The Office of Hostage Affairs in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has helped hostages being freed or rescued through interagency and international efforts. Kidnapping has been a key source of terrorist financing and these efforts are helping. The United States also continues to work with other nations to reach agreements to disrupt terrorist finance networks within the international system.\footnote{Ibid., 9-10.}

Of course, the highest profile and most debated responses to 9/11 have involved the U.S. military and combat operations. The first operation was and is Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. The plan for OEF had four phases. Phase one involved the movement of troops into the region and coordination with other countries to operate from or over their territory. This occurred in the weeks following 9/11 and involved countries such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Phase two required air strikes and special operation attacks on al Qaeda and Taliban targets. The attacks began on October 7, 2001 with the basing arrangements from Phase one being completed by the end of the month. Phase three included decisive operations to topple the Taliban regime. By early-December 2001 all major cities were held by coalition forces. OEF is still in phase four,
which involves security and stability operations. The other major military operation has been Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While debatable if OIF was in response to 9/11, OIF is now the centerpiece of the GWOT. Operations began in March 2003 and major military operations ended in April 14, 2003. Three stages have been defined to achieve victory in Iraq, short-term, medium-term and longer-term. The short-term stage is defined as, “Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.” Medium-term means “Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.” Currently, OIF is between the short-term and medium-term stages. In addition to OEF and OIF, U.S. forces have been deployed to Africa, the Philippines and Columbia since 2001 as part of the GWOT. The U.S. military is likely involved in activities in other countries or regions in support of GWOT, but these activities are too numerous and minor to name here.

While these are not all of the responses by the United States to the 9/11 attacks, they do represent the major activities of the United States. The United States has pledged to fight al Qaeda and global terrorism with each instrument of national power to include law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, finances and the military. Therefore, it is not surprising that the number of activities in support of the GWOT are too numerous to list.

C. JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

1. Japanese Red Army

Japan’s security policy relied primarily on domestic policing and capitulating to terrorist demands to protect the lives of hostages. The National Police Agency and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), which has responsibility for the entire Tokyo metropolitan area, have been key in accomplishing domestic policing. These two

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156 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 337-38.


159 Ibid.

organizations were successful in driving the JRA out of Japan. Informal surveillance was one of the ways that they accomplished this feat. Because Japan’s centralized system of police administration is embedded in society, the police can depend on the active cooperation of local businessmen and old people to police themselves.\textsuperscript{161} A major instrument of informal surveillance and cooperation between society and the police is the \textit{koban} (police box). These small police stations are located throughout the country and provide a low-key presence of the police in Japan. The koban provides many services to the community including providing directions, personal counsel and mediation. Additionally, the police that work in the koban account for only 40\% of the total amount of police, but clear 70\% of the crimes.\textsuperscript{162} The koban work as informal listening posts, while providing these services to society. The police perform house calls (with cooperation from business and other associations, these visits are expected and not considered a bad thing) and keep track of all kinds of information on the people living and visiting in their effective areas. This data “could be utilized for other specialized police activities” which would include combating terrorism.\textsuperscript{163} The police used informal surveillance to discover a planned meeting of the Red Army faction and arrested 53 members of the Red Army Faction at Daibosatsu Pass.

In addition to informal surveillance, active surveillance by the police played a large role in driving the JRA out of Japan. Before the JRA began committing terrorist activities and was holding public meetings to gain members, plain-clothes police photographed everyone attending the meeting and also stood in the back of the hall during the meeting. To avoid being identified, the leaders of the JRA had to wear ski masks. The police put JRA members under constant surveillance after the JRA began their attacks and in some cases a member was assigned two to three plain-clothes policemen.\textsuperscript{164} These actions were partly responsible for tracking down the JRA at Haruna and driving them out of Japan.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 64.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 84.
\end{flushright}
Other elements of domestic policing are non-violence and patience. These elements have helped increase cooperation with the police by making their image friendlier to the populace. When the police raided Haruna after the nine-day siege to capture the remaining JRA members, they lost two, but did not create any martyrs. The police operated under the rule “Thou shalt not kill” and it was very effective. Patience has paid off, but it is debatable if that is due to just luck. From the 1980s until present, many members of the JRA have been arrested and tried for their crimes. At the time of JRA’s terrorist acts, Japan could do little internationally and their patience has helped put many of the remaining members of the JRA behind bars. These actions resulted in the Japanese Red Army being removed from the State Department’s list of active terrorist groups in 2001.165

Although it is considered criminal justice and not domestic policing, Japan’s national prison system has also been effective in combating the JRA. While this may seem insignificant, Japan’s system has resulted in many criminals breaking and cooperating with the police, leading to further arrests. Japan’s police are allowed to hold a suspect in a police prison for up to twenty-three days in conditions that were reported as shocking by Amnesty International in 1984.166 Because most radical prisoners are held in isolation and access to others, including their lawyers, is restricted, detaining political prisoners on lesser offenses has been very successful. It is interesting to note that in the Haruna raid, only five members of the JRA were arrested, but it led to an additional eleven members being arrested.

While the above examples demonstrate some of the successes that Japan’s police force had, their policy of capitulating to terrorist demands were not successful. In each of the cases where the Japanese government was involved internationally with the JRA, Japan gave in to terrorist demands. This resulted in a weak image and put Japan in the pocket of the JRA.167 In 1978, Japan publicly stated that they would no longer acquiesce to terrorist demands, but this policy was not tested until 1999. In 1999, four Japanese

166 Katzenstein, “Cultural Norms,” 83.
geologists were taken hostage in Kyrgyzstan and it is rumored that the Japanese government paid their ransom, either directly or through a corporation.\textsuperscript{168} This did not bode well for Japan’s policy on terrorism, but Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi helped reverse this national policy the next time it was tested after 1999 in a 2004 standoff with kidnappers of Japanese citizens in Iraq. Prime Minister Koizumi did not concede to the terrorists and all five Japanese hostages were released.\textsuperscript{169} Although this was not a true test of Japan’s policy because none of the hostages were executed, it is a sign that Japan’s policy is changing from capitulating to terrorist demands to not negotiating with terrorists.

2. \textit{Aum Shinrikyo}

While the JRA provided Japan with an international left-wing target, Aum Shinrikyo posed many domestic problems for the Japanese. The Japanese police are often criticized for not identifying the violent potential of the Aum Shinrikyo group, particularly given their acquisition of a considerable arms cache. The Religious Corporations Law greatly hamstrung police efforts against Aum Shinrikyo members. Once Aum Shinrikyo received their approval as an official religion, the police backed off. Even when the police had information that linked Aum Shinrikyo to various events they failed to use it due to religious freedom and separation of church and state.\textsuperscript{170} This taboo was obviously very difficult for the NPA and MPD to overcome. In 1996, the Justice Ministry’s Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) attempted to invoke the Anti-Subversive Activities Law to disband Aum Shinrikyo. This use of the law resulted in protests by many human rights and religious groups and in 1997 the request was denied. It was not until 1999 that the Japanese government finally passed a law to deal with a terrorist organization like Aum Shinrikyo. This law allows state security officials to “enter and search the facilities of groups that have committed indiscriminate mass murder over the past ten years.”\textsuperscript{171} PSIA invoked this law and Aum Shinrikyo was officially


\textsuperscript{169} Curtin.

\textsuperscript{170} Katzenstein, “Cultural Norms,” 72.

\textsuperscript{171} Dorman.
targeted. Another problem that plagued Japanese law enforcement was the fact that the system depended heavily on confessions forced by questionable interrogation techniques and not the painstaking detective work or forensic science techniques used by Western law enforcement agencies.\textsuperscript{172} Without using wiretaps and undercover work, the police did not stand a chance against a highly organized and tight-knit group like Aum Shinrikyo. Even when the police finally raided Aum Shinrikyo’s facilities on the charge of land fraud, it was handled like most Japanese police raids. It was highly staged, with tons of cops and media. Additionally, it was announced in advance and therefore did not turn up anything of value.\textsuperscript{173} Another problem with the Japanese system is the lack of a national investigative authority. This forced local police forces to investigate Aum Shinrikyo activities, but usually these investigations took a backseat to each locality’s more important issues. Rivalries between local police forces and the Tokyo police also resulted in information not being shared. The Japanese Security Bureau, an intelligence agency, noted Aum Shinrikyo’s international activities, but also did not share information.\textsuperscript{174}

Even though the police had problems dealing directly with Aum Shinrikyo, they still performed many of their functions well. After the subway attacks, the people of Japan wanted to be reassured that they were being protected. Under the social norms that exist in Japan, citizens were willing to see certain constitutional rights ignored.\textsuperscript{175} In response to the subway attacks, the Self Defense Force (SDF) was mobilized for the first time since 1960 for an internal security threat and the police deployed up to 60,000 personnel in the streets. Additionally, the police obtained search warrants, arrested Aum Shinrikyo members on minor charges, and used isolation and interrogation methods to obtain more information.\textsuperscript{176} These methods were applied with the typical patience exemplified by the NPA and MPD.

\textsuperscript{172} Kaplan, 64.
\textsuperscript{173} Kaplan, 65.
\textsuperscript{174} Kaplan, 149.
\textsuperscript{175} Katzenstein, “Cultural Norms,” 192.
\textsuperscript{176} Katzenstein, “Cultural Norms,” 192.
3. Responses to Other Terrorist Threats

While Japan was dealing with the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, other nations were dealing with terrorist threats. Japan was aware of other nation’s battles with terrorism and since terrorism existed within Japan, Japan should have assessed other terrorist threats, but they did not.

In the case of the JRA, Japan was satisfied with its efforts to drive them abroad and were “uninterested in and misjudged the significance of the fact that Japanese terrorists were operating abroad.” \(^{177}\) Because Japan was unaware of the link between the PFLP and the JRA, the government of Japan was caught by surprise by the JRA and PFLP attack on the U.S. and Swedish embassies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1975. This alone should have forced Japan to assess other terrorist threats, but by the 1980s, JRA’s international operations and importance were in decline, and did not force Japan to assess other threats. The Oslo Agreement and changes in Syrian policy in the 1990s forced the JRA out of the Middle East and with the arrests of most of their cadre, the JRA ceased to be a threat. \(^{178}\) Therefore, Japan did not have to assess other terrorist threats up to the time Aum Shinrikyo became a threat.

When Aum Shinrikyo was recognized as a religious group under the Religious Corporations Law in 1989, they were allowed to operate without interference from Japan’s police forces due to a long standing taboo that insists on the strict separation of church and state in Japan. \(^{179}\) Therefore, while the police forces of Japan were aware of left-wing radicals, like the members of the JRA, they did not examine the activities of religious sects even if there was the appearance of criminal conduct. Prior to the sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, Japan did not conceive of religious sects as serious threats to state security. \(^{180}\) Unfortunately, Aum Shinrikyo did not change Japan’s perspective. Following the attacks, Japan focused on ensuring that Aum Shinrikyo would

\(^{177}\) Katzenstein, “September 11 in Comparative Perspective,” 48.

\(^{178}\) Ibid.

\(^{179}\) Katzenstein, “Cultural Norms,” 72.

\(^{180}\) Katzenstein, “September 11 in Comparative Perspective,” 52.
not be a threat to Japan again. The law that was passed only applies to groups that have committed indiscriminate mass murders over a ten-year span.181

Throughout the 1990s, the G-8 and other nations were unequivocally advancing antiterrorism policies, but Japan did not declare terrorism as a threat to national security.182 This has to do with Japan’s perspective on terrorism. Japanese usually are referring to foreign terrorists operating outside of Japan and do not consider international terrorism a threat. Additionally, Japan does not have many of the different types of global terrorist groups that other countries face (eco-terrorists, ethnic hate groups, anti-abortion organizations, or animal right organizations) operating within Japan.183 This viewpoint and the focus on Aum Shinrikyo prevented Japan from assessing other terrorist threats prior to 9/11 and the GWOT.

4. **Global War on Terrorism**

The 9/11 attacks resulted in considerable changes with Japan. Japanese responses included economic support to the United States and Iraq, participation of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the Global War on Terrorism, and new laws that enabled Japan to actively fight the GWOT.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers, Prime Minister Koizumi pledged his country’s support to the United States. In his speech, he used tough language to describe the attacks in which twenty-four Japanese lost their lives calling them “unforgivable.”184 On September 19, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi outlined Japan’s initial response to the terrorist attacks. Japan’s basic policy considered the terrorist attacks a threat to their national security and that they would actively engage in the fight against terrorism. Additionally, Japan would support the United States and other countries in the Global War on Terror. This basic policy also included specific measures that the Government of Japan would implement. These seven-point immediate measures included:

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181 Dorman.
183 Ibid.
1. “The Government of Japan (GOJ) will promptly take measures necessary for dispatching the Self-Defense Force (SDF) for providing support, including medical services, transportation and supply, to the US forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks, which have been recognized as a threat to international peace and security in the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1368.”

2. “GOJ will promptly take measures necessary for further strengthening protection of facilities and areas of the US forces and important facilities in Japan.”

3. “GOJ will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather information.”

4. “GOJ will strengthen international co-operation, including information sharing, in areas such as immigration control.”

5. “GOJ will extend humanitarian, economic and other necessary assistance to surrounding and affected countries. As a part of this assistance, GOJ will extend emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India, which are co-operating with the United States in this emergency situation.”

6. “GOJ will provide assistance to the displaced persons as necessary. This will include the possibility of humanitarian assistance by SDF.”

7. “GOJ, in co-operation with other countries, will take appropriate measures in response to the changing situation to avoid confusion in the international and domestic economic systems.”

In addition to the seven point emergency measures, Prime Minister Koizumi also pledged $10 million in economic support to the United States for rescue assistance. To enable the seven point emergency measures, a new law was passed called the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Passed on 29 October, this law allows Japan to support the international fight against terrorism on its own initiative. The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was a show of great support for the United States. However, this law is not permanent and will expire in two years, but does include a clause to extend it for an additional two years. The law initially would have expired in

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2003, but was extended to 2005 and again to 2006. On November 9, 2001, SDF Aegis cruisers left Japan for the Indian Ocean and provided rear area logistical support for the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. The GOJ also provided refugee assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan through the SDF, international institutions, and Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They also approved emergency measures to provide additional support to Pakistan and Tajikistan, while economic measures were taken to freeze terrorist funds. The GOJ also undertook diplomatic efforts to promote cooperation on the GWOT. These efforts were only the beginning.

The GOJ established the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq law to provide support to the war in Iraq. This law was passed on July 26, 2003, and provides a structure to allow Japan to provide assistance to Iraq. Specifically, it allowed the SDF to deploy to Iraq and provide support to the Iraqi people. Activities conducted included “medical services, water supply, rehabilitation and maintenance of schools and other public facilities and transportation of materials such as those for humanitarian and reconstruction use and others.” Additionally, SDF aircraft transported materials between Kuwait, Iraq and the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf. The SDF and its materials departed Japan for Kuwait on the 20th and 21st of February 2004. They trained in Kuwait and then deployed to Samawah, Iraq where they

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194 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Outline of the Basic Plan.”
carried out their missions. The GOJ also provided economic support to the United States. In addition to a $1.5 billion grant to provide for immediate reconstruction needs in Iraq, the GOJ provided up to $3.5 billion in concessional loans to the United States to meet medium-term reconstruction needs. Beyond the economic support provided to the United States, Japan also provided economic support to Iraq through international organizations.

The GOJ was constrained by their constitution to combating international terrorism through economic aid and cooperation. The GWOT has allowed Japan to have a direct hand in combating terrorism abroad through the use of their defense forces. While the SDF is not allowed to participate in any offensive operations, they deployed and provided support. Additionally, the GOJ has passed new laws to allow this participation. This is also a difference from the previous two case studies. While much has changed, some things have not. Although Prime Minister Koizumi quickly stated that Japan would provide support to the United States, the GOJ proceeded with their usual patience prior to passing the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law and the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. The hostage incident in Iraq in 2004 was also a valuable event for the GOJ in substantiating their international policy on terrorism and kidnapping. This incident occurred when Muslim militants took three Japanese volunteer workers hostage and threatened to kill the Japanese unless Japan’s troops were pulled from Iraq. Prime Minister Koizumi refused to withdraw the Japanese self-defense forces and the hostages were released.

In summary, Japan began to take action on terrorist threats after 9/11. They instituted some laws that resulted in antiterrorism measures, cooperated with other nations to improve the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and participated in terrorism

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Unfortunately, the new antiterrorism laws address only overseas and regional situations and leave Japan unprepared for domestic attacks. Japan has instituted other laws that deal with direct attacks, but direct attack is defined ambiguously in deference to Japan’s peace constitution. The laws are not meant to change Japan, but instead to chip away at the politically sensitive issue of constitutional amendment. Additionally, measures were adopted to increase security procedures, but seem inadequate. For example, the NPA armed their personnel with 1,000 automatic rifles and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) created a special ten-man unit within the Policy Coordination Division headed by an ambassador in charge of terrorism. Therefore, by U.S. standards, Japan’s counterterrorism policy is more of a stance. It lacks the basic points that make up a policy, a definition of terrorism, threat assessments and the designation of foreign terrorist organizations. The NPA and PSIA have defined terrorism, but neither has the responsibility to punish terrorists. Threat assessments are critical to determining policy priorities and designating foreign terrorist organizations helps prevent transnational terrorists from crossing borders. Japan needs to address these shortcomings to move from a half-hearted policy to a full-fledged counterterrorism policy.

D. COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES

The United States has responded to the attacks of 9/11 by using every instrument of national power against al Qaeda and in support of the GWOT. This comparison will utilize these instruments of national power to evaluate the U.S. and Japanese responses to the terrorist events covered in this thesis.

A comparison of law enforcement responses shows many similarities. In response to 9/11, the United States passed laws to establish the DHS and increase counterterrorism capabilities, while Japan also passed laws to increase counterterrorism capabilities and added a special unit on counterterrorism to an existing division within MoFA. The major difference is the scope of efforts. The U.S. establishment of the DHS is a major bureaucratic effort to reorganize the government of the United States, while

199 Miyasaka, 51.


201 Miyasaka, 51.
Japan did not attempt to change their government’s structure. Japan’s change has been minor and not surprisingly, ineffective, while the verdict is still out on the effectiveness of the DHS. Japan’s other efforts in law enforcement after 9/11 have been mostly symbolic, such as arming the police with 1,000 automatic rifles. This is surprising considering the success Japan experienced in using law enforcement to drive the JRA from Japan in the early-1970s. Japan’s law enforcement system was not effective against Aum Shinrikyo, but they did pass laws after the 1995 subway attacks to deal with the group.

Intelligence reform comparisons reflect major differences. The United States has reorganized the U.S. intelligence community and has made many changes in how intelligence is gathered and used. 9/11 and the lack of information sharing that contributed to the attacks not being stopped, is slowly being addressed. Japan successfully used intelligence against the JRA while they were a domestic threat, but since then they have struggled to have an effective intelligence community. Japan is still facing this challenge today.

In contrast with intelligence efforts, U.S. and Japanese efforts to use diplomacy against terrorism have been similar. Both countries put weight behind the theory that supplying aid to a country will improve the conditions for its citizens and therefore, will decrease the chances that terrorist will be created and spread. Japan has dealt with the international JRA and the al Qaeda threat in roughly the same manner by spending money to make the problem go away. The major difference between the United States and Japan has been Japan’s reliance on capitulating to terrorist demands. While Prime Minister Koizumi was successful in dealing with terrorists in Iraq, it remains to be seen how Japan will react to terrorists in the future.

Preventing terrorist financing has been a priority for the United States and Japan since 9/11. This is in contrast with Japan’s earlier experiences with terrorism where Japan tended to be oblivious of the international terrorist threats. Only when reminded of their dealings with Aum Shinrikyo during the 9/11 attacks did Japan act. It is difficult to determine if this was due to the U.S.-Japan security alliance or if Japan really perceived an external terrorist threat to their sovereignty.
The United States and Japan have both responded with their uniformed services, but their responses are inherently different. Japan has been restrained by their constitution and the government’s interpretation of it. The Self-Defense Forces of Japan were never used to respond to the JRA and they were only used after the Aum Shinrikyo subway attacks to essentially provide peace of mind. Only with new laws and a broad interpretation of Japan’s constitution were the Self-Defense Forces able to participate in rear-echelon support of coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and provide reconstruction forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. In contrast, the United States has arguably used the military as its primary response against terrorism through the GWOT.
V. JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM

A. INTRODUCTION

Japan has had successes and failures in dealing with terrorism. Some responses that Japan has used successfully in combating terrorism include the use of public diplomacy to undermine public support of terrorism, patience and the integration of law enforcement into society. Patience has also worked against Japanese efforts versus terrorism. Japan’s inconsistent application of terrorism policies has also been negative. These successes and failures define the Japanese homeland security paradigm. After elucidating the Japanese homeland security paradigm, Japan’s perception of their homeland security paradigm is analyzed as well as how the paradigm applies to other terrorist threats in Asia.

B. SUCCESSFUL JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

The GOJ has effectively used public diplomacy to combat terrorism. While battling the JRA, the Japanese government used media to portray the Red Army as enemies to society. This image was internalized by the Japanese people and ensured public support of domestic policing efforts, resulting in the JRA moving abroad. In the Aum Shinrikyo case, it became a national pastime to ridicule Aum Shinrikyo. Due to its status as a religious organization, this did not have the effect desired. With the GWOT, the GOJ made the United States’ campaign appear defensive in nature and secured a majority approval from its citizens for its actions. Patience was also used successfully.

Patience is a part of the Japanese national character. The Japanese seldom rush into decisions and approach a problem from all angles before taking action. In their battle against terrorism, it has helped and hurt them. By being patient and allowing the international situation to change, the GOJ has arrested most of the JRA members. This has effectively destroyed this organization. With the GWOT, the Japanese Diet took its time deliberating over the wording of both new laws that were passed to allow Japan’s participation. While not satisfying all members of their government, the carefully justified participation in the Global War on Terrorism is largely supported by the population.

202 Wortzel.
The final successful response covered here is the integration of law enforcement into society. While the Japanese police agencies have trampled civil liberties, they have integrated themselves into society to the point where these injustices are not even considered a nuisance by the society as a whole. Imagine the response of a neighborhood in the United States where the police went door to door asking personal questions. However, this convenience store approach to law enforcement, where citizens come to a police box and order what they need, pays huge dividends with information collection. Additionally, surveillance has played a large role in the police’s success. Tie this to favorable interpretations of law enabling the police to hold suspects in unfavorable conditions for a period of time and it results in obtaining good information. These methods are effective in undercutting a terrorist network’s safe havens.

C. UNSUCCESSFUL JAPANESE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

On the negative side, inconsistency in terrorism policies has hurt Japan. To date, Japan lacks a coherent policy for combating terrorism. All actions have been reactionary. In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, Japan had to pass a special law just to get surveillance approved on the group after the subway attacks. Unless Japan enacts further reforms, a religious group meeting Japan’s national definition of a religion could easily perpetrate a terrorist act similar to Aum Shinrikyo. On the international front, not having a true policy can hurt. Giving in to terrorists and then saying you will no longer give in, only to cave again, does not help a country’s reputation. The Iraq hostage situation was not a very good test of Japan’s policy.

While patience has been a successful response for Japan, it has also had negative repercussions. The Aum Shinrikyo case best exemplifies this. Japan still has not changed anything regarding the Religious Corporations Law. While waiting out both the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, each terrorist group carried out attacks within Japan. Even while their citizens were begging for action, the police and government moved with typical slowness. Flexibility to deal with different situations will be required for success.

D. JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM

It is apparent that Japan responded to terrorist events as described in the previous chapters. Some of these responses have been successful and others have been unsuccessful, but is this a paradigm? As Peter J. Katzenstein points out, Japan’s history
of dealing with terrorism follows four basic principles. These include focusing on non-military policy instruments, an inherent domestic focus, unique domestic policing and an exception to policy based on religion. 203 Japan’s responses to the JRA, Aum Shinrikyo and 9/11 follow this paradigm.

Japan’s constitution and national character, which favors pacifism since World War II, have forced Japan to focus on a broader set of policy instruments than just focusing on military instruments, to include economic aid and international cooperation. Japan’s economic aid increased to Syria to restrict the movement of JRA terrorists in that country when Japan’s royal family went abroad in the 1970s. 204 Japan resumed economic aid to Pakistan for its efforts to combat terrorism after 9/11. 205 Japan cooperated with Russia and shared information on Aum Shinrikyo in the aftermath of the 1995 subway attacks. 206 In addition to economic aid and international cooperation, Japan was also able to rely on patience. Japan waited for the international environment to change before being able to deal with JRA internationally. Japan’s cooperation with Russia to combat Aum Shinrikyo would not have been possible due to the international system in 1980s and Japan would have never been able to respond to 9/11 as they did without the 1995 subway attacks.

While Japan has used policy instruments in the international environment, their efforts to combat terrorism have typically been domestically focused. Japan thought little about the JRA once they were driven abroad. 207 Japan offered little to no cooperation with Russia before the 1995 subway attacks as it attempted to deal with Aum Shinrikyo. Even though Japan has provided support to the U.S. GWOT, a large percentage of Japan’s population has trouble understanding what terrorist threat al Qaeda or radical Islamic terrorism poses to its sovereignty.

204 Ibid., 49.
Japan has been marked by the uniqueness of its domestic policing. Surveillance and information collection that would probably be considered illegal in other countries proved extremely successful in driving the JRA abroad. Japan’s domestic policing may be part of the reason that al Qaeda has been unable to strike an attack in Japan.

While Japan’s domestic policing has been successful against the JRA and possibly radical Islamic terrorism, it failed against Aum Shinrikyo. A line marks Japan’s paradigm that Japanese police do not like to cross when dealing with religious groups. Not only was Japan completely surprised by the emergence and destructiveness of Aum Shinrikyo, they were completely unable to react. Eventually, one law was changed to deal with Aum Shinrikyo’s situation. A law that will probably not work against future religious groups that turn violent.

E. THE JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM AND OTHER THREATS

In the past, Japan had to deal with indigenous terrorist groups like JRA and Aum Shinrikyo. However, Japan’s economic involvement in Southeast Asia and participation in GWOT has opened Japan to a new set of terrorist threats. Japan’s homeland security paradigm will be challenged in dealing with these new threats.

Japan received its first threat from al Qaeda in October 2003. This came in the form of a videotape on which Bin Ladin threatened the United States and its allies, including Japan, with suicide attacks. In November 2003, al Qaeda directly threatened Japan with terrorist attacks if it sent troops to Iraq and Abu Mohamed al-Ablaj, a known al Qaeda operative, sent an e-mail to Al-Majallah, an Arab language weekly, claiming that Tokyo would be easy to destroy.

In addition to the new threats from al Qaeda, the terrorist threat from Southeast Asia is growing. The GWOT is increasing in this region as the United States and the Philippines cooperate on counter-terror operations in that country and terrorist attacks

\[208\] Katzenstein, “September 11 in Comparative Perspective,” 52.

continue to occur within the region. Additionally, in Spring 2005, intelligence sources tracked an al Qaeda operative from Pakistan to Southeast Asia where he was rumored to be setting up a terrorist cell to attack Japan. This threat was emphasized by an attack on a Toyota auto showroom in Indonesia in December 2002. Jemaah Islamiah terrorists have also threatened Japan. Japan’s investment in the region and the large amount of Japanese nationals that live in the Philippines and Indonesia, make Japan an inviting target for Jemaah Islamiah and other Southeast Asian terrorists.

So, how will the Japanese homeland security paradigm work against these new threats? To answer this question, the basic principles of the paradigm need to be applied against the threat.

Non-military policy instruments will be very important for Japan. Japan has good relationships with the nations of Southeast Asia and has provided close to 12 trillion yen in economic assistance to the region since 1954. In addition to providing economic assistance, Japan is also providing counterterrorism assistance. One initiative is through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In 2004, through the APEC Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Initiative, Japan provided seven airports in Southeast Asia and three seaports in Indonesia with security equipment, hosted a Port Security Seminar for Southeast Asian countries, and held the Head of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting in Tokyo. Through these measures, Japan is seeking to defuse factors that contribute to terrorism.

Japan must battle its inherent domestic focus and the exceptions it grants to religious organizations. Japan’s politicians need to continue with efforts that make the Japanese public aware of the threats against Japan. Only through understanding, will the

210 Ferguson.
212 Ferguson.
213 Ibid.
public support Japan’s efforts in the GWOT. With the threat specifically from radical
Islamic terrorists, Japan should evaluate its laws and capabilities versus threats from
religious groups operating in Japan. These two basic principles are limiting factors in the
Japanese homeland security paradigm working against these new threats.

The final principle of the Japanese homeland security paradigm is Japan’s unique
domestic policing. Japan has a Muslim community that consists of around 80,000
immigrants from Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Iran and Turkey. While Japan is restricted in
targeting religious organizations, they have no problems using racial profiling in an
extremely homogenous population. It is suspected that Japan is using its unique domestic
policing model to keep a close eye on its Muslim community.216

Although Japan needs to convince its population of the international terrorist
threat to Japan and have to deal with an ingrained taboo with investigating religious
organizations, their domestic policing policies and international cooperation bode well in
combating al Qaeda and other Southeast Asian terrorists.

216 Olimpio.
VI. U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE JAPANESE PARADIGM

A. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. responses to the 9/11 attacks covered in Chapter IV have deficiencies. These include problems within the Department of Homeland Security, the lack of a forward-looking strategic plan, border security and procedures not based on a layered defense, and deficiencies in identifying terrorists and attacking their finances. Because these are only some of the deficiencies in the U.S. response, the United States should look to other countries to learn from their successes and failures. Japan has had to respond to terrorists, including the Japanese Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo, and their homeland security paradigm should be investigated to gain insight into what successes the United States could integrate and which failures they should not integrate into their homeland security system.

B. DEFICIENCIES IN THE U.S. RESPONSES TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS

With regards to the newly established Department of Homeland Security, there are many areas where deficiencies still exist. The establishment of the department alone will not make the United States safer and there remain concerns about the effectiveness of an extremely large and complex department.\(^{217}\) In addition to the department’s mandate to unify government efforts, it must also work with the private sector to ensure preparedness. However, the private sector remains unprepared for a terrorist attack. What is needed is a National Preparedness Standard that includes evacuation plans, a communication capability, and a plan that addresses continuity. The compatibility and adequacy of communications between “public safety organizations, chief administrative officers, state emergency management agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security” remains a problem.\(^{218}\) Additionally, other gaps in U.S. homeland security, such as the “development of port security plans, and improving security of transportation networks aside from airports,” need to be addressed.\(^{219}\) The Patriot Act, while important,

\(^{217}\) O’Hanlon, x.

\(^{218}\) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 397.

\(^{219}\) O’Hanlon, xi.
still needs to be informally debated by the nation’s institutions and the fine line between civil liberties and security must be established. Cooperation, generosity and community can provide a foundation in the face of the terrorist threat.\textsuperscript{220}

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the TSA, which became a department in the DHS after its creation. The TSA is responsible for transportation security in the United States. It has deployed a significant workforce of baggage and passenger screeners (currently more than 43,000), as well as federal air marshals. With this workforce, the TSA has been screening 100 percent of checked luggage for explosives.\textsuperscript{221} The TSA has coordinated with local mass transit agencies to assess vulnerabilities while increasing emergency preparedness training and conducting emergency drills. U.S. port security has also been addressed with the Coast Guard using new security guidelines to perform risk assessments at U.S. ports. The Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have also been active in strengthening U.S. port security.\textsuperscript{222} The Homeland Security Act created the DHS, which combined more than twenty existing federal agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard and INS.\textsuperscript{223}

The Maritime Transportation Security Act created a security program for all U.S. ports by requiring vulnerability assessments and security plans for vessels and port facilities that could include screening procedures, security patrols, identification procedures, access control measures, surveillance equipment and establishing restricted

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    \item[220] Don Hazen, “Future Tense: A Path Out of the Nightmare of 9/11,” \textit{After 9/11: Solutions for a Saner World} edited by Don Hazen, Tate Hausman, Tamara Straus and Michelle Chihara (San Francisco: Independent Media Institute, 2001), 127.
    
    
    
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All three of these acts mandate the development of strategic plans to ensure the security of critical areas of the U.S. transportation sector by the DHS and TSA, but current efforts demonstrate the lack of a forward-looking strategic plan. Additionally, a layered security system needs to be implemented. A layered security system has multiple levels that each protect and reduce the risk of a terrorist attack.

Using 9/11 as an example, some of the terrorists traveled to the United States on expired visas, used phony identification, were allowed to board planes and then take over the planes. A layered security system would have checks and preventative measures at each level to prevent a terrorist attack from occurring. While weaknesses with the U.S. border security and immigration system have been reduced, problem areas still exist. The merging of border agencies into one new department means that some lessons learned about terrorist travel have not been instituted into U.S. border security. A focus on travel documents at every phase of the U.S. border security and immigration system needs to be established with the appropriate technology to accomplish the task. While the new biometric screening system is a step in the right direction, the only people covered by the system are visitors who obtain U.S. visas to travel to the United States. The effort to stop the financing of terrorist activities has evolved since 9/11, but more efforts are required on the diplomatic front to identify and name individuals and groups as terrorists. A focus needs to be placed on what methods future terrorists will use to meet their financing needs. As with the list of changes, the list of critiques can also go on and on, but it is readily apparent that despite the post-9/11 changes, more work is required.

C. THE JAPANESE HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM APPLIED

In the 2003 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the United States developed a “4D” strategy to “defeat terrorists and their organizations” and “defend U.S.


225 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 391.


228 Ibid., 382–83.
citizens and interests at home and abroad.” This consists of the following tenets: “deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.” The Japanese homeland security paradigm will be applied to this “4D” strategy as Japan’s experiences parallel U.S. experiences.

There are parallels between Japanese experiences with terrorism and the United States’ experiences. Of course, the major parallel is that both the United States and Japan are involved in the GWOT. Japan has deployed troops even if they are restricted by Japan’s pacifist constitution. Both countries are also using non-military policy instruments to combat terrorism. With the JRA, Japan faced both a domestic and international foe in a long, drawn battle, much like the United States is facing in its battle against al Qaeda and the GWOT. Japan’s experiences with Aum Shinrikyo also have parallels with the U.S. experience. Aum Shinrikyo came out of nowhere, had religious connotations, and struck a terrible blow with their sarin gas attacks on Tokyo’s subway system. These parallels allow the application of the Japanese homeland security paradigm to the U.S. “4D” strategy.

Following the U.S. “4D” strategy, to “defeat terrorists and their organizations” the United States must use non-military policy instruments to “deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit” in addition to the military instrument of national power. Japan has used economic aid, international cooperation, media impressions and patience. Many would argue that since Japan has had to depend on these methods, they have used them better than the United States. Based upon this assertion, it may even be plausible that the United States has modeled its economic aid programs off of Japan. USAID and the Millennium Challenge Account both have goals similar to Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Country Assistance Programs.

International cooperation is another element of Japan’s non-military policy instruments. Due to constitutional restrictions, Japan has had to use international cooperation to combat terrorism. The main lesson that the United States can learn from

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Japan in this capacity is that an isolationist view will not work and that you have to work with other countries to be successful in combating terrorism. While the United States is still working on its use of international diplomacy, its international cooperation programs exceed those of Japan. What Japan has done better is relying on other countries to make changes that benefit Japan’s policies.

Another aspect of Japan’s non-military policy instruments is the use of media for public diplomacy. Japan has been able to control aspects of their media to portray government views to the public. This has resulted in intense public pressure on extremist groups. The United States, due to its own unique past, may never be able to control the media to the extent that Japan has been able to do. However, more cooperation to get across government views may be possible.

Using only non-military policy instruments has also forced Japan to depend on patience for the international environment to change before being able to act. This is a lesson that could be very valuable to the United States as it realizes that it cannot go the distance all by itself.

Domestic policing will also be important to “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit.” Japan has integrated their policing into society. This is something the United States may never be able to do as well as Japan. One step in this direction is the U.S. use of the Patriot Act. While many argue that the Patriot Act oversteps constitutional bounds by restricting U.S. citizens’ rights, it also has made the job of domestic policing easier through the easing of tight restrictions on U.S. law enforcement agencies. Even though Japan has arguably done better than the United States in domestic policing, it is unlikely that the Patriot Act was modeled after Japan’s efforts. As a homogenous society, Japan is able to utilize cultural traits in tipping the balance between effective policies and individual rights. While this is not possible in the United States to the degree that Japan has been able to do, the United States may be able to reach more effective policies through public debate.

The Japanese homeland security paradigm contains elements that the United States should avoid. These elements are a tendency to focus on domestic policy and a

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taboo for investigating religious organizations. In its battles against the JRA and Aum Shinrikyo, Japan had a tendency to ignore international cooperation prior to terrorist attacks and reacting by utilizing international cooperation. An effective counterterrorism policy tries not to be reactive, but proactive. This lesson is valuable for the United States as it reforms its bureaucracy to fight the GWOT. The United States should also pay heed to Japan’s experiences with Aum Shinrikyo. Although religious organizations should be respected, they must not be ignored or allowed to operate illegally. This is another valuable aspect of the Japanese homeland security paradigm.

What is surprising is how easy it could be for the U.S. bureaucracy to implement lessons gleaned from the Japanese homeland security paradigm. Reducing the dependence on the use of the military national instrument of power in favor of other instruments is a policy decision that the President could implement. Japan’s unique domestic policy may be impossible to implement in the United States, but what may be possible is public debate and initial policies that begin integrating U.S. law enforcement into the society. By making U.S. law enforcement more accessible to the general public and creating a more positive image, steps in the Japanese direction can be made. The United States, since 9/11, has focused its attention internationally to combat terrorism and seems to be heeding Japan’s lesson. The same can be said about dealing with religious organizations.
VII. CONCLUSION

A. U.S. PRIORITIES AND STRATEGY

Currently, the top priorities for the United States include combating terrorism and ensuring that the U.S. homeland is secure against terrorist attacks. To achieve these goals, the U.S. has developed a “4D” strategy. The tenets of this strategy are: “Defeat terrorists and their organizations, Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists, Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.”

B. GWOT PROGRESS TO DATE

In a speech on October 6, 2005, President Bush summed up the results the administration has had to date in pursuing this strategy. Some of these results include the United States and its allies having killed or captured most of the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks, some of bin Ladin’s senior deputies, along with al Qaeda managers and operatives in more than 24 countries, the terrorist responsible for the USS Cole bombing, a senior Zarqawi terrorist planner, the mastermind behind both the Jakarta and first Bali bombings, and many of al Qaeda’s senior leadership that were in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the United States has reorganized its government and reformed its intelligence agencies to improve homeland defense and track enemy activity. These efforts, along with those of U.S. allies, have also resulted in the disruption of at least ten al Qaeda terrorist plots in the post 9/11 era. Additionally, at least five al Qaeda attempts to case targets in the United States have also been stopped. The United States and its allies have also claimed success for the termination of a nuclear technology black-market led by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. During this time frame, Libya gave up its long-range ballistic missile, chemical weapon and nuclear weapons programs. The Proliferation Security Initiative resulted in at least twelve shipments of suspected weapons technology being stopped. This also included equipment for Iran’s ballistic missile program. Other claims of success include the progress being made in

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232 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 1.
233 Ibid., 15.
Afghanistan against the remnants of the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, the work with Pakistan to defeat the militant extremists in that country, and the fight against terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq.\textsuperscript{235} Despite these claims of success, there are problems with the current strategy and claims.

C. HOMELAND SECURITY PROBLEMS TO DATE

As far as strategy is concerned, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, established by the former members of the 9/11 commission, released reports on how the United States was progressing in its homeland security endeavors in the four years since the attacks on the United States. Unfortunately, the results of these reports have been less than promising. Out of 41 grades given by the project, only one area received an “A” and this grade was an “A minus”. This grade was given for the Bush administration’s efforts in attacking terrorist financing. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project gave “F’s” on homeland security spending in regards to cities most at risk, radio communications among emergency agencies, and airline passenger prescreening efforts.\textsuperscript{236} In addition to these poor grades, the project also feels that the sense of urgency that was apparent immediately after 9/11 has faded away and resulted in stalled efforts to make the United States safer. The TSA is relaxing standards on airline passenger carry-ons.\textsuperscript{237} The allocations of homeland security funds are being criticized as new risk assessment based models are being used to distribute funds.\textsuperscript{238} Other problems include the struggle that U.S. government agencies have had in establishing and defining the criteria and standards that are required to measure organizational performance.\textsuperscript{239} In addition to these problems with U.S. strategy, there are also problems with the administration’s claims.

The problems with the administration’s claims have to do with measurement issues. Although the United States claims that $200 million has been confiscated from

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terrorists, terrorists are still capable of raising money and transferring additional funds. Progress made by claiming the capture or eradication of terrorists does not mean that a terrorist organization has not grown or decentralized into a more “resilient adversary.”

Another issue has to do with unintended consequences and how to measure their impact. Some examples of these include “diverting scarce resources from one policy area to another, increasing spending and possibly adding to the budget deficit, or eroding civil liberties.” These problems in strategy and the measuring of anti-terrorism effectiveness create a dilemma.

D. PROBLEMS WITH MEASURING HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRESS

According to Hoffman and Morrison-Taw’s pre-9/11 qualitative research on countering terrorism, a comprehensive national plan is essential to the success of a counterterrorism campaign. This plan should consist of an “effective overall command and coordination structure” with “legitimizing’ measures” that “must be taken by the government to build public trust and support, combined with anti-terrorist legislation sensitive to public sentiments” and “coordination within and between intelligence services,” and there must be “collaboration among governments and security forces of different countries.” The dilemma comes when comparing the claims of the Bush administration with the critiques of U.S. strategy in light of the importance of a national plan and its elements.

A post-9/11 method of measuring homeland security progress can be obtained by utilizing two of Stephen Flynn’s “principles.” His sixth principle is, “Deterrence Value of Homeland Security.” The simple theory is that if no attacks against the United States have taken place since 9/11, then the U.S. homeland security system is working. What if terrorists are only waiting for the opportune time to attack and it just has not happened yet? Flynn’s first principle, “Fail Safe Security is Unachievable and

240 Perl, 5.
241 Ibid., 5.

69
Counterproductive,” addresses this counterargument.\textsuperscript{244} This principle can be used to back up the U.S. government claims that homeland security progress is real and while it is not fail-safe, enough progress has been made to either prevent or deter attacks within the United States. While this basic method of measuring success can be used, it does not imply that much more can be done to improve the system. It is with these kinds of concerns that the United States should keep in mind the successes and failures of other countries in its battle against terrorism.

E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis focused on the Japanese homeland security paradigm and how it can be applied to the United States in light of the insufficient responses following the 9/11 attacks.

Following the U.S. “4D” strategy, to “defeat terrorists and their organizations” the United States must use non-military policy instruments to “deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit” in addition to the military.\textsuperscript{245} Patience can also be used, but the United States needs to be careful of not falling into Japan’s pattern of always reacting slowly. Domestic policing will be key. Proper policing will deny terrorists their sanctuary and support and also “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.”\textsuperscript{246} The United States must avoid inconsistency. This applies to policy and actions across the fight against global terrorism. Different cultures and situations can result in different approaches and solutions to similar problems that two countries share. Currently, the United States is involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. North Korea is still a problem and rising Islamic radicalism is an increasing threat. These reasons point towards reaching out and learning from other countries.

While not all-inclusive, this thesis points out a road that the United States could follow. The study of other countries and their approaches to the difficult challenge of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{244} Flynn, 165.
\item \textsuperscript{245} National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 15-24.
\item \textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 22.
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countering terrorism and its importance cannot be understated. It is with this hope that the Japanese homeland security paradigm is integrated into the U.S. approach in the GWOT.
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