NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Mark L. Heredia

November 2006

1 The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
# North American Security Cooperation: Prospects For Growth

**Title:** North American Security Cooperation: Prospects For Growth

**Performing Organization:** University of Denver

**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**REPORT DATE**
01 NOV 2006

**REPORT TYPE**
N/A

**DATES COVERED**
- 

**AUTHOR(S)**

**PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
University of Denver

**SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**ABSTRACT**

**SUBJECT TERMS**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
UU

**NUMBER OF PAGES**
306

**NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
unclassified
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

at

THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

Upon the recommendation of the Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, this dissertation is hereby accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

to:

Mark L. Heredia

Dr. Karen Feste
Professor in Charge of Dissertation

Tom Farer, Dean, Graduate School of International Studies

Date
ABSTRACT

This study seeks to explore the possibilities for expanded security arrangements between North American states. What are the obstacles to North American security cooperation? First, are the problems largely due to organizational features? Bureaucratic inertia and bureaucratic politics are known to hinder change—specifically in an organization’s standard operating procedures and fear of other organizations infringing upon another’s jurisdiction. Second, is the problem centered on a theoretical miss-prediction? International integration theory specifies that spillover from different domains occurs, that moving from economics to security cooperation should happen. Third, is the problem one of elite attitudes and behavior among those affected by NORAD or NORTHCOM or something else? How do personal attitudes affect integration? These three theoretical perspectives served as guides for this project. The basic underlying themes found in the bureaucratic inertia literature were generally supported even though some sub-hypotheses did have data invalidating them. Many aspects of the literature speaking to elite influence causing spillover were not supported. Elites do not have to have direct involvement to facilitate spillover. Finally elites look favorably towards NORAD functional expansion but not regional expansion and NORTHCOM, as the new organization in the North American security equation, is looked on with suspicion by nearly everyone. The overall prospects of North American security cooperation remain good in the Canada-U.S. context and lukewarm in the U.S.-Mexico and Canada-Mexico context.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I must acknowledge the expert guidance I received from my committee chair and advisor, Dr. Karen Feste. Her incredible attention to detail, strategic insight, and astonishing turn-around times of my draft manuscripts left me speechless and humbled. I can only hope that one day I will rise to the level of dedication and expertise she exudes. Second, I must also thank the myriad of interview participants that willingly gave of their time and expertise to participate in this study. While I cannot name them, they know who they are and I am truly indebted. Without their open and willing participation, this effort would be for not. Third, my colleague, Lt Col Joseph Derdzinski, Ph.D., spent countless hours discussing ideas, giving me feedback and insight that proved valuable. Our many car rides from Colorado Springs to Denver and countless cups of coffee certainly shaped my thoughts and direction on this project. Fourth, The Air Force Institute of Technology and the United States Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, Dr. James Smith Director, provided key funding for my research trips. Without the support of these organizations, the research would have been severely limited. Finally, I would like to thank Colonel Tom Drohan, Ph.D. and Permanent Professor of the Military Strategic Studies Department at the United States Air Force Academy for sending me to the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver for a tremendous three and a half years to study and earn my doctorate in international studies. It was the best and most challenging time of my life.
## CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations ........................................... viii

Chapter

INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1

Hypotheses .................................................... 7

Methodology .................................................. 8

  Bureaucratic Inertia ...................................... 13

  Spillover .................................................. 14

  Elite Attitudes .......................................... 14

Limitations .................................................. 14

Project Significance ........................................ 16

I NORAD, A PRIMER ........................................... 17

  Background ................................................ 17

    Obstacles to Agreement ................................ 22

  NORAD: Cold War Years ................................ 32

  NORAD: Post Cold War Years ............................ 37

  NORAD: Post 9/11 Years ................................ 40

    Terrorists and Cross-Border Threats ................. 44

    Other Border Protection Issues .................... 45

    Summary .............................................. 47

II BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA ................................. 50
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational History, Culture, and Values</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Competing Interests</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Cultural Issues</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: International Criminal Court</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Priorities and Resources</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Political Issues, Elites, Superpower, Non-intervention</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Views</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Views</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Doctrine, Mandates, and/or Standard Operating Procedures</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Bureaucratic Inertia Not All Bad?</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Is the Unified Command Model the Right Model?</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Views</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Parochialism</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Priorities and Resources</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Cultural and Historical</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Political</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Views: Military to Military Structure, Mexico-U.S.</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Views: Cultural and Historical</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii
Mexican Views 102

Crisis Impact 106

American Views 107

Canadian Views 110

Mexican Views 110

Summary and Conclusions 113

III SPILLOVER 121

Literature Review 121

Results 140

Spillover Occurrence 140

American Views: NAFTA, Two Bilateral Agreements 142

Canadian Views 144

Mexican Views 145

American Views: NAFTA and Interdependency 148

American Views: Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and Spillover 150

Canadian Views 152

Mexican Views 153

Elite Involvement in Spillover 156

American Views: Mexican Navy and Counter-drug Cooperation and Information Sharing 157

Canadian Views 161
Appendices

A INTERVIEW QUESTIONS .......................... 274
B KEYWORD SEARCH ............................. 279
Bibliography ..................................... 280
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile (clause)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFTA</td>
<td>Central America Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CanadaCom</td>
<td>Canada Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANMEX</td>
<td>Canadian-Mexican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANUS</td>
<td>Canadian-U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence [sic] Staff (Canadian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council On Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Continental Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operating Picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTC</td>
<td>Canadian Radio Television Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCR</td>
<td>Command and Staff College Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASD-WHEM</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant to Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEW</td>
<td>Distant Early Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADs</td>
<td>Extra Defense Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG</td>
<td>Governor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War On Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Defense Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADC</td>
<td>Inter-American Defense College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBET</td>
<td>Integrated Border Enforcement Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>(Navy) International Program Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITAR</td>
<td>International Traffic in Arms Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINA</td>
<td>Secretary of the Navy (<em>Secretariat of the Navy</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Military Cooperation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Common Market of the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Minister of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOFORN</td>
<td>No Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSEERS</td>
<td>National Security Entry Exit Registration System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH</td>
<td>Over the Horizon (Radar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEPC</td>
<td>Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROEs</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDENA</td>
<td>Secretary of National Defense <em>(Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Security and Prosperity Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theater Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USODC</td>
<td>United States Office of Defense Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWC</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Cooperative security strategy in the Western Hemisphere has not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. This is surprising in light of two dramatic developments that could have been expected to affect it, namely the terrorist attacks on American soil on 11 September, 2001 and in 1994, the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—an economic alliance between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. The first event posed a major security threat on the North American Continent opening possibilities for reconfigured strategic planning. The second event brought North American states together in a trade pact, opening possibilities for cooperation spillover into other areas. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a binational security agreement between Canada and the U.S. established in 1958, has continued to operate without a major overhaul since its original mandate although it has experienced minor changes. With the end of the Cold War, some policymakers were beginning to question the need for the organization during the 1990s. As Carrubba and Singh discuss, between the end of the Cold War and prior to 9/11, the U.S. valued economic security over military security (2004, 219). Nine eleven led the U.S. to begin valuing military security over economic security. What are the possibilities for expanded security arrangements between North American states in the future?

---

2 View expressed by several interview participants.
Several recent events suggest expansion. The NORAD agreement was renewed in May 2006 and part of that renewal included an expansion of responsibilities into the maritime realm. In September 2005, the Mexican Army conducted relief operations on U.S. soil in support of the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, strongly contradicting a U.S. speculation on Mexican Army non-involvement. Canada established Canada Command in June 2005 that is touted as a peer organization to the newly established US Northern Command (NORTHCOM)—both organizations were created after 9/11. And, all three country’s executives signed a security and prosperity proposal in March 2005. Canada rejected the invitation by the U.S. to participate in the North American Missile Defense shield in February 2005. Was this a sign of lessening Canada-U.S. cooperation?

NORAD’s original mission was to provide “operational control of continental air defenses against the threat of Soviet bombers.”3 This mission directive was the result of the threat posed by the decades-long Cold War where nuclear weapons emerged as the weapon of choice. Canada and the U.S. recognized a mutual threat from the Soviet Union due to their close geographic location and hostility between the West, lead by the U.S. and the East, lead by the Soviet Union. Today’s NORAD mission is similarly grounded in Cold War rhetoric: “To detect and warn of any impending nuclear attack or missile launch.”

---

When the Cold War ended, two significant issues affected attitudes regarding the prevalent threats at that time. First, world leaders felt that a major threat to world peace had been eliminated. Consequently, many called for an economic peace dividend from Cold War spending (Croft et al. 2001, 22). Second, after decades of maintaining a Cold War doctrine and organization, the U.S. military recognized the need to redefine itself in light of the new threat environment. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, developed a vision for a new military doctrine (Kohn 1994, 9). Many who felt there was no longer a major world-wide threat believed the world was headed towards increased peace and security. 9/11 changed that feeling and caused NORAD to expand its focus (Woodrow Wilson Center (WWC), 2005A, 18).

The Mexican debt crisis of the 1980s, increased globalization of production and increased threats to the multilateral trade system as evidenced by increased protectionism and the rise of trading blocs such as the European Community helped spur the initiative for North American economic integration that led to NAFTA. Trade between the U.S. and Mexico had been significant over the years; in 1943, 90% of Mexico’s foreign trade was with the U.S. (Commins 1995, 60). Additionally, in the 1970s, the U.S. wanted to ensure access to Mexican oil

---

4 NORAD’s website today states that prior to 11 September 2001, NORAD was focused on external aerospace threats but as a result of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 they “changed” and today are also focused on internal aerospace threats. http://www.norad.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.who_we_are_today
markets after the oil price shocks in the early part of the decade. Consequently, U.S. policy makers had good incentives to pursue trade initiatives with Mexico. In her discussion of a new security architecture for the Americas, Franko states that the U.S. Enterprise for Americas Initiative marked a turning point in U.S. policy towards Latin America (2000, 12). The initiative, unveiled by the White House in 1990, was characterized as an invitation to Latin American countries. It consisted of three components: (a) a reduction of official debt to the U.S., (b) the stimulation of private investment in the region; (c) the promotion of regional trade (Franko 2000, 10). These three components became the pillars of President Bush’s foreign policy for Latin America replacing a policy that relied more on aid with one that relied more on promoting trade (Franko 2000, 10). Thus, the Enterprise for Americas Initiative helped set the stage for NAFTA’s implementation in 1994.

The U.S. was motivated to increase free trade in Latin America as a response to the growing free-trade initiatives in the European Union (EU) and as part of a larger goal to strengthen the Americas as a trade area prior to the negotiations of the Uruguay Round of General Agreements for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded by 15 December, 1993 (Kingsolver 2001, 62-63). NAFTA became an important step towards this goal (Kingsolver 62; Commins 1995, 31). President Bush was granted fast track trade negotiations authority prior to those

---

Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Hakim and Litan state that Mexican President Salinas’ motivation to call for a trilateral agreement in 1990 was a way to lock-in market-oriented reforms that he had initiated (2002, ix).

At the start of the twenty-first century, North America is left with these two international institutions—NAFTA and NORAD. The first and newer organization deals with trade, investment and economic issues that are often considered “low politics.” The latter is older, and has been successful in its missile-warning mission yet failed in handling the new threats revealed during 9/11. NORAD deals with security issues, the realm of “high politics.” As a possible major blow to the future of NORAD integration, in February 2005, Canada announced it would not participate in the proposed U.S. missile defense shield for North America. However, there were policy initiatives and discussions to expand NORAD to include the maritime and possibly even the land domain. Many call for the need to increase security cooperation in North America in light of new asymmetrical threats.

---

6 Kingsolver cites Mickey Kantor, U.S. trade representative, in a press conference held between two meetings of NAFTA negotiations in July 1993. Kantor stated that U.S. motivation to gain the fast-track authority along with the desire to seek a free-trade area in the Americas was a result of the desire to compete with the EU’s consolidated free trade area. Kingsolver also cites Commerce Secretary Ron Brown as stating that the Clinton administration’s goal was to extend the trade zone to include the entire hemisphere and create greater access to U.S. products (63).

7 Widely voiced by many interview participants in this research project but also reported in the Colorado Springs Gazette, 28 March 2005, and noted by Marcia Seitz-Ehler in the Woodrow Wilson Center Pamphlet 2005B: 1. The NORAD agreement was renewed in May 2006 with expansion into the maritime realm.

8 A thorough report was published by the Bi-National Planning Group in June 2006 outlining recommendations for increased North American Security Cooperation.
This assembly believes that it is not simply renewing NORAD in 2006 and adding a missile defense role that suffices. Rather, Ottawa and Washington need to consider whether NORAD’s mandate should be expanded to include responsibilities for the joint maritime defense of our continent and for responding to trans-border emergencies such as a terrorist attack and natural disasters. The future of NORAD may be influenced by the establishment of NORTHCOM and the Bi-National Planning Group. (WWC 2005A, 10-11)

What are the obstacles to North American security cooperation? Are the problems largely due to organizational features? Bureaucratic inertia and bureaucratic politics are known to hinder change—specifically in an organization’s standard operating procedures and fear of other organizations infringing upon one’s jurisdiction.9 Or, is the problem centered on a theoretical miss-prediction? International integration theory specifies that spillover from different domains occurs; that in moving from economics to security cooperation, it should happen. But moving from economic to security agreements does not happen quickly or easily for it is far easier to deal with low politics than high politics.10 Finally, is the problem elite attitudes and behavior among those affected by NORAD? How do personal attitudes affect integration?11 These three theoretical perspectives served as guides for this project.


11 Quinlan, 2001; Dietl, 2003; Aybet, Croft, et. al, 2000; Heuser, 1997, 1998; Howorth, 2000; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003; Rees, 2001; Cimbalo, 2004; Winn, 2003; Talbot, 2003; Franko,
Investigation into the existence of bureaucratic inertia should reveal the extent, if any, that current bureaucracies have on inhibiting security cooperation. Conversely, evidence of spillover should reveal facilitators to cooperation and will add general knowledge for scholars and practitioners in facilitating cooperation. Elite attitudes occupy the middle ground of this project and its analysis seeks to determine where elite attitudes factor the most—as a hindrance or as a facilitator to cooperation. Elite attitudes influence in bureaucracies and obtain the will to instigate or at least allow for spillover and maintain certain attitudes towards integration (Haas 2002). Thus, the role of elite behavior in these three perspectives is an important part of this study. From this discussion, the following hypotheses, derived from the literature reviews contained in the following chapters, were tested.

**Hypotheses**

H1: Bureaucratic inertia acts as a resistance to change: (a) organizational history, culture and historical legacy determine a set of values and processes not easily changed; (b) organizational doctrine and standard operating procedures constrain the degree to which change can occur as the information gathering and decision-making processes are exercised; and (c) self-perceived importance and parochialism towards other organizations causes subgroups to compete.

---

2000; Weintraub, 1999; Stein, 2001; Hakim/Litan, 2002; Tulchin, 1997; Rowswell, 2004; Dorman, 2001; Rosamond 2001.
H2: Major organizational changes occur after a major crisis in spite of bureaucratic inertia.

H3: Cooperation spillover from one issue area to another in international institutions requires elite advocacy.

H4: Elite attitudes and perceptions towards integration and integration factors can hinder and/or facilitate change.

Methodology

Interviewing policy makers and members of the military is important to the understanding of elite attitudes and perspectives. The primary data in this research consist of how participants answered questions, and form the basis for conclusions and recommendations. To the extent necessary, government documents, reports, congressional testimonies, surveys, and other sources were consulted. The interviews afforded the opportunity for the researcher to probe and clarify perspectives not reflected in official policy positions of organizations, and hopefully obtain a candid assessment of the role of different theoretical arguments—bureaucratic inertia, spillover ideas, elite attitudes—on current and future security cooperation. Additionally, perceptions on the differing relationships between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. were explored. The questions raised in the interview sessions were presented in an unstructured format allowing each participant, a subject matter expert, to speak to his or her expertise. Each participant was promised an interview session of no longer than sixty minutes. In some cases, that time was cut short due to job-related time constraints. In a few
cases, the participant talked for closer to ninety minutes sharing valuable insight in key areas. Most of the interviews were conducted within a 45-60 minute timeframe.

The idea was to interview at least two individuals from the policy divisions of various organizations. First, within the U.S. Department of State: Mexico, Canada, and NAFTA Desk. In the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Mexico, Canada, and NAFTA Desk. In the U.S. Department of Defense: J5 (policy division), NORTHCOM/J5 (policy division), and NORAD/J5 (policy division). Mexican and Canadian policy makers were sought from their respective embassies as were active-duty military officers from among the post-graduate training programs operated by the U.S. military services and regarding U.S. officers, those currently assigned to the Joint Staff. Admission to these schools for foreign officers and assignments for U.S. officers to the Joint Staff is normally reserved for individuals on senior leadership promotion tracks within their respective services. Additionally, military officers serving as attachés for their respective country’s embassies were sought. Their insights were valuable for this study in assessing the possibilities for expanded security cooperation among North American states.

The bulk of the interviews were conducted in Washington D.C. with the remaining interviews conducted in Colorado Springs, Colorado (at NORAD, NORTHCOM, and the Bi-National Planning Group), over the phone or via e-mail. Twenty-eight interviews were conducted: 16 civilian (government
employees and academicians) and 12 military personnel from Canada, U.S., and Mexico. Confidentiality was promised to all participants in an attempt to gain candid opinions on the three main research perspectives and in light of the sensitivities that could exist when public servants of one country share their candid opinions and observations of other country’s organizations. For confidentiality reasons, only the organizations of the interviewed participants are listed and then demographics of civilian-military and country of origin which are not tied to the organizations.

Participants were volunteers. The pool was drawn from the Mexican and Canadian Embassies and Consulates, the American Embassy in Mexico, the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Joint Staff, HQ U.S. Coast Guard, Joint Inter-agency Task Force-South, NORAD, NORTHCOM, Bi-National Planning Group, Woodrow Wilson Center, Council on Foreign Relations, United Nations, Council of the Americas, National Defense University, U.S. Navy International Program Office, Naval Post Graduate School, and Professional Military Education schools at the USAF Air University Command. Volunteers were obtained from the following organizations: Mexican and Canadian Embassies, U.S. State Department, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Joint Staff, NORAD, NORTHCOM, Bi-National Planning Group, Woodrow Wilson Institute, Council on Foreign Relations, National Defense University, and the U.S. Navy International Program Office.
Of the 28 participants, 12 are military and 16 are civilian. Of the 12 military, 7 are from the U.S., 4 from Canada, and 1 from Mexico. Of the 16 civilian, 14 are from the U.S., 1 from Canada, and 1 from Mexico. Together, 21 participants are from the U.S., 5 from Canada, and 2 from Mexico. Political sensitivities in the U.S.-Mexico military relationship created a challenge in obtaining willing Mexican participants as described below. This was perhaps exacerbated by the fact that the researcher was a U.S. Military Officer asking probing questions regarding the Mexican military. While U.S.-Mexican relations are generally regarded as friendly, past experience and power disparities affect how each perceive the other.

The researcher solicited many governmental and non-governmental military and civilian organizations where Mexican nationals worked. Additionally, referrals from research participants proved unfruitful. Some organizations allowed for an initial face-to-face meeting and promised to facilitate a later interview, but these also turned cold. Obtaining access to the Mexican officers at Air University proved extremely difficult. The researcher tried formal channels using the formal process and informal back-channels and “end-runs” but was not successful in securing even one interview. Air University does have a formal process for soliciting volunteers for this type of research, but the researcher encountered stonewalling. A formal letter requesting an interview was never answered and follow-up e-mails and telephone calls proved ineffective. The researcher was warned about the difficulty and indeed, noted it as a possible
limitation in the proposal. Roderic Camp discusses this problem of secrecy that he encountered in writing his book *Generals in the Palacio*. He notes that the Mexican military has an “intense desire to remain unexamined” and notes that “restricted access to historical archives was discouraged, even intimidated scholars” (1996, 5). In order to counter this limitation, the researcher sought U.S. personnel regarded as subject matter experts on Mexico or deal with Mexican issues as part of their job. Convincing some of these experts to participate was challenging as well. For instance, one academician, an expert on Mexico, promised three times to provide written answers to the interview questions and e-mail them back. But in the end, there were no answers to any questions in spite of e-mailing the questions to him three times. On the other hand, Canadians were very open to participate but the relatively small number in the U.S. that work security issues limited the small pool to solicit from. In summary, the bulk of the participants are U.S. citizens yet, all participants are regarded as subject matter experts in their area of expertise and as such, for a qualitative study, their views are valuable and certainly can be used to draw findings and recommendations.

The next phase consisted of categorizing the responses by answers to questions.\(^\text{12}\) In some cases, this was fairly straightforward because the participants

---

\(^{12}\) From each interview a content analysis was conducted using the software search capabilities of Microsoft WORD on a list of 40+ keywords. Among the keywords were: cooperation, NAFTA, security, NORAD, sovereignty. (See Appendix B for entire keyword list). From here, the researcher was able to consolidate the data into 40 separate files based on the keywords. Consequently, one file contained all the responses that all the participants spoke of concerning a particular topic: for instance, “NORAD” and so forth for the 40 keywords. Also, some consolidation took place between some of the keywords as analysis continued. What resulted was
simply answered the question from the researcher. In other cases though—those where the participant took license to speak at length on various subjects—tying the responses back to specific questions was more difficult. Where it was impossible to do so, the topic discussed by the participant was inserted into the discussion in the most logical place. Usually this was determined by analyzing the other participant’s answers to a particular question and including the response there. The original list of interview questions (Appendix A) was too long for 45-60 minute interviews. Thus, a subset of the more insightful questions was created. Even so, this list of twelve questions proved difficult to get through in most interviews—especially when the expert dwelt on a particular item. The list of primary questions divided into three areas that guided the research included:

**Bureaucratic Inertia**

(a) What cultural/historical norms, attitudes, and doctrines exist within the government and/or its organizational components?

(b) Do you see the standard operating procedures and decision-making processes of your organization as a benefit or detriment to facilitating cooperation? Why or why not?

(c) What are the issues or challenges that must be addressed in order to facilitate NORAD expansion to include Mexico?

---

a consolidation of the interview data into 34 different key issue areas analyzed into a running narrative. Then, the data was further sliced using a less systematic process that keyed on the interview questions. This allowed for more detailed findings and conclusions on how the participants answered the various questions.
(d) How has each country’s threat assessment and security posture changed since the end of the Cold War, after NAFTA implementation, and after 9/11?

Spillover
(a) What are the successes of NAFTA and what are the areas of concern?
(b) What evidence of spillover do we see from NAFTA to other areas?
(c) Have security cooperation initiatives increased between countries with the implementation of NAFTA in 1994? Since the 9/11 attack?
(d) How has the military been affected by NAFTA if at all?

Elite Attitudes
(a) Discuss the likelihood of NORAD expansion (both functionally and regionally) or other new security agreement and what factors affect that possibility.
(b) How important is it to each country’s and North America’s Security posture to see NORAD expanded either regionally, or functionally?
(c) Has the establishment of the NORTHCOM helped or hindered security cooperation between the three countries?
(d) How do military capabilities affect security cooperation?

Limitations
This research and conclusions are based on interview responses to specific questions. Twenty eight people agreed to be interviewed; including twenty one from the United States. The results reflect this bias, but are still important because
as the superpower in this tri-fold North American relationship, the U.S. perspectives are arguably most important since the U.S. has the most influence over these policy issues. Said differently, the U.S. perceptions regarding the research questions asked here not only indicate the perceptions of the superpower, but also represent the perceptions that are most likely to have the most influence in North American bilateral and multilateral relations. Thus, they represent in many ways, the “long pole in the tent” that must be considered and addressed before addressing the other minority perceptions. The five Canadian and two Mexican views offer an important counter or in some cases lend key support to the U.S. perceptions.\(^{13}\) Political roles and perceptions may have affected the interview sampling overall—especially considering the two Mexican participants. The Mexico-U.S. relationship has the most potential to realize the possibility where political differences and loyalties may cause one to self-censor when responding to the interview questions.

\(^{13}\) Throughout this dissertation, certain definitions and terms were used to help clarify distinctions and understanding. When discussing the different countries responses to each question, the writer chose to use the terms “American Views, Canadian Views and Mexican Views” to delineate between the U.S. Canadian and Mexican response. “American Views” was used to distinguish the U.S. responses because “U.S. Views” is not typical of how one might address a U.S. citizen’s views. “American Views” is the more typical response although; the writer understands that in some circles, all North American inhabitants regardless of their country affiliation may be considered “American.” Also the narrative includes many quotes to support the conclusions and findings. In some cases, the reader will note that the quotes have certain words or phrases encased in parenthesis. These words and phrases were added by the writer to help clarify the quote. Academic integrity dictates that the insertion of these extra words and phrases does not in any way change the original meaning of the quote. Finally, since the qualitative, unstructured nature of the interviews did not facilitate all twenty eight participants answering all twelve primary questions, in those few cases where there were no responses from the Mexicans or Canadians to a particular question, the reader will simply find no section discussing the Canadian or Mexican views.
Project Significance

This project is important because it provides policy makers and scholars with increased knowledge of: how organizational bureaucratic influences affect change on the benefits that spillover from economic cooperation to security cooperation can bring and the extent to which attitudes of civilian and military elites may affect future integration. Analysis of the North American region also provides fresh insight about superpower involvement in international security cooperation matters.

Chapter one provides a background on NORAD and the accompanying U.S.-Canadian security relationship detailing major issues and events that have shaped NORAD into its current form. Additionally, this chapter sets the stage for issues that NORAD is grappling with now and consequently contributes to formulating the research questions asked in this study. Chapter two provides analysis of historical and cultural aspects of the bureaucratic inertia perspective. Chapter three looks for evidence of spillover from economic to security agreements with a specific goal of identifying elite involvement in spillover occurrence. Chapter four focuses on the last perspective—elite attitudes and perceptions and attempts to assess the impact that elite attitudes have on important North American security cooperation institutions, organizations and events. Chapter five serves as a summary and offers policy recommendations based on the conclusions and findings.
CHAPTER I  
NORAD, A PRIMER  

Background  

Canada and the U.S. have long recognized the need to work together as a way of ensuring security for North America. Cooperation between these two countries is marked by a long, positive history of institutionalized security cooperation beginning in 1938 when both countries realized that a cooperative effort was prudent in defending against threats from abroad. Hence, a pledge of cooperation between Canada and the U.S. was forged when U.S. President Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King signed an agreement in Ogdensburg, New York which formulated the Permanent Joint Board of Defense which exists to this day. This marked the beginning of institutionalized security cooperation between Canada and the United States. Building on the Ogdensburg agreement, both countries would eventually participate in the UN, NATO, and NORAD with NORAD becoming the preeminent institution where binational cooperation has flourished since its inception.

In September 1945, a Soviet defector disclosed a Soviet Union espionage network operating in Canada (Morton 1999, 229). This led Canada, the U.S., and other Western nations to grow concerned over Soviet Union intentions and its growing influence on communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Riendeau 2000, 241-242). Additionally, a Canadian Post-Hostilities Advisory Committee noted that the development of air power had diminished the positive affect geographic
isolation had on Canadian security (Jockel 1987, 13). Thus, as the fear of communism and the Soviet Union grew, both countries recognized the negative impact that air power advancements had on their security posture. Additionally, the end of World War II and the victories over Germany and Japan led the U.S. military leadership to reach an important conclusion: the U.S. should never rush into conflict late and ill-prepared. The military leadership desired instead to have a “forward strategy” and declared in an October 1945 policy statement that potential enemies needed to be kept at a “maximum distance.” The implementation of this policy included establishing forces and a defense apparatus in the outer geographic perimeters to identify enemy threats and attacks before they hit the United States (Jockel 1987, 7).

This policy statement led the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF), as well as the other services, to embark on independent efforts to create a vision and plan for the future defense of the United States. Consequently, in March 1946, the AAF established the Air Defense Command (ADC) at Mitchell Field in New York. However, since they did not receive full funding for their air defense plan, their organization was only 50% mission capable. It would be at least three more years until the U.S. Congress would fund a permanent air defense system (Jockel 1987, 8-9).

The appearance of Soviet Union production Tu-4 aircraft during an aviation day parade in Moscow on 3 August 1947 further heightened U.S.
concerns over Soviet intentions. The Tu-4 bomber’s long-range capabilities meant that the Soviet Union now had the capability of striking Los Angeles, Chicago or New York on a one-way suicide mission. Additionally, if the Soviet Union were to seize an airfield in Iceland, they could bomb New England, New York, Pennsylvania, or Ohio. Similarly from Greenland, they could now hit New Orleans or Denver. Then, in September 1949, President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had set off an atom bomb signaling to the world that they had obtained nuclear weapons capability four to six years ahead of predictions. The combination of the Soviet Union obtaining the production Tu-4 and the atom bomb gave the U.S. a new-found urgency in establishing a continental defense system. Policy makers realized that the U.S. could no longer count on its geographic isolation from the rest of the world as natural protection. Consequently, congress fully funded a permanent air defense system (Jockel 1987, 34).

As the U.S. scrambled to plan, design, and build an adequate continental defense system, the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950. With the outbreak of this conflict, U.S. efforts accelerated to an emergency schedule (Command and Staff College report (CSCR) 1962, 4). The accelerated schedule led to the production of three different U.S. fighter-interceptor aircraft and the creation of the Air Defense Command (ADC), headquartered at Colorado Springs, Colorado

---

14 This was easily determined since the Tu-4 was an exact replica reverse-engineered from captured U.S. B-29 bombers.

15 http://aeroweb.lucia.it/rap/RAFAQ/Tu-4.html.
on 1 January 1951 (CSCR 1961, 4). Unknown at the time, this established what would be a long and continuous tenure for command and control of North American defense at Colorado Springs, Colorado. Additionally in 1951, the first Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) liaison officers began serving at the ADC Headquarters in Colorado Springs. Three years later, the two national air defense commanders established a permanent joint planning group and gave it the task to create a plan that would encompass defense of the entire continent. The group recommended that forces from both countries should be established under a single commander (Jockel 1987, 93).

By 1954, the air defense effort had over 55 squadrons of fighter-interceptor aircraft and the newly created defense network covered most of the continental United States. Additionally, the U.S. and Canada had begun working together to establish an air defense system for all of North America. This effort established air defense systems along the Arctic Circle and the 55th parallel. These systems included the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line and the Mid-Canada Line. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Continental Air Defense Command—headquartered at Colorado Springs—with an area of responsibility including the U.S. and Canada. The previously existing ADC provided much of the structure for the basis of this new command (CSCR 1961, 4-5; Jockel 94).

While there were two separate early warning systems created for air defense, in reality, they were intertwined electronically, geographically, and
tactically. This is important to note because the two systems, one built and paid for by the U.S. and the other built and paid for by Canada, were rightly regarded as belonging to each individual country, but the two systems working together gave both countries the air defense they sought. It was the two countries’ air forces that first began to see the reality of this integration as each operated a system independently but saw the strong ties between the two. Thus, they were the first to see the necessity of establishing a joint command to better control the two systems. This integration would lay the ground work for the final push towards establishing NORAD.

Another part of the air defense system—the Pinetree Line—was established by the U.S. and through an agreement in August 1951 was allowed to extend into Canada. This agreement also divided the costs for building the stations in Canada with the U.S. sharing 2/3 and Canada 1/3 of the cost. The DEW line began construction in 1954 and become operational by the summer of 1957. The cost of this line was borne entirely by the U.S. The Mid-Canada line, not a radar but rather an electronic screen that could detect but not track penetration aircraft, was designed, funded and built wholly by Canada and Canadian citizens (McLin 1967, 27). All three of these systems were designed to detect inbound bomber aircraft.

While the air defense systems were coming into being, the planning for continental defense was decidedly binational and built on an understanding that both Canada and the U.S. would share the brunt of any air attack by the Soviet
Union. Thus, cooperation between the two countries was very good with military planners recognizing that defense of their own country was nearly synonymous with the defense of the other country and summarily, the defense of North America. Beginning in 1955, the problem of how to operationally integrate both Canadian and U.S. air assets was being worked independently by both countries’ militaries. In an effort to work this problem jointly, the military leadership from both countries chartered the Joint Canadian-U.S. Military Study Group. Towards the end of 1956, this group recommended the integration of the air defense units of both countries into a single command structure (CSCR 1961, 6). Both countries’ Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation on 11 May 1956 paving the way for a single, operational command structure for air defense of both Canada and the United States. In early 1957, these recommendations were approved by the various agencies of both governments. Later that year, operational control over the RCAF air defense assets was transferred to a new joint international command—NORAD. The Commander of NORAD, an American General, was given the mission to defend the U.S., Canada, and Alaska from air attack.

Obstacles to Agreement

Between the time that the NORAD agreement was signed by the Canadian government (August 1957) and the time that a formal exchange of diplomatic notes took place (May 1958) the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. This launch of the first satellite by the communist superpower served to stoke the urgency for
North American air defense. Until now, the focus of air defense had been to detect and intercept bombers. Sputnik’s launch revealed that the Soviets now had an intercontinental missile capability. Together with their nuclear capability, it was feared that they now or would soon have the ability to launch nuclear weapons into North America via intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This was a grave concern since NORAD was currently focused on detecting manned bombers, not ICBMs. Thus, the shift in NORAD detection systems, strategy, and planning to protect North America from ICBMs as well as bombers began (Shaw and Warnock 1997, 50-51).

Meanwhile, NORAD’s formal creation did not occur until an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries occurred in 1958. Still, Crosby argues that the recognition of the need for a NORAD type of agreement was first recognized and acted upon by the countries militaries (1997). Indeed, much of the literature notes that in Canada in particular, the diplomatic discussions by Canadian government officials over the need for NORAD, its purpose, composition, and command structure did not take place until after the Conservative government, led by Prime Minister Diefenbaker, had hastily signed the agreement soon after taking office (Jockel 1987, 5).

Perhaps the biggest and lasting obstacle was couched in the Canadian civilian authorities concerns over Canadian sovereignty. The U.S. and Canadian military had established good working relations and generally did not see this as a huge concern. However, the Canadian civilian leadership continued to be leery of
entering into further defense agreements with the U.S. This concern made the following three issues critical to solve: (a) command arrangements governing the relations of American and Canadian forces and of civilian and military authorities within each country—especially in times of emergency; (b) increased political consultation between Canada and the U.S. which was regarded as a corollary of greater military integration; and (c) the link between NORAD and NATO—pushed by the Canadians and resisted by the Americans (McLin 1967, 51).

Canadian sovereignty concerns would remain at the forefront of decisions regarding U.S. equipment and personnel in Canada as well as U.S. access to Canadian bases and airspace. NORAD, an agreement that naturally evolved from Canada-U.S. air defense planning, was no different. The questions of who would control Canadian forces and what access U.S. forces would have to Canadian airspace and bases were some of the most difficult issues to resolve. However for the militaries, the resolution of these questions was not as difficult as it was for the Canadian civilian community. Most of the sovereignty concerns were raised by the Canadian government. The Canadian military for its part, worked the issues smartly with the U.S. government but always with an eye towards the difficulty it would have in getting the arrangements approved. The U.S. military for its part understood the Canadian military-civilian relationship and seemingly worked hard with the Canadian military to massage the process so as to make their job of selling the agreement to the government as easy as possible (Jockel 1987, 100).
The U.S. military’s job in this context was easier than the Canadian military’s. This was in part due to the fact that the U.S. Department of State had little involvement in these types of negotiations and decisions. Inertia caused the State Department to see itself simply as an organization that deals with diplomacy issues which it saw as distinctly different from defense issues. Thus, any oversight of the State Department on these matters was non-existent. In Canada however, the equivalent department—Canadian office of External Affairs—was heavily involved and continually intervened and weighed in on these defense matters.

Canadian sovereignty concerns were further tested when the USAF Air Defense Command began to see the Canadian-U.S. border as tactically irrelevant. The USAF squadrons stationed in the Northern U.S. desired to fly into Canadian airspace to intercept unidentified aircraft, especially those that they deemed hostile. Consequently, in August 1950 the USAF asked the U.S. State Department to query the Canadian External Affairs for permission to do just that, fly their aircraft, controlled by the U.S. air defense system, into Canadian airspace while intercepting unidentified aircraft. This request upset several departments in the Canadian government to include the Department of Transportation as well as the Canadian military who recognized that the Americans were asking for, “in effect, permission to undertake all but unlimited air defense operations in Canadian airspace.” Additionally, Jockel notes that the U.S. was asking for open authority to shoot down hostile aircraft in Canadian airspace—an authority that the RCAF did not even have. The U.S. did receive permission to enter Canadian airspace.
with very restricted limits and no authority to shoot. The U.S. reluctantly accepted the agreement as an interim measure (Jockel 1987, 50-52).

However, the majority of the accusations regarding U.S. breaching Canadian sovereignty occurred during the construction phase of the DEW Line (Jockel 1987, 85). Many saw U.S. contractor personnel coming into Canada and taking charge of projects on Canadian soil as a breach of sovereignty. Many concerns raised in this context were addressed. McLin notes the necessary conditions that were established in order for Canada to allow the U.S. to build facilities in Canada: (a) the U.S. must request the facility; (b) the need for the facility must be justified, with the Canadian government being the judge; (c) Canada could not need the facility; and (d) if item three was met, the U.S. could build the facility only if Canada did not have the resources to build it (28). Further sovereignty issues surrounding the DEW line were: (a) Canadian ownership of the sites; (b) arrangements for liaison between the DEW project office and Canadian Government; (c) Canada’s right to assume operation and manning of the stations in the future; (d) Canada’s right to inspect sites in construction and plans; (e) right of Canadian contractors and electronics firms to bid on an equal basis with U.S. companies for contracts; (f) preferential treatment to Canadian labor and transport firms for work associated at the sites; and (g) NATO status of forces agreement must be in force (McLin 1967, 28). While sovereignty issues would be and continue to be one of Canada’s primary concerns in this binational cooperation,
they would never be so great as to prevent the creation of NORAD or proposed improvements to its structure and organization.

Another obstacle stemmed from a U.S. military concern regarding how Canada saw NORAD in relation to NATO. The U.S. military was strongly opposed to linking NORAD to NATO. Conversely, the Canadian civilian leadership (primarily) and to a lesser extent the Canadian military thought that linking NORAD to NATO was not only a good way to “sell” NORAD to the Canadian public and civilian leadership but also a good idea in principle since NATO was an existing organization and well-respected in Canada. Consequently, many Canadians saw NORAD as an extension of NATO if not in actual composition at least in thought. This difference in outlook towards a NORAD-NATO link was natural more than anything. For the Canadians, NATO involvement had a much stronger pull since they were major proponents of its creation. The U.S., while supporters of NATO, was not as wedded to the idea of keeping new North American security initiatives under the NATO umbrella and saw continental defense falling under a different purview than the Euro-centric model inherent in NATO. In defense of Europe, the U.S. was more open to relinquishing some control of their forces and lessening of influence but in defense of their own homeland, they wanted to total control (Jockel 1987, 96).

This link between NORAD and NATO would indeed become the lynchpin of the Deifenbarker government’s plan to sell NORAD when the deliberations in Canada’s government took place. Additionally, General Charles Foulkes, the
Canadian Chief of Staff, walked a diplomatic tightrope during this time assuring his civilian superiors that NORAD was indeed part of NATO while also ensuring his U.S. counterparts that he understood that NORAD could not be part of NATO (Crosby 1997, 43). Consequently, this caused great consternation for the U.S. military and government when they heard Canada’s Prime Minister stating that NORAD was an extension of NATO. What ultimately transpired was a mutual “agree to disagree” where some in the Canadian government would discuss the link as if it existed but in reality the documents outlining NORAD’s command, control, and reporting requirements never included formal or informal reports to NATO. This was facilitated mostly by the fact that while the Canadian government in particular was most concerned about this, the RCAF and USAF had grown convinced that a joint command was needed and worked hard, somewhat in spite of their civilian leadership, to build the relationship in NORAD to what they felt needed to be achieved16 (Crosby 1997, 49; Jockel 98).

Another problem came from the failure of the U.S. military to unite their services under one commander (Jockel 1987, 93). The National Security Act of 1947 established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring unity to the different services, minimize or eliminate service in-fighting, and present a coherent consensus on military plans to the U.S. civilian leadership. This would

---

16 Crosby argues that the two militaries actually led the effort to integrate to such an extent that the Canadian government had little influence on the process: “In participating in setting the agenda for the Canadian political decision-makers, the Canadian military is also participating in a process which rules out of consideration alternatives which are entertained by Canadian political decision-makers based on distinctly Canadian assessments of the international environment and Canada’s place within it.”
prove to be a tough cultural nut to crack. At this time, most of the infighting took place between the Army and the newly created Air Force who fought over air defense assets (missile interceptors) among other things. However, the establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954 helped alleviate this problem (McLin 1967, 37).

The importance of CONAD was two-fold. First, by appointing a USAF General as Commander-in-Chief, (CINCONAD), the Joint Chiefs were giving a nod to the Air Force as the principal service in the area of continental air defense. Second, in creating CONAD, they gave CINCONAD operational control over all the air defense assets. By integrating air defense assets, the U.S. could now turn its attention to integrating Canadian assets (Jockel 1987, 95).

McLin notes another concern of the NORAD relationship; that the U.S. could easily draw Canada into a war against its will (53). The thinking was that if Canada and the U.S. had an alliance where a U.S. military commander was in charge, the commander, through his responsibility to defend North America, would have the authority to respond to an attack by the Soviet Union. By nature of the fact that he would be acting under the auspices of a joint alliance, he would, by his actions, pull Canada into a shooting war. Thus, a U.S. military officer could unilaterally draw Canada into a conflict without Canadian civilian authorities making that decision. This concern was breached several times when American commanders put Canadian forces on alert during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Middle East War of 1973, and in November 1979 when, without
Canadian government consent, Canadian fighters were scrambled in response to a false missile warning attack at NORAD headquarters (Crosby 1997, 44).

Still another concern regarding joint air defense surfaced as the Canadian government began to realize that if Canada were to enter into a joint air defense agreement with the U.S., it would be seen as a Canadian-U.S. alliance directed against a threat from the Soviet Union. This would be an issue that Canada would have to come to grips with (Jockel 1987, 17). While recognizing that air power advancements had weakened their security posture in the mid 1900s as they sought joint remedies with the U.S., it was inevitable that the resulting agreements would put Canada “in bed” with the U.S. and any air threat against the U.S. by any country would also be a threat against Canada simply by way of association. After several years of working sensitive political and diplomatic issues regarding NORAD’s creation, the agreement reached two last obstacles: the debate over NORAD in the Canadian Parliament and signing of diplomatic notes.

In the June 1957 election, the liberal party surprisingly lost to the conservative party and did not want to approve the NORAD agreement on its way out but rather, left it to be decided by the incoming administration. To complicate matters, neither the outgoing or incoming political party cabinets—the real seat of power in the Canadian Government—had been involved in the sensitive scheming of the NORAD negotiations. Prior to the election, the liberal party—sure of victory—had decided not to submit the NORAD agreement into formal government debate until after the election. However, when they lost the election
and the conservative party took power, the agreement was presented to and signed by the new Prime Minister Diefenbaker in a quick and unceremonious way with no parliamentary debate (Crosby 1997, 26). When the new minority liberal party learned that the agreement had been signed by the opposition party with no formal debate, politics kicked in and the debate on NORAD ensued with Canada’s civilian leadership throttling the advancement and implementation of NORAD for some time (Jockel 1987, 101-102; McLin 1967, 40-41).

The debate in the Canadian parliament did not take place until 10 months after the decision had been made to enter into the agreement and 9 months after the agreement had been operationally implemented (McLin 1967, 48). The three main criticisms from the minority liberal party that framed the debate were: (a) the procedure the Diefenbaker government had exercised in deciding to sign the joint agreement; (b) the procedure that was followed along with the U.S. government in putting that decision into effect (implementing the agreement); and (c) the arrangements of U.S. control over Canadian forces and what was regarded as the inadequate civilian control over the military (McLin 1967, 47). This after-the-fact debate about the need for NORAD and the machinations of who would be in charge of whom and questions of sovereignty and command and control were debated between the two opposing parties in Parliament and in the end, changed little about NORAD and served mainly as a political tool for the ousted liberal party to criticize the newly elected conservative party.
At the same time, the Head of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, upon learning of NORAD’s creation, wrote to the Department of National Defence [*sic*] that an “exchange of diplomatic notes” should have occurred and advocated that it should still be the case. This would prove to be the final obstacle for the official creation of NORAD although military planning for the new command continued seemingly as if the agreement were already formalized (Jockel 1987, 108). The diplomatic note sought by the Department of External Affairs was signed on 12 May 1958 with U.S. negotiators carefully ensuring that it contained no link between NORAD and NATO. Further, the outline of command and control was largely drawn from the Terms of Reference which was a document created by the U.S. and Canadian militaries outlining how they thought NORAD should be structured. The military truly had a strong say not only in NORAD’s creation but also in how it was to be structured (Jockel 1987, 116).

**NORAD: Cold War Years**

The years during the Cold War saw little change to NORAD’s overall mission and purpose. However, the advent of ICBM technology and space assets would, over these three decades, lead NORAD towards what it is today, an aerospace rather than just an air defense organization. This timeframe can be characterized as one where the U.S. and its penchant for big defense budgets, operation and research, and the Cold War arms race with the Soviet Union facilitated advancements in weapon technology. Increasingly, the technology
pushed the frontiers of air and space to the point where it became inevitable that NORAD would become an aerospace force conducting its mission of early missile warning using primarily space assets.\textsuperscript{17}

These advances pushed the debate of NORAD’s mandate from strictly defensive into one that increasingly dealt with offensive capabilities as well as lifting the frontier from ground to air to space. More specifically, the United States’ desire to establish a missile defense shield capable of targeting incoming nuclear missiles before they hit North America would dominate, contextualize, and shape the many questions regarding any possible changes to NORAD’s mission throughout this period.

U.S. President Reagan’s ambitious Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) a.k.a. Star Wars is the proposed system that most are familiar with. However, it should be noted that the SDI research and development process was long, varied, and included many smaller systems; some of which became operational.\textsuperscript{18} While research and development would continue throughout the Cold War, the U.S. abandoned further deployments of ground-based systems choosing instead to rely on deterrence through the arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union via the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (Preston et al. 2002, 13-14).

\textsuperscript{17 For a more detailed description of the political, technical and diplomatic issues and concerns that Canada in particular had to deal with during this timeframe, read Crosby, chapter four (1998, 56-79).}

\textsuperscript{18 Preston et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, RAND, 2002, Chapter one contains a quick concise history of the early development of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. Additionally, Holst and Schneider in Why ABM? provide even more detail.}
As early as 1963, the Commander of NORAD requested that NORAD’s mission be expanded from one focused strictly on air defense to one that included aerospace defense. Canada was (and remains to this day) concerned about the prospect of Canadian involvement via an expanded NORAD from three perspectives: (a) the militarization of space; (b) possession and use of nuclear weapons; and (c) offensive, rather than a strictly defensive posture for NORAD, its mission and systems. In 1963, Canada was concerned that to agree to this change in NORAD’s mission and terms of reference would compromise Canada’s work it was conducting as a member of a UN committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Crosby 1997, 63-64).

The militaries informally agreed to the change requested in 1963 but did not push for the formal change until the 1968 renewal agreement. When the 1968 renewal was final, Canada’s Department of External Affairs was informed that the two militaries had agreed to this change (Crosby 1997, 64). The 1968 agreement included a clause that Canada added: “not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defense” (Crosby 1997, 66). This became known as the ABM Clause. This, with the ongoing SALT negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet Union and Canada’s reluctance to participate in an active missile defense system seemed to put this discussion to rest.

However, three emerging technologies in the seventies continued to shape North American Defense issues: (a) the cruise missile—a “salt free” technology—
meaning it was immune to negotiated SALT agreements; (b) Airborne Warning and Control System—an airborne system capable of command and control with nuclear survivability; and (c) Over the Horizon (OTH) Radar. Along with the technology, Canada, under Prime Minister Trudeau, started to downsize its forces acknowledging that with the demise of the bomber threat, there was no longer a necessity for a large fighter-interceptor force (Crosby 1997, 68).

Canada’s position during the 1975 NORAD renewal negotiations was perhaps the last time that Canada seriously considered lessening involvement in NORAD through various proposals: (a) establishing a separate national HQ for NORAD; (b) creating a new umbrella agreement to cover all aspects of North American defense; or (c) reactivating the Canada-U.S. regional planning group within NATO in order to place North American continental defense under NATO auspices (Crosby 1997, 71). None of the proposals were agreed to. Rather, the 1975 renewal agreement provided Canada more control over its own airspace when the NORAD regional HQs were consolidated from eight to five locations and reorganized along national boundaries. Also, it reaffirmed NORAD’s passive air defense mandate. However, it also implicitly expanded NORAD’s mandate to extra-continental by not “specifying that NORAD’s activities be confined to the North American continent.” In the final analysis, the military achieved what it was after (Crosby 1997, 72-73).

In the 1980s, much of the decade was spent redesigning and upgrading NORAD’s systems to integrate with the new technologies (Crosby 1997, 74).
Space-based systems became the primary with ground-based designated as back-up verification systems. NORAD systems had truly made the conversion to one better characterized as space-based rather than ground-based. By this time, the Canadian defense budget had been cut by several administrations and with strong public support. The downsizing was not only evident in actual dollars spent, but also in a furtherance of the doctrinal and cultural view the Canadians had regarding their role in defense and contribution to world peace-keeping. Meanwhile, in light of a possible space-based directed-energy threat, the Reagan administration pushed for the establishment of the SDI as a means for North American missile defense. It was during the 1981 NORAD renewal agreement that the ABM clause was quietly\(^{19}\) dropped and never re-inserted. Additionally, in the 1981 agreement NORAD officially changed from air to aerospace defense. What is important about this is that NORAD’s responsibilities changed from the air domain to the aerospace domain indicating an acknowledgement from both countries of the expanding nature of the threats. Additionally, its terms of reference officially recognized the emerging importance of NORAD’s role in space thus legitimizing NORAD space operations. The 1986 renewal saw no deviation from the aerospace path that NORAD was on.

\(^{19}\) Crosby states it was done secretly without Parliament or the Parliamentary Standing Committee of External Affairs being notified (1998, 77).
NORAD: Post Cold War Years

A number of significant changes in the international community occurred from 1989 to 1994 that affected NORAD operations and missions. The demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe took place in 1989 (Hungary, Poland, East Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania). The Berlin Wall came down in November 1989 plus West Germany and the Soviet Union reached an accord in July 1990 enabling the reunification of East and West Germany in October 1990. Under pressure from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact’s military structure was abolished on 1 April 1991. Finally, the Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991 marking the end of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War and the accompanying call for the “peace dividend” resulted in a logical questioning over the continued necessity of maintaining a Cold War relic, NORAD. This was logical because NORAD had been created in large part to counter the threat that would define the Cold War—the Soviet Union launching nuclear weapons at North America. The end of the Cold War along with the advent of space technology led to a lessening of importance regarding the geographic location of Canada and its advantages in detecting attacks from the Soviet Union. The advances in space technology led to an accompanying U.S. shift to focus more on space and space assets as a means to increase its security posture. Today, U.S. space assets can virtually do the entire job of detection and warning using ground stations that are nearly all located in
the continental U.S. Consequently, in the aftermath of the Cold War, NORAD’s future began to look uncertain and some started to question if NORAD was still needed (Mason 6). According to Bashow, NORAD was “quick off the mark” to reassess its position in the post Cold War security environment and evaluate where it fit in the new geopolitical environment as well as expanding operations to include counter-drug and counter-terrorist operations (1998 12, 17).

The end of the Cold War saw NORAD take on new counter-drug operations. In 1989, NORAD officials dropped a so-called 180 knot rule which served as an operational limitation in that NORAD could not track aircraft that were flying slower than 180 knots. In lifting this ban, NORAD was able to monitor and track airborne drug smugglers who flew slower than 180 knots to avoid detection. Thus, NORAD began to more actively engage in monitoring, detecting, and even apprehending drug smugglers.

As is somewhat quantified by Bailey, the extant literature has virtually nothing to say regarding NAFTA’s creation and its affect on NORAD (Weintraub 2004, 255). Most of the literature on NAFTA’s impact to North America is focused primarily in the trade, economic, and immigration realms. As noted by Bailey and evident by much of the literature, the closest most scholars get in

---

20 The growing Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs—a space operations base—and the closing of Joint Defence [sic] Facility Nurrungar (a space tracking station) near Woomera Australia in 2000 are testaments to the increasing capability of the U.S. to rely on ground stations in its own territory for space tracking/operations.


discussing NAFTA’s impact on security issues regards cross-border facilitation of legitimate trade and immigration in light of emerging security concerns—but no one directly ties this issue to NORAD. Bailey makes an indirect tie when he notes that while NAFTA has affected border trade, the advancements in border security since 9/11 were facilitated somewhat by cooperation experienced through NORAD and NATO (Weintraub 2004, 248). However, his point is small and he offers no evidence in support.

The year 1994 saw the emergence of three new missile defense programs that relied on the technology inherent in NORAD and the previously created U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) (Crosby 1997, 48). The U.S. naturally invited Canada to participate in these programs via the 1996 NORAD renewal agreement which Canada did sign. This agreement supported the fact that NORAD was growing into the missile defense role. As noted above, earlier NORAD renewals in the 1980’s contained an exclusion clause noting that NORAD was not a participant in any ballistic missile defense system. Later, that clause was dropped. In the 1996 renewal agreement, a provision was added that provided a “more formal mechanism for consultations between the two countries on developments such as missile defence [sic] systems which have implications for NORAD’s missions.”23 In this renewal, we saw a further softening of the Canadian position regarding NORAD’s participation in a missile defense system.

__________________________

39
When 9/11 occurred, it caused many to recognize once again the changing nature of threats to U.S. security. The last enduring threat came from the Cold War and with 9/11, the world was introduced to a new type of threat—asymmetrical (terrorism, drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, cyber-terror). NORAD had been shifting some of its efforts to help alleviate these threats to North America but 9/11 accelerated the pace for NORAD and for both countries. These asymmetrical threats while not new do now have a higher priority and understanding in the U.S. and Canadian national security strategies.

Moreover, the U.S. National Command Authority had nowhere to turn except to NORAD on that day. This was in spite of the fact that NORAD’s mandate was to look for external airborne threats—not internal—a fact pointed out more than once in the 9/11 commission report (9/11 Commission Exec Summary 2004, 10). While many in the press were quick to point to NORAD’s failure, the final 9/11 commission report noted a failure of both NORAD and the FAA, but tempered that finding with a logical reasoning as to why the failure occurred. This was evident in part by the fact that no senior leaders in NORAD were fired as a result of any failures and perhaps more so by the acknowledgement that NORAD, by mandate, was simply not focused on airborne threats from within North America and consequently could not be saddled with a

---

large part of the blame in preventing the attacks. The report noted that NORAD personnel had conceived of training exercises involving hijacked aircraft intended for use as missiles, but the exercise scenario had the aircraft coming from outside North America. As the report concludes, the FAA and NORAD were unprepared but given that un-preparedness, they tried, and failed to effectively improvise a satisfactory homeland defense solution during the events of 9/11 (9/11 Exec Sum 14). Consequently, calls for NORAD’s demise fell by the wayside and conversely, a dialogue ensued which ultimately led to NORAD’s expansion to include the maritime domain in the recent May 2006 renewal.

Post 9/11 saw continued institutionalized security cooperation in Canada-U.S. relations witnessed by the creation of similar government organizations from both countries as a response to the new threats unveiled by the 9/11 attacks. In 2002, Canada and the U.S. expanded cooperation by creating the Bi-National Planning Group, co-located with NORAD in Colorado Springs to address the future of the Canada-U.S. defense relationship.24 The Bi-National Planning Group’s mission is to determine an appropriate vision of what Canada-U.S. cooperation will look like in the future. While not specifically tied to NORAD, the Bi-National Planning Group, as a binational strategic planning organization, has built its recommendations for expanding and broadening binational agreements on the successes of NORAD. The Bi-National Planning Group was

scheduled to terminate in May 2006 but a broad spectrum of Americans and Canadians (to include the Canadian Chief of Defence [sic] Staff) are calling for its functions to remain permanent in some form. This group can force both countries to consider how future continental defense may look and how Mexico might realistically play a more significant role in North American Security.

Also in 2002, the U.S. created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part of the most significant change of the U.S. government in over half a century with the following three primary missions: (a) prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; (b) reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and (c) minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) established NORTHCOM in 2002 to consolidate under a single unified command existing missions that were previously executed by other military organizations. Specifically, the command's mission is homeland defense and civil support.

Canada created the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) in 2003 as Canada’s lead department for public safety with the following mandate:

Ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime and terrorism.

---

26 www.northcom.mil.
And in 2005 the Canadian Defence [sic] Force created Canada Command (CanadaCom) with a similar mission for Canada as NORTHCOM has for the U.S:

CanadaCom will bring a unified and integrated chain of command at the national and regional levels which will have the immediate authority to deploy maritime, land and air assets in their regional areas of responsibility in support of domestic operations.28

The establishment of these new organizations not only reflects both Governments’ substantive reactions to the threats revealed from 9/11 but has also resulted in several more agencies on both sides of the border who now share an increased responsibility in North America’s security. The close security relationship between the two countries as embodied in NORAD and the fact that NORTHCOM (and possibly CanadaCom) has ties to NORAD are two of the reasons why many are calling for increased security cooperation. Indeed the final Bi-National Planning Group report notes that in light of these new government agencies there exists a need for a “continual . . . systematic . . . binational, multinational or continental” effort at increased security cooperation (BPG Report 2006, 33-34). Additionally, as NORTHCOM commenced operation, it began to grapple with the question of how to include Mexico more fully into North American security cooperation since Mexico’s territories were included as part of NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility. This new mandate for NORTHCOM has

---

led it, as well as others, to question how NORAD might be able to help pull Mexico into the North American security equation.29

Terrorists and Cross-border Threats

Bashow notes that Canada’s multi-cultural and multi-ethnic makeup has made it vulnerable and susceptible to terrorist infiltration (8). He asked in 1998 what many are asking now: where does the real terrorist threat lie—in Mexico or in Canada? Canada’s liberal immigration laws have allowed a small minority of extremists to establish themselves and use Canada as a home base to launch grievances against homeland government. As proof he cites Gordon30 who noted that terrorists, residing in Canada, have attacked airlines, foreign missions, personnel and have used Canada as a staging area for attacks overseas and as a base for fundraising and supply replenishment. Within the past five years, Canada has had three major incidences regarding terrorists attempting to launch attacks while Mexico has had zero. Again, as noted earlier, NORAD did make policy changes that allowed it to participate in counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities. However, in spite of NORAD’s efforts to change in accordance with

29 Nunez calls for an expanded role. General Ralph Eberhart, previous NORAD Commander, indicated in an interview with Colorado Springs television news that this type of expansion should be looked at. Finally, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at the United States Air Force Academy hosted a 1-day NORAD Expansion and Enlargement Workshop in Aug 2004 which was attended by personnel from NORTHCOM, NORAD as well as academics from throughout the U.S. Among the topics discussed was expanding NORAD to include Mexico. In May 2006, the NORAD agreement was renewed with an expanded maritime role.

the changing threat environment, the questions regarding its necessity continued to endure scrutiny until 9/11 occurred.

Other Border Protection Issues

Prior to 9/11, many thought as Bashow wrote, that the Canadian-U.S. border was one that neither country had to worry about. While discussing the shared defense benefits both countries enjoy, he incorrectly notes that the U.S.-Canada border is one that has no need for surveillance or control (Bashow 1998, 19). If this were indeed true, then why did this border experience the slow-downs of border traffic immediately after 9/11 so that trade was throttled to the extent that manufacturing lines where shut down and job losses occurred? What this does demonstrate is that some, Bashow for sure, were incorrect in their assessment of the fluidity of the U.S.-Canada border, the reality of 9/11, and the U.S. response to protect itself and secure its borders.

After 9/11, the U.S. negotiated two border agreements with Mexico and Canada dubbed the Smart Border agreements. However, others noted that the initiative for the Smart Border agreements started prior to 9/11 and stemmed from the recognition that the border trade needed to be protected while increasing security at the border—a point discussed later. This was due most likely to two security aspects: illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The Mexican illegal immigration population in the U.S. doubled from 2.5 to 5 million between 1990 and 2000 (Andreas 2005, 2). Drug smuggling techniques adapted to the increased commercial trade. With the increased trade volume going through the border, an
accompanying increase in drug smuggling occurred as well. Since initiatives to make the borders more secure while continuing to facilitate legitimate trade were already underway, one could argue that 9/11 accelerated those efforts.

The legitimate trade is a direct result of NAFTA’s implementation in 1994. Cross-border trade more than tripled between 1993 and 2000, from $81B to $247B making Mexico the second largest trading partner of the U.S. By the end of the decade, nearly 300M people, 90M cars and 4M trucks and railcars were entering the U.S. from Mexico every year (Andreas 2005, 2). Seventy percent of Mexico’s investment came from the United States (Krauze 2005, 1). Eighty percent of the overall Canadian and Mexican trade is conducted with NAFTA partners. One third of all U.S. trade is conducted with Canada and Mexico. Trade among NAFTA partners has tripled over the past decade while cross-border direct investment has increased sharply (Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2005, 1). Additionally, Mexico is the second largest exporter of oil to the United States and Canada is now second in the world in proved oil reserves due to oil exploration and investment in the vast oil sands (CFR 2005, 15). This helped Canada become the United States’ largest and most reliable supplier of energy (WWC 2005A, 14). Further, Canada is the largest customer of 39 American states and Mexico is the first or second largest customer of 22 states and second largest customer overall. North America is now the largest free trade area in the world (CFR 2005, 18).

---

31 This was also confirmed by an interview participant knowledgeable on counter-drug operations.
Thus, as most recognize today, the security and efficiency of the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders is now more important than ever (WWC 2005A, 13).

Summary

Canada and the U.S. indeed have a long, positive relationship in the security cooperation realm. While problems, issues, and disagreements have surfaced over the years, the two countries have endured them all and have, since 1938, been involved in some type of formal, institutionalized security cooperation. NORAD of course is the preeminent organization where binational cooperation flourishes. NORAD’s legacy is a testament to its importance to North American security. Its ability to adapt to changing threats to North America over the decades is evident and commendable (Bashow 1998, 12). However, NORAD failed, along with the FAA, to defend North America on 11 September 2001 and the underlying reasons that led to this failure are rational, acceptable, and not the result of negligence. Further testament to this fact is that NORAD emerged from the 9/11 tragedy more robust and more important to North American Security.

Today, NORAD remains organizationally the same as it has been since its inception. A U.S. four-star General remains in charge with a Canadian three-star general second in command. Operational command and control issues have long been established and both countries seem generally at ease with the command and control structure. The U.S. has continued to push to expand and insert a missile defense system into NORAD while the Canadian government has until recently, seemed supportive. The fact that the agreement has consistently been updated
since 1958 indicates the probability that NORAD will continue to function as the main organization for North American security cooperation. Indeed, along with maritime expansion, the recently signed 2006 renewal allows for the agreement to stay in force indefinitely with no set time for renewal and the ability for the agreement to be updated at any time by either country. While many may focus on the importance of the maritime expansion, the assumption that the agreement will forever be in effect unless one of the counties desires to terminate it also speaks volumes to its future longevity.

The perspectives in this study that involve NORAD remain valid research perspectives. The question of any type of linkage from NAFTA to NORAD or from NAFTA to North American security cooperation remains largely unanswered—especially the former as evidenced by the lack of literature regarding this topic. NORAD, as the Cold War legacy organization, was criticized in the post 9/11 analysis for not adequately preparing for an internal type of attack in spite of having a mandate to look for external threats. Hence, the research regarding the affect that bureaucratic inertia may have on security cooperation remains intriguing. Finally, as NORTHCOM endeavors to increase Mexico’s involvement in North American security matters, the question of how NORAD may help in this matter becomes even more important.

This chapter sought to provide the historical background on NORAD and the accompanied Canadian-U.S. security relationship. With this background, the remaining chapters can now explore those issues, using the perspectives and
methodology discussed in the introduction that may shed light on where some of the hindrances and facilitators are to a more robust tri-lateral or tri-national North American security cooperation institution in the future.
CHAPTER II

BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA

How does bureaucratic inertia hinder international security cooperation?

This chapter opens with a discussion of literature on this topic which leads to a section where the relevant hypothesis and associated independent variables are described. Next, the key interview questions tied to these variables are discussed and finally the responses presented from the three groups: American, Canadian, and Mexican are presented and analyzed.

Literature Review

What is bureaucratic inertia? While there is no ready pool of working definitions for this term, a myriad of scholarly and journalistic work laments the existence of bureaucratic inertia and its negative effect on their specific organization or area of study. There appears to be little or no opposition to the implication that bureaucratic inertia is a hindrance to change and the fact that the extant literature reveals it as such in many different issue areas strongly suggests it can permeate any organization. A detailed description follows:

A common term in the study of government and public administration; bureaucratic inertia is often used in a derogatory sense to refer to the slow pace of large and highly complex

---

32 The list includes, but is not limited to: education, government (in nearly all areas—defense, economics, and politics), AIDS awareness/action, arms control, policing, tracking down terrorists, state building/re-building, inadequate warning of earthquakes and tsunamis and welfare reform. Searching “Bureaucratic Inertia” in EBSCO and www.googlescholar.com revealed numerous examples.

33 Hakim/Litan, 2002; Tulchin, 1997; Rowswell, 2004; Dorman (17) and Rees (40) in Croft et al., 2001; Dominguez, Fernandez, 2001; Ratt 2004; Keohane/Nye, 1977.
organizations (bureaucracies) in accomplishing their tasks . . . bureaucratic inertia more often than not results from the many rules, regulations, policies, and procedures that public and governmental organizations legally have to follow.\footnote{University of Connecticut, http://www.lib.uconn.edu/~mboyer/ms2001-02glossary.html#bureaucratic%20inertia.}

Nastase provides a more applicable (to this study) characterization of bureaucratic inertia in her analysis of institutional choice and bureaucratic inertia in Romania’s decision to adopt a national security council similar to the United States’ national security council (2001, 70-94). She grounds her characterization of bureaucratic inertia in Allison’s (1971) organizational theory model termed “organizational process.”

According to Moe Allison sought to demonstrate how political events can be interpreted in different ways depending upon the model that one applies to the event (Moe 1991, 112). Allison applied three different models to analyze the Kennedy administration’s decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis: (a) rational-actor; (b) organizational process; and (c) governmental (bureaucratic) politics (Allison 1971, 4-5). Allison’s and subsequent studies minimized the rational-actor model and elevated the alternative models’ explanatory power, especially in cases where there was an abundance of data to analyze (Sagan 1994, 71). Allison’s application of the organizational process model and Vandenbroucke’s (1984) similar study of the earlier Bay of Pigs invasion provide context for analysis of bureaucratic inertia in this project.
As explained by Allison, the organizational process model looks at the actions and decisions of an organization (bureaucracy) as outputs from the organizational processes that shape decision making through established norms, procedures, and standard operating procedures (6). When discussing rationality in organizational decision-making, Sagan notes two widespread themes in organizational theory that serve as impediments to rational organizational decision-making (71). First, large organizations by necessity develop structured processes and procedures by which decisions are made. Organizational theory postulates that these processes and accompanying procedures influence organizational decisions (outputs) more than single-unitary actors making strategic rational choices. Allison revealed another aspect of inertia that states while minor modifications do take place within the existence of established procedures, “major organizational changes” typically take place only after a major crisis has occurred (113). Pertinent to this study is the question: Is this what happened to NORAD after 9/11?

The second theme is found in the competitive nature evident within a large organization as different sub-group’s goals and objectives conflict. Sagan (1994, 72) and Jacques (1976, 170) both reached similar conclusions. While writing about concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation, Sagan spoke of the conflict between subgroups. He noted that organizations are not simply tools in the hands of higher-level authorities, but are groups of self-interested and competitive sub-units and actors (73). He went on to argue that organizational theory helps explain
why certain sub-groups experience conflict. He offers as examples that conflict between nurses, doctors, and administrators in hospitals; faculty and administrators in colleges; sales and production departments in business are indicative of conflict as an inevitable part of organizational life stemming from organizational characteristics (73). In seeking to build a general theoretical construction of how social institutions and human nature affect each other, with special reference to bureaucracy Jacques found competing interests within various subgroups led some to resist change and others to seek change (vii, 170). His example of researchers needing rapid progression, looking ahead and seeking change contrasts with middle management’s need to grow but with a more steady progression. Continuity in middle management is most needed and will witness longer terms of service giving middle managers more power. Finally, the “works police”—operational arm of the bureaucracy responsible for the day-to-day operations—also require stability and are less open to change. Herein is one negative effect of inertia on a large organization. As sub-groups and their goals and objectives compete, conflict is created that hinders the organization’s ability to conduct business making it inefficient at best and unproductive at worse. Pertinent to this study is the discovery of conflict between one country’s civilian and military elite as well as organizations within the government, such as the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense. How does conflict in these and similar relationships hinder security cooperation?
Another obstacle to change that is tied to competing group’s interests comes from James Wilson’s (1989) discussion on government bureaucracy. While discussing different types of agencies, Wilson notes the differences between an agency’s outputs and outcomes (158-159). Outputs are those items that the agency actually does—the work or product that it produces. The outcomes refer to the phenomenon of how the outputs improve the environment that the agency is meant to affect. Wilson clarifies how agencies will be resistant to changes that increase their outputs (and consequently, the resources required to sustain these new outputs) without realizing a corresponding improvement in outcomes. This is one reason why change can be difficult. The rise in output and associated resource level needed to produce it do not always readily translate to a correspondingly clear level of improved outcomes. This effect is prevalent in the United States’ efforts to improve Homeland Security. As it levies new requirements for outputs on first responders nation-wide, the immediate question of the first responders is; How does this increase the outcome of improved homeland security? First responders would rather be given the money and be allowed to determine how best to spend it within their areas of responsibility.35

Vandenbroucke applied Allison’s three conceptual models of organizational theory to the U.S. Invasion of Cuba—infamously known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Vandenbroucke, like Sagan and Allison, found more

---

35 A point made clear during the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies “Introduction to Homeland Security” class taught in fall 2003.
evidence for the bureaucratic politics and organizational process models than the rational-actor account. Regarding organizational processes, three characteristics of organizational theory were evident. First, bureaucratic inertia and organization repertoire led the CIA to push forth with its plan in spite of last minute decisions by President Kennedy that severely hampered the operation. Second, the CIA was able to control the release and spread of information due to its standard operating procedure of ensuring secrecy. Finally, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reviewed the plan at the President’s request, routine bureaucratic processes and parochialism within the U.S. Government resulted in minimal criticism of the plan by the JCS (Vandenbroucke 1984, 474-479). Vandenbroucke is the only one who hints that standard operating procedures governing decision-making processes may be helpful. He notes that the ad-hoc, undisciplined decision-making processes of the Kennedy administration contributed to the lack of a structured debate on the decision to implement the Bay of Pigs invasion (485-486). He concludes that three organizational characteristics—inertia, repertoires, and independence—ultimately led to the implementation of a flawed plan (479). This leads to a question for this study; Do any of these organizational characteristics affect North American security cooperation? Exploration of the existence of these effects on North American security cooperation could reveal similar organizational effects from inertia, organizational culture (secrecy), standard operating procedures, and parochialism. Vandenbroucke concluded that the three elements together led to the decision to implement the flawed plan
which was certainly a negative effect on the organization’s decision-making process.

David Welch concludes that despite the dearth of rigorous tests, there are convincing reasons to believe that neither bureaucratic politics nor governmental politics model is as useful as, let alone analytically superior to the widely used rational actor model (1992, 114). Welch notes that the rational actor model performed reasonably well in Allison’s research and should not be abandoned by those who seek useful general propositions about international politics (138). However, he provides balance by highlighting examples where bureaucratic and governmental processes and limitations constrained the application of rational choice in that civilian leaders during the Bay of Pigs were not able to make a fully informed decision (139). In demonstrating that all three models have a place in organizational theory, he also reveals another negative effect that inertia has on an organization. In this case, the standard decision-making processes and associated limitations constrained the elite actors from making the best decision possible. While focusing on organizational theory in this perspective, this study gives credence to the influence of the rational actor model in chapter four which explores the influence of elites on cooperation.

Robert McCalla (1996) studied how well alliances adapt to changing strategic circumstances by focusing on NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War. As a Cold War military alliance like NORAD, the results of his NATO research could also reveal possible affects on NORAD and its ability to adapt in the post
Cold War strategic environment. McCalla first demonstrated how the neorealist theories fall short to explain why NATO, a Cold War alliance, has persisted after the Cold War (450-456). Then, he demonstrated how organizational and international institutions theories provide certain explanatory expectations regarding NATO’s continued existence after the Cold War. McCalla noted that organizational theory specifies a timeline of events that an organization in a changing strategic environment will endure: (a) denial of a need to change; (b) organization members affirming the value of the alliance to member states; and (c) modifying roles and missions or generating new ones in order to survive as an organization (458). International institutional theory suggests that organization members will: (a) use existing norms and procedures to deal with new problems rather than create new ones (inertia); (b) modify (change) the organization as necessary to deal with new problems the existing structures cannot deal with; and (c) use the regime as the basis for ties to other actors, state and non-state, in pursuit of regime goals (McCalla 1996, 464). McCalla concludes that the international institutionalist approach best explains NATO’s behavior during a declining threat involvement (471). Additionally, he confirms the effects of an organization’s norms, procedures, and functions on its ability to change:

. . . where organizational development of an alliance is high, we would expect the impact of the loss of a threat on an alliance to be mitigated and hence slowed. Organizational interest will work to prolong the life of the alliance because in doing so they benefit themselves….an alliance that is at the center of a regime will respond more slowly to changes in threats than one that has not developed attendant norms, procedures and functions. The wider
the range of functions that an alliance fulfills beyond its core
defense function, the less responsive it will be to changes in the
threats it faces and the more likely it is to be transformed in
purpose as its external environment changes. (470)

The effects discussed here on NATO could also be actively affecting NORAD’s
ability to change.

Another set of literature speaks to similar effects of inertia on
organizations. Several give credit to Hannan and Freeman (1984, 1977) for noting
that the age and size of an organization impact its rate of change.36 Hannan and
Freeman characterized inertia by its effect on organizations:

Structures of organizations have high inertia when the
speed of reorganization is much lower than the rate at which
environmental conditions change. Thus, the concept of inertia, like
fitness, refers to a correspondence between the behavioral
capabilities of a class of organizations and their environments.
(1984 151)

They further characterized inertia as relating to an organization’s size and age.
The larger and older an organization is, the higher inertia will be causing more
hindrance to change (158). As an older organization, we would expect to see
NORAD with a fairly significant rate of inertia acting against it. Tying this
conclusion back to one of Allison’s findings creates another question; Can a
major crisis overcome inertia in an older organization and cause significant
change? Hannan and Freeman also wrote on the effects of structural inertia on
organizations within the ecological context. They first established that

---

36 Fredrickson and Iaquinto 1989; Kelly and Amburgey 1991; Baker and Cullen 1993; Gersick
organizations do in fact change, challenging a claim by some that organizational structures rarely change (1984, 150). They cite March (1981, 563) who had asserted that organizations are continually changing . . . but change within organizations cannot be arbitrarily controlled (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 150). This assertion is important because many NORAD critics lament NORAD’s inability to change. The more accurate critique then should focus on NORAD’s pace of change. Moreover, this study is interested in what influences have affected NORAD to either hinder (slow) or facilitate (accelerate) its change.

Fredrickson and Iaquinto studied strategic processes of firms statistically validating the largely untested arguments of authors who have suggested that strategic decision-making processes tend to resist all but modest change” (1989, 535). This means that the strategic decision-making processes inherent in large organizations affect the organizations by causing them to resist significant change. Kelly and Amburgey built on Hannan and Freeman in studying inertia’s effect on the airline industry during the years 1962-1985 where the need for change was strong (1991, 592). Their conclusions validated Hannan and Freeman’s “old organization equals higher inertia” conclusions and formulated a suggestion that the concept of momentum is complementary to inertia theory. But, they acknowledged the need to gain additional internal organizational data (culture, power, decision-making, communication, leadership) before concluding their findings are actual indictors of organizational archetypes (609).
In summary, bureaucratic inertia exists in every organization and its existence is characterized as an inhibitor to change—a negative effect on change. The effects of inertia are inherent in inertia’s characterization as perhaps summarized by Hannan and Freeman: a force that limits the ability of organizations to adapt (1977 930). Specific to this study is their conclusion that organizations respond relatively slowly to the occurrence of threats and opportunities in their environments (1984 151). Organizational processes do not tell the entire story, but they tend to tell more of the story than the rational-actor model. The reasonable conclusion is that each model has something to say, but research shows that when investigating bureaucratic inertia, the organizational process, bureaucratic politics and international institutionalist models rather than the rational-actor or realist models provide more insight into why change was slow or non-existent. Procedures govern much of organizational behavior and leave little room for change. Sub-groups fight for autonomy and strive to protect their areas of responsibility from outside influence and infringement. Minor modifications may occur in spite of the lingering inertia, but major changes occur after a major crisis. The rate of inertia can be attributed to an organization’s size and age where larger size and older age increase inertia in an organization. These effects, born out of the organizational theory models, were tested in this study.

Why has NORAD, by some accounts, failed to change more significantly over the years in light of major events that would seem to provoke change? Were NORAD’s standard operating procedures susceptible to this effect of slow change
and did 9/11—obviously a major crisis—result in significant organizational change? Second, we want to know how the different organizations and governments are working together to foster security cooperation. Are there organizational relationships in North American security cooperation that are experiencing some of the conflict that Sagan discusses? If there are, to what extent, do they realize it, and are they trying to minimize it?

The main hypothesis for investigating bureaucratic inertia states that bureaucratic inertia acts as a resistance to change. A further breakdown of that hypothesis leads to three sub-hypotheses—each of which looks for evidence where bureaucratic inertia restricts possibilities for change and thus, negatively affects security cooperation. Hence, bureaucratic inertia acts as a resistance to change: (a) organizational history, culture and historical legacy determine a set of values and processes not easily changed; (b) organizational doctrine and standard operating procedures constrain the degree to which change can occur as the information gathering and decision-making processes are exercised; and (c) self-perceived importance and parochialism towards other organizations causes subgroups to compete. The second hypothesis states that major organizational changes only occur after a major crisis. The way each factor is associated with bureaucratic inertia is described below.

Organizational history, culture, and values

The institution’s organizational history shapes lingering values, attitudes, and cultural influences. These influences are expected to hinder change because
and by extension, they limit possibilities of expanded security cooperation. Evidence gives credence to the hypothesis’ claim that these influences can be hard to overcome and may hinder change (Vandenbroucke 1984, 479, Kelly and Amburgey 1991, 609). The interview question to test this factor was; What cultural/historical norms, attitudes, and doctrines exist within the government and/or its organizational components? With this question, the researcher sought to determine the most significant cultural or historical norms and/or attitudes that the participants felt exist that hinder change. The significance of each item is first determined by the fact that a participant offered it as an answer to this question. Then, those responses where a majority of the interview pool answered similarly will naturally add to the significance of a particular item.

Organizational doctrine, mandates, and/or standard operating procedures

The procedures that constrain the degree to which change can occur as the decision-making processes are exercised (Allison 1971, 6). In the case of NORAD, a hindrance to change could negatively affect security cooperation—as may be the case in the criticism leveled at NORAD after 9/11. The interview question to test this factor was; Do you see the standard operating procedures and decision-making processes of your organization as a benefit or detriment to facilitating cooperation? Why or why not? This question allowed each participant to consider and evaluate how the standard operating procedures and decision-making processes of their organization affect cooperation. Participants were
encouraged to discuss the reasons why they think the processes are either a detriment or facilitator of cooperation.

Organizational parochialism

This is the reluctance to work with or relinquish responsibilities to a new organization and/or look with suspicion on another organization’s purpose, mandate or motivations. Organizations are not willing to part with existing tasks or missions in large part because of the accompanying resources they will lose. Also, organizations are sometimes reluctant to take on new tasks because it may mean “doing more with less” as the new task may drain existing resources. Further, organizations may look on another or new organization with suspicion—especially if they have a similar mandate or have overlapping area of responsibilities such as in the case with Joint Staff–NORTHCOM; NORAD–NORTHCOM; U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)–NORTHCOM; U.S. State Department–U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Suspicion and questioning of motives can cause one organization to be leery of another thus slowing if not directly inhibiting change. This study has several organizational relationships available to analyze where new organizations are vying for resources and missions that existing organizations had or where organizational parochialism may be a hindrance to security cooperation (Sagan 1994, 72-73; Jacques 1976, vii, 170). The interview question to test this factor was; What are the issues or challenges that must be addressed in order to facilitate NORAD expansion to include Mexico? This question specifically targeted one of the key questions of
this study—NORAD expansion. Responses here will reveal what the different issues are, either perceived or real, that elites and subject matter experts from each country feel are key to drawing Mexico deeper into North American security cooperation. The answers are important in particular to NORTHCOM which has a major goal of including Mexico more deeply into cooperative efforts.

Crisis Impact

Major organizational changes occur after a major crisis. It is to be expected that lingering attitudes, norms and values of a country or organization may indeed transcend time. Moreover, they can hinder significant change while allowing minor changes. This factor is interested in finding evidence where major organizational changes occurred, in spite of lingering inertia, as a result of a major crisis or event (Allison 1971, 113). This factor will be tested primarily by focusing on NAFTA, the Cold War, and 9/11. The question to test this factor was; How has each country’s threat assessment and security posture changed since the end of the Cold War? After NAFTA implementation? After 9/11? This question sought to determine the extent that each of these major events in North American history had on North American security cooperation. Each could be expected to cause a major change to any of the North American country’s security posture. By asking the interview participants this question, we get a determination of which events affected a country’s security posture the most and by association, had a bigger impact on North American security cooperation.
Results
Organizational History, Culture, and Values

What cultural/historical norms, attitudes and doctrine exist within the government and/or organizational components? Of the twenty-one Americans interviewed, fourteen gave specific responses to this question. Additionally, four Canadians and two Mexicans responded which provided substantial information on this perspective. The fourteen Americans identified eight separate items in response to this question. Of these eight items, those associated with aspects of bureaucratic inertia emerged as the top two items identified:

(a) Competing interests between organizations (11 responses)
(b) Country historical and cultural differences or similarities (7 responses)
(c) The International Criminal Court (4 responses)
(d) U.S. priorities and accompanying resources
(e) Political issues
(f) Mexico’s non-intervention policy
(g) Elites
(h) U.S. superpower influence

The Canadians bolstered the cultural aspect by discussing cultural similarities between Canadians and Americans. They also discussed to a lesser extent the impact of inertia on cooperation. They are also perplexed by the “Buy American” attitude so prevalent in the U.S. today. The final item raised by the
Canadians deals with elite influence. The Mexicans discussed cultural differences and similarities and their non-intervention policy.

American Views: Competing Interests

One of the first interviews with a State Department diplomat produced an example of how the competing interests of two organizations can hinder security cooperation within a country. He began by stating, “bureaucratic inertia—this is what is the most difficult . . . cultural inertia too. Technology is not that hard . . . it is the inertia that must be overcome.” He then provided an example of how both State and Justice Department’s individual interests and initiatives in the post 9/11 world created hindrances to cooperation at least initially.

Post 9/11: Focus of homeland security was the domestic challenges. Consular affairs had been dealing with immigration issues for a long time—since the first trade towers attack in 1993. Immigration is hard, [it is] especially hard to know when someone leaves the country. One goal was to reduce immigration from special interest countries. Initiatives at first were more of a hindrance than a help. [The two departments] needed to cooperate a lot on how to get through this. The cultures in the two departments were opposite. Justice—law enforcement, everyone is a potential enemy. State—accommodate the needs of your international friends. The National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was a Department of Justice tool to catch terrorists, but it became an immigration tool as it caught many illegal aliens—this was a big goof and immigration problem. Deadlines were given (for registering) but of course, the illegal aliens showed up during the last few days for fear of being deported—bottle neck, now what to do with all these illegal aliens?

A NORTHCOM participant also noted how organizations competing interests must be understood by the people who are working the issues. He noted:
For the State Department, the objective in Mexico is not the same objective that the DOD has. The reality of the situation is that the top senior U.S. official in Mexico carries State’s water, not DOD’s water. State likes to do soft things, like human rights, visitor control.

Similarly, an ambassador discussed how constituencies can affect cooperation:

Constituencies: security brings more obstacles to trade. Those who advocate for NAFTA may not advocate for security because of the fact that security initiatives will hinder the advances in trade.

Another State Department diplomat noted that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs to fund their own projects. However, when talking to DHS participants, one noted that the State Department (and the White House) levies new requirements on the DHS but provides no funding. Additionally, two NORAD participants noted that the DHS acts unilaterally and this bothers Mexico. If the DHS habitually acts unilaterally, then most likely it would bother NORTHCOM and NORAD as well. The participants shared how DHS and NORTHCOM are pointing fingers at State and the Whitehouse while State is pointing fingers at DHS and Joint Staff is pointing fingers at NORTHCOM (below). This seemingly petty finger pointing is exactly the type of organizational conflict that organizational theories suggest will occur.

While an officer at the Joint Staff notes that military-military cooperation is great, there is still a tug-of-war between the Joint Staff and NORTHCOM regarding Mexico. This seems to be due to the fact that prior to NORTHCOM’s
creation, the Joint Staff dealt directly with Mexico (and Canada for that matter). Now, since NORTHCOM is responsible for Mexico and Canada, the Joint Staff must relinquish some of its direct involvement to the new command. As noted by two participants, Title 10 of U.S. Code, Section 164 and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) indicate that the NORTHCOM Commander is responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of the National Military Strategy (UCP 2004, para 11d). It is in this UCP where previous Joint Staff responsibilities towards Mexico would be officially handed over to NORTHCOM. Since the Joint Staff has similar arrangements with other unified commands it should not be a new or significant problem. Indeed, perceptions from the Joint Staff do not indicate a big concern regarding NORTHCOM assuming some of the Joint Staff responsibilities in principal.

An officer at NORAD also noted:

The March 2005 UCP, NORTHCOM is trying to carve out their jobs from what the Joint Staff has been doing in the past with Canada and Mexico. NORTHCOM and Joint Staff—there is a food fight between these two organizations. Traditionally the Joint Staff has worked continental issues. According to Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 164 and the UCP, Commander USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of the National Military Strategy (UCP 2004, para 11d).

Finally, speaking of the strain new organizations can place on the processes, an officer answered that the emerging role of NORTHCOM and to a lesser extent CanadaCom were chief bureaucratic inertia obstacles.
NORAD and NORTHCOM also have a bit of a competition although, since these two organizations are led by one dual-hatted commander, the conflict is not as great. An officer at the Joint Staff offered that there is a sibling rivalry between NORAD, NORTHCOM and CanadaCom . . . some at Joint Staff feel NORTHCOM is not as efficient [as NORAD] . . . is it a zero sum game—beef up NORTHCOM, diminish NORAD?

NORAD of course has Canada and the U.S. as active participants. Now, the U.S. created NORTHCOM out of NORAD causing many to question how NORAD and NORTHCOM work together. Then, Canada stood up CanadaCom as a peer organization to NORTHCOM. This created a lot of potential for organizations’ competing interests to clash.

Another officer on the Joint Staff asked, “conflict between NORAD—NORTHCOM mission? Air, who controls? NORTHCOM is worried about their UCP.” Then he provided an example that gives insight into the types of conflict that exist between NORAD and NORTHCOM. First, remember that NORAD’s focus is on identifying airborne threats to the U.S. and Canada. NORTHCOM is responsible for defending the entire continent against threats from all domains—land, sea and air. So, who has control of the air? It would seem that NORAD, arguably the parent organization of NORTHCOM, now has a mission that is subordinate to NORTHCOM. In other unified command’s areas of responsibility, the unified command always has operational control over the forces assigned to that area. Is that the case with NORTHCOM and NORAD? Since NORTHCOM
has command authority over North America, does NORTHCOM control NORAD’s assets when needed?

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are somewhat leery of each other. This is due to the similar nature of responsibility in a very similar domain and the subsequent desire by both to acquire the necessary resources in order to accomplish their missions. This resource question was mentioned by an officer on the Joint Staff as he indicated that SOUTHCOM is, “worried about losing missions and assets to NORTHCOM.” SOUTHCOM’s concern hits to the heart of this perspective as existing organizations will be concerned over losing missions and resources to a new competing organization. Another Joint Staff officer stated:

NORTHCOM is still not a mature unified command. SOUTHCOM is more mature—several years—Joint Task Force [JTF] South is established. SOUTHCOM’s heartburn is that NORTHCOM doesn’t have the detection and monitoring capabilities since JTF South still has assets under their control.

Two Joint Staff officers shared their views about competing military and civilian cultures in the Pentagon. One shared,

Military officers, who usually serve on the Joint Staff for three years, normally try to achieve quick results while the civilians, who presumably will be there much longer, always buck the military personnel telling them that is not how things work at the Pentagon and that they need to be patient and be content with small gains.

The prospect for the military personnel of working in a particular job or office much longer than 2-3 years is unrealistic. For civilians though, it is very likely. This means the civilians are more apt to be patient and look for small gains
along their entire career so that when their career comes to an end, they can look back and see how the small victories added up to significant changes. The military officers feel they do not have this luxury because they need to make the most progress on an issue in the 2-3 years they have on staff. To make matters more pressing, these senior officers have only 3-4 years before they are evaluated for promotion. Thus, a 3-year Joint Staff tour could conceivably be their best or only opportunity to prove their fitness for promotion. Regardless, an officer noted that, “crisis management essentially characterizes what issue or regional area gets the attention of senior staff. Consequently, visibility and issue retention is hard.”

**American Views: Cultural Issues**

While eight participants discussed cultural issues in response to this question, there was one fairly significant cultural issue that five of the seven individuals discussed. This is not the only place where cultural issues were found to be a major factor in the research analysis, but in response to this specific question, the following cultural issues were the only ones revealed.

Five participants shared their belief that for the Mexican officers, “schmooze” was important. An officer at the Joint Staff provided the first glimpse of this perception. “In the Latino culture, relationships are important, schmooze is very important.” An ambassador, Department of Homeland Security civilian and NORTHCOM civilian also felt this was an important factor to consider. Perhaps most important were the comments made by Mr. Pardo-Mauer, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Western Hemisphere, who noted during his
SOUTHCOM conference keynote address that, “style and venue are inconsequential to the U.S. but they are important to the Mexicans.” This was certainly a more diplomatic way of discussing the schmooze perception that the other participants more candidly mentioned. This perception has affected the way that NORTHCOM deals with the Mexican military. When NORTHCOM personnel can successfully arrange visits for these officers, they do try to schmooze them—within legal limits of course. So, while the stereotype may or may not be true, the existing perception directly affects how the Mexican’s are treated when they visit NORTHCOM.

Another cultural issue regards the secrecy that surrounds the Mexican Army which makes it difficult to obtain information about it. A NORTHCOM civilian calls it a

... cultural thing ... the U.S. perception of a lack of cooperation because of the historical legacy going back to 1848 ... a pervasive theory. The U.S. thinks that the Mexicans hold a grudge. What about the Mexicans? Thinking as a Mexican—don’t trust the U.S. because the U.S. always acts in its own self interests. Why should I [Mexican] help the United States? What’s in it for me? The U.S. regards Mexico as a third-world country, banana republic. The U.S. attitude is that Mexico needs help. The Mexican’s see themselves as independent but they see the U.S. attitude as an impediment.

Another NORTHCOM civilian speaks of this legacy and links it to this phenomena as if it were proven:

Mexican society and military cultural issues are the big obstacle. Mexico is trapped in its burden of history ... eleven invasions ... there is a slide showing Mexico under
NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility in the command briefing that we do not show to the Mexicans.

The last participant shared “culturally, we [U.S.] want it now. Asia has a long view. Mexico has a long memory [of U.S. wrongs and battles inflicted on them in the past].” There is no disagreement on the difficulty obtaining information on the Mexican Army. The speculations as to why this difficulty exists are where the opinions diverge. As Roderic Camp notes, the difficulty (indeed near possibility of breaking through the Mexican Army’s secrecy) that surrounds them hinders a true perspective and analysis of the Mexican Army’s motivations as well as their capabilities (5). Since the Mexican Navy’s culture is more open, they are more accessible. Hence, we are better able to understand what motivates them and better assess their capabilities.

Finally an ambassador offered one of only two American references to Canadian cultural issues in response to this question when he stated, “Canadians are afraid of U.S. dominance; they look for opportunities to retain their culture.”

A State Department diplomat offered:

Canada is not much different than the U.S. because of international affairs. They militarily participate in Afghanistan and in anti-terrorism operations. Both countries are connected through the economy. Both countries have a multicultural society with large communities of players on all issues: Jews, liberal views, Tamil’s from Sri Lanka, Gang Violence with Tigers, etc.

His view of the many cultural similarities is also discussed by one of the Canadian participants below.
American Views: International Criminal Court

The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the U.S. position not to sign the agreement has created a significant challenge to cooperation particularly with Mexico as noted by four participants but perhaps most notably, by two U.S. General Officers—one during the SOUTHCOM conference and one during the NORTHCOM conference. In addition to not signing the agreement, the U.S. has threatened to stop funding certain programs for those countries that do sign the agreement without signing a U.S. bilateral agreement (Article 98 Waiver) granting U.S. soldiers immunity from ICC prosecution. Mexico appears poised to sign the ICC agreement but not the “Article 98” waiver. If this transpires, then International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to Mexico will dry up. As noted by one participant, IMET is the, “most important program in the hemisphere with somewhere in the neighborhood between $1-$1.5 million dollars a year.”

One SOUTHCOM conference speaker noted that Mexico is already beginning to find alternative military schools to attend in China and other countries. Hence, the shift of Mexican officers from attending U.S. military schools in lieu of other military schools holds long-term negative consequences for future Mexican-U.S. cooperation. If the U.S. does nothing more to alleviate this pending issue for Mexico, then the U.S. will lose the chance to positively influence the next generation of Mexican officers, many of whom are most likely on a promotion path due to their selection to attend schools outside of Mexico (a
practice usually reserved for a country’s best and brightest officers). In turn, these future senior Mexican officers cannot help but look more favorably upon the country where they spend upwards of a year attending classes and learning about that country’s military operations as well as the country’s culture. This challenge is well known and according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, there are initiatives from the Joint Staff to try and counter this pending problem.

American Views: Priorities and Resources

Three participants offered priorities and lack of resources as a major issue in response to this question. In one context, a NORTHCOM officer discussed how, “the U.S. outspends the world in defense.” Its capabilities and size scares some countries . . . it can be intimidating to Canada and Mexico.” A Department of Homeland Security civilian lamented the need to increase Foreign Military Finance (FMF) by noting, “State and White House are not providing increased funding.” A State Department diplomat also discussed this issue noting the difficulties of getting a new program funded:

But we need FMF—we can’t get it into the budget. In three years of trying, the first two years it didn’t even get out of the State Department. Last year it didn’t come back from the Office of Management and Budget. It is hard to get a new program funded even when rhetoric and interests point in that area. The dilemma is that with shrinking budgets, you’d need to cut an existing budget area to get a new one started. The cut in the existing budget [speaking about foreign aid] sends a bad signal to the country in the existing program.
American Views: Political Issues, Elites, Superpower, Non-intervention

The remaining items had no more than two participants share them as an important factor in response to this question. The first item regards Mexico’s non-intervention policy grounded in the Mexican Constitution. While the American responses are few regarding this issue, it is bolstered somewhat by the fact that one of the two Mexican participants also raised this as an item.

Mexico’s Constitution was first written in 1824, shortly after Mexico’s hard-fought independence was won. Internal conflicts reigned between liberal and conservative factions and the constitution was re-written by the influential liberal faction in 1857 and included the following liberal elements:

- Freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. It also guaranteed basic civil liberties for all Mexicans, reaffirmed the abolition of slavery, secularized education, and greatly curtailed the power of the Catholic Church.37

This constitution ultimately led to the War of the Reform between the liberal and conservative factions from 1858-1861 with the liberal faction emerging victorious. The constitution of 1857 and the liberal victory would set precedence for the current Mexican Constitution written in 1917 (Camp 1996, 34).

Significant to this study is the non-intervention clause contained in the constitution. It is found in Article 89, item X. When describing the President’s authority in foreign policy, it allows him to direct foreign policy, but he must do so while observing several standard principles. One of these principles is “self-

---

determination of peoples—non-intervention.” It is this clause and accompanying military doctrine that two civilians note as a constitutionally-mandated challenge for the Mexicans to overcome if they are to become more involved in North American Security Cooperation. This view is supported below in the Mexican responses.

Another participant questioned how often Mexico participates in cooperative ventures in the first place. She asked, “How often has Mexico participated in these types of missions? Who does Mexico cooperate with really?” implying that Mexico does not regularly enter into formal agreements (like NORAD) that may lead them down a path where they feel their non-intervention philosophy would be tested. Domínguez and Fernandez, (2001, Chap IV) argue that the phrase Pragmatic Autonomy has characterized Mexican policy in the UN and in the Organization of American States (OAS). One participant specifically noted the differences in Mexican and U.S. positions within the OAS: “In the history of the OAS, Mexico was always going against the U.S.” A diplomat noted Mexico’s recent attempts to be more involved in hemisphere leadership via the OAS but also worries that Mexico is not as involved as it should be:

Mexico has been trying lately to be more involved—trying to get general secretary of the OAS—but again, not very much involvement with anyone else. Is the rest of the world leaving Mexico in the dust? Lack of participation will hinder them in getting the Latin American seat on the UN Security Council.

Domínguez further stated that Mexico “sees its self-assigned role in the UN as one of trying to develop and improve the UN” (56). Primarily, Mexico has
consistently tried to promote a more democratic decision-making process in the UN by arguing for a better balance between the General Assembly and the Security Council.

On another matter, a diplomat speaks to the influence of elites:

Elites, much more interesting and bigger part of the problem, intellectual tradition. How do you get at the elites? Attitude, leftist, ideological . . . they think they are the queen of Latin American . . . the intellectuals, etc.

An academician lamented what she perceives as the United States’ heavy-handedness in Latin America—the only participant who discussed this issue out of the twenty-eight interviewed. She also touched on elite influence and the political and historical legacy.

SOUTHCOM—Behemoth—Commander throws [his] weight around in a policy vacuum….Need SOUTHCOM and [the] U.S. Trade Representative working together. America projecting its power . . . Colombia is the only place where things are going well. The political legacy is generally negative. Historical . . . elites are critical. Mexico sees Latin America vs. SOUTHCOM. Why separate them from the rest of Latin America? . . . problem within Latin American security community is intense nationalism. The political and historical obstacles need to be overcome.

*Canadian Views*

The Canadian contingent’s responses reveal, in order of significance: (a) cultural similarities between Canadians and Americans; (b) evidence for the impact of inertia on cooperation; (c) a cultural gripe that the Canadians have against the Americans; and (d) the impact of elites. Most interesting regarding the lone view here on elites is that it also comes from a diplomat just as the American
view above on elites came from a diplomat. Further similarities exist between these two individuals but revealing those similarities here would compromise their confidentiality.

Regarding Canadian-U.S. similarities, three of the five Canadians provided examples. The diplomat noted that “700 thousand Canadians live in Los Angeles, 50 thousand in New York. Canadians are enmeshed in the American culture.” An officer added:

The U.S. has a big social influence on Canada. The radio airwaves bring U.S. influence into Canada. The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission has regulations on broadcasts. Canadian content is low . . . a certain percentage of Canadian music must be played. The demographics are similar to Australia with population location closer to the border and coasts. There is a magnification effect of U.S. positions towards Canada due to the big country versus small country dilemma. Public opinion polls show that the U.S. has a good relationship with Canada.

Two officers were unhappy with the phrase “buy American” so prevalent in the public media. One tracks it as part of his job and noted that it “creates problems—it is influenced by political reasons. What does this mean? No one says “buy Canadian” in Canada.” Another also laments this attitude:

What is needed is a realization on the U.S side not to force itself into the “buy American” attitude. For instance, the Joint Strike Fighter program . . . Congressional actions seem to go against the administration. Protectionism on Congress’ part . . . Executive seems more open to free trade.

An officer agrees with the diplomat’s view on NORAD inertia and added:

Inertia over the last 46 years of primarily aerospace domain does not give a good understanding of the give and take needed in
security issues in the maritime domain. By law, civilian agencies have the lead in maritime domain while the military has the lead in aerospace domain. NORAD lacks the understanding needed to deal with the other [civilian] domains and not have the lead . . . this will be a learning curve. In aerospace, NORAD leads, the FAA supports. In maritime, (the) civil agencies lead and NORAD supports. Culture has a lot to do with cooperation. Mutual understanding is enhanced or negated by how closely you work on the issues. Canada-U.S. culture has been developed by working side-by-side for so long.

The diplomat discussed elites and inertia together:

Senior level personnel are open to enhanced or expanded cooperation and even leaning forward with initiatives. While NORAD needs to overcome the inertia from the traditional aerospace mission, the middle to low-level personnel are not an impediment.

*Mexican Views*

In response to this question, the Mexicans focused on their constitutional non-intervention policy and also touched on cultural issues: “Canada and the U.S. have cultural similarities that do not exist between Mexico and the U.S.”

Regarding Mexico’s non interventionist policy, the officer noted that, “in order for the Mexican Army to participate with the U.S., it would need to completely transform.” He supported his view with the point that when compared to the Canadian and U.S. Army, the Mexican Army is very different in capabilities and in doctrine. He further noted: “Mexico has no global vision in its military on maritime concerns” citing the constitutional mandate of non-intervention. The Mexican military is not doctrinally organized to conduct operations outside of its territory as the U.S. and Canadian military are.
The Mexican philosophy of non-intervention is really one of non-recognition which is tied to the Estrada Doctrine. As late as 2003, when Mexico was grappling with a vote on the UN Security Council to support the U.S. in its war against Iraq, a sampling of ten Mexican newspapers (two independents, four left wing, two centrist, two pro-business) demonstrated that their dilemma to support the U.S. was grounded in Mexico’s pacifist tradition, the Estrada Doctrine and their defensive posture.

The Estrada Doctrine stems from Genaro Estrada (1887-1937) who formulated Mexican foreign policy as its foreign policy minister during the revolution. His doctrine essentially condemned the idea of recognition as an insult to a nation and thus, Mexico refuses to recognize or not-recognize states based on this doctrine. Today, most see Mexico’s Estrada doctrine implemented more readily in Mexico’s policy of non-intervention. While there might be evidence that Mexico has intervened in other countries’ affairs at times, they have done so relatively little. Nevertheless, it is this doctrine of non-intervention that limits the Mexican government and military from participating too actively in security cooperation agreements that go beyond the need to defend its own borders.

Building on its own constitutional principle of non-intervention, note the following regarding Mexico’s participation and objectives in the UN:

> The position of Mexico has been guided by a set of principles of international law, such as the principle of non-

---

intervention and sovereign equality among States, all of them, in accordance with the UN Charter. A strong commitment to international law has been pivotal on the initiatives and actions Mexico has promoted along its almost 60-year membership.39

**Question One Summary**

This question sought to determine the interview participant’s perceptions of the most significant cultural/historical norms, attitudes or doctrines that hinder change. American responses centered on bureaucratic inertia and cultural attitudes about Mexicans. The Canadian responses identified cultural similarities between the U.S. and Canada, attitudes, and bureaucratic inertia, reinforcing the top two items in the American responses. The Mexicans also discussed cultural issues and their non-intervention policy which, in the context of this study, falls under a bureaucratic inertia doctrinal hindrance. Mexican responses also support the Canadian and American responses.

Most of the bureaucratic inertia issues raised by the Americans regard issues with NORTHCOM as a new organization and the reluctance or hesitation for existing organizations to embrace NORTHCOM as an equal partner in the quest for better security cooperation. Also, there is evidence of other somewhat generic types of reluctance to work together, found in the assertion that some organizations levy additional requirements on others without an accompanying increase in funding. Second, the civilian and military cultures clash at the Joint Staff. Perhaps an area for further study is to explore how deep this clash is and

---

consequently, how this is affecting security cooperation efforts. Third was an example regarding the reasons for the Justice Department’s NSEERS program and the resulting, unintended impacts on the State Department. In this example, one organization’s security initiative negatively impacted another organization causing it to expend unplanned resources indirectly hindering cooperation.

Cultural difficulties prevalent between Mexico and the U.S. hinder cooperation while cultural similarities between Canada and the U.S. seem to facilitate cooperation. This view was the second most discussed item making it one of the most important items of this question. The Americans are concerned about the secrecy that surrounds the Mexican Army and have a perception that the Mexicans need to be schmoozed as part of the process for establishing trust that could eventually lead to better cooperation. Two Canadians, along with a few Americans noted the cultural similarities between Canada and the United States. Additionally, the Mexican civilian noted that similarities between Canada and the U.S do not exist between Mexico and the United States. Conversely, two Canadians are concerned about the “buy American” attitude so prevalent in American society today.

Two items less discussed but worth noting are: (a) The impact of the ICC and more importantly, the U.S. decision regarding how it will respond to countries who sign it; and (b) Mexico’s non-intervention policy. Significant about these two issues is that they are both grounded in written law and official policy. Constitutional, legislative and executive foreign policy shifts are needed to
change the impact that these two issues have or will have on North American security cooperation. In the case of the later, it is a doctrinal limitation that is constitutionally mandated implying the need for a constitutional amendment to allow change to occur there.

In conclusion, the participants provided ample evidence that bureaucratic inertia and cultural issues are the main items that hinder change. Regarding inertia, the focus is much more on how sub-groups’ competing interests act as a hindrance to cooperation. This results in strong support for the third variable which looked for evidence where competing interests and parochialism of sub-groups hinders cooperation. The data regarding cultural influences indicated that cultural issues can affect security cooperation although not exclusively hinder cooperation. There is evidence for this to be both a positive (Canada-U.S. cultural similarities) and negative (Mexico-U.S. cultural differences) influence. Thus, the analysis for the first variable is one of non-support. The variable looked for evidence of cultural hindrances to security cooperation, which the evidence did support, but the data also revealed evidence where cultural similarities are facilitating cooperation. What we found instead is that cultural issues are a significant factor that can affect security cooperation in both a positive and negative manner.

Organizational Doctrine, Mandates, and/or Standard Operating Procedures

Do you see the standard operating procedures and decision-making processes of your organization as a benefit or detriment to facilitating
cooperation? Why or why not? The twelve American responses to this question included six responses directly to this question and six more focused on a concern about the U.S. unified command model. The three Canadian’s responses provided two items to discuss: (a) inertia; and (b) different organization’s mandates. There were no responses from the Mexicans to this question leaving a total of fifteen responses and two main items.

The American responses began with a healthy challenge to this question’s assumption—that an organization’s standard operating procedures and/or decision-making processes hinder security cooperation. Three Americans overtly challenged this assumption, two others felt it could hinder and help cooperation, and only one agreed with the assumption. Further, if other participants described this aspect of inertia in their organization, they usually described how hard it was to get a policy pushed through the bureaucracy but rarely provided an assessment on the value-added to the output from that process. The main point of those who disagreed with the assumption was that decision-making processes of an organization that output important policy decisions are necessary and in the end, result in the best possible decision. While they admit that the process may slow down possible advances, it is entirely possible that the delays are a small price to pay for arriving at higher quality decisions.

The other major issue discussed by the Americans centered on the decision to create NORTHCOM and more specifically, place Mexico’s territory under NORTHCOM’s responsibility. This follows the U.S. Government’s
standard procedure of using unified commands and assigning regional areas of responsibilities as the way to manage world-wide threats to the United States. Specifically, several participants questioned the decision to put Mexico’s territory under any unified command’s responsibility and then, why that command was a new inexperienced command. Additionally, a concern was raised by a few participants that NORTHCOM may need to look at a different unified command model since it has a unique mission compared to other unified commands.

American Views: Bureaucratic Inertia Not All Bad?

An officer first noted his positive outlook on inertia when discussing some of the inertia differences between the U.S. and other Latin American countries.

... processes to get stuff done, if it were easy to push ideas, then bad ideas would get put forth as well ... Inertia: could be a good thing ... stability, changes in civilian elite, U.S. versus other Latin American countries not so dynamic changes, is this a good thing?

The second positive outlook comes from a NORTHCOM civilian. He noted that, “the process is important, perspectives are important, different levels of lens affect different priorities.” The final positive outlook comes from a diplomat:

Bureaucratic inertia: can be a good thing. Hard things need backing on the Hill [U.S. Congress], need top-level buy-in. Sometimes this helps us. It can withhold the hard, full-court press from Canada that comes when they hit an issue really hard.

The next few quotes are from those officers who see both pros and cons to this issue. One officer stated:

Prior to this action the U.S. had never placed Mexico’s or Canada’s territories under any unified command’s territory. But the standard practice was to place the entire world under some unified command’s responsibility.
For the most part, inertia is a detriment, if only because efficiencies are ignored and interagency processes delay direct feedback between senior Canadian and U.S. decision makers. In the delay, we deny ourselves valuable face-to-face interaction that could contribute a lot more to our relationship and better decision making. Joint Staffs on both sides of the border rely on our close interpersonal relationships to carry us beyond unfavorable political decisions. That said, sometimes the inertia is welcome, especially when the more difficult decisions need to sit and stew to get a mature decision. Maybe I've been here too long, but I also see that inertia is a natural way of managing priorities, only the direst issues receive senior attention.

Another officer offered his positive and negative thoughts on inertia.

Both. In spite of their inefficiencies, the existing decision-making processes are better than no processes at all. That said, there is vast room for improvement and this is what needs to be focused on continentally to improve cooperation. One of the areas we have looked at extensively are the pros and cons of the defense relationships that currently exist.

The final view comes from the lone dissenter. This officer agreed with the study’s assumption that bureaucratic inertia is bad stating that, “anytime you say bureaucratic inertia, you know the answer will not be positive.”

American Views: Is the Unified Command Model the Right Model?

On another issue, six Americans, five civilians and one officer, queried the decision to put Mexico’s territory under any U.S. unified command’s responsibility and further wondered if the standard unified command model was the right model for NORTHCOM to follow.

Speaking of NORTHCOM’s leadership, an officer on the Joint Staff noted that, “they want to be a unified command but have to deal a lot with the domestic issues. Also, they have no resources to do their job.” A diplomat noted that,
“NORTHCOM’s mission is much different than other unified commands.” A civilian felt that “NORTHCOM blindly models its operations after other unified commands—undoubtedly influenced by the procedures of existing unified commands.” Three academicians questioned the decision to put Mexico under NORTHCOM instead of SOUTHCOM jurisdiction. They wondered if this was wise given Mexico’s importance geographically and economically coupled with SOUTHCOM’s experience compared to NORTHCOM’s inexperience. In answering a pointed question from the SOUTHCOM audience, one academician stated “Mexico should not have been placed under NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) and should be transferred to SOUTHCOM’s AOR.”

By way of explanation, NORTHCOM is identified as a unified command but a better description may be defense command. The other unified commands are given missions to protect the U.S. just like NORTHCOM. But they are poised to conduct operations in other countries where a concern about intervention is overridden by threats. For example, after 9/11, Central Command (CENTCOM) launched offensive operations in Afghanistan and then Iraq. Is it likely that NORTHCOM will ever conduct offensive operations in Canada or Mexico? These types of operations in these two countries would be diplomatically, very difficult if not impossible to conduct. In NORTHCOM’s defense though, there are other unified commands with similar challenges. What is the likelihood that PACOM (Pacific Command) would conduct operations in Japan or CENTCOM would conduct operations in Israel? Nevertheless, some participants feel that
NORTHCOM should consider re-orienting itself, its doctrine, and subsequent operations plans to a defensive posture. The difference could help NORTHCOM better tailor its policies to defense-related issues that both Mexico and Canada may be more open to cooperate with.

In answering another question regarding who would be the better unified command to have responsibility for Mexico, the third academician answered, “SOUTHCOM” due to its experience in the Latin American region. She also thought to place Mexico under a different command was unwise because all the remaining Central and South American countries leave Mexico somewhat isolated in the Latin American community. This is an important point when one considers Mexico’s proximity to the U.S; the fact that Mexico is the only Latin American country in North America; and its involvement in NAFTA with the only two “non-Latin American” countries in the Western Hemisphere. NORTHCOM, a new unified command with little experience in Latin American cultural affairs, was given the responsibility for Mexico, a country that harbors lingering suspicion of the U.S. and one that is arguably the most important Latin American country to the U.S.

\textit{Canadian Views}

Three of the four officers discussed the impact of inertia on cooperation as well. Two of these three responses indicated an either overt or covert perception that inertia could be a good thing for change—similar to what the Americans voiced above. Additionally, a Canadian waded into an issue regarding different
organizations with different mandates and how those organizations may or not affect cooperation as they pursue their own goals. One officer answered:

Sometimes procedures and decision making processes of government are a benefit to cooperation. However, the mechanisms of the federal government tend to be slower than military to military cooperation. Government priorities may conflict to a certain extent with military objectives. Examples include perceptions of sovereignty, and protectionism.

Another noted that the organizational mandates or what he calls the “procedures,” are the driving factor to the answer if inertia is either a benefit or detriment. In his response below, he seems open to the idea that inertia, in this context, may be helpful.

NORAD’s mandate is to support both nations so NORAD personnel seek cooperation from a binational perspective. NORTHCOM’s mandate is to protect the United States. NORTHCOM seeks cooperation from a unilateral perspective. These two mandates create tension as NORTHCOM endeavors to perform its mission unilaterally and perhaps at the expense of the cooperative gains realized through the binational emphasis of NORAD. Canada, in creating CanadaCom may also add to this tension as CanadaCom has a similar mission for Canada as NORTHCOM has for the United States. Conversely, it is promising to see new organizations spring up in both countries that are striving to make North America more secure. Also, it is entirely possible that CanadaCom and NORTHCOM will begin to work together on issues important to both and thus, increase security cooperation.

The third officer’s answer is ambiguous but his discussion is essentially negative towards inertia:

Tough too answer. My government, like all governments, normally moves at a snail's pace. This often makes it difficult to obtain decisions on issues of cooperation. However, in my experience, when something is urgent or really important, the
relatively small size of our departments and of government operations makes it easy to accelerate those important issues. In comparison, I find the US system equally difficult and inflexible, if not more so.

*Question Two Summary*

This question sought perceptions of how an organization’s standard operating procedures and decision-making processes hindered cooperation. The biggest surprise came through the challenge that not all bureaucratic inertia is bad. The American and Canadian responses provided enough data to challenge this variable’s assumption that standard operating procedures and/or decision-making processes hinder cooperation. Rather, we find a trend that not all elements of inertia hinder cooperation. The overriding point to support this challenge was while the decision-making processes do slow things down, the value added to the resulting decisions are worth the wait. Additionally, one Canadian felt that the standard operating procedures are perhaps not only beneficial, but are in fact the driving force to establishing an organization’s mandate. While we can agree that the decision-making processes slow down change, they don’t necessarily hinder change because in the end, they may be facilitating change due to better decisions being made. This is a key finding that while most recognize the slow-down effect of procedures and decision-making processes, they also recognize why they exist and their benefits.

To a lesser extent, other elements of inertia were thought to have played a part in the U.S. decision to create NORTHCOM and place Mexico’s territory
under its AOR. The criticism of the decision is fairly balanced between two issues: (a) placing Mexico’s territory under any unified command; and (b) placing responsibility for increasing Mexico’s cooperation under an inexperienced organization.

The Canadian responses to this question touched on an issue discussed by the participants in question one, the issue of competing interests. Here, the Canadian’s focus was more in the context of how the standard operating procedures were the driving force behind the mandates of an organization and how NORAD, NORTHCOM and CanadaCom will have competing interests due to differing binational, bilateral, or unilateral mandates. Hence, this must support variable three, a variable not tested as part of this question.

In conclusion, we see where variable two is not supported by the data and in fact, was overtly challenged by the participants. Nearly half of the participants who specifically discussed this issue felt that there were positive aspects to both standard operating procedures and decision-making processes and provided solid arguments for their views.

There was a fairly significant concern regarding inertia’s effect on the decision to place Mexico’s territory under NORTHCOM. Consequently, while this concern provides mild support for variable two, the surprising non-support for this variable through the robust challenge to the assumption is more convincing. Finally, we saw surprising evidence for variable three, untested in this question, in
the Canadians’ view regarding competing interests driven by the mandates which stem from standard operating procedures.

Organizational Parochialism

What are the issues/challenges that must be addressed in order to facilitate NORAD expansion to include Mexico? The data used for analysis in this chapter came from nine American, three Canadian, and two Mexican responses for fourteen total. Similarly to question one, these responses also had varied answers. The reader should note two major differences between this question and question one. First is the phrase, “what issues/challenges must be addressed” in this question. This phrase provides a context, a label if you will, for the participant’s answers. Question one did not label the responses as issues that, “needed to be addressed” although one could argue that the participants saw their responses similarly for both questions. Second, this question is specific to NORAD. Question one was more general mentioning just, “hindering change.”

The American responses produced a slight majority centered on the lack of U.S. priorities and accompanying resources towards Mexico. Next, cultural, historical, and political issues tied for a close second. Third on this list was the impact that the Mexican Military/Government structure, when compared to the U.S. structure, has on cooperation. The remaining five issues each had one participant discuss them: bureaucratic inertia, technology, global market, immigration (tied to the economy), and the ICC. The reader should note that some of these issues were also discussed in question one.
American Views: Priorities and Resources

Essentially, the American responses save one, all focused on their perception that the U.S. priority was not Mexico or even Canada right now. In order for NORAD expansion to have a chance, the U.S. priority had to shift to see Mexico in particular and North America and Homeland Defense generally more important than it is now. An important view on the U.S. priorities was shared at the NORTHCOM conference by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director for Strategic Planning and Policy who clearly if not elegantly, informed the conferees that; prior to concerns about Mexico and Canada, the Joint Staff had two tiers of priorities:41 (a) Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Guantanamo detainees “issue” in Cuba; and (b) Nuclear weapons issues with Iran, North Korea, and the Middle East. He stopped there, but the message was clear, Mexico, Canada, and NORTHCOM issues fall somewhere after these first two tiers. Other views brought out during the interviews (some of whom had heard the Admiral’s speech) mentioned Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Venezuela as having higher priority. By way of indirect support for the officer’s view, another officer assigned to the Joint Staff mentioned that the Joint Staff priority is the Global War on Terror and includes operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another officer recognized that, “Mexico is not that high of a U.S. priority.”

41 It should be noted that these were the Joint Staff priorities as of June 2005. It is entirely possible that they have changed.
A frustrated NORTHCOM civilian stated:

What will Latin America look like . . . it is not a priority right now. NORTHCOM is trying to convince Washington that Mexico is important. [We are] trying to get a special partner recognition from [the] United States. Resources are needed for new programs and they are cheap compared to Colombia. Mexico has not received foreign military financing since 1965. No one in Washington cares about Mexico. How can we elevate Mexico to the level of relationship with Canada?

An officer at the Joint Staff focused her response on Canada:

For the Joint Staff, the priority is not Canada, homeland defense is not number one [either]. Afghanistan, Canada, Global War on Terrorism . . . It is very much crisis management—hard to be proactive. In this day and age with all the global issues the Joint Staff deals with, in the big scheme of things it is okay that Canadian issues get less priority. To come full circle, however, this downgrading of Canada-U.S. attention leads to long-term neglect that makes it hard to get attention on Canada-U.S. concerns or initiatives when the attention is warranted.

Another NORTHCOM civilian described how the lack of U.S. priority towards Mexico is not lost on Mexico’s senior military leadership:

. . . Nitty Gritty security cooperation—nobody wants to talk about a defense relationship. Energy, rivers, immigration, etc. are okay to talk about but not defense because it is not a top issue at the national executives level. Consequently, SEDENA (Mexican Army) doesn’t think it is important. Smart Border agreements, drug trafficking yes, but not aerospace, defense, attacking, etc. The U.S. needs to bring defense cooperation to the national level and give specifics on how we want SEDENA to help.

Another officer at the Joint Staff offered his remarks within the context of counter-drug operations:

There is a shrink in counter-drug resources. SOUTHCOM. Joint Task Force South is screaming for resources. We requested a plus up of at least $200M for Columbia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We
were allocated only $140M for Colombia. The SECDEF wants to turn the mission for law enforcement issues to DHS and DEA.

Finally, a third Joint Staff officer noted “priorities . . . Mexico not yet. $8M for 34 countries [in Latin America].”

*American Views: Cultural and Historical*

There is a long, negative historical legacy between Mexican and U.S. forces that hinder cooperation. Indeed, the history between these two countries is one littered with war and confrontation. By way of example, several participants as well as a pamphlet from the Woodrow Wilson Center note how the Mexicans “remember” the Battle of Chapultapec.

This battle was the last conflict in the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848. At the Castle of Chapultapec, over 800 Mexicans made their last stand in defense of their homeland. Among the 800 were six cadets who, when ordered to retreat, decided to stay and fight the American invaders to their death. The popular legend maintains that the last surviving cadet leapt from Chapultepec Castle wrapped in the Mexican Flag to prevent the Americans from capturing it. The six cadets are revered in Mexico and are interred at the Monument to the Heroic Cadets in Chapultepec along with an imposing monument at the entrance to Chapultepec Park. The Americans point to this legend as one sign of the cultural influence that permeates the Mexican Army and how it negatively impacts security cooperation as the Mexican officers remember Chapultapec and

---

the sacrifices the “Niños Héroes” made defending Mexico against the invaders from the North.

Another officer noted that the Mexican National Anthem (first performed in 1854) was written in specific defiance of the United States. It is certainly possible that the author, Francisco González Bocanegra, meant to speak of the U.S. invading Mexican soil when he wrote, “But if some strange enemy should dare to profane your ground with his step, think, oh beloved country, that heaven has given you a soldier in every son.” The remaining lyrics call for spilling of blood in protection of the Mexican fatherland and overall, the anthem is very nationalistic.

Remember too that Mexico lost nearly half of its territory to the U.S. through the Treaty of Guadalupe and the Gadsden Purchase. The U.S. territories of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, California, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming were all once part of Mexico. One can get a sense of how the Mexican Army would be at best, hesitant to cooperate with the U.S. military and at worst, loathe to cooperate given the strong negative legacy and patriotic nationalistic feeling that some perceive exists to this day.

A NORTHCOM civilian answered that he can . . . see cultural/historical issues as more important, more influential than economic agreements. It seems that Mexico allows cultural/historical issues to override economic agreements sometimes.\(^{43}\)

\(^{43}\) This was also mentioned in the Woodrow Wilson Pamphlet 2004.
A diplomat posited:

Mexico a poor country? No . . . lots of poor people though. What are the Mexicans’ aspirations? It is not a poor country but struggling with modernity challenges. Old think ties them down sometimes.

American Views: Political

The main political emphasis characterizing the responses here deals with the opinion that trust needs to be built up between the U.S. and Mexico. This is regarded as a challenge that must be addressed to facilitate NORAD expansion. Usually, the context of the response is that the U.S. needs to work harder at building up the trust. This item is tied to cultural issues as both are usually characterized as an issue of trust between the two countries.

An officer at NORAD stated, “Trust and foreign policy cooperation [i.e. Canada and Mexico did not support actions in Iraq].” A Joint Staff officer answered, “Canada . . . not necessarily reliable . . . didn’t support theater missile defense. The political spin on Iraq could have been different.” Another officer at Joint Staff posited “Vega [Mexican Army Chief of Staff] would need top cover; Fox is a lame duck . . . his party is losing cover.” 44 Finally, a NORTHCOM civilian noted, “Mexico does not support us in Iraq. Canada does not support us in Iraq.”

44 Of course the recent election results in July 2006 nearly make his comment regarding President Fox obsolete in that another conservative, pro-trade President apparently won the election. As of early Aug 2006, Mexico’s electoral commission had not declared a final winner and had in fact ordered a recount of some voting precincts.
"American Views: Military to Military Structure, Mexico–U.S."

The Mexican and U.S. militaries have different structures that create challenges to cooperation. Specifically, NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) each are challenged on how to communicate with the Chief of Staff of the Mexican Army. Mexico sees him as essentially the SECDEF equivalent in their government while the U.S. expects him to work issues through NORTHCOM. This makes the Mexican Army General feel somewhat subordinated. An officer at the Joint Staff noted:

"No show stoppers on the U.S. side, more on Mexico. Mexico recognizes the Joint Staff but not NORTHCOM. Mexico’s SECDEF is also in charge of the Mexican Army, so the Army gets all the money. But they are more apprehensive with any U.S. DOD entity. The Army has a long historical culture, but not the Navy. The Navy is not apprehensive. NORTHCOM needs to see the Mexicans as peers to facilitate cooperation."

A NORTHCOM civilian noted:

"[The] Mexican Armed Forces see the need to downplay the appearance of U.S.–Mexican military collaboration. General Vega (SEDENA) . . . lower level guys can work with NORTHCOM, but Vega goes to Washington. Admiral Peron (MARINA) is easier to deal with, U.S. Coast Guard works with the Mexican Navy."

Finally, a civilian at the Department of Homeland Security noted:

"Organization structure of the military is a problem. There is a fear of cooperation in Mexico. The only current agreement with Mexico is a health reciprocal agreement where soldiers on both sides will get health treatment by the other side."
American Views: Miscellaneous

This section lists the remaining issues raised by the Americans. In each case, only one participant discussed the issue. However, the reader may note some similar issues that were raised in question one. Which, when aggregated, may result in significant findings.

A NORTHCOM civilian believes that the “essential elements” are present for cooperation but then worries about the impacts of globalization, Chinese aspirations, immigration, and the ICC:

The essential elements for enhanced cooperation are present . . . post 9/11 threats to mutual interests, tourism, oil, cross-border, economic flow brought on by NAFTA success. China is expanding and wants to open up markets in Latin America. Mexico can go East-West and not be so dependent on NAFTA. There is a stall in migration discussions. NAFTA . . . when the economy suffers, illegal immigration increases. The ICC . . . Article 98 escape clause . . .

A NORTHCOM officer discussed bureaucratic inertia:

NORAD’s inertia will cause it to stay and will cause it to continue to exist. NORAD expansion—good idea but legacy of Canadian-U.S. relationship and Cold War is limiting.

A diplomat noted that, “technology and cost is a limiter . . . will the U.S. write a check?”

Canadian Views: Cultural and Historical

The three Canadian participants who responded to this question produced a majority view that cultural and historical issues are the most important to address to increase cooperation. Then, a diplomat provided a lengthy discussion
on his perception that Canada needs to engage with Mexico on its own to facilitate cooperation. Finally, three other issues, each mentioned once, deal with Canada’s frustration over a U.S. security concern, bureaucratic inertia, and a recent Canadian foreign policy decision.


Canadians are liberal. Their liberal human rights policy creates a hindrance when the U.S. wants to know about country of origin from a person—Canada does not legally talk about country of origin.45 Common law marriage issues in Canada versus the U.S. marriage laws. The language, size . . . .

Another officer noted cultural differences between the U.S. and Canada.

Cultural differences in Canada to the U.S. [Canadian] Liberal human rights in freedom and immigration breeds good will around the world. Government officials advocate soft power. Land mines . . . U.S. did not sign and Canada led the effort world-wide. Paranoia in arms race…peacekeeping is as far as Canada goes. The big point of departure was Iraq. The Gulf War was okay, aggressor nation, invasion [Iraq invaded Kuwait]. Iraq two [2003] though was a different story. Canada wanted the U.S. to use the U.N. to determine steps. Canada thought the U.S. was the aggressor. This created a bit of a struggle for Canada to maintain cooperation on all fronts. U.S. theater missile defense only asked Canada to sign the memorandum of understanding. They [Canadian Government] caved for political reasons. A minority government was in control so they had to worry about losing power.

---

45 This is in some dispute. When queried on follow-up, the Canadian diplomat said this is not true.
The diplomat was the only participant who discussed the need for Canada to engage Mexico more deeply on its own rather than through the United States. However, he noted at the end of his remarks that it is really NORTHCOM’s job to deal with Mexico and that in the end, it is really up to the Mexicans.

Mexico . . . Canada understands it is a keen interest of the United States. Canada doesn’t share the border though. There are historical issues between the U.S. and Mexico. Canada wants to be a third party in this process. Canada tries to emphasize in its dealings with Mexico that they can’t expect to get what they want in the economic realm without giving the U.S. what it wants in the security realm. Canada is trying to help Mexico realize the tie in an attempt to facilitate Mexico-U.S. cooperation.

Dealing with the Mexicans is really a NORTHCOM exercise . . . Bi-National Planning Group and NORAD are focused elsewhere by mandate. Continuation with what is happening with Mexico in NORTHCOM. Canada could help though with Mexico’s understanding by sharing with Mexico lessons learned in Canada’s dealings with the United States. Sovereignty has been ensured—the U.S. hasn’t invaded . . . etc. Key though is with Mexico and its ability to cooperate. The constraint is really with Mexico. [Mexico has a] political, cultural, elite driven enterprise [anti-American] mainly from the liberal left and the media drives Mexican nationalism. Less so with business interests and public opinion.

*Mexican Views*

The two Mexican participants provided viewpoints on several issues they felt needed to be addressed to facilitate NORAD expansion. At the top of the list were cultural/historical issues as well as political issues. Together with the Canadian and American responses, this made those issues significant in response to this question. Then, trade and infrastructure concerns were mentioned.
The officer talked about the Mexico-U.S. relationship and then discussed Mexico’s domestic political challenges and again, focused on the trust factor.

While the Mexican-U.S. relationship was special, it was not easy. There needed to be an increase of mutual trust between the two countries. The historical past is a big weight to overcome in order to build up the trust. One political party was in charge until 2000. Then Fox came into power and brought change, but not enough. Mexico needs the nation to work better to balance the Congressional, Executive, and Judicial branches, [Mexicans] need to get a better balance to see change; 2000 was not a big enough change. PAN (Fox)/PRI/PRD (Nationalist) makes up 90% of the Congress.

Finally, in response to a specific query regarding the American responses hinting towards lingering fear of an American invasion, he answered: “Many years ago, there was a national defense plan [NDP1] that did call for defense against an aggressor from the North, but not any more. Mexico is not afraid of the U.S. invading.

The diplomat discussed the need to safeguard the trade advances made through NAFTA by building up the infrastructure to a level similar to Canada’s.

Need to begin to create infrastructure at security level . . . training, technology, customs, etc. It may take thirty years from now . . . [time-table based on Canada’s infrastructure]. Need to safeguard trade with security cooperation. For instance, Mexico is transmitting information to the U.S. on individuals that enter Mexico that the U.S. is concerned about, but that is all. They are not arresting people or allowing the U.S. to come in and arrest them.

Question Three Summary

This question sought perceptions on what issues and challenges need to be addressed in order to facilitate NORAD expanding regionally to include Mexico.
The data from the American responses revealed the largest although not majority response. They identified the fact that the priority for the U.S. right now is not Mexico, Canada, or even homeland defense. Rather, the priority is the War on Terrorism, Middle East, North Korea, Iran, and other areas. The priority impacts are real as evidenced by a lack of funding and resources for the initiatives that those working North American security cooperation put forth. While this impact is real, it cannot be considered a bureaucratic inertia issue. Rather, it is the output from the U.S. decision-making process that formulates its priorities. While it was rightly identified as an obstacle to NORAD expansion, it is not an obstacle that can be attributed to bureaucratic inertia.

Closely behind the priority issue are historical, cultural, and political concerns. These three areas are linked by a thread. The participants’ responses centered on a trust issue between Mexico and the United States. Here, three of the four Americans who discussed cultural concerns talked about the Mexican nationalistic pride that stems from events as the Battle of Chapultapec. Political issues were mentioned by three officers noting the lack of support from Mexico and Canada on certain U.S. policies and initiatives. Again though, a “lack of trust” underlined the concerns. The Canadian and Mexican responses support the cultural, historical, and political perspective of the Americans so much so that this item emerges as the most important issue to address in facilitating NORAD expansion. This certainly is a bureaucratic inertia item grounded in the cultural/historical attitudes and values and is hindering cooperation.
The next significant issue raised by the Americans regards the challenges that exist in cooperating with the Mexican military due to the countries different military structures. The insertion of NORTHCOM into the relationship and the Mexican Army General’s refusal to deal with NORTHCOM because he sees himself as the counterpart to the U.S. Secretary of Defense may have created consternation. This could be tied to bureaucratic inertia but would be grounded in the doctrinal aspect of inertia and not the cultural aspect. However, while some discussed this issue, it does not seem to be a significant one as the two militaries seem to be working through the difficulty.

In conclusion, the responses to this question revealed some issues that the participants felt needed to be addressed to allow NORAD regional expansion. Not all of the issues are bureaucratic inertia hindrances. One that provided strong support for the first variable is the cultural, historical, and political issues tied together by a concern about the lack of trust between the Mexicans and the United States. This certainly stems from cultural attitudes and values that the first variable seeks evidence for. This lends support for the first variable of the negative impact that cultural issues can have on security cooperation.

The other issue regards how the different Mexican-U.S. military structures create a challenge and difficulty to cooperation. This is grounded in the doctrinal, organizational aspect of bureaucratic inertia which is what variable two seeks evidence for. However, it is a weak hindrance to cooperation since the countries seem to be working around the doctrinal limitations.
Finally, as discussed above, the U.S. funding and resource priorities decision is not an element of bureaucratic inertia but rather, the output of the U.S. decision-making process. Perhaps sandwiched between the cultural, historical, and political concerns is the Canadian observation that Canada can probably do more in engaging Mexico on its own as a way to be a third-party broker for the North American security cooperation. This could certainly be a policy suggestion stemming from this research.

Crisis Impact

**How has each country’s threat assessment and security posture changed since the end of the Cold War, after NAFTA implementation, and after 9/11?**

The responses to this question demonstrate that there is an overwhelming perception that 9/11 had a much more significant impact on the security posture of each country than NAFTA or the Cold War. In fact, only two individuals, one Canadian and one Mexican, addressed the Cold War in their responses. There were a total of eight American, two Canadian, and two Mexican responses to this question for a total of twelve. Most of the responses focused on how 9/11 has changed security at the border with a further breakdown of its effect on trade, security cooperation, immigration, and counter-drug operations. After this border issue, terrorism threats linked to immigration issues were discussed by just a few participants.
American Views

To begin, a diplomat shared how 9/11 impacted NORAD and resulted in NORTHCOM’s creation. Additionally, the diplomat mentioned NAFTA but did not offer any views regarding its impact on NORAD or NORTHCOM.

Lots of things don’t reveal themselves until they actually spring up . . . for instance, problems working with other unified commands. When 9/11 occurred, NORAD took on many tasks by default, then the President realized he needed a single point of contact to go to so, NORTHCOM was created. How can you plan for every contingency threat and warning? 9/11 probably throttled other cooperation initiatives and made security issues and cooperation more urgent. 9/11 was huge; NAFTA was huge, now we have NORTHCOM and CanadaCom. Where are the threats? We don’t know. So we can look at vulnerabilities. At the border . . . bad guys are in Canada but the vulnerability is in the southern border . . . the Mexicans understand our concern and the linkage but they don’t necessarily agree with it.

A NORTHCOM civilian also stated, “Mexico doesn’t buy into the threat assessment. They are more concerned about the poverty of their country.”

More views were expressed concerning 9/11’s impact on the border and specifically, initiatives to facilitate legitimate trade and immigration, but stop the illegitimate. A diplomat answered:

Post 9/11 saw an increase in security issues. The Smart Border agreement with Mexico [twenty-two points] makes the border more efficient in allowing secure transportation. $25M per year in foreign assistance and it all goes to the Mexican side.

A civilian noted:

Prior to 9/11, the focus was on Osama and the millennium bomber. These provided impetus for further cooperation. Cooperation is at many levels in Canada. For example, the Canada-
U.S. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, country-to-country teams scout the border together.46

An officer answered:

Nine-eleven was huge . . . a gaping hole in the border with Mexico . . . how to better control border crossings, cooperate on cargo inspections in both the maritime and land. The U.S. public demands more secure borders. Checking cargo efficiency forces Mexico to coordinate. Nine-eleven [brought a] sense of urgency, immediacy.

Another diplomat answered this question within the context of the Partnership for Prosperity (PFP) agreement and also expressed her view that 9/11 halted some immigration reform initiatives:

The PFP benefits those in less developed areas—Southern zone of Mexico. If 9/11 did not occur, then we would probably have gotten a temporary worker program. Nine-eleven certainly hurt the immigration effort. Lack of support for the U.S. decision to invade Iraq by the Mexicans [and Canadians] hurt the relationship. Ties between agencies in Canada were stronger and allowed for more advances.47

An officer at the Joint Staff shared the impact of 9/11 on the border and counter-drug operations. Additionally, he provided one of the few perspectives on how NAFTA has affected security cooperation.

Nine-eleven really changed the way we do business in counter-drugs. Focus is now the War on Terrorism. Counter drugs: trucks, tractor trailers, cargo containers. Traffickers hide drugs, machines and technology. Its not getting better due to volume,

46 The IBET program consists of country-country, multi-agency teams that target cross-border criminal and terrorist activity. Originally developed in 1996 to fight cross-border crimes between British Columbia and Washington State, IBET has evolved into a binational, multiagency program funded at $135 Million in 2001.

47 This is the same “infrastructure” argument that others made regarding the Smart Border agreements which are discussed later.
increase from NAFTA. As the trade volume increases, the smuggling volume increases too. Resources do not increase to handle the new volume.

A NORTHCOM civilian posited, “Before 9/11, none of this was on the “radar screen” but we really don’t think the concern is that great [even now].” He then asked a question of where the weak link truly lies regarding the question of which U.S. border is the one that terrorists are more likely to sneak through—North or South? The prevailing perception seems to be that the Mexican border is more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. He then provided solid arguments to demonstrate that the threat of an Islamic terrorist entering the U.S. could conceivably be more from Canada than Mexico:

Mexico generally does not like Arabs. This dislike goes back to the negative influence the Moors of Spain had on Mexico. The Arabs would not find a safe haven in Mexico as easily as in Canada. Together with the liberal Canadian immigration laws and more open society, Arabs could more easily find a safe haven in Canada. If Islamic militants were to try and set up a base or staging area or even simply infiltrate a society in anticipation of an attack on U.S. soil, it goes to reason that they would go to the country where there are more of them and where they are more welcome.

In addition, he offered his perspective on shifting U.S. priorities:

[There is] a strategy shift in the U.S. from defend everything to asymmetrical threats . . . be careful with the resources and where we send them. Risk and threat assessment low . . . elites know this is important but is it the pressing issue? Historically, our Southern flank is okay. If that were not the case, we would have done something about the border a long time ago. The presumptive perception is that the border is okay. NORTHCOM doesn’t think that.
Canadian Views

There were only two Canadian responses to this question. They support the American responses that 9/11 had a much bigger impact on security cooperation than the Cold War or NAFTA. Interesting though is the fact that both responses included a reference to NAFTA. An officer answered somewhat ambiguously:

Prior to the Cold War, Canadian priorities were protect the homeland—especially the Arctic. Canadians believed in the collective effort and contributed to Europe. But after the Cold War, we brought troops back to Canada. The Arctic is no longer a threat. Global warning of ships coming from the North is now an emerging issue. After 9/11 . . . 9/11 hasn’t really changed Canadian thinking of threats. However, Canada recognizes that the world has changed. Canada created CanadaCom as a counterpart to NORTHCOM. Since the headquarters are services specific, CanadaCom tries to provide a more integrated structure [similar to the U.S. unified command structure].

The diplomat answered:

. . . nine-eleven threat assessment [brought the] most dramatic steps [new organizations were created as a result]: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, CanadaCom, Department of Homeland Security, [and] NORTHCOM. Border management is greater. Now, Canada looks more closely at the terrorist threat but doesn’t feel it as much.

Mexican views

The Mexican officer’s initial response was to provide Mexico’s threat assessment priorities which are clearly couched in Mexico’s constitutional guiding principles as discussed in question two above. He stated:

Mexico has no enemies; Build defense [doctrine] to protect the land and the people; No need to project its defense beyond the
Mexican frontier. These high-level priorities guide the doctrine and strategy of the Mexican military. Cooperation didn’t change after the Cold War. Nine-eleven though, did increase cooperation. Mexico has no global vision in its military on maritime concerns . . . in maritime, there are good relations with the U.S. Coast Guard in drug trafficking primarily, NORTHCOM too, but no relationship with NORAD. NORAD is a Canada-U.S. special defense agreement. Before 9/11, cooperation was good, but at a different level . . . counter-drug trafficking, oil spills, environment issues, [and] training. Post 9/11 saw a cooperation increase mainly in dealing with terrorists. After 9/11, NORTHCOM was born. With a new vision in the future, new possibilities for improved relations with NORAD through NORTHCOM may exist.

The diplomat stated:

Nine-eleven put the infrastructure to a test in both countries and this test led to the Smart Border agreements. After 9/11, Mexico wanted to put economic and trade concerns over security while the U.S. wanted to put security over trade concerns. This led to the twenty-two points [border agreement] to try and work through these different thrusts.

**Question Four Summary**

This question attempted to determine the perceptions regarding the impact that three major events in North American history (Cold War, NAFTA, 9/11) each had on North American security cooperation. The data show that an overwhelming majority of the participants felt 9/11 had a much more significant impact on North American security cooperation than NAFTA or the Cold War. Speaking of the Cold War first, for all intents and purposes, the impact of the Cold War on North American security cooperation was non-existent with only two participants addressing it and even then, with little gusto. NAFTA too, in response to this question, was not discussed much more. However, when it was
discussed, it was with more substantive analysis than the Cold War. The vast majority of the comments regarded how 9/11 changed security cooperation significantly. Specifically, most participants talked of changes at the border. Many of the border initiatives are tied to the goal of keeping NAFTA’s trade advancements flowing. This could be a sign of spillover which is discussed in chapter three.

The conclusion to this question is that a major security-related event, such as 9/11, can significantly facilitate change in spite of lingering inertia which is found to certain extents in the previous three questions. The data indicate that a major security-related event, such as a 9/11, can indeed transcend an organization’s cultural or historical attitudes to cause quick and significant change. As a result of 9/11, both the Canadian and U.S. governments have witnessed significant changes with the creation of two or more defense-related organizations. Additionally, while the Mexican government has not created new organizations, the views expressed by the two participants support the significant impact that 9/11 had on North America. Looking historically at the Cold War, we saw in chapter one where fairly significant changes and cooperation initiatives did take place as the Cold War was developing. However, change from an economic agreement (e.g., NAFTA) is harder to see although a few participants did talk of NAFTA’s impact.
In conclusion, the data lead us to conclude that economic agreements, such as NAFTA, do not transcend the lingering attitudes and produce the same magnification of change as quickly or significantly as security-related events.

Summary and Conclusions

The data provide supporting evidence that institutional values and cultural attitudes do hinder cooperation. There was also evidence suggesting that cultural similarities can facilitate cooperation, as noted by participants from all three countries within the context of Canada-U.S. cooperation. This finding is grounded in literature discussing cultural and historical legacies that exist in different organizations or groups of people. When Vandenbroucke applied Allison’s models to the Bay of Pigs operation he found that cultural differences, stemming mainly from routine processes and parochialism, between the different branches of the U.S. Government facilitated decisions that contributed to the failed invasion. In a stricter context of Vandenbroucke’s study, we saw evidence of this phenomenon in struggles between different organizations in the U.S. Government. However when expanded to the different countries cultural norms and attitudes, there were data that invalidated this variable. Consequently, this variable is not supported by the data that suggest cultural similarities can enhance cooperation.

For the second variable, standard operating procedures and decision-making processes, evidence is technically inconclusive, although non-supportive data are more convincing than the data in support. This variable is deemed invalid. This finding challenged the premise garnered from literature that defined
bureaucratic inertia, where the overwhelming, constant, description of inertia asserted a negative impact on an organization or issue. The test in this variable, based on the literature’s definition of bureaucratic inertia, was to find evidence to prove the variable. Discovery of the perceptions that saw positive outcomes from inertia invalidated this variable. Many of the participants felt there were positive features to processes and procedures, a value-added to the output of a decision-making process even if it slowed down the organization. But to say that it hinders cooperation may be a stretch because the resulting cooperative agreement may be astounding or even good.

There are two speculations for this. First, while cumbersome processes do slow down an organization, it is possible that the participants recognize the futility of thinking the process will ever change. One U.S. Joint Staff officer speculated about what would need to happen in the Pentagon to change the inertia, but in retrospect, it simply does not seem possible that the decision-making bureaucracy in the Pentagon or the U.S. Government scarcely will change to a point where one may claim that bureaucracy, and inertia by association, no longer exist. This realization may lead one to decide to try and make the best of the process, try to improve it where they can, but work within it rather than long for the day when it may change. Another corollary speculation may be that these

---

48 See footnote #1 for the myriad of areas where the literature discussed how bureaucratic inertia was a negative impact.
processes are necessary and may in fact be the best way for governments and organizations to arrive at the best solution they can reach.

There is support for this variable found in the communication difficulties encountered by the different Mexican and U.S. senior military structures. However, the lower-level cooperation appears unaffected and the two militaries seem to work-around it when needed. Indeed, a few participants even noted that lower-level cooperation is good. This item does not seem to be a huge hindrance to cooperation.

The third variable, organizational parochialism, is strongly supported. The data revealed concerns regarding NORTHCOM with some of the classic issues of resources, areas of responsibility, and a general suspicion towards a new organization surfacing. Additionally, the data provided more examples where different organizations with competing interests hindered security cooperation to some extent. Sagan (1974: 72-73) discussed the competition that exists within large organizations as the different subgroups’ goals and objectives clash. The literature review tied Sagan’s findings to organizational theory by using the theory as an explanatory tool for the data that spoke to competing groups’ self-interests. These data, characterized by several examples of sub-group’s competing interests, clearly supported the literature.

Surprisingly, data from question two: “Do you see the standard operating procedures and decision-making processes of your organization as a benefit or detriment to facilitating cooperation?” revealed support for this variable as well.
This was surprising because question two did not set out to test this variable. Nevertheless, one of the datum discussed competing interests between NORTHCOM, CanadaCom, and NORAD. This surprise finding along with the planned test in question one lends great support to the impact a new organization may have on cooperation.

For variable four, crisis impact, the data revealed strong support that security-related events or crises can transcend lingering cultural attitudes and perceptions and force significant change. Almost everyone who answered question four noted that 9/11 had a much bigger impact on security cooperation than NAFTA or even the Cold War. This too clearly lines up with the literature. When discussing the way bureaucratic inertia can slow down organizational change, Allison (1971: 113) also wrote that this slow process resulting in small, minor changes can be quickly overcome by a major crisis or event. This is exactly what the data support.

One speculation on why the Cold War was not discussed is that most of the participants, active today in their countries’ policy decisions, were most likely not active in policy decisions back when the Cold War threats began to surface. Consequently, with 9/11 occurring just a few years ago, the events and changes from it are certainly more prevalent in their minds when compared to the Cold War events. Looking back, we certainly see significant events taking place in Canada and the U.S. as a result of the threats revealed by the Cold War. Further, the Cold War ended over a decade ago and caused many to question the need for
the institutions that were created over half a century ago when the Cold War was beginning. Finally, the Cold War did not experience such an attack as what was witnessed during 9/11. Nine-eleven saw the boldest and deadliest terrorist attack ever in North America. This did indeed serve as the impetus for great change in how the U.S. and Canada respond to threats in North America. As is discussed in this project, the organizations created in Canada and the U.S. and the cooperation initiatives witnessed through these organizations is unprecedented in the adult life-spans of these participants. Hence, when asked, most will share from their most prescient experiences which are most likely the recent experiences from 9/11.

Another speculation is that NAFTA’s advances and corresponding cooperation paved the way to facilitate deeper security cooperation. If true, this renders support for the spillover perspective analyzed in chapter three. Further explanations for why participants did not discuss the impact of the Cold War are perhaps an area for future study. While it is true that greater cooperation has been witnessed between Canada and the U.S. when compared to either Mexico and the U.S. or Mexico and Canada, the data revealed that a major crisis has a much better chance at forcing significant change more quickly than an economic agreement. In conclusion, the following summarizes the results for the four variables:

Variable 1 Organizational history, culture, and values—Not supported
Variable 2 Organizational doctrine and/or standard operating procedures—Inconclusive, leaning to non-supportive
Variable 3 Organizational Parochialism—Strongly supported
Variable 4 Crisis Impact—Strongly supported

Analysis

The first sub-hypothesis states that bureaucratic inertia acts as a resistance to change due to organizational history and culture that determine a set of values and processes not easily changed. This was tested directly by the interview question: What cultural/historical norms, attitudes and doctrines exist within the government and/or organizational components? The direct tie through variable one establishes that the sub-hypothesis is false because the responses revealed that cultural issues can both hinder and facilitate cooperation.

The second sub-hypothesis states that bureaucratic inertia acts as a resistance to change due to organizational doctrine and standard operating procedure that constrain the degree to which change can occur as the decision-making processes are exercised. This was tested directly by the interview question: Do you see the standard operating procedures and decision-making processes of your organization as a benefit or detriment to facilitating cooperation? The direct tie through variable two established that the sub-hypothesis was inconclusive but leaning towards non-support. The data provided more evidence for the positive aspects of an organizations processes and
procedures rather than the negative aspects. The conclusion is that this sub-hypothesis is false.

The third sub-hypothesis states that bureaucratic inertia acts as a resistance to change due to self-perceived importance and parochialism of one organization towards another organization. This was tested directly by the interview question: What are the issues or challenges that must be addressed in order to facilitate NORAD expansion to include Mexico? The data overwhelmingly support this sub-hypothesis.

The second hypothesis states that major organizational changes only occur after a major crisis. This was tested directly by the interview question: How has each country’s threat assessment and security posture changed since the end of the Cold War, after NAFTA implementation, and after 9/11? The data used to test this variable were overwhelmingly in support of this hypothesis. Nine-eleven had a bigger impact on facilitating security cooperation, cutting through many of the negative influences of bureaucratic inertia, and facilitating significant change.

Conclusion

What overall results regarding bureaucratic inertia’s impact on international security do the data show? Two of the factors, (a) organizational history, culture, and values, and (b) organizational doctrine and/or standard operating procedures were not supported while the remaining two, (c) organizational parochialism; and (d) crisis impact were strongly supported. These findings suggest that in a more general sense, inertia’s negative impact on change
and security cooperation is true. The support for the variables indicates support for the overall assertion of inertia’s negative impact. Still, an opposing view surfaced indicating that in the case of an organization’s procedures and decision-making processes, there is value added to the output of those processes. The assertion that all elements of inertia are a hindrance to change and cooperation was not supported by the data. While the processes do slow down an organization, they may actually result in improved cooperation when the value-added to the final decision is factored in.
CHAPTER III

SPILLOVER

How effective is spillover at facilitating security cooperation and what is the extent of elite involvement in creating spillover? This chapter begins with a literature review which leads to a section where the relevant hypotheses and associated independent variables are introduced and justified. Next, the key interview questions tied to those variables are discussed and finally the responses presented from the three groups: American, Canadian and Mexican are presented and analyzed.

Literature Review

Unlike the bureaucratic inertia literature, the integration literature provides so many definitions of integration that this researcher found contradictions. Primarily, the differences lie in the characterization of integration as a process or a condition (Haas 1964, 26; Aybet 2001, 10). Moreover, most of the integration literature has and continues to deal with European integration. Consequently, the bulk of this review covers that Europe-focused literature. What follows is a review of the literature defining integration, followed by a review of the literature regarding spillover.

Integration—Definition

Hakim and Litan define integration as “the process whereby states open their borders, societies, cultures, and economies, building common institutions on the basis of common values and interests” (2002, viii). Rosamond focuses
narrowly in the security realm and provides a definition not suitable for general use, but does speak to common themes:

International integration is defined as being about the achievement of security within a region or among a group of states. Successful integration is about the radical reduction in a likelihood of states using violent means to resolve their differences. (2000, 43)

Haas saw integration as a process “linking a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible future concrete system” (1964, 29). Later, he wrote about political integration noting the involvement of elites in establishing integration:

The process whereby political actors [elites] in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. (16-17)

Zahariadis defines integration in the EU context as something that is not entered into solely by conscious design or bargain by states, but as a matter of perhaps unintended consequences of everyday interaction between the various actors (2003, 285). He focuses on how issue coupling and complexity affect integration and its chances for success. Zahariadis evaluates four different areas where European integration is taking place. He concludes that, “some areas are more conducive to integration than others” due to coupling and complexity dynamics (306). Tight coupling exists in the foreign policy and security policy areas—an indicator that facilitates integration—but the high complexity accompanying foreign and security policy issues breeds fragmentation as well (Zahariadis 303). This fragmentation, along with the tight coupling, has the real possibility of
leading to “raised conflict, frustration, and possibly failure” (Zahariadis 306).

Zahariadis’ research warns us that we must consider an area’s coupling with other areas and issue complexity to help determine the prospect of successful integration.

Aybet quotes Karl Deutsch (1957) in defining integration as a condition:

The attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. (Aybet 2001, 10)

Still referencing Deutsch, Aybet (10) clarifies that the “sense of community” is a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point—common social problems must and can be resolved by a processes of peaceful change—a similar point made above by Rosamond. Aybet summarizes her definition as “the condition whereby a sense of community is attained through institutions and practices which bring about an expectation of peaceful change” (10).

This sense of community stems from Mitrany’s writings on functionalism. Mitrany, dubbed the “father of functionalism” is widely regarded as such (Greewald 1976, 140; Haas 1964, 6). Mitrany’s two prescient works, *A Working Peace System* and *The Functional Theory of Politics*, established the idea that international relations would be shaped and molded into a peaceful world system as interdependence grew through functionalism. According to Mitrany, the most enduring feature of functionalism is its “creation of a working peace system”
Functionalism has as its major principles the ideas that man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international cooperation; that international organization arranged according to the requirements of the task could increase welfare rewards to individuals beyond the level obtainable within the state (Mitrany, 1975, x). As noted by Keohane, “Haas and others” would form their “intellectual basis for neo-functionalist theories of political integration” (Keohane 1978, 805) Thus, Haas’ views on integration and spillover grounded in Mitrany’s preeminent ideas on functionalism provide a strong theoretical foundation for this study.

For this project, the definition of integration is grounded in the procedural definition instead of the conditional. The procedural definition of integration moves us into the realm of analyzing the effects of integration. Since a process is an action, we see elements of the integration definition that actively affect and shape a country. At this point in the discussion, we are provided our first glimpse of some effects of integration as we summarize the common themes.

First, as countries enter into integration, they become more interdependent and more cooperative but there is no end-state where we declare that integration has been achieved. Second, integration will bring about a self-conscious abstinence from using force to resolve future conflicts. Third, countries must open their markets, borders, institutions, etc. to other countries allowing integration to occur. Finally, integration may be the result of deliberate planning by political
elites and/or it could be the result of unintended consequences. The impact of elite influence on integration is studied in the next chapter.

It should be noted that for the remainder of this study, cooperation will be used within the context of this discussion on integration. It is clear that cooperation is a subset of integration as is found in some of the definitions discussed above. Now that integration has been defined, the discussion will focus on the spillover literature.

Integration—Spillover

The extant literature provides few concrete definitions for spillover. Recent literature uses the word “spillover” or the phrase “spillover effect” in a non-utilitarian sense where the authors make little or no attempt to ground the concept in any theoretical supposition. Rather, the literature uses spillover as a vehicle to study different effects on institutions and organizations in many different contexts. Nevertheless, this liberal use of the term does seem to point out a prevalent assumption that the phenomenon of spillover is well-known. On the other hand, we can thank Ernst Haas for providing us with a definition and process characterization of spillover. Indeed, research of the literature has caused this researcher to conclude that no new literature discusses spillover in a definitional or theoretical context much different from Haas’ definition penned in 1964. Consequently, the literature reveals that Haas’ views on the definition and process of spillover are still regarded as preeminent. Before discussing Haas
though, we once again briefly retreat to Mitrany and his discussion of functionalism as the founding basis for this discussion on spillover.

Haas builds his ideas of integration and eventually spillover on Mitrany:

For Mitrany, community is imminent in the evolutionary logic of his action process and hence, a notion of integration is implicitly part of his theory. For the sociologist, mutually supporting inputs into a social system tend to be associated with growth of structure, expansion of functions, development equilibrium—in short, a process summed up as integration. (Haas 1964, 26)

The “expansion of functions” that Haas mentions will become a key aspect of his characterization of spillover as is discussed next. Mitrany later acknowledged how some “functionalists were able to identify such seemingly unifying elements as spillover” (1971, 535).

Haas speaks of spillover throughout his discussion of functionalism, international integration, and institutions (1964, 111, 409-414, 456-457). He talks of the “spillover effect of international decisions: policies made in carrying out an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded” (111). He later states that spillover is not automatic and it depends on the political will of the actors involved. He explains that spillover will occur if the actors, driven by their self interests, “desire to adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation” (48). Haas also provides a sequential process for spillover. He first writes of the need for an expansion of the original task or mandate. As this task is expanded, the possibility of spillover is created. Then, for spillover to occur, the task, confined to a specific issue area, needs to diffuse into
other areas as elites choose to exercise their influence to cause spillover. As it diffuses, it becomes larger and eventually its own issue area. In discussing Haas’ views on neo-functionalism, Aybet states the actual success of the integration processes themselves are key in drawing in the political party and interest groups. As the elite become more involved through cooperation on the specific task, the spillover effect of this institutionalized cooperation eventually leads to cooperation between these same elites in other areas.

The example Haas uses to test his integration and spillover theories is human rights and the International Labor Organization (ILO). He notes how eventually, human rights moved out from under the ILO discussions/activities and became a broader issue area on its own (353). He later posits that “trade union issues must increasingly appear in the guise of general human rights issues in order to demonstrate a spillover capacity” providing yet another example of spillover (407). An example of non-spillover would be if human rights concerns had remained tied to the ILO discussions, did not diffuse and did not give rise to a general concern about human rights. By staying within the context of a specific, larger issue area, an issue fails to generalize and consequently, spillover does not occur. This does not necessarily portend a negative effect that an issue did not become its own issue area—only that spillover did not occur.

Peter Haas and Adler discuss epistemic communities which may contribute to understanding spillover and the affects of elite involvement. In 1989, Haas writes of the impact that epistemic communities had on the ecologically
focused “Mediterranean Plan.” He defines epistemic communities as a sociological term adapted for use by the international relations community to “refer to a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied” (Haas 1989, 384). Haas and Adler do not specifically tie epistemic communities to spillover, but in 1992 they do state how their ideas are based on the “neofunctionalist and cognitive approaches, and in studying epistemic communities we follow the trail pioneered by Ernst B. Haas and John Gerard Ruggie” (Adler and Haas 1992, 370).

While their discussion of epistemic communities could be interpreted as being contextually limited to the scientific realm, they do note the important relationship between epistemic communities and political and bureaucratic influence. Touching on themes in this study, Adler and Haas note the possible impact that epistemic communities had on the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Nations continue to comply with the free trade principles of GATT, despite the incentives for free riding and despite increasing domestic pressures to pursue protectionist policies. In the U.S. executive branch of government, the continued involvement of economists trained in the Keynesian tradition has helped promote compliance with GATT in the face of a great degree of public outcry. The influence of epistemic communities persists through the institutions that they help create and inform with their preferred world vision. (374-375)

Herein lays a possible explanatory theory for how an epistemic community of neoliberal economists in high levels of both the Mexican and U.S.
government may have facilitated not only GATT formulation but also NAFTA two years later. Finally, looking deeper at how epistemic communities can directly affect policy makers, Adler and Haas note:

Epistemic community members play both indirect and direct roles in policy coordination by diffusing ideas and influencing the positions adopted by a wide range of actors . . . if an epistemic community acquires power in only one country, or in only on international body, then its international influence is merely the function of that country’s or body’s influence over others. (379)

Having discussed the literature defining and shaping spillover, we can now look at some of the effects caused by spillover.

Gregory Pastor et al., write about the effect that insurgent candidates can have in the U.S. electoral system. They note that these candidates normally attract the underrepresented interests and the nomination-stage mobilization by these candidates “tends to carry over and spill over into the general election” (Pastor et al. 1999, 423). This study researches the effect these candidates have on voter mobilization in the early stages of the electoral process which then spills over into increased voter mobilization in the general election. Pastor et al., do not define spillover but rather, characterize it through its effects on future mobilization as either positive (increasing mobilization) or negative (minimizing mobilization). Staying in the electoral context, Thompson and Zuk look for evidence of a spillover effect into increased economic growth. Their study sought evidence where U.S. election year economic stimulation by the U.S. government not only caused economic growth in the U.S. but spilled over and affected other nation’s
economies as witnessed through increased economic growth (Thompson and Zuk 1983, 465). Hence, we see another example where spillover is neither defined nor grounded theoretically but is referenced in terms of how it can facilitate effects on other areas—in this case, from one nation’s economy to another. A final example in the electoral realm is provided by Miller and Listhaug who look at a possible negative effect of spillover. Their study explores trends in political trust between political parties and the governments of Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. for the period 1964-1986. As one of three major features they use to explore this trend, they focus on “the possibility that a negative rejection of political parties as undesirable institutions may spillover to citizen evaluations of government more generally” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 357). Their conclusions are frustrating to someone interested in spillover effects. There is no direct mention of the results of their research and how it answered the question they posed above. They focused their discussion on two other items and essentially left the reader to draw his own conclusions in answering the question regarding spillover. Moreover, there was no attempt to define or theoretically ground spillover.

Lane and Rohner explore how spillover affects institution building. Their study applies more directly to this project with the tie being institutions and how they are affected by spillover. In studying the economic growth of transition economies from Eastern European and Commonwealth of Independent States countries, they focused on the importance of institutions to the successful economic development. They characterized spillover effects as “institution
spillovers” further clarifying: “If a country gets one institution working (for example: administration efficiency) it also has a higher chance that other institutions, like property rights, will do a good job” (Lane and Rohner 2004, 78). Once again, we see no attempt to characterize the theoretical underpinnings for spillover, although they do ground their key hypothesis in institutional theory. They obtain a score through a mathematical ratio using the combining of the countries’ rule of law and property rights with the simple average of government efficiency, regulatory quality and corruption. Their conclusion is that the scores indicate strong spillovers (84). The closest they come to defining spillover is to clarify once again that “a country, which gets property rights working, also has better chances to create an efficient bureaucracy, etc” (84).

Focusing on social issues, Liebert asks the question:

How can an emergent non-state polity construct from its common market a framework for equality, including social and economic rights for women and men and extend it across its member states? (2002, 3)

In researching this question, she includes spillover as one of five “different environmental mechanisms” including: legal, institutional opportunities, knowledge-based and public pressure (9). To Liebert’s credit, she devotes a paragraph to discussing the theoretical grounding for spillover. This includes though a reference to Haas: “The idea of spillover originates in the neo-functionalist theory of integration formulated by Ernst Haas” (Liebert 2002, 14). While building slightly on Haas’ definition, she remains close to Haas’ construct:
Here, [her study] spillover referred to the modes in which integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector” (Liebert 2002, FN 13).

Unfortunately, the inclusion of spillover in her study is short-lived with little further explanation or discussion of its impact except for the one paragraph discussing its theoretical grounding. Frustratingly, it seems to disappear. The point here though is that this article reinforces the conclusion that Haas’ definition is preeminent and the term spillover continues to be used liberally today.

As an interim summary, we see here two main points regarding the spillover literature. First, Haas continues to remain the preeminent authority on the definition of spillover. Second, there is little, if any, attempt to challenge Haas’ characterization and definition of spillover in the more recent literature. Rather, the prevalent use of the term spillover or phrase “spillover effect” is very liberal with little effort to ground it theoretically. The bulk of the recent literature discusses spillover as is demonstrated above, that being an assumption of basic knowledge of what spillover is with more effort spent on analyzing spillover effects in different areas: mobilization, trust in government, economic growth, institution building, etc. The following literature focuses more on the spillover effects that this study is concerned with—cooperation.

This study looks for a spillover effect on cooperation stemming from the economic to the security realm. While asserting the evidence for spillover’s affect on cooperation in Mexican-U.S. relations, Domínguez and Fernandez (2001, 160)
offer Haas’ discussion of the term while Aybet also cites Haas in her discussion of spillover. (Aybet 2001, 24) The fact that Aybet, Domínguez and Fernandez, all writing in 2001, reference Haas’ 1964 work as the authority for defining spillover gives testament to Haas’ ideas on spillover as being preeminent. Domínguez and Fernandez see the issue of institutionalizing bilateral negotiations as the vehicle by which arguably spillover occurred from the economic realm to other areas in Mexican-U.S. relations.49 They argue that the economic initiatives and accompanying engagement and cooperation helped institutionalize bilateral cooperation. Once institutionalized, “as Presidents met again and again, the conversation moved from trade to other issues in bilateral relations” (Domínguez and Fernandez 2001, 33). Eventually, these bilateral cooperation processes facilitated better cooperation in other areas to include security. There is an indication here that spillover is having a positive effect on security cooperation.

While Domínguez and Fernandez do mention Haas as the authority on spillover, it is only a footnote and they take no time to describe spillover other than to characterize one of its effects, cooperation.

In the economic to security cooperation spillover literature, we see evidence of conflicting views. The question is not necessarily if spillover facilitates cooperation. Rather, it regards the preconditions necessary for economic agreements to occur. Can economic agreements be established

---

49 (Domínguez and Fernandez 2001, 32). Also e-mail correspondence between the researcher and Domínguez in April 2005.
independently or must something occur before, perhaps in the security realm for example, that allows states to enter into economic agreements? European Union (EU) integration today involves to a large extent, the discussion of the European Security Defense Policy which may point to spillover in and of itself. However, many point to the early failures of EU integration and the lack of spillover effects (Farrell et al. 2002, 16).

Aybet (2001, 23-24), Taylor (1978, 249-251) and Deighton (2003) each argue that the European Coal and Security Community, created out of security concerns, was not the result of nor resulted in spillover and actually helped thwart the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC). Aybet concludes there is “no empirical evidence of a continuous process of spillover in the EU region” (26). This view is supported by Deighton who notes that the debacle of the EDC led to a paralysis of discussing a common defense plan from 1950-1954. Once the paralysis was alleviated by the enlargement of the Brussels Treaty to include the Western EU, progress on the European Security Defense Policy was minimal for the next 40 years.\(^{50}\)

Aybet demonstrates how French President Charles De Gaulle’s motivations for integration were grounded in two external factors—the “superpower squeeze” and the Soviet threat (40-68). France was not capable of countering the Soviet threat by itself and the inequitable distribution of power in the alliance weakened France. De Gaulle wanted to create a third force that could

\(^{50}\) Deighton in Weiler, Begg, and Peterson, pp. 275-278.
rival the other superpowers (Aybet 2001, 94-103). Consequently, France’s motivations for integration were grounded in national self-interests, not the result of spillover.

Shifting to South America, Pion-Berlin (2000) argues that MERCOSUR, a common market agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has facilitated some security cooperation. While this may be true, his discussion notes that many elites harbored concerns that needed to be addressed before MERCOSUR could be realized. Additionally, his description of Uruguay’s concerns is replete with unaddressed sovereignty issues that hindered Uruguay’s decision to join. Pion-Berlin’s analysis leads this researcher to conclude that in the case of MERCOSUR, security and sovereignty issues needed to be assuaged before the economic agreement could be established.

Aspects of Keohane and Nye’s theory of Complex Interdependence are also applicable to this perspective. Complex Interdependence has at its core, three basic assumptions or what Keohane and Nye call characteristics: (a) multiple channels connect societies; (b) absence of hierarchy among issues; and (c) military force is not used towards other governments within the region (Keohane and Nye 1977: 24-25). Keohane and Nye see many examples where the Canadian-U.S. relationship is characterized best by complex interdependence. Indeed, they devote an entire chapter of *Power and Interdependence* to the
Canadian-U.S. and U.S.-Australian relationship. Their theory affects this research since we see many examples of multiple channels in the country-to-country relationships that exist within this study.

In the Canada-U.S. relationship, we see NAFTA, immigration, military cooperation, and infrastructure (power grids) providing multiple channels; obviously, there is no “absence of hierarchy.” It is abundantly clear from many aspects that Canada and the U.S. will not attack each other militarily. In the Mexico-U.S. relationship, we see multiple channels also connecting the two societies. NAFTA provides an economic tie and immigration from Mexico to the U.S. primarily provides a social tie. However, there is no “absence of hierarchy” on issues deemed important to the two countries; and it appears that military force will no longer be used towards each other.

In summary, spillover is rarely redefined from the preeminent definition provide by Haas in 1964. The literature has built on Haas’ description of spillover and often assumes a general knowledge of its existence and characterization. Most of the literature discusses the effects that spillover has on different areas—only a few of which were discussed here—and generally treats it as a positive force. There is little literature that speaks negatively of spillover—indeed only one negative effect was discussed here but those authors failed to draw conclusions on its effect. There is little doubt that continued research into the extant literature

---

51 Chapter seven of Keohane and Nye is titled: “United States Relations with Canada and Australia.”
would continue to reveal much of the same conclusions. This study focuses on spillover effects of cooperation using Haas’ definition.

According to Hass, direct elite involvement is required to allow spillover to occur. Spillover enjoys no consensus of where its origins truly lie—in the economic or security realm. The question of preconditions haunts the analyses and theories that postulate economic agreements spark spillover to security agreements as was discussed mainly in the EU-focused literature. While we may find instances where economic agreements have caused spillover effects into security cooperation, we can not be sure of the necessary preconditions that promote economic agreements. Cooperation needs to be institutionalized in one issue area in order for it to spillover into another issue area.

The main hypothesis investigating spillover states that spillover from cooperation in one area allows cooperation in another and subsequently facilitates change. A further breakdown of this hypothesis states that spillover needs elite advocacy for it to occur (Haas 1964, 48). The way each factor is associated with spillover is described below.

**Spillover occurrence**

Spillover occurs from one issue area to another issue area. Specifically, spillover occurs between the economic and security realms (Domínguez and Fernandez 2001, 33). The interview questions to test this factor were:

(a) What are the successes of NAFTA and what are the areas of concern?

(b) What evidence of spillover do we see from NAFTA to other areas?
With the first question, the researcher is attempting to establish that NAFTA has been an economic success and trade advances produced by NAFTA have been significant. This is necessary because it reasons that for spillover to occur from the economic to security realm, the economic realm’s origin (NAFTA in this case) should be successful thus facilitating the institutionalization of cooperation. If the economic agreement was successful, then it reasons that spillover would be more likely to occur than if the agreement was unsuccessful.

The second question is very specific. It seeks evidence of spillover from NAFTA to other areas. What this question does not exclusively test for is whether the spillover went to the security realm. By identifying where NAFTA has caused spillover to another realm, we begin to answer the question of spillover from one area to another.

Elite Involvement in Spillover

If evidence can be found where direct elite involvement promoted spillover, then this hypothesis is supported to a convincing degree. Inherent with this variable is the determination of elite motives to create said spillover (Haas: 1964: 48). Elite action may indeed cause spillover effects, but spillover effects could also be caused indirectly without any premeditated thought or plan to cause it to occur. Conversely, evidence of spillover occurring with no apparent influence from elites sheds doubt on this hypothesis. The reader will note that there is not a specific interview question asking for evidence where direct elite involvement has resulted in spillover. This was done deliberately. If the
participants mentioned elite involvement in spillover as part of their answers to other questions regarding spillover then that would provide evidence in support of this variable. Conversely, if in the responses, we see little or no evidence for elite involvement, then this variable would not be supported. The interview questions to test this factor were:

(a) Have security cooperation initiatives increased between countries with the implementation of NAFTA in 1994? Since the 9/11 attack?

(b) How has the military been affected by NAFTA, if at all?

The first question is attempting to explore the evidence of spillover from the perspective of security cooperation being the beneficiary. Additionally, this question provides insight into the likelihood of spillover more easily coming from the economic or security realm. In this question, the economic realm is represented by NAFTA while the security realm is represented by 9/11. An expectation of this question will be an assessment of which caused spillover to occur—NAFTA or 9/11. The second question also looks for evidence of spillover effect from the economic to the security realm by focusing specifically on how the military participant’s job-related activities have been impacted by NAFTA. Evidence here will point to spillover going from NAFTA to the military (economic to security realm).
Results

Spillover Occurrence

What are the successes of NAFTA and what are the areas of concern?

This question had eight American, three Canadian and one Mexican response for a total of twelve. Of the eight American responses, six provided what they felt were NAFTA areas of concern more so than successes while the remaining two provided only successes. Three participants felt that managing NAFTA as two bilateral agreements rather than one trilateral agreement is a problem. Two other participants felt the need to institutionalize the cooperation gains from NAFTA as a bigger concern. One felt the need to keep NAFTA relevant is most concerning.

American Views

We begin the discussion with a detailed response from a U.S. Trade Representative. This participant provided some detail on NAFTA’s advancements and concluded by offering his concern about keeping NAFTA relevant.

From 1993 to 2004, trade among NAFTA nations climbed 150 percent, from $289.3 billion to $724.7 billion. Each day NAFTA parties conduct nearly $2 billion in trilateral trade. U.S. merchandise exports to NAFTA partners grew more rapidly (at 112 percent) than our exports to the rest of the world, at 60 percent. Canada and Mexico are the U.S.’s first and second largest markets for agriculture. Canada and Mexico alone account for half of the increase in U.S. agricultural exports to the world. While the U.S. trade deficit has risen since NAFTA, Mexico and Canada have accounted for less than 20% of the overall increase. In fact, if the rest of the world bought U.S. goods at the same rate as Mexico and Canada, the U.S. trade deficit would be 26% lower.

U.S. employment rose from 112.2 million in December 1993 to 133.3 million in May 2005, an increase of 21.1 million jobs, or 18.8%. The average unemployment rate was 5.1% for the
ten years ending 2004, compared to 6.4% during 1984-1994. U.S. industrial production—78% of which is manufacturing—rose by 35 percent between 1994 and 2004, exceeding the 27% increase achieved between 1984 and 1994. Growth in real compensation for manufacturing workers improved dramatically. Average real compensation grew at an average annual rate of 2.3% from 1994 to 2004, compared to just 0.3% annually between 1987 [earliest year of data availability] and 1994. U.S. business sector productivity [output per hour worked] rose by 2.9% year between 1994 and 2004, or by a total of 32.7% over the full period. During 1984-1994, the annual rate of productivity growth was 1.8%, or 19.1% over the full 10-year period. Productive investment, central to healthy growth and rising living standards, has increased. Even excluding housing, U.S. non-residential fixed or business investment has risen by 78% since 1994, compared to a 34% rise between 1984 and 1994.

NAFTA was the first free trade agreement to address labor and environment concerns. NAFTA "side agreements" created dedicated institutions and a process to review public submissions about enforcement directly with governments. NAFTA partners have undertaken a wide-range of cooperative programs and technical exchanges on industrial relations, occupational safety and health, child labor, protection of migrant workers, and developed common priorities for the protection of certain shared species, sound chemicals management, and promotion of green products like shade-grown coffee.

NAFTA implementing legislation also created the North American Development Bank and the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission to finance environmental infrastructure projects in the U.S.-Mexico border area. To date, 105 projects with funding over $2 billion dollars are providing benefits for 8 million border region residents.

Although most of the tariff cuts were implemented in the 10th year of the Agreement [1/1/03], the last tariff cuts are scheduled for the 15th year [1/1/08]. These cuts will be for the most sensitive products. We need to ensure that those commitments are honored thus keeping NAFTA relevant. Canada and Mexico are the U.S.’s two largest trading partners, so we should work to keep the agreement vibrant.

Areas of concern: (a) although most of the tariff cuts were implemented in the 10th year of the Agreement [1/1/03], the last tariff cuts (are) scheduled for the 15th year [1/1/08]. These cuts will be for the most sensitive products. We need to ensure that
those commitments are honored. (b) Keep NAFTA relevant. Canada and Mexico are the United States’ two largest trading partners, so we should work to keep the agreement vibrant.

American Views: NAFTA, Two Bilateral Agreements

Three Americans noted that NAFTA, a trilateral agreement, is really two bilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{52} This view is supported by Canadian and Mexican participants as well. Further, it does not seem to be a contentious view, but rather one that is accepted as fact.


Three individuals—all from the State Department, talked of the importance of institutionalizing relationships based on positions rather than personalities or past friendships. This concern regarding NAFTA could be loosely grouped with the trade representative’s concern about keeping NAFTA relevant. An ambassador noted that “personal relations have not transferred to better relations.” A diplomat feels the cooperation experienced is still somewhat tied to the personalities of the leaders. She stated:

We need to institutionalize the relationship [to a point] that will transcend the personalities of the leaders . . . need to

\textsuperscript{52} Although this may not technically be the case with NAFTA, it is how all participants see how NAFTA issues are handled—bilaterally between the U.S. and Mexico and the U.S. and Canada.
strengthen all the institutions in Mexico. Can the next president push through the needed structural change [fiscal, energy, labor, judicial reform]? 

Another diplomat discussed the impact that the U.S. “senior people” have on bilateral relationships. She noted that the personal, strong relationship between Presidents Fox and Bush goes back to their days as Governors. Consequently, there were high expectations in the diplomatic realm when the two entered into their countries’ respective presidencies. She concluded that the strong relationship between these two men is grounded in their personal, not professional relationship. She provided another example where the current trade ministers of all three countries, Peti of Canada, Zellick of the U.S., and Derbez of Mexico worked together in differing capacities throughout the years. Now, as foreign ministers of their respective countries, those relationships are more lasting due to the three individuals working together in a professional relationship for such a long time.

An academician is concerned about the Americans’ “Buy American” attitude:

Support for NAFTA is strongest in Canada, then the U.S., then Mexico. The Americans don’t understand trade. The Auto industry [for example]: Buy American. [Americans] need to realize how trade works in today’s global world. Economics and security at the border—Canadians and United States. The Ambassador Bridge facilitates more trade than all of Japan. Canadians [are] worried about companies moving to [the] U.S. because security and environment issues are too restrictive.
A diplomat tied NAFTA to immigration and talked about its relationship to security cooperation.


Finally, a military participant noted that “NAFTA opened Mexico to [the] U.S. but [is] marred by suspicion.”

**Canadian Views**

The Canadian views essentially support the American views where NAFTA is regarded more as two bilateral agreements rather than one trilateral agreement.

An officer stated that in his job, he works trilateral issues. However, they are with Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. but not Mexico. Perhaps more telling is the response provided by another officer who stated that while the U.S. is Canada’s #1 trading partner, the EU is its #2 trading partner, not Mexico.

Although evidence of spillover is not specifically tested in this question, one could expect Canada-Mexico cooperation to have improved somewhat as a result of NAFTA. NAFTA has created a need for Canada-Mexico relations to improve but the data revealed little evidence of improved Canada-Mexico cooperation.

Another officer characterized trade cooperation between Canada-Mexico as a “3 on a scale of 1-10” and Canada–U.S. trade cooperation as a “10.” Since
NAFTA is touted as a trilateral agreement, one would expect to witness cooperation within NAFTA occurring in the three countries’ separate relationships. Canada-Mexico cooperation is by far the weakest relationship of the three. The data speak loudly when the participants share that an eleven year old trilateral agreement is thought of as two bilateral agreements coupled with the fact that there is little advancement in Canada-Mexico cooperation.

*Mexican Views*

The civilian discussed several aspects of NAFTA but also honed in on the dual bilateral nature of NAFTA as a concern:

> NAFTA is always controversial . . . it is a day-to-day issue on both sides. [The] impact in Mexico is bigger than the impact on the United States. Consumer [public] perceptions are generally good. Controversy, not diversifying, slowdowns in the U.S. hurt Mexico. Need to diversify. Mexico-U.S. growth and economic cycles match . . . Canada-U.S. U.S. is also more important. Mexico-Canada: Mexico deals bilaterally. Sometimes, when Mexico and Canada have a common issue or view on a particular subject, they may work together to try and convince/persuade the U.S. of their view. NAFTA in many places is mostly bilateral but in some places not. But overall, Mexico sees NAFTA as two separate bilateral agreements.

*Question One Summary*

This question helped establish the likelihood of spillover occurring by characterizing the perceptions on NAFTA’s successes and areas of concern. The data gathered from this question helped evaluate the first variable which sought evidence where spillover has occurred from one issue area to another. A U.S. Trade Representative gave detailed numbers regarding NAFTA’s advancements.
His views are well supported by the wealth of documentation in the existing literature as well as the fact that nearly all participants discussed NAFTA’s trade advancements during the interviews. The figures he presented seem generally well known and well received. Hence, in establishing one aspect of this question, the overwhelming consensus is that NAFTA has been successful in what it set out to do—increase trade in North American.

The biggest concern is the dual bilateral nature of NAFTA which is touted as a trilateral agreement. This concern, expressed by participants of all three countries, results in a significant finding for this project. This truly is a concern where a trilateral trade agreement that would hint at trilateral cooperation, is really two bilateral agreements. Further, the Canadians noted that Mexico is not even third on their trading list and in some cases, they deal with several other countries before dealing with Mexico. After roughly three years of negotiations and twelve years of existence, NAFTA is best described as two bilateral agreements. One would hope if not expect that Canada-Mexico cooperation, as the result of NAFTA, would have witnessed steady improvement, which appears not to be the case. As an area of further study, the reasons why this has occurred to this extent should be explored—especially in light of the data that point to spillover generally occurring from the economic realm to the security realm.

There are possibly some data that speak to elite influence on spillover, which is what variable two seeks evidence for. The question centers on the perception that the good relations between Mexican and U.S. Presidents is
facilitated more by their personal rather than professional relationship. This issue is evidence for the impact that elites can have on cooperation. However, a deeper question for further study is: When an elite relationship is based more on a personal rather than professional nature, does that breed a better chance for spillover or cooperation to occur? Two American diplomats discussed the need to institutionalize the relationships between Mexico and the U.S.—to get beyond the importance that elite personalities have on a good or bad relationship. If this perception is true, that the relationships have not been institutionalized, then this would indicate a lack of spillover occurring. The reason is grounded in the literature review where Haas spoke of the need to have elite desire to create spillover and then Domínguez/Fernandez discussed how they saw the institutionalization of cooperation through NAFTA spillover into other areas.

**What evidence of spillover do we see from NAFTA to other areas?**

Continent-wide consequences mean that Canada and Mexico have an overriding commercial interest in increasing North America security. (CFR 2005, 3)

North America is energy interdependent; Canada and Mexico are the two largest exporters of oil to the United States. Canada supplies the U.S. with roughly 90% of its imported natural gas and all of its imported electricity. (CFR 1)

Our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary. (CFR 3)

There were seven American, four Canadian, and two Mexican responses to this question for a total of thirteen. Answers revealed two main areas where the participants feel NAFTA has caused spillover to
other areas. One area is couched in Keohane and Nye’s theory of Complex Interdependence. This is evidenced by several participants who noted the interdependence that exists between Canada and the U.S. and to a lesser extent, an observation of growing interdependence between Mexico and the United States. Three Americans discussed the Security and Prosperity Partnership as an outgrowth of NAFTA.

*American Views: NAFTA and Interdependency*

A diplomat noted that economic and political cooperation has tripled trade between Mexico and the United States. She supports the interdependence argument by noting that there is a direct link between Mexican and U.S. economic cycles—a view echoed by the Mexican civilian in question one above. She observed that the economic component of cooperation is more advanced than the security component. There is evidence here for spillover’s origin coming from the economic to security realm due to the fact that economic cooperation, being more advanced than security cooperation, can positively affect security cooperation. It reasons that for spillover to occur, the origin must be more advanced in cooperation than the destination.

A civilian characterized the three countries’ interdependence as a “vastly integrated economy. All three countries saw the need for efficiency at the border in light of increased security measures after 9/11.” He, as did others, was quick to note that the increased security checks during and immediately after 9/11 caused a significant slow down of trade at the border leading to eventual job layoffs in all
three countries. This was a result of the increased trade from NAFTA that led to a system of “just in time” parts for manufacturing. As parts are created and roll off the assembly line they are immediately loaded into trucks and shipped to their destinations where they arrive just in time to be inserted into the assembly line of a larger manufacturing process. When the border slowed to a crawl after 9/11, this process resulted in production line shut downs and job losses in all three countries as parts were not available when needed because they were stuck at the border (Andreas 2005, 3). Thus, the interdependence is clear through the impact of the slowdowns on all three countries. This same participant also noted that the

. . . majority of Canada’s economy was based on exports from Canada with 80% of its exports going to the U.S. and making up 60% of the Canada’s Gross Domestic Product. Canada benefits the most, then Mexico, then the United States.

A U.S. Trade Representative noted how NAFTA and its many “side agreements has created a dedicated institution and a process to review the complaints and ensure compliance with the agreement.” This is similar to what Haas looked for when he talked of spillover (Haas 1964). Do processes in one area create spillover of similar processes in another area? Another trade expert talked about

. . . the frequency of built-in meetings to the tune of two per year at the Deputy Minister level and one per year for the Trade Ministers level. There is an ongoing constant dialogue of working groups—all as a result of NAFTA.

These too are characteristic of cooperative efforts in the economic realm potentially spilling over into other areas.
American Views: Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and Spillover

In March 2005, all three countries’ executives signed the SPP agreement which has as its basic objectives:

The principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary, and will reflect our shared belief in freedom, economic opportunity, and strong democratic values and institutions. Also, it will help consolidate our action into a North American framework to confront security and economic challenges, and promote the full potential of our people, addressing disparities and increasing opportunities for all.\(^{53}\)

Interestingly, it was the officers who seemed most excited about the SPP rather than the civilians. An officer on the Joint Staff noted that with the SPP coming to the forefront, there is now a mechanism “forcing work to be done on some of the harder Mexican issues as they work through the SPP objectives.” Additionally, another officer noted that the SPP provides “top cover for Mexico and Canada to move forward on security cooperation initiatives.” By way of support, he noted that the Mexican Navy has “jumped all over SPP goal number five which deals with increasing maritime security.” Another officer described how the SPP has an economic component to it. The fact that a security initiative has an economic component may be an indicator of spillover. The SPP may very well cause spillover into economic agreements, but simply because the word “security” is the first word in the title does not mean it should be regarded first and foremost as a security cooperative initiative. Indeed, considering the SPP as a

dual security-prosperity (economic) agreement may be the most realistic characterization.

The SPP established working groups that were ordered to produce an action plan for approval by the leaders within 90 days (CFR 2005, 23). While the 90-day deadline was missed, the action plan was published in June 2005 and was the first report to all three countries’ executive branches on the progress of the SPP initiatives. Additionally, the three countries’ leaders held a follow-on summit in 2006. It is no small miracle to have a trinational document approved and published by all three countries within nine months. This demonstrates the direct impact elites can have on integration and subsequent spillover when they personally engage—a question explored more fully in chapter four. A civilian noted that we are witnessing ties in cooperation as evidenced by the recent singing of the SPP which he further notes has an economic and security component to it as well as a desire to improve the quality of life for Mexican citizens in particular. He also stated what many others did and few argued against, that currently; Mexico and Canada are more concerned about safeguarding economic advancements whereas the U.S. is more concerned about securing its borders. He concludes that these two seemingly disparate motivations actually result in the need for spillover to occur between the economic and security realms.

54 http://www.spp.gov/.
Canadian Views

An officer discussed existing ties between economic and security realms by noting: the border issues after 9/11, the East Coast blackout of the electric grid in 2003, and the ice storm of 1998 that resulted in power outages in South Eastern Ontario, Western New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine all lend support to the vast interdependence that Canada and the U.S. experience. Another officer noted that Canada has the U.S. as its number one trading partner, the EU as its number two and Mexico as its third.

The diplomat’s answer was more ideological and noted first and foremost that NAFTA is bigger than just an economic component. He also mentioned the interdependence between Canada and the United States. Finally, he shared a reality he sees with NAFTA and the U.S. business interests:

NAFTA promoted a great sense of interdependence. The solidarity realized through NAFTA and its interdependence is transcendent of economic aspects. There was more at work here than just the economic motivator. Can a government like the U.S. really negotiate on behalf of all the competing interests in the United States? [no] This makes it difficult for the U.S. government to actually enact a unified policy when the different interests are competing against each other.

While he and other Canadians noted that there exist unresolved disputes regarding soft-wood lumber and Devil’s Lake where Canada has accused the U.S. of violating the NAFTA agreement, he feels that “NAFTA is bigger than any one issue” and therefore is very optimistic in its lasting effect. This characterization shared by the Canadian diplomat is similar to Haas’ sense of community
developed through interdependence. However, his rather ideological view is the minority view in this interview pool. The majority view is that NAFTA’s advancements have bred a necessity to cooperate in the security realm.

Finally, an officer seemed to downplay NAFTA’s effect when he noted that Canada and the U.S. “have a long history of agreements—not only in economic/trade areas but security as well. NAFTA was not the biggest agreement.” In this statement, he was communicating that in light of the history between the nations, NAFTA was “just another agreement” to add to the list (of prior agreements). This view could be supported well by the Canadians’ motivations to enter into NAFTA which were primarily to protect their existing free-trade interests with the U.S. (Pastor 1993B, 4).

Mexican Views

Generally speaking the Mexicans addressed NAFTA much the same way as the Canadians. The civilian participant, well-versed in Canadian-U.S. economic history, stated that economic agreements between Canada and the U.S. started in 1962 which was three decades prior to NAFTA. He noted that this long history of cooperation in Canada-U.S. relations led to the creation of the “existing infrastructure” in Canada-U.S. cooperation that now allows quicker and deeper cooperation in many areas. For example, he notes that U.S. Customs Officers have been in Canada since the 1980s while Mexico had just begun to allow U.S. FBI agents to “operate freely” at Mexico City’s airport to inspect suspicious
passengers in December 2004.\textsuperscript{55} He further stated the “economic pressures (a.k.a. NAFTA relationships) on both sides (speaking of the U.S. and Mexico) cause both sides to address the security aspects.” To paraphrase, he is stating that while the spillover has indeed occurred, it has occurred from the pressures associated with maintaining the economic advancements made through NAFTA, not from an elites’ plan to create spillover or create a cooperation community based on mutual goodwill.

The officer’s answer seemed to negate the significance of NAFTA on security agreements although not totally. He noted that while “NAFTA was the principle cooperation (institution) with the U.S. . . . he could not see any increased (security) cooperation directly, but perhaps indirectly.” Consequently, he left the door open for the possibility of NAFTA’s influence although admitting he has not seen direct evidence of its influence.

\textit{Question Two Summary}

This question sought evidence of spillover from NAFTA to other areas. Evidence of spillover from NAFTA to other areas helps evaluate the first and second variables. The first variable looks for evidence of spillover from one issue area to another. Any evidence of spillover originating from NAFTA to another area would support this variable. The second variable looks for evidence of direct elite involvement. If the data revealed evidence of direct elite involvement, then the second variable would be supported as well.

\textsuperscript{55} A point also made recently by Diez and Nicholls (Diez and Nicholls 2006, 2).
The American responses revealed a primary area where they feel spillover has occurred. They feel that NAFTA has resulted in a growing interdependence between Canada and the U.S. and Mexico and the U.S. but none between Canada and Mexico. This perception was supported also by Canadian and Mexican responses. While the data providing this evidence is solid, there is an interesting twist. Why did the participants, in answering a question about spillover, offer interdependence as support? Another question that stems from the interdependence in North America begs a question for further study: Why has NAFTA bred interdependence between the U.S. and Mexico and the U.S. and Canada but not between Canada and Mexico? Nevertheless, it is clear that in response to this question on NAFTA, the data reveal that the interdependence witnessed in Canada-U.S relations is in part due to NAFTA advancements.

Additional slight support for spillover and variable one is found in the dedicated institutions created by NAFTA to resolve complaints and ensure compliance as well as the frequency of meetings built into the NAFTA agreement. This is evidence for NAFTA institutionalization, but unless we can find out how that what has institutionalized in NAFTA has spilled over into other areas, it is at best a precursor of where spillover might come from in the future. A Canadian felt that NAFTA is more than just an economic agreement. He was the only participant who shared a more ideological confidence in NAFTA and its ability to facilitate deeper cooperation.
In summary, the responses to this question provide the best evidence of spillover occurring through the necessity to preserve the economic advancements created by NAFTA that were threatened in the aftermath of 9/11 when the U.S. moved to improve security at the borders. There is also little direct evidence of support for the second variable although there is a hint of indirect support. The Americans noted that the SPP agreement stems from the cooperation witnessed through NAFTA. The SPP is experiencing high visibility right now as a result of the elite involvement. Thus, progress is being made and cooperation and perhaps spillover is being experienced between the security and economic realm by nature of the agreement. Realistically, we need more time to see if that statement comes true. Other than that, there is little support in response to this question of direct elite involvement causing spillover.

Elite Involvement in Spillover

**Have security cooperation initiatives increased between countries with the implementation of NAFTA in 1994? Since the 9/11 attack?** Responses to this question resulted in seven American, one Canadian, and two Mexican for a total of ten. Four of the seven Americans singled out cooperation in the counter-drug domain as the main area of increased cooperation. Specifically, they noted the good cooperation experienced with the Mexican Navy in counter-drug operations. This relates to the question because they feel cooperation is due in large part to NAFTA and 9/11. This was well supported by military as well as civilian participants. Other than the counter-drug area, most participants discussed
the impact of 9/11 or NAFTA in general terms with a few singling out recent agreements such as the Security and Prosperity Partnership or the Partnership for Prosperity agreements as stemming from NAFTA and/or 9/11. In short though, there is consensus that 9/11 had a much bigger impact on cooperation than NAFTA.

American Views: Mexican Navy and Counter-drug Cooperation and Information Sharing

Mexico has recently begun to consider closer collaboration on disaster relief and information-sharing about external threats. (CFR 2005, 10)

To begin, the Commander of Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, a Coast Guard Admiral, provided a promising picture of cooperation in the counter-drug area during his keynote address at the SOUTHCOM conference. He stated that the “working cooperation with Mexico was good and getting better everyday.” Specifically, he pointed to Mexico’s initiative to share intelligence as “very forthcoming. Mexico provides the Common Operating Picture (COP)56 to JIATF on a daily basis.”57 Also, he noted that the coordination his organization experiences with the Mexican Navy is not just working side-by-side but actually working and planning together in a truly integrated fashion. This view was echoed by a U.S. State Department diplomat: “DEA and FBI cooperation is positive and

56 The Common Operating Picture (COP) is a robust intelligence picture encompassing all pertinent areas of concern over a certain regional area.

57 When asked “Why does the U.S. care about Mexico cooperation?” One civilian diplomat offered, after some thought, this idea of the COP and that the U.S. wants that radar picture of the “South”—something it does not currently have.
increasing but the more traditional defense measures do not experience the same level of cooperation.” In fact, the word she used to describe the cooperation in the counter-drug area was “remarkable.” A NORTHCOM civilian stated that the two events, NAFTA and 9/11 resulted in “quantum leaps in cooperation between Mexico and the United States.” He further quantified cooperation after NAFTA as “somewhat—mostly in counter-narcotics” and after 9/11 “a lot.” He finished his answer though with a question: “What is it that the U.S. really wants with Mexico—what is the real objective? Interesting to note is that this question was also asked by the Mexican officer and to a lesser extent the Mexican civilian. Finally, a counter-drug officer confirmed that cooperation with the Mexican Navy has been good.

There is a dissenting view concerning the cooperation with the Mexican Navy though. What is interesting about this view is that it comes from a U.S. Navy officer’s experiences with the Mexican Navy and the Chilean Navy. He characterized the Mexico-U.S. Navy relationship as “estranged, built on suspicion and paranoia—not good.” Regarding the Chile-U.S. cooperation, he stated there is . . . more of a bond between the U.S. and Chilean Navies than between the U.S. and Mexican Navies. The cooperation with Mexico is good but not even close to the kind of cooperation and interaction experienced with the Chilean Navy.

He also noted that there is little foreign military sales and exercise participation with the Mexican Army58 and the Mexican Navy does not participate in exercises
very much while the Chilean Navy participates in UNISTAH, RIMPAC, and PANAMAX to name a few. While his view is a lone dissenting voice, it is fueled by his unique perspective that to this researcher’s knowledge, none of the other participants had.

Regarding 9/11, a diplomat answered that “9/11 brought an exponential awareness of counter-terrorism that spurred the culture class between State and Justice.” He then went on to discuss the cultural differences between those two organizations. He tied 9/11 and NAFTA together by noting that while

\[\ldots\text{ NAFTA increased trade to a just-in-time delivery standard, 9/11 brought a screeching halt to the border although the border was never really closed \ldots but the decrease in efficiency at the border led to shut downs in manufacturing due to parts being late in the just-in-time culture.}\]

A civilian from the U.S. Trade Representative provided an ambiguous but positive response to the question. First, regarding 9/11 he stated:

\[\ldots\text{ depends on how you define security cooperation initiatives. Shortly after 9/11, the U.S. negotiated two Smart Border agreements with Mexico and Canada. While they include some common elements, they each have aspects specific to the realities of the different borders.}\]

However, he failed to note as some others do that the negotiations for the Smart Border agreements were already in progress prior to 9/11. This fact minimizes his response somewhat. Second, he speaks to NAFTA’s impact by providing background on the Partnership for Prosperity (PFP) initiative and how NAFTA may tie to the PFP. Launched in 2001, the PFP was

58 A fact also pointed out by the Chief, Office of Defense Coordination, Mexico.
designed to increase economic prosperity, in particular for Mexico, as a way to curb Mexican immigration to the U.S.—a growing security concern of the United States. Below is an excerpt from the U.S. State Department regarding PFP.

To help address some of the root causes of migration, they agreed to form a public-private alliance to spur private sector growth throughout Mexico. This PFP initiative will harness the power of free markets to boost the social and economic well-being of citizens particularly in regions where economic growth has lagged and fueled migration. This development will be spearheaded by senior-level coordinators on both sides, and will draw on the best expertise among Mexican and U.S. economists, business people and civil society to develop a concrete plan of action to be presented to the presidents not later than March 1, 2002.59

The trade representative offered this analysis of the PFP:

Look at the language. The program is aimed at poor areas in Mexico. The idea is to stimulate economic growth in Mexico, in order to reduce incentives for people to immigrate to the United States. If illegal immigration is a threat to national security, is the PFP a security program? If NAFTA leads to increased trade and investment, thus raising prosperity in Mexico and lowering illegal immigration, is NAFTA a security program?

His analysis and open-ended questions point to the difficulty in determining where the demarcation line is when looking at agreements such as the PFP and SPP—especially when the implementation details are economically focused while the broad goals are security minded. One may be hard pressed to conclude anything other than this agreement is one which relies on economic advancements.

to help achieve security interests. This seems to provide support for direct elite involvement as is sought in the second variable.

An Academician seemed to downplay the impact of NAFTA and 9/11 while admitting to some influence on cooperation. Of NAFTA, he stated:

The circumstances and environment were ripe for facilitating NAFTA. Now, after 9/11, the circumstances have changed again to facilitate a question of how do we get a trilateral agreement in security?

His answer leaves room for interpretation. It is possible that he feels leading up to NAFTA (1994) the security environment was not considered very dangerous and allowed NAFTA to be negotiated and implemented. However, since 9/11, the threat assessment and its urgency has changed and increased to the point where the U.S. at least, is more interested in securing a more robust and perhaps trilateral security agreement than focusing on economic advancements. Simply put, leading up to NAFTA, the emphasis was more on economic than security cooperation and after 9/11, the emphasis is more on security. There is also the possibility that the circumstances he mentioned since 9/11 include the groundwork for cooperation spillover to occur from NAFTA to security cooperation. Finally, a diplomat who is a trade expert answered that she witnessed a bigger change in cooperation as a result of NAFTA rather than 9/11.

Canadian Views

The Canadian view is represented by only one hearty response. The diplomat answered:
Strengthening cooperation is the theme since 9/11—especially to protect economic advancements . . . the 1940 Ogdensburg agreement stemming from a WWII threat . . . both countries recognized the mutual threat and the need to cooperate together to meet that threat . . . this mutual understanding has been re-energized since 9/11 and we are looking to modernize to combat the new, asymmetrical threat.

Mexican Views

This question brought one of the most robust responses from the two Mexicans. The civilian discussed 9/11 and information sharing while the officer reinforced the cooperation in the counter-drug domain and in military training and education.

The civilian’s response to this question focused first on the impact that 9/11 had on economic issues and then information-sharing. This is perhaps explained in part by the fact that his expertise is in trade. Specifically, he noted that while NAFTA and the geographic proximity of the countries facilitated trade, there was no discussion of security-related issues in the economic/trade vocabulary until after 9/11. “Before 9/11, on the economy trade side, security was not an issue.” This point was made by other trade experts (both Mexican and American). The word security simply did not exist as part of their trade vocabulary prior to 9/11—but it does now. He described how 9/11 affected trade:

Nine-eleven brought delays in getting items across the border. These slowdowns at the border hurt the advantage that geographic proximity brought to North American trade. Consequently, the issue became how to safeguard trade without hurting security. That was when security became part of the economic vocabulary.
He concluded, as did others, that 9/11 brought awareness to all parties involved that:

A balance needed to be achieved between the security concerns brought about by 9/11 and the need to allow trade to flow across the border as it was prior to 9/11. This balance is being achieved. The Smart Border agreements, Fast and Security Lanes at the border are evidence that trade is moving forward and security concerns are being addressed. The U.S. and Mexico have reached a level of balance, but also a deeper level of commitment.

He also pointed to information sharing as another area experiencing good cooperation beyond the maritime domain. He noted that this is evidenced by Mexico’s transmission of information to the U.S. on individuals who enter Mexico that the U.S. is concerned about. While they share the information with the U.S., they do not take action by arresting the individuals nor allow the U.S. to arrest or monitor them while on Mexican soil. However, the fact that Mexico shares this information with the U.S. cannot be overlooked and along with the intelligence sharing experienced in the counter-drug area and the common operating picture shared by Mexico point indeed to a domain where Mexico-U.S. cooperation is positive. This positive cooperation has many calling for more cooperation initiatives in information sharing, surveillance, and warning. This bodes well as an area that can be exploited and used to encourage further cooperation as well as reap immediate dividends for improving security in the continent. Further, the idea of information sharing is a specific goal of the Security and Prosperity Partnership agreement.
The officer supported the four Americans’ perceptions regarding Mexico-U.S. Naval cooperation. He spoke of the “excellent cooperation” experienced in the training programs and attendance by Mexican officers at U.S. military training schools. He concluded that the prognosis is that cooperation is still open and with a new vision for the future there is a new “possibility for improved cooperation.” This remark is tempered though by his identification of where the cooperation does and does not take place. He carefully noted that in addition to counter-drug efforts with the Coast Guard, there is “some cooperation with NORTHCOM, but none with NORAD.” He then shared his perception that “NORTHCOM is a strict defense of the United States.” He also noted that in the maritime realm, cooperation is “good with the U.S. Coast Guard in drug trafficking primarily.”

**Question Three Summary**

This question sought perceptions on how security cooperation initiatives between countries had increased as the result of NAFTA and/or 9/11. The answers to this question helped evaluate the first variable which sought evidence of spillover from one area to another and the second variable which sought evidence of direct elite involvement. Of the ten responses, six identified which event had more impact on cooperation. The remaining four offered views of the impact of just one or both of these events. There is evidence that security

---

60 This fact is further supported by the Chief, Office of Defense Coordination, Mexico who noted that while the Mexican Navy takes advantage of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the Mexican Army does not.
cooperation increased after both NAFTA and 9/11. This evidence provides support for spillover’s existence and consequently supports the first variable.

Overall, four participants claimed that 9/11 brought a bigger impact on security cooperation while two claimed that NAFTA had a bigger impact. However, it should be noted that the claims were along “party lines” where the two NAFTA supporters were trade experts and 9/11 supporters were security experts except for the Mexican civilian (trade expert) who indicated that 9/11 had a bigger impact. Nevertheless, the question of how 9/11 impacted security cooperation was answered affirmatively by the majority of participants much more so than NAFTA’s impact on security cooperation. Some of the words and phrases used by the participants to describe how important 9/11 was on increased security cooperation were “remarkable, unparalleled, huge, a lot, quantum leaps.”

The American responses focused on cooperation in the counter-drug domain. However, it was not clear if the cooperation experienced in this domain was the result of NAFTA or 9/11. It appears that the U.S. counter-drug officers’ assessment seems most reasonable. During the interview, he indicated that the increased flow of trade resulting from NAFTA created an accompanying increase in illegal drugs and other illegal items. This created a necessity for better cooperation in the counter-drug domain to negate the increased flow of illegal goods.

Another area experiencing cooperation is in the information-sharing domain as noted by American and Mexican participants. Additionally, this is an
area where the Security and Prosperity Partnership agreement also has a goal to build on. This initiative seems to be affected more by 9/11 and the need to share intelligence information. The Smart Border agreements were also raised as a post 9/11 initiative. However, others noted that the increased trade from NAFTA actually began the process to create the agreements. Prior to 9/11, there already seemed to be an understanding of the need to protect trade while also ensuring better security at the border. This lends support to spillover beginning with NAFTA.

Many participants noted that the motivation for Mexico and Canada to keep the border open stems from keeping the trade advancements intact. For the U.S. it may not necessarily be to close the border, but many stated the motivation is almost certainly to make the border more secure. Mexico and Canada, motivated by the trade advancements, seem to grasp the importance of cooperating in the security realm with the United States. The economic numbers certainly suggest, and few dispute the fact, that first Mexico and then Canada have more to gain in keeping the border open due to their larger percentage of trade with the United States.61 The U.S. has much less at stake economically but could, although evidence does not suggest this, realize the economic/trade card can be used as a carrot and stick approach to reach its border security goals. The more important point though is that NAFTA has facilitated spillover into the

---

61 “Ninety percent of Mexican trade goes to the U.S. but only 15% of U.S. trade goes to Mexico” (Andreas 2005, 3).
security realm, but not by way of deliberate elite involvement or a sense of community. Rather, it is due to the interdependence created as the need to secure the trade advancements force the countries to find a balance between security and trade. This finding was also substantiated by question two’s data. This is ample support for the first variable.

In conclusion, the responses to this question provide nearly equal evidence to the impact of NAFTA and 9/11 on security cooperation. One cannot ignore the impact of NAFTA and its advances in cooperation and how that cooperation may have stimulated the seemingly quicker initiatives post 9/11. This question finds support for spillover from both aspects of this question—NAFTA, 9/11—economic and security realm. The data do not allow us to conclude if either event had a bigger impact. But, combining it with some findings from the bureaucratic inertia perspective would skew the data heavily towards concluding that 9/11 had a bigger impact on security cooperation. Finally, there is no support for variable two found in the responses to this question.

How has the military been affected by NAFTA if at all?

American Views

The eight responses to this question produced evidence that military officers in general are becoming more aware of economic and trade issues and how they impact their security-related, policy-making jobs. Evidence is found not only in responses to this question but also in views expressed by some conference speakers. It is interesting to note the number of speakers and panelists that
mentioned economic or trade issues and how they relate to the Americas. Comments from the keynote addresses were most enlightening in that both of these conferences were sponsored by security-minded organizations and both organizations recognized how the economy and trade affects their policy decisions. This is indeed an indicator of spillover to some degree.

First, General Craddock, Commander of SOUTHCOM stated that there is “profound” economy and trade occurring in South America. He further lamented the movement of foreign direct investment from Latin America to Asia as an unfortunate consequence of increasing security threats. Second, Colonel Contrares Palgatti of the Chilean Army spoke of trade issues during his keynote and advocated an Atlantic-Pacific increase in trade as one initiative to increase security cooperation. He also noted that the “new concepts of democratic peace and free trade bring outstanding opportunities to the Latin American region.”

Third, a panel titled “Defense, Security, and Development” specifically talked about development and economic issues and how, if addressed, they can help the security environment. Finally, The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Western Hemisphere also discussed economic issues in his keynote address. The NORTHCOM conference also had similar evidence recognizing the impact of trade on security. A Joint Staff officer provided a briefing on the current status and impact of the newly signed SPP which has a strong economic aspect.

A pointed follow-up question was asked of many interview participants. This question asked if in their dealings, discussions and workings of the security-
related issues that they deal with, do they ever actually correspond with or attend meetings with others that have economic and/or trade issues as their main focus.

This question was asked because the researcher concluded that interaction between security and economic/trade minded personnel as part of their day-to-day duties would also be an indicator of spillover occurring between the two realms. The answers to this question provided somewhat mixed results but tended to emphasize that security minded officers are becoming more trade and economically savvy.

Of the six U.S. military officers, half indicated in their responses that they do indeed work with personnel from the economic/trade realm as part of their day-to-day job. However, some of the positive responses were somewhat limited. For instance, one U.S. officer who deals primarily with counter-drug operations answered yes but qualified his response by noting the trade and economic personnel he deals with

. . . are not directly related to economic or trade issues but they are very sensitive to both topics. For example, the Treasury rep [sic] will pass info to his/her agency counterpart if necessary. The same applies to the other two agencies. They primarily look at the money laundering problem.

Another officer answered yes but noted his primary job is assisting foreign country purchases of U.S. military equipment. Thus, the nature of his job forces him to deal with economic and trade issues. The third response was a more pointed “yes” with no qualifications.
The “no” responses were more intriguing. Two of the three answers indicated recognition of the need to expand into the economic/trade area. The two responses are below:

. . . and to be truthful, most country desk officers I know don't pay large attention to anything but political-military issues. This is one area where the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense probably ought to broaden. With Canada, the SPP is helping us to do that as we slowly get involved with a more comprehensive approach to continental security.

No I do not deal with economic/trade issues although I know and realize the impact on relations.

The third “no” response seemed to be the minority view regarding officers who worked security-related issues dealing with economic/trade issues:

I have not attended meetings that deal with economic or trade issues. I would be interested in finding out whom and why the military would be involved in these types of discussions—seems to be a bit out of the defense lane.

*Canadian Views*

There were three Canadian responses to the follow-up question and one response to question four. An officer assigned to the Bi-National Planning Group indicated that his day-to-day job has not produced “much experience working with personnel from the economic or trade realms.” He did note that the issue of “paying attention to trade and economic issues” is part of the North American cooperation strategic planning that the Bi-National Planning Group was tasked to do. Further, he noted: “it is part of the mission brief and they are aware of it as a motivator for what they do.” Another officer answered:
For the most part I have little association with those who have economic agendas. Most of my dealings involve military cooperation. In that context I do from time to time discuss foreign military sales issues but that's more related to procurement, supply, and exchange of military hardware. We do have an attaché responsible for defence [sic] cooperation who has more dealings with industry. Economic and trade is big business for our Embassy and we have a large section of government officials devoted to that discipline. These folks may, from time to time, call on the attaché corps if there is a related security issue but by in large they operate independently. I do have periodic contact with officials from major corporations such as Boeing, who are marketing their products, and at times I will seek information concerning a capability or product. And we are always welcome at the big trade shows. My role here is a conduit for information. Perhaps one exception where economic, trade, and military requirements are converging is in the international Joint Strike Fighter program. This unique development program invites participating nations to share in the program development and has resulted in extensive Canadian industry involvement. The project lead is Lockheed Martin, so I do have some dealings with industry through this program.

Still another answered:

Much of what I do has to do with economic and trade issues. Defense industry, in the U.S. and abroad, is particularly concerned about issues as Buy America, offsets in defense trade [trade reciprocity] and how [U.S.] export control regulations hinder defense trade. Today's world is a global one. U.S. policies such as those pursued by Congress over the last few years, generally known as Buy America, while well intended, would have significant impacts on the U.S. ability to put the best equipment in the hands of the U.S. warfighter. Export control regulations are making it increasingly difficult for defense companies to cooperate in a timely manner as each re-transfer to sub-contractors requires Department of State authorization, which takes about sixty days. Thus, my colleagues from many nations and I work together with defense industry associations, think tanks, and DOD officials to keep the defense trade as free flowing as possible.

Finally, the diplomat, assigned to a security organization, answered:

The answer is yes. I interact regularly with Canadian colleagues whose focus is on trade and economic matters. This
includes the staff of our new consulate in Denver, which is primarily trade focused.

**Question Four Summary**

This question sought evidence where the military has been affected by NAFTA. Answers to this question helped evaluate the first variable which sought evidence of spillover from issue area to another. The data in response to this question continued to provide support for this variable. The support is found specifically in the fact that military officers consider economic and trade issues as something that they are at least aware of and in some cases, deal with on a fairly routine basis. Further, a Mexican diplomat noted that in his job, which deals primarily with trade issues, the word security has now become part of his trade vocabulary as a result of 9/11. This evidence of economic issues making their way into the security realm compliments the earlier finding where security issues are becoming something that trade personnel need to be aware of. However, given the characterization of spillover in the literature review, one must note that the data do not provide enough information to decide if what is revealed here is caused by the process of spillover. Once again, the researcher finds himself asking if this is better explained by the bureaucratic inertia perspective where a crisis (9/11) has caused the change quickly or is this evidence of spillover. Have NAFTA’s advancements, the institutionalization of its processes, caused the security-policy experts to slowly become aware of trade and economic issues? While possible, it is hard to determine from the data.
Many responses came from a follow-up question specifically asking those participants who work security-related issues if they have experienced working with others from the trade/economic realm. This question came about as the result of the views expressed by several conference panel speakers, all of whom were military, who discussed trade or economic issues as part and parcel to increasing security cooperation in the Americas. The follow-up question allowed the participants to reconsider the impact of trade on their security-related jobs. The fact that security experts discussed trade issues and its impact on security in Latin and North America lend support to spillover from NAFTA to security issues. Even though 9/11 has accelerated this phenomenon, some talked about these issues becoming part of their day-to-day considerations prior to that. Hence, we can conclude to some degree that NAFTA has facilitated spillover into the security realm thus supporting the first variable.

Summary and Conclusions

The data provided evidence of spillover occurring from one issue area to another. The fact that NAFTA is successful provides a foundation by which we can determine that as a successful economic agreement, NAFTA provides fertile cooperation soil for spillover to grow. The data also provided evidence that the interdependence between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico is the result of spillover from NAFTA. In the literature, interdependence is not directly tied to spillover. In fact, the literature essentially treats them as separate entities. It is interesting to note how many participants answered a question about spillover
by describing interdependence. One possible explanation for this is that the term spillover was generally described to the participants. The detailed explanation found in the literature review was not shared with the participants. It could have left too much ambiguity in how this study characterized spillover. In the strict characterization of spillover from the literature, we actually find that much of the data offered as evidence of spillover do not fit with the spillover described in the literature review.

Nevertheless, the interdependence observation is a good one in that it does force cooperation in different realms. Another view revealed by the data is that any spillover witnessed from NAFTA to security cooperation is one born out of necessity to protect the trade advancements and interdependency. A primary view here is that NAFTA’s advancements have forced the countries to work together in the security realm to ensure that advances from NAFTA are protected as the countries increase cross-border security. The data suggest this was an initiative prior to 9/11 as evidenced by the existing plans for the Smart Border agreements. Additionally, the data provided other possible examples of cooperative spillover in the counter-drug and information-sharing areas. The counter-drug expert felt that NAFTA advances had caused the cooperative spillover in the counter-drug domain as a necessity to handle the increased volume of trade at the border.

The most significant speculation deals with the motivations for the spillover to occur. The literature indicates that spillover can be expected to occur either as part of the growing sense of community or from direct elite involvement.
The former implies a sense of goodwill experienced between the countries that will help initiate spillover. The overwhelming perception though, is that spillover is occurring more from an acceptance of a necessary evil—to protect the trade advances—than from any sense of community or goodwill. The literature does not speak to this aspect of spillover which is a significant finding from this research.

The data also indicated a perception that 9/11 has had a bigger impact on security cooperation than NAFTA. Initially, one may look at that finding as somewhat troubling for proving that spillover occurs from the economic to the security realm. It is possible that the bigger impact on security cooperation witnessed from 9/11 is grounded more in the bureaucratic inertia perspective that states a large change will occur after a major crisis. While the data from this question show more support for 9/11’s impact, there is some support for NAFTA’s impact. That alone may be strong evidence for spillover from the economic to the security realm.

The final question, how has the military been affected by NAFTA if at all, also provided evidence for spillover in the small but poignant amount of data speaking to the impact of economic and trade issues on the jobs of those who deal with security-related issues. This can be coupled with the earlier finding from the trade experts that security concerns are now included in their jobs which focus on economic and trade issues. This impact of one realm influencing another is perhaps the second strongest evidence of spillover from the data. As the issues from both realms are resolved among countries in a cooperative manner, one
would hope that the relationships have a positive effect on both areas. While it remains difficult to determine where spillover originates from—the security or economic realm—it is evidence of spillover to some degree.

Regarding the second variable, the data provide slight evidence in two of the four questions. However, there are more examples, as evidenced by the abundance of data for variable one, where spillover has occurred without direct elite involvement. While the data revealed examples where elite influence may have resulted in spillover, the fact that there is evidence of spillover existing without direct elite influence essentially invalidates this variable. It is important to recall that there was no specific question looking for elite impact on spillover’s creation. It was determined to leave the unveiling of any such evidence to the participants as they responded to the questions.

The first question: (What are the successes of NAFTA and what are the areas of concern?) revealed data grounded in a concern over the lack of institutionalization of the elite relationships. The concern, couched in the question, by itself is what lends support to variable two. The participants were speculating and indicating that if the elite relationships were institutionalized, then that would bode well for deeper and more significant spillover—hence, the evidence of possible future elite involvement facilitating spillover. More evidence for elite influence is found in the SPP agreement. The current elite involvement in that agreement has resulted in increased cooperation in several areas—some mentioned in this project as information sharing and maritime. The SPP was
signed in March 2005 by the three countries’ executives and its progress was formally reported on in the first year and conducted a follow-up summit in 2006. It is possible, although not proven, that one of the SPP’s goal of increased maritime cooperation positively affected the NORAD renewal which saw NORAD expansion into the maritime realm.

The two variables tested the one hypothesis for this perspective. The hypothesis stated that cooperation spillover from one issue area to another requires elite advocacy for it to occur. The first variable sought to help determine first if indeed spillover can even be found between the security and economic realm. The second variable sought more specifically to look for evidence in support of this hypothesis. The conclusions are that first, spillover has occurred between the security and economic realms. Specifically, NAFTA has created spillover into the security realm. Further, 9/11 has caused spillover of cooperation into the economic realm. What is not supported is that spillover needs direct elite involvement to occur. While the data support elite influence on spillover, as found in the SPP initiative more specifically, we do not see a direct tie from elite actions or motives resulting in spillover in every case. Some of the examples revealed from this research demonstrate that spillover has occurred without elite involvement. The data show that this hypothesis is not supported. Spillover does not need direct elite involvement for it to occur. This is an important finding because in the literature, Haas in particular stressed the importance of direct elite involvement in spillover (1964, 48). He stated that “spillover is not automatic and
depends on the political will of the actors involved.” There is little room here in
his characterization of spillover for any other conclusion than; we need to see
direct elite involvement to cause spillover to occur. That is not what the data
revealed.

This is not to say that spillover occurs all the time wherever it could or
should. As is also evident, there appears to be no spillover effect yet in Canada-
Mexico cooperation resulting from NAFTA. This is surprising given the data that
revealed the strong interdependence existing between the U.S. and Mexico and
the U.S. and Canada. The expectation of this hypothesis would be that the
Mexico-Canada relationship would experience positive growth in cooperation as a
result of NAFTA. The literature does talk about how spillover can take time. This
may be the case here. It is possible that the fifteen years of NAFTA negotiations
and existence are not enough time to cause growth in Mexico-Canada
cooperation.

There are also data that speaks to the need to institutionalize cooperation
in one area prior to that cooperation occurring in another area. This is part of the
discussion of cooperation spillover effects as discussed by Domínguez and
Fernandez (2001, 33). Participants did discuss this issue in two separate contexts.
One was a concern that the relationships between elites was grounded more in the
personal rather than professional. Another view felt that NAFTA transcended
more than just the economic issue and along with the institutionalized nature of
the frequent meetings and processes to arbitrate complaints; it has and is
supporting spillover into other areas. Finally, the discussion by many on a main point about interdependence also touches on part of the literature review. This deals more with the definition of integration rather than the characterization of spillover. The literature discussed how interdependence between two countries is a sign of integration along with the opening of a countries markets, borders, and institutions to another country. NAFTA has certainly facilitated all of these aspects of integration, as discussed in the literature review. But as already noted the literature does not tie interdependence to spillover.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we are left with a bit of a contest between two somewhat separate characterizations of spillover. Haas’ characterization and his dependence on elite involvement found little support in the data. Haas also talked about the need to have an issue area grow into its own large issue area before it could become its own independent area of concern. The data did not support that perspective either. Conversely, we found some support for Domínguez and Fernandez’s characterization of spillover in the institutionalization aspect of NAFTA cooperation possibly spilling over into security cooperation. The strongest support for spillover comes from a perspective not discussed in the literature—that of a necessary evil. NAFTA, and its trade advances, perhaps tied to interdependence as well, caused Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. to realize they needed to cooperate to some degree in the security realm to protect the trade
advancements. That may be a new characterization of spillover—one couched in the interdependence argument, but spillover nonetheless.
CHAPTER IV

ELITE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS

There is no fundamental divergence of values between Canada and the United States, but a perception of growing divergence will jeopardize the national interest of both countries. (WWC 2005A, 19)

To what degree do elite attitudes and perceptions affect integration and security cooperation? This chapter begins with a discussion of the literature on this topic which leads to a section where the relevant hypotheses and associated independent variables are described. Next, the key interview questions tied to these variables are discussed and finally the responses presented from the three groups: American, Canadian, and Mexican are presented and analyzed.

Literature Review

In discussing elite attitudes towards integration, one must first define integration. The characterization of integration will remain grounded in the procedural definition discussed earlier in chapter three. The question of elite involvement here prompts a deeper comparison of two procedural definitions representing this disparity. To restate from the previous chapter, we will use Haas’ definition as the focal point (2002, 16-17) because his definition includes the direct insertion and influence of elites:

The process whereby political actors [elites] in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.
Zahariadis argues that integration is not entered into solely by conscious design or bargain between states, “but also the perhaps unintended consequence of everyday interaction between the various actors” (2003, 285). His definition differs from Haas’ in the degree of elite involvement. While he sees a place for elite involvement, it is not as instrumental as Haas’.

These two perspectives provide a spectrum on how elites influence cooperation either directly (Haas) or indirectly (Zahariadis). In analyzing elite influence on integration, the will of the elite becomes a key element. The question here is how much influence can elites exert on the successful outcome of cooperation? In the formation of NAFTA, there is evidence of direct elite involvement in both Mexico and the United States (Hakim, Litan, Kingsolver, Franko). Mexican President Salinas’ inner circle of advisors consisted of an influential group of Mexican neo-liberal “technocrats,” many of whom were educated at some of the same schools that members of the U.S. presidential cabinet graduated from (Kingsolver 2001, 61). Moreover, Domínguez and Fernandez noted that Salinas himself had obtained a masters and doctorate from Harvard while his successor, President Ernesto Zedilla earned a doctorate from Yale (2001, 24). Zedilla, along with U.S. President Clinton, would continue to push for the successful implementation of NAFTA as Bush and Salinas left office.

---

62 “Cabinet members in the Salinas administration had M.A. or Ph.D.s from Harvard (24), Stanford (18), Columbia (12), Yale (10), MIT and Universities of Colorado, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, California-Berkley and Chicago, Cornell and New York University” (Kingsolver 2001, 61).
(Domínguez and Fernandez 2001, 14). Both governments had strong neo-liberal elite influence which undoubtedly helped formulate motivations to establish NAFTA. The influence of elites in the U.S. in particular regarding NAFTA’s formulation is even more impressive when considering the vast negative public opinion plus congressional opposition toward NAFTA that existed at that time (Diamond and Faux, Lee in Grinspun et al. 1993, 235-259). For a partial explanation of how the elites overcame this obstacle, we turn to Nielson (2003).

Nielson studied how political institutions of “middle-income presidential democracies channel societal demands for protection” within the context of international trade. His research focused specifically on how strong presidents with strong legislative powers and strong party leaders can overcome protectionist biases. Simply put, his study focused on situations where elites have to break through protectionist boundaries that arise when a state considers implementing a trade agreement; such as was the case with NAFTA. He demonstrated that elites of this caliber can indeed influence these types of agreements by breaking through obstacles and inducing cooperation (Nielson 2003, 470). He also noted that when power is delegated to a president or party leaders, there is a significant relationship to trade liberalization. His conclusions help determine the positive outcome that elites can have on integration and more specifically their ability to overcome barriers like protectionism.

Page and Barabas also talk about the phenomenon of policy gaps between a country’s citizens and elites. Their conclusions indicate that in most cases, the
differences for the gaps are not due to a lack of knowledge on the public’s part but at worst, may be due to the their inability to see the importance of the issue as quickly as the leaders do. “The sharpest gap” occurs when the issue regards U.S. jobs (Page and Barabas 2000, 350). In that case, policy decisions that are perceived as a threat to U.S. jobs are generally not supported by the public. This was certainly the case in NAFTA that saw great concern by the public and Congress but still witnessed elite influence to enact the agreement. Looking in a different context, Bailey et al. analyzed the power of the U.S. President to persuade a change in public opinion of a social issue. They studied how President Clinton was able to change a portion of the public’s opinion regarding the issue of homosexuals serving openly in the military. Clinton spent “presidential capital” early in his presidency when he pushed forth a proposal to change the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in 1993 (Bailey et al. 2003, 54). The authors hypothesized that Clinton would not be able to change public opinion on such a contentious moral and religious issue. However, they found that he was able to change some portion of the public opinion (mainly in his strongest supporters) to accept his position of allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military, although that was not what he eventually achieved. Even more impressive to the authors was the fact that he changed public opinion in the face of strong opposition from civilian and military elite—some of whom had a strong positive reputation with the public (Bailey et al. 56-57). We see once again where elites can influence issues, although in this case, not an international issue.
Feinberg speaks to elite influence in his discussion focusing on how Latin America gained its economic integration goals with the United States. He demonstrates how elite influence played a big part when he describes how U.S. President George H. Bush was a “professed friend” of promoting Latin America trade (2002, 128). Bush, according to Feinberg, was favorable to free trade due to his “eastern establishment family, elite New England schooling, Republican Party roots” and after he “saw how exchange with Mexico benefited the Texan economy” (2002, 128). Feinberg, Nielson, Page and Barabbas help provide a codified example where elites can influence cooperation in a positive way and even overcome both public opinion and congressional obstacles if desired.

More applicable to this study is Peake’s research on the power of the presidency to set the foreign policy agenda. Peake sought to test the “recent challenges to the traditional model that argue the President’s foreign policy agenda is inherently responsive to media coverage and international events (2001, 69). He found that presidents have greater influence on the media’s and Congress’ agenda than previous research had suggested. More important to this study was the finding that the president had less power to set the agenda in highly salient foreign policy issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict or issues regarding the Soviet Union. But in less salient issues such as trade, Central America and the Caribbean, the President had more power to set the agenda (Peake 2001, 83). Since this study explores trade in North America as part of its focus, Peake’s study provides an expectation that U.S. elite actors have significant influence in
matters of trade and other less salient issues in North America. One could argue that currently North American security cooperation is a highly salient issue.

Hurrell (1998, 534) and Hakim and Litan (2002, 56-61) voice the most prevalent concern that elites have towards integration and the accompanying interdependency that can grow from it, the fear of losing one’s sovereignty. This fear is couched in the very nature of interdependence, that of relying on another country for some aspect of one’s existence. Hurrell notes that between Argentina and Brazil, many Argentineans feared they entered into an unhealthy excessive dependence on Brazil when they signed on to the MERCOSUR agreement. Do Canada and Mexico have similar fears regarding interdependence on the U.S. in light of NAFTA? Hakim and Litan note that in Canadian policy debates “opponents scrutinize every proposal in terms of the cost to Canadian sovereignty, instead of measuring it against the benefits achieved” (2002, 59). This phenomenon could rightly be classified as a force acting on elite decisions to support, or not, a cooperation initiative. As Franko discusses the U.S. should be mindful of its powerful position relative to Canada and Mexico and understand that sovereignty and nonintervention concerns are still a significant obstacle for elites to overcome (2000, xvi). She notes how the “reinvigorated” Organization of the American States, Committee on Hemispheric Security has included these issues as part of its redefining of hemispheric security” (49). Some elites may not want to overcome these obstacles. Pertinent to this study, is the question of how sovereignty concerns affect North American security cooperation. Is this a
concern that actively inhibits cooperation? If so, how does this sway elite
decisions to try and facilitate cooperation and thus, indirectly impact cooperation?

Wrobel argues the Brazilian elite motivations in establishing and
expanding MERCOSUR come from the desire to balance against the U.S. and its
economic gains realized from expanded free trade in the Americas (1998, 552,
557-558). Wrobel explains how Brazil, throughout the Free Trade of the
Americas Agreement (FTAA) negotiations in 1998, used its “sheer size and
weight and economic might, as well as diplomatic skills” to galvanize the
members of MERCOSUR and emerge as their spokesman (557). This allowed
Brazil to confidently confront U.S. policies and emerge from these negotiations
on equal footing with the United States. Franko also sees evidence of Brazil’s
(and the other MERCOSUR members) desire to balance against the U.S. and its
strong economic position (2001, 75, 77). Brazil in particular, distrusts U.S.
motives which it sees as imperialistic. In a limiting fashion, we see here how
elites, driven by motives to balance with a more powerful nation, banded together
to prevent a larger, hemispheric agreement from being implemented in lieu of
their more comfortable regional agreement. It is no small point to note that at this
writing, the Western Hemisphere still does not have a free trade agreement—a
testament to elite influence in hindering cooperation.

There is a group of EU-focused literature that demonstrates how existing
alliances can be hard for elites to overcome. While reiterating the themes many
discuss regarding the EU’s security defense policy, Quinlan notes how the special
relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom influences policy formulation and conflicts with internal EU security planning (2001, 25, 26, 29, 34). Dietl reviewed recent works from five authors and concluded “it is striking that all the books underline the importance of the Anglo-American special relationship for Britain’s foreign policy” (2003, 157). Rees argues that Britain has consistently resisted continental initiatives that it interpreted as seeking to compete with NATO and that

... it has always been the highest priority for London to bind the U.S. into European security, in order to face the threat from the East, and to overcome historical differences among the Europeans. (Croft et al. 2001, 52-53)

Beatrice Heuser shows that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, France in particular saw the U.S. and the Soviet Union through “Hobbsien eyeglasses” and in some instances actually feared the Americans more than the Soviets (1997, 120-122). Quinlan also notes France’s hesitancy to allow the U.S. too much input into the establishment of a European security organization (2001, 34). Coupled with prevailing relations between the French and Americans in light of recent U.S. policies in the Middle East and France’s disagreement, one would be hard-pressed to show France’s attitudes have changed since that time. This literature though reveals another force that shapes elite decisions regarding cooperation

---

initiatives. As elites consider them, whether in the security or economic realm, existing external alliances undoubtedly shape their ultimate decisions. Bringing that into the North American security equation, one must wonder how existing alliances that Canada, the U.S., and Mexico are already involved in may aid (NORAD for instance) or hinder security cooperation initiatives.

Carrubba and Singh (2004) also speak to elite involvement in the context of the EU political elite’s desire to form a European common defense agreement. The model they test is based on three assumptions of the interplay between military security, economic security, and sovereignty and how that interplay impacts individual preferences to support an overarching goal (in their test case) of a EU common defense agreement. Their conclusions, speaking to elite influence, support the idea that if elites desire to create a European common defense it would be to their benefit to tout not only the proposed security agreement, but also any possible benefits from economic security. The sovereignty concern discussed above also emerged as important in their study (Carrubba and Singh 2004, 230). Military security, economic security, and sovereignty are all important factors in this study. While the U.S. wants increased security cooperation, Mexico and Canada seek to maintain trade (economic security) advances. Moreover, Mexico and Canada have sovereignty concerns. How much influence do elites have to overcome the effects of these factors as they strive to secure increased cooperation?
In recognizing the U.S. as the world’s lone superpower, one must realize that its actions will be scrutinized by the international community. Deeper Mexican or Canadian involvement in security cooperation with the U.S. may be seen by some as a reaction to coercive U.S. diplomacy. Many would question, as does Nunez (2002), the motives of the world’s only superpower or even a regional hegemon of which the U.S. is both. Nunez encourages the U.S. to take the lead in establishing a new security architecture in South America, but in a way that alleviates the international community’s concerns about superpower coercion.

Talbot (2003) explores the leader-follower relationship during coalition operations by looking at three case studies: The Gulf War, post Gulf War, and The Global War on Terrorism (Afghanistan). In each case, he focuses on the role the U.S. plays, as the hegemonic leader, in the coalition and how effective its leadership is in establishing a unified coalition via incentives, coercion, or a common ideational bond. In a similar vain as Talbot, Franko (2000, xvi) also encourages the U.S. to be careful in how it exercises leadership in Latin America. She concludes that “patient perseverance and respect for national sovereignty by the U.S. are keys to promoting permanent and sustainable security architecture in the region.” If not carefully orchestrated as a cooperative effort, world opinion could shout of superpower coercion and thus minimize the benefits of deeper security cooperation. Franko, Talbot, and Nunez all indicate that the outcome on cooperation stems from the attitude and role that the U.S. elite play during any
negotiation. The less overbearing and more cooperative the U.S. is, the more likely cooperation will increase at a more rapid pace.

In summary, we see where elite attitudes are both a hindrance and facilitator for affecting security cooperation. Regarding the creation and implementation of NAFTA, we see where both U.S. and Mexican elites strongly influenced and encouraged the creation of NAFTA in spite of strong government opposition and public opinion to the contrary—particularly in the United States. As discussed in the MERCOSUR and European Security Defense Policy literature, elite’s motives for entering into security and economic agreements are instrumental in determining the resulting effect on successful integration. Therefore, elite perceptions and susceptibility towards different factors shaping their opinions towards integration are crucial to the success of cooperation. Equally important is the impression that elite attitudes of the international community may have on security cooperation in a particular region. Superpower elites must be mindful of the international community’s perception as they pursue security agreements with less-developed or weaker countries. Understanding the elite perceptions and attitudes regarding the prevalent institutions in North American security cooperation plus the major factors they perceive as affecting North American cooperation will help policymakers better assess the future direction of security cooperation and make success more likely.

The literature has revealed many factors that sway elite attitudes and opinions as well as examples where elites can have a negative or positive affect
on cooperation. The resulting hypothesis, variables, and questions will focus on ascertaining the elite attitudes and opinions of those factors affecting North American security cooperation which is the focus of this study. Examples where elite influence has affected cooperation, in either a positive or negative way, will also be sought.

The main hypothesis for investigating this perspective states that elite attitudes towards integration can function as a hindrance and a facilitator of change. To test this hypothesis, one must first identify those factors deemed important to elites and then determine if the elite attitudes are a hindrance or facilitator of cooperation. A clarification of that leads to a more workable hypothesis: Elite attitudes and perceptions towards integration and integration factors can function as a hindrance and a facilitator of change. In order to contain the analysis, in most cases, the variables and associated questions have provided the participants with organizations important to this study, mainly NORAD and NORTHCOM, to try and characterize the attitudes and perceptions regarding these important North American security organizations. The way each factor is associated with elite attitudes is described below.

Country perceptions towards expanding NORAD

A country’s perception and attitude regarding the importance an expanded NORAD or other North American security agreement may have on North American security cooperation could hinder or facilitate cooperation. The perceptions and attitudes regarding NORAD expansion or North American
security cooperation in general will be a significant indicator of the types of perceptions and attitudes that must be overcome in order to see NORAD expanded functionally or regionally. The prevailing perceptions and attitudes may provide the ability to better assess the likelihood of NORAD expansion thus enabling policy makers to decide where and how much of their efforts should be channeled to NORAD expansion efforts or other North American security cooperation initiatives. This variable attempts to characterize attitudes and perceptions regarding NORAD expansion as a way of determining what attitudes and perceptions must be overcome or considered in future NORAD or North American security cooperation initiatives. The interview questions to test this factor were:

(a) Discuss the likelihood of NORAD expansion (both functionally and regionally) or other new security agreement and what factors affect that possibility.

(b) How important is it to each country’s and North America’s security posture to see NORAD expanded either regionally or functionally?

The first question is intended to allow the participants to express their opinions on not only the likelihood of NORAD expansion or any other security agreement but also on what they perceive the factors are that will affect NORAD expansion or North American security cooperation. Hence, the second part of this question (factors) provides for an array of responses. The second question attempts to determine opinions regarding a basic but important assumption of this
study; NORAD expansion is important to the future of North America’s security posture as well as each individual country’s security posture. If the answer is that NORAD expansion is not important, that would portend a different strategy for policymakers who desire to increase NORAD or North American security cooperation. If that were the case, then the U.S. would need to convince Mexico and Canada that NORAD or North American security expansion is important to their country. Conversely, an overwhelming positive response would help solidify a conceptual foundation for security cooperation by identifying those North American countries that think cooperative security and/or NORAD expansion is important for improving their country’s (and North America’s) security posture.

Country perceptions toward NORTHCOM

A major critique of NORAD is that it was not capable of handling the threats meted out from the 9/11 attacks. The accompanying assumption of this critique is that NORAD failed to anticipate the new threats and change accordingly to meet them. The creation of NORTHCOM, tied to NORAD, is perhaps the most significant post 9/11 change involving NORAD. Hence, attitudes and perceptions of its effectiveness to improve North American security cooperation are key in assessing the current and future prospects for North American security cooperation. In creating NORTHCOM and assigning North America as its area of responsibility, the U.S. has informed Mexico and Canada that NORTHCOM is the preferred U.S. military organization for them to work through on North American security issues. Therefore, the perceptions of
NORTHCOM’s effectiveness have a strong bearing on the short-term and long-term affect on North American security cooperation. The interview question to test this factor was: Has the establishment of NORTHCOM helped or hindered security cooperation between the three countries? This question attempts to gauge the different country’s perceptions about the effectiveness of one of the newest and most controversial organizations to North American security cooperation. The bureaucratic inertia perspective has already asserted that suspicions exist towards NORTHCOM. Consequently, an expectation here is that answers regarding NORTHCOM’s effectiveness will be lukewarm to negative. The answers to this question can also be looked on as a form of feedback to NORTHCOM and the U.S. DOD as they continue to promote NORTHCOM as the military organization most responsible for North American security.

Impact of the Military Technology Gap

Military capabilities not only affect the quality and extent of security cooperation, but also point to a country’s funding priority regarding defense spending. Inherent in the funding priority is an indirect tie to a country’s perception and attitude regarding their defense needs which is determined by the country elites. The assumption is that a technology gap exists between the world’s only superpower that spends billions on defense and Canada and Mexico that do not. It is important to assess how the technology gap affects the security cooperation initiatives. Does the technology hinder cooperation and if so, to what extent? Do policy makers make different decisions regarding security cooperation
as a result of capability deficiencies? How important is the fact that defense spending priorities in Mexico and Canada are far less than U.S. defense spending priorities (Quinlan 2001, 9, 54)? The interview question to test this variable was: How do military capabilities affect security cooperation? A country’s military capability and defense spending priority is an indicator of the importance put on their defense assets and by association, how that priority may affect North American security cooperation. This question will not attempt to quantify the gap or even prove it. Rather, it is identifying the perceptions of the impact of the gap on North American security cooperation.

Results

Country Perceptions Towards Expanding NORAD

Discuss the likelihood of NORAD expansion (both functionally and regionally) or other new security agreement and what factors affect that possibility. Many participants responded to this question with various factors. Overall, there were twelve American, three Canadian, and two Mexican responses for a total of seventeen responses producing nine different factors. The American responses provide an initial hierarchy of the factors’ importance by virtue of how many participants discussed it. Following is the American hierarchy:

(a) Unrealistic U.S. expectations toward Mexico

(b) Sovereignty concerns

(c) 9/11 inexperience

(d) Elite influence
(e) Border issues

(f) Speculation on why the Mexican Army does not cooperate

(g) Trust

(h) Military-military cooperation

(i) The need for a new continental organization

The Canadian responses added two more views to the sovereignty concerns, two to the 9/11 inexperience and one each to border issues and trust. The Mexican responses added two views to sovereignty, and one view each to elite influence and border issues. By aggregating the responses, the following hierarchy results:

(a) Sovereignty concerns (15 responses)

(b) 9/11 inexperience (7 responses)

(c) Elite influence (7 responses)

(d) Unrealistic U.S. expectations towards Mexico (6 responses)

(e) Border issues (6 responses)

(f) Speculation on why the Mexican Army does not cooperate (4 responses)

(g) Trust

(h) Military-military cooperation

(i) The need for a new continental organization
Only the first six factors are discussed due to the larger number of responses for these factors. After the first six, the remaining three topics had just one response each. The six factors will be discussed in the order given above.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{American Views: Sovereignty}

Eleven Americans felt sovereignty was an important factor affecting security cooperation. Overall, they felt that Canada and Mexico maintaining their sovereignty in the face of U.S. pressure to cooperate is important. This view stretched across military and civilian participants. All who discussed sovereignty issues essentially defined sovereignty in the same way—as a definition provided by a Canadian participant it: “preserves the freedom of independent choices to provide for defense and internal order of affairs without interference by another country.” This is the definition that characterizes the following discussion.

To begin, an ambassador stated “Mexico has a sovereignty issue. They also have a rivalry with Anglo-America—that relationship will always have these concerns.” A civilian noted “national identity and sovereignty concerns [exist] in all states.” Another civilian asks and answers his own rhetorical question:

\begin{quote}
Why does Mexico act sometimes not in its own interests? Stubborn, [Mexico] will not subordinate itself to the U.S. in security . . . [the U.S.] needs something that helps understand Mexico’s motives and decisions.
\end{quote}

Another civilian stated “Mexican politicians maintain an anti-American stance . . . [the] sovereignty issue is exponentially worse in Mexico than compared to the rest

\textsuperscript{64} The remaining four items each had one participant mention it. Further, most of those mentioning the remaining four items had already mentioned one of the top six as more important.

198
of Latin America.” Still another civilian noted how NORTHCOM’s role is misunderstood in Mexico: “. . . [there is] incorrect information circulating in Mexico on the role of NORTHCOM. [They think it] threatens Mexican sovereignty.” Two more civilians noted that the idea of an expanded NORAD creates sovereignty concerns for both Mexico and Canada.

However, a counterview is provided by a diplomat who cited a recent survey indicating that the Mexican public may be willing to put aside sovereignty concerns for advancements in combating terrorism—a high concern for both Mexico and the United States.65

An officer expressed dismay over Mexico’s sovereignty concerns lamenting that the Mexicans need to “get over” the past just as the U.S. has “gotten over” its losing the Vietnam War. Another officer laments the fact that in a 50-year old agreement (NORAD) the Canadians still insist on inserting “a line about maintaining its sovereignty” as if they are afraid that without this disclaimer, the U.S. will somehow infringe on Canada’s sovereignty. A more reasoned observation comes from an academician who noted “to lose a war is one thing, but to lose territory is another.”

As with Mexico, some see NORAD expansion as having possible impacts on Canadian sovereignty. Dwight Mason, writing for the Woodrow Wilson Center notes that NORAD expansion

65 The report notes that 63% of Mexicans support permitting American agents to work with Mexican agents in guarding Mexico’s airports and 87% favor increased entry and exit requirements for people entering Mexico from other countries (Global Views 2004; CFR 2005, 28).
. . . itself also raises questions of sovereignty, independence, and national identity, which are always highly sensitive for Canadian governments.” (WWC 2005B, 8)

Mason further writes:

In Canada, the political problem [regarding NORAD expansion] is sovereignty. Some Canadians believe that an expansion of NORAD will compromise Canadian sovereignty.” (WWC 2005B, 3)

The thinking is that if NORAD expands then Canada will lose some of its sovereignty as the U.S. gains more control over Canadian forces and/or has more freedom to traverse Canadian territory. Mason notes that the “wish” on the part of some to limit NORAD is “misguided since the trend in bilateral relations is towards deeper integration and is probably irreversible” (WWC 2005B, 4).

Arguing for NORAD expansion, Mason notes that

. . . neither country assigns forces to NORAD permanently. An expanded NORAD would similarly further strengthen Canadian sovereignty by augmenting Canada’s ability to control its maritime approaches.” (WWC 2005B, 4)

Additionally, Mason quotes Lieutenant General Macdonald, former Vice Chief of the Canadian Defence [sic] Staff when he testified before the Canadian Senate’s Standing Committee on National Security and Defence [sic] in May 2002. He testified “NORAD helps preserve Canadian sovereignty” and discussed several aspects:

(a) Joint consultation mechanism;

(b) Regional structure respecting boundaries;

(c) Access to U.S. senior national security officials;
American Views: The 9/11 Inexperience

Another factor influencing cooperation is what the researcher has dubbed the “9/11 Inexperience.” This stems from an assumption embedded in a rhetorical question that five participants asked. The question is: “Do Mexico and Canada need their own 9/11 to get them to recognize they need a security agreement with the United States?” The assumption is that in light of the new threats, it is in Mexico’s and Canada’s best interest to enter into deeper security agreements with the United States. The thinking is because of 9/11, Americans have recognized the new threat but Mexico and Canada have not yet recognized the threat because they have not had a 9/11 experience and do not buy-in to U.S. concerns.

A NORTHCOM civilian asked “Does Mexico need a 9/11 to get it to recognize it needs a security agreement with the United States?” A State Department diplomat offered “Heaven forbid, a wake up call like our 9/11 . . . [or a] Spring Break terrorist attack on U.S. students in Mexico . . . Mexico wants our tourism, retirees, etc.” Another diplomat answered:

U.S. psyche is a loss of innocence in dealing with the world as a result of 9/11. The Mexicans and Canadians don’t have it because they haven’t had a 9/11 . . . security personnel in both Canada and Mexico get it that there are security threats that must be countered, but the [lack of] money and public opinion . . . don’t get it yet.
An officer noted:

Mexicans and Canadians don’t see themselves as the target; they see the U.S. as a target . . . public opinion . . . not a target until an attack happens—this is where Canada and Mexico are at.

Finally, an officer at the Bi-National Planning Group stated:

Canada hasn’t had their 9/11, neither has Mexico, although they do feel the impact—the closed borders following 9/11 and the impact on commerce . . . necessity can give a big boost to cooperation.

_Please note:_

*66 Since this interview, the Canadian government has seen a shift in its power base moving from a liberal government to one that is more conservative and perhaps more sympathetic to the U.S. President’s policies. Hence, perhaps at this current time, this point is no longer valid or may be changing.*

**American Views: Elite Influence**

The five American responses were strongly in agreement that elite influence or interest in cooperation was a big factor influencing security cooperation. When combining responses from all demographic groups, elite influence was second to the expectations discussed above by only one less response.

A Department of Homeland Security civilian talked of elite influence:

The White House is moving towards harmonization of North American security. It is realizing that it is more important to have North American security. It is good to have civilian cooperation. We are lacking maritime cooperation but it is getting better between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard and the Mexican Navy.

An academician expert on Canadian affairs shared:

The very top of the governments have a disconnect [PM-President]. The relationship has been pushed beyond reason to an emotional point.66 People at the lowest levels don’t understand the
policy issues or policy reasons that are behind the tasks they are asked to do. They lack the knowledge to make common sense out of the policy implementation directives, hence, at the lowest levels, inefficiency remains.

Another diplomat focused his remarks on elite influence but more so how they may have been affected by the economic factor. He noted that between Canada and the U.S, at the elite level, there is a

\[\ldots\] strong desire for the senior officials to cooperate and this certainly because of the economic advances\(^6\) \ldots\] key extraneous external influence is business/commercial. 9/11 wound up this community and in particular, Canada’s council of chief executives [similar to a lobbying group] that represents an association of export manufacturers.

An officer provided another fairly blunt answer to this question when he answered “No” to NORAD expansion but offered “relations are improving.” He is a firm believer in the influence of elites on cooperation noting that “[Presidents] Fox and Bush have to push the initiatives \ldots need to start there.” The final participant who focused on elite influence was an officer as well, noting elite’s tie to public opinion:

Elites still have to answer to the people. The President is building a case, [and he] has to build a case \ldots Joe Q. Public needs to know the economic impact. Public opinion is tied to economic reasons. Issue importance…when they [issues and elite interests] line up, its easy, but when they do not line up, it is more difficult.

---

\(^6\) He provided rough figures to back up his assertion: 80% of Canada’s trade is with the U.S. and this trade accounts for 40% of the Canadian gross national product. Also, 25% of exports from the U.S. go to Canada and 25% was due to industry.
His perspective on when issues and elite interests line up is perhaps inspired by the fact that he is currently working on the Security and Prosperity Partnership which does have current elite backing and he may be experiencing the “easier” road right now.

*American Views: Unrealistic Expectations*

Six participants expressed concern over unrealistic U.S. expectations regarding Mexico’s cooperation. All six American participants and one Mexican participant feel that either the U.S. is not clearly communicating its expectations to Mexico or the expectations are unrealistic. No one mentioned concerns regarding U.S. expectations towards Canada.

When referencing expectations, a diplomat noted that Canada and the U.S. have at least 1,100 formal agreements with 600 military-related agreements. Mexico and the U.S., she noted, have just one military-related agreement—a health reciprocal agreement where soldiers from both countries can get health treatment by the other side. She also stated:

> The U.S. needs to manage the pace and go slow with Mexico . . . don’t be looking for that one time when we can open the floodgates of security cooperation . . . [we] need to be patient.

However, research revealed another agreement between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Mexican Navy signed in 1989, which lends doubt that there is only one military-related agreement between Mexico and the United States. Nevertheless, her point is well taken. Undoubtedly, there are many more Canada-U.S. than Mexico-U.S. agreements. As a U.S. officer noted, there are “lots of regional and
sub regional plans that exist, however none are defense or military related.” These plans could be a point of departure to create better cooperation in the military-to-military domain.

Still another civilian provided historical context to the view about unrealistic U.S. expectations towards Mexico:

In 1996, a U.S. military member could not even talk to anyone in the Mexican military. MARINA\textsuperscript{68} is participating—MARINA didn’t participate in 1996—now they do. U.S.-Mexico cooperation has taken quantum leaps. The U.S. must take little steps regarding cooperation initiatives and needs to change its frame of mind to adjust to a different reality of what is actually possible.

He suggests the expectations for what can be achieved in U.S.-Mexico cooperation are too grand for now and should be scaled back. A diplomat is also concerned about U.S. expectations. She stated that the U.S. “should not try to get agreements with Mexico” characterizing those agreements to avoid as “large agreements like NORAD.” Another diplomat stated "improvement has been good, but perhaps [U.S.] expectations are too high.” An ambassador stated what a Mexican participant stated below regarding the poor job the U.S. has done communicating its objectives to Mexico: “The U.S. is not clear with its geo-strategy and objectives to the world.”

\textsuperscript{68} “Marina” is Spanish for “Navy” and this is how many U.S. participants referred to the Mexican Navy.
American Views: Border Issues

Responses regarding the border and border issues as an important factor to cooperation once again were spread across the American and Canadian groups. Although fifth in importance, it still had four American responses. When coupled with the border concerns discussed in chapter two, this makes border issues a significant finding of this project.

A diplomat discussed the border in her answers noting that there is . . . a competitiveness at the border—a need to streamline the free-flow of trade. Canada is easier to work with because of the established economic, trade, and industry infrastructures that have been in existence for decades. Mexico has a different view that is more political and hence, the U.S. could not assume that the priorities with Mexico could be the same as they are more likely to be with Canada.

A NORAD civilian focused her remarks on NORAD and border issues:

[NORAD is] a hi-tech creature, binational, has theater missile defense issues and is concerned with theater security cooperation. There may be new ways of working with Mexico lurking out there but we don’t know about them because we are involved in them right now. The U.S. sees the border as a security issue while the Mexicans see it as an economic and social issue—but they [Mexico] don’t buy into it at all. The prism is so different looking at the border.

An ambassador described the border perceptions in terms of a wall:

The Canadians perceive the border as having no wall there and want to ensure no wall is raised up. The Mexicans perceive the border as having a wall already there and they want to bring it down.

He further posited that the Mexican perception of the wall is due primarily to immigration issues and continues to prevent true access to U.S. markets
for Mexican goods. Consequently, the Mexicans desire to bring the wall down and if cooperating with the U.S. in security-related areas will help, then they will do that. He concluded by offering viewpoints on all three countries:

The U.S. needs to really build up the mutual trust with the Mexican military. Canada and the U.S. are talking past each other. Canada is passive aggressive in their diplomacy; Mexico is active aggressive [they push back].

An academician focused on the border noting that while Mexican infrastructure is lacking, as compared to Canada, Mexico’s attitude towards the U.S. is that they “feel the Americans will develop continental security regardless of what they do so why should they worry about participating?” While acknowledging the Smart Border agreements, he played down the influence of 9/11 on their creation: “The Smart Border agreements were already in the pipeline prior to 9/11.” Finally, he notes that the Canadians and Mexicans want the border open for economic reasons while the U.S. is more concerned about border security.

American Views: Speculations on the Mexican Army

The final factor regards speculation as to why the Mexican Army is perceived by the U.S. as not eager to cooperate. This perception is fueled by the fact that, as discussed earlier, the Mexican Navy does cooperate. In chapter two, one speculation was already discussed—that of the Mexican Army being afraid that if they do participate, then their supposed ineptness will be revealed. In the
responses here, we see a concern over the Mexican Army’s non-participation but no new speculations.

Regarding cooperation by the Mexican Army, a civilian asked “What is in it for them?” In answering his own question, he noted that for the Mexican Army, “life is good…does the Mexican Secretary of National Defense (SEDENA) need to cooperate with the U.S. in North American security initiatives to appease his civilian leadership?” As noted in chapter one, the Mexican Constitution and associated foreign policy limits the military’s participation in operations outside the scope of Mexico’s borders due to its non-intervention policy. Undoubtedly this has a bearing on this question and factor raised here.

A NORTHCOM civilian asked “Who does Mexico participate with any way? Do they even participate in hemispheric defense?” While detailed answers to these questions may shed light on this speculation, the presumed answer is that Mexico does not militarily participate or cooperate with anyone very much. If the Mexican government is pleased with the effort of the Mexican Army within the context of its direction, mission, and doctrine; then why should the Mexican Army worry about pleasing the Americans?

An ambassador posited:

Mexico doesn’t want to be seen as lackeys of the U.S. so they don’t have federal troops on the border . . . they feel in doing this, the perception would be that they are doing what the U.S. wants them to do. Mexico’s motivations are primordial and regard its national security. Labor mobility is part of Mexican national security . . . they need to be able to allow legal migration as part of their security.
Finally, an academician noted a positive issue regarding Canadian-U.S. military cooperation:

The Military has more cooperation than civilians because the military likes each other. Institutionally, NORAD was already there, since 1958, so [the] military has a long practice of working together. The Canadians do realize that [through NORAD] they are defending North America. The U.S. military may not see it that way.

Canadian Views: Sovereignty

Generally speaking, the Canadians were open to the idea of NORAD functional expansion, but not regional expansion. The Canadian concern towards regional expansion is discussed in more detail below in question three.

Two of the five Canadians discussed sovereignty. An officer acknowledged the sovereignty issue and his agreement with Mason’s ideas indicating that NORAD was key in protecting Canadian sovereignty by institutionalizing deeper security agreements which included roles and responsibilities of command and control of forces and rules of engagement for traversing airspace and other domains.

While sovereignty is still precious to the Canadians, they recognize the possibility of a U.S. breach on Canadian sovereignty as a perception, not reality . . . [Canada] cannot afford not to have a collective security agreement to protect sovereignty. Canadians believe in institutions like the UN/NATO/NORAD—we have a difficult time with the “coalition of the willing”—this doesn’t sit well with Canada.

The last statement communicates an important aspect of Canada’s world view. They do not like the coalition of the willing because it is not a
coalition that has been officially sanctioned by a legitimate international organization like the UN, NATO, or NORAD. In Canada, there exists a strong cooperative and institutional aspect to what they do and what policies they adopt.

The diplomat feels similarly regarding sovereignty and also indicated he feels the chances are good for NORAD functional expansion:

Yes, sovereignty is still an issue for Canadians . . . [and] NORAD resolved a lot of sovereignty issues around the border. [The chances for NORAD expansion are] very good . . . both sides are going into the talks with an openness towards other domains. Maritime is the next logical area, air is robust, surveillance warning attack assessment is good.

Canadian Views: 9/11 Inexperience

Two officers discussed how Canada has not experienced its own 9/11 and presumably lacks a deeper understanding of the threats. One of the officers, in answering the question about the impact of 9/11 on security cooperation, stated “Canada has not experienced a 9/11” and then noted that prior to 9/11, NORAD was growing apathetic and the need for NORAD was being questioned. After 9/11, he noted that “NORAD developed a new focus. Nine-eleven led Canada, for the first time, to look at some of its infrastructure [power grids, sewer, roads, etc] as possible targets.” Another officer said that 9/11 “hasn’t really changed Canadian thinking of threats.” but Canada recognizes that the “world has changed.”
An officer provided the only positive response regarding NORAD regional expansion when he answered “there is a real possibility that Mexico could participate in the maritime domain . . . need to be in the next generation of memorandum of understanding documentation though.” Then he provided some remarks on the importance of an open border in regards to facilitating trade, and also touched on the immigration issue.

Canada is the largest supplier of energy to the U.S. [provides 90% of natural gas U.S. imports]. Canada is the biggest trade partner with those states [300 thousand people cross border both ways every day]. None of the 9/11 terrorists entered the U.S. through Canada—all came in under the U.S. immigration auspices. An impediment right now is the U.S. does not allow an airplane to fly into U.S. airspace if it has just one person on board who is not allowed in U.S.

An officer assigned to the Bi-National Planning Group thinks the chance of NORAD expansion is “functionally, probably strong; regionally, less likely” citing the differing levels of trust and understanding between the U.S.-Canadian vice the U.S.-Mexican armies to back up his observation. He mildly elaborated: “The trust is there [SPP/NAFTA] but there are other issues to deal with. NORAD would accept expansion . . . it grows prestige, and brings new resources . . . but expansion won’t be easy.” Finally, another officer thinks that functional expansion is likely but not regional:

Not a lot of land activity, most is shipping, maritime and air. Closer defense with Mexico breeds economic agreement. Expand regionally?—not really on the table for renewal next year
[NORAD renewal]. Maritime probably will expand—maybe a stand-alone organization.

*Mexican Views*

Both Mexicans identified sovereignty as a factor. The officer answered

“The issue is sovereignty, a state is a state.” The Mexican civilian tied sovereignty concerns to the unrealistic U.S. expectations.

There is a lack of clarity on the [U.S.] objectives . . . Mexico does not know what the U.S. wants [from Mexico] in security cooperation. It is not clear to Mexico how they can address the security concerns of the United States. The Government of Mexico understands they have to do more in terms of security cooperation, but there is not a clear indication of how far the U.S. wants to go.

There is an obvious indication here that the U.S. needs to better communicate how it would like Mexico to cooperate. In so doing, Mexico could then better exercise its sovereignty by determining what it is willing to do in security cooperation. He concluded his discussion on sovereignty when he ominously stated: “Sovereignty issues still reign in Mexico and there is no effort to change that attitude.”

This should not be a surprise as Mexico’s historical legacy of distrust towards the U.S. would certainly lead to sovereignty concerns. Indeed, a recent study demonstrated the fierce independence that Mexicans have; noting that 89% of Mexicans surveyed felt Mexico should have a “generally independent foreign policy rather than follow the U.S. lead” (Global Views 2004; CFR 2005, 12, 20, 27).
The officer focused his remaining remarks on the influence of the civilian government oversight. “If [the Mexican] Congress says no [to cooperation] it is because they don’t want involvement in an exercise that goes beyond the maritime frontiers.” The military will follow the orders of the civilians appointed over them. If the Mexican Congress can be persuaded to direct deeper cooperation, then it seems likely that the Army and Navy would respond in kind. He also discussed the differences in the Smart Border agreements between Canada and Mexico.

The civilian discussed how existing infrastructure impacted the Smart Border agreements.\(^6\) Then, without prompting, he tackled the perception that the Mexican Army does not want to participate.

Some criticism exists against Mexico for not moving as fast [on the border] but again, the infrastructure is weak and [the] perception [is that] perhaps [the Army] is unwilling to enter into security cooperation.

He clarifies that there is not an overt unwillingness, but rather, the weak infrastructure does not allow the Mexican Army to cooperate more frequently and deeply. He noted that the differences are due to the existing infrastructure in place in Canada that does not exist in Mexico. (e.g. he noted that U.S. immigration officers work on Canadian soil but not on Mexican soil in support of his point)

Canada could do more at the border post 9/11 because of the existing infrastructure brought about by decades of economic

\(^6\) Careful analysis of the two separate plans demonstrates this point. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/usmborder/22points.html. 
agreements [since 1962]. Canada could react faster than Mexico. U.S. Customs officers have been in Canada since the 1980s, none in Mexico even now. Mexico did not have this infrastructure in place . . . the thirty points [Smart Border agreement] with Canada are detailed because the existing infrastructure allows them to be. The twenty-two points with Mexico are vague, have no teeth because the existing infrastructure does not allow detailed points—they must be vague by necessity. Canada’s are specific, focused on who is doing what. Mexico’s are not that specific, does [sic] not detail who is doing what. It takes time to build infrastructure. Nine-eleven put the infrastructure to a test in both countries and this test led to the Smart Border agreements.

Question One Summary

This question sought perceptions on two issues: (a) the likelihood of NORAD expansion and (b) which factors were the most important affecting NORAD expansion. The answers to this question helped evaluate the first variable which looks for perceptions and attitudes regarding NORAD expansion.

The responses from all participants provided nine separate factors and a consensus that NORAD functional expansion was likely but not regional expansion. This conclusion is also supported by data from question three below. Fifteen participants offered sovereignty as the most important factor. Seven identified the 9/11 Inexperience and elite influence as the next two factors. Six offered unrealistic U.S. expectations towards Mexico and border issues as the next two factors. Speculation on the Mexican Army’s lack of cooperation was the next factor with four responses. The remaining factors each had one participant regard it as important.
It is logical to conclude that Mexico’s sovereignty concerns are not going away. Further, it can be strongly suggested that U.S. policy makers should not seek to lessen or eschew Mexico’s sovereignty concerns but rather, register the concern as something that exists and factor it into future policy decisions.

Additionally, U.S. policy makers can be frustrated with the Canadian’s need to insert sovereignty disclaimers in a 50-year old agreement, but this speaks loudly about Canadian perceptions and concerns—especially after decades of cooperative, friendly relations. Moreover, like Mexico, Canada’s sovereignty concern is not something that will go away. Consequently, U.S. policy makers must learn to accept it. Regarding Canada’s sovereignty concerns, there seems to be a mild trend of concurrence as well between the public perception and elite attitude to protect its sovereignty. However, when NORAD expansion or NORAD’s importance to Canada-U.S. relations enters the discussion, this quickly turns into a disconnect between Canada’s public and elite. Further disconnects are seen in Mexico regarding its sovereignty. The elites continue to fiercely guard it yet; a recent survey noted that the public is open to giving up some sovereignty in return for more cooperative agreements with the United States.

To assume that Mexico and Canada need a 9/11 experience in order to help them realize the new threat to North America has to mean that for now, they do not recognize it as something important. As discussed above, more than a few participants believe this. However, survey data revealed a disconnect when looking at Mexican and U.S. public perceptions.
First, the Americans and Mexicans both see international terrorism and chemical and biological weapons as very critical threats (Global Views 2004, 9, 15). In fact, Mexican percentages were higher than U.S. percentages in these two categories with percentages indicating how many of the survey respondents felt these were “critical threats to vital interests.”

- International terrorism (U.S.—75%, Mexico—81%) (GV 15)
- Chemical and biological weapons (U.S.—66%, Mexico—86%) (GV 15)

These two items were the top priorities in the U.S. survey and ranked third and fourth in the Mexican survey. However, it is interesting to note the higher percentages of Mexicans who thought these two items were critical threats when compared to the American percentages. Second, strong pluralities from both countries favor sending troops outside of country to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. This second point was a highly significant finding in the survey since Mexico has only joined a peacekeeping mission once as part of the police force to El Salvador from 1992-95 (Global Views 2004, 23). It would also help debunk the myth of the Mexican Army not wanting to engage in multilateral operations for fear of revealing its supposed ineptness—a perception also discussed above. Third, 63% of the Mexicans surveyed would support a number of cooperative measures to combat international terrorism to include allowing U.S. agents on Mexican soil which indicates a willingness to give up some of the sovereignty concerns (Global Views 2004, 28). This survey provides compelling evidence that counters the 9/11 Inexperience shared by some of the participants in
this study. Nevertheless, it is the perceptions of these participants who have a say in North American security cooperation and the perceptions do affect cooperation.

There are three important things to consider regarding the responses to this question. First, the question was purposely worded so participants would provide responses regarding what they felt were the most important factors affecting NORAD expansion and North American security cooperation. Second, in a qualitative study, the sheer number of responses for a particular item is not necessarily indicative of the most important factor. Given the threads witnessed through the three countries’ participants and the number of participants who discussed the top six factors, we find credible support for these being the most important to NORAD expansion. Third, coupled with similar viewpoints in other questions of this study, we begin to see some general themes on what issues and factors are the most important affecting security cooperation in North America.

In summary, this question helped evaluate the first variable which sought evidence of perceptions and attitudes regarding the importance of an expanded NORAD or other security cooperation agreement. Clearly, the data show support for NORAD functional expansion but not regional expansion. Interesting to note is that NORAD did expand functionally into the maritime realm in the recent May 2006 renewal.

Regarding the impact on NORAD expansion, the six primary factors discussed in this section all affect security cooperation to some extent. Further, they can be divided into those that will or can have a significant impact on
NORAD expansion and those that most likely will not. The factors regarding the speculation on the Mexican Army’s lack of cooperation, U.S. expectations towards Mexico, and sovereignty concerns are likely to have a more direct impact on NORAD expansion than the remaining issues. Border concerns, the 9/11 inexperience, and elite influence seem to be out of the realm of directly impacting NORAD expansion. This division helps identify those factors that most likely have a direct impact on NORAD expansion out of the entire group of factors affecting cooperation. In conclusion, there is strong support for variable one with many factors affecting cooperation and a general agreement regarding the likelihood of NORAD functional expansion but not regional expansion.

How important is it to each country’s and North America’s security posture to see NORAD expanded either regionally or functionally?

My intuition is that we need to take NORAD to the next level. For sure, we need to include some kind of maritime piece and probably some kind of civil support (General Ralph Eberhardt, then NORTHCOM and NORAD/Commander, Feb 2004).

This assembly believes that it is not simply renewing NORAD in 2006 and adding a missile defense role that suffices. Rather, Ottawa and Washington need to consider whether NORAD’s mandate should be expanded to include responsibilities for the joint maritime defense of our continent and for responding to trans-border emergencies such as a terrorist attack and natural disasters. The future of NORAD may be influenced by the establishment of NORTHCOM and the Bi-National Planning Group.” (WWC 2005A, 1-11)

This question is similar to the previous one. While the previous question sought factors that the participants deemed important to NORAD expansion, this question sought participant’s perceptions on how important NORAD expansion
was to North American security cooperation. There were seven American, five Canadian and one Mexican response for a total of thirteen. In the seven American responses, participants in some cases answered the question of NORAD’s importance with a simple yes or no. In other cases, the participants used the question as a springboard to discuss issues surrounding NORAD expansion. The five Canadians revealed a trend that they are somewhat protective of NORAD. The one Mexican response was negative towards NORAD expansion. A significant trend came from participants of all three countries who generally rejected the notion of NORAD regional expansion but were more open to functional expansion, just as we found in the first question.

American Views

The overwhelming American perception is that NORAD regional expansion is very unlikely and functional expansion somewhat likely. A diplomat flatly stated that Mexico in NORAD is a “non-starter on the Hill [U.S. Congress].” A NORTHCOM civilian did not answer the question but rhetorically asked what the benefit is for both Mexico and the U.S. to have Mexico as a member of NORAD.

What can Mexico really offer NORAD? There is a big disparity in capabilities between Mexico and the U.S. Why would Mexico want to join NORAD? Mexico sees the U.S. as only a threat…there are cultural differences. What’s in it for the U.S. or Mexico? Mexico has a non-interventionist philosophy written in its constitution. This would be hard to change and [presumably] necessary for Mexico to be part of NORAD. Regardless, the non-interventionist policy is solidly in its military doctrine . . . Article
89 of the Mexican Constitution says Mexico needs senate approval to send troops out of country.

Another NORTHCOM civilian answered this question by discussing what he feels the “real” problem is—immigration.

Immigration problem—different perspectives; Mexico-U.S. . . . for the U.S. the policies affect all immigrants . . . the U.S. “TV nation” [public] thinks it is just the Mexicans. It is all linked to the economy. Mexican economy is not thriving . . . part of the [SPP] agreement is distribution of wealth but we need to minimize risk in the mean time.

A civilian expert on Canadian affairs tied the answer to sovereignty concerns.

Yes, NORAD expansion is very important . . . Canada will do what is in its own self-interests. Canada’s public opinion is very distrustful of the U.S. military and NORAD . . . [They see] NORTHCOM as a plot to take over Canada. Mexico is hard to see—historical, perpetual bad feelings towards the United States. There may be a generation to go before serious cooperation can be witnessed. However, the military is very keen on NORAD and both countries militaries, having worked together in NORAD for decades, have better relations than the civilians do.

An Academician was adamant over the non-prospect of Mexico joining NORAD citing mostly the historical influence and cultural differences between Mexico, U.S., and Canada as hindrances. He stated “Mexico does not want to be part of NORAD.” Another expressed his misgivings at the SOUTHCOM conference and even offered an alternative solution.

Mexico is not working well with NORTHCOM because of a subordination issue to a military organization. We should use Mexico as a hub; give them the clout they want. NORAD should just be Canada and Mexico—one regional command in charge of whole region.
Shifting to the military participants, one officer posited “NORAD expansion is a good idea but the legacy of Canada-U.S. relations and the Cold War mission is limiting.” Another officer implied that NORAD and its continental defense mission is not the avenue to achieve cooperation with Mexico. He noted “NORAD is robust, but, has nothing [to do] with Mexico.” A military expert on Canada felt NORAD expansion is important but public opinion may not agree with their government’s position. Her answer also hints at the 9/11 inexperience.

NORAD expansion was extremely important but the public opinion from both Canada and the U.S. may not agree. The Canadian public thinks that Canada is not as prone to the same level and kinds of threats that the U.S. faces.

She then offered possible explanations for this concluding that NORAD expansion is important to the governments but probably not important to the public for various reasons.

Canada did not engage in Iraq. Canadians may believe that policy divergences distinguish them as being independent from the United States. Canadians insist on a "multilateral shield" before strategic engagement. The idea of an expanded NORAD may be important to the Canadian Government, but it is not imperative to the average Canadian, although NORAD as a status quo is. The U.S. public probably does not view NORAD with the same esteem that the Canadian Public and Government do. While the Canadian Government repeatedly states that NORAD is the cornerstone of our relationship, the average Joe in the U.S. would most likely not list NORAD very high as an important military relationship. In the U.S., Canada's popularity as an ally is waning and together with Canada’s association with NORAD may lessen NORAD’s importance. U.S. citizens tend to view their military in a larger global context thus minimizing NORAD’s domestic role in their minds. Recent homeland defense and security initiatives post 9/11, Katrina notwithstanding, have involved NORTHCOM or the
Department of Homeland Security, not NORAD. NORAD has been around for so long that the U.S. public takes it for granted.”

Finally, she concluded:

Policymakers in Ottawa and Washington know it is important to enhance the relationship, but if we somehow ended up with only marginal improvements to NORAD during the May 2006 renewal, then outside of the Canadian Government, I’d bet only a few academicians would complain. But, the Canadians don’t want NORAD diminished and they worry about what the NORAD of the future may look like more so than the Americans.

**Canadian Views**

This question provoked perhaps the strongest response from the Canadian contingents. All five Canadians had strong views on the question of NORAD expansion—especially regional expansion. In their responses, one will note an air of protectionism towards NORAD. Beginning with the officers, one used the question as a stepping stone to laud the exploits of NORAD. He noted:

NORAD is already institutionalized. The Bi-National Planning Group made sense [implying perhaps NORTHCOM did not make as much sense?]. NORAD’s strength is in its structure and ability to adapt and evolve to threats over time. NORAD was focused external [pre-9/11]. Was it NORAD’s fault not to focus internal? Who was responsible for looking at internal threats?

This same officer stated:

NORAD renders the 49th parallel irrelevant. The Deputy Commander in Chief of NORAD is a Canadian officer—[he] actually runs NORAD’s operations due to the tri-hatted responsibilities of the NORAD Commander.

Another officer stated bluntly that he “doesn’t see the U.S. wanting Mexico [in NORAD] . . . has trouble imagining Mexican cooperation” and
questions where Mexico would fit into NORAD’s established command and control structure as an equal partner. Two of the four officers noted that operationally, the NORAD command and control construct was “validated during 9/11. Procedures were in place for its mission of looking externally for threats.” The problem was not that NORAD was short-sighted in its vision but rather, the civilian leadership had mandated the external view and NORAD, following orders, could not focus internally. When the internal threat emerged, NORAD was quick to adapt to the new threat. Still a third officer feels the possibility of NORAD expanding functionally is “probably strong but it won’t be easy” citing NORAD’s challenge from inertia over the last 46 years of being a supported organization and needing to transform to a supporting organization.

NORAD is currently supported by a civilian organization—the FAA. In a new maritime domain, the civilian agencies would most likely have the lead (Drug Enforcement Administration/Coast Guard most likely) and NORAD would be supporting them probably in the area of surveillance, warning, and intelligence. He concluded that maritime expansion will most likely not expand at this time lending more negativity to this issue. He feels that . . . it is in the best interest of Canada and North America. But the most important area is in intelligence and information sharing, warning assessments. Less important is the issue of who is flying the aircraft and shooting down threats or patrolling skies or who is driving the ships and making the arrests. Mexico does have a piece in the information sharing realm—lots of intelligence comes from civilian agencies. [He is] aware of more dialogue between the Mexican and U.S. Navy . . . but doesn’t have a lot of details.”
The last officer thought NORAD expansion was a “real possibility” noting that “maritime will probably expand” but it would expand into a stand-alone organization. He noted that this would have to be documented in the next generation of NORAD’s Memorandum of Understanding which as of January 2006 had not been scheduled for an update. This view is also supported by the Canadian diplomat who discussed the legacy of the aerospace mission as something that needs to be overcome to allow expansion. He also defended NORAD’s performance during 9/11. He shared that there were already rules of engagement that surround the issue of who can shoot down an aircraft deemed a threat to NORAD’s area of responsibility. He too talked about NORAD minimizing border issues: “Alaska-Canada-U.S. virtually has no borders.” The diplomat affirmed NORAD’s importance: “Yes, absolutely. NORAD—strong attachment—great success, very beneficial, sharing continental defense—this is a mutual feeling between the two countries.”

*Mexican Views*

The Mexican officer responded to this question and added to the litany of dissenting views regarding regional expansion:

Don’t see it [North American Security] . . . [he does see] National security then regional security, but not North American Security . . . for Mexico to be involved in NORAD, discussions would have to take place first in Congress and the Executive branch and further, Mexico would have to be invited to join, Mexico would not ask to join. The Mexican Navy is already cooperating with NORTHCOM, the Mexican Congress and President would have to be involved in the NORAD decision but Mexico would not ask to be part of NORAD.
Question Two Summary

This question sought perceptions regarding the importance of NORAD expansion to North American security cooperation. Responses to this question helped evaluate the first variable. The data revealed that generally speaking, participants from all three countries see NORAD regional expansion as unlikely. However, functional expansion, within the context of Canada and U.S. maritime cooperation, is looked on favorably and indeed, the recent NORAD agreement renewed in May of 2006 did expand NORAD’s role into the maritime domain.

The U.S. participants were blunt in their pragmatic negativity towards NORAD regional expansion citing cultural and historical issues as the main hindrance. However, when looking at maritime expansion within the current Canada-U.S. NORAD context, the same individuals thought there was more of a chance.

The data revealed strong Canadian support for NORAD’s status quo and a healthy skepticism regarding Mexico’s involvement in NORAD. The Canadian’s skepticism of NORAD regional expansion seems more emotional when compared to the American responses. They pointed to the mechanisms and rules of engagement already in place that allowed NORAD to respond as it did—to an internal threat it was not mandated to look for—during the 9/11 crisis. The implication is that one country’s military could shoot down an aircraft that
contains civilians from the other country.\footnote{The actual ROEs for this are classified, so the researcher can only surmise what they might be. However, the point remains that in support of security cooperation, having these ROEs already established between two countries is significant.} If this is true, it demonstrates a deep level of understanding and commitment to security cooperation. The Mexican participant noted that he had a hard time envisioning Mexico’s involvement in NORAD and quickly noted the issue is one that the Mexican government would first have to discuss before the military could do anything.

A conclusion drawn from this question is that overall; perceptions from all three countries towards NORAD expansion to include Mexico are negative. Maritime expansion within the current Canada-U.S. NORAD context is a real possibility. Variable one is well supported once again and with the same general conclusion found in question one.

Country Perceptions Towards NORTHCOM

**Has the establishment of the US NORTHCOM helped or hindered security cooperation between the three countries?** This question resulted in twelve American, four Canadian and one Mexican response for a total of seventeen tying as the second most discussed question in this project. As might be expected, there is no small shortage of criticism leveled towards NORTHCOM, its efficiency, effectiveness, the decision to create it, and to place Mexico’s territory under its responsibility. The American perceptions towards NORTHCOM are surprisingly cool. Most of the participants—civilian and military—indicated some type of concern with NORTHCOM and its effect on...
North American security cooperation. Many of the Americans noted how the decision to create NORTHCOM caused problems in dealing with Mexico’s senior military staff. Another prevalent issue regards the decision to place Mexico’s territory under NORTHCOM’s jurisdiction. This decision seems to have caused additional stress and conflict on the Mexican-U.S. military relationship as well.

American Views

An academician responded that Mexico is not working well with NORTHCOM and does not want association with NORTHCOM. A speaker at the SOUTHCOM conference also voiced concern over NORTHCOM’s effect on security cooperation. Another academician noted “[Mexico] is not understanding NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM helped because it brought more focus on Canada.” Still another academician felt that “[putting Mexico under] SOUTHCOM would have been better due to SOUTHCOM’s experience in that region providing a seasoned, regional view.” She laments what she perceives as a . . . divide and conquer mindset. Our bureaucracy and no historians to help shape policy so we lose the historical background significance and don’t ask how our policies helped or hurt.

Perhaps tongue in cheek, the last academician noted “Canada thinks NORTHCOM is a U.S. plot to take over Canada.”

The officers were less harsh, but did not embrace NORTHCOM’s successes by any means. One stated:

The Bi-National Planning Group may have taken away some responsibilities from NORTHCOM . . . the Canadians said
Another answered:

Not positive or negative, not sure yet. NORTHCOM hindered counter-drug operations because they transferred operations from SOUTHCOM to NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM wants their hands on part of the money and more involvement in yearly plans that states put together [54 states and territories]. Threats—how much money and how will you spend the money? The process is through Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense for Counter-Narcotics and NORTHCOM wants control of that process . . . Good bureaucracy-established rapport—now dealing with NORTHCOM.

A third felt that

. . . [in the] short term, not sure if NORTHCOM has helped. But perhaps long-term due to fact that NORTHCOM only has to focus on two countries—Canada and Mexico—whereas SOUTHCOM has to focus on a myriad of countries. NORTHCOM is very comfortable dealing with Canada but Mexico is still something they are trying to figure out. The Canadians were well represented at the NORTHCOM conference but not the Mexicans. Mexico didn’t want to be part of SOUTHCOM because they were a North American country but, culturally, the U.S. sees Mexico as another Latin American country. NORTHCOM took over all of SOUTHCOM’s counter-drug efforts [JIATF-South].”

A fourth answered:

NORTHCOM has helped. NORTHCOM is working some civil authority issues that needed to be finessed for homeland defense and NORTHCOM has done this with its domestic focus.

American Views: NORTHCOM’s Impact on Mexican-U.S. Military Cooperation

Several participants voiced frustration with NORTHCOM’s negative impact on facilitating communication and coordination between the Mexican and U.S. military senior level officers. By placing Mexico’s territory under a
combatant command, the Mexican Chief of Staff, who doubles as the Army Secretary of Defense is in a sense, put on an equal plane with the U.S. four-star general in charge of NORAD. This, to the Mexican Chief of Staff, subordinates him to a lesser status in the U.S. eyes in that he is expected to go through NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff before he can talk to the U.S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), who the Mexican General sees as his counterpart.

An officer answered “Now, Mexico prefers to deal with the Joint Staff. General Vega, [SEDENA] prefers to deal with the SECDEF & Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff because this is who he sees as his equivalent.” Another officer noted “Mexico [is] not favorable to NORTHCOM—did not go well. Vega [SEDENA] said I will never talk to NORTHCOM.” A diplomat stated:

NORTHCOM, oh yes, the NORAD second in command previous to current, and he sat down with Mexican Army General Vega and come on pretty strong . . . did not play well and Vega said they will not deal with NORTHCOM. There are growing pains, Mexico dealing with NORTHCOM where it used to be Joint Staff has in effect subordinated the Mexicans. Mexico still likes to go through Joint Staff and the SECDEF and those two offices still respond to them but they try to gently nudge them to NORTHCOM, a real political dance. There are deeper issues there than just NORTHCOM. Mexican officers are still skittish, Mexican’s complaints about NORTHCOM are facile and not substantive complaints. They use NORTHCOM as a convenient whipping post.

A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) civilian noted:

The Mexican Minister of Defense sees the DHS as a counterpart—probably not accurate from the U.S. perspective. The military cooperates when they have the political coverage—like a global program for instance . . . they can participate in something global because its global, not an exercise with the United States.
More simply, a NORTHCOM civilian noted that “SEDENA sees itself as Myers (former Chairman JCS) and Rumsfeld.” Finally, during his NORTHCOM conference address, the director of the Office of Defense Coordination in Mexico stated:

Nothing has changed, no SOUTHCOM General has ever visited Mexico, same as NORTHCOM, SEDENA has nothing to do with combatant commands . . . Non-acceptance of NORTHCOM at the very top but not at the lower levels.

**Canadian Views**

In Canadian-U.S. cooperation, NORAD reigns supreme as the organization where security cooperation is robust. Consequently, the Canadian military contingent for this study has greater concern over NORTHCOM infringing on NORAD’s “territory” when compared to the U.S. participants. This also coincides with the Canadian propensity to extol NORAD’s virtues.

One officer sees NORTHCOM’s mission as basically NORAD’s while another officer laments that NORTHCOM is still looking for a mission and that it looks on NORAD’s missions with envy. He stated:

NORTHCOM has not eroded any arrangements in place, but as we mature in collective defense, it becomes a major player. It is too early to tell, but potentially, as Canada steps up CanadaCom, it will enhance security cooperation because the focus [of both countries] will be nearly the same.

Another officer asked rhetorical questions such as “What are NORTHCOM’s responsibilities? How does it fit in with other agencies? The jury is still out on
this.” indicating not so much a critique of NORTHCOM but a critique of the U.S.
DOD and how it envisions NORTHCOM’s role. Still another answered:

Not sure yet . . . NORTHCOM is not the lead agency on
security . . . [he] sees the Department of Homeland Security and
the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada as the lead
on security. NORTHCOM without a counterpart until recently
with CanadaCom has left an imbalance—now that CanadaCom is
standing up with a parallel mission to NORTHCOM, this should
greatly help cooperation. This forces both countries to understand
each other’s perspectives.

Conversely, the diplomat noted that when compared to NORAD,
NORTHCOM provides a new aspect to security cooperation in North America.
NORAD, a binational organization, is more attuned to treaty-type agreements
where NORTHCOM is more of the military-to-military agreement due to its
bilateral nature:

NORAD resolved a lot of sovereignty issues around the
border. It poses some challenges—maritime, land, civil support
issues. Some see NORTHCOM as an alternative to NORAD others
see it as a compliment.

**Mexican Views**

More telling and perhaps more important is the Mexican perception
regarding NORAD. The officer stated:

NORTHCOM is a strict defense of the United States. The
Mexican Navy accepted [an] invitation to cooperate—cooperation
is still open. The issue is sovereignty, a state is a state.

Put another way, NORTHCOM is an organization that for now, they do not see as
having jurisdiction over their country. Nevertheless, one promising statement
about NORTHCOM came from the officer. He noted that while the Mexican
Navy has no interaction with NORAD, it does interact with NORTHCOM. Additionally, he remarked about the “possibility of improved relations” within the context of NORTHCOM cooperation. His remarks indicate that the Mexican Navy was cooperating with and looking forward to further cooperation with NORTHCOM.

*Question Three Summary*

This question sought perceptions regarding NORTHCOM’s effectiveness at improving North American security cooperation. The responses to this question helped evaluate the second variable which sought evidence of individual perceptions and attitudes regarding NORTHCOM’s effectiveness in helping security cooperation. Overall, the data indicate a lukewarm nod toward an expectation that NORTHCOM will eventually help security cooperation. However, the short-term perspectives were more critical towards NORTHCOM’s immediate impacts on cooperation. Most of what was shared in this context was negative. Only a few indicated that “yes” NORTHCOM had helped. At best, most of the other participants indicated a wait and see attitude. At worst, the responses indicated that in the short-term NORTHCOM had not helped but it probably would in the long-term.

A speculation regarding this finding is that with the creation and establishment of NORTHCOM, many probably see that NORTHCOM is here to stay—especially given the nature of its creation in response to 9/11. Further, while it is possible that the Joint Staff may reapportion the regional
responsibilities of the unified commands at some future time, it is unlikely that they would do so any time soon. NORTHCOM will undoubtedly be given time to reach their goal of increasing Mexican cooperation.

Many American participants noted that when the U.S. put Mexico under NORTHCOM, the Mexican Army and its senior leadership (SEDENA) were not willing to be subordinated by talking to a combatant commander when prior to that, SEDENA could talk directly to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) because General Vega saw himself as a counterpart to those offices. Compounding that perception was the fact that the SECDEF and CJCS engaged SEDENA at that level. The argument is that subordinating Mexico under NORTHCOM’s responsibility actually hurt relations with the Mexican Army, at least in the short term.

The Canadian position indicates that NORAD is still the preferred organization. Further, the Canadians do not want NORAD diminished either by a lessening of the NORAD renewal or by another bilateral organization (NORTHCOM) taking duties and responsibilities away from NORAD. Canadians have more concerns about NORTHCOM’s purpose and competition with NORAD than any other demographic group. Canadian perceptions are grounded in their protectiveness of NORAD. The data show that the Canadians are very concerned that NORTHCOM will infringe on NORAD’s mission. The concerns though are better explained by the bureaucratic inertia perspective regarding competing organizations, not by the elite attitude perspective.
The Mexican perceptions deal mainly with trying to understanding what NORTHCOM has to do with Mexico. Also, the fact that this new organization is now actively trying to increase Mexico’s cooperation with the U.S. makes Mexico suspicious towards NORTHCOM. A Mexican participant did note that the Mexican Navy is cooperating with NORTHCOM. Overall, perceptions of the three countries demonstrate that at least in the short-term, NORTHCOM’s creation has been received with suspicion. In the long-term there is more openness to the possibility that NORTHCOM will help. As history shows, Canada and the U.S. habitually work together, so there is no reason to think that CanadaCom and NORTHCOM will not be working together in the future.

The data support variable one once again in a way that seems grounded in the bureaucratic inertia perspective. As a new organization, NORTHCOM has come under much scrutiny from many different sides. However, most seem to recognize the reality that NORTHCOM is not going away at least in the foreseeable future. NORTHCOM will retain its responsibility for Mexico’s territory in the unified command structure. Consequently, most seem to be of the mind set that if not now, eventually NORTHCOM will help cooperation.

Impact of the Military Technology Gap

**How do military capabilities affect security cooperation?**

Observers have expressed concern about the cumulative decline in the capabilities of the Canadian Forces. Canada’s aging airlift capability limits its ability to respond in a timely manner to many kinds of natural and other disasters . . . these are some of the deficits that can impose
additional costs and responsibilities on the U.S. for North American defense. (WWC 2005B, 5)

North American defense cannot be managed optimally without Canada. (WWC 2005B, 6)

Therefore, an important component of the 21st century bilateral security and defense relationship will be the extent to which Canada can make useful military contributions beyond North America. (WWC 2005A, 11)

This question had ten American, two Canadian and two Mexican responses for a total of fourteen. The U.S. military participants were more likely to discuss this issue and provide more detail regarding their views than the Canadian or Mexican military participants. The American perceptions towards Canada centered on the downsizing and atrophy of the Canadian forces as well as the Canadian Government’s defense budget. Regarding Mexico’s military, the American perceptions centered on the technical gap and speculated how it may contribute to the Mexican Army’s lack of participation. While there is no capability limitation issue for U.S. forces by nature of them being the most technologically advanced military in the world, there is a technology gap that the U.S. must be aware of, as noted by a U.S. officer.

American Views: Technology Gap’s affect on Mexico’s Participation

One characterization of the technology gap was provided by an officer who works in the U.S. Navy International Programs Office. This office deals with foreign country requests to purchase certain U.S. Navy equipment. The officer noted that Canada purchases F-18 fighter aircraft, radar systems, and ships (one
He noted “Mexico doesn’t buy these types of things.” Also, Canada purchases much more equipment than Mexico which equates to the need for a dedicated person to handle all of Canada’s purchases while the remaining Latin American countries fall under another person. Canada has a dedicated person to attend to its requests while Mexico has to share one person among the other thirty Latin American countries. This example by itself speaks volumes of the differences between Canadian and Mexican capabilities and the extent of interoperability problems experienced between Canada and Mexico with the U.S..

The same officer spoke from recent observation and noted “the Mexican Navy’s desire to be strong partners with the U.S. in the Global War on Terror is very great, but its resources are pathetic and limiting.” He provided a good example of how the capabilities affect security cooperation in stating that when one plans an exercise, one must account for the lowest common denominator (speaking in technological/interoperability terms). The force (participant) in the exercise that has the oldest, least flexible technology causes the remaining forces to develop work-arounds in order to ensure all forces can communicate and cooperate. He also posited that the U.S. needs to realize this technology gap exists and understand that it cannot “blow away” other countries by its technology—at least with those countries that it desires to work with. The U.S. needs to program, plan, and design interoperability into new weapon systems in order to limit the times when technology will interfere with operations. He asked:
What good will the advanced technologies do in the Global War on Terror or in facilitating security cooperation if Mexico and Canada cannot keep up with the U.S. due to the advanced technology?

On the negative side, this officer stated that ships in the Mexican Navy are not maintained properly and are not in good condition. Many times the U.S. Navy is warned that if they plan a joint exercise with the Mexican Navy, plan on the Mexican Navy arriving late due to breakdowns in route. On the positive side, Mexico is looking into purchasing some operational, non-obsolete Extra Defense Articles (EADs) from the U.S. Middle East inventory. NORTHCOM in particular is excited about the possibility of this purchase because these EADs are assets that can be used in some border operations.

A civilian posited that the U.S. would not be willing to subsidize the Mexican military to a level necessary to participate as an equal partner in NORAD. “The U.S. is unlikely to write a check for Mexico to bring them up to the capabilities that would be required of them to participate in NORAD operations in particular.” Another civilian focused on capabilities in the NORAD context and asked a very good question: “What does Mexico have to offer NORAD? What benefit is there to the U.S. to have Mexico involved in NORAD?” The capabilities are certainly limiting to the operations and if the desire is to have Mexican officers in NORAD as observers, that is one thing and

---

71 According to the participant, a U.S. Navy Officer, EADs can be any type of equipment that from a quantity perspective, are regarded as “extra” and thus, can be sold to foreign countries. This equipment is not obsolete and is deemed interoperable with other current resources.
from a resource perspective may be doable. But to have Mexico as an active participant in NORAD operations as an equal partner with Canada and the U.S. is an entirely different matter. As noted by another U.S. officer, while Mexico lags behind the U.S. in technology and defense spending, it only suffers the same fate as every other U.S. ally in the world.

A diplomat added:

Mexico is good at disaster relief, but reluctant to interfere. Mexico still has a lingering non-interventionist attitude as part of why they still do not get involved [in the 2005 tsunami, and Haiti].

As discussed earlier, a prevalent speculation posits that the Mexican Army’s capabilities are so lacking that if they participate in security cooperation ventures, they will be embarrassed. Hence, they prefer to remain secret and not reveal how bad they are. While this seems to be the most prevalent perception, it is by no means substantiated. In fact, it was only addressed by two Americans. One, a NORTHCOM civilian stated that it was a “hokey-pokey argument.” Conversely, the Chief, United States Office of Defense Coordination Mexico, one who is arguably in a good position to weigh this issue, feels that this is an accurate speculation. A Department of Homeland Security civilian stated:

[Mexico] is not a risk-taking force. They are worried about their capabilities and how those may embarrass them when working with other [U.S.] services. The Mexican Navy is not easily embarrassed—they have the world’s, I think this is right, tallest ship used for training. They are more open, more international, it is institutional.
American Views: Atrophy of Canadian Forces

There was only one capability issue regarding atrophy of the Canadian Forces. However, it was mentioned by several Americans and substantiated by other sources. During the relief efforts for the 2005 Tsunami that hit Indian Ocean countries, the Canadians were “two-weeks late” in delivering their relief support. This was due to a lack of military airlift and the subsequent need to wait for civilian chartered aircraft. While the desire and manpower existed to help the tsunami victims, Canada did not possess the critical airlift to move them.\(^72\) As seems fairly obvious, one cannot have a quick reaction force unless one has dedicated guaranteed capabilities to move the forces when and where they need to go. This reveals a glaring problem for the Canadians—the lack of airlift. This is even more obvious when one realizes the premium that the Canadians put on their ability to participate in world-wide UN and NATO operations.\(^73\) An academician offered “Canada needs to improve its airlift.” An officer discussed frustration when the Canadians “talk about getting one ship and some trucks when they really need airlift.”

A corollary concern regards Canada’s defense budget. The budget’s decrease has contributed to the atrophy now experienced in the Canadian Military.

\(^{72}\) Article in Canada Newswire Group, 4 Aug 2005 citing a study from the Fraser Institute that concluded the Canadian Strategic Airlift capabilities needs to be replaced. . . cites the Tsunami delay and the need for the airlift if Canada is going to fulfill its desire to be a ready force for humanitarian, peacekeeping, etc.

\(^{73}\) The need for dedicated and improved Canadian airlift was “admitted” by a Canadian Officer speaking at the NORTHCOM conference. Hence, this is not in doubt.
Regarding the Canadian defense budget, an officer laments this fact and noted that the Canadians had an 18-month “operational pause.” However, the U.S. sees this operational pause as just an excuse not to operate due to inadequate funding and subsequent non-mission ready status. Additionally, a diplomat noted:

    Canada’s revenue [tax] is essentially fixed because they are so high, they really cannot go any higher. Thus it makes it difficult to expand the military or other programs. Much of their revenues go to entitlements, so little left for defense, etc. Canada benefits from intelligence sharing. They don’t support a foreign intelligence service—they rely on their allies for intelligence. They don’t need a large standing army or navy because the U.S. will protect them.”

Perhaps, as one insightful U.S. officer notes regarding Canada, we should “talk to them anyway because even to talk to them has long-term benefit.”

Below in the Canadian views, the Canadians also discussed their budget.

**Canadian Views**

A fairly pedantic response came from a Canadian: “Canadians are favorable to expanding military capability and aligning capabilities with the United States.” This statement though is hollow when compared to the reality of the fact that the Canadian forces have atrophied and currently lack real funding to bring the force back to a mission-ready status (WWC 2005B, 5). The Canadians feel they are fixing this.

During the NORTHCOM conference, a Canadian officer representing the Canadian Directorate of Western Hemisphere Policy noted that Canada is poised to nearly double its defense budget over the next five years by adding $13 billion.

---

74 Also mentioned by a two U.S. officers.
Additionally, Canada is reorganizing its forces, to include the creation of CanadaCom, a sister organization to NORTHCOM with a similar mission for Canada as NORTHCOM has for the United States. Along with this budget increase, the speaker continually pointed out the “new vision” for Canadian forces which included a “transformation” of the military command structure. Perhaps what is most significant in his briefing is his statement referencing the tie between the allocation of resources and priorities for Canadian defense. While the priorities (listed below) remain the same, he admitted that funding has been in reverse but this will change, funding now will be in-line with the stated priorities:

(a) Protecting Canada and Canadians;
(b) Defending North America, in cooperation with the U.S.;
(c) Contributing to international peace and security.

Another example of extraordinary cooperation mentioned by an officer is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemption that Canada enjoys. The ITAR allows the U.S. President to control the export and import of defense articles and services. In part 126.5 of the “general policy and provisions” section, one will note the words “Canadian exemptions.” He further noted that “Canada is the only country in the world that has an exemption to ITAR.” When one considers all the countries that the U.S. calls an ally, it is truly significant that Canada is the only country with an ITAR exemption.

Mexican Views

The officer admitted that “interoperability problems” exist between the Mexican and Americans lamenting that “we don’t really have it (interoperability) but we have a plan” noting that sometimes it is a problem. He also posited that both countries must work harder at gaining interoperability. He further noted:

Problems exist, interoperability does not exist, but the U.S. is aware of this and strives to develop the work-arounds necessary to allow the operational cooperation to take place. The U.S. understands the interoperability issue and works around it.

He gained this perspective from observations during a Mexican Chief of Staff visit to various agencies in Washington D.C. in 2004. He noted that the U.S. Military communicated to the Mexican Chief of Staff that it understands there is an interoperability problem and is trying to “facilitate Mexico in this area. We need more interoperability and training in the sea.” When queried, he thought that the last joint exercise with the Mexican Navy was three years ago. But he noted:

We have a very, very good relationship in training . . . Mexicans are studying at the Naval Post Graduate School, 10 per year and at National Defense University, the Naval War College and Quantico [where the U.S. Marine Officers are trained]. Post 9/11 saw an increase of this type of involvement 2-3 fold.

The civilian added “the Mexican Army’s capabilities are not even the same as Canada’s much less the United States.”

Question Four Summary

This question sought participant’s perceptions on how much the technology gap that exists between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada hinders
cooperation. The responses to this question helped evaluate the third variable which sought evidence where a military technology gap hinders North American security cooperation. By extension, this gap reflects on elite priorities to spend money on defense and indirectly speaks to elite influence on cooperation.

Does this technology gap hinder cooperation? Absolutely—as again, all participants admit. However, as one U.S. military participant stated “it is important, but irrelevant” perhaps best sums up its affect on security cooperation. Canada and Mexico suffer the same fate as any other country that conducts operations with the United States. While many participants spoke to the technology gap, the data revealed that from a policy-maker’s perspective, an overall hindrance to security cooperation is minimal to non-existent.

In spite of this technology gap, atrophy of Canadian forces, and budget issues, the robust Canada-U.S. cooperation witnessed in NORAD and the newly formed Bi-National Planning Group, building on nearly 70 years of institutionalized cooperation leads to the conclusion that these capability and resource issues are not a severe negative impact on cooperation. At best, they are a small issue that must be addressed when planning detailed cooperative efforts such as military exercises.

*Rebuttal to Speculation on Mexican Army’s Lack of Cooperation*

The recent Hurricane relief operations in U.S. territory by the Mexican Army greatly dispelled the speculation that the Mexican Army is loathe to cooperate due to its fear of revealing how inept it is. Coming into the U.S. and
conducting relief operations during a high visibility catastrophe where even the U.S. Government was under scrutiny for its response, severely discredits this speculation. In taking this action, the Mexican Army opened itself up to the same kind of criticism that this speculation says they fear. If the Mexican Army fears revealing how bad it is, then the decision to conduct operations on U.S. soil where it knew it would be watched not just by the Americans but by the international community would have been different. Indeed, one could argue that this decision might have been made with just the opposite motivation—to dispel this theory and let the world find out instead how competent it is. This event strongly counters those who speculate that the Mexican Army does not participate in security cooperation ventures because it is hiding its incompetence. This leads to a conclusion that the “embarrassment issue” is not valid and as one participant stated is a “hokey-pokey argument.” However, it must be noted that a few participants did note that the Mexicans are good at disaster relief operations. It would reason that they would be willing to conduct relief operations in another country if they are known to be proficient in that area.

_American Rebuttal to Canada’s Budget Fix_

The U.S. Defense and Air Attaché—U.S. Embassy Ottawa—noted that Canada’s defense budget will not double but rather, increase by only 10%. His calculations seem more accurate from a yearly budget perspective and with inflation factored in. Over the span of five years, Canada’s defense budget will eventually have doubled. When factoring in inflation and the constantly rising
costs of military technology, one could suspect that the U.S. view is more accurate regarding the actual impact to the Canadian defense budget over the next five years. Additionally, he noted that the Canadian defense budget is “one of the lowest in NATO” when figured as a percentage of gross domestic product.

Moreover, an officer who is an expert on Canadian affairs stated that the . . . $13 billion plus up is still too little to make a difference. The U.S. doesn’t really take the plus up as anything serious. The $13 billion plus up would simply bring some weapons systems back up to operational standards but not provide a true 100% increase in capabilities as claimed by the Canadians.\textsuperscript{77}

The U.S. Air Attaché countered the Canadian officers’ statement of matching resources with priorities by noting that from his observations, “Canada continues to fund in reverse order with money and attention going mostly to missions abroad that garner political support.” This makes more sense given Canada’s propensity to support those operations approved by the UN, NATO, or NORAD.

At best, the conclusion is that Canada’s defense budget increases and priorities continue to be an issue of concern from a capabilities perspective.

In summary, the data for this variable, which sought evidence of how the technology gap affects security cooperation, show strong support for the influence at a low-level, but regarding its impact on policy-decisions, seems non-existent. While a real limitation exists at the operational level due to the differing capabilities, it is important to note that at the policy level, the differing

\textsuperscript{77} A view also expressed by the U.S. Defense and Air Attaché assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa Canada.
capabilities do not seem to have a negative affect on policy decisions. In fact, policy makers admit this phenomenon as well—they know it exists. Nevertheless, it does not appear to stop them from making policy that helps security cooperation when they wish to do so. Herein we find strong support for this variable of elite influence on cooperation. In spite of the technology and disparate budgets, elites still make policy decisions to create new security organizations and agreements.

Summary and Conclusions

The data provide evidence for NORAD functional but not regional expansion. Further, the data provide strong support that NORAD is important to North American security cooperation. Moreover, the data revealed nine separate factors important to security cooperation. Three of the nine factors had only one response each while the remaining six factors had from four to eleven responses. The top six factors discussed were determined by responses from participants of all three countries.

Sovereignty concerns reign as the most often mentioned factor influencing NORAD expansion or North American security cooperation. In retrospect, this should not be a big surprise since looking back to chapter one, we see Canada’s sovereignty concerns evident from NORAD’s creation. Given the negative historical legacy between Mexico and the U.S., it is logical for Mexico to still have sovereignty concerns as well. While data from a recent survey indicate there might be disconnects between public opinion and elite attitudes towards sovereignty concerns, the fact that elites still see sovereignty as something to be
highly protected provides strong evidence of the influence of sovereignty concerns on North American security cooperation.

Another significant finding came from question two, how important is it to each country’s and North America’s security posture to see NORAD expanded either regionally or functionally? The Canadians seem to be most concerned about NORAD changing and when afforded the opportunity, lauded NORAD and its achievements—in a sense, defended it. A speculation on why this strong response came from the Canadians is grounded in the Canadian propensity to find comfort in the multilateral and binational organizations by which they prefer to operate. The Canadians were unabashed in indicating that they prefer to work through the UN, NATO, and NORAD to help achieve international goals. Changing NORAD could upset this long-standing binational organization that the Canadians seem to cherish (more than the Americans do). The American and Mexican responses while not as strong as the Canadians, also point towards NORAD regional expansion as unlikely.

Overall, these two questions helped answer variable one which sought evidence of the importance of NORAD expansion, the likelihood of regional or functional expansion, and the most important factors affecting cooperation. This variable was grounded in the literature review which summarized that elite attitudes are both a hindrance and facilitator of cooperation. Elite influence, attitudes and perceptions towards cooperation was hypothesized to have a great effect on integration and cooperation. That is what turned out to be the case here.
U.S. and Canadian elite attitudes generally agree on NORAD’s importance, and generally see functional expansion as something that will be good for North America. All three countries though adamantly oppose NORAD regional expansion at this time.

For the second variable, which seeks perceptions on NORTHCOM’s effectiveness, the data revealed mixed results. While we see fairly strong negative perceptions regarding NORTHCOM’s affect on security cooperation, there also seems to be an understanding that NORTHCOM will improve and ultimately, if not already, facilitate cooperation. The tone and seeming mixed results can be explained by the bureaucratic inertia perspective perhaps more so than the elite attitudes and perceptions. From one perspective, the fact that the U.S. elite decided to stand up NORTHCOM in the wake of 9/11 and then quickly acted on that decision lends support to this variable. The skeptical attitudes towards NORTHCOM do not seem to matter much from this perspective. Yet, most of the comments generated by this variable’s question, has the establishment of NORTHCOM helped or hindered security cooperation between the three countries, seem to be grounded in concerns that existing organizations have towards new organizations—as was discussed in chapter two. In summary, this variable is supported, but there is also support for bureaucratic inertia’s perspective regarding how new organizations are looked on with suspicion.

The last variable sought evidence of elite influence on security cooperation through the corresponding capabilities gap that exist due to the large
disparity in elite decisions of the three countries to fund their nation’s defense. The question, how do military capabilities affect security cooperation, and variable rightly assumed that the technology gap exists. What was measured, were the perceptions towards this gap’s affect on cooperation as an extension of elite decisions to fund their defense budget and resources.

To no surprise, the data confirmed a large technology gap between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Moreover, the data revealed that the gap is exacerbated by current atrophy of the Canadian Military. However, these two factors do not affect policy-maker’s decisions to pursue other cooperative initiatives. None of the responses indicated any sort of hindrance in security cooperation initiatives as a result of this gap. At best, some mentioned the tactical cooperative problems that arise when the different militaries work together, but never in the context of this being a huge hindrance to security cooperation. The fact that the Mexican Navy was lauded for its cooperative participation in counter-drug operations speaks in direct contrast to those who would say that this gap is a huge problem. Recall a statement made by a U.S. officer at the Joint Staff regarding the technology gap being “important but irrelevant” regarding its effect on cooperation. This conclusion lends further support for elite influence on cooperation. In spite of the possible negative impact this technology gap can have on cooperation, elites continue to sponsor new organizations (NORAD Maritime expansion, NORTHCOM, NORTHCOM working with the Mexican Navy in
counter-drug operations, DHS, PSEPC, CanadaCom) and agreements (SPP, PFP) with no evidence that they are concerned about the technological disparity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the literature review provided many examples where elite influence can hinder or facilitate integration and cooperation which is the hypothesis tested in this chapter. The three variables all sought to test a different aspect of this hypothesis. The data revealed that in all cases, elite influence on cooperation was evident. Some of the evidence came from the perceptions and the acting, or not, on those perceptions. Other support was found in the somewhat skeptical attitudes towards NORTHCOM’s effectiveness but general tone of acceptance. The more detailed concerns about NORTHCOM are better explained by the bureaucratic inertia perspective. Elites will make their decisions affecting cooperation regardless of any technical/interoperability problems encountered by the different militaries. Elites do not let the technology gap affect their decisions to pursue cooperative agreements or initiatives.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

The main perspectives in this study theorized that from one international institution to another requires elite advocacy; elite attitudes towards integration can function as a hindrance and a facilitator of change in this process. The analysis from each perspective is summarized.

Bureaucratic Inertia

The basic underlying themes found in the bureaucratic inertia literature were generally supported even though some sub-hypotheses did have data invalidating them. The main bureaucratic inertia hypothesis clearly stated that bureaucratic inertia is a hindrance to change. With one significant exception, the evidence from the interviews supported this assertion. Positive aspects of bureaucratic inertia were also discovered. Many participants challenged the assumption that bureaucratic inertia hinders cooperation. Several said inertia from their organization’s standard operating procedures for decision making adds value to the final output from the process because better decisions were being made, which makes the time spent worthwhile. This indirectly contradicts a portion of the inertia literature because the literature simply portrays inertia as a hindrance. To find evidence of positive effects of inertia contradicts what is written.

The data revealed that cultural differences and similarities between different organizations and countries have the biggest impact on North American security cooperation. Cultural differences negatively impact cooperation and
cultural similarities positively influence cooperation. However, the literature did not speak to country cultural issues. Rather, the literature and resulting questions focused more on organizational culture. Nevertheless, the data spoke heavily to country cultural issues. Additional support for the influence of culture and historic legacy was found in the analysis of elite influence on integration. The strong negative outlook towards NORAD regional expansion is grounded mainly in culture and historic legacy issues between Mexico and the United States. The negative historic legacy stemming from U.S. imperialism and its affect on Mexico in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries certainly adds to this. A strong conclusion from this research is cultural differences and perhaps more specifically the historic legacy between Mexico and the U.S. are a significant obstacle to cooperation while cultural similarities and relatively positive historic legacy between the U.S. and Canada have been and will most likely continue to facilitate cooperation.

Another aspect of this perspective deals with minor versus major change. The data regarding NORAD’s historical background demonstrate that small, minor changes to North American security cooperation have been taking place. Nearly all responses indicated that major, significant change did occur after the 9/11 crisis. When a crisis like 9/11 occurs, a logical expectation is that many will look on existing organizations (e.g., NORAD, NORTHCOM, and CanadaCom) and lament that these did not plan well, did not anticipate well and did not change enough to counter the threat revealed by the crisis. While inertia is slowing
change, the change is occurring nonetheless. In the aftermath of a crisis, significant change will occur that is much easier to see. Both aspects of that literature were validated by the data.

The data supported another area of the inertia literature that speaks to competing subgroups. Sagan noted that within large organizations, the goals and objectives of the many smaller sub-groups tend to conflict (73). From this basic premise, a sub-hypothesis and variable sought evidence where the different groups that were a part of the North American security equation experienced this type of sub-group conflict. The data provided many examples where organizational goals conflict (U.S. State Department and Department of Justice, Joint Staff and NORTHCOM, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, State Department and Department of Homeland Security). Additionally, as a new organization in the North American security equation, NORTHCOM has attracted the most criticism regarding its effectiveness and suspicion regarding its mandates which many see as infringing on NORAD, SOUTHCOM and even Joint Staff areas of responsibility. Finally, the data regarding elite attitudes, while not specifically testing this sub-hypothesis, provided additional support nonetheless. Consequently, there are an abundance of data supporting this aspect of inertia from two of the three perspectives which make this aspect of inertia one of the most explanatory regarding effects on North American security cooperation.

Another important finding regards the impact Mexico’s Constitution has on cooperation. Mexico’s Constitution and non-interventionist policy severely
hamper security cooperation in that the military would have to be completely, doctrinally transformed if it were to engage in deeper security cooperation in North America. The Mexican military is doctrinally organized to generally conduct operations inside its own country. If it were to begin a concerted effort to cooperate militarily as Canada and the U.S. do through NORAD, it would have to seek relief from the constitutionally mandated doctrinal constraints.

In summary, aspects of the bureaucratic inertia perspective, when compared to the other perspectives, appear to be the main obstacles to change in North American security cooperation. Values, perceptions, and attitudes, grounded in the three countries’ cultures and good and bad historic legacy’s are major factors affecting future cooperation. Also, what some termed organizational mandates actually drive the inertia and in some cases, may slow down change but ultimately result in better decisions, thus improving cooperation in the long term. Much of organizational behavior regarding competing sub-groups is alive and well in those organizations that have a part to play in North American security cooperation. Concerns about NORTHCOM, a new organization, exist not only within the U.S. Government but also in Canada, Mexico, Joint Staff and SOUTHCOM.

**Spillover**

Many aspects of the literature speaking to elite influence causing spillover were not supported. While some portions of the literature were validated, the hypothesis; spillover needs elite advocacy for it to occur, was not. There were two
variables associated with this hypothesis: spillover occurrence and elite involvement in spillover. The data revealed some indications of the possibility of spillover as described by the literature, but no clear examples. While we saw numerous examples of the importance of elite involvement in establishing cooperative ventures, there was no evidence that elite action and motivation specifically created spillover. In fact, while the elite attitudes perspective of this study provided evidence for elite impact on cooperation as being both a negative and positive influence, it provided no evidence where elites deliberately participated in facilitating spillover.

Interdependence, while not specifically tied to spillover by the literature, was mentioned by many participants in response to questions on spillover. The data are strongly supportive of the conclusion that NAFTA created some aspects of interdependency. Here is where we find some aspects of the literature supported. Specifically, the data point to multiple channels connecting societies as evidenced by the economic, military, and infrastructure ties between Canada and the United States (Keohane and Nye 2000, 115-117). Also, the fact that military force does not appear to be an option to resolve disputes between Mexico, U.S., and Canada is also supported by the data (Keohane and Nye 1977, 24-25). Mexico used to have a formal national defense plan against an “aggressor from the North” but they no longer have that.

This interdependency may factor into the most significant finding supporting spillover; NAFTA’s advancements in trade have helped the countries
realize they must cooperate together to protect the trade advancements. As noted by many participants, even the U.S. recognizes the need to allow legitimate trade to flow across the borders while still providing the best security possible. Thus, cooperation from an economic agreement has spilled over into the security realm. Parts of the literature either overtly or covertly implies that when spillover actually occurs, it will be by deliberate elite involvement or from a sense of community or because an issue has grown into its own issue area. None of these explain the spillover described by the participants in this study. All three countries recognize the importance of preserving the gains realized by NAFTA and are working together to incorporate the United States’ security concerns while ensuring trade across the borders continues.

**Elite Attitudes**

Interesting perceptions regarding NORAD, NORTHCOM, and defense capabilities were garnered from this perspective. Three variables helped determine the validity of the hypothesis which sought evidence where elite involvement in cooperation was either a hindrance or facilitator.

Perceptions towards NORAD and NORAD expansion were fairly uniform across all three countries. NORAD is deemed important to North American security cooperation by the Americans and Canadians and few feel that NORAD regional expansion is likely. In fact, some feel that it is absolutely impossible. Most acknowledged that NORAD functional expansion was likely and we saw NORAD expand into the maritime realm with the recent NORAD renewal.
agreement in 2006. The literature looks for elite attitudes and perceptions as the main indicator of cooperation’s success. Is it a coincidence that most felt NORAD functional expansion was possible and that NORAD actually did expand functionally? According to the literature, this is what is expected. Perceptions towards NORAD regional expansion were negative and there was little to nothing written about that possibility in the recent NORAD renewal negotiations. There is much opposition to NORAD regional expansion and the literature indicates that if elites do not look favorably on an aspect of cooperation, then it will not happen (Haas 1964, 48).

NORTHCOM’s creation and the concerns regarding its effectiveness could be explained by either of the two perspectives: elite influence or bureaucratic inertia. First, the U.S. President realized he needed a single point of contact to handle domestic threats after 9/11, thus he created NORTHCOM, a direct result of elite influence on cooperation. Second, NORTHCOM’s creation could be explained by the bureaucratic inertia perspective that speaks to major, significant change occurring after a crisis. Certainly, that is what we saw after 9/11. Or, NORTHCOM could be a result of both perspectives. Further study here is needed to determine which perspective may better explain NORTHCOM’s creation. It is clear that the mildly negative comments on NORTHCOM’s effectiveness are grounded in the bureaucratic inertia perspective regarding competing sub-groups. From this perspective, the data supported the bureaucratic inertia literature.
Another aspect proving elite influence on cooperation is found in the discussion on the technology gap’s influence. At the lower levels, there is no question that the technology gap negatively impacts military-to-military cooperation. However, there was no evidence indicating that elites let this concern affect their decisions to pursue cooperative agreements. Recent agreements such as the Smart Border, SPP, PFP, and NORAD functional expansion are indicative of initiatives put forth in spite of an existing technology gap. While the U.S. laments the atrophy of Canadian forces and the small Canadian defense budget, it continues to expand NORAD and other areas of cooperation with Canada as well as pursue deeper cooperation with Mexico, a country possessing even older technology than Canada.

Summary

This study reveals that aspects of inertia seem to matter more in security cooperation when compared to the other perspectives. Specifically, the cultural and historical legacies have a large effect on cooperation. In the case of cultural similarities and a generally positive historical legacy between the U.S. and Canada, cooperation seems to flourish. Conversely, the many cultural differences and long negative history between the U.S. and Mexico causes cooperation to languish and lag decades behind U.S. and Canada cooperation. Subgroups and organizations generally look with suspicion towards others, especially a new organization with a similar mission or mandate. This was very evident in the North American security equation. These observations are supported strongly by
the bureaucratic inertia literature and thus, indicate that the inertia perspective explains more of the questions posed at the beginning of this study.

The perspective regarding elite attitudes and the possibility of both negative and positive influence on cooperation is also supported. However, some of the data from this perspective are actually better explained by the inertia perspective. It is more difficult to determine elite involvement because, as the literature review notes, elite motives must be weighed to truly determine the outcome. This is where it gets most difficult—assessing the motives. While we can see decisions and outcomes, we can not see the motives behind the decisions. Thus, there is a lingering doubt as to the true validity of elite attitudes. That is even clouded more when one realizes that other perspectives (such as the inertia perspective) might better explain the data.

The literature arguing that direct elite involvement was needed to cause spillover was not supported. There was no evidence suggesting direct elite involvement was needed to cause spillover. Rather, there was evidence of spillover occurring without any elite involvement. The strongest evidence of spillover stemmed from the need to protect trade advancements realized through NAFTA. All three countries realized that they needed to protect trade advancements as the U.S. moved to increase border security. This was the most prevalent characterization of spillover revealed by the data but is not how the literature described spillover. Some aspects of the spillover process are evident, but the literature states that the underlying stimulus for spillover comes from a
sense of community or a sense of goodwill that leads country elites to desire spillover and cooperation in other areas. This is not what was found in the necessary evil to protect the trade advancements. Following are significant findings of this study.

(a) Economic interdependency can facilitate security cooperation. It causes countries to realize they must cooperate together to protect trade advancements or prevent negative impacts on their economies. NAFTA continues to deepen interdependency, and we should expect interdependency to grow.

(b) Elite involvement is important in facilitating cooperation but not in facilitating spillover. It is important to note the difference between elite involvement in facilitating cooperative agreements versus creating spillover. Many cooperative agreement initiatives were directly influenced by elite involvement. However, some of those agreements did not result in spillover. There are examples of spillover occurring without elite involvement.

(c) While NAFTA is a trilateral agreement, it is conceptualized and negotiated as two bilateral agreements (U.S.-Canada/U.S.-Mexico). If the countries manage NAFTA as intended, the relationships between them will deepen. This may take elite involvement to shift the focus from two bilateral agreements to a single trilateral one.

(d) Current security cooperation issues center around the borders. The biggest concern is to ensure legitimate trade is allowed to flow while border security is increased. NAFTA has caused a great increase in the volume of
legitimate trade. When the border slowed to a crawl after 9/11 and all three countries experienced economic impacts as a result, it became painfully clear as to the need to better manage border security while facilitating legitimate trade.

(e) Sovereignty remains an issue for Canada and Mexico, and will remain for some time. U.S. policy makers should recognize that every country in the world has sovereignty concerns when it considers cooperating with the U.S..

(f) NORTHCOM should ensure that bureaucratic inertia is not driving the way it does business as other unified commands, but as a unique command it may function better in a different type of unified command “mold.”

(g) NORAD expansion to include Mexico is at best, a long-term goal. The data revealed that this is a long way off. Not only are there cultural and doctrinal inertia issues to overcome but also negative attitudes and perceptions towards NORAD regional expansion. This is grounded in the distrust stemming from the historical negative legacy in Mexico-U.S. relations and Canada’s protectionism towards NORAD status quo.

(h) NORTHCOM has a public relations task in order to sell its mission to all three countries and respective domestic agencies. As a new organization, it faces difficulties stemming from the bureaucratic inertia perspective.

**Future Policy**

**Mexico-U.S. Cooperation**

While the U.S. seeks better cooperation with Mexico, there are many more issues in this relationship that hinder cooperation, including a long negative
history, a fairly strong cultural divide, and the Mexican Constitution driven non-intervention policy. A strong U.S. desire coupled with difficult obstacles makes for unrealistic American expectations of Mexican cooperation. This is due to at least two reasons. First, as noted above, Mexico’s sovereignty concerns, fed by the long negative history between Mexico and the U.S., would cause Mexico to be concerned about the reality or perception of bowing to U.S. coercion. This leads to the second reason which is grounded in Talbot (2003) regarding the influence a superpower can have on a smaller country. The U.S. should be sensitive to this concern as it encourages Mexico to increase cooperation.

The U.S. Government wants the Mexican Government to cooperate more fully while Mexico voices frustration over not knowing for sure what the U.S. wants it to do. One Mexican said that it is not clear how they can address the security concerns of the U.S., noting while the Mexican Government understands they could do more in terms of security cooperation there is no clear indication of how far the U.S. wants to go. The U.S. owes Mexico details on what it is they need them to do and where appropriate, how the U.S. is prepared to help them do it. Two NORTHCOM personnel voiced frustration over the lack of funding tied to their mandate to improve cooperation with Mexico. Their concern is valid. If U.S. policy makers push NORTHCOM to obtain deeper security cooperation commitments from Mexico, then one can logically expect a certain level of funding commitment by Washington.

78 One of the official goals that NORTHCOM has as noted by a NORTHCOM participant.
The data also suggest that Americans take for granted that Mexico needs to be in a cooperative security agreement with the United States. The Mexicans do not seem to be of the same mind. One U.S. civilian essentially challenged U.S. policy makers to put themselves in “Mexico’s shoes” and ask the question of the need for Mexico to engage in deeper security cooperation. It is certainly beneficial for the U.S. policy makers to recognize their presumptiveness in assuming they know what is best for Mexico. As the Mexican participants have stated, the U.S. needs to communicate to Mexico what it wants them to do in security cooperation and why. Then, Mexico will be better able to negotiate and perhaps work with the U.S. on its concerns.

Three additional factors affect future Mexico-U.S. cooperation. The first is that the Mexican Army (and Navy) performs the counter-drug operations in Mexico, not the police force. This is significant because the counter-drug effort is one area where Mexico-U.S. cooperation is relatively good. Consequently, while it may not rise to U.S. expectations, it is certainly something to build on. Second, according to a NORTHCOM civilian, the Mexican Army is the most highly trusted force in Mexico—even above the police force which is still thought to be corrupt. This is significant because if the institution that is most trusted (Army) is the one that cooperates with U.S. organizations, then other organizations can follow their lead with little fear of backlash. Third, Mexico recently bought U.S.-built EC3 Hawkeyes aircraft from Israel which may help in some border/counter-
drug operations. Mexico’s capabilities have improved slightly and it has demonstrated to the U.S. that it is trying to improving improve its capabilities.

Many outside of Colorado Springs call for a Mexican liaison officer to be stationed at NORTHCOM and express dismay that there is none right now. This dismay is somewhat unfounded. There are many questions to ask (and answer) about what a Mexican officer would do at NORTHCOM. Observe, perhaps? How, what, and for what reason? Many call for the sharing of intelligence-information in certain realms as a way to build trust and increase security cooperation (Spinetta 2005). These initiatives are fine and in the context of pursuing initiatives that help meet organizational goals (speaking more specifically of NORTHCOM), are worth pursuing. However, those who propose robust information-sharing initiatives or Mexican Liaison officers “observers” at NORAD, Bi-National Planning Group, and NORTHCOM need to think through the U.S. military’s standard operating procedure of classifying certain pieces of information as “no foreign” (NOFORN). It would be a shame to pursue efforts in the information-sharing area or to pursue a Mexican observer in Colorado Springs without realizing the impact that NOFORN can have on a new, invited member to the team that has an initial perception of mistrust. What will the Mexican officer think when he encounters NOFORN for the first time? If a Mexican observer at NORAD or NORTHCOM is pursued, the NOFORN issue must be minimized to the greatest extent possible to prevent mistrust from growing. NOFORN or similar procedures have as an unfortunate by-product, the capability to reinforce
the initial perception of Mexican mistrust. The U.S. cannot maintain the attitude that the Mexicans or Canadians will just have to “get over it” and expect to have good results.

Another area of future consideration centers on immigration—both legal and illegal and reforms. Prior to 9/11, the U.S. and Mexico seemed poised to implement a temporary worker program to help alleviate this immigration dilemma. A diplomat noted, that it seemed to go away after 9/11. Now, years after 9/11, immigration reform has emerged as a fairly important issue. Since immigration has crept back into the North American security equation, it can be considered a policy area that is part of security cooperation.

A final consideration comes from an observation by the Mexican diplomat. He talked of “cooperation infrastructure” that has been building between Canada and the U.S. for at least thirty years if not more. He provided several examples of this and ultimately made his point that the existence of this infrastructure is why Canada and the U.S. can make more progress today in border cooperation than the U.S. and Mexico. The absence of this infrastructure in Mexico-U.S. cooperation is what hinders better cooperation. He essentially calls for patience and interest in building the cooperation infrastructure between Mexico and the U.S. to a level that Canada and the U.S. experience today. He admits that this will take time, “perhaps two or three decades” he noted. The goal is to have the same type of infrastructure present in Mexico-U.S. border cooperation as exists in Canada-U.S. border cooperation.
Canada-U.S. Cooperation

The data revealed two examples regarding future Canada-U.S. cooperation that demonstrate the positive outlook for this relationship. First, Canada and the U.S. expanded binational cooperation in the creation of the Bi-National Planning Group in 2002. Throughout the interview process, no serious criticism of the Bi-National Planning Group was heard. Indeed, even at the NORTHCOM conference one speaker noted that the Bi-National Planning Group or its functions “needed” to remain in some form. With a mandate for strategic thinking and vision, the Bi-National Planning Group could be an organization that looks outside of NORAD’s status quo and other Canada-U.S. cooperation institutions. This may be the best avenue by which the U.S. and Canada could realistically consider how Mexico can fit into North American security cooperation better.

Second, a U.S. expert on Canada noted that the militaries, through NORAD, enjoy a better cooperative relationship than civilians. In NORAD, officers from both countries work side-by-side, so it is no surprise to see the deep level of commitment and cooperation they have developed. No similar civilian-dominated binational institution exists. The military relationship will continue to foster strong cooperation in the security realm.

Canada-Mexico Cooperation

There were few data that spoke to the state of Canada-Mexico cooperation. The Canadians all seemed to have an attitude that while they do little if anything with Mexico, it is possible that Canada could have a role to play with
Mexico that may not only improve Canada-Mexico cooperation but also Mexico-U.S. cooperation.

For example, a Canadian diplomat noted that Canada understands that the U.S. has a “keen interest” in drawing Mexico deeper into the cooperation equation. Somewhat limiting to Canada-Mexico cooperation is the fact that Canada and Mexico do not share a border. The lack of geographic proximity may indeed hamper relations. He further noted that “Canada wants to be a help to the Mexico-U.S. relationship.” He also noted that Canada does try to emphasize with Mexico that they cannot expect to achieve their goals in the economic realm without giving the U.S. what it wants in the security realm. He concludes that the “key constraint lies with Mexico and its ability and willingness to cooperate.”

North American security cooperation can improve if Canada takes a more active role in its relationship with Mexico. Canada, with its long history of positive cooperation with the U.S. can help assuage Mexico’s concerns in that area. Stacey Wilson-Forsberg and Olga Abizaid Bucio provide a more pointed discussion and recommendations on this relationship in their Canadian Foundation for the Americas policy papers (Wilson-Forsberg 2002; Bucio 2004). Following are policy recommendations that have resulted from this study.

**Recommendations**

(a) The United States, Canadian, and Mexican governments should strive to manage and negotiate NAFTA issues in a truly trilateral fashion rather than the current dual bilateral approach.
(b) The U.S. government should continue to exploit the cooperation experienced with the Mexican Navy in the area of counter-drug operations and information-sharing.

(c) The U.S. government should seek to prevent the loss of International Military Education and Training funds in light of Mexico’s apparent move to sign the International Criminal Court agreement without signing the United State’s Article 98 waiver.

(d) A U.S. Trade Representative should be working at NORTHCOM to facilitate policy decisions that better reflect consideration of not only security issues, but also trade/economic issues.

(e) The U.S. government should seek deeper involvement by the Canadian government in fostering relations with Mexico as a way to create a more trilateral relationship.

(f) The U.S. government should push for establishing the Bi-National Planning Group as a permanent binational plans and policy (J5) organization or ensure the functions currently performed by the Bi-National Planning Group are taken over by another organization along with the manpower and resources to conduct the tasks.

(g) NORTHCOM should partner with local academic institutions to facilitate long-term awareness of how international relations theories may affect their mission. Additionally, these partnerships can facilitate a more collegial and academic forum whereby cooperative ideas can be considered and debated.
Study Limitations

Not all interview participants answered every question primarily due to the qualitative nature of the study and more specifically due to the fact that each participant was regarded as a subject matter expert in a particular area important to this study. While there is a limitation in that we do not possess all the participant’s opinions on every question, we can be reasonably assured we have expert opinions where we need them.

Another limitation concerns how the small pool of Mexicans, and to a lesser extent the Canadians, affect the findings and recommendations. While the difficulty encountered in obtaining Mexican participants in particular is well documented, it would be advantageous to this study for a future researcher to garner a larger population of Mexican participants to answer the questions posed by this study. A larger pool of Canadians would be desired as well. Canadian and Mexican views served to either support the American views or offer key alternative views. Given the small number of Mexicans, it was not possible to settle on major trends or opinions exclusively stemming from the Mexican participant’s answers. A future researcher would need strong ties into the Mexican Army and most likely would have to be a Mexican national; as even some of the researcher’s colleagues who speak Spanish and hail from a Mexican heritage also encountered difficulty in obtaining access to Mexican participants in their research projects. Finally, it is possible that given time, the Mexican Army may grow more open to participating in these types of studies.
Further Research

Building on the limitations discussed above, an area of further research is for a researcher with the right ties and access to the Mexican Army to garner a larger pool of Mexican participants. Doing this would obviously provide a more robust Mexican opinion on the various issues and questions asked in this study. This would allow for a more apples-to-apples comparison of American vs. Mexican views. The same needs to be said for the Canadian participants.

NAFTA, by all accounts is managed as two bilateral agreements. A recommendation from this study implores the U.S. to take the lead and shape NAFTA into a true trilateral agreement. To act on this recommendation may first require further study to understand how NAFTA, touted as a trilateral agreement, has actually emerged as two bilateral agreements. Study of this problem will clarify the forces that shaped NAFTA’s dual bilateral composition. This would provide important causal explanation, on which policymakers could then use to shape NAFTA into a true trilateral agreement.

Similarly and perhaps part and parcel to the suggestion above is an answer to the question of why NAFTA has bred interdependence between Mexico-U.S., and Canada-U.S. but not between Canada-Mexico. Answers to this question would also provide key insight into the reasons that interdependence has grown in some but not all relationships. If hindrances to Canada-Mexico interdependence can be found and subsequently minimized or eliminated, then one could presume the Canada-Mexico relationship would experience growth in interdependence. It
would reason then that all three relationships would experience interdependence and as this study revealed, breed cooperation in the security realm.

As discovered in this study, speculation abounds as to why the Mexican Army, when compared to the Mexican Navy does not want to cooperate. Some, but not all of the speculations were discussed in this study. It would be worthwhile to study the various speculations in detail to identify the valid ones and hopefully determine the causal explanations for this perception. If this were accomplished, then NORTHCOM and other organizations with a mandate to include Mexico in more cooperative ventures could better target their energies at the real reason for a lack of cooperation.

The theoretical explanations behind NORTHCOM’s creation are in doubt and further research to clarify this uncertainty would be helpful. NORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security (in the U.S.) plus CanadaCom and the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada office (in Canada) were, by most accounts, created quickly and in response to 9/11. Elite attitudes and influence on cooperation could be one causal explanation. Another explanation could be grounded in the bureaucratic inertia perspective that states a major crisis will cause significant change. Clarifying this uncertainty would help refine the explanatory value of both perspectives for a recent, significant change in North American security cooperation from two of the three North American states. That determination could add greatly to the theoretical understanding and explanation of causes for increased cooperation.
Another area for further study may be to explore how deep the military-civilian culture clash is at the Pentagon and consequently, how this could be affecting security cooperation efforts. Does this culture clash, discussed in chapter two, hinder change to a significant degree? If the answer is yes, then efforts should be directed to alleviate this clash or at best help facilitate better understanding between the two demographics. If the answer is no, then we can dismiss this issue.

Finally, one academician proposed another perspective by which to study North American security cooperation. He proposed to study the influence of geographic proximity on cooperation positing that “if there were no security threats, then there would be no NORAD, but, there would still be a NAFTA.” It is logical to think that geographic proximity could be a part of the explanation for why Canada and Mexico do not experience the level of cooperation and interdependence that is experienced between Canada and the U.S. and even Mexico and the U.S. A study, of North American security cooperation from this perspective would require a comparison to other theoretical perspectives to help determine the extent of its affect on cooperation. In other words, we would need to make sure we could compare it to other theoretical explanations.
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Since this is a qualitative study, the questions asked during interviews do not have to be the same exact questions for each interviewee. As such, questions will be formulated as a result of two emphases: (a) Focus on the three possible explanations for the lack of new security agreements; (b) Follow-on questions that arise from initial research and during interviews. The questions below have been grouped first by civilian/military and then by the three possible explanations. Some questions provide insight into more than one area.

Questions for Civilian Policy-Makers

Bureaucratic Inertia

1. What organizational challenges exist within your organization that hinder and/or must be addressed in pursuing security cooperation, NORAD expansion or other new security agreements?

2. What external influences exist that hinder and/or must be addressed in pursuing security cooperation, NORAD expansion or other new security agreements?

3. How did 9/11 contribute to increased security cooperation for your country?

4. How does the National Security Strategy (NSS) or other external sources affect the development of security cooperation initiatives?

   Economic—security spillover effects from integration
1. What is the actual or perceived effect of NAFTA on your country’s economy and on your country’s likelihood to enter into more robust security agreements?

2. What ties do you see if any, between economic cooperation initiatives and security cooperation initiatives?

3. Have security cooperation initiatives increased between your country and the other two countries with the implementation of NAFTA? 9/11?

4. What are the apparent pressing motivations for your country to enter into further security or economic agreements?

5. What initiatives need to occur to foster stronger security cooperation and draw Mexico further into the security cooperation equation?

6. Was the idea of NORAD expansion with Mexico discussed before 9/11? Before the implementation of NAFTA?

7. Would you advocate for increased free trade agreements through expansion of NAFTA or some new economic agreement (perhaps with a different country)?

8. Some have proposed a North American Investment Fund so Mexico’s infrastructure and education system can be improved. They argue that a buildup of infrastructure (roads) stretching from Southern to Northern Mexico will increase foreign and domestic investment in the Southern region. This in turn will slow immigration to Northern Mexico and the U.S. and decrease the development gap which will lead to better economic and security agreements between Mexico and the U.S. Do you agree or disagree with this proposal and why?

9. What are the successes of NAFTA and what are the areas of concerns?
Attitudes and perceptions towards integration

1. How important is it to your country’s security to see NORAD expanded either regionally—include Mexico—or functionally—maritime cooperation?
2. How important is it to North American security to see an expanded NORAD or other new security arrangement?
3. How has your country’s threat assessment and security posture changed since the end of the Cold War? After the implementation of NAFTA? After 9/11?
4. Has the establishment of the USNORTHCOM helped or hindered security cooperation between the three countries? Why or why not?
5. Some claim the failure to construct multilateral institutions in North America has been largely deliberate. Canada often thinks that it can extract a better deal from the United States when acting alone and because Washington is not in a multilateral mood these days; Mexico has been the lone advocate of trilateral cooperation. Do you agree or disagree and why?
6. Is security cooperation more likely with one country over another and if so, why?

Questions for Military Officers:

Bureaucratic Inertia

1. How has your country’s threat assessment and security posture changed since the end of the Cold War? After the implementation of NAFTA? After 9/11?
2. How did 9/11 contribute to increased security cooperation for your country?
3. What organizational challenges exist within your organization that hinder and/or must be addressed in pursuing security cooperation, NORAD expansion or other new security agreements?

4. What obstacles exist within your military that hinder security cooperation with the other two countries?

5. What external influences exist that hinder and/or must be addressed in pursuing security cooperation, NORAD expansion or other new security agreements?

6. How and why has the “threat list” in your country changed?

   Economic – security spillover effects from integration

   1. How has the military been culturally or organizationally affected by NAFTA if at all?

   2. What is the actual or perceived effect of NAFTA on your country’s economy and on your country’s likelihood to enter into more robust security agreements?

   Attitudes and perceptions towards integration

   1. What is your military’s general perception towards the other two countries and specifically, their militaries and why?

   2. Do current military capabilities of your military, when compared to the other two, facilitate or hinder security cooperation?

   3. Has the establishment of the USNORTHCOM helped or hindered security cooperation between the three countries? Why or why not?

276
4. How important is it to your country’s security to see NORAD expanded either regionally—include Mexico—or functionally—maritime cooperation?

5. How important is it to North American security to see an expanded NORAD or other new security arrangement?

6. What are the apparent pressing motivations for your country to enter into further security agreements?

7. Is security cooperation more likely with one country over another and if so, why?

8. What are the apparent pressing motivations for your country not to enter into further security agreements?

9. Have you ever worked with members of or been assigned to organizations that allowed you to work with military members from the other countries?

   Additional Questions for NORAD/USNORTHCOM/DOD Headquarters Personnel:

   1. How did the organizational culture of NORAD allow for or limit the possibility of adding Mexico to this organization? Is the civilian or military culture more limiting?

   2. Was the idea of NORAD expansion with Mexico discussed before 9/11? Before the implementation of NAFTA?

   3. How has NORAD adjusted/expanded to the new security threats?
## APPENDIX B: KEYWORD SEARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keywords</th>
<th>BI</th>
<th>Spill</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Done</th>
<th>Hits</th>
<th>Analyzed</th>
<th>Merged?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;911&quot;</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dis)Trust</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(US)NORTHCOM</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes/Elites</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14/5</td>
<td>19-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation/Coordination</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/Cultural</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12-Sep-05</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12-Sep-05</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint/JS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations/Hindrances</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINA</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12-Sep-05</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime/Navy</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18-Oct-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA/Trade</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22/17</td>
<td>17-Oct-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6-Oct-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7-Oct-05</td>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDENA</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21-Sep-05</td>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6-Oct-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat(s) (assessment)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14-Sep-05</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Yes 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillover</td>
<td>Yes 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11-Oct-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions</td>
<td>Yes 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20-Sep-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations on Elite Att</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21-Sep-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Inertia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13-Sep-05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Baer, Delal M., Chairman and Senior Fellow, Mexico Project, CSIS, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, the Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism, 27 April 2000.


Copley, Gregory, “Are We Serious About Sovereignty?” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, July-August 2004.


Cronin, Patrick M., Senior Vice President and Director of Studies, CSIS, Testimony before the International Relations Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 5 November 2003.


Diaz, Miguel. South American Project Director, CSIS, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, 24 June 2004.


_______. Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, U.S. Policy toward the Western Hemisphere; Challenges and Opportunities, 21 October 2003.


_______. Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, U.S. Policy toward the Western Hemisphere; Challenges and Opportunities, 21 October 2003.


288


