**INTEGRATION IN THE RANKS: EXPLAINING THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PRESSURE AND ATTITUDBINAL CHANGE ON U.S. MILITARY POLICY**

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WPAFB OH 45433

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14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
   a. REPORT  b. ABSTRACT  c. THIS PAGE

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
   a. NAME  b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
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A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government

By

Richard J. Bailey, Jr., M.A.

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Washington, DC
August 25, 2006

20070129141
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

If I were to list everyone who was influential in making this research a reality individually, the size of this dissertation would double in size. So let me just say that to all of my friends and family who helped to make this dream come true, I am forever in your debt. Your kindness, compassion, patience, encouragement, motivation, and dedication were truly lifesaving. This project is dedicated to you, and to all those who serve a cause higher than themselves.
DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Puzzle

"If a group is to function and develop, one of the most important areas for clear consensus is the perception of who is in the new group and who is out (or not in), and the criteria by which inclusionary decisions are made. New members cannot really function and concentrate on their primary task if they are insecure about their membership, and the group cannot really maintain a good sense of itself if it does not have a way of defining itself and its boundaries."

- Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture, 2004

In 1948 President Harry Truman issued an executive order which mandated racial integration in the U.S. military. Although there was a noticeable undertaking by some to stall reform efforts, the military establishment eventually followed the order and integrated successfully; this predated the landmark Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka by six years and the first overarching Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 16 years. The integration of homosexuals in the military, however, is a much different story. In 1992, William Clinton pledged during his presidential campaign to allow homosexuals to serve openly. After his election, Clinton
found it extremely difficult to keep that promise. Pressures from both inside and outside the military establishment fought to block the new policy.

Clinton’s compromise with a reluctant military establishment led to a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which took effect on July 15th, 1993. This was not groundbreaking legislation. In fact, it is a policy that “when read between the lines, looked almost exactly like the old one” (Shawver 1995: 1).

The issue of desegregation in the U.S. military provides an interesting paradox. When compared to other organizations in the American bureaucracy, and perhaps American society as a whole, the military is generally regarded as having been one of the pioneers of racial integration. But with sexual orientation, the military seems to have lagged behind. So why was the military such a great proving ground for successful racial integration, but a problematic institution for sexual orientation integration? This research will answer this question by analyzing military integration on three levels: a cross-national quantitative analysis of military integration causes; a historical case study focusing on American institutions; and an organizational analysis concentrating on the structure and culture of the United States military. Before outlining the research design, however, it is
important to understand some of the historical background regarding military integration.

Historical Background

In outlining the puzzle, one might infer that military integration is a relatively new concept. However, the military's struggles both with race relations and with sexual orientation date back almost to the military's establishment in the United States.

Race

"In a very real sense, there has been a dialectic of 'fear' and 'love' guiding the participation of Afro-Americans in the military. Nested within this dialectic, however, is the fact that the military has consistently contributed to the social integration of Afro-Americans into the larger society" (Butler 1991: 27).

The history of military service by African-Americans in the United States shows a pattern of "inclusion by necessity." Put simply, African-Americans were brought into the military in times of war, and then excluded again at the conclusion of conflict. Even in the British colonies, free African-Americans in the north and slaves in the south were used as soldiers when the need arose. This occurred in multiple conflicts with Native American
tribes and four American wars against the French. In each case, exclusion
laws and practices were either overturned temporarily or simply overlooked.
And in the Revolutionary War, necessity again dictated inclusion. George
Washington originally banned African-Americans from military service until
the British offered black soldiers their freedom if they joined forces with
them. When news of the offer reached Washington, he immediately
withdrew his original intentions and offered military service to free African-
Americans, 5,000 of whom served in the war (Butler 1991: 34-36).

In the Civil War, race was obviously an important consideration. The
Confederacy was concerned that slaves might rise up against their masters,
and thus were never armed. Free African-Americans in the north generally
supported the war, but weren’t allowed to serve until after the Emancipation
Proclamation. By the end of the conflict, nearly 180,000 troops had served
valiantly in separate army units (Butler 1991: 36-37).

In World War I, 200,000 African-Americans served in conflict, and
again in separate units. But by the dawn of World War II, when the nation
once again called out to the African-American community for help, there was
a new concern. The brutality of World War I and the ‘return to status quo’
treatment by the country after the conflict were reasons to hesitate.
Community leaders expressed concerns that if the African-American population were to serve (and over 900,000 did), things were going to need to change (Butler 1991: 37-38). And as in previous conflicts, these troops performed magnificently. For example, groups such as the Tuskegee Airmen performed so well that they started to gain recognition not just from the African-American community but from society at large. The seeds were planted for social reform.

Sexual Orientation

"The history of homosexuality in the United States armed forces has been a struggle between two intransigent facts – the persistent presence of gays within the military and the equally persistent hostility toward them. All the drama and controversy surrounding the demand for acceptance by lesbians and gay men in uniform represents the culmination of this conflict, one that dates back to the founding of the Republic" (Baird 1995: 151).

It is clear that homosexuals have been serving in the military for years, maybe since its inception. They serve (and have served) in every branch and in every combat unit, and attend (and have graduated from) every military service academy. "In the past decade, gay people have served as generals in every branch of the armed forces. The Marine Corps has also had at least one gay person at four-star rank since 1981, and at least one gay man has served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that time" (Shilts 1995: 152). In fact, almost all
literature on the service of homosexuals in the military reveals their strong record of patriotic service. Yet the military’s struggle with the issue paints a different picture. The military establishment has fought continuously to prevent an openly gay system. And as stated earlier, the struggle is not a particularly new one. The practice of removing soldiers from service for same-sex behavior dates back to the March 11, 1778, when a lieutenant was kicked out of the Continental Army for sodomy (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 51). Since then, the historical analysis reveals a continuing pattern of censure, but most of it before the previous century was based solely on informal policies.

In the years preceding America’s entry into World War I, the military began to formalize their position. The 1916 Articles of War first identified sodomy as a military crime, punishable in military courts of law. Opponents of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy assert that the 1993 compromise is “really a continuation of those military policies that have been selectively enacted, enforced, rationalized, ignored, and repealed since the Articles of War went into effect” (Haggerty 2003: 10). During the interwar period, perhaps because of the military drawdown following World War I, and because of society’s strong desire to prevent future wars, the focus shifted to
making the military a more efficient force. The by-product of this shift was a concentration on what characteristics of military personnel would be most effective in combat. By World War II, "the newly respected profession of psychiatry had convinced military leaders that homosexuals as a group, regardless of abstinence from sexual activity, possessed personality traits that made them undesirable as service members" (Leonard 1997: viii). The important question here, as will be discussed in-depth later, is whether or not sexual status was, or is, different than sexual conduct. This question has been the cornerstone of the legal and constitutional debates on the subject. In 1942, the Committee on Neuropsychiatry of the National Research Council (NRC), met to examine the consequences of military service by homosexuals. Their conclusions centered on the division of homosexuals into three personality types:

The first was the homosexual who committed additional offenses in connection with sexual gratification; the second was the confirmed homosexual whose activities were confined to seeking out other contacts; and the third, and the most problematic, was the casual homosexual who yielded to seduction due to immaturity, curiosity, or inebriation (Haggerty 2003: 15).

The NRC concluded that the first two groups should be removed from service, but that the third group could be 'reclaimed' by the military and had
the propensity to be good soldiers. This recommendation led to the 1944 issuance of Circular Number 3 by the Secretary of War, which gave jurisdiction to the officers exercising control over courts-martial to determine whether or not the individuals in question could be reclaimed for military service (Haggerty 2003: 16). The same emphasis on the psychological effects of homosexuality continued throughout the 1940s. In a lecture given to Navy recruits in 1948, the homosexual was "portrayed as a psychologically unsound person who expended a great deal of energy in the seduction of the innocent in order to fulfill his own sexual needs" (Haggerty 2003: 19). Sailors were then told that these individuals may be difficult to identify, and thus they needed to avoid all contact with suspicious characters, and to report any unusual activities to their supervisors. In other words, service members became *de facto* 'morality-based' police officers, on the lookout for homosexual tendencies among their peers. In 1949, the Department of Defense solidified the position of the Navy and the NRC by issuing a memorandum. "While still allowing each branch of service to develop its own regulations concerning the separation of homosexual personnel, the memorandum reiterated the belief that lesbians and gay men posed security risks and proved unsuitable for military service" (Haggerty 2003: 20). In
addition, this gave commanders of military units some autonomy in determining the usefulness of homosexual members under their purview. This position lasted throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

In the 1970s however, an increased visibility of homosexuality in American society gave way to an increasing uneasiness in homosexual service members about their forced silence (Leonard 1997: viii). Several service members began to speak out against the policies that had kept them in the closet for so long. Eventually, the issues were brought to the courts. The first case, *Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force*, argued that since commanders were given discretion to retain service members, the policy was unfair and would really be based on an individual commander’s personal judgment not of the individual, but of the practice of homosexuality.

Leonard Matlovich, an Air Force Sergeant, and Vernon Berg, a Lieutenant in the Navy, had been discharged by their respective commanders for engaging in homosexual activity with civilians, yet both had excellent service records. They convinced a federal appeals court that the current autonomy for commanders “imposed some sort of rationality requirement that might have been violated in their cases” (Leonard 1997: viii). After the *Matlovich*
decision, the branches of the armed forces quickly took the commanders’ discretion clause out of their formal policies on homosexuality.

The next round of court decisions focused on service members’ right to privacy, specifically regarding homosexual conduct. The Supreme Court, with the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick in the summer of 1986, “made it resoundingly clear that no fundamental privacy right attaches to consensual homosexual sodomy” (Halley 1997: 1). Again, the debate between status and conduct became a prominent issue. The cases leading up to Clinton’s policy (and since) “show that the status/conduct distinction actually has two components. The first component is the substance of the rule itself: Punishment and discrimination must be based on conduct, not status. The second component is evidentiary: Status itself cannot be used as the ‘evidence’ of conduct... [T]he state cannot rely on the status per se to impute underlying criminal conduct. Instead, the state needs direct evidence of conduct in order to punish its commission as conduct” (Valdez 1997: 68). In other words, the military cannot prosecute homosexuals simply because they are homosexuals. By the statute as it exists today, the military can only punish illegal conduct (based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ). This was exemplified by the Steffan v. Perry decision by the District
of Columbia Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals in 1994. Joseph Steffan had been dismissed from the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis for declaring his homosexuality, but claimed that his conduct did not violate UCMJ policies. The court agreed that his admittance did not constitute illegal conduct, stating: “To permit discharge on the basis of such an inference would contravene both principles of rationality review and constitutional guarantees. Additionally, we find no rational non-conduct justification for the regulations, insofar as they penalize a simple admission of homosexuality” (Leonard 1997: 202). But not all courts have agreed with the ruling, nor have they been consistent with their decisions. In *Bowers v. Hardwick*, the Supreme Court held that “the due process clause does not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy,” claiming that judicial protection under the clause was only applicable to rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” (Sunstein 1997: 205). In other words, the Supreme Court in this case decided that some aspects of homosexual lifestyles were inconsistent with the traditional values of the republic and therefore didn’t warrant constitutional protection.
Obviously, there are still huge disagreements about how to effectively establish a policy which simultaneously respects the right to privacy of military members, eases tensions about morality and cohesion in military units, and keeps both the military establishment and the civilian elites satisfied. The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy attempted to create a compromise between differing factions, but still discriminates both the status and conduct of homosexuals. The Department of Defense’s Defense Authorization Act of 1994 explicitly states the policy by listing the three reasons for automatic separation from service for homosexual members:

1. That the member has engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts...
2. That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual...
3. That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex.

(Leonard 1997: 225)

The status/conduct distinction is again important here. If the conditions for the second reason are met, then dismissal is really only initiated by the admission of status, not necessarily by any breach of military conduct. Yet the Act implies that the admission of homosexuality is misconduct – admitting status is, in this case, a breach of conduct. This clause complicates
(and will continue to complicate) the legal debates on this issue, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

The American Bureaucracy and Organizational Culture

Does the military behave the way it does because of its structure or its position in the American bureaucracy? James Q. Wilson stated that bureaucracies act the way they do, and enact specific rules and procedures, because that is exactly what our society requires them to do. He outlines a model for categorizing organizations within the American bureaucracy based on society's ability to observe their outputs and outcomes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outputs (Daily Work)</th>
<th>Outputs (Daily Work)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observable</td>
<td>Unobservable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes Observable</td>
<td>Production Orgs.</td>
<td>Craft Orgs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wilson 1989: 158)

Figure 1.1. Bureaucratic Organization Categories
When an organization's outputs and outcomes are observable by the public, they are referred to as Production Organizations. Examples of Production Organizations are the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). For example, the public sees what the IRS does and how it operates (especially during the early spring months), and sees the outcome in the form of a highly publicized government budget. Leaders in Production Organizations, for this reason, are more likely to have an impact on the organization, especially since they may gain support (and require support) from the public. When both outputs and outcomes are unobservable, they are referred to as Coping Organizations. Examples of Coping Organizations are police departments, schools, and the U.S. State Department. Here, standard operating procedures are important because the organizations really have no interaction with the public regarding their specific tasks. No one knows, for example, the actual charter of the State Department, nor does anyone really know when it is successful in that mission. When outputs are unobservable but outcomes observed, the agency is called a Craft Organization. Examples are the Forest Service and the Army Corps of Engineers. In Craft Organizations, culture becomes the highest
value. These organizations tend to rely on organizational tradition and a code (ethical or otherwise) to function. Finally, the opposite of Craft Organizations are Procedural Organizations, where outputs are observed but outcomes are not. One example is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In every common workplace you may find tips, rules, or standards developed from OSHA policies, but the public rarely rates or evaluates the success of the organization itself. Here, tasks are of critical importance; OSHA, for example, defines itself by its charter (ensuring safe working environments for Americans).

It is difficult to place the military in any particular category here because its position in the model changes between peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the military resembles a Procedural Organization. We can drive by a military installation and see troops exercising, or aircraft practicing for combat, but without a war, the public has no way of evaluating whether or not the military is performing well (discounting the theory of deterrence, which posits that by maintaining a strong military we discourage would-be aggressors from leading us into war). In wartime, the opposite is true. It becomes a Craft Organization; we obviously know if it is successful, but may not see day-to-day what the military is doing in a distant land to
achieve our national security objectives. And based on Wilson’s analysis, a peacetime military relies on tasks (drills, etc.) while a wartime military relies on culture (tradition and codes). This may have implications for the study of discrimination in organizations like the military.

Does this organizational culture actually contribute to the discrimination by the military? Its leaders certainly assert that the inclusion of homosexuals threatens unit morale and cohesion, “that good morale is central to our having a good fighting force and that removing the ban would compromise our country’s ability to defend itself. It is an argument that gets our attention” (Shawver 1995: 94). Or do policies like the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” actually perpetuate the culture itself, by eliminating “mature gay people who could fit comfortably into its institutional structure while keeping less mature people who are struggling neurotically with secret homosexual feelings?” If so, this would foster “the formation of neurotic guilt along with anonymous sexual encounters and, sometimes, aggressive behaviors and loveless heterosexual marriages that are designed to hide what the military says cannot be told” (Shawver 1995: 63).

And is this discrimination unique to the military? In 1953, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10450, which “codified ‘sexual
perversion’ as ground for dismissal from federal jobs. By some estimates, dismissals from federal employment increased tenfold” (Haggerty 2003: 21). Today, however, many of the agencies in the American bureaucracy are held to national standards which protect the rights of homosexuals especially in the workplace. “The experiences of domestic police and fire services in major U.S. cities, including New York, Chicago, Houston, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Washington, D.C., suggest that American culture has already begun to change and that the military is lagging behind civilian society, not leading the way as a ‘social laboratory’ on this issue” (D’Amico 2000: 258-9). And while there are no perfect analogies, agencies like police and fire departments, which also involve command hierarchies and formal pseudo-military structures, may provide some evidence as to the possibility of success with an openly gay military.

Several unique characteristics of the military make it difficult to compare to other agencies within the American bureaucracy. First of all, the military does not claim that everyone has a right to serve. They clearly discriminate based on many features that may be “disqualifying, such as height, weight, prior conduct record, membership in groups with certain objectives, or mental category... The rights and needs of the group are
emphasized while individual rights and needs are often set aside or sacrificed for military necessity” (Baird 1995: 159). The debate centers on whether or not a service member’s sexual orientation makes him or her unfit for service, or if that characteristic harms the needs of the group. The other unique characteristic of the military (and the obvious one) is that we rely on it to fight our wars. As such, in the past we have given the military more autonomy than other agencies to decide how best to go about achieving that task. The concept of centralized command, but decentralized execution, is a mainstay of military doctrine. As a nation, we rely on the military to make decisions necessary to its mission, allow it to run its own judicial system, and entrust the planning of operations to soldiers in battle. Ultimately, as General Douglas MacArthur told a graduating class at West Point, “through all this welter of [social] change and development, [their] mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable – it is to win our wars” (Wells-Petry 1993: 187).

How far should that autonomy go? In other words, is there (or should there be) a balance for an organization like the U.S. military between making the decisions necessary to win wars, and the demand from a democratic society to respect the right to privacy and the other personal freedoms of its members (as well as the desire for the military to model and follow social
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy formed a crossroads in this debate, because younger generations, who have been exposed much more to the homosexual identity through the media and elsewhere, may have ideological problems with forcing individuals into secrecy. "For [an older] generation who experienced the brutality of active exclusion, invisibility may seem a small price for security. A less cowed younger generation may be less likely to accept exclusion through invisibility, believing that 'Silence = Death'" (Gamson 1997: 10).

Finally, how are organizations (especially Craft and Procedural ones) affected or influenced by public opinion? If "data on public attitudes toward allowing lesbians and gays to serve in the military indicate that there has been at least modest majority approval since the late 1970s," (Yang 1997: 481) then how much impact does that (or will that) have on pressures for organizational change?
II. The Research Design

The research design used to answer the original questions and advance the current literature on the subject will incorporate a multi-method approach, and will consist of three main parts: (1) An international comparison which will rely primarily on quantitative methods, thus exploring global external factors; (2) A qualitative case study analysis of the 1948 and 1993 efforts at military integration, focusing on national external factors such as societal pressure and governmental institutions such as the Presidency, Congress, and the Courts, as well as public opinion; and (3) An examination of the military’s organizational structure and culture, and their effect on policy formation and implementation (thus focusing on internal institutional factors).

Part 1. International Comparative Analysis (Chapters 2 and 3)

Three Factors

A nation’s military may adopt a policy of full inclusion for several reasons, but three key factors seem to stand out as possible explanations.
Factor 1: The Philosophy/Morality Factor. The first is the Morality/Philosophy Factor, which posits that nations with more liberal societies would tend to support anti-discrimination policies. For example, a nation where 75% of the population would have no problem living next door to a homosexual might be more likely to drop the ban on gays in the military than a nation where only 25% are tolerant.

Factor 2: The Military Need Factor. The second is the Organizational Need Factor, which would argue that the more a nation needs its military, or struggles with military recruitment, the more likely to adopt a full inclusion policy. Let us assume that Country A has a military that in the last 50 years has been used twice as much as the military from Country B. The Military Need Theory would predict that Country A is more likely to lift the ban because it simply needs more willing soldiers to continue its pattern of military usage, and discrimination hurts its recruiting efforts (the original assumption here was that these countries do not employ mandatory military service.)

Factor 3: The Political Players Factor. The third is the Political Players Factor, which would argue that the personal preferences, ideologies and backgrounds of the decision-makers are solely responsible for the policy
outcomes. In this case, the political party in power (as well as that of the legislature in each country) would be critical to any nation seeking to lift its ban. In the United States, for example, a Republican Party-controlled Congress along with a sitting Republican president might not be as likely to lift the ban as an administration where both branches and the White House are controlled by the Democrats.

In this dissertation, I will use a cross-national approach to model the first two theories simultaneously. While the quantitative analysis here ignores the Political Players Factor, my case study analysis in section two of the dissertation (Chapter 4) will focus on the leadership styles of Truman and Clinton, to determine the impact of presidential authority on military policy.

Data Collection/Methodology

Because this research tests two different theories (which attempt to explain the same policy), no single dataset existed to guide us through this exploration. Thus, I created a dataset specifically for this research; it is composed of specific information from three unique datasets. The dependent variable is a dichotomous one, signifying whether or not a nation has
adopted a policy of full inclusion for homosexuals. The independent variables attempt to codify a nation’s philosophical stance and military need. The first challenge was tapping into a nation’s views of tolerance. The most robust dataset available was the World Values Survey, from the University of Michigan. This yielded specific attitudes of respondents from different countries on topics of homosexuality, confidence in the armed forces, ideological self-placement, and church attendance. The World Values Survey from 2001, for example, contains the results from over 270,000 interviews (each of which involved answers to over 300 questions) in 65 nations and principalities. As such, the survey sample represents approximately 80 percent of the world’s population. Ultimately, results from this survey were aggregated and tabulated to calculate country-specific means on particular questions. Thus, a nation’s specific thermometer rating on homosexuality is based on the results of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 respondents’ answers to that specific question from the World Values interview in that particular country. The second dataset, World Data, gave specific information regarding each state’s civil liberties index, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) value, and type of democracy. Finally, the Correlates of War Dataset
presented information on how many conflicts a particular nation experiences, as well as its military size and expenditures.

From this analysis, we may be able to examine what factors are most important in determining a state's tolerance toward military service by homosexuals. In addition, we may be able to assess what factors in American society are responsible for the current policy. In addition, if such an analysis reveals that the United States is an exception (in other words, that because the United States shares the same basic indicators as the 23 nations which have lifted the ban on gays in the military), this will serve as a good starting point; the other two sections of the dissertation will try to explain this phenomenon.

Part 2. Case Study Analysis (Chapter 4)

The second part of the research will utilize a qualitative case study to examine the details of Truman's 1948 Executive Order to racially integrate the military and Clinton's 1993 attempt to integrate homosexuals. The study
will contain an in-depth analysis of the historic and cultural contexts of each case.

The research will begin with a pre-emption to a selection bias argument. Acknowledgement of the reasons why this may not be a perfect comparison (the aforementioned debate on whether homosexuality is a trait or a choice, the impact of religion, etc.) will be followed by a list of reasons showing how the cases are similar (detailing the military establishment’s reasons for tending to oppose racial integration in the 1940s and homosexuals in the 1990s, such as lowering morale, unit cohesion, and combat capability).

Next, a detailed narrative will explain each case. It will concentrate on public attitudes toward the discriminated group in each instance, the military establishment’s position, and the leadership factors involved. It will also account for the organizational differences between the U.S. military in 1948 and 1993.

While seminal works on the presidency deal with strategies for success in achieving policy preferences (Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1993; Skowronek 1993; Cameron 2000) or the president’s relationship with the military (Linn 2003; Herspring 2005), much work still needs to be done to understand the military establishment’s relatively new position as a
prominent political force, working either together or in conflict with the president, Congress, the judiciary, and general social public opinion.

At stake in the comparison of the racial and sexual orientation case studies is an understanding of the responsibility of bureaucratic agencies like the military. "The opinion (that the Army has a social as well as a military mission) came into prominence at the same time the military was becoming more and more 'civilianized' in the public consciousness" (Wells-Petry 1993: 132-3). As such, society began to demand that the military reflect the norms of society. But these two cases show that the temporal relationship has not been perfect. In other words, while racial integration took place in the military (arguably) before it was embraced by American society, the opposite has happened with sexual orientation. Barry Goldwater reflected in 1993 on racial integration: "Years ago I was a lieutenant in charge of an all-black unit. Military leaders at the time believe that blacks lacked leadership potential - period. That seems ridiculous now, as it should. Now, each and every man and woman who serves this nation takes orders from a black man - our own Gen. Colin Powell. Nobody thought blacks or women could be integrated into the military. Many thought an all-volunteer force could never protect our national interest. Well, it has - and despite those who feared the worst, I
among them, we are still the best and will continue to be" (Baird 1995: 184).

In that same article, Goldwater, who had a reputation as a fierce conservative, uncharacteristically made the claim that supporting an openly gay military was a good move, and an important one to make. His reason for supporting the move was based on lessons that he learned from racial integration.

We may also learn more about the importance of presidential leadership by examining these cases. Is it “possible that presidents can initiate a public deliberation that leads to longer term attitude change?” (Bailey et al 2003: 22-23) Or is it true that “a president’s ability to effect major policy change on his own is in many instances less dependent on personality and powers of persuasion than on the office’s formal authority and the inherent characteristics of government institutions?” (Mayer 1999: 463) A comparison between the leadership styles of Truman and Clinton may shed light on the reasons for the different outcomes, and teach us more about the importance of presidential posturing.

The same study may tell us more about the impact of public opinion, and about the relationships between society and bureaucratic organizations. “The lessons to be drawn from both race and sex integration are that military
policy can change, but such change takes time and encounters resistance that can be overcome with training, commitment by civilian policymakers and military leaders, and continued political pressure from interest groups and public opinion” (D’Amico 2000: 258).

Ultimately, this section of the dissertation will attempt to tease out strong correlations between the cases, and hopefully lead to generalizations that can be made about the influence of organizational culture, social norms, presidential power, and public opinion.

Part 3. Organizational Culture (Chapters 5 and 6)

The final section of the dissertation will attempt to answer the exclusion phenomenon by examining the bureaucratic structure and organizational culture of the U.S. military. In other words, does the answer to the race/sexual orientation puzzle lie within the military itself? While external factors may make important contributions, the way an organization is set up can have huge impacts as well (Cameron 1999; Wilson 2001; Schein 2004). This analysis will pay particular attention to the role of tasks and culture in popular organizational models, and the role society and leadership
play in their development over time. Field research will be conducted at the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSMM), located at the University of California – Santa Barbara (UCSB). Information will be collected on the specific organizational culture factors which feed discrimination, and on the catalysts for organizational change. I will also examine attitudes within the military about homosexuality, to determine if resistance to integration exists only among military elites (who presumably have the greatest impact on forming military policy), or particular skill sets (for example, perhaps personnel in the medical field are more tolerant of homosexuality than direct combat units). If so, then predictions can probably be made about future policy implications. To ascertain trends in military attitudes, I will use two sets of data. The first is provided by the Center for the Study of International Security’s (CSIS) “American Military Culture in the 21st Century” study. The second is the “Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society” project completed in 2000 by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS). Together, these studies surveyed more than 16,000 military and civilian personnel and held more than 125 focus groups worldwide. These datasets will provide clues as to prevailing
military culture and attitudes, and may point to internal structural causes for military policy trends.

In addition, an examination of military structure over time may provide serious clues. For example, is it possible that the transformation from a draft service to an all-volunteer force caused shifts in military culture? Several noted scholars (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1971; Ricks 1997; Holsti 2000; Feaver and Kohn 2001) argue about the existence of a gap between the military and civil society in terms of values and policy preferences. The presence of such a gap tends to explain policy differences between the military and civil society, and thus illuminates the conflict that can occur between military elites and their civilian bosses (namely, the President and Congress).

If the data taken from the CSIS and TISS studies show that indeed a generation differential exists (in other words, showing that attitudes about homosexuality vary significantly between military elites, mid-level officers, and junior service-members), then the evidence will suggest that time is the most important factor for those seeking a fundamental military policy change. But if the data suggests more homogeneous attitudes, then it will highlight a more systemic, institutional cause. This outcome will support
literature on the civil-military gap and mean that policy change will not occur naturally over time. In other words, a catalyst will indeed be necessary.

This analysis will not only give us insight into the group dynamics inherent in the military, but perhaps empower us to make more broad assessments about an agency’s connection to social norms, and the impact of those norms on changing organizational culture.

This research design is certainly an ambitious undertaking. It employs three different research methods and approaches the question on individual, local, national, and international levels. But a careful attention to the facts and interpretation of data, combined with a concerted effort to adequately represent all sides of the issue, should lead us to genuine advances in our knowledge of organizational culture and the impact of social norms on changes to military policy. The dissertation will also provide evidence which will inform other crucial debates, such as: What factors facilitate military policy changes in the United States? How important is it for a military (especially the American military) to model social norms? Does societal pressure to conform affect a unit’s ability to wage (and win) wars? Are there any unique characteristics of the American military (or American society)
that explain the policy differences when compared to other militaries? Can the tension between the military establishment and pressures for social change be a litmus test for the so-called 'civil-military gap'? If so, what institutional factors have contributed to that foundation?

Certainly, particular policy implications can be drawn from this study, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. One may make assessments about the current ban on openly gay service members. Others may make assumptions about the validity of a 'gender-blind' military draft, if the U.S. ever uses one again. But the more important lessons should be more broadly defined. Namely, in what manner do social norms ultimately tease out organizational change? With this perspective, the study becomes applicable to much more than just the U.S. military, because it may illustrate more generally how large organizations respond to social pressures for change. Ultimately, the research may even influence specific policy changes that better represent the needs of the military while protecting the rights of all of its service members.
Chapter 2

A GLOBAL VIEW OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY

Theoretical Concepts

"Among aristocratic peoples, the officer, quite apart from his rank in the army, also occupies a high rank in society... In a democratic society, any soldier can become an officer, so that the desire for advancement is general and military ambition almost boundless."

- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835

If Tocqueville was correct, it is quite possible that the military is the agency within a nation’s governmental structure best equipped to provide upward social mobility to individuals who might otherwise be the focus of discrimination. But clearly each individual state has unique characteristics which shape different social relationships. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how different countries struggle with discrimination in the military, both in terms of race and sexual orientation. The next chapter will build on this study by employing a cross-national quantitative analysis of military policies toward homosexuality. The goal of these two chapters is to ascertain which factors tend to explain, even in the midst of an incredibly diverse international system, why some countries are more tolerant in their military
personnel policies than others. Such commonalities may shed light on how similar, or different, the United States is compared to other countries. This chapter will first define the theoretical relationships which exist between a society, the state, and its military, and examine those relationships within the broader context of race relations and sexual orientation integration. Next, a discussion of international examples will highlight the fact that the United States is not alone in its struggles over military integration. By defining general relationships and observing what other nations have experienced in terms of military integration, the stage will be set for the cross-national quantitative analysis in Chapter 3. This analysis will not only determine which national characteristics are particularly relevant to military integration toleration, but should provide insight into where the United States military fits on the spectrum of integration.

Before looking at specific examples of how military policies around the world address racial and sexual orientation, it is helpful to examine the general relationships between a particular military and its environment. Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani (1991) provide an excellent starting point:
Within the larger society are the three main variables that we are concerned with in this study: the military, the state, and the state’s ethnic makeup. Each of these variables not only has an interaction with society as a whole, but with each other individually and collectively. A state’s military personnel policy towards race is more than likely a by-product of these relationships;
therefore, gaining a better understanding of these interactions is critical to this study.

Notice that in Figure 2.1 each main variable interacts with the others and with society as a whole. While the relationships between each main variable and society are important, the interactions between the main variables are also particularly interesting. Below are factors which may define each interaction:

Area 1: Military-Society

This interaction involves both how the society views its military and vice-versa. This interaction may, as was mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, inform the debate on the presence of a civil-military gap. Chapters 6 and 7 will look at this interaction in much greater detail, but to give an example of society’s view toward the military in the United States, a good indicator is the National Election Survey (NES). Since 1964, the NES has asked survey respondents to provide a feeling thermometer (on a 0-100 scale, where 0 is completely unfavorable and 100 is completely favorable) rating their attitudes toward the military. This rating may indicate levels of confidence in the military’s ability to keep the nation safe or to win wars, and may even
show a level of trust in the military establishment (that it is doing its job honorably and truthfully). Over the last several decades, public attitudes toward the military have remained relatively constant over time, but occasionally, again over time, there are minor fluctuations and trends. These trends in attitudes toward the military are important to this study for two reasons. First, public opinion (as we shall see later in this chapter) may have an impact on a leader's decision to integrate the military. And second, public interest in the military may affect other institutions (such as the legislature or the courts) when military policy issues are given national attention.
One would expect that the lowest points would have occurred during the Vietnam War (1968-1974), but surprisingly the lowest point came at the end of the Carter administration, perhaps because of the failed Iranian hostage rescue and the Cold War’s effect on the economy at the time. Notice also that post-September 11th, 2001, the military ratings have been higher than ever,

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1 Data collected from the ANES Cumulative Dataset File (www.electionstudies.org). The values of N for the surveys ranged between approximately 1200 and 2700, with the standard deviations ranging between 19.1 and 23.6.
perhaps because of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, and the
acknowledgement from the public that whether or not they agree with a
particular decision to go to war, their support for men and women in
uniform is still crucial to the troops’ morale and well-being. The question
that must be asked now is how important public sentiments toward the
military are in affecting military policy change.

Area 2: State-Society

In this interaction, the form of government and amount of power it
has in defining social behavior is crucial. For instance, the relationship
between an authoritarian state and its citizens is obviously different than the
relationship between a democratic state and its people. We should expect
that democracies are better able to adapt to racial and sexual orientation
equality, especially as minority groups in these societies generally have the
freedom to organize and to publicize injustices. On the other hand,
hypothetically, an authoritarian ruler who wants to encourage equality may
have an easier time enforcing his or her own policies. According to the NES,
however, most Americans don’t have strong feelings (either way) toward the
government. This apathy is apparent in our nation’s voting record:
As Figure 2.3 shows, in the past 40 years, on average, only about half of voting-age Americans exercised that right in Presidential-Year elections. Notice the turnout in non-presidential-election years. In these elections, the turnout...
Turnout percentage rates have hovered only in the upper 30s. When less than half of a particular society votes, one of two things (or a combination of both) are present:

(1) the populace is so content with their government that they don’t feel they need to participate;

(2) people feel disenfranchised and as such feel that their vote doesn’t really matter. (Piven and Cloward 2000: 3)

This makes the United States an interesting case in terms of the state-society relationship. If people have the opportunity to be involved in their democratic system of government but choose not to be (for the most part), then the timeline for social integration may be different than in other democratic societies. In other words, in terms of military integration, with an American society which is comparatively apathetic, the influence of the state-society relationship is much more difficult to determine.

Area 3: Ethnic Makeup-Society

Each national landscape is different in terms of its ethnic makeup:
Figure 2.4. Ethnic Homogeneity % by Country (www.nationmaster.com)
While discrimination and ethnic strife are probably common to every society, the level to which each subgroup experiences prejudice varies greatly, and may depend on power struggles, levels of homogeneity, and so on. For example, the ethnic makeup-society interaction in the United States is probably much different than the relationship in Japan, where ethnic homogeneity is much higher. This is not to say that ethnic conflict doesn’t exist in Japan. Xenophobia and ethnic strife are probably present in small areas, but Japanese society certainly never experienced anything like the civil rights struggles in the 1960s in the United States.

Area 4: Military-Ethnic Makeup

In this interaction, the military responds to social pressures to resolve racial tensions or conflicts. This response may be manifested in how a military conducts its recruiting efforts. Recent controversies surrounding the United States military, for example, concern whether or not it employs minorities in abnormally large numbers in order to fight the nation’s wars, or if minorities have used the military as a vehicle for pressing forward an agenda of equality (Burk 2001; Evans 2003; Keyes 2005). This interaction may also involve how a military grants promotions or awards, and (as specific
case studies will show) whether or not these decisions are affected by race. It may also involve what steps a military uses to solve racial tension. In the United States military, for example, all service-members are required to receive not just initial anti-discrimination seminars, but annual recurring sensitivity training. It is made very clear to incoming military members that discrimination based on gender or race is not tolerated. When those policies are not adhered to, the punishment is generally swift and harsh. Recent sexual assault scandals plaguing the United States Air Force and Naval Academies, for example, led not only to the expulsion and criminal prosecution of some cadets, but also disciplinary actions against the military leaders of those institutions. In essence, the way a military handles minority issues is crucial to understanding the intricacies of military personnel policy change.

Area 5: Ethnic Makeup-State

In this interaction, the response of the state to ethnic conflict is important. While some states may be very active in quelling racial tension, others may be less involved. In addition, within each government, various agencies may be (and probably are) involved to different degrees. For
example, when the United States Supreme Court made the decision in the *Brown v. Board of Education* case in 1954, they took what many consider to be an active role in civil rights. The court overturned the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision from 1899, and thus rejected the 'separate but equal' practice of racial segregation. The United States Congress, however, really didn’t get involved in civil rights until 1964, when they passed the first overarching national civil rights legislation (Rosenberg 1991: 49). Thus, a ten year gap existed between the branches in terms of civil rights activism.

Some states aren’t just apathetic about racial integration, but may exacerbate tensions. Reports from Iraq before Operation Desert Storm in 1990 indicated that Saddam Hussein tested biological weapons on his Kurdish minority population in the northern part of the country. Extreme cases like this show the ethnic makeup-state relationship at its worst.

Area 6: Military-State

In this interaction, the way the government defines the role of its military is important. Many states differ in how the military is controlled. For example, while many authoritarian leaders command the military directly and wear military uniforms (picture Muammar Khaddaf in Libya or
Saddam Hussein in Iraq before his capture), other nations insist on civilian control of the armed forces.

Security concerns for a military are not necessarily focused entirely on external threats. Where the United States employs its military primarily for power projection abroad (and relying on police forces and the Department of Homeland Security for domestic concerns), many states use their militaries to tackle external and internal threats simultaneously. This characteristic may be crucial to understanding a military's role in quelling internal racial conflict, especially when it threatens national stability.

Area 7: Nucleus of Interaction

This interaction is what Dietz et al call the "Integration Nexus". The way in which all three primary variables interact determines to a large extent not only the degree to which racial integration is present in a society or in a military, but also the steps the state, society, and perhaps even a military may take in an effort to change race-related policies, or perhaps to protect the status quo.
But since this dissertation focuses on sexual orientation policies in addition to racial policies, the Dietz model could be reshaped for this study to look like the following:

![Diagram showing the relationship between military, state, and sexual orientation environments.]

Figure 2.5. Relationship Between Military and Sexual Orientation Environment

Here, the interactions are analogous to the ones mentioned in the previous pages concerning ethnic makeup, but a few differences are worth noting.
Area 3: Sexual Orientation-Society

Society's views toward homosexuals varies over time, sometimes changing more rapidly than we might expect. For example, the NES illustrates that general societal attitudes have grown more tolerant over time, but in an erratic pattern. While the NES only asked the thermometer rating for the years 1984-2004, the 20-year sample still yields interesting results:

![Homosexual Thermometer Over Time](image)

Figure 2.6. Society's View of Homosexuals in the U.S.(ANES 2004)

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Data collected from the ANES Cumulative Dataset File (www.electionstudies.org). The values of N for the surveys ranged between approximately 1200 and 2500, with the standard deviations ranging between 29.7 and 36.0.
Notice the dip in 1994. This may have been a backlash in response to President Clinton's efforts at integrating the military, which was a big news topic the previous year. In addition, Newt Gingrich and the Republican Party's Contract with America were gaining popularity. Only starting in 2000 did the thermometer average climb above the 50% mark. This indicates a society still somewhat polarized over the issue of gay acceptance. Nevertheless, the trend over the course of time shows increasing toleration in general. This may be attributed to homosexuals becoming more comfortable with coming out. Many studies indicate that the correlation between toleration and personal interaction is strong. In other words, people who know a homosexual personally are much likelier to be tolerant than those who do not.

Although Americans' generally show a 50% thermometer rating toward homosexuals and homosexuality, their particular policy attitudes vary greatly:

\footnote{For an example see Herek (1991: 64).}
As Figure 2.7 shows, Americans for the most part support a policy of allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military, even topping the 80% mark in 2004. Ironically, this was the same year that 13 states successfully passed voter initiatives against gay marriage. Clearly, while attitudes toward homosexuality in general hover in the middle, attitudes on particular issues vary from topic to topic.
Area 4: Military-Sexual Orientation

In this interaction, a military’s history with sexual orientation is important, especially concerning treatment of homosexuals, and in turn, their willingness to fight the establishment. As Chapter 1 pointed out, military policies in the United States have discriminated against homosexuals since George Washington’s tenure as General of the Revolutionary Army. Chapter 4 will discuss the role the United States military played in the early 1990s, when President-elect Clinton attempted to overturn the traditional policy.

Area 5: Sexual Orientation-State

As the 2004 elections showed, the government is becoming the new front for the culture war in America. In response to what appeared to be a stronger push from gay rights activists for justice, thirteen states included initiatives on their ballots to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. And in all thirteen states, the initiative passed. Similar initiatives are being pushed in several more states in 2006. This example shows that government can play a very active role in defining social policy.
International Examples

"Virtually all of the authors find that the military has not, in general, played a major or successful role as an integrating device, either within its own ranks or for the larger society. Ethiopia, Nigeria, China and Israel are instances where this generalization is especially well drawn: Greece, Turkey, and the United States appear to have made some progress, especially (in the case of the United States) concerning advancement within the military itself. Yet despite such variations, virtually all of the chapters conclude that militaries tend to reflect the cleavages, stratifications, class relationships, and biases that are present in the larger society in which they exist and from which they draw their primordial influence on all state-run or state-mediated institutions, even if such institutions are determined to act as a change agent within and for the larger society."

(Dietz et al 1991: 12)

Now that we have an understanding of the theoretical connections between a state, its society, its military, and its racial or sexual orientation makeup, we should now focus on specific countries to gain insight into how these relationships manifest themselves in terms of military policy, particularly with regard to personnel. The questions we must continue to ask are: (1) Can a nation's military serve as a vehicle for social integration, as Tocqueville claimed in 1836 (see the beginning quote in this chapter), or is it more of a conflict generator, as Dietz and his colleagues contend? And (as the next chapter will address through a quantitative comparative cross-
national analysis) are there global factors which tend to indicate a nation’s willingness to adopt integration policies within its military?

First, what might influence someone from an ethnic minority to join the military? Perhaps minorities join in an effort to gain favor with the ruling elites in society, to gain necessary training and skills useful after military service, to achieve higher class standing or socioeconomic status, or, in extreme cases, to gain control of a military and ultimately the government (Dietz et al 1991: 17). But the reason may be even simpler. Nationalism is an often overlooked factor in cases regarding military service. In many nations, such as the United States, military service may be desired by some simply because of a love for their country or a basic call to duty.

On the other side is the issue of need. Manpower requirements are a basic struggle for any military organization. While many nations employ compulsory military service requirements, others adopt volunteer-only procedures. But in either case, a nation’s response to varying external (and sometimes internal) threats changes the manpower requirements for its military. In other words, sometimes militaries need more people. In these instances, the military’s need may outweigh the “perceived utility of restricting minority access to military employment” (Dietz et al 1991: 17-18).
Ultimately, if this theory holds true, social integration in the military can be explained with simple economic terms, and supply and demand become extremely important.

To get an understanding of how militaries deal with ethnic and sexual orientation differently, we should look at a few examples. The following pages illustrate the different struggles in each military, but also show that worldwide, nations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas are all struggling to determine how to define military personnel policy (sometimes even in non-democratic regimes).

Israel

Israel’s military, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), have been lauded by many as one of the most skilled and powerful militaries in the world. They have also gained a reputation for being the one organization in that country that was an “egalitarian institution devoid of any discrimination or favoritism” (Roumani 1991: 52). But Maurice Roumani’s research yielded a much different conclusion. He contends that there are sharp divides in the IDF, and that their efforts at ethnic military integration (through compensatory programs and educational opportunities for underprivileged
minorities) are “at best marginal” (Roumani 1991: 74). The biggest example of ethnic discrimination in the military there exists between two different types of Jewish Israelis. The privileged majority, known as the Ashkenazim, are Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia who were “the authors of modern Zionism.” Oriental Jews (as they are now informally known) are among the immigrants who flooded into Israel from Asia and Africa in the late 1940s and early 1950s. They have been systematically edged out in terms of the IDF power structure. “In order to feel more secure, it is only logical that the elite of the army and the state will ensure the dominance in the IDF of that ethnic group which is found dominant in Israeli government which identifies itself with the state and considers itself most talented” (Roumani 1991: 74).

Unfortunately for Oriental Jews, according to Roumani, they are discriminated against by a government and military that the rest of the world deems to be among the most egalitarian.

Greece and Turkey

These two countries, often bitter enemies, make two interesting case studies in terms of military integration. Although geographic neighbors and similar in many ways, the relationship between the military and the state is
completely different in each country. In Greece, while the political and bureaucratic elites are often affluent members of society, the military is traditionally comprised of members from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Nevertheless, the Greek military is often a major player in terms of political power in the country, so underprivileged Greeks are often motivated to seek upward mobility through military service. The relationship between the Turkish military and the state is different for two reasons. "First is the presence of a strong personality, Kemal Ataturk, who shaped, defined, and established principles of behavior for the governing of Turkey and the armed forces. Second, the military and civilian elites' socio-economic backgrounds are similar, and they both hold a significant place in the history of modern Turkey and subscribe to Kemalism. They imbue themselves with guardianship responsibilities and contribute to the stability of the state. It is only as a last resort, and reluctantly, that the armed forces intervene if counter elites enter the political process and stray from the tenets of Kemalism" (Brown 1991: 101). A perfect example of this occurred in 1980 when the General Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, led a coup d'état – he pointed out at the time that he was not eliminating democracy, but ultimately protecting it. So in each country, while the military is used as a vehicle for
upward social mobility, the relationships between each military and the state are completely different. While the Turkish military recruits and attracts members from the same circles as political and bureaucratic elites, the Greek military generally draws from an underprivileged group. As such, conflict between the military and state have been relatively scarce in Turkey, while in Greece at times the military and civilian institutions seem as if they are on "a collision course" (Brown 1991: 101).

China

University of Texas Professor Gordon Bennett theorized that there are three possible answers to the question of the extent to which the military fosters social integration:

"Hypothesis 1, Military Leads: Where government is marked by personal loyalties, weak institutions, and instability, armies are the ultimate source of order and authority, and are responsible for good government....

Hypothesis 2, Loyalty Test: The premodern practice of recruiting armies from 'backward' but 'martial' groups who were numerically a minority, weak economically, low in sophistication, and dependent upon central authority for their status, has been replaced with modern reluctance to arm minorities whose loyalty is questionable... [thus], developing country armies offer powerful incentives to minority communities to either demonstrate loyalty or move toward separatism...
Hypothesis 3, Military Retards Integration: Worse even than remaining neutral, developing country armies slow down social integration. As social and economic developments proceed and mature, the military’s political importance falls... Army units commanded to quell domestic disorder consequently yield a spectacle of the ill-educated clubbing and firing upon the severely alienated” (Bennett 1991: 105-106).

His research in China led him to conclude that the third hypothesis in prevalent there (while the experiences in Greece and Turkey might support the first two hypotheses). Bennett found that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), while “well positioned to contribute to social integration,” has actually contributed to increased discrimination of disadvantaged groups. He concludes that the reason for this may be found in the cultural traditions of constancy in China, and that military policy, like many Chinese institutions, is “derivative, not formative” (Bennett 1991: 111). The sheer size of China and its military indicate other cleavages as well. These non-ethnic fault lines can cause just as much tension as racial divides, and are defined by:

(1) Region

(2) Development differential (coastal cities vs. interior towns and villages)

58
(3) Social class (white collar bureaucrat vs. blue collar worker and farmer) (Bennett 1991: 107)

Although these cleavages, and the discrimination by the state and military, are much more difficult to detect, they may be just as damaging and cause just as much conflict as ethnic discrimination.

India

In the early part of the 20th century, British segregation of the Indian Army was based on what they deemed to be practical concerns (different customs, cultures, eating habits, etc. required separate units). "It was also argued then that these communal regiments produced a better fighting unit and a better esprit de corps" (Thomas and Karnad 1991: 129). But these arguments were somewhat flawed, considering that no such segregation occurred in either the Indian Navy or Air Force. Communal recruitment in the Indian Army has been tough to change, especially since it means taking away what seems to be a communal authority to certain ethnicities in order to spread opportunities to previously neglected minorities. But efforts within the military establishment and certainly by the state have made important strides. During the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, the military and the
press went to great lengths to publicize that the wars were more 'secular vs. theocracy' conflicts than 'Hindu vs. Muslim' ones. In fact, the military publicized heroic acts made by Muslims serving in the Indian Army. For example, "the bravery and death in the line of duty of a jawan in the tank regiment named Abdul Hamid was given much fanfare by the Indian press, much of this having been orchestrated by the Indian government which constituted the main source of information for such matters" (Thomas and Karnad 1991: 136). But by far the biggest attempt at ethnic integration occurred with the creation of the Brigade of Guards (BOG). The BOG is an elite fighting force comprised of the best elements of all of the ethnic communal units. "Emphasizing this showpiece nature of this regiment, it was cobbled together by transferring the 'best' battalion from each of the established regiments and forcing these disparate fighting groups [Sikh, Dogra, Jat, Maratha, Mahar, Rajput, etc.] to merge their identities" (Thomas and Karnad 1991: 131). As the BOG continue to show the benefits of an integrated force, the Indian Army as a whole may begin to transform itself into a completely integrated structure.
Ethiopia

Like many nations in Africa, Ethiopia is ethnically diverse; its citizens speak over 80 native languages there. When Haile Selassie was deposed in 1974, the new government, controlled by the Soviet Union, declared that “all Ethiopians of whatever religion, language, sex, or local affinity shall live together in equality, fraternity, harmony and unity under the umbrella of their country” (Welch 1991: 164). Even with this mandate, however, prejudice remains. Even after the revolution of the 1970s, the minority ethnic elite (the Amhara, which comprise about 19% of the population) maintained virtually all power roles in the Ethiopian army, although some minor authority was shared with co-opted subgroups like the Tigreans (representing 16%) and Oromo (40%). In essence, the stratification of responsibility according to race remained even through a major change of power. “The undoubted accomplishments of the revolution cannot conceal this essential continuity in Ethiopian politics” (Welch 1991: 174). Ultimately, the only change was rhetorical in nature.
Nigeria

Nigeria is one of the most culturally diverse nations on the continent, with over 250 ethnicities and native languages. In the First Republic period from 1960 to 1966, political power was split into three major regional governments, each controlled by the predominant ethnicity in the region: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West, and Ibo in the East. Religious differences also existed between these subgroups, with the Hausa-Fulani primarily an Islamic people and the Yoruba and Ibo predominantly Christian. In 1961, shortly after independence, the national government (controlled largely by northern interests) issued a proclamation which mandated that 50% of its officer corps be recruited from the North, and 25% each from the Eastern and Western provinces. The Yoruba and Ibo representatives pushed for an eradication of this quota system, knowing that with the ban lifted, they would eventually gain control of the military, especially considering that they were generally much more educated than the Hausa-Fulani. While government attempts to reduce paranoia among each group regarding the other two have lessened the tensions prevalent in the early days of the republic, “there remains considerable internal tension which requires astute leadership to control” (Wright 1991: 184).
The experiences of Israel, Greece, Turkey, China, India, Ethiopia and Nigeria show that even in nations which seem culturally homogeneous, or in those which mandate military service, ethnic discrimination is almost always a reality. (We will look more in depth at the United States military’s struggles with racial discrimination in Chapter 4.) The examples also show that each nation deals with military integration in its own unique way. Chapter 3 will use a quantitative analysis to search for similarities, rather than differences, between the countries which allow homosexuals to serve openly in their military, as well as similarities between countries which have maintained exclusionary policies.

Now that we have an understanding of the theoretical relationships that exist between the society, the state, the military, and the nation’s racial and sexual orientation cleavages, and have seen examples of those relationships in an international context, we will now turn our attention to the international picture in general, to ascertain whether or not certain characteristics of a state, society or military can predict military integration
policies. And we will do so in Chapter 3 by looking at how nations deal with sexual orientation integration in their militaries.
Chapter 3

CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTEGRATION

“Few people are capable of expressing with equanimity opinions which differ from the prejudices of their social environment. Most people are even incapable of forming such opinions.”

- Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955)

Contextual Background

One way of studying military integration as a concept in the United States is to analyze what her neighbors have undertaken thus far. From there, we will be able to determine if there are shared characteristics of countries which tend to support egalitarian military policies, and then, speculate as to where the United States falls on that spectrum of toleration. The study of foreign militaries provides a social and historical context for viewing the issue of military integration in the United States. “The social context provides insights into relationships between the larger culture and the military… [while] historically they provide us with a longitudinal view of the issue as it evolves over time and within and between cultures similar to
the United States" (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 122). A favorite example of experts in favor of lifting the gay ban is Canada. “When the ban was lifted in Canada in 1992, it was found that the predictions of disaster did not pan out” (Shawver 1995: 102). If the analogy can be drawn, it may show that the worries of American opponents to lifting the ban are overstated. “Those service members interviewed by the RAND Corporation in countries that have lifted the ban claimed that in their experience there was no significant threat to unit cohesion or organizational performance created by the presence of homosexuals in their militaries, either at home stations or deployed at sea or abroad” (Shawver 1995: 107). Ultimately, the task is to examine the factors that allow for this amicable organizational culture in other militaries, and determine whether or not a more educated determination can be made regarding the issue in the United States.

But before we begin the quantitative analysis, an overarching theoretical model is needed to search for possible explanatory variables. The previous examples of Israel, Greece, Turkey, China, India, Ethiopia, and Nigeria in Chapter 2 lead us to construct a theoretical model for initiating military personnel policy changes:
Figure 3.1. Theoretical Model of a Military Integration Decision Process

Notice in Figure 3.1 that the process is somewhat different for an authoritarian government. Both sides of the model (pertaining to authoritarian and democratic governments) assume that the national leader is ultimately responsible for making the decision, and that these individuals are the commanders-in-chief of their respective militaries. In each case, the leader’s policy preferences are paramount, but in democratic societies external factors play a much more prominent role. We assume that in an authoritarian government, the national leader needs only to make the decision and demand adherence to his or her policy. Only the external factor
of military need comes into play, as he or she feels the need to protect the
country from harm, and thus makes decisions on military personnel policy in
order to insure they are adequately equipped to protect the nation's interests.
In a democratic society, the same military need factor still applies, but we
assume that the leader's decision is not necessarily the law. Other
governmental institutions which represent citizens' interests are influential
enough to make a difference. Thus, the impact of the courts, the legislature,
interest groups, public opinion, and even the military itself may need to be
taken into consideration. This model, then, points to three theories that may
help explain why a nation adopts a military personnel policy welcoming
previously excluded minorities.

Three Key Factors

As our theoretical model points out, a nation may adopt a policy of
full inclusion (lifting its ban on racial preference or sexual orientation
exclusion) for several reasons, but three key factors seem to stand out as
possible explanations, and have been the main reasons cited for countries
which have already lifted their ban:
Factor 1: The Philosophy/Morality Factor.

The first is the Morality/Philosophy Factor, which posits that nations with more liberal societies will tend to support anti-discrimination policies. For example, a nation where 75% of the population would have no problem living next door to a homosexual might be more likely to drop the ban on gays in the military than a nation where only 25% are tolerant. Religious traditions may play a large part in this factor, and must be accounted for. Religion is obviously an important factor in determining many people's value systems, and thus countries where religion is practiced more may embrace more traditional views, certainly with regard to homosexuality. As such, the hypothesis with this model includes a prediction that countries that are more secular in nature will be more likely to adopt military policies of full inclusion. The Philosophy/Morality Factor has been cited as the primary reason for lifting the ban in several countries. Deborah Mulliss, the director of Personnel Equity Policy in the New Zealand Defence Force, stated at a conference on Don’t Ask Don’t Tell in 2003 that on the whole, the New Zealand populace “is reasonably accepting of our broad range of diversity, and this acceptance comes out in our social policy that the government
makes" (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 106). In the Netherlands, views on the importance of social equality gained momentum in the 1960s (as they did elsewhere), but lead to governmental change early. In fact, the Netherlands became the first nation to allow openly gay service-members when it lifted its ban in 1974 (Anderson-Boers and Van Der Muelen 1994: 205).

Factor 2: The Military Need Factor.
The second factor used to explain military personnel integration is the Military Need Factor, which argues that the more a nation needs its military, or struggles with military recruitment, the more likely to adopt a full inclusion policy. Let us assume that Country A has a military that in the last 50 years has been used twice as much as the military from Country B. The military need model would predict that Country A is more likely to lift the ban because it simply needs more willing soldiers to continue its pattern of military usage, and discrimination hurts its recruiting efforts. Initially the assumption was that this factor only applied to countries which do not employ mandatory military service, but even nations which require military service at some point only recruit and train soldiers who meet personnel standards. Thus, any policy which renders some individuals (whether they
are women, members of a subjugated racial minority, or homosexuals) ‘unfit’ for military service, is subject to be changed if the nation faces political hardships which demand more qualified service members. Such was certainly a factor for lifting the ban on homosexuals in Israel, a nation which uses its military more any other country except the United States. Avner Even-Zohar, a captain in the Israeli Army’s education unit, stated that in 1993, before Israel lifted the ban, “Professor Uzi Evan, who was also very influential in developing the Israeli nuclear bomb, came to the Knesset [Israeli parliament]. He revealed his sexual orientation to the whole nation and explained how he was dishonorably discharged from the army. People realized that we could not afford to lose such a brilliant scientist simply because of his sexual orientation” (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 113). Necessity is a huge motivator for political and social change. Thus, a nation like Israel whose military needs every qualified individual may be more likely to integrate. The military need factor may also apply in states where the military’s own preferences take precedent. Bronwen Gray, the director of the Defence Equity Organization of the Australian Defence Force, claimed that the Australians are much more focused on “professionalism and competence. We do not care about people’s sexual activity, as long as it is not unlawful or
contrary to the inherent requirements of the job" (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 106).

Factor 3: The Political Players Factor.

The third factor for why a nation might integrate its military is the Political Players Factor, which posits that the personal preferences, ideologies and backgrounds of the decision-makers are solely responsible for the policy outcomes. In this case, the political party in power (as well as that of the legislature in each country) would be critical to any nation seeking to lift its ban. In the United States, for example, a Republican Party-controlled Congress along with a sitting Republican president might not be as likely to lift the ban compared with a political landscape where both branches are controlled by the Democrats. The Political Players Factor explains the lifting of the ban in England and partially explains the lifting in Israel. Steve Johnston, the chairman of the Armed Forces Lesbian and Gay Association in Great Britain, stated in 2003 that after years of organized protests against gay discrimination, "the secretary of state for defence stood up and literally and quietly said that the United Kingdom no longer had this policy [of discriminating against gays and lesbians in the military]. No fanfare, no
fuss" (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 109). In Israel, a nation with perhaps a more conservative military, political players again made the difference, or at least contributed. Avner Even-Zohar, referenced above, stated that “both the late Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who at the time [1993] was the minister of defense, and the chief of staff, Ehud Barak... actually supported the change. But the decision actually came from the parliament, the Knesset. Yael Dayan, the daughter of General Moshe Dayan, was primarily responsible for pressing for the change, and even though she is not a lesbian herself, she supported the cause” (Belkin and Bateman 2003: 112-113).

In this chapter, the first two factors will be tested using a cross-national quantitative approach. The Political Players Factor will be better analyzed using the qualitative analysis presented in Chapter 4.

Data Collection/Methodology

As stated briefly in Chapter 1, because this analysis tests two different factors (which attempt to explain the same policy), no single dataset existed to guide us through this exploration. Thus, I created a dataset specifically for this research; it is comprised of specific information from several unique
datasets. The dependent variable is a dichotomous one, signifying whether or not a nation has adopted a policy of full inclusion for homosexuals serving in the military. The independent variables attempt to codify a nation's philosophical stance and military need. The first challenge was tapping into a nation's views of tolerance. The most robust dataset available was the World Values Survey, from the University of Michigan. This yielded specific attitudes of respondents from different countries on topics of homosexuality, confidence in the armed forces, ideological self-placement, and church attendance. The World Values Survey from 2001, for example, contains the results from over 270,000 interviews (each of which involved answers to over 300 questions) in 65 nations and principalities. As such, the survey sample represents approximately 80 percent of the world's population. Ultimately, results from this survey were aggregated and tabulated to place each country on two specific spectrums. The first places a nation somewhere on an imaginary line between survivalist values and respect for self-expressionism, while the second uses a spectrum of secular/rational values vs. traditionalism. The second dataset, World Data, gave specific information regarding each state's total population, which served as a control variable. Finally, the Correlates of War Dataset presented information on how many
conflicts a particular nation experienced between 1950 and 2001 (including the duration of each conflict), as well as each nation's military strength in terms of personnel.

From this analysis, we may be able to examine what factors are most important in determining a state's tolerance toward military service by homosexuals. In addition, we may be able to assess what factors in American society are responsible for the current policy. In addition, if such an analysis reveals that the United States is an exception (in other words, that because the United States shares the same basic indicators as the 23 nations which have lifted the ban on gays in the military), this will serve as a good starting point for the institutional and organizational analyses that follow in the next three chapters.
Model and Variables

What makes a nation lift its ban on gays in the military? To test the Philosophy/Morality and the Military Need Factors, the following model was used:

\[
\text{Allow Gays} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{Survival vs Self Expression}) + b_2 (\text{Secular/Rational vs Traditionalism}) + b_3 (\text{Total # of Conflict Months}) + b_4 (\text{Proportion of Population in Military}) + b_5 (\text{Total Population}) + b_6 (\text{Gross National Product Per Capita}) + \text{error}
\]

Figure 3.2. Model Predicting Probabilities of Nations Lifting the Ban on Homosexual Service-members
The following explains each variable, and how each was determined:

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE**

*Allow Gays:* Dichotomous dependent variable – if a nation allows for open service from gay members, this value = 1. Otherwise, ‘Allow Gays’ = 0.

This data was collected from the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military at the University of California at Santa Barbara. As of 2006, only 24 countries worldwide have lifted the ban. These countries are listed in Appendix 1.

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

**Philosophy/Morality Factor Variables**

*Survival vs Self Expression:* This variable is one of the main resultants of the World Values Survey compilations:
One "dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies-which brings a polarization between Survival and Self-expression values. The unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life.”
(WVS, 2006)

The value of this variable theoretically ranges from 0 to 450, where a zero indicates a country still focused completely on survival, and a 450 identifies a nation which doesn’t need to worry about survival at all, and instead focuses on human rights and self-expression issues. Of course, no nation sits on either of these extremes. All of them vary in terms of degrees toward one or the other. In the sample of 76 countries used in this study, Moldova was the nation closest to the Survival side of the spectrum, while Sweden scored closest to the Self-Expression side. Figure A1.1 (Appendix 1) shows all of the countries in the sample listed in order of their score on this spectrum.

Secular/Rational vs Traditionalism: This variable is the other main resultant from the World Values Survey and indicates a nation’s basic values foundations:

"The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very
important and those in which it is not. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics."

(WVS, 2006)

The value of this variable ranges theoretically from 0 to 460, where a lower score indicates a nation with secular/rational values systems, and a higher score points to a society which still embraces religious or traditional mores. In our sample of countries, Japan scored closest to the secular/rational limit and El Salvador scored closest to the traditional values extreme. Figure A1.2 (Appendix 1) shows the sample countries listed in order of their score on this spectrum.

Military Need Factor Variables

Total # of Conflict Months: This variable came from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset. Originally, the plan was to use the total number of conflicts a military had been involved in over the last half century. But some conflicts are much longer than others (think Vietnam versus the Grenada), and so simply counting the number of conflicts might not accurately tap into how
much a country actually uses its military. Thus, a better variable was one
which showed how much a military was used over a period of time. This
variable shows how many months a nation's military was used in an
interstate conflict between January, 1950, and December, 2001. Although the
COW dataset does not directly give the value, it does present each conflict's
start and end dates (day, month, and year). Thus, a simple calculation
determined how many months a particular military was employed in an
interstate battle. If a nation's military was used in two conflicts
simultaneously, I purposely double-counted it, because I wanted to capture
the stress that this puts on a military's personnel. The busiest military in the
sample is the United States, followed by Israel. Figure A1.3 (Appendix 1)
shows the values for this variable in each country.

**Proportion of Population in Military:** This variable is the number of military
personnel per 10,000 citizens. This variable was included to test the Military
Need Theory. If a nation keeps a large military in terms of personnel
(expressed as a percentage of total population) then recruiting may be a more
challenging undertaking. These values reflect 2001 data, and are shown in
Figure A1.5 in Appendix 1. Of all of the countries in the sample, Israel has the largest relative military by far.

CONTROL VARIABLES

When looking at Table 3.1, a first glance may give the impression that the only nations that have lifted the ban on gay service-members are larger or wealthier countries. But this was not the only reason to include population and wealth as control variables. Size was important in terms of military recruiting. In other words, if a country is large enough, does it really worry about integration? In a nation whose size is so large that it has an incredible pool of personnel to choose from for its military, perhaps military need (in terms of personnel) is diminished. Thus, the model had to account for such a possibility. Secondly, in terms of wealth, one need only to look at Inglehart's vision of World Values from his survey. He concluded that there are Materialist and Post-Materialist nations. In Materialist countries (countries where industrialization has yet to occur, and likely those with lower Gross National Products (GNPs)), survival was still paramount. Human rights take a back seat to basic needs. In Post-Materialist nations (those with relatively high GNPs), most basic needs have been met, so there is a focus
shift toward quality of life and self-expression. Therefore, variables for both population and wealth were needed in the model.

**Total Population:** This control variable indicates the total population of a country in 2001 expressed in millions. Figure A1.5 in Appendix 1 shows the values for Total Population used in the regression. China has the highest population in the sample followed by India and the United States.

**Gross National Product per Capita:** This variable is the Gross National Product for a country per capita in 1998, expressed in thousands of United States dollars. Figure A1.6 in Appendix 1 shows the values for this variable. Of the nations in the sample, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Norway had the highest values.

A table of summary statistics of all the variables used in the regression is located in Appendix 1, table A1.2.

### Assumptions and Hypotheses

This research makes several assumptions. First, and most importantly, the research is attempting to take a current snapshot of nations and their...
militaries today. But the data is obviously not real-time. The World Values Survey results were compiled in 2001, while the World Dataset was taken in 1999 and the Correlates of War dataset in 2002. While the values of all of these variables have certainly changed in the last several years, the assumption here is that the ratio of the values between countries has stayed relatively constant.

In determining ‘Total # of Conflict Months’ for the sample countries, Vietnam data includes both North and South, and Germany included East and West data before the unification. In addition, the Czech Republic and Slovakia both used Czechoslovakia data before the split. The assumption here is that the use by one could still impact the other. In determining military usage over the past half century, Germany, for example, may feel the history and lingering effects of military usage by both the former East and West Germany.

_Hypothesis 1: The nations which are more secular will be more likely to have lifted the ban on homosexual service-members._
Hypothesis 2: The nations which place higher premiums on self-expression will be more likely to have lifted the ban on homosexual service-members.

I predicted that the first factor, the Morality/Philosophy Factor, would be shown its importance by this analysis and would show strongly that more tolerant nations and societies would tend to adopt policies allowing full inclusion of gay service-members. Thus, Hypothesis 1 predicts that the nations with lower values of Secular/Rational vs Traditionalism (those countries closer to the Secular/Rational side of the spectrum instead of the Traditional Values side) will be more likely to lift the ban on gay service-members. Similarly, Hypothesis 2 predicts that nations with higher values of Survival vs Self Expression (those countries closer to the Self Expression side of the spectrum instead of the Survival side) will be more likely to lift the ban.

Ronald Inglehart used these two values (Survival vs Self Expression and Secular/Rational vs Traditionalism) for each country to create a World Values Map, illustrating basic patterns of international belief structures:
Figure 3.3. Inglehart Values Map

Notice that Professor Inglehart combined areas into larger subgroups based on either geography or religious impact. When you compare Figure 3.2 to Table A1.1 (the countries which have lifted the ban on homosexual service
members) it seems as if most of the countries allowing homosexuals to serve lie in the top right of the values map. This was useful in generating the first two hypotheses, positing that nations with higher secular/rational and self-expression scores would be more likely to adopt a policy of full military inclusion.

**Hypothesis 3:** The nations with higher military need will be more likely to lift the ban on homosexual service-members.

In contrast, with regards to the Military Need Factor, I expected the analysis to reveal at most a slight correlation between the size and use of a military and the adoption of an inclusionary policy. This prediction was based on the fact that only democracies (and mostly European democracies) have lifted the ban, and probably didn’t utilize their militaries any more than other nations. In order to assess military need for a particular country, proxies were used. The specific independent variables used to test this model were Proportion of Population in Military (military size as a percentage of total population), and Total # of Conflict Months (number of months of interstate conflict from 1950-2001). Here, interstate conflicts are
defined as violent hostilities between states in which the national military is used. Hypothesis 3, therefore, predicts that nations with higher values of Proportion of Population in Military and Total # of Conflict Months will be more likely to lift the ban on homosexual service-members.

Results

The model set forth in Figure 3.1 worked even better than expected. After running the probit analysis, the following coefficients for the model were determined:

\[
\text{Allow Gays} = \ 0.784 + 0.014 \ (\text{Survival vs Self Expression}) \\
- 0.014 \ (\text{Secular/Rational vs Traditionalism}) \\
+ 0.005 \ (\text{Total # of Conflict Months}) \\
- 0.031 \ (\text{Proportion of Population in Military}) \\
- 0.043 \ (\text{Total Population}) \\
+ 0.042 \ (\text{Gross National Product per Capita}) + \text{error}
\]

Figure 3.4. Model Predicting Probabilities of Nations Lifting the Ban on Homosexual Service-members (with Coefficients)
With a sample of 76 nations (24 which have lifted the ban, 52 which have not), the starting (naïve) model for predicting whether or not Allow Gays = 0 is 68.4% (52/76). With the variables input, the predictive power of the model shot up to 93.4%, and correctly predicted 71 out of 76 countries. This yielded a Reduction of Error (ROE) of 79.1%. A full display of SPSS statistical results is located in Figure A1.7 in Appendix 1. Note that with the exception of Gross National Product per Capita, all variables were statistically significant.

**Factor 1: The Morality/Philosophy Factor**

The results of this model were consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. As expected, the coefficient for Survival vs Self Expression was positive, indicating that the more a nation shifts from a survival emphasis to a focus on self-expressionism, the more likely they are to lift the ban on homosexual service-members. And also as expected, the coefficient for Secular/Rational vs Traditionalism was negative, indicating that the more secular a society, the more likely they were to lift the ban. This reinforced the notion that religion is still a very important factor in determining individual policy preferences, especially in terms of homosexuality. Also notice that the absolute values for
both coefficients are equivalent, meaning that each spectrum is important in
determining a nation's general views toward homosexuals and military service.

Factor 2: The Military Need Factor

The results of these variables were interesting, and surprisingly robust. Again, it is interesting to note the signs of the coefficients. The positive coefficient for Total # of Conflict Months shows that the more a military has been used, the more likely it is to lift the ban. But contrary to expectations, the negative coefficient for Proportion of Population in Military shows that a larger relative military is less likely to lift the ban. This may indicate a few things. First of all, it may show that a larger military is more difficult to control in terms of policy change. Or it may indicate an institutional setup that negates the Military Need Factor, such as mandatory military service.

Control Variables

Originally, looking at the list of nations in Figure 3.1, one could speculate that nations that lifted the ban were larger or wealthier nations.
But the control variables yielded some interesting results. While the positive coefficient for Gross National Product per Capita does support the wealthy nation theory, the variable was not statistically significant. And the negative coefficient for Total Population indicates that contrary to expectations, the larger a country’s population, the less likely it is to lift the ban.

Ultimately, both factors, the Philosophy/Morality and Military Need Factors, were shown to have an impact on a nation’s tendency to adopt a policy of openly including homosexual service-members. Figure A1.8 in Appendix 1 lists the calculated probabilities for each nation of adopting this policy. The nations in bold print indicate the cases in which the model incorrectly predicted the actual policy stance. Figure A1.9 shows the results in the form of a probit graph. From this analysis, the nations which should have lifted the ban (based solely on the model’s outcome) are Iceland and Japan, and those which don’t have the military need or values systems consistent with the policy but have adopted it anyway are South Africa, Lithuania, and Italy.
Conclusions

What can be learned from the testing of these two factors? There are two important applications. In the short term, this research can be expanded upon to analyze American policymaking. The next step here will be to examine where the United States falls in terms of the independent variables used to test these two theories. Analyzing the raw data, coupled with initial assumptions, leads me to conclude that the United States is not the huge outlier I expected on the issue of inclusionary policy, but upon initial analysis of the raw data, the United States shares the liberal thought consistent with the nations that have lifted the ban, and uses its military perhaps more often than any other nation in the world. These facts would tend to predict that the United States would have lifted its ban as well by now. In other words, if the United States bears a striking resemblance to these 24 countries in terms of morality/philosophy and military need, what explains the unique American stance on the policy? The model determined a probability of the United States lifting the ban at 0.0293, or less than 3 percent. First of all, the control variables explain the difference. If we take Total Population and GNP Per Capita out of the model, the United States' predicted probability jumps to
23.08%. Secondly, the United States is not as high on the secular/rational vs. traditional values spectrum as I had once assumed. There is a fundamental adherence to traditional values in this country that still drives policy initiatives (as Chapter 4 will explore). But finally, and perhaps most importantly, institutional or organizational factors may be affecting the policy. Chapter 4 will examine more closely the national institutional factors at play, by looking historically at the Truman and Clinton efforts, and Chapters 5 and 6 will examine organizational factors unique to the United States military.
Chapter 4

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF MILITARY INTEGRATION

"Democracy is, first and foremost, a spiritual force; it is built upon a spiritual basis - and on a belief in God and an observance of moral principle. And in the long run only the church can provide that basis. Our founder knew this truth - and we will neglect it at our peril."
- President Harry S. Truman, 1951

Case Selection

In the preceding chapter, a cross-national quantitative analysis model predicted that the United States would not have lifted the ban on homosexuals in its military (based on military need, values systems, the sizes of its military and general population, and wealth). But the model helps to explain only a part of the greater puzzle - why was the U.S. military such a pioneering institution in terms of racial integration yet so problematic for sexual orientation integration? The United States military is a large, complex organization, and may be difficult to mandate changes simply by Executive
Order. But we do have an example of how a President (Truman) was successful in executing such a demand on the military. In this chapter, we return to the original puzzle and look in-depth at why the United States military was a pioneering institution in terms of racial integration under President Truman, and yet so difficult to change in terms of sexual orientation integration under President Clinton. In both cases, major national institutions like the Congress and the courts played an important part.

Any effective case study analysis must first define its parameters, and include a discussion of why the particular cases were chosen for examination (George and Bennett 2004: 79). In this analysis, the dependent variable is whether or not the United States military integrated a minority into its ranks. Independent variables will include the efforts of the president and his executive staff, the national legislature, the judiciary, public opinion, and interest groups.

Why Two and Not Three Cases?

The most common question I received in this undertaking is “Why not include the integration of women into your analysis?” It is definitely a fair question. Women have struggled for acceptance in the military since World
War II, and even today, instances of sexual harassment grab national attention. For example, a scandal at the United States Air Force Academy in 2004 led to Congressional investigations which exposed cultural trends and organizational apathy (Jablonski 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Homosexuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institution Pushing for Change</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Congress/Sec. of Def.</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Military Involvement by Minority</td>
<td>Segregated Units</td>
<td>Non-Combat Jobs</td>
<td>Integrated but in closet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Interest Grp Defending Minority</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)</td>
<td>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)</td>
<td>Service-members Legal Defense Network (SLDN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party in Control of House</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party in Control of Senate</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Arguments Against Integration</td>
<td>Cohesion, Need for Separate Facilities</td>
<td>Cohesion, Need for Separate Facilities</td>
<td>Cohesion, Need for Separate Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for 'Hurt' Morale</td>
<td>Racial Prejudice</td>
<td>Sexism, Harassment, Possibility of Assault</td>
<td>Harassment, Possibility of Sexual Assault</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1. Similarities/Differences in Cases
Table 4.1 shows some of the similarities and differences between the race, sex, and sexual orientation integration cases. Notice that the main arguments against integration (espoused by those from both within and outside the military establishment who opposed change most strongly) are the same in each case. Opponents of integration claimed that unit cohesion would be harmed, and that a need for separate facilities (showers, living quarters, etc.) would be too costly. For the purposes of the case study, however, the race and sexual orientation cases provide an interesting political science comparison. In each of these two cases, a president took charge of a situation and pushed for change when the rest of society was largely opposed to it. Both attempts focused on sweeping, immediate change, as opposed to the advances for women, which came in piecemeal, and didn’t come from a single policy push (Peach 1996: 158-160). Women weren’t allowed in military combat units until the early 1990s, and even then the allowances came slowly, and in phases – women were finally allowed in aviation combat in 1991, sea warfare in 1993, and land units in 1994. And even today there are certain combat units from which women are excluded. Thus, while including the gender case could possibly be enlightening, this
study will focus only on the race and sexual orientation cases, to look specifically at how a President’s policies were handled by other governmental institutions, interest groups, and the general public.

What Will the Case Study Show?

What lessons can be learned by examining Truman’s Executive Order in 1948 which successfully directed the military to integrate racially with Clinton’s failure to push his openly gay military policy through in 1993?

First, we must assess whether or not it is a fair comparison. Arguments for comparing the cases suggest that the military establishment (as well as society at large) used many of the same contentions against each form of integration. In the late 1940s, members of the military brass were concerned that racial integration would hurt morale and unit cohesion. In 1948, Dwight D. Eisenhower commented on his problems with racial integration, by saying “I do believe that if we attempt... to force someone to like someone else, we are just going to get into trouble... when you put in the same organization and make live together under the most intimate circumstances men of different races, we sometimes have trouble” (Shawver 1995: 98-99). These same arguments are made about homosexuality today,
claiming that it is in the best interest of the military to discriminate. "All military personnel policies discriminate. They discriminate between individuals and groups that have strong potential for successful soldiering and those that do not. And these discriminatory judgments are made by Congress, by the Secretary of Defense, or by the service secretaries in fulfilling their duty to compose strong, combat-ready, and efficiently administered armed forces" (Wells-Petry 1993: 5).

Yet there are arguments which try to explain why it is unfair to compare the cases. First, many people still believe that sexual orientation is a choice, not a trait. "Psychological models of causation have posited either that homosexuality is innate and immutable or, conversely, that homosexual behaviors are a learned or adaptive response that strays from an ideal developmental pattern" (Haggerty 2003: 10). If the latter is true, then the comparison may be flawed; society may demand that agencies like the military refrain from discriminating based on involuntary traits like race, but may be more accepting of discrimination based on individual choice.

But the foundation of traditional attitudes about homosexuality may be based on five myths that sociologists claim society has in the past embraced as truth:
First, there is the myth that homosexuality is unnatural, that homosexuals want to be the opposite gender, something that they are not, something unnatural. Second, there is the myth that homosexuals are mentally ill, that homosexual desire is a kind of sickness, like a desire to smoke opium, or wash one's hands excessively. Third, there is the belief that homosexuals are predators, that they will attack heterosexuals, or seduce them, and turn them into homosexuals. Fourth, there is the myth that homosexuals do what they do because they have an uncontrollably strong sex drive. And, finally, there is the myth that homosexuality is a matter of free choice.

(Shawver 1995: 49)

If they are recognized as mere myths, and not truths, the comparison will be a stronger one, and it will pave the way for the case study research. The myth-truth distinction is blurred, however, by attitudes within military culture itself. In other words, it might not matter whether or not these are actual truths, but whether or not the military believes them to be truths. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. At stake in the comparison between racial and sexual orientation integration in the military is an understanding of the responsibility of bureaucratic agencies like the military. “The opinion (that the Army has a social as well as a military mission) came into prominence at the same time the military was becoming more and more ‘civilianized’ in the public consciousness” (Wells-Petry 1993: 132-133). As such, society began to demand that the military reflect the norms of society.
But these two cases show that the temporal relationship has not been perfect. In other words, while racial integration took place in the military (arguably) before it was embraced by American society, the opposite has happened with sexual orientation. Still, as was pointed out in Chapter 2, society is still not completely tolerant of homosexuals or homosexual behavior. As Figures 2.6 and 2.7 illustrated, while the public's tolerance of gays serving openly in the military has increased dramatically in the last 15 years, society's thermometer rating on homosexuality in general has only recently (since the year 2000) risen above the 50% mark. This may indicate that the military isn't necessarily 'lagging behind' the rest of society in terms of progressive attitudes toward integration, but merely reflecting the attitudes of a large portion of the public.

Ultimately, this qualitative research will attempt to tease out strong correlations between the cases, and hopefully lead to generalizations that can be made about the influence of organizational culture, social norms, presidential power, legislative and judicial strategy, and public opinion. As such, we should look at the cases in terms of the efforts made and successes and failures of each branch of government, as well as public opinion and interest groups.
Comparing and Contrasting Presidential Leadership Styles

The linchpins for the racial and sexual orientation integration cases are Presidents Truman and Clinton. As stated in Chapter 1, these two men were proponents of policy change. Both tried to alter military personnel policy through executive power. As such, we need to gain an understanding of their specific leadership styles, and how they interfaced with their environments. The two important questions are: (1) Why did each President act the way he did? And (2) What factors influenced Truman’s ability to succeed but kept Clinton from achieving his objective? Ultimately, what can one person do in terms of altering military policy? To start, we need to understand how the presidency is studied. Quantitative studies of the presidency and presidential behavior are difficult, if for no other reason than the fact that a small-n exists. With only 43 presidents to study, patterns or quantitative analyses across presidencies are subject to methodological criticism. The seminal works in the study of the presidency, however, show that even with this limitation, there are still several theoretical traditions used, mostly to determine what characteristics or strategies of presidents
lead to successful administrations, and, for the purposes of this research, successful policy initiatives. For example, rational choice approaches focus on a president's preferences and the strategies he uses to achieve policy objectives. George Edwards (1989) dictates that the president is more of a Facilitator than a Director, meaning that a president is most successful when he exploits opportunities on issues where there is no clear majority, thereby tipping the balance, rather than trying to direct the country down his own path. Mark Peterson (1990) does the same, saying that the president is more successful as an agenda-shaper than an agenda-setter. And Charles Cameron (2000) illustrates that the president has a powerful weapon in his ability to veto legislation (or even the threat to use it) and that successful presidents use this power to their advantage. Behavioral approaches focus less on a president's personal preferences or agendas and more on what presidents actually do. James Barber (1972), for example, posits that a president uses cues from past experiences in his dealings with present decisions. These personality traits can be characterized as either positive or negative, and either active or passive. Thus, presidential administrations (and their successes or failures) can oftentimes be attributed to personal characteristics. Another classic behavioral work is *Presidential Power*
(Neustadt 1960) and the follow-up *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (Neustadt 1990) which characterize (and rate) presidential behavior and success through his ability (or inability) to bargain with Congress. In 1993’s *Going Public*, Samuel Kernell addresses a different behavior - a president’s propensity to take issues over legislators’ heads and go straight to the public for support, in the hopes of persuading constituents to pressure Congress, which may help to achieve presidential policy preferences. But some scholars use institutional arguments to explain presidential behavior. Terry Moe (1985) and Charles Jones (2005), emphasize that the key to presidential behavior lies in his interaction with Congress, and that successful presidents are able to understand that (1) there is a huge gulf between presidential capacity and the public’s expectation of presidential performance (therefore it is in a president’s best interest to always strive for more power); and (2) that the American government is more of a separated system than a presidential system, so he must strive to work as best he can with the legislature (and their institutional goals). A subset of institutional approaches utilizes historical institutionalism, as evidenced in Stephen Skowronek’s *The Politics Presidents Make* (1997). In this work, Skowronek categorizes administrations based on the president’s
relationship to the previous administration, and whether or not that previous administration was resilient or vulnerable. In this vain, a president's personality or political skill isn't as important as political context. Ultimately, studies of the presidency reflect a rich blend of distinct theoretical approaches. When examining both the Truman and Clinton presidencies, we must focus on how each man related to his environment, and used that environment to further his military integration objective.

**Truman and Racial Integration**

Opinions of the Truman presidency vary greatly. Many of "those who study Truman have tended to see him as a small, shallow, visionless man attempting to function far beyond his capabilities or as a strong president who developed the power and authority of his office, defended the accomplishments of his predecessors, and achieved great things in upholding America's international position" (Hamby 1988: 41). Even with Hamby's assessment of scholars viewing Truman's leadership style in less than glowing praise, some sing Truman's praises as a no-nonsense, grounded, strong leader (McCullough 1992; Leavell 1988; Axelrod 2004).
One thing that does seem to be agreed upon, however, is the style with which Truman managed the executive branch. It is important to examine each president’s interaction with his environment in order to gain an understanding of the memory, motivational, perceptual, and other systems which might affect policy directions and preferences (Rubin 1989: 5). As put forth by Alexander George and Eric Stern, Truman used a Formalistic Model of information flow with his staff. The Model is depicted in Figure 4.1:

![Diagram](attached_image.png)

Figure 4.1.

The Formalistic Model of Communication Used by President Truman

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This model emphasizes the role of each cabinet head and adviser as a functional expert of some aspect of governmental policy area. As opposed to other models of information flow, in the formalistic model the president doesn’t necessarily encourage communication between cabinets or even agencies within cabinets, and rarely solicits specific information from experts within the individual agencies. He relies on a very small group of advisers and expects them to be fully versed in a particular policy area. This model was used almost exclusively by President Truman in determining the military’s position on race.

In the case of military integration, before World War II, the military was often thought of simply as an instrument of power projection responsible only to the president:

In terms of American military structure in World War II, cooperation between the services was almost nonexistent, and the military chiefs worked directly for the president... in conducting the war, Roosevelt relied almost entirely on the military to make major decisions. Consequently, the Chiefs were in the catbird seat when it came to military, diplomatic, and sometimes political decision making. However, when major strategic decisions arose, Roosevelt was prepared to intervene, and on at least one major occasion he overruled the Chiefs, even though his decision put him at odds with them.

(Herspring 2005: 31)
Roosevelt argued with the Chiefs on where to strike Germany in 1942. General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, favored a cross-channel attack. But Roosevelt, persuaded by the British, ended up choosing an assault on North Africa. Marshall felt crushed that the president would choose the advice of his allies in Great Britain over his chief military strategists. For the most part, however, Roosevelt’s relationship with the military was strong. He guided them (and the country) through a major war and out of the Great Depression, and earned a reputation as a problem solver. When Roosevelt died in 1945, Harry Truman fully admitted the challenge he felt in having to fill the shoes of his predecessor. His main problem, however, especially in terms of his relationship with the military, was that he had been left out of almost every important military decision. He was not invited to war planning meetings between Roosevelt and the Chiefs, and as such had to develop a relationship with the nation’s military leadership almost completely from scratch. Just months into his administration, he had to make one of the most difficult decisions a president has ever made – the decision to use nuclear weapons on Japan. But in the military’s eyes, Truman handled it brilliantly, and with a calm and strength they understood and appreciated. They also appreciated his
approachability. "From the military's standpoint, Truman possessed several favorable traits, among them his willingness to meet as needed with [military advisors] Admirals William Leahy and Sidney Souers. Thus, regardless of what course the president ultimately chose to follow, he would first hear the military's views and recommendations. The Chiefs also appreciated the degree to which the president relied upon one of their former members [George C. Marshall]" (Herspring 2005: 53). This relationship would serve Truman well, especially when just three years later, he would be faced with another difficult decision -- how to treat African-American service-members in the United States military.

"The Afro-American experience is one of the most interesting studies in human relations in the history of the world. On the one hand, blacks have been utilized as slaves and experienced systematic inequality, but on the other hand, they have shown an unexplained loyalty to their country" (Sibley 1991: 42). Military service by African-Americans is a perfect example of this. African-Americans have served honorably in every conflict since the Revolutionary War, and yet for most of this country's history, these soldiers were treated much worse than other troops. For example, an Army Service Forces Study submitted to the Director, Special Planning Division at the War
Department (which was tasked to evaluate the performance of African-American soldiers in World War II in an effort to determine minority postwar service) on September 19th, 1945, was completely critical. “On the whole, the performance of Negro officers has been below the standard established by white officers. Generally it can be said that they lack ambition, resourcefulness, aggressiveness, sense of responsibility, and the ability to make decisions” (MacGregor 1977 VII: 36). With attitudes like this one prevalent in military (and perhaps societal) culture, Truman would have a big challenge in pushing for military racial integration.

In a way, Truman’s relationship with the military was perfect for handling a decision like racial integration. It is worth noting that after his experience with the military leadership at the end of World War II, he felt comfortable seeking advice from military leaders, and hired many on afterwards to serve in various civilian positions within the administration. “For example, he selected Walter Bedell Smith as ambassador to the Soviet Union and then director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Lucius Clay as the military governor of Germany; Douglas MacArthur as governor of Japan... and of course, Marshall served as secretary of defense, Omar

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6 The MacGregor citations on the next several pages refer to a collection of copied letters and Gillem Board and Fahy Committee Hearing documents. All references are directly from the original sources.
Bradley as head of Veterans Affairs, and Admiral Leahy retained for several years his position as chief of staff to the president” (Herspring 2005: 54). Smith had been a four-star Army general and assistant to Eisenhower. Clay was also a previous Army general who had served as Military Governor of Germany. And Bradley had been a five-star Army general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In essence, Truman surrounded himself with the military’s past superstars.

The pressure on the Truman administration in the months immediately following World War II came from two main sources. First, demands from civil rights groups reminded administration officials that African-Americans should no longer be simply a source of unskilled labor for the United States military. Letters to the President from several minority interest groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Urban League (NUL) and the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America (UNAVA) made it abundantly clear that Truman needed to “lead the way so that the armed forces of the world’s greatest democracy [could] become in truth the world’s most democratic armed forces” (Henderson 1948: 346). Second, postwar African-American reenlistment was much higher than anyone had expected, and certainly
higher in terms of percentages compared with the reenlistment figures for white troops. The reason for this may have been simple -- African-American troops "were afraid to reenter what seemed a hostile society and preferred life in the armed forces, imperfect as it might be" (MacGregor 1981: 152-153). For both of these reasons, the Truman administration had to start serious inquiries into sweeping military policy changes.

On the 20th of July, 1944, the chief civilian aide to the Secretary of War, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., sent a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. In the letter, Gibson recommended that staff studies be conducted on two main issues: "the preparation of Negro soldiers for demobilization and ... the inclusion of Negroes in the postwar Army (MacGregor 1977 VII: 3). For the first time, a high-ranking military official stated officially that integration was on the horizon and that the military establishment needed to figure out how to achieve it as harmoniously as possible. "The issue then is not whether Negroes can be made into good soldiers but how (MacGregor 1977 VII: 5). In response, on May 23rd, 1945, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson tasked all of his commanders-in-chief to provide reports of their experiences with Negro troops in the war. He then organized a board of three general officers whose mission was to investigate Army policies
toward African American service-members, and to explore the possibility of integration. The group later became known as the Gillem Board, named after its chairman, General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. From October, 1945, until January, 1946, the board heard the testimony of “sixty-nine military and civilian witnesses and examined the various studies of Negro manpower made between the two world wars. The Gillem Board report was the most extensive inquiry ever made by the Army into its Negro policy” (Dalfiume 1969: 150). The board made eighteen specific recommendations, which included the following:

- African Americans should now be allowed into special and overhead units (in other words, while it did not mandate integrated housing and dining, it did recommend integrated office, work, and combat environments)

- The existing ratio of African Americans in the armed forces should be the same ratio as in the national civilian population

- Offer African Americans a larger selection of occupation specialties within the military

- Create a staff which would be used specifically to oversee racial issues within the military
Encourage competition based on merit for positions be universal, and not based on race

That no limit be placed on the number of African American officers in the military, and that their appointment, promotion, and advancement not be affected by race

(MacGregor 1988: 156-157)

The board report shocked the military establishment; many of the commanding generals at the time sent letters through the chain of command in response to the Gillem Board recommendations. For example, A 28 December, 1945, letter from the acting Army Service Forces Chief of Staff, Major General Daniel Noce, to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, stated that “For the present and foreseeable future, special intermingling of Negroes and whites is not feasible. It is forbidden by law in some parts of the country and is not practiced by a great majority of the people in the remainder of the country” (MacGregor 1977: 386). In several more letters sent through the chain of command by Army, Army Air Corps, Navy, and Marine Corps generals, similar positions were taken, as well as offering other recommendations such as insuring that no African-American officers be given command of white troops, and that the military continue to ensure
separate support facilities by race. Over the next few years, interest groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons (NAACP) and the League for Non-violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation lobbied both the Administration and the Department of War (which during this time was renamed the Department of Defense) in order to convince the president to push legislation calling for an end to segregation. Under the direction of A. Randolph Williams, for example, the League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience threatened to tell African Americans not to register to vote if Truman didn’t pass an Executive Order by August 16, 1948, the day the conscription laws were scheduled to be effective. “Truman got the message; after all, he wanted both to be elected president and to pass selective service legislation” (Herspring 2005: 70). While issues of segregation were being discussed nationwide in terms of schooling, government jobs, corporate America, and public establishments, the first battleground occurred in the nation’s military. This was a unique institution after all, especially compared with the others mentioned, in that the president could issue executive orders which would be mandatory and apply to all branches of the military. In addition, with the new reorganization of the military in 1947, a newly formed Defense Department
(which, among other things, created a separate Air Force) was perhaps more suited to immediate change (this will be discussed later in Chapters 5 and 6). The new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, began speaking directly with President Truman on integration issues and on 29 February, 1948, proposed a non-publicized, experimental integrated unit test case (MacGregor 1977 VIII: 445). In April of 1948, the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs met at the Pentagon to discuss the matter further. Present at the meeting were Secretary Forrestal, former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, Chairman of the Conference Lester Granger, and the Secretaries or Under-Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Clearly, they understood that the President meant business and that this change was soon to take place. One factor which helped the cause was that Secretary Forrestal was committed to change. He stated at the meeting that the “problem we have is not one that's limited to the Negro people; it's a National problem” (MacGregor 1977 VIII: 455). On July 26th, 1948, Truman made it official by issuing Executive Order 9981, which stated that there would “be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin” (Dalfiume 1969: 171). Still, some members of the military establishment were somewhat hesitant. The
following day, General Omar Bradley, the Army’s Chief of Staff, declared that the Army was “no place to conduct social experiments and that desegregation would come to the Army only when it was a fact in the rest of the United States” (Dalfiume 1969: 172). In response, Truman ordered the creation of the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. It was headed by a Georgian named Charles Fahy (the committee later became known as the Fahy Committee).

The Fahy Committee held several meetings and hearings to work exclusively on implementation problems. The following is President Truman’s first speech to the committee on January 12th, 1949:

“Well, gentlemen, I issued an Executive Order, last spring, or fall – I forget the date of it – on the better treatment – not “fair” treatment but “equal” treatment in the Government Service for everybody, regardless of his race or creed or color, and it’s slowly and gradually taking hold. And I have asked you gentlemen to serve on this Commission in an effort to expedite the thing in the Government Service so that you can actually carry out the spirit, as well as the letter, of the order. And I hope you will make a survey of the situation, not only in the Military Services, but in all the branches of the Federal Government, and then inform me of anything that’s lacking, and make any suggestions that you deem necessary for the improvement of the situation.

I appreciate the fact that you’re willing to serve on this Commission – Committee, whatever you want to call it – and I’m satisfied that with this wort [sic] of a setup we can get the thing working as it should work...
That’s what I look for and I want it done in such a way that it is not a publicity stunt. I want concrete results - that’s what I’m after - not publicity on it. I want the job done and I want to get it done in a way so everybody will be happy to cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock somebody’s ears down, I don’t want to have to do that, but, if it becomes necessary, it can be done. But that’s about all I’ve got to tell you.”

(MacGregor 1977 IX: 5-7)

Fahy worked closely with the Chiefs and with the Secretary of Defense, but often met with President Truman directly. Both the Navy and Air Force postures indicated that for the most part they saw racial segregation as a waste of manpower, and were willing to move forward (MacGregor 1977 IX: xi). The Army, however, still had reservations about large scale integration. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, told the committee on March 28th, 1949 that “the Army is not an instrument for social evolution” (MacGregor 1977 IX: 503). But the Committee kept coming back.

Committee-member Lester Granger put the Secretary in the hot seat, charging that “you [Secretary Royall] constantly speak of the intelligence, of mental characteristics, and performance characteristics of the Negro soldier. Now, there is no such assumption of a composite soldier with other racial and special groups in the Army. There are other minorities. There are other unpopular groups. There are groups that can be characterized as regional
minorities. And there is reference, for instance, to the tendency of Negroes
to enlist in the Army because they are excluded from other branches of the
armed forces by their higher selection standards. The same thing would be
true of whites. There is no quota for enlistment of white Southerners. Why
would there be a quota for enlistment of Negro Southerners?” (MacGregor
1977 IX: 539-540). In essence, the Committee made it very difficult for each
branch Chief to argue about the feasibility of segregationist policies. In 1949,
the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, advised the three Chiefs of
Staff that “equality of treatment and opportunity required abandonment of
rigid segregation” (Dalfiume 1969: 184). Even Secretary Royall himself
issued a memorandum on April 21st, 1949, ordering that “all individuals,
regardless of race, will be afforded equal opportunity for appointment,
advancement, professional improvement, promotion and retention”
(MacGregor 1977 XI: 1228). Integration as a policy was now service-wide,
and by 1953, over 95% of all African American troops were serving in
racially integrated units (Dalfiume 1969: 218).

Some historians, however, think that the policies enacted were just a
tertiary cause for reform. “The real catalyst for racial integration was not
governmental policy, but the Korean War. The army doubled its size within
five months of the outbreak of hostilities. By June 1951 the army numbered 1.6 million, with 230,000 men serving in Korea in the Eighth Army.

Realistically, quotas and segregation would keep the army from maintaining this rapidly expanding force. African American recruits flooded army training installations; indeed, predicting the number of each race that would arrive was impossible... Faced with the need to employ soldiers, many commanders did not wait for an official change in policy. Rather, they started assigning desperately needed replacements to units without regard to race” (Herspring 2005: 72).

Even with these circumstances, a governmental catalyst was needed to push for official reform. Truman was just the leader needed with the conviction to push forward, if for no other reason than that he possessed an unflappable attitude about what strong leadership entailed. Truman “became a self-taught adherent of the great man theory of leadership.” He believed that leaders were the “driving force in history” and that great leaders make those changes even sometimes at a personal cost (Greenstein 2000: 30). This would certainly be the case in terms of civil rights. He was “no zealot for minority rights but, more than most elected officials of his day, he was determined to do something about racial segregation” (Milkis and
Nelson 2003: 290). His formalistic style of leadership kept him from direct contact with the chiefs on the subject, and instead worked with his specific military advisers.

Truman’s relationship with Congress was a factor insofar as Congress’ relatively little response to the issue. While segregation nationwide was a hot topic in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Congress did little to stop Truman’s efforts to change his military’s stance on segregation. In fact, a search of the Armed Services Committee Hearings both in the House of Representatives and the Senate yielded very little, as did a search on the Congressional Record. In April and May, 1948, the House Armed Services Committee debated House Resolutions 6274 and 6401, which advocated increasing the strength of the armed forces. During the committee hearings, two members of the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service, Alfred Black (speaking for A. Philip Randolph) and Grant Reynolds, were allowed to present arguments for integration, stressing that an integrated military policy would help with manpower shortages (House Armed Services Committee 1948: 6420-6432). And the Senate Armed Services Committee debated Bill 2861, a bill to extend the Selective Service Act, in June 1950. During the hearings, Alfred Black again presented information on behalf this
time of both Randolph and Reynolds and the Committee Against Jim Crowism, and pushed for ensuring integration policies extended to selective service. Besides these instances, there is very little in the Congressional Record dealing with the military's policies regarding race. Congress simply didn't get involved. Either the issue was too polarizing, or Congress as a body refrained from battling the President on the issue. "Truman's relationship with the Congress has been among the most debated of his presidential roles." He had over ten years in the Senate and understood that manhandling the Congress (as his predecessor FDR had done on numerous occasions) was not in his best interest as President (Hamby 1988: 67). As such, it is possible that Congress let Truman exercise some executive privilege in handling military personnel policy. But the tide was turning in terms of the relationship between the president, Congress, and the military. Before Truman, Congress had very little interaction with the military, especially in terms of military policy. Perhaps because of the successes of World War II, the military began to see itself as a political entity, one which could protect its own interests in a political arena. "From this point on, the individual services, and even the military as a whole, would enlist the aid of Congress in an effort to protect their bureaucratic prerogatives" (Herspring
This interaction has grown ever since, and, as the Clinton case will show, Congress became much more of a stumbling block for the new President-Elect from Arkansas in his quest for an openly gay military.

**Clinton and Sexual Orientation Integration**

In 1991, Bill Clinton, the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, announced that his first task after election would be removing the ban on homosexuals in the military. The statement from his official campaign position paper read: “Bill Clinton has called for an immediate repeal of the ban on gays and lesbians serving in the United States armed forces” (Drew 1994: 43). Most heterosexuals paid little attention to the campaign pledge. But Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned Clinton after the election that he shouldn’t just lift the ban without consulting with military officials, and that the military just wasn’t ready for such a large, sweeping personnel policy change. With the firestorm that followed immediately after Election Day, Clinton began to realize that there were many more political actors outside the military who weren’t ready for the change either.
Clinton’s leadership style was somewhat different than Truman’s. While he sometimes used Truman’s formalistic approach, he often blended it with the collegial approach most often associated with one of Clinton’s political idols, President John F. Kennedy. The Collegial Model is depicted in Figure 4.2:

![Diagram of the Collegial Model](image)

Figure 4.2. The Collegial Style of President Kennedy (Clinton Used a Combination of this and the Formalistic Style of Truman) (George and Stern 1998: 201)
The Collegial Model is obviously much more complicated than the Formalistic one. In the collegial approach, the president has two-way communication with each adviser and cabinet member. In addition, each adviser is encouraged to interact with other advisers to gather information and make policy suggestions. The other unique characteristic of this approach is that the President also has specific policy interactions with experts at certain agencies as well. In essence, the collegial model is an information 'free-for-all'; while it ensures that information is spread to the maximum extent possible, it also adds the possibility of miscommunication and confusion. Presidential scholar John Burke stated that when compared to his three predecessors, Clinton was "by far the least concerned or constrained by organizational structures or ordered decision-making procedures" (2000: 180). This model in light of Clinton's experience with the military is particularly relevant for two main reasons. First, the military is a highly stylized, highly structured organization. As such, the military works best with leaders who follow generally the same pattern of command structure. In Clinton's model of information and leadership organization, the fact that so many advisers are used made things difficult for the military, especially when asked to carry out directives abroad. Second, as opposed to
the Truman case, the influence from Congress, the courts, public opinion, interest groups, and even the military brass itself became even more integral parts of the complications that repealing the ban would cause; as such, the new president found himself in the middle of a social battleground that was difficult to control.

At the core of the problem was the fact that Clinton and his advisers simply never realized how big of a firestorm lifting the ban would create. Paul Begala, one of Clinton’s chief campaign strategists in 1992, later stated, “It wasn’t a big thing in the campaign. We clearly had no appreciation of the offense that would be taken at a Presidential directive ending the ban” (Drew 1994: 44). Some historians point out that during the campaign, Clinton made little or no effort to discuss the ramifications of such a move, and probably hadn’t even thought about what the opposition to such an order would argue (see for example, Renshon 1995: 72). When Les Aspin, Clinton’s pick as the new Secretary of Defense, met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the inauguration to discuss the possible implications of lifting the ban, the meeting “was a stormy one, which lasted for an hour and a half and ended with a request by the Chiefs to see the President” (Drew 1994: 45). After the meeting with the Joint Chiefs, and constant discussions with Congressional
leadership, Clinton backed down and agreed to a policy in which service-
members would not be asked about their sexual orientation, but that any
admittance or conduct exposing homosexuality would still be grounds for
dismissal. In many respects, the new policy was an affirmation of the status
quo.

In a way, Clinton was already at odds with the military. During the
campaign, many opposed to his candidacy portrayed Clinton as a draft-
dodger, and painted him soft on defense and out of touch with national
security issues. "If George Bush [Senior] fostered one of the most
harmonious relationships with the senior military leadership, William
Clinton engendered one of the most difficult. Clinton was the first president
since the end of World War II who had not served in the military; he knew
little if anything about the armed forces and had expressed his disdain for
them publicly" (Herspring 2005: 331). This put the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in a difficult position. He needed to
follow orders from his Commander-in-Chief while leading a massive agency
whose members (for the most part) were less than enthusiastic about their
new president. Clinton was also wary about General Powell, who had been
much more vocal than previous Chiefs about policy positions, and especially
because the victory in the first Gulf War had made him a household name and a very popular figure with the American people.

Another key player in the debate was Senator Sam Nunn. When Clinton ignored his warnings prior to the inauguration, and announced to the public that he would seek to lift the ban, Nunn used his influence in the Senate to threaten to block Clinton’s budget plan. Clinton was caught in a crossfire – if he dropped the ban initiative, he would be turning his back against the gay and lesbian community who had given him “strong financial and organizational support” during the campaign, as well as failing to come through on one of his campaign promises. On the other hand, he risked losing his budget proposal (which called for a reduction in the deficit, another one of Clinton’s campaign promises) and irritating a military organization he was already on shaky ground with (Milkis and Nelson 2003: 386).

Clinton was also in trouble with other Democratic members of Congress (not to mention Congressional Republicans). His problem was that he “would need to rely exclusively on the Democrats in a situation where his political status was weak, his party appeal was open to question, his public support was fragile and his experience in Washington politics minimal.
Clinton would need to work hard at creating coalitions of support within his own party” (Foley 1999: 27). Transcripts from both the Senate and the House Armed Services Committee hearings on the subject reveal a much more lively debate than anything that took place regarding racial integration. Senator John Kerry, for example, gave an impassioned speech in favor of lifting the ban (U.S. Senate 1994: 476-481). Senators Dianne Feinstein and John Warner debated the issue of housing arrangements with an openly gay military (U.S. Senate 1994: 512-513). General Colin Powell and Congressman Martin Meehan discussed the status/conduct distinction detailed in Chapter 1 (U.S. House of Representatives 1994: 74-75). In addition, Generals Merrill McPeak (U.S. Air Force), Gordon Sullivan (U.S. Army), and Carl Mundy (U.S. Marine Corps), and Admirals David Jeremiah and Frank Kelso (U.S. Navy), testified in defense of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ compromise (U.S. House of Representatives 1994: 35-89). And retired Army General and Desert Storm war hero H. Norman Schwarzkopf argued that an openly gay military would destroy unit cohesion, which he believed was the “single most important factor in a unit’s ability to succeed on the battlefield” (U.S. Senate 1994: 595). But, ironically, Senator Nunn was the strongest vocal opposition to lifting the ban. He was even more vocal than his Republican
counterparts. Ultimately, Clinton’s determination to forge a new path and become a “New Democrat” isolated some members of his party; in the end, many of his efforts at revolution in his first 100 days left him, in the eyes of his own party, to be at best a party outsider, and to Republicans, a traditional liberal Democrat (Stoesz 1996: 199).

He even had critics within the gay community. While some welcomed his campaign pledge as a step in the right direction, others in the gay community felt that his first priority should have been pushing for legislation that promoted fair and equal opportunity in the workplace (Berman 2001: 22).

Could Clinton have done anything differently? Some historians, like Colin Campbell, suggest that he should have occupied “the high ground” by reminding General Powell that the Commander in Chief, not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, controls the military (1996: 66). In the end, everyone suffered. The gay community was hugely disappointed with the outcome, and argued that its service-members would still be forced to stay in the closet about their sexuality. And Clinton himself suffered a huge political setback, in two important ways. First, his image before the campaign as a moderate Democrat had been replaced by one that portrayed him as simply another
liberal. Secondly, his backing down from his position made him look weak in the eyes of Congress, other Washington elites, and even the public-at-large. According to pollster Stan Greenberg, Clinton's handling of the issue caused a 20 percent drop in favorability ratings in just his first two weeks in office (Drew 1994: 48).

Just three weeks after his inauguration, on February 10th, 1993, Clinton held his first town meeting in Detroit, with satellite audiences in three other cities. One of the first questions he received dealt with his decision to tackle the 'gays in the military' issue right first rather than focusing on the problems with the national economy. Clinton simply responded with "It wasn't my idea" (Holloway 2003: 67). His inability to take a strong position made him vulnerable in some Washington circles, and exposed him to harsh criticism from both sides of the political aisle and the American public.

National Broadcasting System (NBC)/New York Times (NYT) polls conducted in early 1993 showed that while Americans were almost completely split on their attitudes toward homosexuals serving in the military, 56% believed that "Don't Ask Don't Tell" was a good compromise. In addition, 56% believed Clinton handled the issue poorly. 56% felt that he was paying too much attention to the needs of homosexuals, and 66%
believed that government shouldn’t pay so much attention to the gays in the military issue (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995: 202).

The opposition by Congress and the military establishment weren’t simply factors themselves – the coalition forged between the Congress and the military was a critical component. Powell met with Nunn and later threatened to resign if Clinton forced his hand in lifting the ban through Executive Order (Campbell 1996:66). Starting with the Truman administration, and growing stronger ever since, has been a relationship between the military control structure and the national legislature. From the middle of the twentieth century forward, “when senior military leaders felt attacked, they turned to their allies on the Hill to help override what they perceived to be a weak president. One can decry this action, but like it or not, a new, powerful player had entered the civil-military arena in Washington” (Herspring 2005: 84).

The ability for individual members of Congress to oppose the president on policy matters (especially members of the president’s own party), is an important distinction which sets the United States apart from many of her European counterparts. Most of the countries which allow homosexuals to serve openly (as Chapter 3 pointed out) are located in
Western Europe. In many of these parliamentary democracies, party affiliation and party loyalty are critical. In the presidential style democracy of the United States, however, legislative individualism is often a result. In other words, Democratic legislators (like Senator Nunn) on Capitol Hill felt justified about opposing the president on this issue. This individualism can cause serious problems for presidents, as it did to Clinton in this case (Sinclair 1996: 101).

It is also important to note that interest groups had a much bigger impact in the Clinton case than in the Truman one. While civil rights interest groups were important in pointing out Truman’s vulnerability in the 1948 election, there was very little organized opposition (in other words, no segregationist lobbying was done to the president). In contrast, in 1993, interest groups on both sides were very vocal about the gays in the military issue, and had much more access to the president (Wilson 1996: 230). Gay rights groups, who had supported Clinton throughout the campaign, were eager to see the ban lifted as soon as possible, while Christian conservatives were well organized and saw this issue (as well as controversies surrounding Clinton’s extra-marital affairs and the Whitewater investment scandals) as sufficient reason to rally support and establish a well-organized political foe.
In the end, it spelled political disaster for the new president. “In a single episode, he identified himself with an unpopular liberal stance on a controversial social issue, he ended up grievously disappointing his gay and lesbian supporters, and by caving in to resistance from Congress and his nominal subordinates in the military, he raised doubts about the strength of his leadership” (Quirk and Hinchliffe 1996: 268). In fact, only after the passage of his Family Medical Leave Act in 1993 did he begin to rebuild his political image and gain confidence and momentum.

The courts also played a bigger role in the Clinton case. In terms of racial integration, the 1896 Supreme Court decision *Plessy v. Ferguson*, which had declared that separate facilities on the basis of race were fair as long as they were equal, was still the general rule. Not until the *Brown v Board* decision in 1954 was that standard overturned. In the Clinton case, however, high profile cases involving service-members removed from the military because of their sexuality had received national attention for over twenty years. Although the courts may not have had a direct impact on the formulation of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy, their influence in exposing the national public (and in particular interest groups) to the issue certainly made an impact in terms of rallying support for both sides of the debate.
A president who takes it upon himself to alter military policy faces challenges. As Dale Herspring pointed out, "It is almost axiomatic that a president who decides to make major changes in a short period of time will violate the Chiefs’ perception of military culture. Why? Because if the president wants to make such changes he [the President] will probably circumvent them [the Chiefs]" (2005: 425-6), thereby possibly causing resentment from the military establishment. Both Truman and Clinton faced these challenges. And yet only Truman was successful in achieving his policy goals. While their presidential leadership style played a role, the increased involvement from Congress, the public interest generated by the media and the courts, and the well-organized opposition efforts from passionate interest groups all made Clinton’s efforts even more difficult than Truman’s. In addition, the emergence of the military as a political force made Clinton’s job much more difficult.

As the Clinton case pointed out, militaries can be complex organizations, and are certainly sometimes difficult to manage. While Chapters 2 and 3 explained the global factors tending to explain military policy, and this one looked at national institutional factors, one piece of the puzzle remains. How is the military itself a factor? Is the military somehow
distinct from other agencies within the American bureaucracy in terms of organizational culture? And has that culture changed over the last 60 years? Chapters 5 and 6 will attempt to answer these questions, to look not only at the possible differences between the Truman and Clinton cases, but also to help predict the future of military personnel integration in the United States.
Chapter 5

THE EFFECTS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY’S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

“In the face of an outside challenge – be it the New Look [Eisenhower’s plan of reducing military (especially Army) budgets in accordance with his 1950s national security strategy] or the Rumsfeld reforms [in which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s insistence on future technological advances threatened to reduce the Army’s importance in national security strategy] – the armed forces’ internal differences tend to be papered over and a unitary front established.”

- Brian McAllister Linn, 2003

So far, this research has looked at international and national institutional factors which tend to explain why the United States military was able to accept the order to integrate racially but not in terms of sexual orientation. But there is still a piece of the puzzle missing. Thus far, this research has determined that the United States is not as tolerant as some countries in Western Europe, for example, that have lifted the ban on homosexuals in their militaries. We have also looked historically at the struggles of those seeking racial integration in 1948 and sexual orientation integration in 1993, and seen the important differences in influence that the
President, Congress, the courts, interest groups, and public opinion had in determining the different outcomes. But is it possible that the military was different structurally in 1948 than it was in 1993? In other words, is it possible that integration was more difficult in 1993 partly because of the nature of a military organization and culture which made policy change more difficult? There may be factors inherent in the military as an organization which fill in the blanks. Obviously, the military stands out as a unique agency within the American bureaucracy, both because of its size, and perhaps more importantly because of the nature of its mission.

Thus, this chapter and the next one will focus on the military as an organization, to see if factors inherent in its structure and culture may help to explain the difference between the racial and sexual orientation cases.

Ultimately, Chapters 5 and 6 aim to answer one main question: Is there anything specific to the United States military as an organization that fosters an environment opposed to the integration of homosexuals? This chapter will explore the literature on the civil-military gap and military culture, to assess the debate on whether or not such a gap exists, and if so, to what extent it may influence personnel policy implementation. First, we must identify and explain the theories of the civil-military gap and the relative
homogeneity of military culture and attitudes. Next, an assessment of the seminal works on the civil-military gap will highlight the debate about its existence and size. Then an analysis of literature on military culture will reveal the possibility that a strong set of attitudes and values unique to the profession of arms may hamper any integration initiative. After the review of literature and theories in this chapter, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 6 will not only prove the existence of such a gap, but will determine whether attitudes within the military personnel structure are dependent on rank, generation, race, gender, or branch of service. The argument here is that the demographic of the ‘average’ military professional may be much different than it was in 1948, and thus problems for homosexuals in the military will continue.

Two Theories

In the quest for understanding whether or not there are organizational factors inherent to the military specifically which may help to explain the differences, two theories must be examined and tested:
Theory 1: Military personnel on the whole carry a different value system (for the most part) than the rest of civil society.

These differences may be more pronounced than they were in 1948, when the military consisted primarily of a cross-section of society (the World War II draft ensured this characteristic). The transition to an all-volunteer force on June 30th, 1973, may have done two things. First, it may have allowed the military to foster a stronger military culture than it had experienced before (after all, military members were now a part of the organization because they wanted to be a part of it). Secondly, this culture may have become a self-perpetuating phenomenon, in the sense that now for the most part only like-minded individuals are drawn into a life of military service. In addition, the military may purposefully seek to recruit individuals whose value systems most align with that of the military norm.

Theory 2: Whereas civil society's values systems can be categorized in terms of generation, race, gender, age, and socioeconomic status, the values systems of military members are more homogeneous in nature.
If this is the case, the prospects for lifting the ban are less optimistic. In other words, as the rest of society slowly starts to become more tolerant of homosexuals and homosexuality (which polls indicate), the military may lag behind even after the next generation enters the ranks, effectively continuing its policy of exclusion. If the opposite is true, and attitudes about homosexuality in the military are generational in nature (or based on some other characteristic like rank, branch, etc.) then the chances for lifting the ban in the next few decades are much better.

The Civil-Military Gap

In 1957, historian Samuel Huntington released a book entitled *The Soldier and the State*. In it, he claimed that military institutions in any country are shaped by two dominant but opposing forces. On the one hand, there is “a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security.” On the other is a “societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society” (Huntington 1957: 2). In Huntington’s opinion, this created a delicate balance. If
militaries reflected only social values, they might be rendered incapable of
accomplishing their primary mission, which is to fight and win wars. But if
they completely ignored social norms, they might not be able to function
within the context of the larger society they are employed to defend. After
all, the larger society equips the military with what it needs to accomplish its
tasks. This delicate balance, in Huntington's opinion, fuels the problem of
civil-military relations.

Why is the civil-military gap, if it indeed exists, important to this
research? Quite simply, any noticeable split between the values of the
American military and the rest of civil society would make policy change,
especially from an outside entity, more difficult than in any other
organization. If there are explanations to be made in terms of the military as
an organization, then differences in culture or values systems are extremely
important and must be determined.

The study of civil-military relations is a relatively new one, with very
little work surfacing before the second half of the twentieth century
(Huntington 1962: 262). This may be attributed to the general acceptance of
the early work of Carl von Clausewitz, a military doctrinarian who posited
that there should never be conflict between military officers and their civilian
leaders - this is because “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on by other means” (1976: 83). However, as Chapter 4 pointed out, beginning with the Truman administration, military leaders began to forge relationships both with members of Congress and with the media and public at large, in an effort to ensure they had the resources to adequately do what the nation expected them to do. As such, the military carved out for itself a niche as a “persistent pressure group pursuing its own organizational and material well-being” (Janowitz 1981: 21).

Military Legitimacy

Any study of the military as a political being within the context of the larger society must examine military legitimacy. Three main models serve as the standard ideal types for consideration:

1. Militocratic Model – In this model, the legitimacy of the military is sacrosanct. Military needs are directly related and in harmony with national interest.

2. Democratic Model – The military is legitimate only if its purpose, goals, and means are approved of by the society as a whole.
3. Anarchist Model – The military can never have political legitimacy, because the greatest threat to free expression is the effect of organized government, and as an agency of that government, the military is in essence a perpetrator of tyranny.

(Harries-Jenkins 1981: 237)

This illustrates the problem inherent in civil-military relations, especially since each model is wrought with difficulties. If we accept the militocratic model, then society allows the military organization to make choices based on what it deems necessary to carry out the nation's security goals, and does not question them. This simply doesn't happen within the confines of a society where resources are limited, however. In other words, while Americans want to feel safe from external threats, they also want to feed their families, receive adequate health care, etc. Thus, the military does not exist within a vacuum, but within a larger framework competing for scarce resources. In the democratic model, the military must make concessions based on the needs and wishes of society at large. But warfare in the 21st century has become so technologically savvy that most of civil society can't relate to the military's functional existence, much less dictate its policy or strategic goals. Thus, the military can't respond completely to the wishes of
a society that isn’t versed in the specific science of modern warfare. And the anarchist model ignores the simple fact that militaries in democratic societies exist for one main reason – to protect the self-expression and self-determination that are the main characteristics of those governments. Thus, it is fallacious to argue that the military exists to thwart free thought and expression.

*Categorizing the Military as an Agency Within the American Bureaucracy*

As stated in Chapter 1, James Q. Wilson’s seminal work *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* categorized bureaucratic organizations in the United States according to whether their outputs and outcomes were observable or not. It is difficult to place the military in any particular category here because its position in the model changes between peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the military resembles a Procedural Organization, because outputs are observable but outcomes are not. In wartime, the opposite is true. It becomes a Craft Organization; we obviously know if it is successful, but may not see day-to-day what the military is doing in a distant land to achieve our national security objectives.
The military is also unique in that an unusual deference is given traditionally by the judiciary to Congress and the Executive in the administration of the armed forces, certainly more than other agencies within the bureaucracy. The Uniform Code of Military Justice acts as a separate legal code applied strictly to military members. But even in the cases from 1994-1998, immediately following the implementation of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, in which appeals from discharged homosexual service-members were made to civilian courts, the court in each case made judgments which reflected a deference to military order. In each case, the court basically admitted that it was "ill-suited to second guess military judgments that bear upon military capability and readiness" (Congressional Record Service 2005: 16-18). In essence, the military is a unique agency within the federal bureaucracy in that "the Supreme Court has insisted that the judiciary treat congressional and executive decisions on military policy with special respect" (Ratliff 1996: 533).

So through what lens should we view the military in terms of its legitimacy and culture? Perhaps the simplest explanation is the best one in this case. Wilson explains that all agencies have goals, even if they are

oftentimes vague or unclear (1989: 33). But more often than not, for each agency within the American bureaucracy, two goals seem to be obvious. The first goal of a bureaucratic agency is simply to do what society employs it to do. The U.S. Postal Service, for example, has a goal of delivering mail in a reliable and timely manner. But the second goal is more complex: agencies want to survive and thrive (Schein 2004: 87). In an ever-increasing competitive game over scarce governmental resources, agencies make their best case for why they need to continue as an agency if not grow in size and expand their responsibility.

The Importance of Street-Level Operators

This position, however, uses an important but perhaps erroneous assumption. The previous argument assumes that the organization acts and feels as one, homogeneous unit. Clearly, in an organization as large and complex as the United States military, assumptions like this one are problematic. Certainly, men and women in uniform are interested in the survival of the organization, in the sense that it provides them a way to make a living, and on the whole they understand and appreciate that their efforts provide for the common defense of American society. But in terms of
specific policy directives, most service-members are completely removed from organization-wide decisions. Those decisions are left to the President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an organization such as the United States military, though, where structure and chain of command are so crucial, how important are the attitudes of the street-level service-member? Clearly the street-level operator is important for many reasons, and may in some ways even be responsible for de facto policy outcomes. A perfect analogy is the state trooper. I once asked students in my American Government class what the local highway speed limit was in the area. Everyone was unanimous in providing the answer ‘65 miles per hour.’ But when I asked the question again, and wanted them to tell me what the real limit was, most said between 70 and 75 miles per hour. What accounted for the difference in answers? Many agreed that most state troopers wouldn’t pull vehicles over until they were at least five to ten miles per hour above the speed limit, so although the state legislature enacted specific rules concerning the speed limit of vehicles, the street-level operators’ enforcement of those rules created a de facto new standard, one which is understood by most vehicle operators on the highways. This analogy may be true in the military as well, especially in an organization
where centralized command and decentralized control is commonplace, and
where enormous responsibility is left to the battlefield, unit-level
commanders.

In essence, although only top staff officers are making agency-wide
decisions, the attitudes of members of all ranks are important for three main
reasons:

1. Members from these ranks in the decades to follow fill the highest
leadership roles in the military, and thus are tomorrow’s sweeping
decision-makers;

2. Senior officers feel that their purpose is two-fold: first, to see that the
mission of their organization meets its obligations and goals; and
secondly, to ensure that the people in their organizations have the
tools necessary both to accomplish the mission they are responsible
for and to allow them to achieve their personal goals (thus keeping
morale in the unit high);

3. Recruiting in the last several years (especially in light of the effect of
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on operations tempo) demand that
attention be placed on the quality of life of service-members. In other
words, because many American service-members are deployed more
often now than ever before, the military’s ability to attract qualified men and women has been affected substantially; this has forced leaders to examine new ways to make military service and life more attractive both to those individuals currently on active duty and to potential new recruits from civilian society.

“Job” Versus “Calling”

Complicating this challenge for senior leaders is the distinction between the institutional and occupational formats. Where many service-members may consider the nature of their military service as a ‘calling,’ others may look at it primarily as a ‘job.’ This distinction is important, especially as social pressures for change may be met differently by these two groups. Service-members embracing the institutional format (those who feel they have been called to service) may be more strongly opposed to organizational change, especially if they feel that it is coming from outside the military establishment (for example, a campaign pledge by a new President who had never served in the military). Those embracing the occupational format, however, see their service much more like a civilian job, and thus may be more amenable to changes, especially as such pressures as
egalitarian initiatives have already taken hold in most of the rest of civilian society. David Segal, after assessing attitudes of service-members in the late 1970s, noted that "the data on the attitudes of armed forces personnel do not wholly support either an occupational or a calling model of service and hence neither a purely political nor purely industrial definition of the citizenship implications of military service" (1983: 303). In other words, while service-members on the whole are interested in comparing their jobs to similar ones in civilian society (each year, for example, the Army, Air Force, and Navy Times publications list salaries for military positions and compare them to analogous jobs in the corporate world), they also understand the fundamental difference between the two, and acknowledge that their commitment to military duty demands a unique perspective.

This is important in the realm of personnel integration policy for an obvious reason. It is possible that those service-members who lean more toward the institutional model over the occupational model may be less inclined to favor integration policies, especially if they believe that it might hamper their ability to maintain either institutional legitimacy or, perhaps more importantly, institutional effectiveness. Studies like Segal’s show that the occupational school of thought is much more prevalent today than it was
in the past; thus, the possibilities for reform are present. But what happens to service-members as they move up in the ranks? Do they transition from an occupational to an institutional mindset? Do they start to see their service as a calling much more than a job, especially as they decide to make the military a career? If so, then military culture may be making a huge impact, one which calls into question the possibility of integration anytime soon. If this is the case, our critical task must be to find out "how much of civic consciousness is determined by the predispositions entering soldiers bring into the military and how much can be shaped by what happens to soldiers once in the military" (Moskos 1983: 308). Chapter 6 will aim to determine this effect by analyzing service-wide survey results.

Civil-Military Relationships

As stated earlier, the military was in a huge transition in the early 1970s. One of the legacies of civil-military relations was Vietnam, where the military felt that over-control by civilian leaders crippled our efforts to win the war (Lehman and Sicherman 2002: 6). In addition, the military switched to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973. Coming off the heels of the war, and with public demand for the elimination of the draft, the military,
following the guidelines set out by the Gates Commission in 1970, followed a marketplace approach, based on four key assumptions:

1. "There is no analytical distinction between military systems and other systems – in particular, no difference between cost-effectiveness analysis of civilian enterprises and military services;

2. Military compensation should be as much as possible in cash, rather than in kind or deferred;

3. Military compensation should be linked as much as possible to skill differences of individual service-members;

4. Social cohesion and goal commitment are essentially immeasurable." (Moskos 1983: 312)

In this effort, the AVF has created an atmosphere in which the military, just like any corporate giant, does its best to compete and recruit the best-qualified men and women from civil society for service. But how effective has that process been? Has this shift to self-selection the self-selection process effectively guaranteed that "those who choose a career in the military will espouse values and opinions that are more 'conservative' than the rest of society?" (Holesti 1999: 41)
In order to ascertain the effectiveness of the AVF, we must examine the possibilities that exist in terms of relations between the military establishment and the rest of civil society. Figure 5.1 shows these varying types, which depend on levels of congruence and interaction. Congruence is defined by Huntington as the extent of similarity between the military and society. Figure 5.1. Alternative Relations Between the Military and Society

(Huntington 1977: 23)
society in terms of "personnel, functions, structure, and other salient characteristics." Interaction is defined as the extent to which "military institutions and individuals have a multiplicity of contacts with non-military institutions and individuals" (Huntington 1977: 23). When both congruence and interaction are high, the relationship is one marked by identification. Israel is a perfect example here; because the military’s presence is so apparent there (recall from Chapter 3 that Israel’s military ranked second, only trailing to the United States, in terms of how much its military was used in the last fifty years) the difference in values systems is almost non-existent. On the opposite end of the spectrum is a situation where both congruence and interaction are low. This relationship is defined as one of insulation. Huntington gives the example here of the United States military in the late 1800s, when it was highly specialized and somewhat removed from the rest of society, especially as America was entering the dawn of its status as a fledgling superpower. In the years that followed, Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and the United States’ involvement in both World Wars I and II solidified our superpower status. ‘Professionalism’ marks the relationship of high interaction/low congruence, and ‘Self-sufficiency’ characterizes the relationship with low interaction/high
congruence. For personnel integration to occur successfully, the most likely relationship for an easy implementation is 'Identification'; society identifies easily with military culture, and because congruence is high, society's imposition of values onto the military is relatively painless. The 'Self-sufficiency' and 'Professionalism' scenarios are both problematic for change, but certainly a better environment than 'Insulation', in which the military is almost completely removed from society and therefore might put up barriers to reform. Where was the United States military in 1948 and 1993 on this scale? I would argue that the relationship during the racial integration transition was most likely characterized as 'Identification.' The country had just three years earlier achieved victory in World War II, and as opposed to previous wars, did not undergo a massive scale back in terms of personnel (because of the impending Cold War, starting with hostilities in Korea and continuing for the next four decades). As stated in Chapter 4, President Truman had hired several former military leaders as his advisors, providing a natural level of high congruence. In 1993, however, it can be argued that the relationship was somewhere between 'Professionalism' and 'Insulation.' The shift to an All-Volunteer Force twenty years earlier had meant that the natural draft 'randomization' in terms of personnel had all but vanished, and
thus the gap may have started, as many have stated, its divergent path. And although interaction may have been high in terms of the recent successes in Desert Storm, most of civil society had become disillusioned with military goals in the face of domestic challenges like health care and the economy. In other words, President Clinton had a much bigger challenge in terms of the propensity for organizational change in 1993 than President Truman faced in 1948. And although Clinton's leadership may have increased public support for the policy by choosing to spend political capital on the issue (see Bailey et. al. 2003), actual reform proved impossible to achieve.

**Shrinking the Gap**

Military culture and societal culture are at often at odds. Where the "military ideology demands authority, honor, and obedience, the political ideology [demands] consensus, expediency, and compromise" (Wesbrook 1983: 275). Two main schools of thought have been developed in political science literature as to how to handle this disparity. The first, most often associated with Huntington, calls for encouraging a conservative shift in societal values so that it falls in line with contemporary military norms. The other, most often attributed to Morris Janowitz, recognizes the complex
nature of modern warfare and the military’s dependence on technological innovation, thus calling for a slow and systematic ‘civilianization’ of the military (Holesti 1999: 6). Both of these approaches, however, are problematic. While both Huntington and Janowitz are justly concerned with the consequences of such a gap, their suggested solutions would be either very difficult to accomplish or create severe obstacles to military effectiveness.

Let’s first assume that the presence of the gap is real. Huntington’s solution to bringing society’s views in line with the military’s is difficult. How would that be accomplished? If anything, while public support for military members is at a level probably unmatched since World War II, the thought of embracing military culture is another animal. For one, the public relationship with the military changes over time. In the last 60 years, for example, the American public welcomed heroes back from World War II, showed outright disdain for the military during the Vietnam crisis, and rallied support once again in Desert Storm. According to an ABC News Poll conducted on September 11th, 2001, just hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the American public looked to the President and the military for strength. 94 percent of respondents felt that the United
States should use its military in response to the attacks. But maybe even more surprising is the fact that during the same survey, a startling 84% of respondents felt that the military should be used to seek out and take action against countries that associate with terrorists, even those not responsible for the attacks of 9/11 (Larson and Savych 2005: 94). Obviously, as America became entrenched in occupation operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, support for military action has waned. Even though support for the military in general remains relatively high (as Chapter 2 pointed out, the National Election Survey results indicate that respondents’ thermometer ratings toward the military hover in the 70’s and low 80’s), it does vary. And with that, the landscape of low to mid-congruence and mid to high-interaction probably categorizes civil-military relations in the ‘Professionalism’ group. This means that the public sees the military often, but may not identify with military members. As such, while it is strong in terms of support (generally, even members of the public who question the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq still maintain a positive attitude about military members, but may blame civilian leaders for specific national security decisions), it is unlikely that the public will embrace and internalize military culture anytime soon. And even if there were a propensity for such a transition, what would the mechanism
be for such a shift? Huntington's recipe for shrinking the gap, while ideally possible, will most likely never be realized.

Janowitz' plan, on the other hand, may slowly be starting to take shape. His recommendation for shrinking the gap has been to 'civilianize' the military. Once the military becomes more and more interlaced with the corporate world (as discussed earlier, the AVF was one way to begin the process), the military might embrace civil society's culture, and bridge the gap. There is no question that the marriage between civilian technology and military capability has often been explored and encouraged, in order to continually update the nation's defense technology and industrial base (OTA U.S. Congress 1994: 8). In addition, think about how much we've begun to rely on reserve forces for operations abroad. Even though the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, declared in February, 2006, that the Pentagon plans to reduce the number of reserve troops in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007, about a third of all troops used in military operations there have been reservists (O'Hara 2006: 1). This means the military has been relying heavily on service-members who spend most of their time working outside the military, and arguably bringing a civilian sector mentality with them to the military establishment. Chapter 6 will determine whether
reservists’ attitudes are remarkably different from active duty service-
members. If so, this trend toward part-time service-members may have huge
implications for the future civilianization of military culture. While one
critique of Janowitz is that he fails to adequately assess how seriously
military professionals take their positions (Herspring 2005: 9), the fact that
the military over time is being integrated with civilian contractors and part-
time soldiers may make an impact.

In summary, the presence of a values gap between the military and
society can make any personnel policies difficult to enforce, especially if the
military senses that the push is coming from an outside entity. This delicate
balance between civilian leaders and military professionals can be navigated,
but only after those leaders take into account the context within which such
change needs to take place. The only way for national leaders to maintain
public support for the military and simultaneously ensure national security
is to “find common ground and forge policies that reflect a durable
consensus” (Larson and Savych 2005: 222). The key to finding that common
ground lies in grasping the sometimes complex nature of military culture.
Understanding Military Culture

"Culture is both a dynamic phenomenon that surrounds us at all times, being constantly enacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership behavior, and a set of structures, routines, and norms that guide and constrain behavior" (Schein 2004: 1). If a civil-military gap exists, then it is undoubtedly a factor of military culture. But as organizational behavioralist Edgar Schein defines above, culture is a dynamic phenomenon. This begs the question whether or not military culture was different in 1948 than in 1993. And for the purposes of studying the possibility of integrating homosexuals openly into the ranks, does military culture construct an obstacle to policy change? Consider the story of A.B. Kelly. Kelly joined the Marines in 1998 and graduated at the top of his basic training class. He was transferred to duty at the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, North Carolina. Troops in his new unit began to question his sexuality, and eventually put the young Marine to a test. In a committee hearing testimonial letter to the U.S. Senate, Kelly explained how his colleagues had asked him to join them on a deployment to the Philippines: "They insisted that I would have a great time because of the
prostitution in the Philippines. They said that women would cost less than 20 dollars and detailed the things that women prostitutes would do 'sexually to me’” (Kelly to U.S. Senate 1994: 897). Kelly avoided the deployment but continued to face harassment. After serving less than 2 years, Kelly was discharged from the Marines because of his sexual orientation. Is the harassment that Kelly faced indicative of an organizational culture that frowns on homosexuality? And if so, is it changing? Before beginning our quantitative analysis in the next chapter, we must understand how military culture shapes the attitudes of service-members, and whether or not this culture is self-perpetuating.

Service vs Military Culture

Where does an Air Force pilot’s priorities lie? Does she see herself primarily as an American service-member? Or does she identify herself as an Air Force officer? Or Air Force pilot? Or pilot in general? The difference illuminates the fact that subcultures exist in any large organization. In a group as large as the United States military, the easiest categorization occurs at the branch level. Army soldiers may embrace a different culture than
Coast Guard members, while Navy submarine officers may feel distinct from Air Force medical personnel.

'Service culture' refers to an allegiance to a particular branch of service, not only psychologically but operationally, while 'military culture' reflects a spirit of joint allegiance and cooperation. This distinction provides for a "double-edged sword for civil-military relations" however. A military in which service culture predominates may be easier to manipulate by political leaders who are able to play one service against another, but this also results in an overall barrier to military efficiency, especially in times of war. Alternatively, a military with a more unified culture will certainly be better able to fight and win wars, but may be more difficult to control as the Joint Chiefs unify and are able to resist efforts by the executive to manage them (Herspring 2005: 13-14).

The issue of personnel integration provides the perfect lens with which to view both military and service culture. "Defining the criteria for deciding who is in and who is out of an organization or any of its subunits is one of the best ways to begin to analyze a culture" (Schein 2004: 210). Both military and service culture come from three sources: (1) the beliefs and value systems of the founders of the units; (2) the learning experiences of
individual service-members as the units evolve and change; and (3) beliefs and values systems brought to the military by new service-members (Schein 2004: 225). Does this mean that George Washington's legacy still lives on in today's military? In a way, his presence is definitely still felt. The modern-day parade, the salute, the chain of command, and everyday military customs and courtesies can be traced back to the Continental Army and General Washington (some date back even further to European practices).

For the purposes of our analysis, sources two and three are more important. The military changed in the fifty years between the Truman and Clinton cases, not only because of the initiation of the AVF but also in terms of warfare requirements, the end of the Cold War, the transition back to conventional rather than nuclear warfare, and the growth of reserve and guard forces in supplementing active duty service-members. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen have had to adapt to these changes, and this adaptation influences (over time) cultural shifts. In addition, the nature of modern warfare has begun to blend service-unique cultures and remove some of the distinctions that made service culture so predominant in the Cold War years. The emphasis on joint (inter-service) operations has been predominant in military education and doctrine since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. Since then, a focus on shared technology, strategy, and communication between the branches has created an atmosphere where military culture has replaced service culture as the common allegiance. While Army-Navy games still generate good-natured inter-service rivalries, at the end of the day most soldiers, sailors, and airmen see themselves more broadly as American service-members. Thus, as Herspring noted above, it is now much more difficult for political forces, especially the President, to play one military Chief of Staff against another. A unified Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) can be a unique, and very powerful, political entity.

*The Importance of Leadership in Shaping Military Culture*

In the development of organizational culture, senior leadership plays a crucial role. In fact, the relationship between senior leadership and culture is a two-way street. On the one hand, if groups are successful, then culture will dictate the expectations of future leaders and in a way help select leaders’ successors. But if the group undergoes tough times, and “its environment changes to the point where some of its assumptions are no longer valid,” future leaders are now determined by those who can step outside that
culture and create evolutionary change. "This ability to perceive the limitations of one's own culture and to evolve the culture adaptively is the essence and ultimate challenge of leadership" (Schein 2004: 2). But what about times between sweeping successes and difficult challenges? Is it possible for leaders to have an impact on military culture during day-to-day operations? In a way, leaders can influence culture simply based on what they decide to focus on. "They communicate their values, priorities and beliefs through what they notice, comment on, measure, and control" (English 2004: 21). This may be a positive influence, but can sometimes cause conflict and attract criticism. One example occurred in the U.S. Air Force in 1990. General Merrill McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff, wanted to make a statement about the Air Force as the dominant branch of service. One of his most visible initiatives was in changing the uniform regulations. He changed the service dress uniform to look more like a civilian suit, by removing the epaulets and placing rank on the sleeves in a fashion similar to Naval uniforms. This caused a backlash with some members of the service, who felt he was civilianizing the military. One officer even "privately complained that he looked like Ralph Kramden" (Tampa Tribune 2004: 1). In the case of homosexuals in the military, a leader's attitudes, especially when
vocalized, may impact or even reshape the organization's attitudes about integration. General Gordon Sullivan, for example, made the argument to the House Armed Services Committee that unit cohesion was based primarily on a shared set of values and beliefs, and that individuality threatened that cohesion (U.S. House of Representatives 1994: 37). When the military's top brass espouses views like this, indirectly stating that homosexuals hurt unit effectiveness because of this difference between them and the majority of soldiers in the military, it possible for subordinates in the organization to accept and even to internalize those views?

Good or bad, this influence on culture defines leaders as opposed to managers. "One could argue that leadership creates and changes cultures, while management and administration act within a culture" (Schein 2004: 11). Obviously, as in the McPeak example, culture is not easy to change. It is one of the most stable facets of any organization. "The most central issue for leaders, therefore, is how to get at the deeper levels of a culture, how to assess the functionality of the assumptions made at that level, and how to deal with the anxiety that is unleashed when those levels are challenged" (Schein 2004: 37). In addition, the relationship between senior leadership and group members at every level from upper management to the street-
level service-member is crucial. First, it gives leaders the legitimacy to push for cultural changes. And second, it allows leaders to assess those deeper cultural levels necessary for meaningful evolutionary change.

*The 'Gender' of Organizations*

"The increased emphasis on new wave management techniques highlighting the importance of employee involvement, interpersonal and teamworking skills, and empowerment has highlighted personal characteristics and behaviours such as counseling, coaching, nurturing and collaborating. These characteristics are traditionally associated with women with growing evidence pointing towards business requiring a more feminine approach to management" (Wilson 2001: 116). In some ways, the military is no different. While its mission and techniques have made it much less of a nurturing organization than say, for example, a public school system, the military has made some strides toward becoming a more collaborative force.

One possible explanation for this is the increasing numbers of women in the service, and perhaps more importantly in leadership roles (Beckett and Chien 2002: 38). Within the last fifteen years, the number of positions opened to women has increased dramatically, especially in the area of
combat operations. Table 5.1 shows the percentage of military positions that were open to women before April, 1993, and those open to them after the legislative and policy changes enacted during the Clinton administration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Positions Open Before April 93</th>
<th>% Pos. Open After Law/Policy Chgs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Total</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1. Positions Open to Women Before and After Legislative and Policy Changes
(Beckett and Chien 2002: 8)

Thus, in just under a decade, the number of positions opened up to women in the Department of Defense rose by 19%. In the past, traits of female leaders have been overlooked as "it has generally been the case that for women to succeed they should conform to the cultural practices and behavioural characteristics present in masculine dominated organizations" (Wilson 2001: 107). But is the military as rigid as it used to be? And has the increase in women made the military more tolerant as an organization? If so, then policy change may be possible. If not, then traditional masculine
culture may be around for generations to come. Such traditional masculine organizations are historically more difficult to change, especially as barriers are put up in front of those seeking to enact equal opportunity policies and initiatives (Wilson 2001: 229). Chapter 6 will break down attitudes among service-members to see if gender makes a difference.

Researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies indicate that the United States military is at a critical juncture. At the core of this juncture is the United States' post-Cold War hegemonic role, the effects of an All Volunteer Force, an older and more experienced force, the civil-military gap, dwindling resources for military operations, an unprecedented operations tempo, technological advances in warfare, and pressures from society for equal opportunity initiatives (Ulmer xix). How much has the gap and culture played a role in developing the attitudes of service-members? In the next chapter, quantitative analysis will examine whether attitudes about tolerance differ between the military and the rest of society, and within the military whether these attitudes vary by rank, branch, age, education, gender, race, and other variables. This will solidify the assumption that the
military itself as an organization is a factor in determining personnel integration success or failure.
Chapter 6

SOCIAL ATTITUDES IN AND OUT OF THE U.S. MILITARY: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

"The military as a vehicle for social integration can best be discussed by formulating three basic questions: How (on a micro level) do young men and women who are conscripted or who enlist in military service become socialized and changed by their experience? Might these individual changes in the aggregate affect the larger civilian society? And (on a macro level) might the civilian and the military sectors come to reflect one another over time?"

- Henry Dietz et al., 2003

In terms of attitudes about sexual orientation integration, is there a gap in policy preferences between civilians and military service-members? And if so, do attitudes within the military vary by characteristics such as branch of service, job specialty, rank, gender, and race, or is military culture a service-wide phenomenon? This chapter will answer these questions by using a quantitative analysis of a survey conducted by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies in 2000. The survey asked over 3,500 respondents (including over 1,500 military service-members) for their views on social as well as national security issues. This analysis will be important in terms of
making predictions for future policy changes regarding the integration of homosexuals openly into the military services.

Hypotheses Tested

The analysis in this chapter will test two hypotheses:

1. A values gap exists between military members and the rest of civil society on the issue of homosexuality in the military (see for example, Huntington 1957; and Janowitz 1971). While civilians are split on the issue, military members are overwhelmingly against lifting the ban.

2. Even though military members are much more conservative, the gap simply reflects a 'lag' in the sense that junior service-members are probably much more tolerant than their superiors (see, for example, Ricks 1997; Holsti 1999; and Feaver and Kohn 2000). If the opposite is true, then military culture has self-perpetuated to an extent that either (a) incoming recruits are quickly assimilated into this new culture and values system; or (b) the military under the All Volunteer Force (AVF) concept is either attracting or willfully recruiting like-minded
individuals (for more on the debate, see Moskos 1983; and Ulmer et. al. 2000).

Models and Variables

**Dependent Variable**

*Progay* - One question in the TISS survey asked respondents whether or not they favored allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the U.S. military. For an affirmative response, *progay* is assigned a value of 1. For a negative response, *progay* was assigned a value of 0. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logit model will be used to determine the effects of independent variables on the likelihood of an individual supporting lifting the ban.
**Independent Variables**

**Gender**

This variable (*female*) is a dummy variable. Female respondents were assigned a value of 1; men were assigned a value of 0. The prediction is that women will be much more likely to support lifting the ban, whether or not they serve in the military. Military women may be especially tolerant, in light of the fact that they themselves have been fighting for equal treatment and opportunities, and have only recently been allowed into some combat positions.

**Occupation**

The survey asked respondents for their major career field. The choices were as follows:

1. Business Executive
2. Military
3. State Department or Federal Service Officer
4. Labor Official
5. Communications
6. Public Official
7. Health Care
8. Lawyer
9. Educator
10. Clergy
11. Student
12. Other

A series of dummy variables were created to see if general occupation had any bearing on attitudes toward the integration issue. Respondents who served in the State Department or Federal Service, in Labor, or Clergy, were combined into a general public service category. Thus, the following dummy variables were created:

*Occupation Business Executive* – business executives

*Occupation Military Professional* – military professionals

*Occupation Communication* – communications specialists

*Occupation Public Official* – those working for the State Dept, Federal Service Officers, labor unions, or clergy members

*Occupation Health* – health care professionals

*Occupation Lawyer* – lawyers

*Occupation Educator* – educators

*Occupation Student* – students

Those who responded with ‘other’ became the default category in the regressions.
Military Service

One of the most important independent variables indicates whether or not an individual is currently serving or has ever served in the military. A dummy variable, Military Service, is given a value of 1 if the respondent is or has served; otherwise, the value of Military Service is 0.

Primary Branch of Service

For those respondents in the military, dummy variables were created to determine if branch of service made a difference in terms of attitudes. This also would show whether or not service culture as opposed to military culture (as expressed in Chapter 5) still affects values systems in service-members. The following are the specific variables created for this purpose:

Primary Service Army – given a value of 1 if the respondent is serving or has served in the United States Army, to include the Army Reserve or Army National Guard; otherwise, Primary Service Army has a value of 0.

Primary Service Navy – given a value of 1 if the respondent is serving or has served in the United States Navy, to include the Naval Reserve; otherwise, Primary Service Navy has a value of 0.
Primary Service Air Force -- given a value of 1 if the respondent is serving or has served in the United States Air Force, to include the Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard; otherwise, Primary Service Air Force has a value of 0.

Primary Service Marine Corps -- given a value of 1 if the respondent is serving or has served in the United States Marines, to include the Marine Reserves; otherwise, Primary Service Marine Corps has a value of 0.

The default position reflects a military member who serves or has served in the U.S. Coast Guard.

Military Specialty

For those members who serve or have served in the military, this series of variables indicates the primary area of operations that the respondent is or was involved in (for all of the following variables, the value was given a 1 if the respondent was primarily involved serving that function; otherwise, the value of the dummy variable was equal to 0):

Military Specialty Logistics – for those individuals who served as logistics or supply specialists
Military Specialty Service Support – for those serving in combat service support roles (those who provide services such as medical care, personnel support, etc.)

Military Specialty Combat Support – for those serving in combat support roles (those who move, arm, fix, and fuel combat forces)

Military Specialty Combat Arms – for respondents in combat arms specialties (those dealing specifically with weapons systems)

Military Specialty Intelligence – for those who serve or have served as intelligence officials

Military Specialty Other Support – for those in support roles not mentioned above

Military Specialty Pre-Commissioning – for those in pre-commissioning status (for instance, respondents who were attending military academies or enrolled in Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at the time of the survey)
**Highest Rank**

For those respondents who are or were military service-members, this next series of dummy variables indicates the highest rank attained during military service:

*Rank Enlisted* – this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent served in the enlisted ranks or was a warrant officer; otherwise, *Rank Enlisted* was given a value of 0.

*Rank Cadet* – this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent was enrolled in a pre-commissioning program (service academy or ROTC) at the time of the survey; otherwise, *Rank Cadet* was given a value of 0.

*Rank CGO* - this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent’s highest rank attained was that of a company grade officer (the lowest three ranks in the officer corps); otherwise, *Rank CGO* was given a value of 0.

*Rank FGO* - this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent’s highest rank attained was that of a field grade officer (the two middle ranks in the officer corps); otherwise, *Rank FGO* was given a value of 0.

*Rank SNO* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent’s highest rank attained was that of a senior officer (the highest five ranks in
the officer corps); otherwise, Rank SNO was given a value of 0.

*Party Identification*

This series of dummy variables indicate a respondent’s affiliation with a political party:

*Party Republican* – this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent was a self-identified Republican; otherwise, *Party Republican* was given a value of 0.

*Party Democrat* – this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent was a self-identified Democrat; otherwise, *Party Democrat* was given a value of 0.

*Party Independent* – this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent was a self-identified Independent; otherwise, *Party Independent* was given a value of 0.

*Party No Preference* – this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she had no preference in terms of political affiliation; otherwise, *Party No Preference* was given a value of 0.
Geographic Region

This series of dummy variables indicate where the respondent grew up. It asks for a general region rather than a specific city or state:

*Region New England* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up in the New England states; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region South* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up in the south; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region Mountain States* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up in one or more of the mountain states; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region Pacific Coast* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up in the Pacific Coast region; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region Mid-Atlantic* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up in the Mid-Atlantic states; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region Midwest* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent
claimed that he or she grew up in the Midwest states; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region Southwest* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up in the southwest; otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

*Region Other* -- this variable was given a value of 1 if the respondent claimed that he or she grew up somewhere other than the areas mentioned (perhaps in another country, or in Alaska or Hawaii); otherwise, this variable was given a value of 0.

The default value for this series of variables was 'moved around,' indicating that the respondent grew up in several different regions.

*Race*

This variable (*minority*) is also a dummy variable. Minority respondents were assigned a value of 1; caucasians were assigned a value of 0. The prediction is that minorities will be much more likely to support lifting the ban, whether or not they serve in the military. Military minorities may be especially tolerant, in light of the fact that they themselves may identify with the struggles that African-Americans had to deal with in the past.
Age

In many ways, age and military rank are correlated. Thus, in the models which examine only military members, rank was used. But in the models looking at the possibility of a civil-military gap, age was used instead (obviously using rank as an independent variable would eliminate civilians from the sample). The following variables were used to break the sample into categories based on respondent age:

*Age Under 30* - for those respondents under the age of 30, this variable was given a value of 1; for all other respondents, this had a value of 0.

*Age 30 to 50* - for those respondents between the ages of 30 and 50, this variable was given a value of 1; for all other respondents, this had a value of 0.

The default group for this series of variables is the mass of respondents who were over 50 years of age. The prediction is that younger generations will be much more tolerant of homosexuals, and thus much more in favor of lifting the ban.
Religiosity

As Chapter 3's cross-national analysis indicated, religiosity generally has a lot to do with people’s attitudes toward homosexuality and tolerance. Thus, this series of variables attempts to control for religiosity by using church attendance as a proxy:

Church Weekly – This dummy variable was given a value of 1 for respondents who claimed that they attended church, on average, one or more times per week; for all other respondents, this variable was given a value of 0.

Church Monthly – This variable was given a value of 1 for respondents who claimed that they attended church, on average, one or more times per month, but not as often as weekly churchgoers; for all other respondents, this variable was given a value of 0.

Church Yearly – This variable was given a value of 1 for respondents who claimed that they attended church, on average, one or more times per year, but not as often as monthly churchgoers; for all other respondents, this variable was given a value of 0.

The default group in the sample comprised those respondents who claimed that they never attended church. The assumption is that the more regularly
a respondent attends church, the less likely he or she will be in favor of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military.

Models


\[
P(\text{Progay} = 1) = a + b_1 \text{ (gender)} + b_2 \text{ (occupation)} + b_3 \text{ (military service)} + b_4 \text{ (party identification)} + b_5 \text{ (region)} + b_6 \text{ (minority)} + b_7 \text{ (religiosity)} + b_8 \text{ (age)} + \text{error}
\]
This model, applied to the entire sample of military members and civilians (3,531 respondents total), will ascertain whether or not the civil-military gap exists with regards to policy attitudes on Don't Ask Don't Tell. 'Military Service' is our main concern here with regards to the gap, but other variables must be controlled for, namely gender, occupation, party identification, geographic location, race, religiosity, and age.

Model 2 (Testing the Theory that Values Systems within the Military Establishment, Particularly Regarding Attitudes Toward “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” are Categorical):

\[ P(\text{Progay} = 1) = a + b_1 \text{ (gender)} + b_2 \text{ (branch)} + b_3 \text{ (specialty)} + b_4 \text{ (rank)} + b_5 \text{ (party identification)} + b_6 \text{ (region)} + b_7 \text{ (race)} \]
This model, applied only to those respondents in the sample who were currently serving in the United States military or had served previously, as well as military service academy or ROTC cadets (1,147 respondents total), will ascertain whether or not attitudes are based on military categories like rank and military specialty, while still controlling for gender, party identification, region, race, and religiosity. Because the model includes branch of service, it will also determine whether there are remnants of service culture still left, as opposed to a unified military culture.

The regression used for both models was a logit regression because the dependent variable is a dichotomous one, signifying whether or not the respondent supported lifting the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the military. As such, the outcome is a probability. In other words, our models will show the probability that a respondent based on certain characteristics (for example, a white male army senior officer from Washington state) would be likely to support lifting the ban.
Predictions

Model 1

As Chapter 5 pointed out, evidence indicates the presence of a civil-military gap in terms of values systems.

Military Service: In terms of the policy on homosexuals serving openly in the military, I predict a strong negative coefficient for Military Service, signifying that members of the military (past and present) are much less inclined to accept lifting the ban than their civilian counterparts.

Gender and Race: I also predict strong positive coefficients for female and minority, because women and minorities, after possibly experiencing prejudice themselves, could be more tolerant than white males.

Party Identification: Party identification should also be important, so I predict a strong positive coefficient for Party Democrat, as Democrats on the whole will probably be more likely to support lifting the ban. Religiosity should also be a strong factor.

Religiosity: I predict that the more religious the respondent, the less likely they will be to support lifting the ban, supposedly because of his or her
intolerance of homosexuality in general. Thus, I predict negative coefficients for Church Yearly, Church Monthly, and Church Monthly. In addition, I predict that the absolute values of the coefficients for these variables will increase as church attendance increases. In other words, I predict that the absolute value of the coefficient for Church Weekly will be much higher than the value for Church Yearly, since those who go to church one or more times per week will probably be less tolerant than occasional churchgoers.

**Age:** Age should also be an important variable. Younger generations are exposed more to homosexuality in terms of entertainment and popular culture than older ones were, and may be more exposed personally, as more homosexuals are 'out' now than ever before. For this reason, I predict that there will be positive coefficients for both Age Under 30 and Age 30 to 50, since both groups (those under 30 years of age and those between 30 and 50 years old) will likely be more tolerant than older generations.

**Occupation:** Occupation and region are much more difficult to predict. Occupation will likely have little or no effect, since very few professions have strong enough cultures influencing policy attitudes, at least not in terms of military integration policies.
Region: Region might have an influence, but perhaps only insofar as it contributes to other variables like religiosity and party. For example, a respondent from the south might be considered more socially conservative than someone from New England. But since the model controls for religiosity and political party identification, region may become insignificant in terms of explanatory power.

Model 2

Since Model 1 looks at the possibility of a policy attitude gap between military service-members and civilians, Model 2 digs deeper into the question of the effects of military culture by examining only military members, retirees, and cadets. Here, the key variables are rank, service, and specialty, but controls are still in place for gender, race, religiosity, region, and party identification. The predictions for the control variables are the same as those for Model 1.

Rank: As far as rank, I predict that there will be strong positive coefficients for both of the officer rank levels, Rank FGO and Rank CGO (since the default category of rank is for senior officers). In other words, I think that compared to senior officers, company grade and field grade officers will
be more likely to support lifting the ban. This is because senior officers have simply been in service longer (for the most part) and therefore would have been exposed to military culture much more.

**Branch:** In terms of branch of service, I predict no concrete differences, and thus no strong coefficients for any of the service variables. As Chapter 5 pointed out, military culture has all but replaced service culture, so that an army soldier and a navy sailor probably don't have unique attitudes any more *solely because* of their branch of service.

**Military Specialty:** In terms of specialty, I predict that the closer an individual is to actual combat, the less likely he or she will be to support lifting the ban. It is my prediction that military culture is most pronounced in combat units, so I expect to see strong negative coefficients for *Military Specialty Combat Arms*, since this represents combat arms specialists. My guess is that all other specialties will have little or no effect on explaining policy attitudes.
Results

Appendix 2 shows the results from the logit analysis. As Figure A2.1 shows, Model 1 had an original predictive power of 66.0% and after the regression a power of 78.1%. This is a reduction of error of 18.3%. In terms of statistical significance, several variables were important. The gender, military service, party identification, and religiosity variables were extremely significant, while the region, age, race, and some occupation ones were less explanatory. Military members, as predicted, were much less likely to support lifting the ban than civilians. Thus, in terms of military integration, a definite policy preference gap exists between military service-members and civilians. As predicted, females were much more likely to support lifting the ban than men. The coefficient for minority was surprisingly negative, indicating that minorities were actually less likely to lift the ban, although the variable was not statistically significant. Some of the occupation variables were actually significant. For example, health care professionals were more likely to support lifting the ban than educators, while respondents in the communications career field were more likely than public officials. Since all of the independent variables were dummy variables, and
the model used a logit regression, the outcome is simply a probability that an individual, based on certain characteristics, will be in favor of lifting the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the military. The following table shows a sample of probabilities from Model 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Mil/Civ</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bench</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mil Officer</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mil Officer</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mil Officer</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mil Officer</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Mil Officer</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Busn Exec</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Busn Exec</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>0.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Communic</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>New Engl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1. Probabilities of a Respondent Supporting Lifting the Ban (Model 1)

Notice that the benchmark is a 35 year-old white, male, military officer from the Midwest United States. He attends church once a week and identifies
himself as a Republican. The model finds that this respondent has a less than 5% chance of supporting gays serving openly in the military. Changing one variable at a time from the benchmark, Figure 6.1 shows the effects of different respondent characteristics. For example, just changing his church attendance from weekly to never raises his probability of supporting integration from 4.9% to 16.2%. And the woman with the same characteristics has an 11.6% probability, or more than twice as likely as her male counterpart. The one surprise, as stated earlier, is in regards to race. A minority male military officer is the least likely respondent in the sample to support lifting the ban, while a white female civilian is most likely.

In the second model, I wanted to discover whether or not attitudes in the military were homogeneous, or if they could be categorized based on branch, rank, and specialty. Figure A2.2 shows the results of the logit regression. The starting (random) model of the 1,147 military respondents had a successful prediction rate of 75.8%, and a rate of 79.8 once the Model 2 variables were applied. This indicates a reduction of error of 5.2%. In other words, the model's results are not as robust as they were for the first model. It may indicate that the military values system is much more homogeneous
than I had predicted. The implications of this possibility will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7.

As Figure A2.2 shows, gender, party identification, and religiosity were huge indicators, and all were statistically significant, while race and region were unimportant. I was initially surprised at the significance, however, of the branch of service variables. While the significance of the Air Force and Navy dummy variables were statistically insignificant (compared to the default Coast Guard respondent), those for the Army and Marines were significant and had fairly strong negative coefficients, indicating that on average, Army soldiers and Marines were less likely to support lifting the ban than their counterparts in the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. While military historians claim that a general military culture has replaced service culture, this difference shows that at least in terms of military integration policy attitudes, something is going on in each branch individually which may be helping to shape group opinions. I was correct in my prediction about combat specialists. *Military Specialty Combat Arms* was the only specialty variable found to be statistically significant, and its negative coefficient indicates that service-members who are closer to combat situations are less likely to support lifting the ban. Rank was incredibly
important, and may have been the strongest set of variables in the model. Compared to the default value of the senior officer, enlisted members, company grade, and field grade officers were much more likely to support lifting the ban. In fact, the coefficients indicate that the higher a member climbs the ranks, the less likely they will be to support an openly gay personnel policy. A sample of probabilities for respondents supporting lifting the ban using Model 2 is listed below in Table 6.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Specialty</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bench</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Gen Supt</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Combat Arms</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Gen Supt</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Combat Arms</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Combat Arms</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Gen Supt</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Gen Supt</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Senior Offc</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Gen Supt</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Moved Ard</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Coast Gd</td>
<td>Gen Supt</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Pac Coast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.2. Probabilities of a Respondent Supporting Lifting the Ban (Model 2)
Notice that the benchmark is a white male coast guard senior officer. He is a Republican involved in support operations, who never attends church and moved around during his childhood so doesn't really claim a boyhood hometown. Based on these characteristics, the likelihood of him supporting the integration of homosexuals is 12.2%. Notice that if we change just his branch of service, and make him a senior officer in the Marine Corps, the likelihood now is cut almost in half, to 6.7%. On the other hand, if we just make him an enlisted service-member instead of a senior officer, his likelihood triples to 45.0%. Based on these results, the least likely respondent to support integration is a white male Marine senior officer with a combat specialty, while a female, minority, enlisted Coast Guard service-member is most likely.

Conclusions

The data indicate that the civil-military gap is clear and obvious, at least in terms of policy attitudes toward homosexuals in the military. While civilians for the most part support integration, military service-members are generally hesitant to adopt the change. To try and understand why, Model 2
looks at possible patterns among military members. Service culture still
exists to an extent, with the Army and Marines somewhat more resistant to
change than the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. In addition, rank is
extremely important, with senior officers among the least likely to support
integration policies. For those interested in change, the results should
ironically instill both hope and concern for the near future. Chapter 7 will
explain further, and examine how important these distinctions are for future
policy implications.
Chapter 7

REFLECTIONS, PREDICTIONS, CONCLUSIONS

"All legislation, all government, all society is founded upon the principle of mutual concession, politeness, comity, courtesy; upon these everything is based...Let him who elevates himself above humanity, above its weaknesses, its infirmities, its wants, its necessities, say, if he pleases, I will never compromise; but let no one who is not above the frailties of our common nature disdain compromises."

- Henry Clay, U.S Statesman (1777-1852)

A Look Back

This research began with a simple puzzle: why was the United States such a pioneering institution in terms of racial integration and yet so problematic for the open inclusion of homosexuals? The task of answering this puzzle led to a multi-method, multi-scope inquiry. After assessing the historical context in the introductory chapter, Chapters 2 and 3 looked at the international picture. Chapter 2 illustrated the theoretical relationships that exist between the society, the state, the military, and the nation's racial and sexual orientation cleavages, and provided examples of those relationships in an international context. These examples showed that every nation's military deals with discrimination problems, and each handles issues of
toleration differently. What compels world leaders to adopt policies of military integration? Our theoretical model illustrated that the decision is not an easy one, and in democracies it is even more complex. But an assessment which compared states' responses to military integration was a good starting point. The quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that there are certain state characteristics which help to predict the probability of a nation adopting policies of sexual orientation inclusion. Comparing the 24 states which have lifted the ban on homosexuals in their militaries with the rest of the world yielded surprisingly robust results. First, as predicted, nations with world values favoring secular views over traditional foundations, as well as those more concerned with self-expression as opposed to mere survivalism, were more likely to have lifted their ban on homosexuals in their militaries. In addition, militaries which were used more often in international conflicts were more likely to have lifted their bans, signifying that military need is a tangible factor in determining integration policies. The analytical model used in this analysis predicted the likelihood of the United States lifting its ban at a very low 2.93%. This was mainly due to the fact that the size of the United States population minimized the military need factor, and that the United States, in contrast
with states in Western Europe for example, still largely embraced traditional values over secularism. Thus, the United States was not the exception to the model that I had expected to see on the issue of inclusionary policy.

With the international perspective providing a good starting point, the next step was to narrow the focus to national institutional factors. What institutions might have explained the different outcomes between the Truman and Clinton initiatives? After all, even though segregationist mindsets were present in 1948, and full compliance was not achieved overnight, Truman’s Executive Order banning racial segregation in the military is now thought of as a groundbreaking civil rights accomplishment. Clinton’s pledge to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military, on the other hand, failed amidst a flurry of political opposition. The qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 looked in-depth at the Truman and Clinton presidencies, and assessed what institutional factors may have facilitated successful racial integration yet hampered sexual orientation integration.

While their presidential leadership styles played a role in the different outcomes of the racial and sexual orientation integration cases, several obstacles made Clinton’s efforts seemingly more difficult than Truman’s. A much greater involvement from Congress, a higher public interest generated
by the media and the courts, and the well-organized opposition efforts from passionate interest groups all made Clinton's attempts at sexual orientation integration impossible. In addition, the emergence of the military as a political force made Clinton’s job much more difficult. Indeed, the military as an institution has changed significantly in the last half-century, and so an analysis of the military as a unique bureaucratic institution was needed to make the analysis complete.

Thus, the third and final portion of the research occurred in Chapters 5 and 6, and looked at the United States military itself. Chapter 5 examined the literature and theory behind the civil-military gap and military culture, while Chapter 6 used a quantitative analysis to prove the existence of this gap, and to ascertain the effects of military culture on toleration. Chapter 5 revealed the unique nature of the military as a bureaucratic institution, giving support to the concept of a civil-military gap. First, it is an agency in which leadership is extremely important, perhaps even more important than in other agencies. In every organization, a leader has the ability (and sometimes the responsibility) for shaping or reshaping culture, but in the military these effects are often timeless. For example, several customs and courtesies in the military today date back to General George Washington and
the Continental Army. In addition to leadership, street level operators (in this case enlisted members and junior officers) are also extremely important. Loyalty in the U.S. military is directed not only to the country and its citizens, but also to the individual units to which service-members are assigned. As such, military culture is shaped from the top and from the bottom. Most military members see the profession of arms as a calling instead of a job. This means that adherence to military principles (and indeed lifestyles) becomes critical. Chapter 5 also pointed out that the military’s relationship to the state can vary over time, based on levels of congruence and interaction between the two. In the Truman administration, both were high, and so his ability to shape personnel policy was easier than in Clinton’s case, where both congruence and interaction were lower. This created friction between the administration and the military establishment, and made it difficult for the new president to dictate military policy.

Chapter 6 tested out the theories discussed in Chapter 5, namely the presence of a civil-military gap and the homogeneity of military culture. A quantitative analysis of attitudes between military members and civilians revealed that the civil-military gap is clear and obvious, at least in terms of policy attitudes toward homosexuals in the military. While civilians for the
most part support integration, military service-members are generally
hesitant to adopt the change. As for the question of the homogeneity of
military culture, a separate analysis pinpointed policy preferences of military
members based on branch of service, rank, geographic region, religiosity,
race, gender, and specialty. The data revealed that service culture still exists
to an extent, with the Army and Marines somewhat more resistant to change
than the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. In addition, rank is extremely
important, with senior officers among the least likely to support integration
policies. Ultimately, the data reveal that military culture is not necessarily
homogeneous, but more generational in nature, and thus the propensity for
change is higher than I had originally expected. This has important
implications for future military policy.

A Look Ahead

What are the future policy implications for homosexuals in the
military? Will homosexual service-members ever be fully integrated? This
research indicates that for those hoping to change the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
policy, the future is promising, but change will not happen soon. As the data
in Chapter 3 indicated, the United States is more conservative on the
traditional-secular spectrum than the nations which have lifted the ban on
homosexuals in their militaries, but attitudes in this country toward
homosexuality are changing. While many think that a social polarization is
underway in America and that culture wars are being fought in state ballot
initiatives on issues such as gay marriage, society’s attitudes on homosexuals
in the military support the adage that “Americans are closely divided, but
not deeply divided” (Fiorina 2005: ix). Most Americans now believe that
homosexuals should be allowed to serve openly in the Armed Forces, and
public perception of the military is higher now than at almost any other time
in recent history. This makes me think that homosexual military service will
be reformed before any other homosexual issue. In other words, Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell will probably be repealed before gay marriage or gay adoption
become nationally accepted institutions.

But Chapter 4 showed that any president wanting to change the policy on
homosexuals in the military will have a big fight on his or her hands. The
political landscape is now much different than it was in 1948. Several things
must happen for a president to be successful in effecting military policy
change. Even though public opinion might be in the president’s favor, other
governmental institutions must be on board. First of all, the relationship
with Congress is extremely important, especially since Congress is more
involved in military matters than ever before. The president must know that
a push would be acceptable to a majority in each house of Congress.
Secondly, the military itself must have a strong relationship with the
president. Congruence and interaction must be high between the military
establishment and the president. For example, a former prominent military
figure who later enters the White House will have an easier time initiating
this change than a president who has never served, and thus doesn’t have a
personal relationship to men and women serving in uniform. Ultimately, the
president will need that close relationship when appealing to the military
brass. “A president who hopes to introduce change without provoking
serious conflict with the Chiefs must involve the senior officers in the
process, even if they seem unresponsive. If they believe the change is being
imposed on them from outside, they will circle the wagons and work to
undo the changes they opposed as soon as the president or secretary of
defense has left Washington” (Herspring 2005: 426).
Global politics will also play an important role. World War II and Korea played a huge role in paving the way for successful integration, especially as the invaluable contributions of African-American service-members could not be ignored. Even the most outspoken critics of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military have stated that gay service-members have served, and continue to serve, honorably in service to their country. This will need to be the focus of a push for policy change. "Those sympathetic to such an innovation (like lifting the ban) indeed drew analogies with President Truman’s decisions to integrate the military services racially in 1948, at a point when Stalin had not yet acquired nuclear weapons, when the Cold War had not yet heated up. When the pressure on national military forces is not so immediate, it was argued, it might be the appropriate time to make adjustments necessitated by domestic social attitudes as a whole" (Quester 1999: 146). In fact, Chapter 4 has shown that while this may be true in terms of policy change, the opposite is true in terms of policy implementation. It was our push into Korea that helped battlefield commanders see the benefits of racial integration, and realize that their fears of a loss of cohesion were unfounded.
Finally, the military must embrace, or at least agree not to fight, the change. The results from Chapter 6 indicate that there is a definitive civil-military gap, and that the military as a whole holds much more conservative views than society-at-large; but they also show that military attitudes are not as homogeneous as one might expect. Today's younger military members are much more tolerant than their senior counterparts, perhaps because they have grown up in a time where homosexuality is portrayed in every facet of pop culture. As these soldiers become tomorrow's military leaders, the environment will probably become more accepting of the change. Military culture will continue as a pervasive, conservative force, and will, on the whole, resist policy changes, but eventually today's street-level operators will become tomorrow's Joint Chiefs of Staff, and those leaders will reshape culture.

For those fighting for the integration of homosexuals openly into the United States military today, the results of this research may be frustrating. This study concludes that several factors must be in place before successful integration can occur: a president must have a genuine interest in wanting the change; a majority of the Congress must be in agreement; public opinion
needs to continue its trend toward secular values and toleration; global politics might create an environment for change; and the military culture needs to be changed by tomorrow's generals. These changes are a generation away, but the trend is evident. In the end, the goal for policymakers will be to find the delicate balance between maintaining national security objectives by meeting the needs of the military while at the same time doing their duty as public officials to protect the rights of all of America's service-members.
Appendix 1

FIGURES AND DATA FROM CHAPTER 3

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Israel

Italy
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom

Table A1.1. Countries Which Allow Gay Service-members
(Belkin, CSSMM, 2005)
Figure A1.1. Survival vs. Self-Expression Ratings

(a lower score means emphasis on survival)
Figure A1.2. Secular/Rational vs. Traditional Values Ratings
Figure A1.3. Values of ‘Total # of Conflict Months’
Figure A1.4. Values of ‘Proportion of Population in Military’
Figure A1.5. Values of 'Total Population'

216
1998 Gross National Product per Capita

Figure A1.6. Values of 'Gross National Product Per Capita'
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survival vs. Self Expression</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>106.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular/Rational vs. Traditionalism</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>107.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Conflict Months</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>262.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Population in Military</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(military personnel per 10,000 citizens)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>187.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross National Product Per Capita</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in $1000 US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1.2. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Regression
Logistic Regression

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unweighted Cases&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected Cases Included in Analysis</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselected Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Internal Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A1.7a - Probit Regression Results (SPSS)
Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table\(^{a,b}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Allow Gays</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
<td>Allow Gays</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Constant is included in the model.
\(^{b}\) The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0 Constant</td>
<td>-.773</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>9.817</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.462</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Variables not in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0 Variables</td>
<td>SurvVS SelfExp</td>
<td>28.333</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SecRatVSTrad</td>
<td>15.027</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TotalConflictMonths</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percmili</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tpopmil</td>
<td>2.300</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gnppercap</td>
<td>32.997</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Statistics</td>
<td>41.394</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A1.7b – Probit Regression Results (SPSS)
Block 1: Method = Enter

### Classification Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Allow Gays</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The cut value is .500

### Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SurvVSSelfExp</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>2.983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>1.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SecRatVSTrad</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>4.795</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TotalConflictMonth</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>2.553</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>1.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percmili</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>3.353</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tpopmil</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>5.649</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gnppercap</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.620</td>
<td>1.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.784</td>
<td>1.776</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.659</td>
<td>2.189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Variables entered on step 1: SurvVSSelfExp, SecRatVSTrad, TotalConflictMonth, percmili, gnppercap.

### Casewise List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Selected Status</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Temporary Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Allow Gays</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Resid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.633</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. S = Selected, U = Unselected cases, and ** = Misclassified cases.

b. Cases with studentized residuals greater than 2.000 are listed.

Figure A1.7c – Probit Regression Results (SPSS)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actually Lifted?</th>
<th>Estimated Probability</th>
<th>Model Policy Prediction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>0.0036</td>
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<td>0.0050</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
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<td>0.0056</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>0.0119</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<td>0.0323</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
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<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>0.0401</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>0.0441</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>0.0629</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A1.8a – Model Predicted Results
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actually Lifted?</th>
<th>Estimated Probability</th>
<th>Model Policy Prediction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>0.1315</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>0.9965</td>
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</table>

Figure A1.8b - Model Predicted Results
Predicted Probabilities of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military

Figure A1.9. Probit Graph
(All 5 missed predictions and the United States are highlighted)
Appendix 2

FIGURES AND DATA FROM CHAPTER 6
Logistic Regression

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unweighted Cases&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected Cases</td>
<td>2351</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Included in Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Cases</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3531</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselected Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3531</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Internal Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table<sup>a,b</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1551</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Constant is included in the model.

<sup>b</sup> The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 0</th>
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Figure A2.1. Logistic Regression Results for Model 1 (page 1 of 4)
Variables not in the Equation

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Figure A2.1. Logistic Regression Results for Model 1 (page 2 of 4)
Block 1: Method = Enter

Model Summary

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a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

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a. The cut value is .500

Figure A2.1. Logistic Regression Results for Model 1 (page 3 of 4)
### Variables in the Equation

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*a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: female, ocbsexec, ocmlofc, ocommun, ocpubofc, ochealth, oclawyer, oceductr, ocstudnt, milserve, ptdemoc, ptindep, ptnopref, pother, rgnwen, rgsouth, rgmtn, rgpaccst, rgmidatl, rgmidwest, rgsowest, rgother, minority, chweekly, chmonth, chyearly, ageund30, age3050.*

**Figure A2.1. Logistic Regression Results for Model 1 (page 4 of 4)**

(Results from SPSS)
Logistic Regression

Case Processing Summary

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a. The variable spprecom is constant for all selected cases. Since a constant was requested in the model, it will be removed from the analysis.
b. The variable mcadet is constant for all selected cases. Since a constant was requested in the model, it will be removed from the analysis.
c. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding

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Block 0: Beginning Block

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a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Figure A2.2. Logistic Regression Results for Model 2 (page 1 of 4)
### Variables in the Equation

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### Variables not in the Equation

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Figure A2.2. Logistic Regression Results for Model 2 (page 2 of 4)
Block 1: Method = Enter

Model Summary

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a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table

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a. The cut value is .500

Figure A2.2. Logistic Regression Results for Model 2 (page 3 of 4)
### Variables in the Equation

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* Variable(s) entered on step 1: female, psarmy, psnavy, psairfrc, psmarine, splog, spcss, spcmbarm, spintel, rnenlist, rncgo, rnfgo, ptdemoc, ptindep, ptnopref, ptother, rgnewen, rgsouth, rgmtn, rgpaccst, rgmidatl, rgmidwst, rgswest, rgother, minority, chweekly, chmonth, chyearly.

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**Figure A2.2. Logistic Regression Results for Model 2 (page 4 of 4)**

(Results from SPSS)
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Volume XII - Integration


