


UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY by Major Vikas Slathia, Indian Army, 118 pages.

The United States (US) and India have recently several initiatives that could lead to a strong strategic partnership. India visualizes a major role for itself in the current world order and the US acknowledges this possibility. India seeks lasting partnerships achieve its strategic ambitions. The primary question of this thesis is, Will the current partnership agreements between the US and India further India's long-term national interests?

Despite holding many common values including support for democracy, India and the US have not shared a very cordial relationship in the past. However, since the end of the Cold War, the two nations have moved closer towards a much consistent relationship.

This study assesses the possibility of India achieving the objectives through a lasting partnership with the US vis-à-vis partnerships with other major global players. The study indicates that there is a great potential for security partnership but the current efforts are more rhetorical than practical. The real convergence of interests between India and the US is visible in the economic and technological arenas. The history indicates that the US is not a reliable security partner for India, nor will it be in a position to support India in the event of war with either Pakistan or China. This thesis recommends that India continues to pursue multilateralism adopting a combination of realist and liberal policy which is likely to safeguard its long-term national interests.

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ACRONYMS

AFMM	Army Force Management Model
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BPO	Business Process Outsourcing
BRAHMOS	Name of a supersonic cruise missile jointly developed by India and Russia. Acronym uses Brahmaputra and Moscow.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
IT	Information Technology
LCA	Light Combat Aircraft
MNNA	Major Non NATO Ally
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
POK	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation

SAFTA	South Asia Free Trade Agreement
SAU	South Asia Union
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communications
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We have an ambitious agenda with India. Our agenda is practical. It builds on a relationship that has never been better. India is a global leader, as well as a good friend. . . . My trip will remind everybody about the strengthening of an important strategic partnership. We'll work together in practical ways to promote a hopeful future for citizens in both our nations.¹

President George W. Bush

The United States (US) is the sole superpower of the world and India is an emerging global power. The apparent convergence of the interests and core values of the two nations in the complicated modern world order has led the two nations to shed the estrangement of the past and seek stronger partnership for the future. For many pundits, this strong partnership is the foundation leading to an ambitious strategic alliance. Seemingly, there is a newfound willingness to embark on a serious relationship despite conflicting domestic and external pressures from certain quarters. The two nations view each other as a bundle of opportunities and have great expectations from one another. The current climate has resulted in several significant bilateral agreements in the fields of civil nuclear cooperation, energy and environment security, public health, economics, innovative and advanced technologies, and strengthening democracy.

Basis for Partnership

“Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.”² The Soviets fought with the US during the World War II (WWII) but immediately afterwards the two superpowers engaged in a prolonged Cold War. Partnerships between nations are not based on friendship but on their national interests.

On the issue of national interests, India's first Prime Minister Pandit JL Nehru once told the parliament, "I am on my country's side and nobody else's."³ He also said, "Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country."⁴ Respective national interests determine the nature of such partnerships between nations. The national interests lead to national objectives and these objectives determine the national strategies. The convergence of the national interests of two nations may bring them closer to form strong partnerships. India and the US have identified some areas of mutual interests and thus have great hopes from one another for a lasting partnership.

India's National Interests

The government of India has not announced a formal national security strategy, but the nation's strategic interests can be traced from the speeches by the leaders, statements, and foreign policy and partnership agreements. India views itself as a major player in world affairs. Some of the perceived strategic goals include recognition as a nuclear power; a strong and stable economy; entry into the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC) as a permanent member; recognition as a regional power and a major global player; self reliance in the high technology, defense, and space sectors; and recognition in the field of science and technology, especially research and development. India's wants to maintain the Indian Ocean as a demilitarized zone and free from the presence of the major powers which do not belong to the region.

Global player. India has the potential and desire to be a major player in the world affairs. At the same time the US views India as a key natural ally sharing the same ideology with the potential to dominate the strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region.

In the midst of the turbulent world order, the current warmth in relationship between the world's oldest and largest democracies is a great opportunity to transform their relations and forge a revitalized strategic partnership. A strong partnership between these two nations, each possessing significant geographical advantage and potential to dominate their parts of the globe, will have significant ramifications on the future world order.

India's Foreign Policy. The current tone of India's foreign policy has evolved after dramatic changes over the past sixty years. It has transformed from being highly idealistic at the time of independence to socialist during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the nation has adopted a more realist model mixed with a pinch of liberalism and idealism in tune with the prevalent world order. The realist model (realism is defined later in this chapter) is suitable for the pursuit of the national interests. However, this model on its own may not be sufficient for a nation aspiring to be a global player.

Benefits of the Partnership with the US to India. A partnership with the US may help India achieve most of its strategic goals especially in the fields of economics, defense, space and high technology and facilitate the growth of India into a developed nation. India needs capital and the US needs markets. Both nations confront terrorism in its worst form. The US is leading the war on terror, and India can certainly benefit from cooperation in this field.

US National Interests

The strength of the relationship between nations depends on the convergence of interests on the nations in question. The US would be interested in India only if the partnership supports and promotes US national interests. Therefore, while the thesis is

focused on Indian interests, it is imperative to study the impact of the relationship on the US. While India needs assurances on its security, the US needs partners to secure its interests outside the US, more so in Asia. The US needs new and stable markets. In addition, India has a huge and experienced military capable of sharing the burden of international military operations. “Successfully wooing India is key to preserving the liberal, American-led international order.”⁵ According to Thomas Donnelly and Melissa Wisner, “Outside Tony Blair’s Britain, only India stands as a natural great-power partner (to the US) in building the next American century.”⁶

India is viewed as a leader of the Third World with a somewhat liberal outlook. Today, India occupies a unique position in the world order. India’s foreign policy has created a climate of considerable trust and confidence among the Middle East nations. India could well be the voice of the US in the developing world. The neutrality during the Cold War period also played a vital role in India’s current image in the world scene. Such policy prompted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to call India “the most important ‘swing state’ in the international system--a country which has the ability to tilt the balance between war and peace, between chaos and order.”⁷ The commonality of interests and values of the US and India make India one of the most suitable potential long-term allies to the US.

Other Options with India to Realize Its National Objectives

The events following the end of the Cold War suggested that the world would be dominated by single superpower, the US. However, today several other players have emerged as major power centers and are likely to play a significant role in the future world order. The US acknowledges that the future international affairs will be dominated

by the six major powers centers.⁸ The European Union (EU) is a major economic player and reorganizing itself into a viable military force capable of projecting forces beyond the geographic boundaries. India is positively engaging with the EU on the economic and technology fronts. Russia still wields considerable influence in its neighborhood and global affairs, especially given its control of energy reserves. The twenty-first century is considered the century of the Asian powers. China, emerging as an economic giant, may team with Russia to counter the US. Japan too is seeking its rightful place in the world arena. India continues to maintain a close relationship with Russia. China and India appears to be moving closer, at least on the economic front. Japan and India have recently signed a vision document for a strategic partnership. The Latin American giant Brazil has teamed up with India to oppose Western policies in forums, like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Each of the above powers is capable of contributing towards India's national interests.

Possibility of US-India Strategic Partnership

For India, the US appears to be the most probable ladder to its “dreams to greatness.”⁹ The US and India share some vital mutual interests that provide impetus to a long-standing partnership to “transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership.”¹⁰ Besides sharing major economic and security interests, the US and India confront a common competitor in the future, China. India and the US share the common interests of “democracy, commercial enterprise, the rule of law, secularism, non-aggression and religious pluralism.”¹¹ India potentially is one of the biggest challengers to China. Besides, both the US and India face the greatest threat of

the modern times, terrorism. Some analysts feel that the US-India strategic partnership will play a major role in future world order.

However, the US and India have largely viewed each other in the past with a fair amount of indifference and mistrust. There have been fleeting moments of closeness.

India's Ambassador to the US Mr. Ronen Sen summarized the past relationship in his following remark:

It is a fact that India-US engagement in the earlier period was often episodic and there were periods of time of misunderstanding and even outright hostility, like during the time of the Nixon Administration and the Bangladesh war. Then there were also long periods of benign neglect by both countries. But this does not alter the fact that relations were often very close previously during the height of the Cold War, for instance after the 1962 conflict with China.¹²

The two nations have bridged a number of gaps, but there is lot of ground still to be covered. The present relationship is not free from obstacles. Strong lobbies in both nations oppose a close relationship, citing issues such as the US' support to Pakistan, capitalism, differences of opinions in WTO, India's stubborn diplomacy, the nuclear program, economic competition, and the negative effect of outsourcing on the US citizens. A partnership with the US will bring with it a share of hostilities stemming out of the anti-US feeling growing rapidly across the globe. A closer relationship may not be in India's interests in view of its large Muslim population. While the interests are common, India does not wish to be used and viewed as a tool to further unilateral interests of the US.

India's nonaligned policy is often cited as one of the major reasons for the estranged relations between the US and India. Some analysts argue that the nonaligned strategy championed by India for years could neither prevent four major wars and insurgencies, nor control the arms race in the region. "It brought about the intrusive

presence of the US and China into South Asia and attempts by both to strategically balance India for what they perceived as a tilt towards the USSR.”¹³ The US tried to balance India’s dominance of South Asia by supporting Pakistan while China expanded its influence over Pakistan, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and Nepal. The continuous nagging engagements and preoccupation with local conflicts stunted India’s growth despite enormous resources and potential.

A thorough analysis of the trends and compulsions of the past relationship, the current agreements, and reasons for the present obstacles and apprehensions will determine if a strong and reliable US-India partnership is possible. The scope and tone of the partnership in turn would determine whether such a partnership can support India’s strategic interests. The purpose of this thesis is to carry out this analysis by seeking answers to the following questions.

Primary Question

Will the current partnership agreements between the US and India further India’s long-term national interests?

Secondary Questions

1. What are India’s strategic interests and national objectives?
2. Are the current agreements between India and the US mutually beneficial to ensure a lasting partnership?
3. How will a strategic partnership with India further US national interests?

4. Should India adopt the realist model or a liberal model of the international relations in pursuit of its national objectives? Or should India adopt a combination approach like the US?

5. Does India have options other than the partnership with the US to realize its strategic goals?

6. What are the structural obstacles to US-Indian strategic cooperation?

7. What are the structural advantages to US-Indian strategic cooperation?

Assumptions

This thesis analyses the partnership between India and the US based on five assumptions. First, the basis and direction to the relationship will be governed by own national interests of the two nations. Second, India's dream of global power status is not based on challenging the economic and military might of the US. Third, the policies of the two nations will remain broadly the same despite future changes of governments in two nations. Fourth, there is no drastic shift in the current world order. India maintains its attractiveness by continuous progress in all spheres, particularly in the economic field, thus living up to the role expected of it in world affairs. India continues to maintain its position in the world affairs despite emergence of new global players in the world.

Definitions

National Interests. This term is defined differently by different political scientists. Italian political scientist Vittorio Emanuele Parsi thinks that "in modern times determining national interest is a political process and a democratic expression of what citizens want from their government."¹⁴ However, they are often reduced to the interests

of the most powerful economic actors.¹⁵ He disagrees with Morgenthau, who thinks that the national interests can be objectively determined, and with Stephan Krasner, who determines that the national interests are the objectives of the central decision makers of the state.¹⁶

National interest can be defined as “things of benefit to nation: actions, circumstances, and decisions regarded as benefiting a particular nation.”¹⁷ At its most fundamental level, the national interest is generic and easy to define: all states seek to preserve their political autonomy and their territorial integrity. Once these two interests have been secured, however, national interests may take different forms. Some states may have an interest in securing more resources or land; other states may wish to expand their own political or economic systems into other areas; and some states may merely wish to be left alone. Generally speaking, however, the national interest must be defined in terms of power. National power has an absolute meaning since it can be defined in terms of military, economic, political, diplomatic, or even cultural resources.¹⁸

National Objectives. The US Department of Defense defines the national objectives as “the aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.”¹⁹

Political Idealism. Idealism is the practice of forming ideals or living under their influence.²⁰ Idealism in international relations holds that “a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson's idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the ‘institution-builders’ after WW II.”²¹

Political Realism. Realism emphasizes the role of the nation-state and makes a broad assumption that all nation-states are motivated by national interests, or, at best, national interests disguised as moral concerns.²² It assumes that power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena. In the international stage this theory asserts that nation-states are seen as the primary agents that maximize, or ought to maximize, their power. Political realism in essence reduces to the political-ethical principle that might is right.²³ Realism or similar theories can be traced to the ancient theorist, like Thucydides,²⁴ Sun Tzu, Chanakya,²⁵ Bismarck, and Clausewitz. “Neo-realism,” as described Waltz’s book, *Theory of International Politics* published in 1979, may fit into the current foreign policy approach adopted by India and most modern nations. It argues “a systemic approach: the international structure acts as a constraint on state behavior, so that different states behave in a similar rational manner, and outcomes fall within an expected range.”²⁶ Neo-realism recognizes the international system as an anarchical structure that restrains and balances the nation-states’ irrational pursuit of their own national interests at the cost of others.

Liberalism. “Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Preferences may vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Liberalism also holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political (high politics), but allows economic interactions (low politics) through commercial firms, organizations or individuals. Another assumption is that absolute gains can be made through co-operation and interdependence, thus peace can be achieved.”²⁷

Limitations

The foremost limitation this thesis suffers from is the fact that India does not have a formally announced national security strategy. However, India's Ministry of Defense does articulate India's major security objectives. Secondly, the author does not have access to the government's documents. Therefore the analysis was based on the assessments made by various thinkers and the statements issued by the governments of the US and India. Thirdly, the subject is vast and current. Everyday happenings affect the policies and strategies of the nations. This, along with the paucity of time available to the author, limits the depth and scope of the research.

Delimitations

Through this thesis the author intends to analyze the prospects of India achieving its national strategic objectives through partnership with the US. Even though successful partnerships are made only when the interests of the concerned partners converge, the scope of this thesis is limited to the Indian perspective only. However, the thesis may broadly touch upon the interests of the US. Moreover, it is not possible to analyze all the aspects of the partnership in totality in the given time and scope of this thesis. Therefore, the thesis is limited to only the major aspects of India's national strategy and partnership with the US.

Summary

India certainly has serious and ambitious strategic goals ranging from economics, security, and a role in international affairs. In the current world order, India may not be able to achieve these goals on its own. India has opened itself to the world in pursuit of

its objectives. Among other world powers, the US, with its economic and military might, appears to be the ideal ally for India's success. However, despite similar ideologies and stated policies, there are several voices, both in India and the US, against the partnership. These voices raise some serious concerns, like the adverse effects of a close relationship on the US economy, the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the residual effects of the previous policies. The partnership is likely to bring with it a host of concerns that cannot be ignored. For instance, Indians may not remain immune to the recent spread of anti-US feelings. Some fear that India's economy and, now, its nuclear capability are being "sold" to the US. India may lose its traditional independence in the world politics. India must identify its strategic objectives, evaluate various options for partnership and adopt a suitable foreign policy to engage with partners to attain these objectives.

¹President George W Bush speech before embarking on his visit to India in February 2006, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-13.html>; Internet; accessed 15 May 2006.

²Lord Palmerston, English statesman (1784-1865) [quotation on-line] available from http://thinkexist.com/quotes/lord_palmerston/; Internet; accessed on 23 November 2006.

³A. Appaduria, *Roots of India's Foreign Policy: 1947-1972* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1981).

⁴B. R. Nanda, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (Honolulu, University Press of Hawaii, 1976).

⁵Thomas Donnelly, "Time to Woo India?" *National Security Outlook*, December 2002; available from www.aei.org/publication14519; Internet; accessed 30 July 2006.

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⁷Dan McDougall, “India is the New American Dream”[article on-line] available from <http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1674652005>; Internet; accessed on 30 July 2006

⁸United States Secretary of State Ms. Condoleezza Rice, “Does India have a World View;” available from <http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/jan/09ks.htm>; Internet; accessed on 30 July 2006.

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¹⁰Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh during July 2005 visit to USA.

¹¹Ibid..

¹²India’s Ambassador to USA, Mr. Ronen Sen, during a Special Lecture sponsored by the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 26 October 2005.

¹³Dr. Subhash Kapila, “India-USA Strategic Partnership: The advent of the Inevitable;” available from <http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper120.html>; Internet; accessed on 30 July 2006.

¹⁴Italian political scientist Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, *The National Interest and Globalization: Democratic Regimes in the Transformation of the Post-Westphalian System*, 1998. A review of the book by Matthew Evangelista is available from http://www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/MISR/R_1521_9488_005_20159.asp Internet; accessed on 15 October 2006

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Dr. Stephen Krasner is the Director, Policy Planning in the US Government and author of the book, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).

¹⁷Definition of “National Interests” available from http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861696679/national_interest.html; Internet; accessed 6 August 2006.

¹⁸Definition of “National Power;” available from <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/realism.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 August 2006.

¹⁹Definition of “National Objectives” available from <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermsn/g/n4205.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 August 2006.

²⁰Definition taken from *Merriam-Websters* [online dictionary]; Internet; accessed on 6 August 2006.

²¹Definition of “Political Realism;” available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism_%28international_relations%29; Internet; accessed on 6 August 2006.

²²Definition of “Political Realism;” available from <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/realism.htm>; Internet; accessed on 6 August 2006.

²³Definition of “Political Realism;” available from <http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/polreal.htm>; Internet; accessed on 6 August 2006.

²⁴An ancient Greek historian who wrote the *History of the Peloponnesian War* and is also cited as an intellectual fore-bearer of realpolitik.

²⁵Ancient Indian theorist who authored *Arthashastra* in 300 BC.

²⁶Definition of “Political Realism;” available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neorealism>; Internet; accessed on 6 August 2006.

²⁷Definition of “Political Liberalism;” available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_international_relations_theory; Internet; accessed on 6 August 2006.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In many ways, the character of the twenty first century will depend on the success of our (India and the US) cooperation for peace, prosperity and democracy and freedom.¹

Indo-US Joint Declaration of March 2000

A strategic alliance with the US at this stage will create for India an opportunity to engage with other major world powers on an equal footing. It will also help India in evolving a foreign policy, which is more flexible and multi-centric than what existed in the non-alignment period.²

K. Subrahmanyam

This chapter provides a review of the references used to develop and analyze the main theme of this thesis. A close and strong strategic partnership is vital to the interests of both the US and India. Strategic thinkers on both sides are engaged in writing extensively on the possibilities and the obstacles to a long-term partnership between India and the US. Abundant literature is available on this topic in the form of books, government documents, articles in magazines and journals, and the Internet. While several books written on the subject provide the background and detailed analysis, the recent articles bring the discussion up to date. There is a heavy reliance on the Internet and electronic media for the latest inputs.

This thesis examines the literature separately for historical background; India's rise as a global power and its likely future disposition; the strategic interests of India and the US; books on partnership between India and the US and similar partnerships elsewhere; and the current events. The balance in research is maintained by examining the works of both Indian and the American writers.

Stated Government Policies and Documents

National interests govern any nation's foreign policy. The characteristic of the relationship or agreements between nations is based on these national interests and objectives. These interests are based on the national character, policies, security, economics, and global standing of the nation in question. These interests are often made public in the form of major speeches by the political leaders, policy documents, and agreements with other countries with similar interests.

The US lays out its interests and vision in *The National Security Strategy (NSS)* published in 2006. The document provides the strategic vision of the current US government, including its future goals in international relations. The main themes of this document which directly affects India include forming "alliances to combat terrorism, championing human dignity, desire to defuse regional conflicts, global economic growth, promoting democracies and the challenges; and opportunities of globalization." The document makes special mention of India in the chapter discussing the cooperation with main centers of global power. The US government's *NSS* 2006 includes India as one of the main centers of the global power. The intention of the US government is reflected in the following statement in the *NSS*:

We [the US] have made great strides in transforming America's relationship with India, a major power that shares our commitment to freedom, democracy, and rule of law. India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the US in a way befitting a major power.³

The current Indian government, on the other hand, does not have a formalized national security strategy. However, the government's intentions have been clearly indicated by the objectives identified by the Ministry of Defense (discussed later) and the

speeches made by the national leaders in various national and international forums. India's stance in world affairs is also demonstrated by the several agreements made by India with other nations. The relations between the US and India began to improve during the rule of Bhartiya Janata Party government in India. This government issued a vision statement document in 2003 that provides the general idea of India's long-term strategic aims. The new government in India has not issued any vision statement of its own, but more or less, direction of India's foreign policy is reasonably constant.

President Bill Clinton's visited India in 2000 and initiated the current rapprochement in relationship. The relationship picked up momentum post 9/11. The two nations signed several agreements in various fields including the areas that were never addressed in the past, like defense technology and weapons and the nuclear technology. The analysis of the recent agreements would determine the possibility and future of US-India strategic partnership. The analysis of the policy documents and statements of the leaders of the two countries would determine the convergence or divergence of the national interests of the two countries. Convergence of the interests and positive outcome of the recent agreements would certainly put India on the path to achieving its strategic objectives.

Historical Perspective

The analysis of the history of the relationship between the US and India is vital to the possibility and the framework for any future partnership. Dennis Kux traced the history of Indo-US relations from 1941 to 1991 in his book, *India and USA: Estranged Democracies*. The book was the first analysis of its kind on the US-India relations. The book addresses the transformational phase of the relations after the Cold War and

provides adequate historical perspective to the reasons for estrangement of the two great nations for over fifty years. The Indian perspective of the history of the same period is well covered in *Indo US Relations 1947-89* by Santosh Saha.

The track record of India's foreign policy since independence is interesting. Writing in "India's New Foreign Policy Strategy,"⁴ by noted Indian journalist and strategic thinker C RAJA Mohan, gave an interesting and wholesome perspective of the India's foreign policy over the past sixty years. It highlights India's policy through the Cold War and its opening up to the world after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It has specific reference to the policy towards the US. The current tone of India's policy towards the rest of the world has been clearly laid out in the article and this could form the basis for evaluation of the suitability of the policy towards achieving the national objectives.

Current Security Environment and India's Position in World Politics

Stephan J. Blank traced the rising power and capabilities of India and its influence on the region in his book, *Natural Allies: Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo American Strategic Cooperation*. He highlighted the bilateral defense agenda and rationale for Indo-US strategic partnership. *India in the World Order: Searching for a Major Power Status* published in 2003, by two highly regarded scholars of Baldev Raj Nayar and TV Paul of the McGill University, Montreal, examined "the prospects and implications of India's integration into the major power system in the twenty first century."⁵ The analysis was based on the capabilities and constraints and gives a holistic view of the possibility of growth of India as power of the world.

The security environment of South Asia is the key to possibility of India's global influence and is, therefore, related to the partnership with the US. Another publication by the Strategic Studies Institute called *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances* edited by Michael R Chambers is a collection of essays by various writers on diverse subjects like economics, military, regional politics, and nuclear issue. All of these collectively affect the future of India and possibility of it emerging as a global player. The book explored the possibility of India emerging as a global player and its relationship with the US. Another book *South Asia after Cold War* by Stephan P. Cohen a senior fellow in Foreign Relations Studies in the Brookings Institute and an expert on India, Pakistan, South Asian security and proliferation issues, gave an overview of the international perspectives on the South Asia after the Cold War. This book was coauthored by Indian writer Kanti Bajpai, who provides the Indian perspective and balance to the study. Stephan P. Cohen has written a lot on Pakistan, and his work will help understand one of the most important factors affecting US-India relationship.

Partnership between the US and India

The shift in US policy to positively engage India is the basis for the all the efforts towards the strategic partnership. The world has been skeptical of this shift and India came under sharp criticism after the nuclear tests of 1998. *Engaging India: US Strategic Relation with India*, another collection of essays, published immediately after the nuclear tests of 1998, explored the common and divergent grounds on economics, military exchange, and technology transfer issues between India and the US. The book addressed several questions on domestic factors influencing the foreign policy, role of nuclear weapons and missiles, and policies relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Mr. Amit Gupta's thesis "The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or complementary Interests," published in 1995, is an interesting and comprehensive perspective. Are the two nations really in for a great partnership or is this only a momentary shift in policy? In the introduction, the author wrote that the envisaged partnership between India and the US was not possible. The book comprehensively covered the history of the relationship. The book illustrated how, despite convergent national and strategic interests, the two nations may never be able to engage into a meaningful strategic partnership unless some major shifts in the policies take place. Amit Gupta recommended some of the steps that are required to be taken to make the partnership work.

Other Options for India

In the recent past, India renewed its efforts to positively transform its relations with most nations of the world. This demonstrates India's willingness to engage with all the major powers and not to restrict itself only with the US. India intends strengthening the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) as a balancing force in the world order.⁶ Besides the NAM, India has formed several partnerships with Russia, EU, Brazil, China, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and South Africa. India has also vociferously demanded radical reorganization of the United Nations. This demonstrates India's intention of keeping other options open.

Summary

India hopes to be a major player in the world politics, and the US believes that India has the potential to be one of the major power centers of the world. The partnership

between India and the US is still evolving. The strength of the relationship will depend upon the convergence of interests of the two countries and the ability of the two nations to overcome past indifference. This chapter introduced the literature that would help analyze the possibility of India-US relationship furthering India strategic goals. Besides published books, the articles, essays, comments, and current happenings available on the news media and Internet will contribute immensely towards the thesis.

¹Declaration stated in the Joint Statement “India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st century,” signed between India and the United States during March 2000 visit of President Clinton to India.

²Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, Chairman of the Task Force on Global Strategic Developments appointed by Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh while speaking at a seminar in New Delhi In February 2006, just before President George W Bush’s visit to New Delhi.

³Quoted from the US NSS available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionVIII.html>; Internet: accessed on 15 July 2006.

⁴C. Raja Mohan is noted Indian journalist and strategic thinker. The complete text of “Shift in India’s Foreign Policy,” available from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan.pdf#search=%22Realistic%20approach%20of%20India's%20foreign%20Policy%22>; Internet; accessed on 15 October 2006.

⁵Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, “Foreword,” *India in the World Order: Searching for a Major Power Status* (Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003).

⁶Siddharth Varadarajan in article, “A quest for New World Order,” published as a precursor to the recent NAM summit held in Havana; available from <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=32&ItemID=10941>; Internet; accessed on 15 October 2006.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interests. This is a bitter truth.¹

Chanakya

This chapter outlines the research methodology used to collect information and to analyze the available information and data. The problems and questions are not quantifiable; therefore, a mathematical solution should not be expected from this research. The scope of this thesis is limited to India's interests, and the analysis will focus mainly on the ability of the current partnership agreements between India and the US to support India's national interests. This thesis uses a combination of critical analysis and comparative evaluation of the stated problem and questions.

The basic criteria for finding the answer to the research question is to evaluate the potential of the current partnership agreements between India and the US to help India meet the national objectives set by the government of India. The research will also evaluate various models of the international relations as suitable for India to achieve its national objectives. The research will incorporate the use all the instruments of national power; diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME). The research will also evaluate the recent partnership agreements between India other major players of the world politics to generate a comparison. The research would be carried out in following steps.

Step 1: Background. The relationship between India and the US has never been consistent. Both nations follow and respect democracy, human values, and freedom, yet

their approach to international relations is different. Harry Barnes wrote, “The two nations share the overarching vision of a world order that is free from the scourge of the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. Their differences stem from their divergent approaches towards a common goal of comprehensive global disarmament.”² This divergent approach to common goals is seen in several issues, like the UN reforms, WTO, and terrorism. An analysis of the past relationship will help to determine the course of the future partnership. The analysis would also discuss India’s foreign policy since independence, with particular reference to the effects of following such policy on India’s relationship with the US.

Step 2: India’s Strategic Interests. It is prudent to determine India’s current strategic objectives upfront and link them with the strategic interests of the US. Besides the above stated objectives, India’s interests are identified from the various official declarations and speeches by the leaders. An analysis of the national strategy of the US would also be necessary to determine the US national interests to evaluate convergence of the interests of the two nations.

Step 3: Evaluate Recent Partnership Agreements. The convergence of interests of the two nations is demonstrated by various partnerships agreements between the US and India. This part will evaluate the ability of the recent agreements to further India’s stated objectives. The analysis would also determine the sustainability of the agreements by comparing the Indian interests with the US interests.

Step 4: Comparative Analysis. Currently India is positively engaging with most major global players. This part would examine various options available to India for strategic partnerships. Each partnership is likely to bring its share of advantages and

disadvantages. India's partnerships with some of these nations may not be conducive to US interests. The comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of a relationship with other nations vis-à-vis the US, would determine India's best interests. This analysis will help determine India's future foreign policy, particularly towards the US.

Step 6: Recommendations. Lastly, the thesis will make recommendations based on the above evaluation and analysis. The recommendations would focus on the model to be adopted by the Indian government while conducting its foreign policy with the US in particular and other major powers of the world in general.

¹Chanakya (350 BC-275 BC), also known as Kautilya, was a famous Indian political thinker, strategist, and writer. He authored *Arthashastra*, a treatise on statecraft and economic policy.

²Harry Barnes, "Foreword," *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Background to the US-India Relations

The past relationship between the US and India has alternated between friendly and hostility resulting from estrangement and mutual suspicion. The two countries do recognize the significance of each for the other, but a strong positive relationship never developed. Amidst several ups and downs, the occasional closeness between the countries suggested a possibility of a lasting alliance. But the hopes were dashed by conflicting national interests and policies. The current US-India relationship is also one such moment that is considered the foundation for a lasting strategic partnership. The relationship has flourished over the past decade or so and there are many expectations. An analysis of the past illustrates several opportunities were missed. It remains to be seen if this relationship transforms into a strategic partnership to further India's national objectives. This chapter explores the background of the India-US relationship to identify the factors that hold back the relationship with a view to find solutions to the impediments.

While the desire to be friends comes from the shared common ideals of democracy and freedom, the traditional suspicion between India and the US is in part the direct result of the poor impressions of each other. The Indian freedom struggle, led by Mahatma Gandhi, fascinated many Americans, but at the same time they held a very unflattering image of poverty stricken India as depicted by Katherine Mayo in her popular 1927 book, *Mother India*.¹ Movies like *King of the Khyber Rifles* (1954), that depicted weak Indians as compared to strong Englishmen, did not do any better for the

image of the Indians. India is still struggling to fully recover from this withering depiction of an “impoverished casteist society.” Indians too did not hold any better view of the US. To them the US was country of materialism, crime, and racial discrimination.² This view was reinforced when Indians such as Rabindranath Tagore, a Noble Laureate, were subjected to humiliation by a US immigration official.³

Preindependence Relations

The US’ engagement with India and interests in India’s partnership in global efforts predates India’s independence. The first links of the independent US were established with India in 1792 when George Washington appointed Benjamin Roy as consul to India.⁴ At the time India was governed by the British and the political relations with India were virtually nonexistent. The major investment of the US in India at that time was in form of the religious missionaries.⁵ The US interest in India increased in the interwar period. India’s freedom struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi caught the attention of the Americans, who opposed colonial imperialism.⁶

With the arrival of the Democrats to power in the US under President Roosevelt in 1933, the Indians hoped that the liberals opposing imperialism would support India’s cause for freedom. Contrary to the expectations, the US government did not adopt an aggressive strategy to pressure the colonial powers to grant independence to their colonies. The real US involvement in the Indian affairs started with the entry of the US into the WWII. US projected itself as the “arsenal of democracy,”⁷ and hoped the British would help put an end to fascism in return for US support to the British war effort against the Germans.

President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, were convinced that the Indians would cooperate better in the war effort if the British promised independence to India at the end of the war.⁸ There was frantic activity on the part of the US to get India on its side in the war effort. The US government started direct talks with the British Indian government, even if it was channeled through London, and the Indian nationalist leaders. Besides championing the cause of democracy, the US viewed India as a vast pool of manpower that could play a dominant role in the war effort if allowed to be an active partner, rather than being passive, with Indian soldiers fighting under the British banner. This, they thought, was possible if the British granted the Indians status equal to other members of British Commonwealth.⁹ This was unacceptable to the British, and the top leadership in the US did not wish to “upset the Indian applecart.”¹⁰

Indian leaders thought about free India’s foreign policy long before independence. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru¹¹ was nominated the foreign policy spokesman of the Indian National Congress in the late 1920s. While the US extended the “arsenal of democracy,” to India, the Indian leaders adopted a cautious approach in engaging the US. The Indians did not want to replace one colonial power with another external power meddling in their internal affairs. Nehru joined in the criticism of the Latin America policy of the US during the Brussels conference against colonialism in 1927. He led the Indian view that the US was the leading example of economic imperialism.¹² This view also raised suspicion on the US intentions when it suddenly “woke up” to support Indian independence in 1941. Indians thought that the US needed Indian troops to actively participate on its side during WWII. Indians were wary of both the US and the British. Therefore, despite the efforts of the US government to pressure Great Britain for India’s

independence, Indian leaders did not capitalize on it. They saw the independence as inevitable.

Despite the suspicion, Indian leaders had great expectations from the US. They were the only hope, among all the Western nations, that understood and promoted the concept of freedom and democracy. The US also opposed the two state theory of the British to divide India on religious grounds.¹³ The US supported the provisional Indian government ahead of the complete independence. They assigned 250,000 troops for eastern India to prevent the Japanese invasion of India from Burma.¹⁴ President Roosevelt even had heated exchanges with Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, over India's independence.¹⁵

At this time, Indian leaders started a strong "Quit India Movement"¹⁶ against the British in 1942. Great Britain arrested all major leaders in India. The Indian leaders were hoping for an American intervention, but Roosevelt decided not to confront Churchill on the issue. Roosevelt had his agenda very clear, war was more important to him than Indian independence. This was not appreciated by the Indian leaders. At the same time, the Americans were frustrated by the attitude of the Indian leaders. Gandhi expected the US to intervene and at the same time detested the US policy of racial discrimination.

The pre-independence interest of the US in India was probably the highest point in the history of relationship between the two countries. There were many expectations, none of which were met. This was a great opportunity missed by both sides to engage into a lasting meaningful relationship. This pre-independence encounter and the resulting impasse was the probably the reason for the Indians to adopt a policy that distanced

themselves from the major power blocks that followed the WWII. Dennis Kux has wonderfully summed up this encounter in his book:

Between the Indians and the Americans the priorities ultimately differed. For Indian leaders, even for those like Nehru who were emotionally supportive of the Allied cause, the top priority remained that of ending the British rule and gaining India's independence. For Roosevelt, winning the war was the top order of business. Every thing else came second, including India's independence if this would risk a serious rupture with his British allies. Because the Indians and Americans expected and thought they deserved each other's support, the course of events during the war sharpened the mutual disappointment. This first extended interaction between the US and India foreshadowed the frustrations that would follow during the next five decades.¹⁷

As India was being divided into Hindu and Muslim nations, the Americans continued their interests in the country. The US appointed Raymond Hare to spend three months in the subcontinent to get acquainted with the region. He remarked to Mahatma Gandhi that he did not find much enthusiasm amongst Indians for the independence. Mahatma replied, "The reason was simple, it was about partition."¹⁸ When Hare asked Mahatma Gandhi how the sympathies between the US and India could be deepened, Gandhi's reply was, "By employment of unselfishness, hitherto unknown in international relations."¹⁹ This was very much the tone of intended foreign policy of free India. The same idea was reinforced by Pandit Nehru who said, "The country would stay out of the entanglement of the current power struggle in the belief that such was in the best interests of India and the world peace." He added that, "there was a general fear of the American economic penetration," but added that India would depend upon the US for certain types of support."²⁰ Moreover, on the economic front, India wanted to adopt a more socialist model like the British rather than the capitalist model of the US.²¹

Postindependence Relations

With the end of the WW II the US was shaping its foreign policy to confront the Soviet communism. Independent India was an attractive ally for both camps. The US wanted India on its side, whereas India maintained its independence in foreign policy. The main features of India's foreign policy as articulated by Nehru were, firstly, India supported rapid decolonization of the world; secondly, Asia's destiny rests in Asian hands and the reduced influence of the Europeans in Asia; thirdly, opposition to racial discrimination as seen in South Africa and the US; and lastly, India wanted to play an active role in the world affairs by following a policy of *non-entanglement*.²² India perceived itself as a strong power in South Asia who did not need any external support to bolster its foreign policy.²³

The early relationship of free India with the US got off to a shaky start characterized by estrangement and mistrust. The first real difference between the US and free India emerged over the Kashmir issue. The Kashmir issue hijacked the fate of the US-India relationship for five decades. Despite the fact the US was initially uninterested in getting involved in the issue due to its preoccupation all over the world, the government was forced to adopt a stance as the dispute reached the United Nations Security Council. For most Indians, the US perception of the Kashmir issue is biased towards the Pakistani claims. Also, that the views in the US at the time were largely dictated by the British perception and feedback, distortion (or say selective use) of facts and not on the reality on ground. For instance, while most Western writers viewed Kashmir as a "Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu ruler," the ground reality remains that the state of Jammu and Kashmir has three distinct regions, each having its own

demographic and cultural identity. The Muslims were in majority but by a slender margin. Moreover, the world has repeatedly ignored the perception and plight of the minority Hindu and Buddhist populations of the state. Besides, India has a larger Muslim population than Pakistan therefore the call for accession to Pakistan on the basis of religion was unfair.

Lord Mountbatten, the last British representative in India, brought up the issue of “self-determination” by the people of Kashmir. Based on Mountbatten’s counsel and his own confidence, both in the desire of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to join secular India and the international community, Nehru took the issue to the United Nations for an amicable solution. The people in Kashmir had played a vital role in stalling the Pakistani aggression at the doorsteps of Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. Nehru expected the international community especially the US to condemn the Pakistani aggression. Nehru was dejected by the American attitude in the United Nations. He wrote to his sister, “The USA and UK had played a dirty role.” He called the American and British response on Kashmir as “completely wrong” and warned that such attitude would have a “far reaching results in our relations.” The Indian leadership believed that the west was opposed to India’s non-entanglement stance. According to Nehru, “The motives of the US were to get the military and economic concessions in Pakistan”²⁴ in an effort to make inroads into the region against the Soviet influence.

Besides the Kashmir issue, the US and India differed on several international issues, like Palestine, international control of atomic energy, creation of Israel, Indonesia, and Indo-China. The US viewed international communism as a major threat, while India thought this threat was overstated. Nehru thought that the security psychosis created by

this threat would provoke war instead of preserving peace.²⁵ Such differences in the fundamental issues were not good for a young nation's relations with the superpower. However, despite his biases against America and several differences, Nehru was hopeful of a cordial relations with the US on the premise that, "it is well recognized today all over the world that the future of Asia will be powerfully determined by the future of India."²⁶

The Korean crisis of the early 1950s was the first test of free India's foreign policy. While the US under the leadership of Dwight Eisenhower was getting tougher on the communists,²⁷ India was moving strongly towards its stated non-entanglement policy. Many in the world viewed the neutral India as the obvious choice to play the lead role in handling of the Korean prisoners of wars. Singman Rhee, the President of Republic of Korea, and the US had a different view. They viewed that India was playing to the tune of communist China.²⁸ The performance of the Indian contingent in Korea led by Thimmayya proved the fears wrong, and their neutrality was much appreciated by the Americans. Rhee, referred to by Nehru as a puppet of the American government,²⁹ was still unimpressed and did not want India's participation in the international conference to decide the future of Korea. Utterly disregarding India's immaculate performance in Korea, the US chose to side with Sigman Rhee and an opportunity to improve relations with India was wasted.

At this time the US was looking for security partners against the communist expansion. The fact that India was not backing the US in the Cold War played a role in tilting the American interests in favor of Pakistan.³⁰ Moreover, despite India's limited economic and military capabilities, its standing in the post-Korean War international arena was elevating rapidly, and its policy of neutrality was proving successful.³¹ During

his visit to South Asia, Secretary Dulles was unimpressed by Nehru's "impractical statesmanship", but was floored by the hospitality of the Pakistanis,³² who were desperately seeking defense cooperation with the US to match India's defense potential. Pakistan probably was an ideal partner to establish the US presence in the region and, if required, could contain India's growing strength. Nehru noisily opposed the arms deal between the US and Pakistan because he feared the deal could worsen already existing tensions between India and Pakistan. This could also encourage Pakistan to seek an adventurous encounter with India. The US rejected Nehru's reaction as arrogance and his quest for regional leadership. Soon the Americans tilted in favor of Pakistan.

Despite Eisenhower's personal concerns that the deal would worsen relations with India, Dulles managed to convince the president to sign the deal. Dulles argued that failure to do so would bring Nehru to the limelight and establish him as a prominent international leader.³³ President Eisenhower's approved the deal in January 1954. The gap between US and India widened. The entire episode was summarized by J.J. Singh, "The US motivation was equally divided between a desire to strengthen western defenses against the communism and a wish to give vent to anti-India feelings."³⁴ The US believed that the gains of having an ally in Pakistan would offset the losses sustained by losing India as an ally.³⁵ Nehru wrote in a letter to M.M. Panikkar, then Indian Ambassador to Egypt:

The US believes that by this policy they have completely outflanked India's so-called neutralism and thus would bring India to its knees. . . . The first result of all this would be an extreme dislike of the US in India.³⁶

During Eisenhower's second term, the relationship between the US and India improved primarily because of the improved personal chemistry between President

Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nehru. The US viewed India as the most significant broker between the east and the west.³⁷ The Americans wanted to strengthen India and project it as a model of governance to other Asian states.³⁸ However, little was achieved practically. India joined other major leaders of the world to form the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) which further irritated the US. The US and India continued to differ on issues like the US support to the Pakistani Kashmir cause in the United Nations and the arms sale to Pakistan including the latest F-104 combat aircrafts.³⁹

At this time India too was seeking military hardware from the outside to bolster its defense mechanism to defend against growing threats from Pakistan on one side, and China on the other who grabbed a large chunk of Indian territory called Aksai-chin in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's defense deal with the US received a major boost when it allowed the US to establish a base near Peshawar to be used for surveillance over the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ The US leadership wanted to provide similar equipment for India including the latest Sidewinder missiles.⁴¹ However, owing to pressures from the pro-Pakistan lobby, the US refused to hold both Pakistan and India on the similar footing.⁴² Pakistan was an ally and India was nonaligned. India therefore relied on the Soviet Union for the aid. For India, the relationship with the Soviet Union would strengthen its position against China,⁴³ and the military hardware thus provided would allow it to improve its defenses against ever-modernizing Pakistani military. Once again, despite understanding and acknowledging the importance of India in the future world order, another great opportunity was lost by the US, once again placed priority on the relationship with a country along the Soviet rim and thus accommodating its immediate goals.

Defense cooperation between India and the US was seen in Congo, where India led the largest United Nations contingent. India sent a smaller force to Laos. The relationship reached a high point during the short term of President Kennedy. India received the largest economic package so far amounting to one billion US dollars for two years from the US in 1961.⁴⁴ However, two major events led to soured relations. India's offensive to capture Goa from Portuguese in 1961 led to harsh criticism by the US because of the use of aggression by India while preaching peace to the world. The second issue was India's deal with the Soviet Union to purchase MiG-21 fighter jets.

India's 1962 war with China brought new reality to the forefront for India. India's poor showing exposed India's poor defense potential. The Soviets refused to provide the promised military hardware to the Indians in the wake of the war. The MiG-21 deal was put on a hold. India did not receive any support from any of the NAM countries except for cosmetic diplomatic support from Egypt and Yugoslavia. For Nehru this was the time to realize that India was not safe on its own. He turned to the West for military hardware. The US and the Commonwealth agreed to provide a short term military package of 120 million US dollars to India. This package was too small for the huge Indian requirements.⁴⁵ Obviously the Pakistani concerns prevented the US from providing a larger package. On the positive side, the key factor in the package was to facilitate India's increase in capability to produce arms indigenously.⁴⁶ Over the next few months the US worked hard to increase the package for India, but President Kennedy was assassinated before he could signal a final go ahead in November 1963. According to Galbraith "It was a great opportunity to bring India much closer to the West."⁴⁷

The debate on military aid to India continued after Kennedy. The Americans were reluctant to provide an all out assistance to a desperate India trying to reorganize its battered military. The US refused to provide the supersonic F-104s, and thus delayed the modernization of the Indian Air Force. Once again the Pakistan factor played a major role in American decision making. India turned to the Soviet Union, who by now had returned to its position of neutrality between China and India. The Soviets obliged by providing forty five MiG-21 jets. This was the defining moment for the public opinion in India in favor of the Soviet Union. For many thinkers, once again the price paid by the Americans to keep their partnership with Pakistan vis-à-vis India was heavy.⁴⁸

Pakistan meanwhile was strengthening its military with substantial US aid including the Patton tanks and F104s. It was also negotiating a cozy relationship with China. Pakistan launched an offensive on the Rann of Kutch in Indian State of Gujarat on 9 April 1965. Indian troops were surprised and pulled back because they feared that they would be cut off by the flooding of the marshes. Indians suffered heavy casualties. Pakistan was emboldened by this small victory, the poor show by Indians in the 1962 conflict with China and the confidence gained by the qualitative edge it had over India due to the military aid by the Americans. Pakistan launched “Operation Gibraltar” in August 1965 to liberate Kashmir by infiltrating guerrillas into Kashmir who were expected to cause an uprising. Pakistanis, frustrated by the failure to cause an uprising, launched an offensive on 1 September 1965 to cut off Srinagar, the capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, from the rest of India. Lal Bahadur Shastri, then Prime Minister of India, responded aggressively and the fight escalated all along the

international border. In one of the fiercest tank-t- tank battles since the WW II, Indians made tremendous gains, but none could claim a decisive victory.

Despite the American promises not to allow the use of American military hardware against India,⁴⁹ they did little to prevent Pakistan from stalling their misadventure. Instead Soviets once again took the lead to broker the peace.⁵⁰ At the same time the American government under President Johnson was reconsidering its economic aid to India citing sluggish economic and social progress made by India.⁵¹ The Americans were obviously unhappy with the near stagnant Indian economy despite millions of dollars being pumped into a nation who even after twenty years of independence could barely feed itself. The US once again failed Indian aspirations.

By the end of the sixties, the US did not see India playing any major strategic role in the world affairs, in sharp contrast to its hopes during the fifties and early sixties. India was reduced in US eyes to just another big country with lots of poor people and with no significant value to American national interests.⁵² There was a sense of exhaustion towards South Asia among the Americans.⁵³ As such by this time the two nations were too engrossed in their own internal affairs to deal effectively with each other. While the US was dealing with the Vietnam, South Asia took a backseat. It had, to a great extent, accepted the situation in the region as stable and not threatening. South Asia was too engrossed in its own troubles.

Bangladesh Crisis. The US was pulled back into the South Asian crisis during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. The trouble in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) caught the attention of the world. The Pakistan government was criticized for atrocities on Bengalis in this part of the country.⁵⁴ India, in the middle of the two warring sides of Pakistan and

with a large influx of refugees from East Pakistan, envisaged another war with Pakistan while hoping for a political solution.⁵⁵ The White House assured India that the Americans would enforce an arms embargo on Pakistan. However, the New York Times reported on 22 September 1971 that several ships were about to leave the New York harbor, carrying arms for Pakistan. India felt cheated and accused America of condoning or even encouraging continuation the Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan.⁵⁶ There was a considerable aura of tension during Indian Prime Minister's visit to Washington DC in November 1971.⁵⁷

Preemptive Pakistani air strikes on eight Indian airfields on 3 December 1971 triggered the war between India and Pakistan. The US leadership, primarily President Nixon and Kissinger, suspected that India planned to wipe out the rest of West Pakistan after a comprehensive victory in the east.⁵⁸ This was based on the CIA report of 6 December 1971, even though no one else really thought India had any such intentions. Nixon disregarded Indian government's assurances in this regard as lies. In an effort to protect its "ally," Nixon on 10 December 1971 ordered deployment of USS *Enterprise* as Task Group 74 in the Bay of Bengal with the specified mission of evacuation of the stranded Americans. The unspecified mission was to send a message to the Indians and the Soviets, who, in Nixon's analysis, were fuelling India to humble a "US ally,"⁵⁹ and humiliate the US by dismembering Pakistan.

At the end of this war, India was bitter with the American policy and actions. In Harold Saunder's words, "The President's (Nixon) personal liking for Pakistan as well as his dislike of the Indians, especially Indira Gandhi, did nothing but reinforce the way Nixon reacted to the crisis."⁶⁰ Nixon responded by blaming India of derailing the

political process to restore peace.⁶¹ In his foreign policy report of 1972, he claimed that “India’s impatience frustrated US efforts to nudge Yahya Khan (Pakistan President) towards a settlement and that a strong US stand reduced chances of India’s attack on West Pakistan.”⁶² Indira Gandhi, on the other hand blamed the US of providing only the lip service to the need for a political solution⁶³ and not restraining the Pakistanis.

Nuclear Tests by India. The US and India tried to improve the relationship, especially on the economic front, after the Bangladesh crisis was over. The effort received a serious blow with India going nuclear by testing its first nuclear device in 1974 which prompted a nuclear race with Pakistan. They declared the launch of its “peaceful” nuclear program.⁶⁴ Despite India’s claim that the purpose of the test was peaceful and legal since it was not a signatory of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, several sanctions including cancellation of loans from the World Bank, were slapped on India. The process of warming of relations with the US was once again derailed. India became only the sixth nation in the world with nuclear capabilities.

Internal Political Turmoil. The next two decades were followed by a severe political turmoil in India. Indira Gandhi imposed emergency⁶⁵ in 1975. The West suspected the future of India’s democratic institutions. In the words of former Ambassador Moynihan, “When India ceased to be a democracy, our interests just plummeted. I mean, what does it export but communicable diseases?”⁶⁶ The statement demonstrates two significant points. One, American interests in India were primarily based on the fact that India was the face of the Third World democracy. The fall of democracy weakened US interests in India. Second, this brought out the underlying general perception of the Americans about India and its people. Obviously, a lack of

mutual respect is detrimental to cordial relationship. However, India recovered from this shock and fair elections were held within two years of the imposition of emergency. While India was redefining its internal political system, its focus on the international relations reduced during the next two decades. Also, India grew out of Pakistan centric mentality and considered strategic issues beyond its immediate neighborhood. The outward-looking India was irked by the US takeover of the Diego Garcia naval base in the Indian Ocean from the British, and its expansion during the 1973 Arab Israel war. India wanted the major powers out of the Indian Ocean to maintain it as a demilitarized zone.⁶⁷

The late seventies witnessed some warming of the relationship between India and the US and there were discussions on providing India with 155 millimeter Howitzers and TOW antitank missiles. This was primarily aimed at dissuading India from getting closer to the Soviet Union.⁶⁸ However, the deal never came through. At the same time, the Indian population in the US was increasing. They were primarily professionals with higher technical degrees and had the highest per capita income among the ethnic groups in the US.⁶⁹ This may have contributed towards laying the foundation of changing perceptions about the Indians in the US.

The quiet US- Pakistan relationship rekindled with the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Pakistan emerged as the obvious conduit for the major support to the Afghan ultras opposing the Soviets and the local government supported by them. Pakistan trained and equipped Afghan insurgents and raised the Taliban. Therefore, the large US monetary and military packages to Pakistan resumed. The US justified the military aid, including F-16s, as enabling Pakistan to counter the communist expansion.⁷⁰

India accused Pakistan of diverting funds and resources towards spreading unrest in India. Interestingly, the evolution and death of the Sikh movement for “Khalistan” in Indian Punjab almost coincided with the Afghan insurgency in the eighties. Clear evidence was presented by the Indian government about the linkage of the Sikh terrorists with Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence (ISI).⁷¹ This was also acknowledged by the CIA.⁷² This reason was enough for the Indian government to contest the American aid to Pakistan.

Also, interestingly, the emergence of Kashmir insurgency also coincided with the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The infrastructure created in Pakistan trained Afghan insurgents, and the terrorists thus trained were available to be redirected to Indian Kashmir in the late 1980s. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, and withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan, the F-16s for Pakistan for “anti-communist cause” made little sense. While the US dismissed Indian accusations as rhetorical without much substance, India had enough reasons to believe that the US military aid to Pakistan would eventually be directed towards India.⁷³ The killing of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh terrorists in 1984 added fuel to India’s deteriorating relations with Pakistan and the US.

Foundation of the Current Relationship

By the mid 1980s, the relationship between India and the US was beginning to mature with the cooperation in technical and economic fields. The personal chemistry between President Reagan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi played a key role in this change. The two nations reached agreements on the issues of nuclear fuel supply for the Tarapur plant in India, launched initiative for cooperation in science and technology, and

the year 1985 was to be observed as year of India in the US.⁷⁴ The American economic aid to India resumed focusing on the venture capital and technology transfer instead of the traditional aid in agricultural and health sectors. However, for Indians the US aid was far too little to support the large population of about 85 million.⁷⁵

Following Indira Gandhi's 1984 visit to the US, the talks on the sale of military hardware to India resumed. Americans wanted to wean India away from the Soviet military aid. The US wanted India to develop its own defense production capability, but provided little "real" help. The mistrust at both ends prevented any defense deals from being realized. The US Department of Defense (DOD) prevented the deals from being finalized due to the strong anti-India and pro-Pakistan sentiments.⁷⁶ DOD argued that the American equipment provided to India would fall into the Soviet hands. At the same time Indians doubted the US reliability based on past experience. The Americans had backed out of deals like the nuclear fuel for the Tarapur plant and had cut off arms supply unilaterally during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The American terms of contract favored themselves since they retained the privilege of backing out of agreements unilaterally at any time.⁷⁷

During the eighties India had a strained economic relationship with the US. The US wielded its influence on the international financial institutions by blocking loans to India from the World Bank, International Development Authority (IDA), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).⁷⁸ The reason cited for such actions by the US was India's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁷⁹ For India these were the main sources of developmental funds. The relations continued to be sour and Indira Gandhi charged the US of "siding with a dictator at the expense of a democracy."⁸⁰ India and the

US disagreed on major issues in the UN. India led the way, along with Brazil, to oppose the developed nations in the various rounds of WTO talks.

The years following the assassination of Indira Gandhi were not very productive for India's foreign policy. The focus was largely internal with India battling with Punjab terrorism and rising Kashmiri unrest. The Rajiv Gandhi government focused on economic reforms and concentrated on technological development. At this time India also managed the only successful military procurement from the US in the form of the General Motors engine for the development of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

End of Cold War. The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter of America's relationship with South Asia. The US moved away from Pakistan and was no more required to wean India away from the Soviets. By the beginning of the 1990s, the US no longer backed the call for plebiscite in Kashmir. Meanwhile, India was still battling terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir. The US criticized the alleged high handedness of the Indian government in dealing with these terrorists. Instead of taking steps to prevent the use of US soil being used for instigating Sikhs and collecting funds for Punjab terrorism,⁸¹ the US government passed a legislation to end the economic aid to India based on India's allegedly poor human rights record. Interestingly, even today, while the US wages the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the American soil is being used by organizations, like *Council of Khalistan*.⁸² This organization carries out anti-India propaganda and allegedly organizes visits of terrorists to Pakistan to revive the Sikh terrorist group Babbar Khalsa.⁸³

The US continued to exert economic pressure on India by threatening to impose the Super 301.⁸⁴ India viewed this as a direct encroachment into the internal economics

of India. Such steps were viewed as hindrances to the growth of India's economy. The US was unhappy with the slow rate of growth sarcastically called as the "Hindu Rate of Growth" by *The Economist* in 1991.⁸⁵ On the strategic security front, the general feeling continued that the US wanted to contain India's growth as an independent center of power.⁸⁶ The US Defense Planning Guide for the Post Cold War Era of 1992 confirmed this fear. The report indicated the US desire to contain the growth of India's power even in the post Cold War era. Still gripped with the Cold War mentality the report said, "We [US] should discourage India's hegemonic aspirations over the other South Asian states and the Indian Ocean."⁸⁷

The nineties witnessed more political turmoil in India. However, the Indian foreign policy focused on trying to engage positively with the US. Consecutive governments in India provided access to the refueling facilities to the US Air Force during the 1991 Operation Desert Storm. In response, the US facilitated sanction of a large loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to India. This was a major departure from the previous policy. India too supported the American proposals of sanctions against Iraq in the UN.⁸⁸ Domestically, by 1991, India was on the way to major economic reforms to open up the economy.⁸⁹ India's growing middle class, so far starved for the consumer goods, was an attractive market for the foreign companies. The economic interests surpassed hurdles of the past and by 1994, the Clinton administration focused on stronger economic ties with India.⁹⁰

Even as the economic ties grew in the nineties, the US government was largely influenced by Pakistani propaganda of the said human rights violations in Kashmir by Indian security forces. That did not help the cause of truly strengthening the partnership.

However, for a change the economic relationship remained independent of the Pakistan factor. Moreover, the credible evidence presented by India on the Pakistan involvement in Kashmir terrorism was acknowledged by the US. President Clinton provided the impetus to the strengthening of the US-India relationship. The seriousness of the two countries to transform their relationship to a strong and serious partnership was demonstrated by the events following India's second round of the nuclear tests in 1998. As the US government imposed the US Congress mandated sanctions on India, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee proclaimed that the US and India were natural allies.⁹¹ Noted Indian strategic thinker C Raja Mohan wrote, "Since then the mutual rapprochement has led to lifting of sanctions and start of a meaningful economic and technological cooperation, with a distinct possibility of expanded military cooperation."⁹²

The events following 9/11 changed the US perception on terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism. Some analysts may have thought that this would be a turning point in the US-India relationship. The US announced the Global War on Terror (GWOT). As proclaimed by President Bush, India hoped that the US would uniformly view and tackle all forms of terrorism, including Kashmir. However, the geopolitical significance of Pakistan in this GWOT prevented the US from acting in favor of India. While India was among the first nations to extend support to the US post 9/11, Pakistan grabbed the limelight as it announced full help in the GWOT. In return to the support it extended to the US, Pakistan expected a huge arms package worth one billion US dollars, including the P-3C Orion and F-16s.⁹³ As the focus shifted, India was once again left alone to deal with its own problems.

The continued US aid to Pakistan worried India, and the relative US silence on the Pakistan support to Kashmiri terrorists generated fears that Pakistan would be further emboldened. These fears proved right when the Pakistan backed terrorists attacked India's Parliament in December 2001.⁹⁴ India mobilized its forces and Pakistan followed suit. With its troops still based in Pakistan for the Afghanistan fight, the US feared a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, especially following President Musharaf's statement that Pakistan may use the nuclear bomb if required, to solve the Kashmir dispute.⁹⁵ Immediate and thoughtful intervention by the US led by Collin Powel eased tensions, and India decided to exercise restraint keeping the US interests in mind. In turn the US exerted pressure on Musharaf to shut the Kashmiri terror camps. This was once again indicative of the willingness of India and the US to work closer. The years to follow saw a number of agreements including one on the supply of nuclear fuel and joint military exercises. The two nations appeared to shed the past inhibitions to work for a lasting partnership.

Summary

The two great nations commenced their relationship much before Indian independence with great expectations. The mistrust and suspicion resulting from the initial failure of a meaningful engagement, coupled with differences emerging on several domestic and international issues immediately after India's independence, set the tone for future relationship. Personalities of the leaders and conflicting national interests adversely affected the relationship. The opportunity was wasted owing to the shortsightedness resulting from preoccupation of the two nations in their national interests of the day.

The study of the historical background highlights three major aspects. Firstly, it traces Indian foreign policy and national objectives over the years. India envisioned playing a vital role in the global affairs from the very beginning. Secondly, it highlights the major impediments that caused the two great democracies to follow divergent paths despite similarity of interests. Thirdly, it indicates that the national interests override all desires and intentions to have cordial relations. The major reasons for the differences between India and the US emerging from the above study were:

1. Nehru's ambition to see India as major power. The US Vice-President Nixon observed in Dec 1953 that "Nehru was least friendly leader and his objection to the American arms deal with Pakistan stemmed from his personal thirst for influence over South Asia, the Middle East and Africa."⁹⁶

2. The US was unhappy with India's non engagement policy fearing that eventually the Soviet Union would be able to woo India on their camp.

3. The Indo-US relations were restricted by the US commitment to its other partners like South Korea and Pakistan. The US' policy was largely governed by its Cold War entanglement with the Soviet Union. For the US India was a beacon of hope against the communism, but unfortunately it was not playing up to the American desires.

4. One of the major impediments to the US-India relationship was the US-Pakistan relationship.⁹⁷ When India decided to stay away from the Cold War camps, Pakistan was the obvious and willing alternative for the US.

5. For several years India was hindered by its Pakistan fixation. The departure from the past policy saw Indians not allowing Pakistan factor come in the way of progress of relations with other countries. This resulted in an overall growth in India.

6. The mistrust was created by the US economic and technological policy with India. The use of the American influence over the world financial bodies to stop economic aid to India and backing out of the treaties like the Tarapore plant created this aura of mistrust. This was contrary to India's desire to be able to operate independently in the international arena.

7. India followed protectionist policies on the economic front and was slow to change. The US was unhappy with India's slow economic growth despite major economic aid provided directly by that country.

Several major national interests of India emerged from this study of the history of US-India relationship. Firstly, the security concerns to maintain its territorial integrity against external aggression of any kind was a key element of the Indian foreign policy. Secondly, safeguarding domestic security and economics interests was more important than pleasing the superpower. Independent economic policy was key to independence in world affairs. In addition, driven by the need to feed a huge population forced the Indian planners to develop an independent economic policy. Thirdly, India wanted to play a lead role in world politics from the very beginning, particularly as a voice of the poor nations in the forums dominated by the developed nations. Fourthly, India wanted to retain its independent foreign policy. Fifthly, India wanted to play a dominating role both in South Asian Politics and the Indian Ocean. This was largely governed by its size and naturally strategic location. Sixthly, India wants to develop a capability to deal with China.

The background of the US-India relationship is an essential factor in determining the future relationship. The past indicates that despite similarity of interests in key areas, the desire to have a good relationship and even after carrying out basic spadework the

two nations were unable to provide the final shape to a lasting partnership. The relationship was hampered by a legacy of mutual suspicion and mistrust resulting from the policy decisions to suit the immediate national interests and pleasing the so called allies at the cost of a lasting partnership with each other.

Evaluation of India's Past Foreign Policy

We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past two world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. . . . We seek no domination over others and we claim no privileged position over other peoples. . . . But we do claim equal and honorable treatment for our people wherever they may go, and we cannot accept any discrimination against them. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war.⁹⁸

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

We shall take part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely a satellite state of another nation.⁹⁹

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

The basic foundation of India's foreign policy is the direct outcome of the vision of the leaders of India's freedom movement. The basic principles forming the basis of India's foreign policy are: a belief in friendly relations with all countries of the world, the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, the sovereign equality of all states, independence of thought and action as manifested in the principles of nonalignment, and equity in the conduct of international relations.¹⁰⁰ The idealistic nature of these principles heavily influenced Indian foreign policy which took shape prior to India's independence. Of these, two main principles affected India's dealing with the US: (1) nonalignment and

independence in conduct of own policy and (2) working towards equity in conduct of international relations.

The study of the history of US-India relations indicates that India's foreign policy which has a direct bearing on the US has seen five major transitions, as pointed out by C Raja Mohan in his speech during a seminar in Beijing on 26 May 2006.¹⁰¹ Nehru crafted the foreign policy for India at the very dawn of India's independence. Nehru's definition of the foreign policy left a lasting impression on most future Indian policies. This initial strategy remained consistent with minor changes for over forty years. The first forty years of India's foreign policy can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase was governed by Nehru's idealistic approach, which in turn was derived from the idealism associated with India's freedom struggle. Such idealism led to a sort of confrontation with the US on some of the issues which were not directly related to India's internal national interests. For example, India opposed racism, colonialism, and the US international policy which was termed by Nehru as economic imperialism.¹⁰² This phase was characterized by India's role in the NAM and the resultant US tilt towards Pakistan vis-à-vis India. India received its first jolt resulting from this policy during the 1962 conflict with China.

The second phase was characterized by Indira Gandhi's main focus on national interests and tackling regional threats, rather than India's role in world affairs. This phase was marked by India's nuclear test and break up of Pakistan (independence of Bangladesh). Both the events were a major eyesore for the US. India continued pursuing its agenda in the NAM. This was a period of closeness with the Soviet Union.

The third phase began when Indira Gandhi softened its attitude towards the US. Her closeness with Ronald Reagan was viewed as a positive engagement with the US. However, the dynamics of the Cold War and the legacy of mistrust prevented the relationship between the two nations from being cemented. Indira Gandhi's assassination was followed by a new era of politics in India with Rajiv Gandhi leading the way to speed up economic development. This positively changed the dynamics between the two countries. The young legacy was continued through the next few years, which were a period of unrest in internal politics. However, the relationship could never break away from the strains of the past.

The first real transition, which can be considered as the foundation of the modern Indian diplomacy, began in the early nineties. This transition was a major departure or more appropriately redefining of the Nehru's ideology. With the pressures of competing with the emerging Asian markets with India lagging behind in the race, planners in India shifted focus from the past emphasis on politics to lay stress on economics while drafting the foreign policy. "The slow but successful economic reforms unleashed the potential of the nation, generated rapid economic growth and provided a basis to transform its relations with great powers, regional rivals Pakistan and China, and the neighborhood as a whole."¹⁰³

The unleashing of India's economic and military potential in the early nineties brought about the second transition to its foreign policy. "This shift transformed India from being a leader of the 'Third World' to the recognition of the potential that India could emerge as a great power in its own right."¹⁰⁴ The third transition was in India's approach towards the West. India shed its anti-Western approach which had dominated

most of the Cold War.¹⁰⁵ India's democratic structure was as such committed to the Western values and with the economic awakening and disintegration of the Cold War India was more willing to engage with the West, while maintaining its independent voice in the international arena.

The fourth transition came about with India shifting gears from Nehru's idealism to modern world realism during the nineties. "The Indian leaders began to emphasize practical ways to achieve power and prosperity for India."¹⁰⁶ This transformation came about with the realization that India's standing in the world had steadily declined during the Cold War. The next transition was in a way an extension of this shift to realism. India declared its nuclear power status with the test of a nuclear weapon in 1998, 24 years after the first test of a nuclear device. This ushered India into the era of "nuclear diplomacy."¹⁰⁷ India was now willing to engage with all major powers of the world including the US, EU, Russia and China. India's current foreign policy is not restricted only to the "big power diplomacy." It has a strong element of the regional diplomacy and willingness to reconciliation with the neighbors, like Pakistan and China, over the traditional disputes.¹⁰⁸ The benefits derived by India from the past policy were:

1. India retained independence in conduct of international relations.
2. Non alignment helped India develop its own military capability by a combination of import of military goods from more than one country and by developing indigenous arms manufacturing capability.
3. India emerged as a leader of the Third World in international forums like the United Nations, World Trade Organization and Non Aligned Movement.

4. India emerged as a regional power demonstrating its economic and military strength in the neighborhood.

5. The Indian Ocean remains free from major military bases with the exception of Diego Garcia and Coco Island.

6. Indigenous development of nuclear, rocket and space capabilities.

7. The policy helped India maintain reasonably good relations with most nations particularly the Middle East, which has assumed a great significance in the current world order.

The disadvantages to India that emerged from such a policy were:

1. India was hampered by the conflicting interests of domestic economic development versus maintaining independence in the world affairs.

2. India had to focus resources and energy into self protection in the absence of a suitable alliance. The problem accentuates in the midst of hostile neighbors.

3. India found itself isolated in crisis situations like the 1962 Sino-India conflict.

4. Annoying the US by the non alignment, challenging US international policy and engaging in arms deals with the Soviet Union resulted in the interference by the Americans in sanction of monetary loans from the international institutions they largely influenced.

5. India was forced into an arms race by the American support to Pakistan. This resulted in diversion of resources from developmental projects.

6. Most significant result of India's foreign policy, equally reciprocated by the US, was the emergence of a deeply rooted legacy of suspicion and mistrust that came in way of efforts to improve bilateral relations.

7. India remained isolated from the west and failed to improve its image among the developed nations.

India's initial foreign policy had a mixed impact on India's interests. On one hand it helped the country maintain its individual identity, carve a place for itself in the international arena particularly in the economic and military fields and retain the option of dealing with all nations on equal footing. However, the policy prevented India from realizing its full economic potential and could not match up with its contemporaries in Southeast Asia. The real transition began in the nineties. The most significant feature of the recent foreign policy is the willingness to change for the sake of the national interests.

India's Strategic National Interests

Our objective is to focus on the centrality of national interests in the conduct of our external relations and the pursuit of our economic interests. We have taken important initiatives, keeping in mind the imperative of retaining our freedom of options, remaining alive to our concerns. Our efforts have contributed to making the international environment for India's development more secure.¹⁰⁹

Dr Manmohan Singh

India is yet to formulate and announce an official national strategy based on its national interests. However, the national strategy emerges from the objectives listed by the India's Ministry of Defense and several recent actions by the Indian government to support these objectives.¹¹⁰ Indian interests have also been highlighted in several speeches by the leaders and several papers written both by the government, in form of statements and agreements, and by renowned strategic thinkers.

There are four basic national interests of nation states: defense of the homeland, economic well being, the creation of a favorable world order or external environment,

and the promotion of values.¹¹¹ Of these, for a nation like India, creation of a favorable world order becomes important because it allows unhindered pursuit of the first two. The promotion of the values is an idealistic requirement that can be pursued once the other primary interests are otherwise met.

Security

India's Ministry of Defense (MOD) sums up India's security environment as follows:

India is strategically located in relation to both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. India's geographical and topographical diversity, especially on its borders, poses unique challenges to our armed forces in terms of both equipment and training.

Its peninsular shape provides India a coastline of about 7600 kms and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of over 2 million sq kms. The island territories in the East are 1,300 kms away from the main land, physically much closer to Southeast Asia. The peninsular India is adjacent to one of the most vital sea-lanes stretching from the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca through which much of the oil from the Gulf region transits. This is an area which has attracted super power rivalries in the past and continues to be a region of heightened activity by extra regional navies on account of current global security concerns.

India's size, strategic location, trade interests and a security environment that extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south, underpin India's security response. In view of this strategic spread, it is essential for the country to maintain a credible land, air and maritime force to safeguard its security interests.¹¹²

India is surrounded by neighbors who are either hostile or unstable and are capable of exporting their problems into India. Therefore, territorial integrity and internal security have emerged as the most important national interests for India. India shares a long border with Pakistan and China, both of whom are nuclear capable. Both have used their military power against India and hold a portion of Indian territory.

India shares its longest boundary with China and the two nations have their disputes ranging from border demarcation to Chinese occupation of Aksai-Chin. India's Tibet policy is also a source of tension between India and China. India allowed Tibet's Dalai Lama to stay within India much against the Chinese desires. China has the numbers and arsenal to humble India on the military front, as was demonstrated in the 1962 war. Moreover, China maintains an independent policy with little inclination to participate in an international effort to promote peace.¹¹³ In effect China has traditionally retained a foreign policy based on its own national interests rather than to please the international community and is likely to remain as such for some time to come. China is suspected of having played a role in the North Korean, Pakistani, and Iranian nuclear program. Incidentally, all these countries have the capability to reach deep inside Indian territory.

Pakistan and India have several disputes, and confrontation between the two is often referred to as a nuclear flashpoint. Pakistan has developed the capability to deliver nuclear missiles deep into Indian territory. Besides, Pakistan has sponsored a proxy war in Indian Punjab during the eighties and currently, in Kashmir, which has paid them rich dividends. Religious cross border terrorism¹¹⁴ sponsored by the Pakistan's ISI has hit most regions in India including the Parliament. As such Pakistan has emerged as a hub for terrorist activities across the globe¹¹⁵ and exploits the religious sentiments to spread hatred for India among Muslim nations.

With the world focus on events in the Middle East, Bangladesh also offers a safe haven for the terrorists.¹¹⁶ Bangladesh and India have several border disputes and border management issues like smuggling. Huge illegal migration of over 13 million Bangladeshis through the porous borders into India threatens to significantly influence

the demographic pattern of the region neighboring Bangladesh. The migration brings along severe criminal and cross border terrorism related problems. India accuses Pakistan's ISI of using the Bangladeshi territory to infiltrate terrorists into India.¹¹⁷

Nepal too has major internal problems related to Maoist Communist groups fighting the Nepalese government. The open borders with India have allowed the Nepalese Maoists to spread to Indian States bordering Nepal. Moreover, Pakistan has also used Nepal as a base for terrorist activities against India as was demonstrated by the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 from Kathmandu by five Pakistani terrorists in December 1999.¹¹⁸ The communist connection to the Nepal insurgency also hints at the possibility of the increasing Chinese influence on the country.

The ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has a direct political and security impact on India. Tamils, the ethnic group fighting the Sri Lankan government, have their roots in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. This puts India into a serious political dilemma. This "creates the possibility for countries hostile or unfriendly to India to establish a foothold in Sri Lanka in a manner inimical to India's security interests."¹¹⁹ This also affords an opportunity for major powers to establish bases in Sri Lanka in the garb of military assistance, as was the case in 1987 when India had to hurriedly send an Indian Peace Keeping Force to keep foreign forces (including the US, Pakistan and Israel¹²⁰) out of the region. Sri Lanka along with India dominates the vital Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is India's best interests to help the Sri Lankan government solve the problem once and for all.

India has traditionally stayed away from groups and alliances. During the 1962 war against China, India realized that it was militarily incapable of really protecting

itself. Own national interests always govern the policy of each nation, and none of the major powers may come to India's assistance in its hour of the need. India must therefore either join an alliance or develop the capability to be self-sufficient in defense production. Important areas for India include long-range missiles, hold enough arsenal, develop expeditionary forces and a strong to widen sphere of influence, and a credible nuclear deterrent. India must develop an understanding with all the major powers to ensure military support at all times, tackle international terrorism, maintain regional security, and pressure the states exporting terrorism to refrain from doing so.

In view of the above security situation and against the backdrop of India's core values namely; democracy, secularism and peaceful co-existence and the national goal of social and economic development, India has evolved the following national security objectives:

1. Defending the country's borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution;
2. Protecting the lives and property of its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats and militant activities;
3. Protecting the country from instability and religious and other forms of radicalism and extremism emanating from neighboring states;
4. Securing the country against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction;
5. Development of material, equipment and technologies that have a bearing on India's security, particularly its defense preparedness through indigenous research, development and production, inter-alia to overcome restrictions on the transfer of such items;
6. Promoting further co-operation and understanding with neighboring countries and implementing mutually agreed confidence-building measures; and
7. Pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and key partners.¹²¹

Economics

As India experiences rapid economic growth, economic security and trade security will be increasingly more important. In other words, geo-economics, rather than geopolitics, will become the priority. The new threats to India will involve threats to its economic interests, and this in turn will imply that India would have to forget geographical boundaries and actually prepare itself to protect its interests even beyond its geographical borders.¹²²

Indian Air Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi

India's economy was a late starter when compared to other Asian economies. The late start puts additional burden on the planners to keep the higher economic growth sustainable in view of the challenges and stiff competition in the global economy. India's economic interests are related to the large population and the need to have a huge capital for an all-round development. "The next vital interest in order of importance would be to create a secure environment conducive to India's unhindered economic development. India should aim to achieve the status of a fully developed country by 2020-25 and the Indian Government must not tolerate any external interference in this national effort."¹²³

The three main contributors to India's gross domestic product (GDP) is the services sector (53.8%), industry (27.6%), and agriculture (18.6 %). However, the labor force committed to each is highly disproportionate, 23% in services, 17% in industry, and 60 % in agriculture.¹²⁴ India, by virtue of the population, is an agricultural based economy even though the share of agriculture in the overall GDP is constantly diminishing over the last decade or so. The cost of production is much higher than the remuneration for the agricultural produce. There is increasing pressure from the developed countries on developing nations to reduce the import tariffs on agricultural produce. If accepted, Indian produce will be much costlier in India than the heavily

subsidized food grains imported from the developed countries. The continuation of this trend could result in India importing food grains and thus increasing unemployment and poverty. Moreover, due to the faulty trade practices and poor distribution system most of the produce is wasted. In addition, the partisan and faulty international patent laws, which at one point allowed the traditional Indian produces, like Basmati rice and turmeric, to be patented in the US,¹²⁵ need to be amended to provide a fair deal to Indian farmers.

The hunger for large capital is fulfilled mainly by the services sector which utilizes the well educated and English speaking population. This sector has invited large international investments in business process outsourcing (BPO), call centers and software related jobs in the information technology (IT) industry. This sector is currently in India's favor vis-à-vis China due to availability of a large English speaking population. India is likely to face several challenges in the coming years from other nations.

The industrial sector has finally taken off during the past decade or so with the economy opening up. Many multinationals have set up shop in India, once again due to availability of a skilled work force at affordable prices. However, there are several hindrances posed by the bureaucratic procedures in place in India, primarily as a safeguard against exploitation by the transnational businesses. The economic growth of a country is dependent upon the industrial production. India stills needs to go a long way in realizing full potential in this sector.

Large populations along with economic development bring high energy needs. "Energy security will be particularly important in future, as fossil fuels will become more and more inadequate for the nation's increasing energy needs. Domestic oil production

has been declining while the demand has been rising steadily. Hence, oil will continue to be a strategic resource and the security of India's oil supplies from abroad as well as that of all oil reserves and installations will need to be ensured.”¹²⁶ Besides, India needs to explore and secure other sources of energy, like nuclear energy. India also needs a large capital to develop its infrastructure that is essential for economic growth and improving the standard of living.

Other areas of Indian economic interests are improvement in the technology sector to increase job opportunities to the highly trained and technically qualified youth. This will ensure that the skilled work force is retained for India's own production capabilities. Other sectors with high potential for growth are the health, pharmaceutical, high technology industry like space, airlines, and the defense industry. In the words of Gurmeet Kanwal:

The threats to India's maritime security are increasing exponentially as the world turns more and more towards the exploitation of ocean resources for food, energy and raw materials. This long- neglected aspect needs to be incorporated in the management of national security so that India's ocean resources in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are not poached at will by state and non-state actors. Increasing piracy at sea and the possible use of India's island territories by terrorist organizations and for trade in contraband goods are other serious maritime threats.¹²⁷

International Relations

The conduct of international relations is governed by national interests. India's vital interests in the international relations are governed on one hand by its security and economic interests, and its long standing neutrality on the other. India must shape its international policy to cater for its security concerns and engage with most nations to pursue its economic interests. India's international interests are also governed by the

desire for international recognition not only as a major leader of the Third World countries, but also as a key voice in all international matters.

“India's foremost vital national interest is independence and autonomy in decision-making. There can be no compromises with national level decision-making in important matters, particularly those relating to national security.”¹²⁸ This refers to India's decisions on issues like the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), testing nuclear devices, and reserving the rights to vote on vital international issues in the UN. India has a traditional faith in the international organizations, like the UN, and in the need to strengthen them to tackle major international issues. India must oppose the efforts of some nations to marginalize the UN and growing tendency to use of other nonglobal organizations, like NATO, for international military interventions. Expansion of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and India's inclusion as a permanent member is high on India's agenda. The expansion of the UNSC will not only provide equal representation to all continents making it a truly global but also provide countries like India to provide balance to international decision making.

It is in India's interest to strengthen organizations, like NAM, and to expand their agenda for economic development of the member states. India would also like to continue to voice the concerns of the developing countries in the forums, like the WTO, and prevent unfavorable monopolistic policies from being implemented. India imports majority of its oil from the Middle East. Early settlement of the Middle East crisis and lasting peace in the region is in India's energy security interest. India's capability to develop effective medicines at cheaper rates for major diseases, like AIDS, can be put to good use in poor countries where people cannot afford expensive medicines.

The next vital interest in order of importance would be to create a secure environment conducive to India's unhindered economic development.¹²⁹ Use of aggressive diplomacy to deal with international and trans-border terrorism, territorial disputes with neighbors, and regional stability at the earliest will be in India's best interests. Promotion of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace to prevent militarization would allow India to realize the full potential of its huge Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has always been high on India's agenda. Illegal transfer of nuclear technology especially to irresponsible and unstable states is detrimental to India's security.

Spread of Ideology

India's ideology in the international affairs is based on the five principles of India's first foreign policy under leaders like Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. These are: a belief in friendly relations with all countries of the world, the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, the sovereign equality of all states, independence of thought and action as manifested in the principles of nonalignment, and equity in the conduct of international relations.¹³⁰ Promotion of democratic values is high on India's international relations. Another bench mark of India's official ideology is "secular nationalism". India is the home for people from various religions and cultures. India promotes secular values and freedom to follow any religion or culture.¹³¹ India and the US, the oldest Democracy in the world, are considered to be the torch bearers in the spread of democratic values.

Summary

The territorial integrity, internal security, regional security, peace in the Indian Ocean, and safeguarding of its economic interests are the crucial national interests for India. Exploiting its technological potential in developing indigenous capabilities in industry, defense production, and space science are other key interests. Economic growth to sustain a large population is largely dependent upon availability of capital and energy security. India also needs to secure its voice in the international scene by securing a permanent seat in the UNSC and leading the way in other international forums. The spread of democracy and secularism across the globe is in India's best interests. India has traditionally avoided having a definitive strategy and hence most of its security-related decisions have been reactive. Now there is a need to have a clearly defined strategy which is proactive rather than reactive to safeguard India's national interests.¹³²

US National Interests

The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.¹³³

The National Security Strategy of the US, 2006

Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.¹³⁴

President George W Bush

Formulating national interests is the subject of considerable study in the US. In one study carried out by an independent organization under the Nixon Center called *The Commission on the National Interests of the US*, has collated a detailed list of the US national interests in varying degree. However, the vital interests identified in this study conducted in 2000 were:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the US or its military forces abroad.
2. Ensure US allies' survival and their active cooperation with the US in shaping an international system in which we can thrive.
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on US borders.
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment).
5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.¹³⁵

These will remain the basic tenets of the national interests of the US in the years to come. The interests are based on the threat to the US and its citizens around the world, protection of long term allies, defeat the threats to national security, maintain global economic supremacy and protect America's economic interests. Because it is a superpower, the US interests reach far beyond the national boundaries. The current interests are highlighted in form of the goals in the *National Security Strategy* published by the Bush administration in 2006:

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity.
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.
8. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty first century.
9. Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.¹³⁶

It is quite evident that India and the US face similar challenges. They share similar ideologies and believe in spreading the democratic principles across the globe. The convergence or conflict of their national interests will determine the strength and type of relationship the two nations will share in the years to come.

Recent Initiatives and Partnership Agreements between the US and India

India and the US have negotiated several agreements over the years and undertaken various initiatives for cooperation in various fields. The US assisted with India's space program in 1969 and atomic energy in 1963. India was one of the founding countries of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) in 1962. India reached several other agreements with the US on agriculture, education, economic cooperation, technology, and health which helped India progress over the years. Past agreements on defense cooperation included the military sales agreement of 1951 and the agreement of mutual defense assistance of 1958.¹³⁷ After a prolonged estrangement, the relationship began to warm up during the latter part of the 1990s. With the growing realization of mutual interests, several initiatives and agreements to be signed between India and the US during the later half of 1990s. "Due to the burgeoning unfolding of India's military

and economic potential, India began to be noticed and factored in US strategic calculus only in the latter half of the last decade of the 20th century.”¹³⁸

The scope of the recent initiatives is vast. The most significant aspect of the initiatives is the inclusion of a vibrant military partnership. “India’s April 2001 agenda indicates that it is critically important for India that America treats it as an equal partner and that this relationship leads to a partnership where security cooperation played a prominent role.”¹³⁹ This section evaluates the recent initiatives and partnership agreements between the US and India.

Security

According to the White House, “India and the US are building the foundation of a durable defense relationship that will continue to support our common strategic and security interests.”¹⁴⁰ The close US-India defense cooperation is a new phenomenon which received impetus after the September 2001 visit of Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee to Washington, DC. The US-India Defense Policy Group met in New Delhi in December 2001 to outline a defense partnership based on regular and high-level policy dialogue. A US-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was established in January 2000 and meets regularly.¹⁴¹ In June 2005, the US and India signed a ten-year defense pact outlining planned “collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increasing opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, expanded collaboration related to missile defense, and establishment of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group.”¹⁴² The main areas of cooperation are:

1. Maritime Security Cooperation: The US and India are committed to a comprehensive cooperative effort to ensure a secure maritime domain.

2. Counterterrorism including bioterrorism and cyber security.
3. Military Logistics Support: The US and India are likely to sign an agreement to facilitate mutual logistic support during combined training and exercises, and disaster relief operations.
4. Defense Trade and Technology: The US reaffirmed its goal to help meet India's defense needs and to provide the important technologies and capabilities that India seeks.
5. Non-proliferation: Both countries support efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and also support the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
6. Disaster Relief. Launch a new U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds on the experience of the Tsunami Core Group, to strengthen cooperation to prepare for and conduct disaster relief operations.¹⁴³

The militaries of the two countries have conducted several unprecedented joint military exercises since late 2002 involving the navies in the Indian Ocean region, air forces in Alaska and India, and tactical level army exercises in mountain warfare and jungle and urban counterinsurgency. Several senior US military leaders have visited India during the past few years. "The strength and depth of the Indo-US defense relationship can be gauged from the fact that so far this year, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of the US Army Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps have visited India."¹⁴⁴

The US views defense cooperation with India in the context of "common principles and shared national interests such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. Many analysts laud increased US-India security ties as providing a counterbalance to growing Chinese influence in Asia."¹⁴⁵

Civil Nuclear Cooperation

What this agreement (Indo-US nuclear deal of March 2006) says is things change, times change, that leadership can make a difference. I am trying to think differently, not to stay stuck in the past, and recognize that by thinking differently, particularly on nuclear power, we can achieve some important objectives.¹⁴⁶

President George W Bush

The US and India reached a historic agreement on civil nuclear cooperation during the February 2006 visit of President Bush to India to address India's surging energy needs for its growing economy. India is a non signatory to the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This prevents India from trading freely to procure fissile materials or technology to enhance its nuclear energy production capability. The treaty is receiving mixed responses both in India and the US. The main aspects of the treaty are:

1. The U.S. and India have agreed to pursue civil nuclear cooperation to allow India to cooperate and trade in this key area.¹⁴⁷
2. India has agreed to take steps that will bring it into the international non-proliferation mainstream, including placing its civilian nuclear facilities and programs under IAEA safeguards and adhering to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.¹⁴⁸
3. India is to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs over the next eight years in order to gain U.S. expertise and nuclear fuel to meet its rapidly rising energy needs.¹⁴⁹
4. India's civilian facilities would be subject for the first time to permanent international inspections.¹⁵⁰
5. The Bush administration originally sought a plan that would have allowed India to continue producing material for six to 10 weapons each year, but the new plan would allow India enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year.¹⁵¹
6. India's prototype fast-breeder reactors, which can produce significant amounts of super-grade plutonium when fully operating, will not be subject to inspections.¹⁵²

However, for the deal to take effect, it is required to be ratified by the two houses in the US. There is some resistance to the deal in the US on account of the fact that India is one of the only three countries in the world not to sign the NPT, the fears that this might encourage a nuclear arms race in the region, and that it is contrary to the US policy of curbing nuclear proliferation. At the same time, many Indians oppose the deal on the pretext that India should maintain independence on the nuclear issue, and the nuclear policy should not be subjected to international control.

While some analysts may argue that the civilian nuclear deal favors India extraordinarily, the second and third order effects benefit the US. India and China are expected to be the largest consumers of energy as these two countries alone share over 40 percent of the world population. India imports over 90 percent of its petroleum requirements. The energy security for India through alternative means would ensure less pressure on international oil markets which in turn will ease pressure on the US. Also, bringing the Indian civilian nuclear program under international scrutiny and inspection will increase the transparency and therefore enhance confidence within the international community.

Energy and the Environment

In order to strengthen India's energy security in the growing global demand and competition, the US and India have agreed to work together to develop new technologies to produce clean, safe, and reliable energy. The main aspects of the agreements in this field are:

1. India will join the FutureGen international partnership which will work to create a zero-emissions coal-fired power plant, enabling greater use of coal in an environmentally sustainable way.

2. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER): India has joined the US, Russia, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China as an ITER member.

3. Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: The US and India, together with Australia, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, will work on practical ways to improve energy security, improve air quality, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in ways that foster economic growth.¹⁵³

Innovative and Advanced Technologies

The US and India have agreed to work together to support the creation of innovative, dynamic, knowledge-based economies. The main features of the agreements are:

1. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): The US is funding IPR training programs to strengthen enforcement and patent examination, as a vibrant IPR regime is critical to the promotion of a creative, technologically advanced economy.

2. Science: The US and India established and co-fund the \$30 million bi-national Science and Technology Commission to generate collaborative partnerships in science and technology.

3. Space: The US and India have agreed to continue exploring further cooperation in civil space, including areas such as space exploration, satellite navigation, and earth science. In addition, agreements are being completed that will allow for the launch of U.S. satellites and satellites containing U.S. components by Indian launch vehicles.

4. Science and Technology Framework Agreement, building on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training, and the establishment of public-private partnerships.

5. Building on the strengthened nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce's Entity List.¹⁵⁴

Economics

Economics has been the mainstay of India's foreign policy during the past decade.

Not only has it helped India earn respect in the international arena, but also economic development is essential to bring India to the league of developed countries. The US is

India's largest trading partner.¹⁵⁵ It has reached several agreements with India to expand cooperation with India to create opportunities for the overall development of the country. The main areas of focus are: facilitating job creation and economic growth, supporting economic reform and liberalization, developing a bilateral business climate supportive of trade and investment, and improving market access for goods and services. The two countries have agreed to support and accelerate the economic growth in both countries through greater trade, investment, and technology collaboration. The main aspects of their economic agreements are:

1. Trade: The US and India agree that trade is essential to promoting global economic growth, development, freedom, and prosperity. Over the last five years, U.S. exports to India have more than doubled, helping to create better-paying jobs in the US.
2. WTO. Both countries are committed to completing the WTO Doha Development Agenda before the end of 2006.
3. Investment: The US and India welcomed the report of the U.S.-India CEO Forum and agreed to work on its recommendations through the Economic Dialogue; endorsed the efforts of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum to reduce barriers to trade and investment; agreed to hold a high-level public-private investment summit in 2006; and are continuing the dialogue on various issues, including further liberalization of investment restrictions, regulatory transparency, dispute settlement, and reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
4. Agriculture: The US and India have launched the knowledge initiative on agriculture to link universities, technical institutions, and businesses to support high-priority joint agriculture education, research, and capacity-building projects including biotechnology.
5. Promote modernization of India's infrastructure as a prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian economy. As India enhances its investment climate, opportunities for investment will increase.¹⁵⁶

Public Health

The US and India have expanded their cooperation to combat and prevent Avian Influenza and HIV/AIDS. The involvement of the private sector will not only boost the health standards but also the economy. The long awaited nod of the US to accept Indian developed drugs to be used for AIDS treatment and prevention across the globe is a major departure from the past policies.

1. Avian Influenza: The US and India agreed to expand bilateral efforts on avian influenza by, among other things, reaching out to the private sector, developing regional communications strategies, and planning an in-region containment and response exercise. India will host the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza meeting in 2007.
2. HIV/AIDS: In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh agreed to further strengthen cooperation on HIV/AIDS by leveraging resources, knowledge, and expertise. Since then:
 - a. The US increased funding in FY2006 for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programs to 29.3 million US dollars.
 - b. An Indo-US Corporate Sector Fund for HIV/AIDS was established, which is a partnership among US and Indian businesses to fight AIDS. Six companies have already pledged a total of 1.2 million US dollars to the fund.
 - c. The US Food and Drug Administration has given approval to 13 generic antiretroviral drugs produced by Indian pharmaceutical companies. These drugs can now be purchased as part of the President's Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS for use around the world.¹⁵⁷

Democracy

The promotion of democracy is one of the major ideological similarities between the US and India. The two nations affirmed their joint commitment to promote freedom and democracy in an effort to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the countries willing to do so. India and the US decided to work together to strengthen democratic

practices and capacities and contribute to the new UN Democracy Fund.¹⁵⁸ President

Bush said:

India is also showing its leadership in the cause of democracy by co-founding the Global Democracy Initiative. Prime Minister Singh and I were proud to be the first two contributors to this initiative to promote democracy and development across the world. Now India can build on this commitment by working directly with nations where democracy is just beginning to emerge. As the world's young democracies take shape, India offers a compelling example of how to preserve a country's unique culture and history while guaranteeing the universal freedoms that are the foundation of genuine democracies.¹⁵⁹

Besides assisting the US Navy by patrolling the Malacca Straits and providing reconstruction teams, India's major contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was the promotion of democracy. India pledged 565 millions US dollars as aid for reconstruction of Afghanistan, provided 50 million US dollars to complete the Afghan National Assembly building, trained Afghanistan national assembly staff and is developing a program to train the assembly's elected leaders.¹⁶⁰ "The US and India will work together to support the growth and development of vibrant civil societies, including independent media and non-governmental organizations, in countries that seek such assistance."¹⁶¹

Summary

The above agreements between the US and India demonstrate the full spectrum of cooperation between India and the US. They also demonstrate that the agreements are based on converging mutual interests and not favoring any one country in particular. Some of the agreements such as the ones in the defense cooperation and nuclear fields, are a major departure from the past and demonstrate the genuine interest of the two nations, particularly the US, to engage with each other positively. The next section covers

India's possible alliances and partnerships with other major powers which could facilitate its national interests.

Other Options for Strategic Partnerships for India

The end of the Cold War was a turning point in the world politics. Many analysts thought that the unipolar world, with the US in the lead, will remain largely peaceful concentrating on the economic development, rather than power politics. Within ten years of the end of the Cold War, the US and the world faced a new threat; transnational terrorism. At the same time geo-economics replaced geopolitics in the global power game. Many strategic thinkers believe the world in the twenty-first century will not be dominated by one exceptionally strong nation but by many players which will be globally important if not dominant. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice identified six power centers for the twenty-first century international politics. These are EU, US, Japan, Russia, China, and India.¹⁶²

India apparently accepts this role and has begun to positively engage each of these powers. India must also interact with some states other than the big five to grow unhindered. The five other regions of significance to India are: the immediate neighborhood or South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The Indian South Asian concerns encompass military, economic, democracy, and humanitarian aspects. The Middle East currently affects India on the economic as well as the security front. India is not so much concerned by a direct attack as it is with the security of large Indian diaspora in the Middle East and the second order effects it could have on India's internal security situation. The large Muslim population in India could be easily influenced by the happenings in the Middle East. The ASEAN is

mainly an economic attraction. However, any deterioration of security situation in Indonesia, Malaysia, or Myanmar could adversely affect India. The Strait of Malacca significantly affects trade with China and Japan besides the ASEAN nations, and therefore it must remain secure and open. Africa and Latin America are the future markets which are the main attractions for emerging powers like India and China. Africa is likely to become the economic battle ground for India and China.

Relationship with Russia

India and Russia traditionally have had close ties. Some analysts argue that with the end of the Cold War, Russia's influence decreased and it is not in a position to provide all out assistance to India. Earlier when they were stronger, during the 1962 Chinese offensive on India, Russia did not intervene. Nevertheless, the two nations have a long history of cooperation.

Russia remains the largest exporter of defense goods to the world. Thirty five percent of Russian defense production goes to India.¹⁶³ Russia-India defense cooperation has exceeded 33 billion US dollars since 1960. Even though the Russians may have lost the technological edge since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the mere volume of trade demonstrates that they remain the most reliable partners for India. In addition, unlike the Americans, the Russians share the technology willingly with partners like India.¹⁶⁴ The two nations have embarked on joint ventures in defense production. The success of jointly produced supersonic cruise missile BRAHMOS demonstrates the potential of the partnership. The aviation industries of the two nations, in collaboration with the French, are working on developing a fifth generation strike aircraft. India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Russia's Ilyushin design bureau, and the Irkut Corporation

will cooperate in development and production of a multipurpose troop carrier on the basis of Il-214.¹⁶⁵ Also, the Russians have allowed Indians to locally manufacture and modify strategic equipment, like the Sukhoi 30 MKI and T-90S tanks. Such cooperation caters to India's desire for self reliance in defense technology. According to one scholar the major areas of Russia- India cooperation brought up during President Putin's visit to India in 2004 include:

1. Russia and India will move from a "buyer-seller" relationship to an expanded joint research and development and joint production of weapon systems'
2. Joint investment in the BRAHMOS cruise missile will be enhanced for greater production.
3. Both countries will explore joint production of fifth generation strike combat aircraft.
4. Joint air-borne troops' exercise will be held.
5. Intellectual property rights agreement in relation to defense production would be finalized within five months.
6. Agreements on up-gradation of existing Russian weapon systems in India were signed.
7. Supply of Russians spares for India's future requirements were discussed and procedures streamlined.¹⁶⁶

Russia considers India more reliable than China and is willing to give up its Pakistani defense agenda if India is able to address its security concerns in that region.¹⁶⁷ Russian President Putin stated during the December 2004 New Delhi Summit that: "India is our strategic privileged partner. . . .and speaking from the point of view of geographical representation, India is number one."¹⁶⁸ The main agreements reached during that visit were:

1. Joint declaration emphasizing the strategic partnership between Russia and India.

2. Russia-India Space Exploration Co-operation. This includes India's help for the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system.¹⁶⁹

3. Russia-India Agreement on Strategic Cooperation in Energy Sector. This includes the Sakhalin-1 oilfield development and the Kudankulam nuclear power plant being built in southern India with Russia's.

4. Russia Supports India's Candidature for United Nations Security Council Permanent Membership with full veto powers

5. MOUs and agreements covering bilateral cooperation in fields of navigation, visa services and banking.¹⁷⁰

During the Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam's visit to Moscow in 2005, the two countries agreed to implement or develop major joint projects in energy, metals, civil aviation and space. They plan to expand work in the science-intensive and high-technology sectors.¹⁷¹ The two nations are confronting terrorism in their home countries. India supported the Russia proposed International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was passed in April 2005, and Russia assured support to India's draft comprehensive convention on combating international terrorism at the United Nations.

Rapprochement with China

China and India have had strained relations owing to the several bilateral and regional differences. However, since the economic awakening there has been an effort on the part of the two countries to positively engage each other. One of the major border disputes was settled when China officially accepted the state of Sikkim as part of India in April 2005. The border trade between China and India through Nathu-La Pass in Sikkim was reopened. This pass accounted for over 80 percent of trade between the two countries in early 1900s but was closed after the 1962 war. The volume of trade between India and

China amounted to 18.73 billion US dollars in 2005 and is expected to be more than 20 billion US dollars in 2006. These events indicate the willingness of the two nations to mend their relationship.

The process of friendship was set in motion in 2003 during the visit of former Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee to Beijing. The two sides signed the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive co-operation between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India,” which became the basis for future partnership. The main aspects of this document are:

1. Friendship and co-operation between the two countries meets the need to:
 - a. Promote the socio-economic development and prosperity of both China and India.
 - b. Maintain peace and stability regionally and globally.
 - c. Strengthen multi-polarity at the international level.
 - d. Enhance the positive factors of globalization.
2. Both sides affirmed that they would abide by the following principles, promote a long-term constructive and co-operative partnership and, on this basis, build a qualitatively new relationship:
 - a. Commitment to develop their long-term constructive and co-operative partnership on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and equality.
 - b. As two major developing countries, China and India have a broad mutual interest in the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world, and a mutual desire in developing wider and closer co-operation and understanding in regional and international affairs.
 - c. The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other.
 - d. Both sides agree to qualitatively enhancing the bilateral relationship at all levels and in all areas while addressing differences through peaceful means in

a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable manner. The differences should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.¹⁷²

The two nations are the major economic powers expected to play the leading role in the international markets. Both sides agreed to work towards the enhancement of direct air and shipping links, tourism, exchange hydrological data in flood season on common rivers as agreed; and cooperation in agriculture, dairy, food processing, health, and other sectors. The two sides agreed to enhance co-operation at the World Trade Organization, which is not only to mutual benefit but also in the broader interest of developing countries.¹⁷³ China and India also want to look at developing a free trade area that, with a combined population of 2.3 billion, would be the largest in the world.¹⁷⁴

Both countries recognize the threat posed by terrorism to them and to global peace and security. They are firmly opposed to the introduction of weapons in outer space, and their use against space-based objects and support cooperation in development of space technology for peaceful purposes.¹⁷⁵ The two nations conducted joint naval exercise off the Shanghai coast in November 2003. The two armies planned joint counterterrorism and peacekeeping training programs.¹⁷⁶

China and India support multilateral cooperation in Asia, believing that such cooperation promotes mutually beneficial exchanges, economic growth, and greater cohesion among Asian countries. The two sides have stated that the improvement and development of China-India relations is not targeted at any third country and does not affect either country's existing friendly relations and cooperation with other countries. China also supports India's aspiration for the permanent seat in the UNSC but is still noncommittal¹⁷⁷ owing to some domestic concerns like the differences with Japan.¹⁷⁸

The two nations signed the Memorandum for Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Oil and Natural Gas in January 2006. The treaty includes upstream exploration and production, refining and marketing of petroleum products and petrochemicals, research and development, conservation, and promotion of environment-friendly fuels. The agreement also allows trading in oil and joint bidding in third countries that will help both nations reduce the burden on the exchequers.¹⁷⁹ The two sides agreed to work together in a practical manner to cooperate on preserving the environment and ensuring sustained development and to coordinate positions on climate change, biodiversity and other issue in relevant multilateral fora.

While economics have brought the two nations closer, they still have several bilateral and multilateral disputes to settle. The two nations are yet to resolve the Aksai Chin and Arunachal issues. Tibet's Dalai Lama runs an exiled Tibetan government from India. China's close defense relations with Pakistan are a major concern for India. China and India may compete for the same markets and energy resources in the future. Moreover, many analysts see India as competitor for China and hence a suitable ally for the West particularly the US. Notwithstanding this the two nations have embarked on the path of friendship and cooperation. Even though the current close relationship is purely bilateral, it has far-reaching effects on India.

Relationship with Japan

The visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to India in April 2006 ushered a new era of engagement between the two countries. The two nations have shared an wide ranging economic relationship in the past, but this visit that culminated with a joint statement titled "India-Japan Partnership in the New Asian Era: Strategic

Orientation of India-Japan Global Partnership.” This was an indicator of the strategic orientation of the modern times. The strategic vision of the relationship is highlighted by the understanding between Japan and India to operate in three layers of cooperation: firstly, bilateral economic relations; secondly, a closer regional cooperation for peace and stability in the region; and thirdly, use their strategic convergences to strengthen global partnership in environment, energy, disarmament, nonproliferation and security.¹⁸⁰ The highlight of the agreement was the following eight fold initiative decided by the two sides:

1. Strengthening of the momentum of high-level exchanges, launching of a High Level Strategic Dialogue and full utilization of the existing dialogue mechanisms.
2. Comprehensive economic engagement and exploration of an India-Japan economic partnership agreement. Support India’s efforts at accelerated economic development, particularly in priority sectors like infrastructure, including transportation and power, and environment.
3. Enhanced security dialogue and cooperation, especially the maritime security with a close interaction between the Indian and Japan Coast Guard and Indian Navy and the Maritime Self Defense Force of Japan through exchange of views, friendship visits and other similar activities.
4. The two governments will launch a new Science and Technology Initiative, in areas such as modern biology, biotechnology and health care, agriculture, hydrocarbon fuels, nano-science and technology, environment, information and communication technology, robotics, alternative sources of energy and high technology.
5. Cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-people contacts to raise the visibility and profile of one country in the other.
6. Cooperation in ushering a new Asian era.
7. Both India and Japan are aspiring contenders for the permanent UNSC seat. They have formed a group of four, G4, including Brazil and Germany in this regard. The Governments of India and Japan will also expand and enrich their cooperation in other international organizations, including in the WTO.

8. The two sides decided to start India-Japan Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism to identify possible future areas of cooperation. They will also work as partners against proliferation. They will ensure increased focus on energy security, energy efficiency, conservation, and pollution-free fuels.¹⁸¹

Both Japan and India are seeking a greater role in the world affairs. The recent Indo-Japanese partnership agreements focus on bilateral, regional, and global issues. They are primarily dealing with economic and developmental issues but the foundation is set for defense ties.

Relationship with European Union

The relationship between India and Europe predates history. Most of Europe owes its linguistic heritage to India and much of its cultural base. Nor is this now just a historical irrelevance: in July 1987 Forbes Magazine published the results of scientific research, which concluded that: 'Sanskrit is the mother of all the European languages [and] the most suitable language for computer software'. This symbolizes the relationship between India and the EU, at one and the same time very old, yet dynamic and entirely modern. Besides the political, economic and trade dialogues which tend to dominate the vision of EU-India cooperation, there is a strong supporting cultural and social interrelationship encompassing many sectors and levels of both societies.¹⁸²

The EU-India relationship dates back to early 1960s. India was one of the first nations to set up diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor to the EU. The two 1994 agreements between the two comprehensively cover most aspects related to trade and commerce, energy, agriculture, science and technology, human resource development, cultural exchanges, and environment.¹⁸³ In 2004, the EU presented a paper on the proposed strategic partnership between India and the EU. The strategic partnership was formally launched during the sixth summit at New Delhi in 2006. The main objectives of the proposed strategy were:

1. International cooperation through multilateralism, including promoting peace, combating terrorism, non-proliferation and human rights. EU and India are seen as forces for global stability. India is viewed by the EU as a major partner in conflict prevention. This has prompted the EU to expand the scope of relationship with India to include cooperation in combating terrorism and organized crime.

2. Enhanced commercial and economic interaction, in particular through sectoral dialogue and dialogue on regulatory and industrial policy. EU is the largest trading partner for India, but India is 14th for the EU. Strategic sectoral dialogues should be developed in the following areas:

a. The information society;

b. Transport;

c. Energy;

d. Biotechnology;

e. The Galileo program (the European global satellite navigation system); and

f. Space partnership.

3. Cooperation on sustainable development, protecting the environment, reducing climate change and combating poverty;

4. Continuous improvement of mutual understanding and contacts between the EU and Indian civil societies.¹⁸⁴

There have been regular annual summit meets between India and the EU since June 2000. A formal agreement was signed during the last Summit in 2006 to include India in the Galileo project. On the security front, the first meeting of the newly established EU-India Security Dialogue was held in May 2006. This is a useful and important forum for an in-depth exchange of views on global and regional security issues, including disarmament and nonproliferation, as well as bilateral issues of common concern. In addition, India maintains an active defense trade with countries, like the United Kingdom and France.

Other than the big six, India also identifies some other global players important to its foreign policy. India is working closely with Latin American giant Brazil for trade. Brazil is the main partner with India to voice the concerns of the anti-developing countries in the WTO. Brazil, India, and South Africa announced that they would create a strategic trilateral bloc to reduce commercial barriers and promote social development. India is also working hard to push the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and South Asia Union (SAU) in South Asia.

India has adopted a balanced Middle East strategy. India is dependent on the Middle East for most of its oil. At the same time during the past six years Israel has been an important partner especially in defense related trade. Israel is the second largest partner, after Russia, in defense trade with India. The main deals include the Barak antimissile defense system for the navy and the “Phalcon” project (AWACS) for the air force, Crystal Maze air-to-surface, Python air-to-air missiles, Popeye cruise missiles, Arrow-II antiballistic missile defense system, Green Pine early-warning and fire-control radars, Aerostats for long-range surveillance. India is also negotiating with Israel for the defense procurement. Several joint research and development projects are underway for more advanced radars, long-endurance and high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare systems, and third-generation night-fighting capabilities.¹⁸⁵

Summary

Keeping abreast with the current world order, India has adopted a policy of multilateralism in which it is almost equally engaging with all the power centers of the world. From the study presented in this section it is quite clear that each power center has something particular and significant to offer to India to meet its national objectives. The

next section will examine the advantages and disadvantages of India's relationship with each of the power centers vis-à-vis the US.

The Comparative Analysis

The recent agreements between India and the US are considered the foundation for a lasting strategic partnership. There are a lot of expectations from these agreements and both the governments seem to be working hard to make the relationship blossom. The national interests drive relationships between the nations and the strength of the relationship will depend upon the convergence of interests. This chapter will discuss the ability of the recent US-India agreements to further India's national interests. At the same time, it is prudent to compare the US-India agreements with India's agreements with other major powers. This chapter then compares the advantages and disadvantages of India's partnership with the US vis-à-vis other major powers.

Security Interests

As enumerated earlier, India's major security interests are territorial integrity, internal security, regional security and stability, security against the use and proliferation of WMD, zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and self-reliance through high quality indigenous defense production. The security scenario in the region is fragile. India continues to face a realistic threat from China and Pakistan, exacerbated by the close military ties of these two countries. This chapter will examine each aspect of India's security interests and explore the possibility of securing these interests with a lasting partnership with the US.

Protecting territorial integrity and its citizens is the foremost responsibility of the any nation. India has territorial disputes with two of its neighbors and both of them are nuclear capable. Indo-Pak relations are considered the biggest threat to the regional stability. The US wields tremendous influence on Pakistan and can help defuse tensions between India and Pakistan, as was demonstrated in the December 2001 buildup along the Indo-Pak border. China has a close military relationship with Pakistan which could result in a coalition against India. The influence of the US is likely to help prevent such a possibility. None of the other major powers can exert adequate and real pressure on Pakistan. Therefore the US remains the best bet for India in maintaining a balance in the region. Discussions for India to join the US initiated Theater Missile Defense (TMD) remains in early stages.

The security cooperation between India and the US has had an uneven history for India. The Mutual Defense Assistance of 1958 did not prevent the 1962 Chinese agreement or the 1965 Pakistani aggression. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war the US deployed a carrier group in the Bay of Bengal, as a demonstration of force against India. Moreover, India has not received adequate assistance for modernization of Indian forces since the 1962 Sino-India conflict, primarily due to the resistance from the pro-Pakistan lobby in the US. The US needs the partnership with Pakistan and obviously will not back India in a war with Pakistan. The US is not likely to openly help India in case of an Sino-Indian conflict due to its strategic economic interests in that country. Between India and the US there still remain some areas of conflicting interests.

The US leads the world in the war against terror and that is one of the most promising arenas for security cooperation with India. India and the US have agreed to

work together in countering terrorism. Many joint exercises have been conducted by the two militaries. However, this is yet to be translated into actual ground operations. The very fact that the US understands the Kashmir problem better from the Pakistani angle, due to its past partnership, shows that India is not likely to receive much assistance from the US in combating terrorism in Kashmir. This was demonstrated by their luke-warm response to the 7/11 bombings on the Mumbai suburban trains. India may have to fight a lonely battle with terrorism within its own borders.

In terms of regional security, Pakistan still remains a major ally for the US despite the fact that Pakistan is a hub of terrorism. Recent events raise doubt over the US capability to influence Pakistan. The US was unable to prevent the use of the Pakistan soil for anti-India activities. Pakistan continues to maintain double standards in combating international terrorism while dealing with India. Despite US pressures, fifty nine terrorist camps are still operating in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK).¹⁸⁶ The US could not influence the Pakistan government to take appropriate actions against the tainted nuclear scientist AQ Khan. While Pakistan cooperates in the GWOT elsewhere the US does nothing to prevent attacks on India by terrorists trained and equipped in Pakistan. The American policy on Pakistan may change after the current Afghanistan crisis but that is a long time from now. One Indian daily remarked on the US dealing with Pakistan and India:

Despite all efforts by New Delhi that this country should not be equated with Islamabad and that the USA and India being two great democracies can be natural allies, there is something that prevents the right message from reaching Washington. Even after September 11 when the fight against terrorism tops the national agenda of both countries, America continues to suspect India. Or, perhaps, a militarily and economically resurgent India does not fit into the US scheme of things in South Asia and Central Asia.¹⁸⁷

The US viewing India as a counter-balance to China is against the regional stability. In effect India would become a battleground for the US in its war against China. The problem gets complicated if Pakistan sides with China. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the US would join India's war against China while expecting India to join the US war with China. The US has too much at stake with China in the economic front to take that chance. Russia and the EU also may not come to India's rescue in a war against China. Japan may have the will but not the military resources.

The ten-year defense pact between India and the US has all the ingredients for a comprehensive deal. Many joint exercises have taken place between the two militaries. The maritime security cooperation is likely to support India's maritime interests in the Indian Ocean through a joint effort with the US. However, this gives access to the US Navy to Indian ports, naval facilities and shallow waters. The US opened up the defense sales to India with the largest deal in four decades for the eight ANTPQ-37 counter-battery radars in February 2002. However, the equipment is still to be delivered as in 2006. One of the major shortcomings is that the time taken for the deals to be effective is pretty long. Some deals were made in the past too, but most deals either could not be finalized or too little came too late. Also there are fears that if India purchases most equipment its own defense research and development will take a back seat.

In the defense production and defense trade, the Indian experience with the US does not support India's dream of self reliance. The pacts, like the engines for India's LCA, took decades to conclude. Besides increasing the costs for India this adversely affected India's self-reliance in fighter jet production, and made the jet almost obsolete before it could be mass produced. Deals on 155millimeter Howitzers, F-104s, and

AWACS never saw the light of the day. The US tried to prevent India from making the defense deals with other nations, such as Israel for strategic equipment like the Phalcons¹⁸⁸ and the cryogenic engine from Russia. The deals with the US are monopolistic as the US reserves the rights to modifications to the equipment or does not transfer the technology with the equipment which is not in India's self-reliance interests.

In contrast, India received top-of-the-line military hardware from the Soviet Union and continues to do so from Russia, Israel, and some European countries, like France and Sweden. The joint venture on the fourth generation strike aircraft versus and large transport aircraft; BRAHMOS supersonic cruise missile; transfer of technology of the strategic equipment like T-90s and Su30 MKI; the aircraft carrier; and several other Russia-India deals when compared to the slow and few Indo-US deals, tilt the balance towards Russian as a more reliable partner.

India's security-related relationship with the US has yet to mature. The hype created by the 9/11 incident raises expectations, but the history shows that there were bouts of high expectations in the past, which did not really materialize into a lasting partnership. The US is capable of taking an aggressive diplomatic and military action for regional stability, but may not do so to safeguard its own national interests. The US also emerges as the only nation capable of assisting India in case of war against China, but is unlikely to do so. The US could also help India maintain dominance in the Indian Ocean by keeping other powers out in its own interest. The future decisions of the US are likely to be influenced by its own national interests rather than India's interests. While the US can provide lip service to diplomatically influence peace in the region, in the long run

India will also have to look elsewhere for the military hardware, high technology trade, and technical collaboration for the self-reliance in defense production.

Economic Interests

India's economic interests include securing capital for a sustained high-growth rate and infrastructure development; securing new markets; eliminating trade deficit; energy security; promoting agriculture sector; safeguarding the EEZ; self reliance and excellence in high technology areas, like space technology and high technological manufacturing; and increasing job opportunities within the country to prevent brain drain.

The US and Indian interests truly converge only in the economic field. India is an attractive market as well as an economical and reliable production center for US multinationals. The US is the largest and strongest economy in the world and therefore an important provider of capital, technical know-how and opportunities. The influence of the US over the world financial bodies also makes it prudent for India to have good relations with the US to generate capital. The US and India have recently finalized agreements on innovative and advanced technologies, trade, agriculture, infrastructure development, investments, public health, energy, and civil nuclear cooperation. Such wide-ranging agreements are sure to boost India's economy by bringing US investments and creating jobs in India. Moreover, since these agreements are equally beneficial to both the countries they demonstrate convergence of interests, which in turn guarantees a long-term partnership.

The agreements in innovative and advanced technologies, energy, and civil nuclear cooperation are particularly important since they will ensure India's self-reliance in high technology, which India hopes to master in the near future. The civil nuclear deal

is the real test. This is a paradigm shift in the US policy. The US action in India's favor would allow other major nuclear states to follow suit, which in turn would address the energy security issue for India. There is opposition in the US since India is a non-signatory to the NPT. This agreement is a test for the US commitment to the US-India relationship.

While Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh termed the deal as “*ironclad guarantees* on uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply in return for India agreeing to perpetual and irreversible safeguards on all its civilian facilities,”¹⁸⁹ there are fears in India that the US would restrict India's “nuclear freedom” through this deal. “Such ironclad guarantees have turned out to be an iron-cladding on India to bind it to American non-proliferation objectives, and a guarantee for the US that it can have India so bound and beholden.”¹⁹⁰

The former Prime Minister of India Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee raised several issues against this deal. Some of his observations were:

1. The Waiver Authority Bill introduced in the US Congress will allow Washington to grant waiver when India meets seven conditions mentioned in the bill. India should try to get an all time waiver (from the US non proliferation laws) from Washington as was the case with China.
2. The proposed legislation (in the US congress to amend the law to have full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India) when passed "will convert a voluntary moratorium on further tests by India into a legally binding commitment for all times to come". This is not acceptable in view of the India's nuclear neighborhood.
3. India's position and huge investment would be adversely affected by a simple "adverse determination by the US President" due to the clause according to which "If the President of US determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after its (bill) enactment such waiver shall be terminated".
4. The option of walking out (by the US) of its commitments under the deal, is "seriously flawed" since India will be the sole the loser from the failure of the deal after having invested huge amounts and resources.

5. "The nation shall pay a heavy price in future by closing its options on the size of its credible minimum nuclear deterrent. Our nuclear armed neighbors shall face no such constraints."¹⁹¹

The intention of the US government would become clear once the deal is finally ratified and presented again to India for finalization. While a favorable deal is likely to assist India in securing its energy needs, it has ramifications on the India's security interests.

India is engaging with other nations on the economic front. The agreement with the EU is comprehensive and wide-ranging. The deal with Japan too is farsighted and likely to benefit India's long-term interests. Japan has a developed, rich, and stable economy with tremendous technical know-how. India is observing the year 2006 as the India-China friendship year. The mere volume of trade between the two nations is huge and is likely to exceed 50 billion US dollars by the year 2010, notwithstanding the complaints of dumping of goods by China in India. While all the nations will contribute towards India's economic interests, the mere size of the US economy is the biggest attraction for capital-hungry India, thus making it the preferred destination.

India's Interests in International Relations

India's interests in international affairs revolve around a central theme of creating a secure environment conducive to India's unhindered economic development. This encompasses both the security and economic concerns. India continues to strive for an independent voice in international forums and wants to retain autonomy in decision making. For this, India needs to enhance the international recognition by securing a permanent seat in the UNSC, to create a strong Third World voice by strengthening NAM and WTO, and to promote economic growth in the neighborhood by strengthening South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and SAU.

Indian interests in this arena clash with the US interests. While some quarters in the US acknowledge and support India's claim for the permanent seat in the UNSC,¹⁹² the US government is still not prepared to accept India as a suitable candidate. On 13 July 2005, the US urged the UN General Assembly to oppose the resolution proposed by the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) to expand the UN Security Council.¹⁹³ Many believe that the US vetoed against Indian candidate and career UN diplomat Shashi Tharoor, for the post of the UN Secretary General during the 2 October 06 straw polls. Tharoor told the *Times of India* that he did not think Washington's vote was as much against him or India as an expression of [US] support for South Korea, a longtime US ally.¹⁹⁴ For some analysts China also may have opposed an Indian nominee.

India and the US remain on opposite sides in the WTO.¹⁹⁵ While the EU has more or less agreed to the demands of the developing countries, the US sticks to its stand.¹⁹⁶ The two nations continue to agree on the basic ideology, but their approach to deal with the world affairs is divergent. For the United States, NATO is the preferred path to international conflict resolution, while India prefers projecting the United Nations as the sole body for such endeavors. India prefers a multilateral path while the US apparently prefers forming alliances and coalition of the willing. On the other hand, considering the US clout over most international organizations and the power of veto in the UNSC, India may never achieve its goals in the international arena without US help and confidence. That would, however, mean that India compromises on its autonomous decision making.

In the international arena, Indian interests may be better addressed by the continuation of a multilateral approach. India already has the support of Russia, China, and Brazil in the WTO. Brazil, Japan, Germany, and several European nations support

India's candidature in the UNSC. India also has huge stakes in NAM. For its part, India must not remain adamant on the demand for the UNSC seat. Strengthening SAARC, closer relations with ASEAN, and regional harmony may yield better results for India than a seat in the UNSC. At the same time the US and India are increasingly willing to work together in international affairs. The two nations are working out the modalities to leverage each other and help break the impasse in the stalled WTO talks.¹⁹⁷ This may be a small beginning, but brings hope for strong future partnership.

Ideological Interests

The US and India share common ideals of democracy, human dignity, and secularism. While India promotes democratic values it does not aggressively pursue spreading or exporting democracy without the consent of the nation concerned. At the same time, India remains surrounded by non-democracies or unstable democracies, such as Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Close cooperation with the US would help India preserve its democratic values and help other nations develop theirs. The US pressure on Pakistan to return to democracy after the 1999 coup did result in some kind of elections in the troubled country. The US helped with removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. India was not comfortable with that regime because of its support to the Kashmiri terrorists and its role during the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight 814 in December 1999. The US also played a vital role along with India, to diffuse the Nepal crisis in 2006. It is now keen on an early solution to the Sri Lankan crisis. In effect, while the approaches of the US and India may differ, there are ideological similarities which provide opportunities to the two nations to work together.

Despite the ideological similarities, there is a vast divergence in the approaches of the US and India in pursuit of their goals. While the two nations agree on several other international issues, like the prevention of nuclear proliferation, their approach in dealing with the issue is divergent. For instance, while the US recommends harsh measures on Iran, India continues to engage with Iran on other bilateral issues. India's ideological interests in international relations are based on the principles revolving around the nonalignment and equity in conduct of the international relations. Traditionally these interests contradict the US ideology which believes in forming blocs and alliances for collective security. Even though the US continues to support alliances like NATO and is working on their expansion, it is inching towards multilateralism. According to the White House the US and the United Kingdom agreed that, "effective multilateralism, and neither unilateralism nor international paralysis, will guide our approach."¹⁹⁸ However, the US policy is dictated by its immediate interests and the government switches between unilateralism and multilateralism. The UK newspaper *The Observer* reported, "Hopes of a new US multilateralism have been dashed. The Bush administration may form coalitions when it suits the US but its overriding mission is to show the world why the American way is best."¹⁹⁹

On the other hand, the EU ideology and the approach seem closer to the Indians. The basic essence of the EU strategy is multilateralism and regionalism.²⁰⁰ The Russians and the Chinese are different forms of the governments and therefore are ideological different from India. Russians advocates multilateral action, especially in the matters not directly concerning the region around Russia. Japan has similar ideology and its recent

strategic agreements with India indicate that the two nations have potential and desire to promote the common ideals together.

¹Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* (Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, DC: The National Defense University Press, 1992), 4. A total of 256,697 copies of 'Mother India' were sold in 27 editions.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., 3.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 7.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., 8. Quoting *The Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS)*, 1941, vol 3, p. 176 and memorandum by Assistant Secretary A.A. Berle, 5 May 1941.

¹⁰Ibid., 8.

¹¹'Pandit' is title given to learned men in India. J. L. Nehru was a nationalist leader of the Indian National Congress, who went on to become the first Prime Minister of India. He has been credited with crafting India's foreign policy. He was one of the leaders who founded the initiative called the Non Aligned Movement.

¹²Kux, 5.

¹³Ibid., 32.

¹⁴Ibid., 24.

¹⁵Ibid., 38.

¹⁶"Quit India Movement" was a mass civil disobedience movement by Indians led by the Nationalist leaders aimed at providing a final push to the British to come to the negotiating table for India's independence. This was the greatest movement for India's independence after the *revolt of 1857*. More than 1,000 peaceful demonstrators were

killed and over 3,000 injured by the oppressive use of brute force by the British. More than 100,000 were arrested.

¹⁷Kux, 38.

¹⁸Ibid., 54. Quoting Paul Hare, *Journey to South Asia*, a diplomatic chronicle of the Middle East and South Asia: Biography of Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, 1924-1966.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., 57, quoting *Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS)*, 1947, vol.3, pp. 160-61, Embassy New Delhi to State Department, 9 July 1947.

²²“Non Entanglement” was the policy adopted by India under Pandit Nehru, to ensure that India remained free from the influence of the two emerging power blocs in the world politics at the time.

²³Kux, 56.

²⁴Ibid., quoting *Selected Works of Jawahar Lal Nehru (SWJN)*, Second Series, volume 5.

²⁵Kux, 89.

²⁶Ibid., 69.

²⁷Ibid., 99.

²⁸Ibid., 101.

²⁹Ibid., 104.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., 105.

³²Ibid., 106.

³³Ibid., 111.

³⁴Ibid., 115. J. J. Singh was a longtime head of the Indian league in the United States.

³⁵Ibid., 131.

³⁶Ibid., 115.

³⁷Ibid., 148.

³⁸Ibid., 154.

³⁹Ibid., 168.

⁴⁰Ibid., 160.

⁴¹Ibid., 168.

⁴²Ibid., 169.

⁴³Ibid., 170.

⁴⁴Ibid., 186.

⁴⁵Ibid., 212.

⁴⁶Ibid., 211.

⁴⁷Ibid., 212. John Kenneth Galbraith was a Harvard Professor who was appointed the US Ambassador to India under the Kennedy regime. He said that only the President, Assistant Secretary Talbot, and he supported larger package to India.

⁴⁸Kux, 230, 231.

⁴⁹Ibid., 237.

⁵⁰Ibid., 236.

⁵¹Ibid., 240.

⁵²Ibid., 268.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., 292.

⁵⁵Ibid., 297.

⁵⁶Ibid., 294.

⁵⁷Ibid., 298-299.

⁵⁸Ibid., 304.

⁵⁹Ibid., 305.

⁶⁰Ibid., 306. Saunders was the NSC South Asia staffer at the time of Bangladesh 1971 crisis.

⁶¹Ibid. The US was convinced that Indians provided the support to the Mukti Bahini, the Bengali rebel group which launched the armed struggle in Bangladesh. Even though Indira Gandhi did not have any specific date for the offensive, the posturing of the forces may have prompted the preemptive strike on India by the Pakistanis.

⁶²Kux, 307.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., 315.

⁶⁵Kux; Emergency meant arrest of prominent political leaders, dissolving the parliament, imposition of press censorship and restrictions on civil liberties. According to Dennis Kux, it was a de facto martial law (p. 336).

⁶⁶Kux, 337.

⁶⁷Ibid., 352.

⁶⁸Ibid., 371.

⁶⁹Ibid., 380.

⁷⁰Ibid., 383.

⁷¹South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) website available from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/BKI.htm; Internet; accessed 13 October 2006.

⁷²Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website available from http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1993/terrorism_press.html; Internet; accessed on 13 October 2006.

⁷³Kux, 385.

⁷⁴Ibid., 391.

⁷⁵Ibid., 393.

⁷⁶Ibid., 394.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., 386.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Large number of Sikh diaspora in UK, USA, Canada, and Germany supported insurgency in Punjab, available from <http://india.indymedia.org/en/2002/12/2525.shtml>; Internet; accessed on 13 October 2006.

⁸²Organizations like U.S.-based Council of Khalistan (based in Washington, DC) are still active in the US and Canada. Organizations are still using the US soil to carry out anti-India propaganda. Information available from <http://www.khalistan.com/> and http://www.sikhtimes.com/news_123105a.html; Internet; accessed on 13 October 2006.

⁸³Babbar Khalsa is the oldest Sikh terrorist group that carried out major bombings on Air India Flight 182 *Kanishka* on 23 June 1985 from Toronto with a brief stopover at Montreal was en route to New Delhi. There has been an attempt to revive the group, which worked in close coordination with Pakistan's ISI. Recent activities of this group are available from http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/india/states/punjab/terrorist_outfits/BKI.htm; Internet; accessed on 13 October 2006.

⁸⁴Kux, 434. Para. 301 of the Omnibus Trade Competitiveness Act of 1998, required the president to take retaliatory actions against the countries, like India, where the USA was running a trade deficit.

⁸⁵Ibid., 438.

⁸⁶Chintamani Mahaparta, *Indo US Relations into the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 1998), 111.

⁸⁷Ibid.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

A world of six balancing powers and balance of power politics among them is altogether a new experience for the Indian political class, bureaucracy, media and academia. Over the last 60 years, this nation has been conditioned, to denigrate the politics of balance of power. It never occurred to our politicians that non-alignment was balance of power in a bipolar world where the two powers that constituted the opposing poles could not go to war because of nuclear deterrence. Already, India is fast learning to play the balance of power politics.¹

K. Subrahmanyam

India followed the policy of nonalignment during the Cold War. Some analysts argue that this policy was a failure since it could neither prevent four major wars which India fought and a prolonged proxy war,² nor did it allow India to progress on the economic front. On the other hand, the policy facilitated India's emergence as a major player in the world. It facilitated the growth of India's military might and strengthened grassroots economy. As a result, India today enjoys diplomatic independence in decision making. It set the conditions for India to be recognized as one of the six major power centers in the world who are likely to balance the international equation in the world affairs during the twenty first century.

The world is increasingly moving towards a balance and interplay of the above six powers and the possibility of future wars, much less the nuclear or missile war, between these powers is becoming less likely. The major powers scramble for strategic partnerships with all other major powers in search of equilibrium in the balance of power relationships.³ The major powers face enemies like the global terrorism. Also, the wars

between a major power and a medium or small power are not ruled out.⁴ This is particularly true for India. India continues to face the threat of war with the nuclear-enabled Pakistan and is likely to deal with the threat to internal security from the terrorists from within and across the border. The US too acknowledges that the future international affairs will be dominated by the six major powers centers. According to the new formulations suggested by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:

1. For the first time since the peace of Westphalia in 1648 the prospects of violent conflict between great powers is becoming ever more unthinkable.
2. Major states are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war.
3. Today the US is building a more lasting and durable form of global stability: a balance of power that favors freedom comprising the US, Japan, Russia, the European Union, China and India, especially the last two.
4. The greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing States than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones.
5. The unparalleled danger posed by weak and failing States are transnational ones relating to terrorism, pandemics, movement of criminals and terrorists and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.⁵

Even if the major powers do not go to war with each other war they are likely to support their smaller allies when they go to war against another major power. This is demonstrated by the scramble for regional and global alliances. The dream of self-sufficient collective defense of Europe appears inching towards a reality with the EU spreading its scope to well organized collective forces. The end of Cold War saw the expansion of the NATO, which continues to grow. The NATO amended its charter to allow offensive operations beyond the European boundaries. The major NATO nations seem to have more faith in NATO as an effective force rather than the UN. Such actions by NATO are viewed as a real threat by some, particularly after its decision to spread its

influence beyond European frontiers as in case of Afghanistan. Erstwhile Soviet republics attempted an alliance for collective defense in the form of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In India's neighborhood, the Chinese and Russians formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan accepted the major non NATO ally (MNNA) status from the US, which allows them almost similar status as NATO nations. A Pakistan-China alliance is the most dangerous situation for India. Viewing India as a competitor, China may try to retard India's ascent by keeping its busy with Pakistan. There is also a talk between Russia and China to forge an alliance to confront the threats emerging from the ever-expanding agenda of NATO, and later invite countries, like India and Brazil, to such an alliance.⁶ In the midst of all this scrambling, India continues to follow the path of non-alignment which could lead to the isolation in the increasingly dangerous world.

The US-India relationship has been plagued by mutual suspicion and mistrust. The relationship has also been marred by making choices contrary to the interests of the other. India adopted a rigid idealist strategy in an increasingly realist world. India wanted to play the prominent role in the world affairs without proving its potential, whereas the US could never allow India to grow in strength beyond a certain point. The US attitude towards India could also be categorized as retaliatory or punitive, because India decided not to side with the West camp during the Cold War. The possibility of relationship was ruined when high mutual expectations met with little accomplishment. There are high expectations for the current agreements, but a lot remains to be desired to transform the rhetoric into reality.

India's primary national interests are related to security and economics. The recent agreements are ideal launch pads for a lasting partnership between India and the US. However, these agreements on their own do not serve all Indian interests. Moreover, the security partnership is clearly hindered by divergent security interests. The mistrust underplays the desire to have a closer defense relationship. The US reluctance to share technology hinders India's integration in the US-led TMD and the PSI. There is no real partnership in the GWOT despite the fact that the two nations are both affected by transnational terrorism. India did not send troops to join the US coalition in its recent endeavors. India will have to share the war burden with the US to be allies in real terms. Nor has the US played any tangible role in helping India in combating terrorism. At the same time the US will have to accept an aggressive Indian reaction to the cross border terrorism if the diplomatic channels do not work. Older technology of ANTPQ-37s or F-16s will not help India achieve desired modernization and self-reliance in defense production. India needs much more and faster.

On the other hand, the economic relationship between India and the US is flourishing despite issues of disagreement in WTO, energy, and nuclear energy; the security partnership is yet to evolve in its true sense. There is a lot of understanding and desire that helped the initiation of dialogue, but lot is desired to transform the six or seven year old security relationship into concrete action.

On the international relations and ideology front, the two nations agree on similarity of ideology and the need for India to play a major role in the world affairs, but fail to translate the desire into effect by differing on several international issues. India does not openly support the US stand on Iran, the Iraq war, or the Israel-Lebanon conflict

of 2006. Nor does the US support India's claim in the UNSC or its stand in the WTO. While the two nations promote democracy, their approach is not really similar. There is a major divergence in policy where the US continues to promote NATO activism and is willing to take unilateral actions in the absence of a multilateral consensus, while India advocates multilateral approach and emphasizes diplomacy as opposed to the military action to conflict resolution. This, coupled with the ambiguous Pakistan policy of the US, will remain the main source of suspicion for the Indians.

Recommendations

In order to forge a strategic partnership, the foremost challenge for the US and India is to identify and overcome the hindrances to lasting partnership. Firstly, mistrust and suspicion based on historical differences are main obstacles to future cooperation. Secondly, there is a need to bridge the gap between expectations and actions. Unrealistic expectations may cause friction. Some steps in this direction were taken when India accepted the necessity of the US partnership with Pakistan. Thirdly, the two nations must view each other as an opportunity, rather than a threat. Fourthly, the two nations must pick their allies with due deliberation keeping the long term interests in mind, rather than immediate gains. Fifthly, India must not make a major issue of international recognition, such as the permanent seat in the UNSC. This is likely to be a major hindrance in India's scramble for lasting partnerships in the complex equilibrium of balance of powers. Rather India must strengthen itself so that it can no longer be ignored. Once India grows in stature and the world understands the need for reforms in the UN, India will get its rightful position. Sixthly, over indulgence in "nonalignment" on India's part may become a major impediment in the US-India relationship. Rather, India must use its position in

the NAM and the relationship with the US to bridge the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” of the world.

In order to derive the most from the recent initiatives between India and the US, India must take actions which support its interests while trying to nourish the partnership. Firstly, India must adopt a balanced policy which could be a combination of a realist and liberal approach with a pinch of idealism in its foreign policy. India must focus on and relentlessly pursue its national interests for the time being. This may require formalizing a national strategy. Secondly, understand that based on the own national interests none of the major powers is likely to come to India’s rescue in an event of war with another major power or their close ally. Therefore India must focus on complete self-reliance and develop enough capability to defend own national interests on its own. A strong nation can do what it wants, but a weak nation will have to do what it must to please others. Thirdly, India should work on creating a secure regional environment by actively assisting neighbors resolve their internal crises. Moreover, India should expand its sphere of influence both in quality and quantity to actively participate in conflict resolution in the neighborhood, such as Sri Lanka. This will not only enhance its international image but also provide a secure environment for unhindered economic development. Fourthly, India should strengthen and protect its economic interests. The main area of focus is infrastructure development to support sustainable economic growth. India must make wise decisions towards self-reliance in high-quality indigenous defense production, and space and nuclear technology. Moreover, India should expand its search for energy security. For its size, India will have to look beyond the conventional means

while competing for existing resources. Surrendering freedom of action for limited gains (nuclear deal with the US) is likely to retard growth.

Fifthly, India seems to be the most vulnerable among the six major powers. As the world moves to form alliances of convenience, India does not have a real option for a strong and reliable partner. India must consider options to ensure security in the form of reliable, workable, and plural alliances. This will ensure freedom of action without surrendering independence in decision making. The dynamic scramble to achieve equilibrium in an international balance of power will allow the power centers to have multiple alliances for different contingencies. Due to the fluid situation among the major powers, India must modify its approach towards nonalignment. The classic nonalignment is not possible in the current world with multiple poles. Independence in national decision making can still be achieved by promoting multilateralism and engaging with all the major power centers.

Sixthly, India must continue to support the truly international organizations like the UN. India must continue to safeguard the interests of the developing world, which in turn means its own interests, in forums, such as the WTO. Seventhly, this is an opportune moment for India to launch the information campaign to educate the world on issues, like Kashmir. Western perception appears to be tilted towards Pakistan because India maintained relative silence in response to Pakistan propaganda on the Kashmir issue. India should convince the US to:

1. Shun arrogant unilateralism in international affairs. Such policy raises the suspicion.

2. Apply uniform of the Global War on Terror and extend it, diplomatically or militarily, to the nations which threaten India's internal security.

3. Acknowledge that Kashmir is integral part of India and the disputed region is the one illegally occupied by Pakistan and China. This is essential prerequisite for arriving at a solution on this issue.

4. Acknowledge India's status as a nuclear power and allow freedom to trade and use nuclear energy.

5. Support India's claim to the UNSC seat.

6. Overcome suspicion to accelerate the cooperation in defense production, space and high technology.

7. Work towards adding meat to the rhetorical agreements. More is needed to combat terrorism than making joint statements.

No doubt the US is capable of providing assistance to India in its hour of need, but the US is unlikely to do so in its own national interests. India cannot rely on US help for its own security and military hardware. Russia may provide military hardware but, as demonstrated in the past, may never come out to India's rescue notwithstanding its ability to do so. While the world is witnessing a visible ascent in the US-India relationship, history shows that the past "ups" were very short lived. The positive aspect this time is that this is the longest period of a good relationship, and there are no real threats to derail the process. In fact, India did receive diplomatic support during the 1999 Indo-Pak war and the 2001-2002 Indo-Pak crises. As of now, it may be in India's best interest to allow events to take their course as they may instead of pushing for an unsustainable strategic military partnership with the US or any single major power. Between the US and India,

the real convergence of interests is clearly visible only in the economic and technological arenas. This is where India needs to focus for the moment. At the same, the current US-India relations are at an unprecedented high. If this opportunity is missed, the two nations will take along time to forge a real partnership in the future.

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²Proxy war is the term used by Indian government for the transborder terrorism launched from Pakistan territory.

³Subrahmanyam.

⁴Ibid.

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⁶In February 2005, Russia and China announced strategic partnership in a bid to counter expanding Western military and fiscal influences. They intend to invite other major powers, like India and Brazil, to join them. Details available from <http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/02-03b-05.asp>; Internet; accessed on 24 October 2006.

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