NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

AVOIDING DOWNWARD SECURITY SPIRALS IN NORTHEAST ASIA: THE GRADUAL TRANSITION TO A MILITARILY "NORMALIZED" JAPAN

by

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Avoiding Downward Security Spirals in Northeast Asia: The Gradual Transition to a Militarily "Normalized" Japan

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The world is on the verge of a dramatic shift in security relations in Northeast Asia. With a "rising China" and a Japan emerging as a "normal" military power by revising the pacifist clause of its constitution (Article 9), many analysts argue that the new century may bring with it increased instability to the region. With this forecast in mind, this thesis explores how the United States should approach a militarily "normalizing" Japan. The primary questions that will be analyzed are: 1) Will the current ad hoc movement towards the revision of Article 9 (Renunciation of War Clause) be the impetus for a downward security spiral in Northeast Asia? 2) What should U.S. policy be towards the revision of Article 9? and 3) Should the United States push for further "normalization" and burden sharing in security relations? This thesis concludes that to ameliorate the security tensions in the region, the United States should implement three policy prescriptions that will increase the transparency and the time horizon associated with this dramatic shift in Japan’s military restraints. Thus, avoiding downward security spirals in Northeast Asia by encouraging a gradual transition to a militarily “Normalized” Japan.
ABSTRACT

The world is on the verge of a dramatic shift in security relations in Northeast Asia. With a “rising China” and a Japan emerging as a “normal” military power by revising the pacifist clause of its constitution (Article 9), many analysts argue that the new century may bring with it increased instability to the region. With this forecast in mind, this thesis explores how the United States should approach a militarily “normalizing” Japan.

The primary questions that will be analyzed are: 1) Will the current ad hoc movement towards the revision of Article 9 (Renunciation of War Clause) be the impetus for a downward security spiral in Northeast Asia? 2) What should U.S. policy be towards the revision of Article 9? and 3) Should the United States push for further “normalization” and burden sharing in security relations?

This thesis concludes that in order to ameliorate the security tensions in the region that are arising from the ad hoc revision of Japanese Article 9, the United States should implement three policy prescriptions which will increase the transparency and the time horizon associated with this dramatic shift in Japan’s military restraints. The first policy recommendation is that the United States should use its influence to encourage Japan to hold off revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 May 2022). Second, to minimize Japan’s need to re-militarize, the United States should maintain its current force levels in the region leading up to the 2022 transition in order to provide continued stability in the region. Lastly, the United States should push for greater burden sharing by the Japanese; however, it should focus on a greater utilization of Japan’s ability to project “soft power.” Execution of these policy recommendations will help to ease the fears of Japan’s apprehensive neighbors (China, North Korea, and South Korea).
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First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my wife’s dedication and sacrifice over the last seven years and, in particular, the last 18 months. My success is directly attributable to the caring support that she provides for our children and me. I could not imagine accomplishing this program without her. In addition, I must thank our two boys, Mason and Patrick, for their energy and ability to bring the simplicity and joy of life back into perspective. Finally, without the encouragement of my greater family—Mom, Dad, Laura, Wayne, Sharon, and Phil—this accomplishment would not have been possible.

Completing this difficult program of study would have been unattainable without the constant reassurance and strength from a God who has sacrificed so much for me and who inspires me to achieve the most I can with the opportunities I am given.

Last, but certainly not least, many thanks to my academic “sherpas” who have guided me through this journey. In six short quarters, I have learned an incredible amount about our nation’s security affairs and I can only hope to adequately reflect the time and effort you invested in me to the rest of the Navy and throughout the rest of my career and life. In particular, Dr. Olsen and Dr. Twomey, thank you for your time and effort in seeing me through the gauntlet that is the thesis process. Your guidance was invaluable in my efforts and I deeply appreciate the time that you invested in this project. Finally, to my undergraduate professors and the institution that helped to instill in me an excitement for the challenge of both academics and faith, Dr. John Mason, Dr. Tim Sherratt, and Gordon College—thank you.
I. INTRODUCTION

No man is entitled to the blessings of freedom unless he be vigilant in its preservation.

-Douglas MacArthur, 1948

Very few observers of post-World War II Japan would have predicted that a constitution produced by a conquering enemy, and which took little over a week to write, would sixty years later remain unchanged. Many had predicted—including the constitution’s authors—that as soon as the country was freed from the shackles of American occupation, its words would quickly be revised. However, much to the surprise of those forecasters, the Japanese constitution has not been modified, while its accomplice in aggression, Germany, has revised its Basic Laws (constitution) forty times since 1947. Nearly sixty years since the Japanese document’s inception, it still breeds internal controversy and regional anxiety. At the core of these problems is the potential modification of Article 9 of the constitution (The Renunciation of War Clause), which reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The seventy-three simple words of this statement of peace have had a profound effect on Japan’s foreign affairs and its internal and external security.

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4 Japanese Constitution, Article 9.
Within the last decade, there has been an escalating drive by conservatives and, surprisingly, a growing number of those traditionally considered to be on the left, to revise the wording of Article 9. Both groups increasingly support the position that revision is essential to provide Japan with the legal foundation to assume a larger role in international affairs. Many within the debate believe that revision is an essential step on the road towards the return of “normal nation” status and is long overdue. Ichiro Ozawa, a prominent Japanese politician, popularized the term “normal nation” in the mid-1990s. Ozawa states,

What is a “normal nation”? First, it is a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community. It does not refuse such burdens on account of domestic political difficulties. Nor does it take action unwillingly as a result of “international pressure.”…A second requirement of a “normal nation” is that it cooperate fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people. …Japan must satisfy these two conditions if it is to go beyond simply creating and distributing domestic wealth and become what the world community recognizes as a “normal nation.”  

These aspirations towards “normalcy” may seem innocuous on their own. However, Japan does not exist in a security vacuum. Therefore, it is essential to analyze what a militarily “normal” Japan would mean for Northeast Asia and the United States.

The world is on the verge of a dramatic shift in security relations. With a rising China and a Japan emerging as a “normal” military power, many analysts argue that the new century may bring with it increased instability in East Asia. With this forecast in mind, this thesis will explore how the United States should approach a “normalizing” Japan. The primary questions that will be analyzed are: 1) Will the current ad hoc movement towards the revision of Article 9 (Renunciation of War) be the impetus for a downward security spiral in Northeast Asia? 2) How will Japan’s neighbors react to revision of Article 9? 3) What should U.S. policy be towards the revision of Article 9?

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6 For the purposes of this thesis, my causal logic is as follows: “normalization” equals revision of Article 9, which equals greater Japanese involvement in regional and world security affairs.

and 4) Should the United States push for further “normalization” and burden sharing in security relations?

In order to develop several concluding policy recommendations, Chapter II of this thesis provides a brief history of: 1) adoption and interpretation of Article 9; 2) establishment of the JSDF (Japanese Self-Defense Force); 3) a review of the modern debate concerning the revision of Article 9—specifically, why there has been an increased push for revision and what those recommended changes entail; and 4) a brief overview of the U.S. position on the matter. The Chapters III and IV will examine the potential regional concerns and responses to the revision of Article 9. In particular, this study will survey Northeast Asian responses: South Korea, North Korea, and China.

Finally, this thesis will conclude by providing three policy recommendations that, if implemented, will help minimize the potential for increased regional instability and downward security spirals in the region. The first policy recommendation is that the United States should use its influence to encourage Japan to hold off revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 May 2022). Second, to minimize Japan’s need to re-militarize, the United States should maintain its current force levels in the region leading up to the 2022 transition in order to provide continued stability in the region. Lastly, the United States should push for greater burden sharing by the Japanese; however, it should focus on a greater utilization of Japan’s ability to project “soft power.” Implementation of these three policy recommendations will help to ameliorate the security tensions in the region that are arising from the ad hoc revision of Article 9 by increasing the transparency and the time horizon associated with this dramatic shift in Japan’s military restraints.
II. THE FOUNDING OF A PACIFIST NATION

A. INTRODUCTION

For a Japanese nation that had been at war for almost two decades, the widely accepted adoption of a peace amendment in its constitution was a profound change. However, with the Emperor’s surrender on 15 August 1945, it was clear that a once great warrior nation was ready for peace and a change in state policy. Therefore, whether their acceptance and maintenance of such an accord was due to the unconditional defeat they suffered at the hands of the Americans or because of the return of society to civilian control is debatable and will be addressed later. However, my focus in the first part of this chapter is on the history surrounding the adoption of Article 9, specifically: 1) its origination in the Potsdam Declaration; 2) General Douglas MacArthur’s and his staff’s—Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAPs)—intentions; 3) the Japanese response; and 4) the changing tide in U.S. policy. The second portion of this chapter provides a brief history on the development of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) after the constitution was established: 1) its origination; 2) the legal backlash and issues surrounding constitutional interpretation; 3) the gradual increase in its role and assertiveness; and 4) an examination of the growing SDF capabilities and procurement initiatives since the early 1990s. Next, this examination will analyze the ongoing domestic debate on the revision of Article 9. Finally, this chapter will close by providing a brief overview of the U.S. position on the matter.

B. HISTORY OF ARTICLE 9

The inception of Article 9 dates back to before the end of World War II. In the words of Charles Kades, one of its authors, “on 26 July [1945], Truman and Attlee, with the concurrence of the absent Chiang Kai-Shek—but without that of Stalin, because the USSR had not yet entered the war against Japan—set forth their terms for the surrender of Japan in the awesome document known as the Potsdam Declaration.” Specifically, point twelve of the Declaration states, “The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has

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been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.”

Building on this language and sentiment, General MacArthur and his staff at SCAP drafted a constitution founded on peace and non-aggression. The penmen of Article 9 at first intended to place the “Renunciation of War” clause in the preamble, but in order to give it more emphasis, it instead was written as its own article. Many historians argue about who originated this clause and, when asked, MacArthur alluded to his Japanese counterpart as its originator. Courtney Whitney, who was chief deputy in charge of the government section of the SCAP and a close personal friend of MacArthur’s, in his book *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* describes the origination of Article 9 as follows:

…Prime Minister Shidehara, after expressing his thanks for the penicillin, had proposed that when the new constitution was drafted, it contain an article renouncing war and the maintenance of a military establishment once and for all. By this means, Shidehara had said, Japan could safeguard itself against the re-emergence of militarism and police terrorism and at the same time offer convincing proof even to the most skeptic of the free world that Japan intended to pursue a future course of pacifism. Shidehara further pointed out that only if relieved from the oppressive burden of military expenditures could Japan have the slightest chance of providing the minimum necessities for its expanding population, now that all its overseas resources were gone. It was this that they had discussed for two and one-half hours. Shidehara’s private secretary, Mr. Kuramatsu Kishi, has since thrown further light on Shidehara’s views by stating that he had held them for a long time before communicating with MacArthur.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Philippines—another country that MacArthur assisted in the writing of its constitution—had a similar clause. Alternatively,

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perhaps what one sees are two leaders so thoroughly affected by the destruction of war that they both envisioned and hoped for a perpetually peaceful Japan. No one will ever know for sure whether the impetus for Article 9 was a Japanese or American idea, but the above comments by Major General Courtney, a first hand participant in its conception, gives strong credibility to those who say it was purely a Japanese creation. Yet, the fact that remains is that sixty years after its inception, the Japanese people have been unwilling to amend it. This largely has been due to the pacifist sentiment of society, a focus on economic recovery over military expansion, and the “rigidness” of the constitution established by Article 96. Therefore, those politicians who would have revised Article 9 earlier have not been permitted to do so because popular support would not have passed such a stringent amendment process. Article 96 requires that in order to amend the constitution, there must be a two-thirds majority vote in both houses and, subsequently, the revision must receive majority support by popular referendum for ratification.12 To this date, despite Prime Minister Koizumi’s persistence, the Japanese people have yet to be presented with a referendum.13

The Japanese response to, and acceptance of, the constitution is important to examine because many of the decisions made by the country’s leaders sixty years ago are affecting their contemporaries today. With regards to Article 9, during the initial drafting period in 1946, the Japanese government’s Diet representative on constitutional revision, Hitoshi Ashida, had only two distinct changes from the initial version presented by SCAP, “…one preceding the first sentence of Article 9: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order….’ The other preceding the second sentence of that article read: ‘For the above purpose…’”14 The overall effect of these changes, which later became known as the Ashida amendment, was that they left greater room for future interpretation.15 In the words of Theodore H. McNelly,

13 Ibid.: 30.
14 Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 236.
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 as amended may be interpreted to mean that war and the threat or use of force are renounced only as a means of settling international disputes. War and force might therefore be permissible for self-defense. The phrase at the beginning of paragraph 2, ‘in order to accomplish the aim if the preceding paragraph,’ could be interpreted as qualifying the renunciation of land, sea, and air forces. Thus, although armaments for settling international disputes are banned, armaments for other purposes, such as self-defense, are not renounced.  

The second significant event during the infancy of Article 9 was its interpretation by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, which would eventually come to be called the “Yoshida Doctrine.” Under pressure from the United States to rearm with the outbreak of the Cold War, Yoshida focused on the establishment of a minimal military force and looked to economic growth as the key to Japan’s success. Because of Yoshida’s belief in the need to be a “mercantile state,” he was more than willing to forgo military strength and, thus, trade some of his foreign policy autonomy for U.S. protection. In essence, what came to be known as the Yoshida doctrine was founded on two overarching principles—resistance to military buildup and a focus on post-war economic recovery. The first principle was institutionalized with the adoption of Article 9 and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, in which Washington guaranteed Japan’s security in exchange for basing rights. Therefore, Yoshida legally ensured that Japan would be able to focus on economic recovery. Regionally, the Yoshida Doctrine had a reassuring effect on Japan’s neighbors and assisted in the stabilization of the region.

It is interesting to note that less than five years after the United States had authored a peace constitution for the people of Japan, Washington was pushing for its remilitarization. As mentioned above, with the onset of the Korean War and the broader Cold War, the United States reconsidered its position on Japanese rearmament and thought it more important to focus on the utility of having a geo-strategic partner on the Soviet and Chinese flank. This period saw the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty  

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16 McNelly, “Induced Revolution,” 92-93.

17 Interestingly, “Yoshida himself in later life came to regret the course that he had set.” For more on this subject see: Michael B. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd and revised. (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004).

and, as a stipulation within, the creation of the National Japanese Police Reserve. However, in an attempt to stay within the confines of Article 9, the “self-defense” force could not exercise the right of collective self-defense. Walking a fine line to avoid labels of remilitarization and to maintain the integrity of Article 9, Tokyo and Washington avoided overt military reemergence. Whether the United States meant Article 9 to be this restrictive is debatable. In the words of Charles L. Kades, one of the primary drafters of the Japanese constitution, “In recasting Point II of the MacArthur/Whitney Notes into a form suitable for inclusion in the model for a constitution, I had omitted the phrase ‘even for preserving its own security’ from the sentence in which Japan renounced war. I believed it was unrealistic to ban a nation from exercising its inherent right of self-preservation.” In contrast, when asked why Japan did not expressly reserve the right of self-defense, Yoshida replied, “Of late years most wars have been waged in the name of self-defense.”

C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SDF

With the onset of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the future Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) was born. It was commissioned as the National Police Reserve in late 1950, two years later, in 1952, it was renamed the National Safety Forces, and finally, in 1954, it was reorganized as today’s SDF. The establishment of a national security force was not solely due to the Korean War. With the commencement of the Cold War and the fall of China to communism, the United States and Yoshida believed that it would also be a beneficial tool for suppressing the rise of communism in Japan. After Yoshida re-established a nominal military force, many attempted to test the legality of his decision. In 1957, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Yoshida’s policy and found that the constitution “was not intended to render Japan defenseless or incapable of resistance…” Building on its legal and political legitimacy and weakening pacifist

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19 Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," 236.
20 Ibid.: 237.
sentiment, the SDF has gradually increased its role and assertiveness over the last fifty-five years.

Central to Japan’s security policy over the last half-century has been its alliance with the United States. Beginning in the 1950s with the commencement of the Cold War, Japan quickly became the most important spoke in the U.S. wagon wheel of Far East security. The history of the U.S.-Japan security relationship centers on four key events: first, the original 1952 bilateral security treaty that provided for an exchange between basing rights and inclusion in the security umbrella; second, the 1960 revision of that treaty; third, the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation; and fourth, the 1997 revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The most recent rendition of the security alliance—the 1997 agreement—has drawn attention from its neighbors because of its ambiguous language concerning Japan’s participation in a Taiwan unification scenario.

A second factor that has had an impact on Japan’s emergence as a strong “defensive” power since the establishment of the SDF has been its “miraculous” economic growth. As shown in Table 1, despite a policy of limiting defense expenditures to 1% of its GDP, it has produced a highly technical and modern defense force due to its rapid economic growth. In 2005, Japan had the fourth largest military budget (in U.S. dollars) in the world. However, when ranked by percent of GDP, it is one hundred and thirty-fourth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yen millions</th>
<th>US$ millions</th>
<th>% GNP</th>
<th>% annual govt exp.</th>
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<tr>
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<td>11,500</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>5.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1. Japan’s Defense expenditure 1975-2004 calculated in yen and US dollars, and as a percentage of GNP and annual government expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure (yen)</th>
<th>Expenditure (US dollars)</th>
<th>GNP%</th>
<th>Military%</th>
</tr>
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<td>0.93</td>
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<td>0.97</td>
<td>5.94</td>
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</table>

The watershed event that has led to Japan’s increasing emergence as an internationally engaged security provider was when it received criticism for its “check book diplomacy” during the 1991 Gulf War. Despite its tremendous financial contribution to the war effort—some 13 billion dollars—Kuwait failed to acknowledge Japan’s support in ending the conflict. The impact that this event had on Japan is clear if one looks at its response to the criticism. In particular, the Japanese Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law on 15 June 1992. The adoption of such an internationalist policy was a major step for Tokyo towards a more active role in world and regional security affairs. However, to limit their exposure to UN world-policing efforts, they stipulated five conditions that must be met before they would commit forces.

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to peacekeeping operations. Those conditions are: 1) a cease-fire had been reached; 2) consent from all parties; 3) strict impartiality; 4) if any of the above three conditions change, the Japanese can withdraw their forces; and 5) use of weapons is limited to the self-defense of Japanese forces.\(^\text{26}\) The adoption of this Law on Cooperation has led to Japan’s participation in a series of peacekeeping and reconstruction operations throughout the world, for example: Cambodia 1992; Mozambique 1993; Rwanda 1993; and Iraq 2004.

In addition to their increasing security role in the UN through peacekeeping and Reconstruction Operations, within their home waters, observers have seen a much more assertive Japanese SDF. Eugene Matthews, in the December 2003 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, provides an excellent description of one of Japan’s most provocative encounters:

> The mystery ship did not respond to hails and fired on Japanese ships when they approached. In response, the Japanese decided to give chase. After an extended pursuit deep into Chinese waters, Japanese patrol boats opened fire on the intruder with heavy machine guns. The fleeing craft—which turned out to be a North Korean spy ship, bearing no fishing equipment of any kind—caught fire and sank, killing its Korean crew.\(^\text{27}\)

This type of encounter would have been unthinkable just ten years ago, but today there seems to be a growing acceptance of the need for increased military autonomy and capability. The *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2005* provides a useful synopsis of this evolving Japanese military:

> …Japan’s own security approach is undergoing a significant evolution, with changes in policy, force planning, and the country’s role in regional security codified in the issuance of a major revision of the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) on December 10, 2004. Japan’s changing external role was most dramatically illustrated by the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to Iraq in January 2004, marking the first time the SDF had been sent to an area ‘where combat ha[d] not completely ceased.’ In security terms, Japan is increasingly assuming the status of a “normal nation.”\(^\text{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Hamura and Shiu, "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle,” 428.

\(^{27}\) Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003): 74.

Japan’s military hardware procurement has been increasing in correspondence with their assertiveness. According to the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), the enhancement of defense capabilities is a priority. For example, the MSDF is in the procurement and delivery phase for the 14,700 ton, helicopter capable Osumi class LST amphibious ships, the 16 DDH helicopter carriers, and more Aegis destroyers. In addition, in 2004 the SDF requested and was approved $1.2 billion for Ballistic Missile Defense, an amount that was nine times the total spent on similar projects between 1999 and 2003. Finally, “in a move already creating considerable stir in surrounding countries, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) announced a plan for Japan to rapidly procure independent strike capability, in the form of cruise missiles or precision air-to-surface munitions (JDAM) to further deter the North Koreans.” Specifically, the JDA’s *Defense of Japan 2004* white paper states, “…in the JFY 2004 budget, it has been decided to acquire a precision guidance device (to be added to existing conventional bombs) which can guide the bomb accurately to a preset target by receiving a signal from a GPS (Global Positioning System) satellite after the bomb is released.” This decision, combined with the concurrent rapid development of an air refueling capability, has more than just North Korea concerned over the pattern of development. These military hardware developments, along with the latest LDP initiative to raise the Japanese Defense Agency to the ministry level and to rename the SDF as the Self-Defense Military, has regional neighbors wondering how far it will go.

To conclude, from the inception of the post-war constitution, the nature of Japanese security—from post-war protectorate to internationally and regionally active security participant—and the forces—from police force to the most modern military force in Asia—that it would take to provide it has been a point of contention both domestically

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30 Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," 75.


32 “Defense of Japan 2004.”
and internationally. With the establishment of the SDF in 1954 and the gradual rise in its capabilities and stature over the last decade, the world is left wondering, “What is next?”

D. THE ONGOING DEBATE

There are two concurrent debates concerning the revision of the constitution: whether or not to revise it, in general; and whether or not specifically to revise Article 9. This section will provide a brief overview of the latter debate in three parts: 1) by laying out the arguments concerning the amendment of Article 9; 2) by using polling data to demonstrate the shift in popular and legislative attitudes towards revision; and 3) by briefly exploring why the desire for change exists.

Prominent Japanese politicians differ significantly on whether or not to revise Article 9. In the words of former LDP Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa:

But the attitudes of these nations toward Japan might also change if Japan were to decide to amend its Constitution—especially Article 9—and alter its defense policy. We do not want to do anything that would arouse antipathy or suspicion among our neighbors. I believe it is unwise to try to revise the Constitution because of the predictable damage such change would do to our international relations.33

In rebuttal, former LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone states:

Some worry that revision of Article 9 would make China, the DPRK (North Korea) and the ROK (South Korea) and other neighboring countries wary of Japan. With the present Constitution as it is, however, these neighboring countries are even more suspicious of Japan, and this could easily escalate into friction.34

The differing opinions of these two former Prime Ministers demonstrate that this issue will not be easily solved and that it has left Japanese society divided. This division and debate became increasingly evident during the 2006 Constitution Day celebrations. Across Japan there were rallies calling for the preservation of Article 9 and groups who label themselves as “defenders,” such as the Article 9 Association, have seen significant

33 Kiichi Miyazawa, "Rethinking the Constitution (2)--A Document Tested by Time," Japan Quarterly 44, no. 3 (July-September 1997): 10. Miyazawa was Prime Minister from November 91 to August 93, LDP, first elected to the house of Councilors in 1953 served eleven terms.

34 Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Rethinking the Constitution (1)--make it a Japanese Document," Japan Quarterly 44, no. 3 (July-September 1997): 6. Nakasone was Prime Minister of Japan from November 1982 to October 1987, LDP, first elected to the House of Representatives in 1947, and at the time of publication was serving in his nineteenth term.
rises in "grass-roots groups supporting the association’s cause." Finally, as this thesis will demonstrate in Chapters III and IV, Prime Minister Nakasone’s belief, that if the constitutional review process is “sufficiently open and candid, Japan will win the confidence of other nations,” has credence and should be taken under strong consideration. More recently,

Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who has hinted at his intention to run in the LDP leadership race, takes a negative stance on revising the Constitution hastily, although he was involved in the party's process to devise a draft, as subpanel chairman of the party's constitutional revision committee.

In a lecture in Tokyo on March 25, Fukuda said, "Revisions should be made after Japan's situation is correctly understood." "It must be done very cautiously," he added.

Fukuda’s comments are important because it is just another demonstration that even within the LDP there not a consensus on how constitutional reform should proceed. The final recommendations of this thesis are founded on the above principles of transparency and positive iterative interaction.

Amongst the Japanese public, there has been a rising trend in support for revision of Article 9. “The April 8 [2005] edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun reported the results of an opinion poll in which 60.8% of respondents expressed support for revising the constitution, the second year in a row that the survey has found more than 60% support for reform.” In an effort to account for biases that may exist in the above statistics, in 2005, two other polls received lower but similar numbers—54% for Nihon Keizai Shimbun and 48% for NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). However, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the key lies in the wording of the question. All of the above polls asked if they support revising the constitution without any mention of Article 9. An

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36 Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Rethinking the Constitution," 6.


38 Nishi, "Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-First Century," 36.

39 Ibid.: 36.
excellent example of the biases associated with Japan’s daily newspapers is that on April 04, 2006 the *Yomiuri Shimbun* published an article entitled “71% Want Constitution To Clarify SDF Existence.” However, when one looks deeper into the article, one will find that only 39% of respondents thought that Article 9 should be rewritten.40 An underlying intent to spur support for revision of Article 9 is clearly evident in the *Yomiuri’s* headline. In addition, a street survey scheduled to coincide with the celebration of the 2006 Constitution Day found that, of a sample size of 28,169 respondents, 21,652 or 77% were against any type of revision to Article 9.41 Moreover, a poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* during the same time frame found that overall 42% of respondents said neither paragraph of Article 9 should be revised, and those supporting revision were split three ways depending on which clause would and would not be amended.42 “In the Diet, as with the general public, support for revising Article 9 is lower—30 percent for clause 1 (the renunciation of war) and 43 percent for Clause 2 (the renunciation of war potential).”43 As mentioned in section one of this chapter, it would take two-thirds majority support in the Diet to revise Article 9, that is unless reformers first change Article 96 and decrease the “rigidity” of the requirement. Despite the lower support for the revision of Article 9, there certainly has been an increase in overall acceptance of its eventual revision, as evident in the increased frequency of discussion on the matter at the highest levels of government. Keeping with their stated intention, in November 2005—coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the LDP’s founding—the party released their draft revision of the constitution and Article 9. The LDPs proposed revision of Article 9 reads as follows,

(Pacifism) Article 9 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

40 “71% Want Constitution To Clarify SDF Existence,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 04, 2006 in *FBIS* April 04, 2006, JPP20060403044001.


(Military forces for self-defense) Article 9 (2) In order to secure peace and the independence of our country as well as the security of the state and the people, military forces for self-defense shall be maintained with the prime minister of the Cabinet as the supreme commander.

The military forces for self-defense, in implementing activities to deliver duties provided for under the preceding paragraph, shall in accordance with law subjugate themselves to the Diet and other authorities.

Aside from implementing duties stipulated in the first paragraph, the military forces for self-defense may engage in activities conducted in international cooperation to secure peace and security of the international community as well as in activities to maintain public order in emergencies or to protect freedom or the lives of the people.

Aside from what is stipulated in the preceding two paragraphs, matters relating to the organization and control of the military forces for self-defense shall be determined by law. 44

The two most dramatic changes from the original document are its direct acknowledgement of the right to maintain standing military forces for self-defense and its declaration that those self-defense forces can participate in “activities conducted in international cooperation,” or in other words, collective self defense. Yet, even within the ruling coalition, the New Komeito has pledged to fight the LDP’s proposed changes and will submit their own draft in late 2006. The New Komeito’s draft will maintain both parts of the current Article 9.

There are numerous reasons for the increased support to revise Article 9 of the constitution. This section will quickly examine a few. Mayumi Itoh provides an excellent synthesis of what has changed:

The question is what changed the Japanese attitude toward the constitution. Three major factors caused the change: first, Japan’s growing economic position in the world; second, the Japanese realization of its emerging role in international society; and third, the U.S. pressure on

Japan to increase its “burden sharing” in the maintenance of international security.45

More specifically, the majority of the reasons people and politicians cite to revise Article 9 can be placed into three categories: 1) desires to “normalize;” 2) autonomy from U.S. policies; and 3) increased international engagement. Finally, Prime Minister Koizumi is one of the main reasons why the reform movement recently is getting such popular support. As Christian Caryl puts it, “At the center of the revision movement is Koizumi himself, who has publicly declared his intention to alter Article 9 so that it will define a clear legal basis for the existence and role of the nation’s military.”46 While Koizumi is in office, constitutional revision will surely remain of high importance; however, only time will tell if it will stay a priority once his term of office is completed.

**E. UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE DEBATE**

This final section will survey the pre-existing U.S. position on the revision of Article 9. From John Foster Dulles to today’s presidential administration, the United States has continually pushed Japan to increase their security burden sharing, specifically, in the arena of collective defense.47 This U.S. objective appears to be evident in the initial push to re-establish a military force in 1950 and in each rendition of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. In addition, the most recent “2+2 U.S.-Japan security dialogue” has gone so far as to include a declaratory statement on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Straits issue.48 In 2000, the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University published a report on the future of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. The report stated that a lack of Japanese commitment to collective defense

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46 Christian Caryl, With Hideko Takayama, and Kay Itoi, "Law of the Land; as Soporific as it Sounds, the Challenge of Reforming the Country's Constitution is Getting Japanese Excited." Newsweek (February 7 2005): 30.


is a significant hindrance to the security alliance.\textsuperscript{49} “Many in Tokyo interpreted this as an endorsement of constitutional revision. However, the report was careful to emphasize that decisions on the constitution must be thoroughly considered by the Japanese people themselves.”\textsuperscript{50} Finally, the U.S. position on the revision of Article 9 became quite clear when on August 14, 2004,

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on Thursday said Japan will have to ‘examine’ war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution if it wants a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. ‘We understand the importance of Article 9 to the Japanese people and why it's in your Constitution,’ he said in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun and other Japanese media representatives here. ‘But at the same time, if Japan is going to play a full role on the world stage and become a full active participating member of the Security Council and have the kinds of obligations that it would pick up as a (council) member, then Article 9 would have to be examined in that light.'\textsuperscript{51}

Consistent with previous U.S. presidential administrations, Bush has continued to push for increased burden sharing in the maintenance of regional stability.

F. SUMMARY

In summary, as this chapter has demonstrated, there is a heated debate in Japan concerning the revision of Article 9. While there is increasing support for revision of the constitution, there is still a great deal of ground to cover before both the country and the region—as will be discussed in Chapters III and IV—are ready for a “normal” Japan. In addition, despite the constitutional provision that “…land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” Japan’s “defense” force has emerged as one of the most capable in the world. Finally, while many within the United States may believe that it would be beneficial for Japan to assume a greater role in regional security affairs, as Chapters III and IV will demonstrate, this movement toward a “normal” military may have a mixed response from regional neighbors.


III. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND REVISION OF ARTICLE 9

A. INTRODUCTION

Last year (2005) marked the sixtieth anniversary of the end of Sino-Japanese military conflict. However, despite growing economic interdependence and cooperation since 1945, diplomatic relations have been “hot and cold.” In particular, since 2001, there has been a downward trend in diplomatic relations between these two East Asian powers. On the surface, it appears that the tension exists, in large part, due to the controversial behavior of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. However, observers of Asian affairs should not be deceived. The issues that divide the most populous country and the wealthiest country in East Asia have been simmering since 25 July 1894 when Captain Togo fired upon and sank the Chinese troop transport Kowshing, killing all 1,100 soldiers onboard.52

With the defeat of Japan in 1945 by allied powers and the imposition of a peace constitution, Beijing came to see the maintenance of Article 9 as a “demarcation line” between regional aggressor and amenable neighbor. To better understand China’s reaction to Japanese revision of Article 9, the first half of this chapter will examine Beijing’s approach to this regional predicament in two parts. First, this chapter will assess how various interests and factors have each driven Beijing’s approach. In particular, it will focus on territorial integrity and national sovereignty, economic interdependence, access to export markets and resources, regional stability, the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and historical revisionism. Second, it will show how Beijing’s solution to this perceived problem has been to oppose, balance, and divide.

The second half of this chapter will explore what Japan’s likely response will be to Beijing’s ongoing efforts to moderate its movement towards the revision of Article 9 and a more prominent role in Northeast Asian security. Based on the analysis of China’s approach the chapter will address a number of questions. What will likely be Japan’s reaction? Will Japan take steps to reassure its neighbors that a recurrence of what

52 Eugene B. Canfield, “All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor,” Naval History 18, no. 6 (December 2004): 42.
happened in East Asia in the first-half of the twentieth century will not repeat itself? Or, will Japan respond with bold defiance in the face of Chinese criticism and accusation? Broadly defined, there are three possible responses from Japan: 1) moderation; 2) status quo; and 3) open defiance. This chapter will argue that the first is most likely, but each will be discussed in turn. Finally, this chapter will close by evaluating the prospect of Beijing succeeding, Japan’s probable response, and options available to the United States to ameliorate the growing tensions between these two important neighbors.

B. CHINESE INTERESTS AND FACTORS

The interests and factors that drive Beijing’s approach to the problem of the revision of Article 9 are significant and diverse. This section will explore the top four of these in order of their relative importance to the Chinese regime: 1) territorial integrity and national sovereignty; 2) Japanese historical revisionism as it aids domestic nationalism; 3) economic concerns—regional stability, interdependence, and access to export markets and resources; and 4) the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

Due, in large part, to China’s recent history of subjugation by imperial powers, territorial integrity and state sovereignty is at the forefront of Beijing’s foreign policy. Within Sino-Japanese relations, there are two points of contention concerning territorial disputes and sovereignty: 1) the Pinnacle Islands (called the Senkaku Islands by Japan and the Diaoyu Islands by China); and 2) Taiwan. In the words of Linus Hagström, “…academic accounts as well as official sources treat the Pinnacle Islands dispute as one of the most burning matters in Sino-Japanese relations and even in East Asian politics at large….“53 In addition, the common belief is that these types of disputes are the most likely to drive the two countries to war. An indication of the importance that Beijing places on these two factors is evident in the laws it has passed to protect their sovereignty against Japanese intrusion. Concerning the Pinnacle Islands, in February 1992, Beijing passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and, in March 2005, the third conference of the 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law directed at Taiwan. For Beijing, the prospect of the revision of Article 9 is just one more indication of a growing Japanese willingness to be militarily assertive in the region.

These fears are not completely unfounded; in the latest iteration of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Japan has taken an unprecedented stance on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.\textsuperscript{54} “Immediately after the declaration, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement, ‘the Chinese government and its people oppose’ the security agreement between Japan and the United States… describing it as an intrusion by Japan and the United States into China's internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{55} As was Beijing’s concern, the declaration has had the effect of bolstering Taiwanese independence factions, who were “…relieved that Japan has become more assertive.”\textsuperscript{56}

Beijing’s concern over Article 9 relates to national sovereignty in that it fears that, with a remilitarized and legally recognized Japanese defense force, Tokyo will be more aggressive in protecting and or asserting its claims to the disputed Pinnacle Islands. In addition, it is likely that Beijing understands that, despite continued reinterpretation of Article 9 over the last half-century, it still stands in the way of Japan becoming a full-fledged military partner of the United States.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, Article 9 is still important because it impedes Japan’s ability to interfere in a Taiwan Straits crisis.

The factor that receives the most press and diplomatic rhetoric is Beijing’s concern about Japanese historical amnesia. There are two aspects of its concern that are important to this analysis: its use of the “history card” as a tool to moderate Japanese behavior; and its exploitation of anti-Japanese xenophobia to enhance Chinese nationalism. Concerning the first point, in response to the LDP’s promulgation of its draft constitution, the \textit{Xinhua} news agency released the following statement,

\begin{quote}
The international community, especially the Asian countries, earnestly hopes Japan will remember the catastrophe its aggressive war has brought to its people and the peoples in other Asian countries, and respect and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{54} Joint Statement U.S.-Japan SCC, 2005.
\textsuperscript{55} Li Jiaquan, "Why has Chen Shui-Bian Shifted His Focus to Japan?" \textit{Zhongguo Pinglun She}, November 15, 2005 in \textit{FBIS-China}, November 30, 2005.
\textsuperscript{56} Anthony Faiola, "Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan; Growth of China Seen Behind Shift," \textit{Washington Post}, February 18, 2005, sec. A.
safeguard the current pacifist constitution so as to ensure lasting peace in Asia.58

In general, Beijing has attempted to use complaints about Japan’s revisionist history to moderate its behavior. As Denny Roy states in his article “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations,” “As the Japanese are well aware, the Chinese government has an interest in exploiting the historical guilt issue to wring additional economic aid out of Tokyo and to undermine Japan’s potential growth in military power and regional leadership.”59 In addition, in his book *Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States*, Robert G. Sutter observes the same phenomenon,

…Chinese government-supported media and other outlets have used accusations of Japanese militarism as a way to build nationalistic feeling in China, to put the Japanese government of the defensive, and to elicit concessions from the Japanese government in the form of aid, trading terms, or other benefits.60

In fact, it has become painfully obvious to the Japanese that Beijing will quickly set history aside if it becomes disadvantageous to its approach. This is evident in China’s effort to keep the political and economic functional lines separate from one another. On the one hand, Beijing wants to politically isolate Japan for its non-remorseful, ahistorical behavior. Yet on the other hand, as stated above, it does not want this political banter to interfere with its economic relationship. If “history” were truly the great issue that China makes it out to be, then logic would follow that it would use whatever means necessary to deal with the problem. However, this has not been the case and, therefore, it discredits Beijing’s political maneuvering on the “history” issue. This phenomenon has become increasingly evident to Japanese politicians “according to Singapore’s ‘Lienho Zaobao’ newspaper, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura openly said Japan will no longer ‘submit itself to China's wishes in whatever he does’ because of its invasion of China during World War II and that now is the time for Japan to develop ‘more equal’


diplomatic relations with China.”61 Therefore, in summary, the “history card” in the past has worked to moderate Japanese behavior. However, as of late, there is a growing determination by the Japanese to disregard its use. The second factor that contributes to the exploitation of “history” by Beijing is its usefulness in encouraging domestic nationalism in order to enhance regime legitimacy. In the words of Robert G. Sutter, “In the case of China, the government has gone out of its way to stoke the fires of nationalism, in part as a way to fill the ideological void created by the failure of communism.”62 With the 1978 economic reforms, and further economic liberalization since, the ideological legitimacy of the CCP has suffered a serious blow. In an effort to shore up its legitimacy, it has replaced communist ideological backing with nationalism, as Yinan He so astutely states,

Beijing’s move was based on a rational calculation that the tasks of enhancing internal cohesion and boosting regime legitimacy were more pressing that maintaining harmonious relations with Western countries. To this end, the Chinese government promoted an official nationalism that was centered on not class struggle, but self-other conflict with foreign countries.63

Finally, it is important to note that China’s use of anti-Japan centered nationalism has also limited Beijing’s ability to pursue a flexible foreign policy. Peter Hays Gries thoroughly chronicles the rise and hijacking of foreign policy by “popular nationalists” in his article “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan.”64 This rise in domestic, increasingly Internet-based, nationalism will be an issue that is prevalent in China’s foreign policy until the regime finds its legitimacy through another vehicle—perhaps liberal democratic institutions.

The third most important group of interests and factors that shapes Beijing’s approach to the revision of Article 9 by the Japanese centers around China’s current and

62 Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities, 87.
potential economic growth. Specifically, regional stability, economic interdependence, and access to export markets and resources are of primary concern. In 2005, the total trade value between China and Japan reached USD 189.3 billion, and estimates for 2006 predict that it will top USD 200 billion. The importance of this relationship is reflected in the fact that in 2004 China became Japan’s number one trading partner, surpassing the United States. Therefore, Beijing’s anxiety is that if Japan continues to move further towards becoming a “normal nation” by revising Article 9 of its pacifist constitution, then there will be a growing likelihood of Tokyo becoming more assertive, which could in turn affect: 1) economic relations; 2) access to each other’s markets; and 3) regional stability. During this period of rapid development for China, the last thing it wants is to disrupt its dramatic growth pattern. For example, according to the Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao, “the Chinese side does not want a cooling down of economic and trade relations with Japan like the stalemate in political relations.”65 In addition, Beijing may be concerned that revision of Article 9 will strengthen an already powerful Japanese navy, the Maritime Self Defense Force, which could more easily allow it to interrupt Chinese sea lines of communication, thereby interfering with its access to export markets and inbound resources. Finally, the belief that increasing Japanese assertiveness will affect regional stability is evident in Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao’s comments on 24 November 2005, "[Japanese] adherence to the path of peaceful development serves the fundamental interests of Japan itself as well as the peace and stability in this region."66

The final factor in order of relative importance to Beijing concerning the revision of Article 9 is the impact that it may have on the U.S.-Japan security alliance.67 It is feared that once Japan modifies its constitution to participate in collective security—even though it claims it will only do so in self-defense—the probability of Japan participating in U.S. joint action to constrain China is more likely. For example, Japan’s recent collaboration with the United States on the Taiwan Strait issue is breaking down barriers

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65 Sun and Wang "Negotiations on Development of the East China Sea."
67 See Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities, 86-87, for an overview of Beijing concerns regarding the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.
once considered taboo and bringing about accusations from Beijing that the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of 1972—the “1972 system”—and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship have grown to be but hollow documents in the face of Japanese “normalcy.” In the past, Beijing has viewed the U.S.-Japan security alliance with ambivalence. However, with Tokyo’s increased assertiveness and a growing U.S. military presence around China’s borders, the alliance is increasingly being seen as a mechanism to contain China. Further, its usefulness as a check on Japanese military expansion has all but faded. Beijing publicized its concern on this issue in an article entitled “U.S. Pushing Japan To Boost Military Role,” in which it stated, “with its own military spread thin, Washington appears to be trying to use the talks [2+2] to nudge Japan out from under the U.S. security blanket and make Tokyo a much more active player in global strategic operations.” The next section will examine Japan’s response to the Chinese efforts outlined above.

C. CHINA’S APPROACH

Beijing’s approach to the problem of the revision of Article 9 is similar to the approach it has used in regards to other issues, such as: visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine war memorial, history textbook revisions, and military expansion. In general, Beijing has attempted to oppose, balance, and divide in response to these foreign policy problems. There are two prominent goals that this approach has tried to achieve: 1) to moderate what is perceived as Japanese extreme behavior; and 2) “…[to] prevent a resurgence of the Japanese armed forces that would give Japan the capability to harm, challenge or coerce China by military means.”

1. Oppose

The most visible aspect of Beijing’s approach has been its effort to “oppose” what it perceives as Japanese “remilitarization.” The state-run news sources in China provide a strong indication of the importance of this matter,

[The] *People’s Daily* asserted that the Peace Constitution, which renounces war forever along with Japan’s right to retain armed forces,

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69 “U.S. Pushing Japan To Boost Military Role.”

‘represents a demarcation line,’ and noted that ‘once the demarcation line is broken through,’ there will be reason to worry that Japan will move toward remilitarization.71

Beijing is very careful to cloak its concern about Article 9 in an historical context. Nevertheless, as any student of Sino-Japanese relations knows, history can be set aside if China so desires. As Yinan He states,

…for a long time Chinese leaders sought strategic cooperation with Japan and swept the memory problem under the carpet until the early 1980s when they felt increasingly insecure about their domestic power status and policy implementation. In order to strengthen national cohesion and divert public resentment away from domestic issues, the government painted a dark image of Japan by openly challenging Japanese historical attitude in diplomatic arena and promoting patriotic history at home.72

A similar “setting aside” of history was evident in an earlier period: when Beijing and Tokyo normalized relations in 1972, China did not demand reparations or an official apology for the atrocities that it had committed during the war.73 It is unlikely within the political environment that exists today that Beijing would so readily set aside the “history” issue.

One of the channels that Beijing has utilized to address the issue of Japanese revision of Article 9—or as Beijing would say, “remilitarization”—has been to oppose its bid for a permanent UNSC seat. China justifies its opposition due to Japan’s historical amnesia but, in reality, one can suspect that Beijing does not want to lose the influence it has as the only Asian nation permanently on the Security Council. China has grown accustomed to using the UN to build relationships with other countries by supporting their interests; for example, it opposed interventions in Sudan and Iran, two of the major oil exporters to China. Beijing is apprehensive about Japan obtaining a permanent UNSC seat because it believes that it will undercut some of its influence. Thus, Beijing stands in direct opposition to Washington’s following position. “On August 13, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated boldly in Tokyo that if Japan ever hoped to become a

73 Lam Peng Er, “The Apology Issue: Japan's Differing Approaches Toward China and South Korea,” American Asian Review 20, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 37.
permanent member of the UN Security Council it would first have to get rid of its pacifist Constitution.\textsuperscript{74} Taken alone, this comment does not seem too brazen. But if one takes into account earlier comments made by his deputy Richard Armitage, Powell’s position appears as a concerted effort to encourage Japan to revise Article 9. Japanese newspaper \textit{Asahi Shimbun} chronicled this effort,

> Powell’s comment, which follows a similar remark in late July by his deputy, Richard Armitage, suggested that hopes are growing within the administration of President George W. Bush for a revision of Japan's Constitution. While Powell emphasized his respect for the will of the Japanese, Armitage was more blunt, telling a Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker Article 9 stands in the way of strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.\textsuperscript{75} So far, Beijing’s efforts to block Japan’s UNSC bids have been successful, but they have not been effective at stopping a growing movement towards the revision of Article 9.\textsuperscript{76}

A second instrument that Beijing has used to address, in particular, the revision of Article 9 and, in general, its fears of Japan’s remilitarization have been domestic protest. The evidence does not exist to substantiate a claim that the government actually instigates protests, but its intentions become clear according to how it handles each incident. In April of 2005, there were massive anti-Japanese protests throughout China, and it is telling when \textit{Xinhua} news states that “the police attempted to dissuade the demonstrators, but to no avail.”\textsuperscript{77} In this case, one can interpret the word “dissuade” to mean “did nothing.” A February 2006 Congressional Research Service Issue Brief came to a similar conclusion, “many observers noted that the Chinese authorities were unusually passive in allowing the protesters to organize, fueling speculation that Beijing quietly encouraged the demonstrations.”\textsuperscript{78} Beijing skillfully uses domestic protest over Japan’s behavior to strengthen its foreign policy positions and promote domestic nationalism. However, as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Nobuyoshi and Tsutomu, “Powell: Article 9 Review.”
  \item \textsuperscript{76} See Chapter 2 for an analysis of this movement.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} “Chinese Agency Reports 16 April Protests In Shanghai, Hangzhou,” \textit{Xinhua}, April 16, 2005, in \textit{BBC Worldwide Monitoring}.
\end{itemize}
analyzed in the above section, there has been a growth in Internet-based nationalism that likely helped to drive this protest further than Beijing had intended it to go.79

2. Balance

The second underlying maneuver in Beijing’s approach is that it has used “balancing” tactics in a discrete manner in the hopes of eliciting a desired response, however being mindful not to let this political tactic interfere or spillover into Sino-Japanese economic relations. This concern for the impact politics might have on economic relations can be observed in the following excerpt from Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao newspaper,

China was enraged at his action and cancelled the fourth round of negotiations [on the joint development of resources in the East China Sea] that should have held in October this year. On the other hand, negotiations on promoting Sino-Japanese relations of economic partnership will still be held in November as scheduled….This has fully demonstrated that the Chinese side will not "let economic relations deteriorate with the cooling of political relations," and shows China's sincerity to consolidate a microeconomic foundation [wei guan jing ji ji chu] in its relations with Japan.80

Concerning its balancing strategy, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao in March of last year [2005] said, "As Japan's neighbour, China sincerely hopes that Japan should conscientiously draw its lessons, give due considerations to the concerns of Asian countries which it had invaded in World War II. China hopes that it should be prudent in making any revision relating to the military security."81 Beijing has consistently approached the problem of the revision of Article 9 as one that concerns the entire region. However, aside from Japan’s immediate neighbors in Northeast Asia, the other countries of the region—such as the ASEAN block, Singapore, and Taiwan—have not voiced such heartfelt concern. For example, by couching this problem as a regional one, China is attempting to sway the alignment or “regional order” in its favor by creating a dividing line between the once oppressed and the non-repentant oppressor. Therefore,

79 Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking.’”


81 "China Urges Japan to Take Prudent Approach to Constitutional Revision," Xinhua, March 1, 2005.
it is not surprising that Beijing has consistently protested against provocative Japanese behavior in terms of its impact on “neighboring countries,” “Asian neighbors,” or “the international community.” During a meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Hu Jintao at the Asian-African Summit in Jakarta, President Hu reiterated this “party line” when he said, “…such deeds by Japan had hurt deeply the feelings of the Chinese people and peoples of other Asian nations, and had aroused discontent among them.” This strategy would be important to Beijing because perhaps it believes the region will be more amenable to Chinese efforts to build the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010 if China is successful in stigmatizing Japan as a non-remorseful aggressor and China as the maintainer of peace and stability in the region.

One instrument that China uses to balance against Japan is diplomatic rhetoric. In an effort to isolate it from the international community, Beijing is quick to identify Tokyo’s actions as abominations to accepted statecraft. By labeling Japan as a non-remorseful World War II aggressor, Beijing can build its own influence throughout the world, especially with other “Third World” countries that have experienced the bondage of imperialism. In addition, it provides common ground for China and the Koreas to oppose Japanese regional expansion.

3. Divide

Finally, the last facet of Beijing’s approach is to divide Japan from the United States whenever possible. This is similar to the “wedge strategy” the United States used to create tension between China and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. This tactic is evident in Beijing’s attempt to play the role of an “honest broker” in the Six

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Party Talks. Its approach is in stark contrast to the hawkish position of the United States. By demonstrating the U.S. inability to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, China is demonstrating its position as a regional peacemaker. Thus, it can be argued that both Japan and Korea would prefer a Chinese-guided peace on the peninsula to a U.S.-shaped conflict. A second example of this tactic is Beijing’s policy of not devaluing its currency in response to the Asian financial crisis. In the words of Hongying Wang,

> Despite the self-interest in resisting devaluation, China’s position has won high praise internationally….Chinese leaders have repeatedly contrasted China’s willingness to take risks and pay a price for the region’s stability with Japan’s reluctance to use its economic strength to the same end.86

Beijing’s tactic of driving a wedge between Japan and the other major economies of the world, particularly the United States, and stigmatizing Tokyo as an inwardly focused regional actor, has had its intended effect. The success of this strategy is evident in President Clinton’s remarks at a June 1998 news conference in Beijing with Chinese President Jiang Zemin,

> I think that China has shown great statesmanship and strength in making a strong contribution to the stability not only of the Chinese people and their economy but the entire region by maintaining the value of its currency….I think that what we have agreed to do is to continue to do whatever we can to promote stability and to support policies within Japan that will restore confidence in the economy, get investment going again, and get growth going….We are not the only actors in this drama, and a lot of this must be done by the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. We can be supportive, but they have to make the right decisions.87

One can see in President Clinton’s comments exactly what Beijing had hoped for—praise of China and criticism of Japan.

However, due to the horrific events of 11 September 2001 and the bond that has developed between Prime Minister Koizumi and U.S. President Bush, the relationship between Japan and the United States is far too strong to be affected. In particular, the fifth meeting of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in June 2004 addressed

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this very issue when they said, “If the alliance is rock solid, the Chinese will unlikely set themselves on a collision course with us.”\textsuperscript{88} Nevertheless, the Chinese may reason that it will not be long before these “kindred spirits” have left office and the opportunity to insert a “wedge” may reappear.

D. POSSIBLE JAPANESE RESPONSES

In the words of Tomohiko Taniguchi, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute, “In geostrategic terms, the Pacific Ocean has become narrower and the East China Sea much wider.”\textsuperscript{89} The new millennium has clearly brought increased tension to this ancient neighborhood of Northeast Asia. As chronicled in the first half of this chapter, China is increasingly apprehensive about Japanese movement towards revision of Article 9 and what appears to be a move to claim greater regional and world importance with the assistance of the United States. Now that the foundation of China’s approach towards this perceived problem has been examined, next this chapter will assess three possible Japanese responses: 1) moderation; 2) status quo; and 3) open defiance.

One possible response by the Japanese would be to acknowledge the concerns of arguably its most important neighbor and to moderate its rhetoric and movement across the aforementioned “demarcation line.” In Japan’s recent history, this would have been the most likely course of action that Tokyo would follow. For example, beginning in 1975 with Takeo Miki, prime ministers resumed the practice of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine\textsuperscript{90} and, in the early 1980s, Nakasone Yasuhiro paid homage at the sacred Shinto temple, which raised strong protests both domestically and internationally. In response to this outcry from its neighbors, Nakasone cancelled plans for a second visit.\textsuperscript{91} This is just

\textsuperscript{88} Tomohiko Taniguchi, “Whither Japan? New Constitution and Defense Buildup,” \textit{The Brookings Institution} (May 2005): 24. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities is a formal committee. Its purpose is described by the Prime Minister’s office as follows, “In recent years, responses to new threats such as the progressive proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and international terrorism have become major issues for the world, including Japan. With such a backdrop, the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities was established to comprehensively examine the modality of Japan's security and defense capabilities from a broad-ranging perspective in order to more appropriately deal with these issues.” See Prime Minister of Japan website at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/04/27anpo_e.html (accessed May 2006).


one example where political pressure from China and others has had its intended effect of moderating Japanese behavior. However, two and a half decades have changed many things, including the level of public support concerning this type of regionally provocative behavior. As McCargo states in his book *Contemporary Japan*,

> The gradual decline of a pro-China ‘old guard’ in the LDP and the bureaucracy (especially the Foreign Ministry) allowed tensions between the two countries on a range of bilateral issues to become more apparent.92

Today, Prime Minister Koizumi has made his mark on Japanese politics by openly disregarding requests by regional neighbors to cease this type of activity. In addition, if his ability to dissolve the Diet and reestablish his coalition even stronger than before is any indication, public support for such flamboyant behavior is growing. Yet despite the domestic political currency that these strong signals provide, with growing economic interdependence between these two Northeast Asian neighbors, this controversial behavior could come at a dramatic fiscal cost. Moreover, given the last fifteen years of almost economic stagnation, this prognosis is something Japan can ill afford. Considering this, one might predict that Japan would moderate its behavior in response to Chinese protests simply to ensure that the economic relationship is not affected.

Besides the economic factor, domestically there remains a strong pacifist coalition. One such group is the “Article 9 Association,” of which members, such as Mikiko Miki, who experienced first hand the death and destruction that came with a strong military and a “normal” constitution, will adamantly impress upon whomever will listen the necessity of maintaining Japan as a pacifist nation.93 Nevertheless, as analyzed in Chapter II, the trend line in polling data over the last two decades shows that this hardcore pacifist belief appears to be waning across Japanese society. Moreover, the current administration has shown no signs of moderating its behavior.

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93 The author had the good fortune of participating in a seminar course with Mikiko Miki taught by Dr. Tsuneo Akaha at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, CA. Mrs. Miki is studying at MIIS on a grant from the Article 9 Association (see [http://www.9-jo.jp/en/index_en.html](http://www.9-jo.jp/en/index_en.html) (accessed April 2006). As someone who lived through the 1930’s and 40’s, she is a strong supporter of maintaining the pacifist nature of the Japanese constitution.
The second response that Japan could pursue is to simply maintain the status quo concerning Article 9 and its attempts at a greater regional and international security role. The status quo would be defined as maintaining the pacifist constitution as is and moving gradually towards greater regional security burden sharing with the United States. Denny Roy believes that this will be the most likely scenario with one important caveat:

The most likely outcome for the foreseeable future, absent an external security shock that could speed up the process, is continued gradual expansion of Japan’s security activity, with Japan’s armed forces participating in additional regional security activities (including joint exercises, multilateral dialogue, and certain joint operations).\(^\text{94}\)

This response is not as amenable as moderating its behavior through pull-back and restitution, but it would not exacerbate tensions as quickly as a position of open defiance would. However, from a realist standpoint, over the long term such a policy would have its costs also. As China continues to grow in wealth and military strength over the next few decades, Japan will find that it will become increasingly difficult to achieve what it perceives as its rightful place in the international community. In addition, as China’s influence in the region and the world continues to grow, in the future, Japan will be faced with a much more powerful and assertive Chinese protest to what it perceives as Japanese “remilitarization.” If China does “reshape the regional order,” as some predict,\(^\text{95}\) Japan could see its legacy as an “incomplete superpower”\(^\text{96}\) continuously perpetuated.

The third possible response the Japanese might have to the Chinese attempts at moderating its behavior would be open defiance. As stated earlier, barring any security shocks, this response is the least likely. However, as conventional wisdom predicts, “when things start moving in Japan, they tend to do so rather rapidly.”\(^\text{97}\) The U.S. possible “pull-back” from the region may have a profound impact on Japan’s need to quickly establish itself as a regional military force to be reckoned with. This leads to apprehension in Beijing that some sort of virtual hand-off from Washington to Tokyo

\(^{94}\) Roy, “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon,” 100.


\(^{96}\) McCargo, Contemporary Japan, 180.

\(^{97}\) Taniguchi, “Whither Japan?,” 3.
will take place. In particular, Beijing may already be witnessing the beginnings of this “hand-off” in the recent 2+2 agreements. For the first time since the end of World War II, Japan took an official stance with the United States on the Taiwan Straits crisis. In February 2005, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement that included “a peaceful resolution of issues on the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” as a strategic goal.98 The United States has been attempting to coax Japan out of its pacifist economically focused “shell” for the last five decades and it appears that, recently, Washington has found a willing participant—much to the consternation of Beijing. Therefore, both Beijing and Washington will influence the possibility of Japan responding to China’s foreign policy approach with open defiance.

In summary, there are three general paths that Japan could take in response to Chinese attempts to moderate its behavior concerning the revision of Article 9 and its attempts to play a more assertive role in Northeast Asia. The possible Japanese responses are: 1) moderation; 2) status quo; and 3) open defiance. Based on the current geo-strategic situation, Japan will most likely maintain the status quo. However, the possibility of a world event, such as a large-scale terrorist attack or a North Korean accidental or intentional missile strike on Japan, accelerating this process should not be ruled out. In addition, despite Japan’s status quo tendency, Beijing is still extremely concerned about this trend in Japanese foreign and domestic politics. In the final section of this chapter, I will explore the prospects for Beijing’s success and options available to the United States to ameliorate the growing tensions between these two important neighbors.

E. PROSPECTS

Beijing’s approach—balance, divide, and oppose—to the issue of Japanese revision of Article 9 will slow down the LDP’s efforts in the short term. However, over the long term, it is improbable that China will be able to stop the growing acceptance of its revision. With each passing year of Chinese growth and North Korean belligerency, those who advocate constitutional revision gain more followers.

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In summary, Beijing may have legitimate concerns regarding: territorial integrity and national sovereignty; economic interdependence; access to export markets and resources; regional stability; the U.S.-Japan security alliance; and historical revisionism. And Beijing’s use of UNSC seat opposition, domestic protest, and diplomatic rhetoric may have slowed the process of Article 9 revision by fueling pro-constitution anti-revision groups in Japan, such as the Article 9 Association. Nevertheless, barring any dramatic world events, a gradual movement towards revision is inevitable. However, Beijing will continue to attempt to affect the revision that is adopted through its use of the “history card,” despite the fact that “the Japanese have become less inclined to passively accept criticism from abroad; [and that] they are more disposed to launch verbal and other kinds of counterattacks.”

Hayes goes on to show that this change in attitude is increasingly evident in Japan’s willingness to criticize the United States for its economic shortcomings. As an aside, the instrument that Beijing has not yet used in its battle for Japanese moderation may very well be the most powerful. Economic coercion has been purposefully absent from Beijing’s efforts, primarily because, at this point in history, they have more to lose than Japan. However, in the future, this balance may shift and, at that point, China may find it advantageous to begin to tie Japanese desired responses to economic incentives.

Finally, a powerful determinant in Japan’s decision to revise Article 9 and assume a greater role in regional security will inevitably be U.S. policy choices and actions. If the United States reduces its military presence in the region, as some would like, Japan will likely attempt to fill the gap left by the U.S. exodus. This may take place on its own or come as an intentional handoff of regional security responsibilities from Washington to Tokyo. In the near term, the United States should avoid increasing Japan’s hard power “burden” for regional security. Instead, the United States would be better served by focusing on Japan’s ability to project “soft power” because it can serve in a

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100 Ibid.
101 Besides the bilateral trade flow which was over 190 billion USD in 2005, any move by Beijing that would cause its economic ties to sour with Tokyo would likely also affect its trade relationship with the United States. Thus, as detailed throughout this chapter, China has been extremely careful to keep negative diplomatic relations from impacting economic interdependency.
complementary role to American hard power and would be more amenable to both its populace and its regional neighbors. An increase in Japanese use of hard power in the current regional security environment will have the likely effect of instigating downward security spirals. By instead focusing on Japan’s comparative advantage in projecting “soft power,” the United States can achieve a more holistic security alliance in Northeast Asia. In addition, Japanese use of “soft power” will bode well with its traditional policy of comprehensive security. Due to the lack of transparency, both in Beijing and in Tokyo, the region is on the edge of a possible arms race. Both countries question the other’s military intentions and believe that its military capacity or efforts to modernize are not in line with its stated intentions.102 For the Japanese side of this deadly equation, Tomohiko Taniguchi provides an idealistic recommendation:

A security dilemma serves no one’s interests. The Japanese government must invite Chinese defense planners to Tokyo regularly so they can scrutinize Japan’s defense buildup and developments. This attempt at transparency should be unwavering and unilateral, with or without reciprocal action from the Chinese side, in order for Japan to achieve the moral high ground.103

In realistic terms, such a policy is unlikely to be adopted by the Japanese government. With China’s relative gains over Japan in both economic and political power during the last two decades, Tokyo is increasingly apprehensive of China’s emergence as a capable revisionist power. In the words of Denny Roy, as of late, “Japanese exhibit more sensitivity to the balance of power in Asia, less willingness to accept unique restrictions based on their experience during the Pacific War, and a greater inclination to reconsider Japan’s defense policies.”104 In order to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia, it is essential that the United States maintain a substantial military presence in the region for the foreseeable future. The countries of the region have come to expect the United States to provide this public good. This is especially important while China is in potential democratic transition and Japan is suffering through residual economic stagnation.

In addition, the United States should encourage Japan to postpone revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of its signing (3 May 2022) in order to provide time for China to proceed down its road towards full fledged democracy. This policy would increase the transparency of the issue on both sides. Specifically, the growth of democratic institutions in China and the separation of Japan’s revision of Article 9 from a particular administration will help to alleviate problems of transparency and signaling as well as prevent the emergence of a downward security spiral in Northeast Asia.
IV. KOREAN-Japanese relations and revision of Article 9

A. INTRODUCTION

The Korea\textsuperscript{105}-Japan state-to-state relationship is both complicated and nuanced. Unlike Korea’s neighbors to the north—China—it had the misfortune of enduring thirty-five years of direct Japanese subjugation and, even before that period, an additional fifteen years of pervasive influence. Many students of East Asian regional affairs simplistically cite this “history” as the primary factor inhibiting further cooperation and understanding between Japan and the two Koreas. However, more than “history” affects the willingness of North and South Korea to accept Japanese revision of Article 9, and, therefore, a greater role in regional security affairs. Will the Korean peninsula balance against what it perceives as a militarily rising Japan, hence fueling downward security spirals in the region, or acquiesce to its “hegemonic” ambitions? What will Korea’s approach be to manage this dilemma and what are the interests, factors, and instruments driving it? Finally, what will Japan’s response be to this “approach,” and what impact will other regional powers—the United States and China—have on this relationship?

Numerous sayings have been “coined” over the years to characterize this relationship, and Korea’s position within it. For example: “Korea is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan;” “Korea is the land bridge to Asia;” “Korea is a shrimp between two whales;” and, most recently, Korea as the second tier of “the flying geese.” Setting aside these rudimentary portrayals, this chapter, in its first four sections, analyzes the current dynamics of this complex relationship and provides an assessment of the Korean response to Japanese revision of Article 9. These sections will dissect this regional issue in three parts: 1) an overview of relations; 2) an assessment of the interests and factors driving both Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s approach; and 3) an analysis of each Koreas’ approach to revision of Article 9. Once the groundwork has been laid, sections five and six will provide an assessment of the possible and likely responses that Japan may take in

\textsuperscript{105} In order to provide a holistic assessment of the regional response to Japanese movement towards revision of Article 9, this chapter combines North and South Korean approaches to demonstrate an overall response. As needed, the North and South’s individual relationships and reactions will be examined separately in this analysis.
the face of Korean pressure, and, finally, will close by analyzing the prospects for Korean success and briefly review the impact that third-party regional actors may have on the outcome and process.

B. KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS OVERVIEW

Diplomatic relations between Japan and the Korean peninsula have been mired over the last half-century by persistent political squabbling. In the south, Tokyo and Seoul did not re-establish normalized diplomatic relations until 1965, over twenty years after the end of World War II and the collapse of the Japanese colonial empire. For the northern half of the Korean peninsula—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) — normalization of state-to-state relations with Japan continues to elude the two sides. Despite normalization, relations between South Korea and Japan proceeded rather cautiously. As Victor Cha states, “It was not until 1979, a full 14 years after normalisation (and decades more of mutually held Cold War security threats), that Seoul and Tokyo established the first bilateral consultative council on security affairs (a parliamentary body).”106 This section will provide a brief overview of this relationship in three parts: 1) ROK-Japan relations; 2) DPRK-Japan relations; and 3) Japan’s polices towards the two Koreas.

Since the end of Japanese occupation and the solidification of the division on the Korean peninsula, numerous factors have contributed to the vacillating ROK-Japan diplomatic relationship. A few of the primary impediments have been: a Korean identity based on opposition to Japan; chronic trade deficits; and, certainly, Japanese treatment of “history.” As Victor Cha and Selig Harrison have so thoughtfully identified, the Korean identity and its associated nationalism is foundationally built on a premise of “anti-Japanism.”107 Due to this underlying sentiment, it has been difficult for Koreans to set aside this identity to achieve greater cooperation with its Japanese neighbors. In addition, this anti-Japan attitude has been institutionally reinforced in the two major national holidays that the ROK celebrates each year—Independence Movement Day (1 March)


and Independence Day (15 August).\textsuperscript{108} The establishment of these dates as days to reinforce the memory of Japanese aggression has become so institutionalized that the current Korean president, Roh Moo hyun, uses them to issue public statements admonishing Japan about its remembrance of history.\textsuperscript{109}

Another factor that fuels South Korean weariness of Japanese intentions is the chronic trade deficit that is in Tokyo’s favor. In August of 2005, Yonhap News reported that,

\begin{quote}
Last year [2004], South Korea reported its largest-ever trade deficit of US$24.4 billion with Japan, the highest level on record among all its trading partners, according to the nation's Commerce Ministry.

Warning of the perils of becoming an economic tributary to Japan, the deficit has snowballed in recent years, with the deficits of $9.9 billion in 2001, $14.7 billion in 2002 and $19 billion in 2003.

For the January-June period of 2005, South Korea also posted a $11.9 billion trade deficit with Japan, the ministry's recent snapshot of trade activity showed.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

Selig Harrison, in his book \textit{Korean Endgame}, succinctly captures the Korean sentiment when he states, “Japanese companies, in turn, did their part to make South Korea dependent on Japanese technology, rather than other foreign technology, by establishing informal control over South Korean enterprises through dummy partners and technical assistance or licensing agreements, as distinct from equity investment.”\textsuperscript{111}

Finally, a key aspect of Japan-Korean relations is its long and colored history. Many of the problems that hinder cooperation today either directly or indirectly stem from history-related issues. The period that is of greatest focus is from the annexation of Korea in 1910 until the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945. In addition, post-World War II history has complicated the relationship even further. These issues will be

\begin{footnotes}

\footnote{109 “S. Korea's Roh raps Japan on History,” \textit{The Korea Herald}, March 2, 2006.}


\footnote{111 Harrison, \textit{Korean Endgame}, 297.}
\end{footnotes}
discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter, but they deserve mention since they are important facets of the overall relationship: 1) the kidnapping of Japanese by the North; 2) Pyongyang missile tests; 3) the collapse of the Agreed Framework to denuclearize North Korea; and 4) the subsequent creation of the Six-Party Talks mechanism. Japan’s legacy in Korea is harsh, be it comfort women, forced labor, eradication of the Korean culture, or direct subjugation. Therefore, it is not surprising that history, if encouraged, can play a prominent role in state-to-state relations.

In contrast to these negative aspects of the relationship, there have been counter forces that have brought these two states closer together. One such force that numerous analysts cite has been the persistent threat of a North Korean attack as an impetus for closer ROK-Japan relations.112 For example, within two months of the August 1998 DPRK Taepodong missile launch over the Japanese archipelago, Seoul and Tokyo issued a joint declaration pledging greater security cooperation.113 Within two months of this agreement, a “torrent” of military exchanges and joint exercises had begun to take form.114 Contributing to or a byproduct of this warming of diplomatic relations, there are some indications that, on the social and cultural level, relations appear to be improving since normalization. “The number of Japanese tourists visiting Korea in 2004 was some 2.4 million, up more than 30 percent from the 1.8 million figure for 2003. More Korean tourists are also visiting Japan as part of increasingly diversified tour programs, and 2005 has been designated as Korea-Japan Friendship Year.”115 In addition, during the period from 1998 to 2002, positive relations flourished, culminating in the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup. According to a joint survey conducted upon completion of the World Cup in July 2002 by Japanese and Korean newspapers, Asahi Shimbun and Dong-A Ilbo, 78.8 percent of Korean and 79 percent of Japanese


113 Fouse, “Japan’s North Korea Policy,” 110.


respondents projected that their two countries would “move into a more desirable relationship.”

The above examples provide a clear demonstration of the positive impact that individual leadership can have on this relationship. It is not a coincidence that this dramatic thawing of South Korean-Japanese relations took place during the administration of Kim Dae-jung—popularly known as DJ. DJ’s “history” with Japan guided his policy initiatives, which led to the temporary “healing” of the South Korea-Japan relationship. In the early 1970s, DJ was residing in Japan where he was responsible for an opposition movement against then President Park Chung-hee. The extent of his ties to Tokyo became more evident in the aftermath of his abduction from the safety of Japan by ROK special agents on 8 August 1973 and later when Park’s successor Chun Doo-hwan sentenced him to death. The Japanese government protested against the trial and used diplomatic efforts to influence his release.117 Because of this support as Moon and Suh surmise, “…much of his [DJ’s] effort later to improve Korean-Japanese relations could be attributed to the action of Japanese when he was kidnapped.”118

However, under the current leadership of President Roh Moo-hyun, there has been a “shift” in the administration’s policies regarding relations with Japan.119 In essence, the shift is to a “hard line” stance against what is perceived as Japan’s attempt to achieve regional hegemony and its lack of remorse for the atrocities that it committed during World War II. Under the Roh administration, these “hard spots” in the relationship—specifically textbook revision, apologies, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and claims to Dokdo/Takeshima—have emerged as what appear to be insurmountable issues.

In contrast to the wide array of issues that bind and divide the southern half of the Korean peninsula and Japan, in the North there are three key aspects that define the

119 See Hosup Kim, “Evaluation of President Roh Moo-hyun’s Policy Toward Japan,” Korea Focus 13, no. 6 (November-December 2005): 47-49.
Pyongyang-Tokyo relationship (besides military threat—discussed separately): 1) normalization; 2) the “aid” package that will come with normalization; and 3) regime legitimacy. The formal normalization process began in September 1995 when Japan’s Prime Minister Murayama announced his intention to begin the process. These early attempts failed for various reasons and the process has been stalled ever since. This year [2006], the DPRK and Japan are scheduled to resume talks concerning the normalization of diplomatic relations. The primary reason why Pyongyang is so persistent in its efforts to normalize relations is the much-needed economic “aid” package that will come with it. North Korea’s economic health has suffered significantly since the end of the Cold War; therefore, the $5-$10 billion dollar normalization reparation package is viewed as essential to regime survival and to assist with economic recovery. The final factor in the DPRK-Japan relationship is similar to that of the ROK in that regime legitimacy has traditionally been founded on opposition to Japan. In the words of David Fouse, “…North Korea stood out as a special challenge given that its leadership had defined its own legitimacy unequivocally in terms of opposition to Japanese colonial oppression.” This phenomenon is “baggage” remaining from the original split of the Korean Peninsula and Pyongyang’s insistence that it was the true nationalist freedom fighters and, thus, had the right to rule. However, the leadership in the South was Japanese collaborators and, therefore, their credibility to rule Korea was illegitimate, or so they claimed. These three factors in the DPRK-Japan relationship are the most prominent issues that will influence Pyongyang’s approach to revision of Article 9. However, there are numerous other issues that divide these two countries, with the most obvious being military contention. This factor will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

On the other side of this bilateral relationship, Japan has consistently demonstrated that the main concern in its relationship with the ROK and DPRK is continued stability, thereby ensuring an amenable regional and international environment for economic


123 Fouse, “Japan’s North Korea Policy,” 105
growth. Thus, Japan supports the status quo of a divided Korea, is apprehensive toward the hard-line policy approach that the United States at times pursues, and is primarily focused on its economic relationship with the Korean peninsula or, what is termed in Japanese, *seikei bunri* (separating political and economic issues). As Edward Olsen states in his book *Korea: The Divided Nation*,

> While many in the Japanese public may share that skepticism about U.S. policies, the conservative government under the Koizumi administration that held office at the same time as Roh and Bush, clearly was empathetic toward a more hard-line approach to North Korea, critical of Roh, and uneasy about the prospects of China gaining more clout in guiding the inter-Korean efforts to resolve the tensions created by the DPRK’s nuclear option.124

The key word in the above quote is “empathetic;” Tokyo is “sensitive” to the actions of the United States but still follows a pragmatic policy approach. This is not to say that Japan does not react when North Korea “rattles its cage,” but rather that over the long term it is more focused on a slow evolutionary change on the peninsula. Specifically, Tokyo’s two major concerns with the unification of Korea are the massive refugee problem that a North Korean collapse would cause125 and the inheritance of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the ROK.126 Finally, over the last two decades, Japan has become more focused on the benefits of establishing multilateral and regional organizations to deal with foreign policy problems. In particular, it has proposed or helped to establish the Six-Party framework that currently exists to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue, a Free Trade agreement (FTA) between Japan, Korea, and ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization,127 and an Asia Monetary

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Fund (AMF). Therefore, it is important to observe a pattern of growing regional engagement through multilateral institutions.\(^{128}\)

\section*{C. KOREAN INTERESTS AND FACTORS}

This section will explore and analyze the five predominant interests and factors that have influenced the above outlined approach of the two Koreas. Specifically, the five factors that will be explored are: 1) territorial integrity; 2) economics; 3) historical revisionism / antagonism; 4) nationalism; and 5) normalization.

The first factor that influences South Korea’s approach to Japanese revision of Article 9 is the persistence of Japanese claim to the island the ROK calls Dokdo and the Japanese call Takeshima. In 2005, this issue was rekindled when Japan’s Shimane prefecture established 22 February as Takeshima Day and “during a press conference in Seoul in February 2005, Japan’s Ambassador to Korea Takano Toshiyuki brazenly claimed that Dokdo belongs to Japan.”\(^{129}\) As Choi Sung-jae reveals in his article, “The Politics of the Dokdo Issue,” this foreign policy problem has been captured by domestic political forces and established as a topic that, “no ambitious politicians in Korea can ignore….”\(^{130}\) The Dokdo factor will continue to influence the foreign policy approach of South Korea as long as elements in Japan continue to verbally and physically\(^{131}\) attempt to claim the island. These claims, combined with a Japan that appears to be shedding some of its pre-existing military constraints—with the revision of Article 9 and the movement towards establishing the defense agency as a full ministry—have made Korea apprehensive about Japan’s goals and doubtful of its overall transparency.

The second interest that has guided Korea’s approach towards its neighbor across the East Sea is and has been economic. In particular, there are three subcategories that are of concern to Seoul and Pyongyang: 1) dependence; 2) retribution or compensation; and 3) assistance with ensuring an economic “soft landing” for North Korea. The ROK is extremely wary of its dependence on the Japanese economy. This is evident in its


\(^{129}\) Kim, “Roh Moo-hyun’s Policy toward Japan,” 39.

\(^{130}\) Choi, “The Dokdo Issue,” 489.

\(^{131}\) “A more recent example of more extreme tactics was Nihon Shidokai’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to actually land on the island in May 2004.” See Choi, “The Dokdo Issue,” 476.
concern over the trade deficit that exists and in its opposition to Tokyo’s efforts to establish a “Yen bloc,” or even a Japan-led Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The DPRK has not had the opportunity to develop a dependence on the official Japanese economy, but rather, over the last six decades, it has become increasingly reliant on the monetary interaction that comes from the pro-North Korean organization in Japan—Chosen Soren. In recent years, the Japanese government has made a concerted effort to eliminate the economic remittance moving from Chosen Soren to the Kim Jong-il regime in response to events such as the Taepodong missile launch of 2002. It has accomplished this task through unfavorable banking regulations for Chosen Soren-run banks and by establishing strict maritime laws that mandate the need for insurance for all vessels docking in Japanese ports. This is restrictive to North Korean shipping because its vessels are the primary uninsured users of Japanese ports. Second, as detailed in section one, the DPRK is extremely interested in the amount of “retribution” that it may be able to extract from Tokyo for its World War II aggression. The ROK is also watching closely to see that the North’s compensation is equitable to what it received in 1965 and because the remittance will help the South with its strategic goal of ensuring a “soft landing” for Pyongyang’s failed economy. As Kaseda Yoshinori states about the Kim Dae-jung administration, “President Kim, whose Sunshine policy had promoted the soft-landing of the crippled North Korean economy, also wanted to see greater Japanese economic assistance to North Korea because the financial burden for the soft-landing was too much for South Korea alone to shoulder.” Therefore, on the one hand, Korea is concerned about its dependence on the Japanese economy but, on the other hand, both sides of the demilitarized zone see the necessity of Japanese assistance. These economic issues certainly contribute to the foreign policy outlook and approach detailed above.

The third factor that influences the use of an approach of opposition, balancing, and coercion is the history issue. There are a number of specific issues that stem from this factor—the Yasukuni Shrine; textbook disputes; historical apologies; and reparations for comfort women and forced labor. These have become important issues for both

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North and South Korea because the division of the peninsula and, thus, the establishment of these two separate states, are indirectly attributable to the legacy of Japan. If Japan had respected the sovereignty of the Korean kingdom back in 1910, there would not have been the need to divide the nation into Soviet and American “trusteeships” in 1945. In addition, the occupation of Korea by Japan was brutal and bloody, leaving a permanent mark on the Korean peninsula. Three of the more pungent examples from this period of brutality are: the use of Korean girls as sex slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army fighting in Manchuria and greater China; the use of forced labor throughout the Empire; and the attempted eradication of the Korean culture through political, social, and educational indoctrination. Therefore, it is not surprising that the two Koreas are skeptical of any attempt by Japan to assume more responsibility for regional security because it feels that Tokyo has not reassured the region with an adequate apology for its atrocities from the last time it was a “normal nation.” For example, even the written apology provided to Kim Dae-jung in 1998 can be called into question because, as Selig Harrison points out, “…the word for ‘apology’ used in the Japanese text of this declaration, owabi, is weaker and more ambiguous than shojai, the word that Seoul had suggested.”134 Thus, this lack of what some consider a sincere apology and regional refusal to forget the past has contributed to the distrust that exists today between Japan and its neighbors.135 Therefore, this phenomenon contributes to the apprehension Korea has concerning the “normalization” of Japanese security forces.

The fourth factor that influences the Korean approach is nationalism. As detailed in section one, nationalism was a foundational factor in the creation and maintenance of the ROK and DPRK. Before Japanese colonization, Korea lacked a strong identity as a Western-type nation state.136 Therefore, its subjugation was the spark for a Korean national identity that was founded on anti-Japanese colonialism. In the words of Victor Cha, a highly regarded expert on Korea,

Negatively constructed nationalisms and nationalist myths are not unique to Korea; however the degree to which this identity is so viscerally framed

134 Harrison, Korean Endgame, 292.
135 Er, “The Apology Issue,” 34.
136 See: Cha, “Hate Power and Identity.”
against a past aggressor may marginally distinguish the Korean case. For example, the two national holidays in Korea (1 March or samilchol and 15 August or kwangbokchol) celebrate Korean patriotism by specifically resurrecting anti-Japanese images. The fiftieth anniversary celebrations of Korean independence in 1995 were marked by an excessively expensive raising (over $200 million) of the National Museum (the former colonial headquarters of Japan). By contrast, 4 July is a patriotic institution in the US but its construction is a a pro-American holiday more than an explicitly anti-British one.\textsuperscript{137}

This “us vs. them” type of nationalism is reinforced through state propaganda in the North and strategic statements made on specific anniversaries in the South. Of interest is the recent phenomenon of a united Korean remembrance and protest. In 2005, both sides of the peninsula observed the 60th anniversary of Liberation Day by announcing a Joint statement calling for Japan to “stop distorting the past and pay as compensation for its past invasions and crimes.”\textsuperscript{138} In addition, “the two sides urged Tokyo to end attempts to whitewash war crimes, withdraw amendments to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which commits the country to pacifism, suspend Tokyo's military expansionist policies and its deployment of forces overseas, and end sanctions against North Korea.”\textsuperscript{139}

Finally, the last factor that bears upon North Korea’s approach is diplomatic normalization with Japan. This process has been two decades in the making. However, progress has been stalled due to the relatively recent disclosure that the DPRK had been abducting Japanese citizens to assist its spies in infiltrating Japan. The 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit in Pyongyang secured the return of those still alive, but this has only spurred increased popular resentment for the communist regime and calls for a full accounting of those who had died while in captivity. Barring a dramatic change in the DPRK’s position on the issue, a diplomatic stalemate will persist for some time to come. South Korea’s détente with the North has altered its position on Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization. However, Seoul is still wary of Japan gaining the upper hand on the peninsula. In the words of Yoshinori Kaseda, “historically, Seoul has shown strong displeasure when

\textsuperscript{137} Cha, “Hate Power and Identity,” 314n11.
\textsuperscript{138} “North and South Korea Blast Japan on Liberation Day,” Chosun Ilbo, August 15, 2005, in FBIS, August 15, 2005, KPP20050815000172.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
Japan improves its relations with Pyongyang more than Seoul did.”140 In addition, South Korea is determined to separate the ongoing Six-Party Talks from either abduction or normalization issues, but Japan persistently attempts to push these issues onto the agenda. “Song Min-soon, chief negotiator of the Republic of Korea (ROK), pointed out at the six-party talks' opening ceremony that the current round of talks should focus on the Korean nuclear issue.”141 Referring to the attempt by the Japanese delegation to introduce the abduction issue, he said, “it is inappropriate to distract the talks from its focal point.”142 This factor and the four others detailed above—1) territorial integrity; 2) economics; 3) historical revisionism / antagonism; and 4) nationalism—each in their own way influence the approach that Seoul and Pyongyang take to deal with Japanese revision of Article 9. The next section will explore the instruments and channels that the two Koreas use to promote modification or change of Japanese initiatives.

D. KOREA’S APPROACH

Do the two Koreas believe that Japanese revision of Article 9 is a foreign policy problem? What has been its approach to deal with this issue and what instruments or channels has it used to achieve its desired end-state? In the words of the DPRK state-run internet web portal Naenara, “Japan runs amuck to bury Article 9 of the constitution now in force which stipulates that Japan should abandon war and use of armed forces and have no war forces in a bid to turn itself into a war country on a lawful basis.”143 In addition, in March 2006, South Korean President Roh gave a similar assessment of Japan’s actions without the scathing rhetoric, “if Japan wants to become a leading country in the world, it should gain trust from the international community through its conduct in light of universal human conscience and historical experience, not just by revising its laws or strengthening its military forces.”144 It is evident from the above statements and the decision by President Roh to reject Prime Minister Koizumi’s request

142 Ibid.
144 “Roh raps Japan on History.”
for a summit in 2005,\textsuperscript{145} that the current leadership on the Korean peninsula are concerned about revision of Article 9 and, more specifically, about a growing desire by Tokyo to assume more autonomy for its military protection. To cope with this policy dilemma, the two Koreas have: 1) opposed; 2) balanced; and 3) attempted to coerce. All three of these maneuvers are attempts to encourage Japan to slow down its security reform initiatives and to take into consideration the concerns of its regional neighbors. However, unlike the China case, South Korean protest, in general, does not directly attack or mention the revision of Article 9 but rather it focuses on other issues that are reflective of a changing Japan—Yasukuni Shrine visits, ahistorical textbook revision, and rising claims to the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands.

1. **Oppose**

A standard foreign policy tactic of nations is to oppose the actions of other nations in order to influence a desired response. In keeping with this tactic, over the last five decades of normalized relations between the ROK and Japan, Seoul has opposed a number of its initiatives and actions. One of the more recent examples is Japan’s attempt to establish an Asian equivalent to the International Monetary Fund, which would have provided a safety net for Asian participants faced with economic financial crisis. In the words of Moon and Suh, “national sentiments in South Korea would not tolerate Japan’s hegemonic ascension in the region’s economic sphere.”\textsuperscript{146} In addition, both the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine controversies have fueled heated opposition by the two Koreas to Japanese historical revisionism and antagonism.\textsuperscript{147} In response to Koizumi’s first visit as Prime Minister in 2001, South Korea’s ruling Millennium Democratic Party “…lawmakers delivered a letter of protest to the Japanese Embassy in Seoul in which they expressed "deep disappointment and a sense of betrayal" at Koizumi's shrine visit

\textsuperscript{145} “FM Urges Japan To Look At Historical Root Of Dokdo,” \textit{Yonhap}, May 01, 2006, in \textit{FBIS}, May 01, 2006, KPP20060501971080.

\textsuperscript{146} Moon and Suh, “Security, Economy, and Identity Politics,” 583.

and demanded an apology from him along with a declaration that he would not visit the shrine again in the future.148

The primary instruments that Korea has used to mediate Japanese behavior are domestic protest and diplomatic rhetoric. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, domestic protest has been an effective tool for the Chinese government in its attempts to influence the Japanese decision-making process. However, for Korea, this channel has been less effective because the North is internationally marginalized as radical and insignificant and the South does not have the same level of control over its population as Beijing does. Through its control of the media and the police force, China can spur and end domestic protest more effectively than a democratically-elected regime can through a free press and a police force that represents the people rather than the state or party. Along these same lines, the North does have a distinct advantage in using the third instrument of diplomatic rhetoric. Even if it is disregarded internationally, it is still an important tool for influencing the dialogue on the issue. As detailed in section one, the DPRK has been consistent in its use of its state run media sources to reprimand Japanese behavior. On the contrary, the ROK is at the mercy of the free press to convey its messages of displeasure.

This tactic or approach has had a mixed track record of success. It influenced Prime Minister Nakasone’s decision to apologize and cease any further visits to the Yasukuni Shrine during his tenure in office.149 In addition, in the case of the textbook controversy of 1986, it produced an apology and resignation of the education minister.150 However, today this approach appears to be having little effect on the Koizumi administration. Korean opposition only had a minimal impact on Koizumi’s first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as Prime Minister. Specifically, he changed the date of his visit from the anniversary of the end of World War II (August 15), as was promised during his election campaign, to two days prior.151 Nevertheless, this acquiescence by Koizumi did

148 “S. Korea's ruling party holds rally.”
151 Shibuichi, “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute,” 211.
not satisfy Japan’s regional neighbors.\textsuperscript{152} Also, under the current Japanese administration, Korean opposition to recent textbook revisions has had similarly little effect. This defiant behavior by Tokyo, many believe, is predominantly fueled by the charismatic nationalistic behavior of Prime Minister Koizumi and is reinforced by the George W. Bush administration. Indeed, the next three years will see three of the four leaders in this four-sided relationship—Japan, United States, ROK, and DPRK—turn over, and with that, a very different dynamic may emerge. In the near term, Korea will continue to use opposition to influence Japanese behavior with varying degrees of success.

2. Balance

The second facet of the Korean approach to the foreign policy problem of Japanese revisionist behavior has been to balance against what is perceived as an initiative by Tokyo to establish itself as a regional hegemon. Korea’s regional balancing has taken on two particular forms: alignment with China; and militarily. As Kim Hosup states,

\ldots a basic policy adjustment has been adopted by the Roh administration in terms of Korea’s role within the existing Northeast Asian order. In particular, the President has stated that Korea would play a balancing role in assuring the peace and prosperity of not only the Korean peninsula but Northeast Asia as well…\textsuperscript{153}

Korea’s geographical and political positions in Northeast Asia make it well suited to play the balancing role that South Korean President Roh desires. The last two centuries have demonstrated Korea’s importance as the country at “the center” of Sino-Japanese contention and, with political hostilities on the rise, the Korean peninsula will once again find itself in the middle of this conflict.\textsuperscript{154}

Aligning with China is one instrument the two Koreas have pursued in an effort to balance against Japan. The beginning of this policy shift has started to take place both economically and politically. Economic integration between the two Koreas and China is

\textsuperscript{152} Shibuichi, “The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute,” 212
\textsuperscript{153} Kim, “Roh Moo-hyun’s Policy toward Japan,” 50.
growing. In 2004, an Asian Times article insightfully describes the changing regional order in Northeast Asia,

However, this time "China's soft power" is no longer Confucianism, but the even more influential economic and trading power in this rapidly globalizing world economy. And Koreans, befitting their ancient proud self-appellation of being a "mini-China", have certainly caught the tide early on. The world has just witnessed the epochal event in 2003 when two-way Sino-South Korea trade exceeded that between South Korea and the No 1 economy on earth, the US, barely 10 years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two Cold War ideological and battlefield enemies.155

This phenomenon is evident in the rapid growth of economic exchanges between both halves of the Korean peninsula. As mentioned above, in 2003, China surpassed the United States as the number one recipient of Korean exports and this has continued to be the case since. On the cultural level, in May 2006, China and South Korea “signed an agreement to enhance the exchanges and cooperation on culture and copyright issues….According to the agreement, the two sides will help with each other and seek common benefits within the World Trade Organization and other international institutions.”156 On the economic side, for the ROK, Seoul is apprehensive of any FTA that does not include China as one of the principal partners. Politically, as North Korea’s only remaining security treaty partner, Pyongyang understands that its regime survival is dependent on the “China factor.” Additionally, China’s honest broker leadership within the multilateral Six-Party Talks has increased its political currency with the Roh administration. In the words of Dennis Halpin, a senior staff member on the House Committee on International Relations, “I am worried Korea is a ripe apple swinging on a very weak twig waiting to fall into the lap of China. I see Chinese influence rising on the whole Korean Peninsula, and that's a danger to our [U.S.] strategic interest in Asia.”157

Depending on the severity of the perceived crisis, South Korea will forgo its desire to play the balancer in Northeast Asia in order to secure its national interests with

the assistance of China. Kim Hosup chronicles this phenomenon under the Roh administration:

Korea’s desire to expand its military cooperation with China, in accordance with its policy of playing a balancing role or serving as a ‘balancer’ within the Northeast Asian order, is related to the issue of Japan’s colonial rule and aggression. After returning from a Korea-China defense ministerial meeting held in China in April 2005, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung expressed the promotion of a balanced military diplomacy toward neighboring states as a means of preserving Korea’s national interests. In calling for ‘Korea to hold defense-related meetings with Japan and China at an equal frequency,’ Yoon [ROK Defense Minister] thus made clear his intention of playing the China card, in this particular case Seoul-Beijing military cooperation, in order to check Japan.158

Korea’s ability to use this “China card” to balance and at the same time not become entangled in a Chinese sphere of influence is doubtful. As China “rises,” the probability of it “reshaping the regional order”159 grows, and, consequently, the ability of Seoul to use the “China card” to its own advantage will diminish. Therefore, over the long run, South Korea will need to decide where it fits into a Chinese-dominated regional order and whether it is ready to forgo its traditional quasi alliance with the United States and Japan.160

Finally, both Koreas have used military balancing to dissuade Japan from expanding its military capabilities. Theoretically, the buildup of defensive weapons, particularly in defense dominant geographies like Northeast Asia, should not cause a spiral of tension. However, Hwang Jihwan postulates that the “deep-seated historical antagonism can make the defensive stance seem offensive in East Asia.”161 One demonstration of this has been the two countries’ past responses to a hostile North Korea

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160 A quasi alliance is one in which two states remain unallied but share a third party as a common ally. The principal characteristic of the model is its emphasis on policies of the United States as a key causal determinant of changes in Japan-ROK bilateral behavior. See Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 3.

161 Hwang, "Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power," 104.
and a “rising” China. Within the confines of traditional balance of power theory, one would have expected Japan and South Korea to develop a countervailing alliance. However, an increase in security cooperation has not been the case; instead, what can be observed are increased tensions on the part of both nations, thereby increasing the probability of downward security spirals.162

3. Coerce

Finally, the last facet of the two Koreas’ approach to resolving Japanese foreign policy problems is to coerce. The clearest examples of the use of coercion come from the DPRK because it typically involves some sort of overt military action—Taepodong missile tests, incursions into Japanese territorial waters, and nuclear brinkmanship. However, how much of President Roh’s comments condemning Tokyo’s behavior is directed at a Japanese domestic audience is hard to determine. Nevertheless, his comments certainly help to fuel protests by the Japanese domestic left against regionally provocative behavior. By the same token, North Korea has also used methods at its disposal to attempt to coerce Tokyo to acquiesce to Pyongyang’s demands. David Fouse provides an excellent example of such behavior; “with Japan unwilling to move forward on normalization talks despite the return visit of the Japanese wives, North Korea determined to up the ante again in August 1998 with the test launch of a Taepodong rocket, which traversed northern Japan before falling into the Pacific Ocean.”163 A clear connection between the DPRK’s use of coercion and Japanese revision Article 9 is not evident. However, it has demonstrated that it has used brinkmanship in the past, so it is probable that it would use it in the future.

In particular, the northern half of the Korean peninsula has consistently relied on brinkmanship as a foreign policy instrument. Some of the more prominent examples are the 1994 crisis that brought Northeast Asia to the brink of war and the 1998 Taepodong rocket launch over Japan. The importance of this event in Japanese life and politics is poignantly described by Yoichi Funabashi. As the missile passed through Japanese airspace, it “had a psychological impact on the Japanese equivalent to the Sputnik shock

162 Hwang, "Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power," 101.
163 Fouse, “Japan’s North Korea Policy,” 110.
to the American people in 1957.”164 This attempt by North Korea to encourage Tokyo to return to the negotiating table165 has had the unintended effect of providing the ultra-conservative elements in Japan with the domestic support they needed to push for expanded military capabilities and confrontational behavior. This behavior on the part of North Korea could likely encourage downward security spirals throughout the region, not just between the DPRK and Japan. As Thomas J. Christensen states,

the theory [security dilemma theory] states that, in an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats. This can lead to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional tensions, reducing security, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one’s security environment.166

Therefore, based on the current state of affairs in Northeast Asia, it is probable that North Korea will continue to use brinkmanship because there is little for it to lose.

In summary, if Japan proceeds down its ad hoc road to Article 9 revision, the two Koreas will likely use opposition, balancing, and coercion to cope with this perceived foreign policy dilemma. Whether this approach and these instruments will be effective in slowing the process of Japanese military “normalization,” and what the possible responses from Tokyo might be, will be explored in the following section.

E. POSSIBLE JAPANESE RESPONSES

Based on the above analysis and the determination that the two Koreas will use opposition, balancing, and coercion to deal with the problem of Japanese revision of Article 9: What will Tokyo’s response be when presented with such an effort? This section will outline three predominant responses that have emerged over the last sixty years and conclude with a prediction of what Japan’s response will be to the issue at hand and why. The three overarching responses that can be observed are: 1) moderation; 2) status quo; and 3) defiance.

165 Fouse, “Japan’s North Korea Policy,” 110.
A successful Korean approach will produce a moderated Japanese response and a change in its behavior. There are two important examples of this approach achieving at least partial success on the controversial Yasukuni Shrine issue: Prime Minister Nakasone’s apology and change in policy concerning his visits to the Shrine in the 1980s; and Prime Minister Koizumi’s partial acquiescence with his break in stated intentions by visiting a few days prior to 15 August 2001. In addition, this approach was successful during the textbook revision controversies of 1982 and 1986. As Lee Myon-woo details in his article, “Textbook Conflicts and Korea-Japan Relations,” in the case of the 1982 crisis, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa announced that Japan would make the necessary amendments.167 The 1986 controversy had a similar outcome with a slight twist. In the midst of the conflict, Fujio Masayuki, a known conservative, was appointed to the position of education minister and, in response to harsh criticism, he returned accusation with accusation. “As the criticism abroad expanded, the Japanese government issued a formal apology for Fujio’s remarks and in the end accepted his resignation.”168 These four episodes are demonstrations of the effectiveness of the Korean approach to achieve Japanese moderation in the face of perceived behavioral problems.

The second possible response by the Japanese could be to simply maintain the “status quo” by neither moderating its behavior in response to the Korean approach nor responding with open defiance. This response is prevalent today in the “foot dragging” policy that Tokyo is employing against North Korea. Rather than assisting North Korea or siding with the United States to abruptly end the DPRK regime, Japan is biding its time and waiting for a gradual collapse. By maintaining its “status quo” policy towards Korean unification, Japan believes that it can best serve its national interest. A second example of this response is Japan’s reluctance to support Washington’s extreme tactic of stopping all oil supplies to the DPRK that were promised in the 1994 agreed framework.

The last response that Tokyo may elect to follow is one of defiance to the Korean approach of behavioral moderation. Under Prime Minister Koizumi’s leadership, this has emerged as the prescription of choice. Authors such as Kaseda Yoshinori believe that North Korean coercion through the instrument of brinkmanship has spurred Japan to

break “…away from its longstanding pacifist policy and began to develop offensive capability and enhance its intelligence capability.” 169 Most recently, there have been four examples of defiance in response to DPRK maneuvering: 1) the implementation of Theater Missile Defense (TMD); 2) setting aside the 1969 Diet Resolution that prohibited the military use of space by establishing a spy satellite program in 1998; 170 3) strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance; and 4) the ending of Japanese food shipments to the DPRK in 2002 in response to its brinkmanship. A Japanese response of defiance can also be observed in the textbook and Yasukuni Shrine controversies since Prime Minister Koizumi took office.

In summary, the Japanese government has demonstrated all three responses at one period or another and the reason for this phenomenon predominantly falls on the shoulders of domestic politics and its leadership. Prime Minister Koizumi is a charismatic and popular politician with a flare that is rare in Japanese politics; these traits have provided him with an unusually high degree of political autonomy. Thus, if Tokyo hurriedly adopts some form of Article 9 revision, Korea will respond through opposition, balancing, and coercion to moderate Japanese behavior. Japan’s counter response will depend on the leadership and the domestic political situation at the time. However, if Koizumi or his possible successor Shinzo Abe is in office, the most likely response will be one of defiance. This situation will fuel a security dilemma in Northeast Asia and a destructive downward security spiral. 171 Therefore, what can be done to ameliorate this hazardous situation? Moreover, what role has the United States and China played in producing this conflict? In the last section of this chapter, the analysis will turn to look at the overall prospects for the Korea-Japan relationship and what influence the two other regional powers have had and could have on the process.

F. PROSPECTS

The prospects for a sanguine emergence of Japan as a “normalized” military power through the revision of Article 9 are bleak unless Japan increases its transparency and the time horizon surrounding such a dramatic shift in its security posture. The

170 Fouse, “Japan’s North Korea Policy,” 111.
current ad hoc movement towards revision is fueling distrust and apprehension in Seoul and Pyongyang and, as of late, neither the United States nor China has been helping to ease this tension. As Robyn Lim assesses:

China's vital interest on the Korean peninsula is to exercise maximum influence over the process of reunification. The last thing China wants to see is a strong and independent state on its northeastern frontier, any more than it has wanted a strong and independent Vietnam on its southern borders.172

With respect to the U.S. influence, of particular interest was the presumable effort by Washington to derail the Japan-DPRK normalization efforts in 2002. “The prospects for the early conclusion of normalization treaty and for the rebuilding of the North Korean economy with Japanese economic cooperation further diminished and virtually evaporated when Washington revealed Pyongyang’s clandestine uranium enrichment program on October 16, 2002.”173 Is it a coincidence that this revelation came to light less than a month after Koizumi’s one-day summit with Kim Jong-il, which was intended to “kick start normalization” talks, and just one day after the much anticipated return of the five surviving abductees from North Korea? The timing points to an intended effort by the United States to derail the normalization process because it was not in its interest to increase the longevity of the Kim dynasty—of which, it is feared, will likely proliferate WMD technologies and material—through the substantial Japanese economic package that would accompany normalization. Victor Cha, in his theory of the quasi-alliance relationship that exists between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, describes another negative influence that Washington has on the relationship:

…the U.S. presence may foster a ‘freedom of irresponsibility,’ in which the incentives for the two states, especially Korea, to approach relations in a more rational and constructive manner are low and the temptation to utilize bilateral animosities for domestic political purposes is high.174

Whether it is intentional derailment or mere presence, the United States has an unmistakable influence on Korean-Japanese relations. Thus, the question remains: What can the United States do to abrogate the downward security spirals that will evolve from

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174 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 204.
the ad hoc revision of Article 9? In the next chapter, this question will be explored and three recommendations for U.S. policy makers will be presented.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This final chapter provides three policy recommendations that will assist in minimizing the emergence of downward security spirals in response to a militarily “normal” Japan. In their most rudimentary form, these recommendations are founded on the stabilizing nature of the status quo security arrangement in Northeast Asia and, by slowing the emergence of Japan as a “normal” military actor in Northeast Asia for a specified period, they will help to ease the fears on the Korean peninsula and in China. A declaratory policy of revising Article 9 on the 75th anniversary of the constitution’s enactment will assist in separating the practical need for revision and the inflammatory actions of any particular Japanese regime, as well as increase the transparency of the movement by providing direction to the current ad hoc attempts at revision. In summary, the following are the recommendations to American policy makers: 1) encourage Japan to postpone the revision of Article 9 until the 75th constitutional anniversary; 2) maintain current military force levels in the region leading up to this transition date; and 3) utilize Japan’s ability to project “soft power,” vice a narrow-sighted push for “hard power,” in the security alliance. Execution of these policies will be a delicate diplomatic process and recommendations two and three should be implemented first because they foster a conducive environment for the achievement of policy recommendation one. In order to accomplish this, the U.S. State Department will have to ensure a coherent and united front with their counterparts in the Defense Department. Another important factor in the State Department’s implementation is not to appear as if the United States is attempting to meddle in Japanese domestic affairs. This type of “non-interference” policy approach is important since recommendations two and three will assist in building an international environment in which Tokyo does not feel pressured to remilitarize.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommendation One

First and foremost, U.S. policy should encourage Japan to postpone the revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 May 2022). This will have a stabilizing effect on the region for three pre-dominant reasons: 1) allows time
for Chinese democratic transition; 2) increasing the time horizon allows for more opportunity for a peaceful settlement of conflict on the Korean peninsula; and 3) separates revision from a particular political regime.

As China grows in wealth, it will likely proceed down the road towards democracy and liberalization, which will then encourage a more stable and amenable relationship between Japanese and Chinese democracies.\footnote{Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," \textit{The American Political Science Review} 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 87.} Signs of this democratic transition in China are becoming increasingly evident. For example, reports from the March 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) was telecast for the first time. In the words of a top official involved, “Live telecast of delivery of the report aims to meet public demand for more information about NPC’s work, including lawmaking and supervision.\footnote{“UPDATE-2: Chinese Top Legislator's Work Report Live Telecast for First Time,” Xinhua, March 09, 2006, in \textit{FBIS}, March 09, 2006, CPP20060309078030.} The official goes on to say, “It's a part of China's ceaseless efforts to enhance transparency of NPC's work and promote political democracy.\footnote{“UPDATE-2: Chinese Top Legislator's Work Report Live Telecast for First Time,” See also, “1st LD: China Promises More Democracy in Legislation,” Xinhua, March 09, 2006, in \textit{FBIS}, March 09, 2006, CPP20060309078032.} On the legal front, “top Chinese lawmaker Wu Bangguo said here Thursday that the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress (NPC) will further promote democracy in its legislation by soliciting more public opinions.\footnote{“China Promises More Democracy in Legislation,” Xinhua, March 09, 2006, in \textit{FBIS}, March 09, 2006, CPP20060309078031.} In addition, as an “Open Source Center” analysis concludes, “the provocative articles express greater support for limited democratic institutions than is normally the case in PRC media, suggesting that party leaders are tolerating broad boundaries for the discussion of such issues.\footnote{“OSC Analysis 26 Dec: PRC Media Air Discussion on Democratic Institutions,” \textit{FBIS}, December 26, 2005, CPP20051226029001.} Fundamentally, as one would expect, it is not in the interest of those who have a monopoly on power to willingly cede that power unless they are under tremendous pressure to do so. Therefore, it is evident, from the increased discussion in government-controlled media and direct effort by the CPC to consider a wider variety of opinions on legal and legislative matters, that the seeds of
some form of democracy have been planted and are taking root. It is probable that what will eventually emerge will not be some sort of clone of American democracy but, more likely—due to path-dependency stemming from its socialist political legacy—a European-style social democracy will establish itself. However, the benefits of democratic peace are not an instantaneous phenomenon. As Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, and numerous others have surmised, the transition phase to a mature democracy can actually produce a more volatile regional situation than when that regime was authoritarian ruled.\(^{180}\) Therefore, it is in the best interest of the United State to minimize distractions to this process of Chinese democratization.

One of these distractions is the negative relationship that exists between what Beijing calls “Japan’s failure to acknowledge its history of aggression”—Yasukuni Shrine visits, right-wing textbooks, or remilitarization—and Chinese use of nationalism to support authoritarian regime legitimacy.\(^{181}\) In April 2005, this negative relationship became unmistakably evident when thousands of Chinese took to the streets to protest against Japanese behavior, quickly growing beyond government control. As predicted by Mansfield and Snyder, “needing public support, they [ruling groups] rouse the masses with nationalist propaganda but find that their mass allies, once mobilized by passionate appeals, are difficult to control.”\(^{182}\) This event is important to the broader discussion of democracy because, as Qi Jing Ying, a Chinese doctoral student studying in Tokyo, has determined, “these old quarrels [over history] were only a pretext for the demonstrations last April. The protests had as much to do with the ‘public thirst for democracy’ as they did with genuine anti-Japanese feeling”\(^{183}\) and demonstrate the correlation between nationalism, democratic transition, Japanese provocative behavior, and regional conflict. Thus, due to the conflictual nature of a democracy in transition and the need to minimize


\(^{182}\) Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 85.

opportunities for nationalist-driven regional conflict, it is essential that American policy assist in the peaceful transition of China to a mature democracy.

In summary, as discussed in Chapters III and IV, the region is currently ripe with nationalism. In China and North Korea, the governments are using this nationalism to legitimize their regimes and, in South Korea, it has become a historical legacy that has been passed down from one generation to another. As Yinan He states, “elites sometimes shelve their historiographic differences with another country to concentrate on other immediate issues, but they tend to exploit the political benefit of international history disputes when they feel a strong sense of insecurity in domestic politics.”184 While China moves through its transition to democracy, this sense of insecurity will fade, as well as the need to use nationalism to provide regime legitimacy. As Seymour Lipset postulates in his classic work on democratization theory, a crisis of legitimacy will occur during a transition to new social structure, but once democracy takes hold, that crisis will wane.185 In addition, there is a strong likelihood that, as the Chinese exploitation of “the history card” diminishes, the two Koreas will experience a less accepting environment for their use of it as well. In fact, Seoul and Pyongyang will likely follow the lead of the Middle Kingdom on this issue, and if Japan is able to improve relations with China, then Chosun will follow closely behind. Therefore, holding back revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution will provide China more time to move toward democratization, which will have a stabilizing effect not only in Sino-Japanese relations but also in relations with the Korean peninsula.186

Concerning the Korean peninsula, extending the horizon by allowing more time for both reunification and peaceful cooperation will provide a stabilizing effect on Japanese-Korean relations. As demonstrated in Chapter IV, both halves of the Korean peninsula are concerned about Japan assuming a greater responsibility for regional security affairs. Therefore, as Japan proceeds down the path toward military

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184 He, “The Clash of Memories,” 2.
186 In essence my casual argument is that China has increasing signs of all the ingredients for democracy: industrialization; urbanization; better education; a growing middle class; and overall increased wealth, which Seymour Lipset has hypothesized leads to the emergence of democratic institutions. Therefore, if China emerges as a democracy there will be a significant decrease in the prospects of armed conflict between Japan and China—democratic peace theory.
“normalization,” the regional tensions that may develop in response would likely spill over into the Six-Party Talks forum, possibly miring a constructive dialogue in nationalistic political banter and further de-legitimizing the U.S. position. Mistrust of the U.S. position in the Six-Party Talks will increase because, in the absence of direct U.S. protest, the other actors in the region will view Washington’s silence as an endorsement of Japanese remilitarization. This deepening adversarial relationship that would develop between the United States and Japan on one side and the two Koreas and China on the other would be detrimental to U.S. national interest and its attempts to stop nuclear proliferation originating from the Korean peninsula.

Finally, establishing a declaratory policy concerning Article 9’s revision will ease tensions over Japan’s perceived rush to remilitarize by increasing transparency in this challenge to a post-war security taboo. In large part, regional fears of remilitarization have been exacerbated by Prime Minister Koizumi’s nationalistic actions and the stagnation of the Japanese economy. The countries of the region have not forgotten the last time that the combination of economic downturn and growing popular nationalism were combined in Japan, which led to World War II. Increasing the horizon in this situation has two key stabilizing effects. First, it separates the revision of Article 9 from the current LDP regime. This is important because the domestic political party backlash against the LDP’s draft constitution proposal—released in November 2005—did not help to reassure Japan’s neighbors of its benign intentions. In particular, the LDP’s failure to gain even the support of its coalition partner, the New Komeito, strips the LDP’s draft of much needed legitimacy. Second, it provides Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors an adequate amount of time to adjust to the concept of their expanding role in the region. Thomas Christensen summarizes this point quite succinctly when he says, “given the strong popular sentiments in China about Japan and Taiwan and the dangers of hypernationalism in the democratization process, it would be best for the region and the world if China transited political reform without distractions and jingoism that would likely flow from a Sino-Japanese security competition.”

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187 Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 44.
In addition, as discussed above, the same logic can be applied to Korean-Japanese relations, but rather than a democratization process, it is instead a course towards peaceful reunification that can be derailed by Japanese military expansionism.

2. Recommendation Two

The United States should maintain its current force levels in the region leading up to the 2022 transition in order to provide continued stability. As Michael Yahuda lays out in his book, *The International Politics if the Asia Pacific*, American presence in the region has “…provided the public goods that underwrite the strategic stability…” in the region, and, as several analysts have proposed, if the United States reduces its presence in the region, the likelihood of a downward security spiral ensuing will dramatically increase. In addition, the security umbrella that the United States provides will continue to encourage the consensus among countries in the region “…that economic development should be the overarching national objective.” All of the aforementioned benefits that come with maintaining current U.S. military force levels in the region will also help in the implementation of policy recommendation number one. Finally, by using Jennifer Lind’s analysis of Japan’s tendency to “buck-pass” and Thomas Christensen’s work on security dilemma theory, one can better understand the consequences associated with a U.S. withdrawal from the region.

As Jennifer Lind has established, Japan has subscribed to a policy of buck-passing onto the United States, when possible. She states the foundational tenant is that “buck-passers recognize the need to balance against a threat, but they do as little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others.” Commensurate with this theory, as the ability to buck pass erodes, one should observe that the buck-passer increases their capabilities in order to fill the gap. Specifically, in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance—at times when relative U.S. protection declines—Lind shows that

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188 Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific.


190 Berger, ‘Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia,” 389.


192 Ibid., 103.
there has been an increase in military force to compensate for the loss.\textsuperscript{193} She cites that, in the 1970s—
with a growing Soviet East Fleet and downsizing American presence—this is exactly what happened. In addition, despite the end of the Cold War, there continues to be numerous threats that have forced Japan to persist with its military build-up. Based on this theoretical foundation, one could surmise that the United States can dramatically influence Japanese remilitarization simply through its presence in the region. Therefore, if the United States conducts force reductions, Japan’s most likely response will be to expand its military capabilities. This increase in military capabilities, even if it is intended as purely defensive in nature, will in turn produce a security dilemma between Japan and its neighbors. Theoretically, a security dilemma is created when in “…an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats.”\textsuperscript{194} During this crucial transition period, it is essential that the United States remain firmly engaged in the region in order to serve as the arbiter who can, and must, “ameliorate security dilemmas and prevent spirals of tension” in Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{195} In contrast to the current U.S. effort to push Japan toward assuming a greater amount of the “burden” for regional security, Washington instead should accept Tokyo’s “buck-passing” during the period leading up to 2022. Allowing Japan to buck-pass through this period will ease regional fears of a rapidly emerging remilitarized Japan and will remove the pressure from Tokyo to quickly reform Article 9 in order to meet its security needs. Overall, the execution of policy recommendation number two is essential to the successful implementation of recommendation number one.

3. **Recommendation Three**

The United States should continue to pursue more equitable burden sharing in the U.S.-Japan security alliance. However, until 2022, Washington should focus on Japan’s ability to project “soft power.” Japan’s “soft power” can serve in a complementary role to American “hard power” and would be more amenable to both its populace and its

\textsuperscript{193} Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” 115.
\textsuperscript{194} Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 25.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.,26.
regional neighbors. “What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, an increase in Japanese use of “hard power” in the current international and regional security environment will have the likely effect of instigating downward security spirals in Northeast Asia. By instead focusing on Japan’s comparative advantage in projecting “soft power,” the United States can achieve a more holistic security alliance in Northeast Asia. As Tsuneo Akaha states “…a country that has enormous hard economic and military power may undercut its soft power by adopting coercive policies toward others.” With the ongoing U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. ability to project adequate “soft power” has diminished. Therefore, an equitable integration of the “soft power” capabilities of Japan would effectively serve both the interests of the Japanese people and American politicians, while at the same time reducing the potential backlash associated with an increasing Japanese role in world affairs through the use of “hard power.” In addition, by focusing on Japan’s ability to project “soft power,” Washington will more likely achieve success in persuading Tokyo to take a longer road to Article 9 revision.

Specifically, due to the horrific events of September 11, 2001, Washington has increasingly turned to the use of “hard power” to prosecute the Global War on Terror and to overthrow the government of Iraq. As Joshua Kurlantzick surmises in his article “The Decline of American Soft Power,” “the evidence of America’s declining attractiveness is wide, with surveys from every part of the world showing diminished reputation….a March 2005 poll by BBC of 22 nations across several continents found that nearly all believed China plays a more positive role in the world than the United States.” This poll points to the importance of Japan maintaining its economic, cultural, and environmental “soft power” in order to better complement the U.S.-Japan alliance. There

are very few, if any, who would question American “hard power” dominance but, with the globalization of economies, media, and information, the ability to convey “soft power” is increasingly as important. Thus, in the current security environment where the United States will find itself militarily engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and possibly North Korea or Iran for the foreseeable future, it is important that Washington look to its close allies to assist in favorably influencing the international environment. To this end, “Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country.”

Whether it is the projection of economic power through ODA (overseas development assistance), or influential power through the popularity and prevalence of pop and traditional culture, Japan’s ability to project “soft power” can serve American national interests by producing a holistic power projection capability. Further, if the United States draws Japan more closely into a “hard power” relationship, this association will negatively impact Tokyo’s legitimacy as a center of “soft power” influence. In the words of Eiichi Katahara, “I argue that Japan should play a greater international role as a ‘global civilian power’….Japan’s concept of comprehensive security, with Article 9 of the Constitution and the United States-Japan alliance as its basic ingredients, remains effective in the post-Cold War world.”

Therefore, by encouraging Japan to hold off revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document adoption (recommendation number one), and maintaining its force presence in the region leading up to this transition (recommendation number two), not only will the United States help to ease tensions in Northeast Asia by increasing transparency, but it will also serve its own interest by fortifying a collaborative “hard and soft power” relationship with its most important ally.

C. CONCLUSION

Most analysts would agree that Northeast Asia is one of the most important regions in the world to U.S. strategic interests today. Due to this fact, it is of the utmost significance that the military “normalization” of Japan goes as smoothly and as quietly as possible. Over the last sixty years, the Renunciation of War clause in the United States

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brokered Japanese constitution has provided reassurance to Japan’s neighbors that the aggression that they experienced in the first half of the 20th century would not happen again. Nevertheless, as time has passed, there has been a growing desire by the people of Japan to resume its “rightful status as a normal nation.” 202 As I have discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, there is a great debate within Japan concerning what “normalization” would mean for Article 9 and the Self Defense Force. However, as demonstrated in Chapters III and IV, it is certain that Japan’s regional neighbors wait apprehensively to see what the result of the debate will be. Nevertheless, due to the current ad hoc nature of the reform movement and the lack of transparency involved, Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors have or are prepared to oppose, balance, divide, or coerce in order to influence Japan not to cross what is seen as a “demarcation line” between amenable neighbor and regional aggressor. As Mayumi Itoh states, “Japan will have to make every effort to convince its Asian neighbors, deeply wary of Japanese remilitarization, that making the SDF explicitly constitutional does not at all mean that Japan will again become an aggressor.” 203 To accomplish this task, the United States should: 1) encourage Japan to delay revision of Article 9 until the 75th anniversary of the document’s enactment (3 May 2022); 2) maintain its current force level in the region; and 3) better utilize within the U.S.-Japan security alliance the latter’s ability to project “soft power.” By executing all three recommendations together, there is a greater likelihood that Washington’s policies will be able to encourage the Japanese slowly to precede towards revising Article 9. Finally, the adoption of these policies will not cure all of the ailments of Northeast Asia that are perpetuating the possibility of a security dilemma. However, they will certainly have a stabilizing effect on this dynamic region over the next two decades.

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