PREPARING THE AMERICAN SOLDIER IN A BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TO CONDUCT INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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**Preparation of the American soldier in a brigade combat team in conduct information operations in the contemporary operational environment.**

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**14. ABSTRACT**

This thesis determines whether the Army is adequately preparing its tactical leaders and soldiers in a brigade combat team (BCT) to conduct information operations (IO) in the contemporary operational environment (COE). First, an explanation of IO and its applicability is addressed using current examples from military operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, IO has become a critical combat enabler because of its nonlethal ability to influence adversarial, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences. Second, the author identified select IO skills and IO applications that American soldiers in a BCT should be educated and trained on to effectively conduct IO within a BCT. These skills are intercultural communication, language, negotiation, and media awareness. The applications are laws of war, rules of engagement, ethics and morality, and commander’s intent. Third, the thesis examines the Army’s institutional education and operational training of IO at the BCT level and below. Using institutional course management plans from select officer and noncommissioned officer schools and current operational training directives for deploying units to Iraq, an analysis of IO education and training was conducted. The thesis concludes with recommendations to the institutional and operational Army for improving IO education and training for American soldiers serving in a BCT.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PREPARING THE AMERICAN SOLDIER IN A BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TO CONDUCT INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT by Major Brian T. Beckno, USA, 93 pages

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The value of this thesis will be measured by the initiation of changes necessary to prepare the American soldier to conduct information operations in the contemporary operational environment. American soldiers deserve the best professional education and training the Army has to offer. This thesis is devoted to them.
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ACRONYMS

ABCD  Actions, Behavior, Choices, and Decisions
AO    Area of Operations
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
AUTL Army Universal Task List
BCT   Brigade Combat Team
BNCOC Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course
BOLC  Basic Officer Leader Course
CALL  Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCC   Captains Career Course
COE   Contemporary Operational Environment
COIN  Counterinsurgency
CPIE  Cognitive Properties of the Information Environment
DOD   Department of Defense
FM    Field Manual
GIE   Global Information Environment
IO    Information Operations
JP    Joint Publication
LOO   Logical Lines of Operation
M-ANCOC Maneuver-Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course
MTP   Mission Training Plan
NCO   Noncommissioned Officer
OE    Operational Environment
OIF   Operation Iraqi Freedom
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Observation Number 12 is the admonition to *remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants*, the relatively junior commissioned or noncommissioned officers who often have to make huge decisions, sometimes with life-or-death as well as strategic consequences, in the blink of an eye.

LTG David Petraeus, *Military Review*

The Situation

The president of the United States determines national strategic objectives, and it is the civilian and military leadership in the Department of Defense (DOD) who ensure military forces are “employed in ways that meet the President’s strategic objectives” (Rumsfeld 2006, 66). Throughout history, US military strategy has focused on adversaries, nonstate actors, rogue governments, and terrorist organizations resulting in policy towards each. Adversarial attacks, activities, and proclamations against the US and its allies have mobilized the president and Congress to exercise the use of military force to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic, to protect US national interests, and America’s citizenry.

The Army is an instrument of US military power. Its capabilities are joint and expeditionary in order to contend with land adversarial threats within the contemporary operational environment (COE). The 2006 Posture Statement, *US Army* presented to the US Senate and House of Representatives on 10 February states the Army’s focus, “to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth--the ultimate instrument of national resolve--that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex
21st century security environment” (Harvey 2006, ii). The 2006 Posture Statement continues:

The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect vital national interests, and to fulfill national military responsibilities. Our mission is enduring: to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. The Army is also charged with providing logistics and support to enable the other Services to accomplish their missions. The Army organizes, trains, and equips Soldiers who, as vital members of their units, conduct prompt, sustained combat on land as well as stability operations, when required. (Harvey 2006, 4)

The Army has been conducting sustained land combat since March 2003 when it commenced a US military invasion of Iraq. Called Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), lethal military operations destroyed Iraqi military forces and toppled the dictatorial regime of Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein. With the “official” ending of decisive offensive operations in May 2003, the Army clumsily transitioned to stability and reconstruction operations attempting to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi population affected by the war. Failing to anticipate unpredictable fallout from the war, the Army and coalition forces continue in 2006 conducting stability and reconstruction operations while fighting an insurgency attempting to destabilize the country and terrorize the Iraqi people.

As Army units conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations destroying insurgents and their networks, simultaneously rebuilding Iraq for return to the people is a critical step in the fighting an insurgency. As stated in Army Field Manual, Interim (FMI) 3.07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, “In a counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is public support. In order to defeat an insurgent force, US forces must be able to separate insurgents from the population. At the same time, US forces must conduct themselves in a manner that enables them to maintain popular domestic support” (2004, 2-13).
To maintain popular domestic support, Army COIN doctrine postulates that understanding the local societal dynamics are critical for success. “For US forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs” (FMI 3.07.22 2004, 4-3). To accomplish this, Army units must have the capability to communicate with, respect, protect, and influence the local population. Army units must promote legitimacy to coalition military operations while maintaining local, regional, and international public perceptions of trust and confidence. American soldiers must understand their behavior and actions can have strategic implications. What Army doctrine and existing capabilities possibly support these requirements? The answer is by American soldiers in a brigade combat team (BCT) conducting Army information operations (IO). This is the subject of this thesis.

The Problem Defined

The purpose of this thesis is to determine: ‘Is the Army adequately preparing its tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT to conduct IO within the COE?’ Since IO are at the forefront of current operations in OIF, the success of IO will depend not only on the higher-echelon commander and planning by his staff, but also on the soldiers and junior leaders beneath him who must comprehend and execute it. My research will address the preparation, education, and training required for Army soldiers to conduct IO. To reach this level of detail, a series of secondary and tertiary questions focused on doctrine and training will be answered: (1) At the company, platoon, squad, and soldier level, how can the Army prepare and train these small unit organizations to conduct IO within the COE?
(2) How is the Army preparing its soldiers and leaders at the tactical level (BCT and lower) to employ IO in accordance with doctrine and their commander’s intent? and (3) What deficiencies, if any, must the Army fix regarding IO training and doctrine for soldiers and lower tactical echelons to make IO more effective on the battlefield?

**Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions**

**Limitations.** IO is an operation that is conducted throughout all the armed services. Due to the imposed page limit for the thesis, the application of IO throughout all the services will not be discussed. The research will be restricted to Army operations, Army institutional education and operational training, Army IO doctrine, and, when applicable, joint IO doctrine.

**Delimitations.** Although IO are conducted throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, addressing IO at all three levels is beyond the scope of this thesis. As a result, thesis research is limited to the tactical level specifically focusing on BCT leaders and soldiers and their ability to execute IO on the battlefield. To maintain thesis relevance, research focuses on BCT-level IO during OIF. The Army’s institutional combat training centers, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the National Training Center were not contacted for this thesis. Research only focused on training individual IO skills for enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and commissioned officers. Research only focused on the Army’s operational training requirements for OIF and the institutional professional education systems for company-grade officers (lieutenant through captain) and company grade NCOs (sergeant through sergeant first class). Of the Army’s institutional professional education programs, only the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC), Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, Phase I (BNCOC),
Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), Basic Officers Leaders Course Phase II (BOLC II), Infantry Officer Basic Course (BOLC III), and Infantry Captains Career Course (IC3) were contacted and researched for this thesis.

**Assumptions.** IO will continue to be at the forefront of COIN operations in OIF and in future combat and stability and reconstruction operations. Army leaders and soldiers in a BCT will require increased education, training, and proficiency to effectively employ IO in the COE.

### The Contemporary Operational Environment and Operational Environment

In FM 7-100, *Opposing Force Doctrine, Framework and Strategy*, the COE is defined as “the operational environment that exists today and for the clearly foreseeable future” (2003d, iv). The COE is not a single operating environment, but rather an operating environment comprised of a combination of eleven critical variables: the physical environment, the nature and stability of the state, sociological demographics, regional and global relationships, military capabilities, technology, information, external organizations, national will, time, and economics (FM 7-100 2003d, v).

Correspondingly, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the OE as, “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander” (JP 1-02 2006a, 388). In FM 3-0, *Operations*, Army doctrine identifies six dimensions of the operational environment that could affect a commander’s ability to conduct military operations; threat, political, unified action,
land combat operations, information, and technology (2001, 1-8). It is the information environment within the COE and OE that are supporting subjects of this thesis.

The world today lives within the global information environment (GIE) due to the explosion of information technologies. People globally are networked through media communications technology, such as satellite and Internet, which enables information to be distributed worldwide within seconds.

Computers have increased dramatically in speed over the last ten years; satellites have facilitated clearer and cheaper communications. Electronic innovations have introduced smaller, lighter and cheaper media equipment enabling faster program and report production and transmission. This increase in tempo has placed a greater burden on most decision makers around the world, and not just in government. Not only do people have to decide more quickly, they must also be capable of making those decisions or issuing direction at any time of day or night.

. . . However, there is one organization standing on one side of this technological fence, harnessing these enhancements in capability and technology--the media. (Hulme 2001, 2)

On 28 April 2004 the CBS news investigative television newsmagazine 60 Minutes broadcast a report of several American soldiers mistreating, abusing, and torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib prison west of Baghdad. “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” an article by Seymour M. Hersh of The New Yorker magazine, broke the same story days later. The photos and story that documented the atrocities were viewed and read by the world via the media’s global networks. The international public was shocked. The Bush administration lost domestic and international support and credibility for OIF. The Army was reticent. Since perhaps, the Vietnam War’s My Lai massacre in March 1968 have American soldiers been found to be committing comparable immoral and deplorable crimes. The My Lai massacre prompted pervasive outrage domestically. The international reaction to Abu Ghraib, especially throughout the Middle East, was the same. Due to the atrocities committed by only some American soldiers at the prison, an eruption, both
international and domestic, against detainee abuse and torture ensued. Abu Ghraib caused
the Army and the US government, specifically DOD, to reevaluate its detention
procedures and doctrine. Still further, Congress passed “The McCain Amendment,” a law
prohibiting torture and directing the use of approved interrogation techniques outlined in
the Army’s interrogation manual. How did American soldiers have such an impact on US
legitimacy, policy, and military operations?

The Strategic Corporal: Defined by the Marines

Is it possible for American soldiers to have strategic impact? The Commandant of
the Marine Corps argued yes with his characterization of a “strategic corporal” in January
1999 when Marines Corps Gazette published his article, “The Strategic Corporal:
Leadership in the Three Block War.” In his article, General Charles C. Krulak describes
the plight of young American Marines in accomplishing their assigned mission in an
increasingly unstable, more lethal, asymmetrical combat environment where combatants
and noncombatants are not easily defined. He writes, “Further complicating the situation
will be the ubiquitous media whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be
acted out before an international audience” (Krulak 1999, 20). This young Marine
corporal, now coupled with the global information network via an embedded journalist,
has the ability to influence global public opinion and US international legitimacy
depending on whether his actions were the right ones. “In many cases, the individual
Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will
potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and
strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the
larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests--the Strategic
Corporal” (Krulak 1999, 21). While General Krulak’s strategic corporal characterization is the basis for this thesis, by Army standards, the strategic corporal is not doctrinal US Army terminology. The American soldier is.

Although the Army does not specifically train its newest soldiers to be strategic, Krulak implies the Marines do. He writes that the Corps must continue to recruit Americans with character, train and transform them into Marines, continue their professional education, equip them with the necessary tools, and lead them in the finest traditions of the Marine Corps. Under these conditions, his strategic corporal will be more capable of meeting the challenges in the COE because Marines will know how to make the right decision at the right time (Krulak 1999, 20).

The American Soldier: Defined by the Author

For the purpose of this thesis, the American soldier or “soldier” is not a corporal or a Marine, but an Army enlisted soldier, NCO, or commissioned officer who works in a BCT or subordinate unit assigned to the BCT. The American soldier is deployed and conducts his daily missions, performing combat, COIN, and stability and reconstruction operations equivalent to his Marine counterpart. The American soldier is surrounded by and works within the GIE. “Information emanates from everything a unit does—the way soldiers wear their kit, the way messages are announced to local leaders, the way soldiers conduct operations and treat people. All of these things send signals to the populace and to the enemy—signals that reveal a unit’s reputation, level of training, and intentions” (Miska 2005, 65). The American soldier consistently understands the difference between right and wrong, generally possessing the moral character and necessary warrior ethos to perform his duties. He may or may not understand that his appearance, words, actions, or
behavior could have strategic implications. FM 6-0 rightly states the magnitude and expectations of the Army’s soldiers with emphasis on the last sentence;

The scope of land combat reaches to the lowest tactical land-force element--its irreducible unit of maneuver and action--the individual soldier. These soldiers number in the thousands for a brigade commander and the tens of thousands for an operational-level commander. Soldiers receive orders passed through multiple echelons of command. They must understand the prescribed limits within which to exercise subordinates initiative. In addition, lower-level commanders have much less experience and professional education than higher-level commanders. However, they must understand the higher-level commander’s intent and the effects of their actions on the operations of the entire force [emphasis mine]. (2003b, 1-13)

As stated by the Secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis J. Harvey, “The Army’s vision for leaders in this century is that of the Pentathlete--a multiskilled leader who personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects, from war fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management” (Harvey 2005a, 19). The Army’s 2006 Posture Statement defines the leader attributes which are expected of Army’s pentathletes, its soldiers:

**Multi-skilled Leader**

- Strategic and creative thinker
- Builder of leaders and teams
- Competent full spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier
- Skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy
- Understands cultural context, and works effectively across it

**Leader Attributes**

- Decisive, with integrity and character
- Confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations: Prudent risk taker, innovative, adaptive
- Empathetic
- Professionally educated and dedicated to life-long learning
- Effective communicator (Harvey 2006, 15)

Secretary Harvey’s multiskilled leader and soldier is necessary to conduct military operations within today’s OE. This thesis will further describe and define those soldier
skills and applications that support IO and the education and training necessary to achieve Secretary Harvey’s vision.

The Applicability of Information Operations

In August 1995, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) released Pamphlet 525-69, Concept for Information Operations. Its summary states, “This concept describes the importance of information and how to win the information war in military operations now and into the twenty-first century. It identifies information as an essential enabler of military power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It details the ways in which information contributes to friendly mission success and adversary defeat as an integral part of joint, combined, multinational, or interagency operations” (Hartzog 1995, 3).

“This concept defines information operations (IO) as the framework for integrated support for battle command and describes the operational capabilities necessary for its planning and execution (Hartzog 1995, 3). This pamphlet declares that “IO will directly support the commander's intent and will be conducted throughout the full range of military operations and at all levels of command. IO will be developed and executed to provide commanders with knowledge-based military superiority over an adversary. . . . IO will be executed by a disciplined soldier team focused on mission objectives and fully aware of the commander's intent” (Hartzog 1995, 16).

In 1995, the Army identified that it must codify a new emerging concept to remain effective in the “information age.” It called this concept “information operations.” In November 2003, the Army published FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, acknowledging, as in 1995, that in order for the
Army to operate in the GIE it requires Army resources, capabilities, doctrine, and tactics. The Army recognized that it must have the ability to fight with information having the capacity to effectively conduct IO during military operations. The Army continues to improve its IO doctrine to achieve this effect.

FM 3-0 states, “All military operations take place within an information environment that is largely outside the control of military forces. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information; also included is the information itself. National, international, and nonstate actors use this environment to collect, process, and disseminate information. The media’s use of real-time technology affects public opinion, both in the US and abroad, and alters the conduct and perceived legitimacy of military operations” (2001, 1-12). Thus, the information environment provides every American soldier the capability of influencing international opinion; more importantly, reports of his actions broadcast throughout the information environment can have strategic implications.

In December 2005, LTG David Petraeus, the commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas hosted an IO symposium attended by leading experts from industry and academia, and Army BCT commanders with recent operational experience. He solicited their ideas and experiences to incorporate into better IO doctrine and training development. As approved by LTG Petraeus in February 2006, Army IO is defined as, “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specific supporting and related capabilities, to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making, while protecting our own. It includes the use of these capabilities to influence the perceptions of foreign friendly and neutral audiences” (Petraeus 2006a). Despite refinement to the definition, it remains complicated. It requires numerous readings and in doing so still does not guarantee comprehension. If the Army’s doctrinal IO definition is this complex, how does the Army expect its commanders, staffs, leaders, and soldiers to understand the concept?

Army IO doctrine written in FM 3-13, *Information Operations*, misleads readers to believe the employment of IO by a commander is simple, logical, decisive, and attainable. FM 3-13 states, “Commanders use the IO elements/related activities to shape the information environment” (2003a, 1-11). However, one of the criticisms of IO doctrine is the confusion arising from the complexity of the definition itself, regarding just what IO exactly is. Experience shows this complexity may be preventing commanders from executing IO doctrinally. In fact, the complexity of IO has forced commanders in OIF to develop TTP in order to achieve the effects they want IO to achieve in their areas of operation. The complexity of IO has forced commanders to interpret the intent for IO. However, this does not necessarily mean they will interpret that intent correctly.

Unfortunately, because IO has come to mean something different to everyone it therefore means nothing. In an article written titled, “IO for Joe”, LTC Joseph Paschall, United States Marine Corps, writes about this frustration: “To assist the tactical planner currently engaged in actually influencing people (vice doctrine), we must get past this tendency to endlessly group, regroup, redefine and rename everything relating to IO and
emerge with something that describes the exact application of IO elements for tactical units” (2005, 26).

In his opening remarks for the IO symposium LTG Petraeus stated, “Clearly, we are grappling our way forward in this field, intellectually, and we are finding out that this is a discovery learning process as we continue to try new techniques and approaches, while at the same time developing and refining our doctrine that guides this field. . . . our task over the next couple days of this symposium is to achieve momentum in this effort as rapidly as possible to help our forces ‘down range’ get maximum benefit from IO and to achieve the full potential of this critical combat multiplier” (Petraeus 2005).

The IO Threat

As experienced by COL Joseph DiSalvo, a BCT commander whose 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division operated in Baghdad in 2005, “The adversary does not effectively use information to their advantage; more accurately, they make up circumstances to fit their theme. They package it on Al Jazeera as a credible conduit of information. If no one counters Al Jazeera or Al Aribiya, the Iraqi and international audiences think there is some degree of veracity. We need to figure out how to discredit these outlets and call them to task” (DiSalvo 2006). COL DiSalvo’s experience is additionally supported by COIN theory: “The news media, especially the electronic mode, is a weapon of the insurgent; it is his to manipulate, and if he manipulates it, he owns it” (Schneider 2005, 36).

COL DiSalvo’s feedback for this thesis revealed his opinion that the insurgency is not terribly efficient or effective in leveraging information.
My opinion, we give way to much credit to terrorists for ‘mastering information’. They are terrible (they lie, have crude methods executed over some technology that over rates their capabilities). Our (the west's) ineptness is what makes them the masters. The problem is we (the west) think indigenous people think like us. They do not. In Iraq where I was, the average educational level was 5th grade. People only had had access to TV for 2 years. Their mindset is what they see or hear first is true. They do not speak much English. They are very visual and relate to religious tones. We (the west) are culturally inept and leave the door wide open for irresponsible reporting and propaganda. We can beat the terrorists in IO if we leverage our superior technology (dominate all forms of media technically) and get smarter on how to connect ideologically with this complex culture. (DiSalvo 2006)

Insurgents in Iraq exploit the GIE by conducting terrorism. They specifically target the international public, Iraqi population, coalition country populations, or the US population. “The purpose [of blind terrorism] is to get publicity for the movement and its cause, and by focusing attention on it, to attract latent supporters” (Galula 1964, 58). Undeniably, insurgents in Iraq have specifically targeted the American public and government. Their desire to inflict maximum violence to create US, coalition, and Iraqi casualties attempts to erode coalition harmony and create enough political uncertainty to incite the US or coalition governments to pull troops from Iraq. This supports an insurgency theorist who wrote, “The insurgent has to destroy all bridges linking the population [of Iraq] with the counterinsurgent [Iraqi government] and his potential allies [US and coalition forces]” (Galula 1964, 59).

The ebb and flow of popular support during war historically has been a deciding factor whether war continues. Adversaries recognize this and know the American people tend to lose faith when US policies are not successful. Future adversaries will continue to use the media exploit the American public. They link individuals globally, are relatively cheap and accessible, and there is inherently no risk in using them. FM 3-0 states, “Adversaries will seek to shape conditions to their advantage. . . . and will try to
change the nature of the conflict or use capabilities that they believe difficult for US forces to counter” (2001, 1-9). Whether deliberate or coincidental, insurgents have exploited the Army’s weakness in executing IO. Additionally, FM 3-0 states “Adversaries will continue to seek every opportunity for advantage over US and multinational forces. When encountered, they will adapt to the changing conditions and pursue all available options to avoid destruction or defeat. This environment and the wide array of threats present significant challenges. Army forces must simultaneously defeat an adversary while protecting noncombatants and the infrastructure on which they depend” (2001, 1-9).

**Why This Is Important**

Information is everywhere. It travels as truth, rumors, or lies through various forms of media (print, radio, television, and Internet), often at the real-time speed of live broadcasting or through person-to-person contact. Information and the way it is used can affect and influence opinions and perceptions. This is the doctrinal concept of IO. IO execution relies on the tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT. American soldiers need the right skills and applications if IO are to be effective. This requires education and training at all levels throughout the institutional and operational Army. With the necessary education and training, American soldiers increase their odds of making the right decision especially when today’s OE is asymmetric and increasingly unpredictable. American soldiers must understand their responsibilities to execute IO and recognize that their actions and behavior can influence a population’s perceptions for the benefit of Army operations.
To accomplish this, IO doctrine, education, and training must be incorporated throughout the institutional and operational Army. American soldiers at the battalion, company, platoon, and squad level must be resourced with the necessary education and training if IO are to be effective in the COE. According to doctrine, the BCT is the lowest organization at which IO are planned; however, platoons and squads in a BCT execute that plan. Is the Army adequately preparing its tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT to conduct IO in the COE?

The 1995 TRADOC PAM went on to state that “IO will be executed by a disciplined soldier team focused on mission objectives and fully aware of the commander's intent. . . . Awareness training in IO (to include all elements) should be integrated in all officer training schools (officer advanced course and above) and NCO training schools (advanced NCO course and above) curricula. . . . A progressive and sequential set of skills should be developed for officers and NCOs for integration into appropriate schools and courses” (Hartzog 1995, 15, 28). All of these have yet to be implemented.

In the third chapter, IO skills are address specifically as intercultural communication, language, negotiation, and media awareness. IO applications are specified as laws of war, rules of engagement, ethics and morality, and commander’s intent. These IO skills and applications are a result of the research and are not currently part of Army IO doctrine.

The United States Army is constantly adapting to the COE to remain decisive in winning the nation’s wars. Developing IO doctrine, education, and training is one means to accomplish this. However, the Army must properly educate and train its soldiers
throughout the institutional and operational Army in order to achieve success with IO. Without this emphasis, the ability for BCT squads, platoons, and companies to execute tactical IO will remain limited.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Literature Review

Information operations continue to be developing in doctrine, employment, and importance. The effects IO achieve by influencing adversarial, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences are critical when conducting full spectrum operations. Incorporating IO throughout all BCT lines of operation is a requirement for BCT units and commanders. Since the Army published FM 3-13, *Information Operations*, in 2003 and Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, in 2006, there have been marked improvements in doctrine and the services’ understanding of IO, specifically its capabilities synchronized to achieve desired effects.

Research for this thesis incorporated numerous military publications, professional journals and articles, interviews, and professional textbooks and studies which supported the central premise of the thesis. Since IO are at the forefront of Army operations in OIF, this thesis benefited from current publications citing the application of IO in the Iraq OE. Validating these publications were interviews of BCT commanders who provided their personal experience and opinions, ensuring truthfulness and accuracy throughout this study.

Another critical source of information for this thesis was obtaining the course management plans and weekly training schedules of the Army’s institutional schools, which instruct noncommissioned and commissioned officers. These documents were paramount in revealing the actual IO courses and lessons taught throughout the Army.
Army Publications

The 2006 Posture Statement, United States Army was presented to the committees and subcommittees of the US Senate and US House of Representatives in February 2006. Presented by the Secretary of the Army, The Honorable Francis J. Harvey and the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army’s Posture Statement addresses the resources and support necessary for the Army during fiscal year 2007. It describes in great detail the Army’s efforts to continue transformation and to support the global war on terrorism. This document is given yearly to Congress.

FM 1, The Army, published in June 2005, is a great field manual that describes the purpose of the Army as the world’s premiere land power. It clearly defines the parameters within which the Army serves the nation and how it is manned and equipped to do so. It specifically describes what it means to be a professional Army soldier imbued in the Soldier’s Creed, Warrior Ethos, and Army’s Values.

FM 3-0, Operations, published in June 2001, is the Army’s principal doctrinal manual on full spectrum operations. Although under revision, the current version emphasizes information superiority and the information environment vice information operations. In fact, there is only one paragraph devoted to IO, referring loosely to offensive and defensive IO. In the new revision, FM 3-0 is to have a robust chapter on IO, more formally describe their significance to commanders, and how they should be incorporated throughout the full spectrum of Army operations.

FM 3-13, Information Operations, published in November 2003 is most applicable for division and corps-level staff planners and commanders. Although suitable, the manual is not designed for the tactical commander and staffs in the BCT-level and
below. This is a fundamental flaw in this manual. It fails to addresses other audiences who plan and execute IO below the BCT. Unequivocally, IO is a tactical operation as has been executed in the Iraq OE. Even though IO are incorporated into the operational and strategic levels of military operations, it is at the tactical level that adversarial, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences are most influenced for the benefit of Army operations.

FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, published as an interim field manual in October 2004 and expiring in October 2006, is the Army’s doctrine on COIN. Faced with an insurgency in Iraq, Army units conduct COIN operations everyday. One principle central to this doctrine is the ability of Army commanders to maintain the support of the local population. IO is a capability that can assist commanders in achieving this.

FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, published in August 2003, is a manual for NCOs, officers, staffs, and commanders. This manual describes a commander’s responsibility to visualize the battlefield, describe the battlefield, and direct subordinates through mission orders and commander’s intent to accomplish assigned missions. This manual is about the art and application of command and the responsibilities sacred to it. This manual was used to doctrinally define commander’s intent, of which adherence to has implications for IO.

Department of Defense Publications

The DOD *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)*, published in February 2006, is a forward-looking document signed by the Secretary of Defense. It outlines his priorities for the Department. It describes the current status of DOD, and his proposals are interpreted as guidance. This *QDR* has many recommendations for improving the
armed services’ ability to fight the “long war.” Several recommendations support this thesis regarding increases in language and cultural training.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, published in November 2005, is an official directive to applicable departments, services, and combatant commanders for the preparation, training, and implementation of new doctrine and capabilities to conduct SSTR operations. This directive refers to the importance of language and foreign culture immersion which relates directly to this thesis.

Joint Publications

Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, published in February 2006, is the pillar of joint IO doctrine and it is what the Army uses to devise its own IO doctrine. JP 3-13 is remarkably easy to read and has some very valid IO concepts specific to influencing targeted audiences. It underwrites the importance of incorporating IO in all joint operations. It is current, has a valid construct, and is a key publication for any researcher wanting to learn more about IO specific to joint operation or about IO in general.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, published in April 2001 and amended through March 2006, is a DOD dictionary that includes all joint and service definitions for doctrinal and associated military references. This reference is a must for any military professional. It is best accessed through the Internet.
Miscellaneous Publications

This thesis focuses on IO and the education and training required for American soldiers to execute IO in the COE. For comprehensive research on the institutional Army’s education on IO, it was necessary to obtain the current course management plans or the weekly training laydowns of the Army schools selected for this thesis. Utilizing the resources from the United States Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy at Fort Benning, Georgia; the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas; the Basic Officer’s Leader Course, Phases II and III at Fort Benning; and the Infantry Captain’s Career Course at Fort Benning, their course management plans and weekly training laydowns were tremendous sources of information that were incorporated into this thesis.

Interviews and Recommendations from the Field

A source of information for this thesis was enlisting the assistance of former BCT commanders who commanded in Iraq. COL Ralph Baker commanded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Armored Division for fifteen months in Iraq. For twelve months, the 2BCT’s AO was Baghdad and the remaining months the brigade operated in North Babil Province. During his interview, COL Baker provided valuable insights into how he employed IO in his brigade AO. IO was only second to intelligence operations in importance. He highlighted the finer details of IO not prevalent in current IO doctrine. He absolutely believes that a soldier’s individual behavior can have the greatest impact on IO. COL Baker’s interview overwhelming validated this thesis.

COL Joseph DiSalvo commanded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division for twelve months in Baghdad. Although no face-to-face interview was
conducted, COL DiSalvo provided excellent feedback via email and phone conversations, sharing his own opinions about IO and how his brigade incorporated them into BCT operations. His incredible feedback made the thesis better and more credible.

Research Methodology

The purpose of this section is to describe the research methodology used for this thesis. First, the scope of the thesis required reduction. IO is a vast doctrinal subject. It comprises core competencies of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNA), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC). Each of these core competencies has its own doctrine. Each is governed by regulations and one, PSYOP, is regulated by law. IO are supported by other military operations of physical destruction, information assurance, physical security, counterintelligence, counterdeception, and counterpropaganda. These too have individual doctrine, TTP, and regulations. Lastly, IO has related capabilities of public affairs and civil-military operations. These capabilities have separate proponents for doctrinal development and regulation.

The focus of this thesis did not include any of the core, supporting, or related capabilities of IO. Rather, its focus was on the American soldier’s ability to conduct IO while serving in BCT-level tactical unit. The thesis had to establish that IO could still be performed without having to specifically apply any of its core, supporting, or related capabilities. To do this, specific research on the ability to influence people at the cognitive level was necessary.

The foundation of IO is their ability to influence an adversary, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences for the benefit of Army operations. Using the Army’s current
involvement in OIF, it is clear that the American soldier can influence an adversary to surrender or fight. However, the ability of the American soldier to influence beyond his lethal capabilities deserves more research. This thesis focused on the American soldier’s ability to influence perceptions using IO skills of intercultural communication, language, negotiation, and media awareness and the IO applications of laws of war, rules of engagement, ethics and morality, and commander’s intent. None are recognized by current IO doctrine and too few are actually incorporated into the professional education of NCOs and officers who serve at the squad, platoon, and company level.

In order to properly define the IO skills and applications, research on each topic was required. Using military publications and articles, textbooks devoted to these topics, and the current course management plans and training schedules provided by the institutional Army, a cross-referenced analysis of each IO related skill and application with the actual classes taught was conducted. It was during this analysis that an anticipated gap in educating and training IO throughout the Army was confirmed.

Critical to this thesis is its credibility and validity. Since the thesis is focused at the BCT level, interviewing BCT commanders was a requirement. Two BCT commanders who commanded their brigades in Baghdad, participated in this thesis by provided feedback and recommendations to enhance the thesis argument. Incorporating their personal and professional opinions based on their operational experience helped shape and provide the thesis greater validity.
For the uncertain 21st Century operating environment, we need leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute, effective communicators and dedicated to life-long learning.

Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey, ARNEWS

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that IO become a core competency within each of the armed services. This directive is admission by DOD that IO is an extremely important military capability for whose execution each service must have doctrine, training, personnel, and leadership.

The development of IO as a core military competency and critical component to joint operations requires specific expertise and capabilities at all levels of DOD. At the highest professional levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies that are the capstone to American military power. The Services, United States Special Operations Command, and other agencies develop capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in law, policy, and lessons learned. At each level of command, a solid foundation of education and training is essential to the development of a core competency. Professional education and training, in turn, are dependent on the accumulation, documentation, and validation of experience gained in operations, exercises, and experimentation. (JP 3-13 2006, XV)

DOD is asserting the criticality of IO and its essential utilization within the COE. As a result, the Army must improve IO and their application as an independent military operation. To carry out this guidance, the Army must implement operational and institutional change elevating IO as a mission-essential task for a BCT and subordinate units. To effectively do this, Army IO doctrine and principles must be introduced throughout the professional education and training of the American soldier. After all, it is the American soldier who executes IO at the tactical level.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the Army is adequately preparing its tactical leaders and soldiers at the BCT level and below to execute IO within the COE.

Within the Army’s tactical war-fighting forces:

These units, known as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), are more robust, require less augmentation and are standardized in design to increase interoperability. They are, in essence, a self-sufficient, stand-alone tactical force, consisting of 3,500 to 4,000 Soldiers, that is organized and trains the way it fights. . . . By creating a modular, brigade-based Army, we are creating forces that are more rapidly deployable and more capable of independent action than our current division-based organization. Their strategic responsiveness will be greatly improved. Modularity increases each unit’s capability by building in the communications, liaison and logistics capabilities needed to permit greater operational autonomy and support the ability to conduct joint, multinational operations. (Harvey 2005b, 7,8)

The BCT is an organization capable of conducting independent military operations. Within its assigned AO it is the lowest echelon that has the capability to build combat power, synchronize complex operations, and maintain situational awareness of what is going on throughout its operational area. It is organized to conduct the full range of military operations within the greater requirement to execute the Army’s mission:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of--

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
(2) supporting the national policies;
(3) implementing the national objectives; and
(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States (FM 1 2005, 2-7).

Within the COE, “The Army exists to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill the Nation’s military responsibilities. Specifically, the Army mission is to provide to combatant commanders the forces and capabilities
necessary to execute the National Security, National Defense, and National Military
Strategies” (FM 1 2005, 2-8).

What exactly is the COE and why is it important? FM 7-100, Opposing Force
Doctrine, Framework and Strategy, defines the COE as “the operational environment that
exists today and for the clearly foreseeable future” (2003d, iv). The COE is not a single
OE, but rather an OE comprised of a combination of eleven critical variables: the
physical environment, the nature and stability of the state, sociological demographics,
regional and global relationships, military capabilities, technology, information, external
organizations, national will, time, and economics (2003d, v).

Correspondingly, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, defines the OE as, “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and
influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the
unit commander” (JP 1-02, 2006a, 388). In FM 3-0, Army doctrine identifies six
dimensions of the OE that could affect a commander’s ability to conduct military
operations; threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and
technology (2001, 1-8).

On 14 April 2004, the 1st Cavalry Division assumed command of the
Multinational Division – Baghdad (MND-B) for OIF and immediately embarked on an
ambitious Task Force Baghdad end state: “A secure and stable environment for Iraqis,
maintained by indigenous police and security forces under the direction of a legitimate
national government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism” (Chiarelli
2005, 7). To accomplish this, the division’s leadership recognized they needed the
division’s units to conduct missions along specific logical lines of operation (LOO).
These LOO were logically connected to create the necessary synergy required to achieve
the division’s end state to move Iraq towards complete autonomy.

The 1st Cavalry Division identified five LOOs for commanders in Baghdad:
combat operations, training and employing security forces, essential services, promoting
governance, and economic pluralism. “Each LOO was tied to a robust IO capability
(equating to a sixth LOO), moving incrementally and cumulatively toward decisively
accomplishing the ultimate goal of shifting Baghdad away from instability and a fertile
recruiting ground for insurgents, to a thriving modern city encompassing one-third of
Iraq’s population” (Chiarelli 2005, 5). This doctrinal framework demonstrates how
“commanders synchronize activities along multiple lines of operation to achieve the
desired end state” (FM 3-0 2001, 5-9).

In Baghdad, the 1st Cavalry Division noted IO as a LOO that required planning,
synchronizing, and execution within each of the five LOOs they identified. “To target the
operational center of gravity, information operations, in concert with actions, rose to a
level of importance never before deemed necessary, and it was well known that the
insurgents knew the value of an information operation executed at the right opportunity.
Unless coalition-initiated projects were methodically thought through and publicized,
insurgents would claim credit for the results, using posters, graffiti, or even sermons to
inform the people they were the ones responsible for improvements” (Chiarelli 2005, 15).
“The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can
lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not
by what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him” (Galula 1964,
14). Clearly, insurgents and terrorist organizations in Iraq are operating within the information environment to influence and propagate their ideologies throughout the GIE.

In full spectrum operations, IO is a continuous military operation supporting separate LOOs and, when applicable, achieving IO effects independently. BCT commanders seek to seize specific objectives or achieve desired effects utilizing the lethal and nonlethal soldier combat systems resident within the BCT. Throughout the execution of military operations IO are used to fight the adversary or to influence targeted foreign friendly or neutral populations. Doctrinally, IO provides a commander the capability to influence decision-makers, whether adversarial, neutral, or friendly.

The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in order to affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and understanding of the situation. . . . IO capabilities can produce effects and achieve objectives at all levels of war and across the range of military operations. The nature of the modern information environment complicates the identification of the boundaries between these levels. Therefore, at all levels, information activities, including IO must be consistent with broader national security policy and strategic objectives. (JP 3-13 2006, I8, I9)

One of many debates about IO is what exactly governs, constitutes, and defines IO. IO doctrine prescribes core, supporting, and related capabilities. These “brief well” and are easily arranged doctrinally. However, there is more to IO than these capabilities. The most important construct of IO is the ability to influence adversarial, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences. Theoretically, IO have cognitive capabilities which affect the perceptions, opinions, and understanding of a targeted individual. IO can influence a target audience differently, be it an adversary, foreign, neutral or friendly foreign population, depending on the IO messages and themes used. This cognitive element of IO focuses on people and is potentially the best method to achieve better success conducting COIN operations in the COE.
FMI 3.07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, states, “The proper application of force is a critical component to any successful counterinsurgency operation. In a counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is public support. In order to defeat an insurgent force, US forces must be able to separate insurgents from the population. At the same time, US forces must conduct themselves in a manner that enables them to maintain popular domestic support” (2004, 2-13). “The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population” (Galula 1964, 79). The use of IO in Iraq by Army commanders is less about the insurgents and more about influencing an Iraqi population to remain friendly, or at least neutral, towards coalition operations and the new Iraqi government. IO themes and messages are intended to reinforce positive coalition and Iraqi government achievements. These IO themes are also the individual actions, behavior, and credibility that soldiers and leaders achieve by building trust and confidence with the local population with whom they communicate. IO is a critical combat capability because they can influence and change the perceptions of a population without the use of lethal force. The ability to separate the greater population from the insurgents is an objective that cannot be achieved by employing lethal weapons. The population must be engaged with person-to-person contact whereby relationships are built, cultivated, and maintained. From the personal observations and experience of a BCT commander whose brigade operated in Baghdad, “A soldier’s personal conduct is the single most important impact he can have on IO” (Baker 2006).

Most current IO doctrine is enemy-focused. FM 3-0 states that “IO are used to deny, destroy, degrade, disrupt, deceive, exploit, and influence the enemy’s ability to
exercise command and control. To create this effect, friendly forces attempt to influence the enemy’s perception of the situation” (FM 3-0 2001, 11-16). JP 3-13 also has the same adversarial focus in its definition: "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specific supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own” (JP 3-13 2006, GL9). Commanders in Iraq have finessed the role of IO to not only target adversaries per the doctrinal definition but also include the planning and coordination of IO activities to influence friendly or neutral populations. Recognizing this necessity, the Army updated its definition nesting it with the joint IO doctrine in JP 3-13: “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making, while protecting our own. It includes the use of these capabilities to influence the perceptions of foreign friendly and neutral audiences” (Petraeus 2006a). For the purpose of this thesis the five core competencies and supporting and related capabilities listed in the Army definition of IO are not the focus. If the core, supporting, or related capabilities of IO are not employed, then are IO even possible? The answer is yes. This is due to the human cognitive properties that exist in the information environment.

As described throughout IO doctrine, commanders synchronize the core, related, and supporting activities to achieve desired effects on the adversary while protecting their
own friendly information systems. However, the application of IO for this thesis resides within the cognitive function of IO as previously described. In the latest publication of JP 3-13, the human cognitive capabilities of IO will provide the best background for determining how the Army can better prepare soldiers within a BCT to conduct IO in the COE.

Cognitive Properties of the Information Environment [CPIE]. Cognitive properties of the information environment are the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization. Cognitive properties may include:

(a) Cultural and societal factors affecting attitudes and perceptions such as language, education, history, religion, myths, personal experience, and family structure.

(b) Identity of key individuals and groups affecting attitudes and perceptions, whether in the same or a different country as those they influence.

(c) Identity and psychological profile of key decision makers, their advisors, key associates, and/or family members who influence them.

(d) Credibility of key individuals or groups and specification of their sphere of influence.

(e) Laws, regulations, and procedures relevant to information and decision making, decision-making processes, capability employment doctrine, timeliness, and information content.

(f) How leaders think, perceive, plan, execute, and assess outcomes of their results and actions from their perspectives.

(g) Identify key historical events between the target country and the US, which may affect an individual or group’s attitudes and perceptions of the US, whether in the same or different country as those they influence. (JP 3-13 2006, III-2)

CPIE do not involve the direct application of the core, supporting, or related IO capabilities. Rather, the concept of CPIE recognizes the existence of the human dimension and the role it performs in the information environment. The CPIE do not require an IO capability, application, or technique to create an IO cognitive event. They
simply exist in the OE and help define how people decide, choose, behave, and act on externalities. A further suggestion of CPIE theory as related to IO is that IO simply seek to truly engage and influence human consciousness. “Consciousness means the awareness people have of the outside world and of their perceptions, images, and feelings” (Matlin 2003, 67). Consciousness includes the perceptions and understanding of visual images, the recalling of life events, the beliefs about the world, and the attitudes toward other people (Matlin 2003, 67). Considering this, CPIE theory clearly indicates that the actions, behavior, choices, or decisions (ABCD) of an American soldier will have IO implications because of the events soldiers create in the conscious minds of people they encounter and impact.

The ABCD of the American soldier have convincing IO implications when expanded globally. United with the global information network, the ABCD of the televised American soldier will validate perceptions, expectations, and stereotypes of the viewing audiences. In simple terms, the ABCD of the American soldier will equate to whether American actions, objectives, and goals are good… or bad. These perceptions resonate throughout the information environment and can affect military operations and success from the strategic to tactical level.

What skills should the American soldier have to contribute to the overall IO effort which seeks to achieve positive effects that benefit Army operations? The QDR reveals the need for greater qualifications to increase the current capabilities of today’s soldiers. “This means the Department must be prepared to develop a new team of leaders and operators [soldiers] who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and
working with local networks to further US and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence--rather than through military force alone” (Rumsfeld 2006, 89).

There is much documentation of lessons learned from US military operations in Iraq and the QDR clearly reflects those lessons with new policy directives. It describes the requirement to create a better force readily adapting to fight and win the “long war.” This long war approach is, in part, due to the pervasive challenges of conducting COIN operations in Iraq. The lessons learned have highlighted a recurring theme of skills, additional training, and education that are and will continue to be required of soldiers operating and fighting in the long war. An example is the recognition of the need for improved language proficiency and capabilities. The QDR states, “The Military Departments have also begun more intensive cultural and language training, which over time will create a more culturally aware, linguistically capable force, better able to forge victory in the long war. The Department must overcome a legacy of relatively limited emphasis on languages and continue to expand efforts to place linguistically capable individuals at all levels of the military--from the tactical squad to the operational commander” (Rumsfeld 2006, 15).

One of the clear lessons from the long war has been the requirement for the US military to transition into stability and reconstruction operations throughout a combat theater. Clearly, the OE has taught the Army that it has a responsibility to provide security and facilitate the rebuilding of a nation once offensive combat operations have achieved their military objectives. However, in line with cold war doctrine throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Army always built its capabilities around its ability to conduct
offensive and defensive operations. Commanders rarely trained, except when required for operational missions, on stability and reconstruction operations or on the individual and collective skills necessary to perform such missions, until now.

Not only has the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that the services must have IO as a core competency, also directed in Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 is that “Stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning” (England 2005, 2). Why then is this directive important and what is the implication of having IO become a core competency? The reason is stated within the Directive: “Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels” (England 2005, 4). This thesis proposes IO have a unique set of individual skills which have significant contributions to IO execution and effectiveness in the COE. Language proficiency is just one of them. DOD’s focus on languages in both the 2006 QDR and 2005 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 is clear recognition that language training and proficiency are critical for military units to perform in the COE. The effectiveness of IO will be increased when American soldiers have the ability to communicate in some degree with those they encounter, thereby leaving a positive experience behind.
American soldiers are sensors, communicators, ambassadors, and enforcers. The American soldier assumes these roles based on the current situation in which he finds himself. As a sensor, a soldier is expected to be observant and to collect and disseminate information that could have intelligence value about the enemy or other unique events that occurred within his AO that are worthy to report to higher authorities. Soldiers are communicators in that they verbally talk to and physically communicate with local populations to gain intelligence or to plainly state the reasons for their presence. Soldiers are ambassadors because they represent America, the American military, and American values. Lastly, soldiers are enforcers who are trained to conduct lethal operations to destroy any adversarial threat to not only protect themselves but also, more importantly, to protect the surrounding civilian population. Each role the American soldier plays has IO implications. There are some very important skills which the Army should train to better prepare soldiers to conduct IO within the COE. What are those skills and what would they do for a BCT?

A focus of this thesis is the development and incorporation of specific IO skills and applications into Army professional education and training. IO skill development proposals for this thesis are intercultural communication, language, negotiation, and media awareness. IO application proposals are laws of war, rules of engagement, ethics and morality, and commander’s intent. These skills and applications are not new to the Army. However, what would be is the incorporation of these IO skills and applications into the Army institutional and operational training methodology. Theoretically, because IO skills and applications have IO implications, training in any or all of these proposed areas would have IO effects that would increase the value and capability of IO to achieve
the effects desired by the commander. Many of these tasks could be trained at the BCT level; however, there are some important initiatives and changes in the Army’s institutional training methodology that would need implementation in order to incorporate such a varied set of skills into the life-cycle training of the American soldier. Each IO skill and application proposal should be analyzed in detail to evaluate the significance and practicality of each.

**Intercultural Communication Skills**

A supporting component to IO with IO implications in the COE is the importance of American soldiers having cultural knowledge, understanding, and sophistication. Their ability to effectively communicate while displaying respect for a population’s values, customs, ethnicity, family, religion, and sovereignty is critical. Intercultural communication contributes to soldiers’ own credibility with the population. It refutes a population’s stereotypes that Americans are culturally inept.

Cultural training is not new to the Army; however, it has never received the necessary emphasis or resources required for soldiers to attain the cultural acuity required in the COE. Operations in Iraq have validated that the cultural training for soldiers must be elevated to an importance on par with, for example, individual weapon proficiency training. Soldiers who are culturally sophisticated are better able to achieve nonlethal effects, which are primarily inherent in IO doctrine. BCT commanders recently returned from Baghdad have admitted in interviews with this author the importance of nonlethal effects. Conducting IO is at the forefront of nonlethal operations. Potentially, cultural sophistication displayed by soldiers could be worth more to IO and COIN operations than their ability to employ their personal weapon.
The US Army invaded Iraq with its forces unprepared to interact with Iraqi culture. Other than the token cultural awareness briefing (if) conducted by the unit, there was insufficient knowledge or understanding of the significance the Iraqi culture, family, tribal affiliations, and religion would have on combat and stability and reconstruction operations. There was no understanding of subjective culture which is the “learned and shared patterns of beliefs, behaviors, and values of groups of interacting people. . . . [it] refers to the psychological features that define a group of people--their everyday thinking and behavior--rather than the institutions they have created” (Bennett 1998, 3). Army units in Iraq did not have this awareness. They were not acutely sensitive to the role of Iraqi men and women within their family or tribe. They did not understand the tribal hierarchy or influence carried by local religious leaders. It was only through trial and error that small unit leaders at the BCT level, those most in contact with the population, learned to incorporate these cultural considerations into daily interactions with the population.

To increase the effectiveness of IO, soldiers need a cultural sophistication that aids in their ability to interact and retain legitimacy and credibility with the local population. A solution is for soldiers to have the capacity to communicate interculturally. “Intercultural communication is the communication that occurs between people of different cultures” (Bennett 1998, 2). If American soldiers are able to culturally behave in ways that are respectful and essentially disprove the negative stereotypes about them, then a major step toward victory will already have been made with the local population, the center of gravity. An unsuspecting Iraqi would be impressed with soldiers who were culturally respectful, who could engage with him in a disciplined and compassionate
behavior. This, in turn, would result in second- and third-order effects in intelligence gathering and perceptions of legitimacy of military operations throughout the local population. What then is important about cultural knowledge and intercultural communication?

Intercultural communication is the exchange of cultural information between two groups of people with significantly different cultures. . . . Intercultural communication should focus on the exchange of information among two or more cultural systems embedded within a common environment that results in the reduction of uncertainty about the future behavior of the other system through an increase in understanding of the other social group. (Gudykunst 2003, 260)

Intercultural communication is an area of communication theory that deserves intense study. When two differing cultures collide, “Intercultural interaction has the greater potential for misunderstanding. . . . It may lead only to greater uncertainty, frustration, anxiety, and conflict” (Gudykunst 2003, 261). Unlike plain cultural awareness training, intercultural communication addresses the implications of cultural communication when strangers, in this case, soldiers, encounter a foreign population. For example, within intercultural communication is a supporting theory called communication accommodation theory. It maintains that the behavior of individuals (soldiers) can impact the future communication with others. A subtheory of communication accommodation theory, “evaluation and future intentions,” suggests that an individual’s perceptions are related to perceived “benevolent intent” from a stranger. “The perceived benevolence, in turn, creates a positive effect which motivates future communication between the first individual (and the group he represents) and the stranger (and the group he represents)” (Gudykunst 2003, 173). In this example, the way soldiers behave, either as individuals or as groups, can have positive impact on the perception of those they encounter. “The British Army calls this ‘leaving a trace,’ noting that every
contact between soldiers and locals leaves some sort of trace, whether physical remnants of the patrol (battle damage, improved school, etc.) or a memory in the mind of a local” (Sowards 2005, 68).

Intercultural communication is about understanding the differences between cultures while maintaining the ability to communicate across each. “Cultures are different in their languages, behavior patterns, and values” (Bennett 1998, 2) and it is because of these differences that misunderstandings create tension and uncooperativeness. Educating soldiers and training them to have the intercultural acuity to interact with foreign populations would benefit the BCT commander in executing IO. Soldiers who interculturally communicate are at the forefront of the commander’s ability to conduct effective IO within his operational area.

Language Skills

The ability to interculturally communicate would be greatly enhanced if American soldiers had simple language proficiencies, but the challenge remains in which language. The Army has a long history of language education; however, institutional language training has traditionally been a result of immediate necessity rather than consistent skill development. Language training has either experienced explosive growth during wartime periods such as World War II and Vietnam, when only specific languages were studied per the region of conflict. “In our twentieth century experience, this largely academic need for language skill has often been supplanted by a more immediate need to communicate with allies or to intercept information from an enemy. Although we are most familiar with the extensive training begun during World War II, it might be expected that there are numerous other episodes that have required language ability, as
every war the United States has fought in this century was a coalition war” (Muller 1986, 44). Perhaps the reason is only a select group, the intelligence community, required language skills across the military services. Despite the requirement for tactical language skills, the Army has done little to learn from its past and has not invested in educating and maintaining soldier tactical language skills.

Language training has typically been centered on the Army’s institutional ability to decipher foreign enemy intelligence. “Our unfortunate experience has been that foreign language capability in the US armed forces has been restricted primarily to one sphere of military activity. In the minds of most casual observers, the military significance of foreign language competence is pigeonholed into the category of military intelligence--strategic and tactical” (Muller 1986, 4). In Iraq however, linguists cannot reside exclusively within the intelligence community. Tactical units must have ability to understand and communicate with local populations, and to do this an institutional change must begin so soldiers can learn to speak and communicate beyond English. However, specific assessment and selection of soldiers who have an affinity for languages would be required to achieve this end state.

Perhaps one of the greatest supporting individual tasks to IO is to possess the ability to communicate with a population using their language. There is no doubting the value of an individual being able to read, write, and speak a foreign language. “Fluency in [a] language leads to an understanding of the culture in which it is embedded. Without the capability to operate in a given culture, a unit or an individual will, at best, realize only limited success. At worst, an operational unit will find itself alienated from its environment” (Muller 1986, 6). Many experts agree that even if individual language
proficiency is limited, there are unique benefits that remain from the study of any language. Preventing alienation from the local population has vast implications related to intelligence collection, civil-military operations, situational awareness, and understanding between coalition units and local citizens. This understanding creates trust and confidence in the local population which is extremely necessary for coalition forces to conduct successful COIN operations.

Speaking a language or at least having a familiarity with a language, would help prevent “cultural imperialism: the concept that an American working in a foreign country who continues to speak English exhibits an implicit arrogance by expecting others to make the effort to learn his language, and arrogance that suggests we are no different from the former colonial rulers. For foreigners to make the effort to learn the local working language is to demonstrate--often dramatically--a sense of respect for the people who speak that language. To avoid the effort can sometimes be interpreted as a show of disrespect” (Muller 1986, 15).

Since one of the fundamentals of IO is the ability to influence perceptions for the benefit of military operations, this invites a myriad of additional considerations. Language is uniquely linked to perceptions as it is to culture. The natural evolutions of languages are a result of the experiences and perceptions understood to occur within a particular culture. Language, perceptions, and culture are interrelated and contribute to each other in ways that must be understood because “if we fail to assume that people of different cultures may sincerely perceive the world differently, then our efforts toward understanding are subverted by a desire to ‘correct’ the one who has it wrong” (Bennett 1998, 16).
Consequently, IO planners and executers must have a comprehension of the linguistic, cultural, and perceptual elements which are included in the commander’s AO. Soldiers must understand that how they view an event may differ from how the local foreign population views the same event. By teaching languages, the Army gives its soldiers greater appreciations and insights necessary to operate within the COE and within the greater context of the long war.

In the 2006 QDR, DOD highlights this:

Recent operations have reinforced the need for U.S. forces to have greater language skills and cultural awareness. It is advantageous for U.S. forces to speak the languages of the regions where the enemy will operate. In 2004, the Department of Defense launched the Defense Language Transformation Initiative to improve the ability of the Armed Forces to work more effectively with international partners. The Military Departments have also begun more intensive cultural and language training, which over time will create a more culturally aware, linguistically capable force, better able to forge victory in the long war. The Department must overcome a legacy of relatively limited emphasis on languages and continue to expand efforts to place linguistically capable individuals at all levels of the military – from the tactical squad to the operational commander. . . . Finally, by emphasizing greater cultural awareness and language skills, the QDR acknowledges that victory in this long war depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of kinetic effects. These cultural and language capabilities also enhance effectiveness in a coalition setting during conventional operations. (Rumsfeld 2006, 14, A4)

Does, however, the QDR really say anything revolutionary about the necessity to invest in language training? The answer is no. The Army has routinely recognized the importance of language proficiency. For example, “Modern languages appeared in the undergraduate curriculum at the U.S. Military Academy as early as 1803” (Muller 1986, 20), and in 1955 the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recommended that, “...the Department of Defense expand and promote language training
by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected language courses (Muller 1986, 14). Lastly, in 1979 recommendations were made for the “institution in the precommissioning environment--service academies, ROTC programs, and OCS--of required and elective language courses in the history and cultural traditions of host nations” (Muller 1986, 21). Similarly, the 2006 QDR states a familiar recommendation for language proficiency: “Require language training for Service Academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship students and expand immersion programs, semester abroad study opportunities and inter-academy foreign exchanges” (Rumsfeld 2006, 79). Ironically, DOD is recommending a program when decades previously similar recommendations were made for the improvement of linguistic capacity throughout the military.

In order to prevent the historical trend of under-resourced language training, the Army must adopt a new and perhaps painful policy towards increasing language proficiency throughout its ranks. In 1978, A Review of Education and Training for Officers found that “Foreign language proficiency remains one of the fundamental requirements for the American army officer which is seldom addressed in discussions of his education” (Muller 1986, 20). The review continues to identify the positive implications of language study and education: “Even if proficiency is not attained, or is lost, the study of foreign languages does provide certain residual benefits. From contact with a foreign language and the study of a foreign culture, a student quickly learns that other people often have different perceptions of reality” (Muller 1986, 22). This clearly identifies the cognitive function of IO. Without language proficiency at the tactical level, BCT tactical leaders and soldiers are susceptible to misunderstanding the intentions of the
local population. A fresh approach to DOD language training requirements would be the
acknowledgement that communicating with foreign populations at the tactical level is so
important to IO that language training must have equal emphasis and priority as training
for combat operations. Perhaps the Army will heed its previous errors and invest heavily
in new, innovative ways to inculcate into Army training the education and sustainment of
language proficiency at the unit level.

**Negotiation Skills**

Predictably, throughout the COE, small unit leaders in a BCT will have no choice
but to interact with locals in order to execute the commander’s IO plan. Potential leader
engagements with the local population could achieve IO objectives whereby unit
credibility is established, intelligence improved, and an appreciation of the overall
situation gained. “Patrols are often directed to engage the locals and deliver focused
messages. While this sounds simple enough, most junior leaders are ill-prepared to
engage locals and effectively deliver focused messages. A little knowledge in
engagement techniques, interpreter skills, and rehearsals can greatly assist leaders in
patrol execution” (Sowards 2005, 67).

Not unlike a police officer working the beat, tactical leaders must know and
understand that their responsibilities extend well beyond their ability to render an
adversary incapable of conducting his operation. It also includes the ability of small-unit
leaders to conduct face-to-face meetings with local host-nation leaders, whether tribal,
religious, or elected. To effectively communicate and understand the positions of these
prominent individuals, tactical leaders must have a thorough understanding of and be
confident in negotiating.
Negotiating is simply “a process that occurs when parties are trying to find a mutually acceptable solution to a complex conflict. . . . and they occur for two reasons (1) to create something new that neither party could do on his or her own, or (2) to resolve a problem or dispute between the parties” (Lewicki 2004, 3). Negotiation situations arise however under a unique set of circumstances that tactical leaders in the BCT should know in order to seize unanticipated opportunities that may arise to resolve conflict or create mutual benefit among involved parties. Lewicki, Sauder, Barry, and Minton in their book *Essentials of Negotiation*, describe characteristics necessary for negotiation situations:

1. There are two or more individuals, groups or organizations;
2. There is a conflict of interest in that what one wants is not necessarily what the other wants;
3. The parties negotiate because they think they can use some form of influence to get a better deal that way than by simply taking what the other side will voluntarily give them or let them have;
4. The parties, at least for the moment, prefer to search for agreement than to fight openly, have one side capitulate, permanently break off contact, or take their dispute to a higher authority to resolve it;
5. Each party generally concedes and modifies their positions to compromise and;
6. Successful negotiations involve the understanding of the psychological motivations (intangibles) of the parties involved and the management of tangibles that each party can discuss towards agreement. (2004, 4)

Negotiating requires education, practice, and a unique understanding of characteristics necessary to create a negotiating situation. People negotiate all the time but understanding and having the foresight to know an opportunity to negotiate a solution for the benefit of those parties involved in conflict is a “tactical” skill. It involves having intimate knowledge and understanding of the local power brokers and knowing what their interests, their agenda, and their political aspirations within the community are. It involves understanding the overall desires of the parties involved and also being able to accurately predict what each party involved might or would be willing to give up in order
to produce a desired outcome agreeable to all. Unless the lieutenant has the maturity and 
education to recognize the signals conducive to opportunistic negotiating, his ability to 
influence the IO fight will wane. Uniquely linked to effective negotiation is doing so with 
a cultural acuity the other side will recognize and appreciate.

Negotiating and intercultural communication strategies are critical when a 
negotiator or arbiter attempts to resolve conflict and create compromise for all parties 
involved. In order for the American soldier to effectively negotiate with a local religious 
leader, for example, he must have an acute cultural mindset and understanding of the 
position with which the religious leader will most predictably “come to the table.” In 
essence, “feeling the culture” and knowing how the particular culture involved will 
influence decisions of this religious leader could create opportunity for a negotiation 
situation. As related to IO, negotiating skills must be readily available to the BCT 
commander and his subordinate tactical leaders because of the face-to-face interaction 
they will have with local leaders and common citizens. In other words, “A sound 
understanding of how humans perceive and communicate in general will help negotiators 
understand why people behave the way they do during negotiations” (Lewicki 2004, 
121). Robert Kaplan, writing for the Los Angeles Times, writes about this very 
phenomenon in his article, “The Future of America--In Iraq”:

Throughout Iraq, young Army and Marine captains have become veritable 
mayors of micro-regions, meeting with local sheiks, setting up waste-removal 
programs to employ young men, dealing with complaints about cuts in electricity 
and so on. They have learned to arbitrate without losing patience. . . . I watched 
Lt. John Turner of Indianapolis get up on his knees from a carpet while sipping 
tea with a former neighborhood mukhtar and plead softly: ‘Sir, I am willing to die 
for a country that is not my own. So will you resume your position as mukhtar? 
Brave men must stand forward. Iraq’s wealth is not oil but its civilization. Trust 
me by the projects I bring, not by my words.’ (2005, 2)
An interesting corollary between negotiating and its relation to IO lies within the emphasis on perception within the IO definition. Returning to the definition, IO has the capability to influence the perceptions of adversary, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences. Negotiating supports a perceptual process (Lewicki 2004, 122) and because of this, negotiating is also linked to IO through its ability to influence perceptions.

The formulations of perceptions by individuals, groups, or organizations are based on the environmental stimuli they decipher. The stimuli create behavior. “In any given negotiation, the perceiver’s own needs, desires, motivations, and personal experiences may create a predisposition about the other party. Such predispositions are most problematic when they lead to biases and errors in perception and subsequent communication” (Lewicki 2004 122). Therefore, knowing and understanding the religious leader’s perceptions about US military operations could very well impact the BCT commander’s ability to effectively negotiate and thus, influence the process.

**Media Awareness Skills**

Perhaps a BCT commander’s greatest opportunity to conduct IO is him, and his leaders, who have been trained to leverage the power of media during combat, COIN, or stability and reconstruction operations. Media is such an influential component on the battlefield that BCT commanders must effectively plan and leverage media as part of their overall IO plan. “Regardless of the type of media available to any society however, face-to-face communication will remain the most effective form of communication” (Bennett 1998, 102).

Evidence of the media’s influence is pointedly captured by George Packer in *The New Yorker* magazine in a quote from a newly appointed mayor of the northern Iraq city
of Tal Afar. The mayor, Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri says of working with American units and soldiers from the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, “I began to work with the Americans here and saw a new picture. I thought before that all Americans, like Bremer and the people we saw on TV, were killers and turned guns on Iraqis. But when I worked with them and saw them more, I realized they were different. Before, we were just sitting and watching Al Jazeera and believing it. Now I see it’s a lying network” (2006, 54).

This quote supports what LTC Steven Boylan, who served as the Director of the Combined Press Information Center and also served as the deputy spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq in 2005, briefed to a Military and the Media elective class at the Command and General Staff College: “Seventy percent of Iraqi citizens polled consider television a trustworthy source of information” (Boylan 2006). In contrast, “77 percent of Americans believe that the military at least sometimes gives false or inaccurate information to the media” (McCormick Tribute Foundation 2005, 44).

These IO conditions, whether seen in Iraq or in the US, support the recognition that the effective and appropriate employment of IO, especially when incorporating media, can have both positive and negative effects on the perception of military operations. The significance of these IO conditions and the impact they have on IO effectiveness further support the contention that the Army must incorporate resourced media training for all soldiers, especially those tactical leaders who will directly encounter journalists.

Subordinate units must have the opportunity to use media to get positive, truthful messages to the local, regional, and, at times, global audiences. The information and stories presented by journalists can have lasting impacts on foreign policy, Congress, the
President, and clearly the support of the American people. Kenneth Payne in his article, *The Media as an Instrument of War* reinforces the importance of media and the continual impact they continue to have in the OE: “The conflicts of the last decade have amply demonstrated that the media, ostensibly non-state actors, have become an important party in many international conflicts. In conflicts involving advanced Western militaries, this is accentuated by the evolution and increasing importance of information operations. Winning the media war is crucially important to Western war planners, and increasingly sophisticated methods for doing so have been developed—albeit with varying results” (Payne 2005, 92).

As discussed in Chapter 1, the global media network significantly influences the individual opinions and perceptions of its viewers. Media is a business and the stories they broadcast inform or entertain within the greater context of making a profit. American soldiers have a responsibility to journalists to help them understand the proper context in which they write and publish their stories. Incorporating and planning media can be most effective when public affairs (PA) is used to get the desired story or message out to the greater media network. PA is a related capability to IO and specifically deals with media and the control of information released to the media.

Media engagements at the BCT level must always be ethical and truthful. This is what sets the American military apart from insurgents. Insurgents use the media as a means to broadcast their message, whether it is truthful or not, or to reinforce their ideology. With public polling of Iraqis revealing that most believe what they see on the television, any insurgent attempts to make themselves look as though they are defending the common Iraqi’s legitimate rights will be believed without supporting evidence.
However, coalition units have their own credibility problems with the local population because what generally comes from the coalition is not considered credible (Boylan 2006).

A means to establish BCT credibility with a local population is disciplined behavior by its soldiers. As discussed previously, a soldier’s individual behavior is his most significant contribution to IO. By leveraging media and focusing on soldiers doing beneficial acts for the local population, especially when performed together with host nation forces, a media broadcast of such an event would be a small victory for coalition forces. The challenge remains in delivering the right message that benefits coalition forces and discredits insurgent propaganda.

The US military has an obligation to embrace the media. There must be an understanding that events during combat will be complicated and will not always be good-news stories. Due to the wide acceptance that what the media broadcasts can have immediate impact on foreign or military decisions made at the strategic levels which thereby impact the tactical decisions or operations conducted, the Army has an immediate obligation to train and educate is tactical leaders within a BCT to work with and understand the media and how to effectively interact and use the camera to tell the story.

As long as tactical leaders remain truthful and journalists remain ethical, published stories should reflect reality. The media are the primary conduit to the American people and to the global audience. With the use of embedding reporters during the beginning of OIF, numerous reporters had immediate access to stories as they developed. These embedded reporters were alongside the same soldiers about whom they wrote. “The Embedded Media Program was a resounding success for both the military
and the American people. . . . While the Pentagon might claim that each future conflict will have to be examined before determining a public affairs policy, the truth is that the ‘fork in the road’ has been taken and there is no turning back. The Embedded Media Program is here to stay” (Starnes 2004, 16).

This new paradigm places more requirements on the Army. Media should now be considered as an ever-present condition of the battlefield. Commanders and staff planners, in conjunction with PA, should incorporate the effects of the media into planning. Exposing BCT leaders and soldiers to media and the effects of it should be always incorporated into training. This remains consistent with the Army’s current doctrine of tactical leaders being able to visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess the environment or situations in which they find themselves. BCT and subordinate commanders must not only consider the impact of military operations within their AO but also simultaneously visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess how the media will inherently affect their BCT operations.

Having BCT leaders and soldiers educated and trained in media awareness is important because of the implications to IO. Due to the vast impact media can have on military operations and perceptions of reality, proper training will reduce the chance of erroneous or inaccurate information from soldiers and incorrect reporting from journalists. Soldiers need to understand and train with the media. The DOD’s embedded media program during OIF was a paradigm shift and COL Glenn Starnes, United States Marine Corps, in his research paper to the U.S. Army War College, Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom emphasizes this
DOD strategy and the impact it will continue to have on commanders and their units in combat:

The media will expect the Embedded Media Program to be employed every time America goes to war. The military will need to employ the program if they are to win the public affairs battle and the information operations campaign. . . . If my concern is founded in truth, senior leadership must recognize that embedded media will invariably affect the decision process of battlefield leaders. Media training for officers and senior enlisted must become an integral part of the training syllabus at all levels of military schooling. As part of tactical exercises, military leaders need to study and critique possible situations involving media reporting and their effect on operations. (2004, 15-16)

Since the information environment not only includes the battlefield but also extends throughout the world, the incorporation of media events into training and formal education of the Army’s tactical leaders and soldiers is paramount. The strategic implications that media will have on reporting the realities on the battlefield are well known and accepted. BCT leaders and soldiers must not only understand this impact but also proficient in operating within the embedded media paradigm. Since the information environment and its impact on IO planning and execution cannot be overlooked, the Army’s concerted efforts and institutional requirements to change its training and educational systems to accommodate this reality on the battlefield is a must.

Empowerment of junior leaders and soldiers with the capabilities to speak and tell the story, whether good or bad, will contribute to the credibility that what is reported is truthful and real. COL William Darley’s January 2005 article in Army Magazine, “Why Public Affairs Is Not Information Operations” provides great insights into the use and application of PA to remain connected with the American people:

[Public affairs] is instead an advocate that can influence the global information environment, not through deception, sloganeering or marketing campaigns, but through promoting public exposure of the greatest asset the Army has--the American soldier. The most powerful moral influence affecting public support for
the military is found not in the textured and calculated words of the nation’s spokespersons reciting rote messages, but in exposure to the selflessness, disciplines, integrity, courage, technical military competence and basic decency of our servicemembers. (2005, 3)

COL Darley continues to advocate “Though relatively passive in approach, media access to our servicemembers together with honesty and forthright release of information in a timely fashion has proven over time to be among the most powerful elements of perception influence the military has with regard to garnering public trust and support for the military even during periods of domestic political acrimony and unrest” (2005, 3). Hence, Darley implies that PA can support a BCT commander’s IO plan by controlling and managing media and the information released for their broadcasts. By using BCT soldiers who are trained and comfortable with media they will effectively continue to tell the stories that need to be told. They are the most credible and perhaps “unpolluted” stories the Army has to tell.

**Laws of War Application**

The media play a very important role in reporting accurate, truthful news. Precisely linked to the conduct of any military operation is the adherence to the laws of war and the media has an important role in this which specifically relates to IO:

The media play an important role in this process by conveying information about the conduct of war. . . . In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of popular support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way. Precisely because of this, adversaries who are able to take advantage of mass media frequently go out of their way to depict or even invent military actions against them as violations of some general legal or moral standard or to hide or downplay their own actions. (Reisman 1994, XXIV)
Whether media are present or not, commanders making tactical decisions must be continually aware that they have responsibilities to not only to uphold the oath they swore but also abide by customary international laws of war. It is not just commanders but the entire professional Army, the officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers, who must acknowledge that laws of war exist and are meant to be upheld.

On the surface, one may not see how understanding and acting within the laws of war relate to IO but clearly they do. BCT units must conduct operations with a detailed understanding of the legal obligations to protect civilian life, and cultural and religious structures. American soldiers must realize that insurgency tactics in COIN will not necessarily comply with any laws of war. These types of adversaries do not necessarily observe the laws regarding which countries have signed specific treaties in recognition that war does have inherent constraints. Due to the complexities of combat and the fog of war always experienced on the battlefield, BCT leaders and soldiers must be aware of the laws that do exist and that it is obeying these laws of war that sets the US military apart from adversaries who do not abide by the same rules. That an enemy may fight without rules while US soldiers are bound to obey them can create complications--all the more reason why education and training of the laws of war are a critical component of the professional development and knowledge of the professional Army.

In 1989, the U.S. Navy, in its Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, remarks with clarity the conditions of the law of war. This analysis recognized the complexity that exists when adversaries do not recognize laws of war:
The customary international law of armed conflict derives from the practice of military and naval forces in the field, at sea, and in the air during hostilities. When such a practice attains a degree of regularity and is accompanied by the general conviction among nations that behavior in conformity with that practice is obligatory, it can be said to have become a rule of customary law binding upon all nations. It is frequently difficult to determine the precise point in time at which a usage or practice of warfare evolves into a customary rule of law. In a period marked by rapid developments in technology, coupled with the broadening of the spectrum of warfare to encompass insurgencies and states sponsored terrorism, it is not surprising that nations often disagree as to the precise content of an accepted practice of warfare and to its status as a rule of law. (Reisman 1994, XX)

However, W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, in the introduction to *The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict*, state, “The fact that custom is so hard to identify, and that in some conflicts the failure of one of the belligerents to conform to it may indicate its suspension or inapplicability, presents major problems to soldiers in the field, and to students and judges after the fact. Furthermore, it is quite difficult to tell a soldier, whose life may hang in the balance, that it is not clear whether certain actions may be taken—especially if the adversary is taking them” (1994, xxi).

Due to the inherent complexities that exist on the battlefield, formal education and consistent training that exercises the laws of war are necessary to develop a soldier’s ability to make decisions which are supported by the laws of war. Commanders and soldiers are equally responsible for the application of the laws of war, and every attempt to expose units to them contributes to the application. “It is patent that if those engaged in hostilities have not been exposed to the prescriptions of the law of armed conflict, then they hardly can be expected to comply with them. Military manuals, special training in the laws of war, and dissemination of the laws of war by nongovernmental organizations
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross are important parts of its application” (Reisman 1994, XXVII).

As stated in the International Committee of the Red Cross’ *Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces*:

> It is the responsibility of every commander to ensure that the law of war is always respected and enforced in all circumstances, and these same commanders have a responsibility to ensure that law of war training is conducted within their organizations to ensure their soldiers understand their individual and collective responsibilities to uphold the law of war and that steps need to be taken to prevent violations. Additionally, commanders have it within their purview to ensure that violations of the law of war are stopped and that appropriate disciplinary actions are taken as required (de Mulinen 1987, 63, 64).

A commander is responsible for the conduct of military operations within his AO. He is responsible for the actions of his unit and the behavior of the soldiers within it. Without question, soldiers who have a detailed understanding of the laws of war and their legal responsibilities to uphold it could well contribute to a commander’s overall IO objectives. Soldiers who are disciplined and understand their responsibilities while in combat or while conducting stability and reconstruction operations will be more prepared to deal with the tremendous complexities they will undoubtedly encounter in the COE. As stated by COL Ralph Baker when discussing individual soldier discipline and personal conduct, “Personal conduct is the single most important impact a soldier can have on IO. . . . You have nothing to worry about when you maintain the discipline to act with dignity and respect for those [Iraqis] you are interacting with on a daily basis” (Baker 2006). Soldiers who are well ingrained in the laws of war will inherently behave within the expected standards and therefore will contribute to the greater application of IO within a BCT AO. In order for BCT soldiers to be successful in prosecuting the laws
of war it must be fully integrated throughout military training so that “combat reality will result in instinctively correct behavior” (de Mulinen 1987, 64).

As documented in the International Committee of the Red Cross’ *Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces*, a guideline for training a company or any other military unit is the “rules for behavior in action” which directly support the legal application of the law of war. They similarly reflect COL Baker’s comments.

**Combat Rules**
1. Fight only combatants
2. Attack only military targets
3. Spare civilian persons and objects
4. Restrict destructions to what your mission requires

**Enemy combatants who surrender**
1. Spare them
2. Disarm them
3. Treat them humanely and protect them
4. Hand them over to your superior

**Wounded enemy combatants**
1. Collect them
2. Care for them
3. Hand them over to your superior…
4. … or to the nearest medical personnel

**Civilian Persons**
1. Respect them
2. Treat those in your power humanely
3. Protect them against ill-treatment; vengeance and taking of hostages are prohibited
4. Respect their property; do not damage or steal it (de Mulinen 1987, Red Pages, 1).

The application of the laws of war on the battlefield is too important to be disregarded. Education and training focused on the laws of war is a critical pillar in the professional development and maturation of Army soldiers and leaders. The implications to American military credibility are too great if soldiers are not well informed and trained
on moral and ethical decisions they will undoubtedly encounter on the battlefield. Since they wield the power to take human life with the squeeze of a trigger, the Army has a responsibility to ensure that they understand the incredible responsibilities they have to remain moral and ethical while on the battlefield. Soldiers who are moral and ethical on the battlefield will remain righteous in the eyes of the local population. Inherent to this are the obvious implications to IO. War is already horrible, but when leaders and soldiers conduct questionable acts or even atrocities, these acts will permanently scar the Army’s reputation, contribute to the hegemonic stereotypes about American foreign policy, and further erode the strategic credibility of the US. If history is an indicator, what occurred at My Lai in Vietnam and Abu Ghraib in Iraq will not be forgotten due to the deplorable behavior of American soldiers. With the proper training of soldiers and leaders who exercise leadership and discipline, events as these can be avoided.

**Rules of Engagement Application**

To assist a commander in executing military operations that reflect the laws of war he is responsible to establish and disseminate ROE to his subordinates. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” (JP 1-02 2006, 463). ROE assist a commander to clarify appropriate actions to be taken by subordinates when particular situations or circumstances occur on the battlefield. They help define appropriate behavior that can involve both lethal and nonlethal effects on adversaries or noncombatants. They are essential to defining for subordinates the appropriate and proportional response to a situation. As stated in the Army’s interim COIN manual:
Knowledge of the ROE itself is not sufficient to help Soldiers make informed decisions regarding the appropriate application of force. Consistent and effective application of the ROE requires extensive training and discipline to develop the judgment, depth of knowledge, skills, and procedures necessary to apply force in a counterinsurgency environment. . . Leaders must ensure that every Soldier completely understands the mission and commander’s intent, and has comprehensive situational understanding at all times. The appropriate level of situational understanding, realistic training, and disciplined adherence to basic troop leading procedures equips Soldiers with the tools necessary to make informed decisions regarding the decision to use or refrain from the use of force. (FMI 3-07.22 2004, 2-14)

ROE, coupled with the laws of war, have direct impact on the application of IO because they help establish for subordinates appropriate behavior and response to circumstances they will most likely encounter in the OE. A soldier’s behavior cannot play into the stereotypes the local population may have about Americans. COL Baker highlighted that Iraqis in Baghdad were looking to be offended by soldiers . . . and soldiers played right into those stereotypes. Since a soldier’s behavior is directly linked to the perceptions formed by the local population, COL Baker’s personal convictions about soldier behavior, respect, and discipline are especially important:

The minute a soldier’s behavior plays into the stereotype of Americans it aids the insurgency. It validates their claims about the US and the American army. A soldier’s conduct and cultural sensitivity training are important but they are not the silver bullet. Treating people with dignity and respect. . . . Army CO2 training, and daily interaction . . . even treating a detainee, you have nothing to worry about when you treat Iraqis or detainees with dignity and respect. No one can say otherwise. It goes beyond manners, it involves command climate . . . if leaders permit soldiers to call Iraqis ‘haji’ or ‘diaper head’ you are mildly eroding the respects of the culture. These are things to look at in training, but it is critical to be successful in this environment. (Baker 2006)

Although COL Baker’s description seems more related to intercultural communication, his point is clear; soldiers who are disciplined in executing the commander’s ROE will help in overcoming negative stereotypes. ROE will assist in establishing an air of credibility with the population which is a necessary condition to
defeat an insurgency. Training vignettes can alleviate some of the uncertainty soldiers will experience on the battlefield. During training, putting them in precarious situations that challenge their ability to make good decisions and challenge their personal values is critical to ensuring successful military operations under real conditions.

As young soldiers and tactical leaders assume more empowerment and responsibilities customary to decentralized operations characteristic of COIN, the institutional Army must provide the most “at risk” tactical soldier population with specific education that reflects the necessary IO skill sets required in the COE. The American people expect of the Army good decision-making and soldier values. Understandably, however, leaders and soldiers will routinely make mistakes. Training these particular IO skills will better prepare those same leaders and soldiers to make the right decisions. Hard, realistic training reduces the risk they will make the wrong ones.

Ethics and Morality Application

The realm of understanding good, bad, right, and wrong is inclusive in training ethics. “Ethics is the area of morality which concentrates on human conduct and human values” (Thiroux 2001, 3). As summarized by Jacques P. Thiroux in his book Ethics: Theory and Practice he states:

When we speak of people as being moral or ethical, we usually mean that they are good people, and when we speak of them as being immoral or unethical, we mean that they are bad people. When we refer to certain human actions as being moral, ethical, immoral, and unethical, we mean that they are right or wrong. . . . The important thing to remember here is that moral, ethical, immoral, and unethical, essentially mean good, right, bad, wrong, often depending upon whether on is referring to people themselves or to their actions. (Thiroux 2001, 3)
If we examine human nature as empirically and rationally as we can, we discover that all human beings have many needs, desires, goals, and objectives in common. For example people generally seem to need friendship, love, happiness, freedom, peace, creativity, and stability in their lives, not only for themselves but for others, too. It doesn’t take much further examination to discover that in order to satisfy these needs, people must establish and follow moral principles that encourage them to cooperate with one another and that free them from fear that they will lose their lives, be mutilated, or be stolen from, lied to, cheated, severely restricted, or imprisoned. (Thiroux 2001, 26)

American soldiers represent a cross-section of American society. They come from different backgrounds, traditions, religious affiliation, and parental upbringing. The concepts of ethics and morality as address by Thiroux suggest that American soldiers who are indoctrinated in them will reinforce desired behavior. More importantly, training ethical decision-making and moral behavior will reduce the risk for the Army’s youngest leaders so that when confronted with an ethical decision they will reasonably make the right one.

Transforming soldiers to behave ethically and morally within a values-based Army requires consistent education and training. Introducing soldiers to values which describe good, bad, right, or wrong will develop their own understanding of morals and ethics. Already a part of the Army’s requirement for values-based training is that BCT and subordinate commanders have a responsibility to their soldiers to ensure that sustained values-based training is conducted throughout the year. Called the Consideration of Others (CO2) Program, soldiers conduct interactive training to reinforce the Army is a values-based organization. These are the same values soldiers will take with them on the battlefield. Soldiers who are ethically and morally sound are more likely to draw upon that foundation when faced with precarious situations encountered during combat. Training must reinforce the values expected from soldiers. Creating realistic
training events where soldiers’ values, morals, and ethics are stressed is absolutely necessary. Without that feedback, soldiers and leaders may not necessarily know that their own set of values, morals, or ethics could be in conflict with what is expected by the Army and, perhaps, humanity in general.

**Commander’s Intent Application**

The remaining concept that supports a BCT commander’s ability to execute an IO plan is his subordinates’ understanding of intent. As stated in FM 3-0, “The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state” (2001, 5-14). Commander’s intent allows subordinates the freedom to seize unforeseen opportunities that may arise to accomplish the mission when the original plan no longer applies. Commander’s intent is a clear and concise statement of the expanded purpose for conducting an operation. In concert with concurrent operations within the BCT’s AO, IO intent would describe final conditions that should exist when the overall end state is achieved. Army doctrine expects understanding of commander’s intent two levels down from the commander so when conditions that impact the current plan change, intent gives subordinates the freedom to still achieve the purpose of the mission but perhaps by other means. Commander’s intent ideally converts the commander’s thoughts into actions. It allows subordinates to seize the initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise.

JP 3-13 describes commander’s guidance as it applies to planning IO:

The commander’s vision of IO’s role in an operation should begin before the specific planning is initiated. At a minimum, the commander’s vision for IO should be included in the initial guidance. Ideally, commanders give guidance on IO as part of their overall concept, but may elect to provide it separately. The commander may elect to provide separate guidance on IO when a more focused
and direct discussion about IO is appropriate. Commanders may find providing separate guidance on IO during exercises is a valuable tool for training their staffs to view IO as an integral part of their overall operations concept (2006b, V-7).

JP 3-13 also emphasizes the importance of specifying intent for IO as separate guidance and vision and how IO should impact the overall desired end state:

The commander visualizes, plans, and directs operations--IO are a part of those operations. The commander’s intent should specify a visualization of the desired effects to be achieved with IO and other operations for the staff to develop IO objectives. The commander must not only be able to visualize the desired effects to be achieved with IO but also understand the adversary’s capabilities to limit the impact of US operations while the adversary strives to acquire information superiority from the US. . . . The commander’s intent must include the concept of how these effects will help achieve force objectives. (2006b, I-4)

Although written about mission command during stability and support operations, which could easily be compared to current COIN operations in Iraq, FM 6-0 effectively describes why knowing and understanding commander’s intent is important. It is a very similar requirement when executing COIN in Iraq.

A clear commander’s intent that lower-level leaders can understand is key to maintaining unity of effort. Circumstances of remote locations or rapidly changing situations can force commanders to conduct decentralized operations, and soldiers must exercise subordinates’ initiative to solve problems as they arise. One isolated, thoughtless action can undo months of patient work, potentially alienate the local populace, and benefit the belligerent’s cause in stability operations or diminish the effects of support operations. (2003b, 1-19)

So far, this chapter has presented evidence suggesting that the Army has an opportunity to harness particular skills and applications in its soldiers which will improve and expand the capabilities of IO for a BCT commander. Improving a soldier’s IO capabilities will have enormous impact on a commander’s ability to employ IO at the tactical level. This chapter will now transition to the Army’s institutional and operational training methods analyzing how each incorporate IO skill education and training into each soldier’s professional development.
The Institutional and Operational Army

The Army is divided into two organizations focused on preparing the Army for the nation’s wars; the institutional Army and the operational Army:

The institutional Army (schools and training centers) is the foundation for lifelong learning. The institution is a key enabler for unit readiness. It develops competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders and soldiers able to succeed in situations of great uncertainty. The institution provides the framework to develop future leadership characteristics that produce critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, and mental agility. . . . The institution teaches Army doctrine and provides the experiences that train leaders and soldiers. (FM 7-0 2002, 1-7)

The institutional Army is responsible for the continuing professional education of its soldiers, NCOs, and officers. For soldiers, the institutional Army conducts initial military training for its newest recruits. For officers, the institution has the Officer Education System (OES) with several levels of education; Basic Officer Leader Course I (BOLC I) is the Army’s commissioning sources of lieutenants; BOLC II is an introduction of newly commissioned lieutenants into the Army; BOLC III are branch-specific courses for new lieutenants, whereby they receive specialized training in their basic branch; and the Captains Career Course (CCC) is designed for Army captains who have served at the platoon, company, or battalion level and are preparing to be company commanders within their branch.

The NCO education system (NCOES) also has several levels of training whereby the Army’s NCOs receive technical, tactical, and leader education. NCOES prepares NCOs to conduct full spectrum operations within their current grade or higher grades within their branch specialty. Some examples of NCOES that NCOs in a BCT attend are; the Warrior Leaders Course, designed for soldiers newly promoted to sergeant; Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC), designed for staff sergeants; and the
Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), designed for sergeants first class.

Contrastingly, the operational Army is where commanders train their units. “Soldier and leader training and development continue in the unit. Using the institutional foundation, training in organizations and units focuses and hones individual and team skills and knowledge. . . . Unit commanders are responsible for sustaining small unit leader and individual soldier skills to support the unit’s mission” (FM 7-0 2002, 1-9).

The IO skills and applications discussed in this chapter can have a tremendous impact on a BCT commander’s ability to conduct effective IO within his AO. These IO skills and applications can be incorporated into the operational and institutional Army. Currently, the operational Army sees the immediacy of training very similar tasks to the proposed IO skills and applications; however, the institutional Army has yet to incorporate them despite the current requirement in the Iraq. Until the Army can adjust its institutional educational systems to the OE, the responsibility squarely falls on the commander to find innovative ways to train and evaluate leaders and soldiers on conducting IO.

“Closing the gap between training, leader development, and battlefield performance has always been a critical challenge for any army” (FM 7-0 2002, IV). Currently, the Army is experiencing a gap in IO institutional education and operational training for tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT. What makes this alarming, particularly in COIN operations in Iraq, is IO have become more important than combat operations. Commanders know IO are absolutely necessary to achieve nonlethal effects in a BCT AO. Although lethal combat operations are still required to conduct COIN in Iraq,
building the population’s trust and confidence through the active use of IO will only help
BCT commanders achieve their desired end state. Without the proper institutional
education and operational training on the employment of IO in a BCT and below, how
can the Army expect BCT’s to employ IO to standard in accordance with IO doctrine?
The answer is, it can not.

The Army is continuously training to conduct military operations as part of a
joint, expeditionary force. Commanders train their units on essential tasks generally
related to potential missions. For all units deploying to OIF, United States Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) has directed the training of specific soldier and leader tasks in
CHANGE 5 to FORSCOM Message R311051ZMay05. They are directly related to the
Iraq OE and are necessary to ensure units deploying to Iraq are trained and prepared to
react to the types of situations they could encounter.

Listed below are the individual, leader, and unit tasks from the FORSCOM
message which support IO. These tasks are not identified to be part of IO but are directly
related to solving the gaps. Specific to IO, the FORSCOM message only states that IO
training should be conducted in accordance with FM 3-13. No further guidance is
provided. Unfortunately, FM 3-13 provides little guidance on performance-oriented IO
training. It does not provide specific actions, conditions, and standards applicable to IO.
Hence, a commander is left to interpret FM 3-13 deciding on the most important tasks
that he thinks support IO training and individual soldier proficiency. This is clearly a gap
in what the doctrine currently provides and what FORSCOM is directing commanders to
execute prior to deployment. How can FORSCOM direct commanders to train IO in
accordance with FM 3-13 when the FM does not adequately provide a commander tasks
and associated standards to conduct IO?

The intent of the FORSCOM message is to provide training guidance for
operational units deploying to OIF after 01 July, 2005. Selected from the FORSCOM
message are tasks the same as, or similar to, the proposals for IO skills and applications.

2. THEATER SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. ALL INDIVIDUALS
DEPLOYING TO OIF MUST BE TRAINED IN SPECIFIC TASKS BELOW.

2.A. COUNTRY ORIENTATION BRIEF TO INCLUDE A GENERAL
OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, CULTURAL, RELITIOUS,
AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE SPECIFIC COUNTRY.
INFORMATION FOR THIS BRIEF IS OBTAINABLE AT THE CIA WORLD
FACT BOOK WEBSITE AT
(WWW.ODCI.GOV/CIA.PUBLICATIONS/FACTBOOK/INDEX.HTML).

2.C. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TRAINING IAW TC 7-98-1, STABILITY
AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS, LESSON 4: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
APPLICATION. SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) AND
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON USE OF DEADLY FORCE WILL ALSO BE
TRAINED IN THEATER.

2.E. MEDIA AWARENESS TRAINING IAW TC 7-98-1, STABILITY AND
SUPPORT OPERATIONS, LESSON 8: MEDIA STRATEGY.

2.P. ALL REGULATORY BRIEFINGS SPECIFIED IN APPLICABLE ARMY
PUBLICATIONS: GENERAL ORDERS / OPSEC / SAEDA / EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY AND PREVENTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT OR
ASSAULT / DA FRATERNIZATION POLICY / ARMY VALUES.

2.Q. COMPLY WITH THE LAW OF WAR AND THE GENEVA AND HAGUE
CONVENTIONS.

2.R. BASIC IRAQI LANGUAGE TRAINING. ALL SOLDIERS WILL
RECEIVE TRAINING ON BASIC IRAQI LANGUAGE COMMAND
NORMALLY USED DURING OPERATIONS.

Specific leader training:

3.C. PERFORM NEGOTIATIONS IAW 7-98-1, STABILITY AND SUPPORT
OPERATIONS, LESSON 13: NEGOTIATION.

3.Q. ENFORCETHE LAW OF WAR AND THE GENEVA AND Hague CONVENTIONS.

General collective competencies and multi-echelon training:


Stability operations collective competencies:

5.C.5. MEDIA RELATIONS IAW TC 7-98-1, LESSON 8, MEDIA STRATEGY.

Brigade level stability operations competencies:


Above brigade level, FORSCOM directs:


6.D. DIVISION AND ABOVE COMMANDERS WILL CONDUCT MISSION READINESS EXERCISE (MRX) WHICH INCLUDE IO AND CMO IN THE EXERCISE SCENARIOS. (United States Army Forces Command 2005, 2)

What is interesting about CHANGE 5 to FORSCOM Message R311051ZMay05 is that these tasks highlight an immediate necessity to better prepare soldiers and units for the Iraq AO. The operational Army has taken the lead to ensure these tasks are trained prior to deployment or prior to arrival into Iraq. However, is the institutional Army educating and training similar tasks to support the operational Army’s current requirements? By analyzing current training layouts and course management plans from BOLC II and III, CCC, and WLC, BNCOC, and ANCOC, the Army’s schoolhouses are not educating students on IO; generally not training the specific tasks selected from the
FORSCOM message above; and are not educating students on the IO skills and applications presented throughout this chapter.

Noncommissioned Officer Education System

Warrior Leader Course (WLC). “The Warrior Leader Course (WLC) is a branch–immaterial course conducted at Regional [noncommissioned officer academies] (NCOAs) worldwide and training battalions. It provides basic leadership training for Soldiers selected for promotion to sergeant. The WLC provides Soldiers an opportunity to acquire the leader skills, knowledge, and experience needed to lead team-size units. It is the foundation for further training and development. Training focuses on; Establishing self–discipline; Instilling professional ethics; Leading, disciplining, and developing Soldiers; Planning, executing, and evaluating individual and team training; Planning and executing missions and tasks assigned to team-size units; Caring for Soldiers and their families” (AR 350-1 2006, 63). Additionally, WLC trains and evaluates thirty-nine warrior tasks and nine battle drills (Brimstin 2006). The warrior tasks and battle drills focus on individual and collective student-soldier competence and proficiency. The tasks train and test a student-soldier’s ability to lead small unit teams and squads in tasks associated with shooting (sixteen tasks), moving (four tasks), communicating (four tasks), fighting (twelve tasks), and joint urban operations (three tasks). The warrior tasks and battle drills performed in WLC are nested with the remaining tasks listed in the CHANGE 5 to FORSCOM Message R311051ZMay05.

Understandably, the focus of WLC as an institution is to train lasting individual and collective leader tasks and skills that sergeants generally perform throughout the Army. WLC is not necessarily responsible to conduct the exact same tasks the
operational Army determines currently relevant. However, the tasks selected from the
CHANGE 5 to FORSCOM Message R311051ZMay05, to include the IO skills and
applications proposed in this chapter, are not trained in WLC.

Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). “The BNCOC is a branch-
specific course that provides Soldiers selected for promotion to staff sergeant with an
opportunity to acquire the leader, technical, and tactical skills, knowledge, and
experience needed to lead squad-size units” (AR 350-1 2006, 63). Divided into two
phases, BNCOC Phase I consists of a branch-immaterial common core while BNCOC
Phase II is branch-specific. The BNCOC Phase I is divided into leadership, training, and
warfighting courseware. In the BNCOC Phase I leadership courseware, students receive
classes on Ethical Behavior (two hours) and Apply the Ethical Decision Making Method
at Small Unit Level (two hours). In the BNCOC Phase I training courseware, students
receive Cultural Awareness Considerations class (two hours). No other tasks specific to
the FORSCOM message or to the IO subjects presented in this thesis are taught in
BNCOC Phase I or Infantry BNCOC Phase II at Fort Benning.

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC). “The ANCOC is a
branch–specific course that provides an opportunity for Soldiers selected for promotion
to sergeant first class to acquire the leader, technical, and tactical skills, knowledge, and
experience needed to lead platoon–size units” (AR 350-1 2006, 63). This course
additionally focuses on platoon sustainment operations, Army doctrine, and platoon
tactical operations. Analysis of the Infantry ANCOC curriculum revealed that IO is not
part of this course. However, Infantry ANCOC students do receive Ethical Decision
Making (two hours) during their course. With the realignment of Infantry ANCOC to a
Maneuver ANCOC (M-ANCOC) the prototype curriculum has promising additions of IO (two hours) and maintains current Ethical Decision Making (two hours).

Commissioned Officer Education System

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) Phases II/III. “The BOLC is initial entry training (IET) (Phase II) and branch-specific qualification (Phase III) courses that provide newly commissioned officers an opportunity to learn the leadership, tactical, and technical tasks and supporting skills and knowledge required to lead platoon-sized units” (AR 350-1 2006, 53). BOLC II is a seven-week course primarily focused on transitioning Army cadets to Army lieutenants. They receive acculturation training and learning doctrinal Army standards on physical fitness, combatives, weapon proficiency, and leadership at the platoon level. Tasks are basic and prepare new lieutenants for their branch-specific BOLC III course. IO, as discussed throughout this chapter, are not within the scope of BOLC II/III nor are the tasks selected from CHANGE 5 to FORSCOM Message R311051ZMay05 used for this thesis.

To research BOLC III, the training schedule for lieutenants attending Infantry BOLC III at Fort Benning was analyzed. This infantry-specific thirteen-week training course is designed to rigorously train and prepare infantry lieutenants to arrive at their unit ready to assume responsibilities as a platoon leader. This population of lieutenants, to include all the branch-specific BOLC III courses, is a key population to train and indoctrinate in enduring Army skills, values, and standards. Infantry BOLC III students receive a course on military justice (two hours) but other tasks related to IO are not the focus of this course. As stated by COL James Klingaman, the commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning who oversees the training of BOLC II/III and Infantry
Captains Career Course officers, “IO is not a focus of the training we conduct in these courses. The feedback we receive from infantry commanders in operational Army continues to demand the basics. They want their infantry lieutenants to be proficient in the basics of being an infantry platoon leaders and company commanders. Conducting IO at the company or platoon level is not one of them” (Klingaman 2006).

Captains Career Course (CCC). “The CCC facilitates life-long learning through an educational experience that emphasizes leader competencies, integrates Captain’s operational experiences with their institutional experience and facilitates self development. It provides captains an opportunity to learn the leader, tactical, and technical tasks and supporting skills and knowledge needed to lead company–size units and serve on battalion and brigade staffs. The CCC includes common core and branch–specific tactical and technical instruction, branch immaterial staff process professional development training” (AR 350-1 2006, 54). The Infantry CCC (IC3) is a twenty-two week course that focuses on full spectrum operations at the company and battalion level. It is intensely focused on a captain’s ability to plan, synchronize, and lead an infantry company in combat in any environment or situation. According to their 22 March 2006 course overview, IC3 invests lesson hours via doctrinal lectures in the following courses: law of war and ROE, ethics and ethical decision making, media and media planning, military justice, cultural terrain, and equal opportunity. IC3 students, during their Stryker BCT urban offense module do receive a doctrinal lecture on IO.

Summary of IO Education and Training

Below is a current summary of the Army’s institutional education and operational training of the specific IO skills and applications presented throughout this thesis. It
compares the operational Army’s current training requirements for units and soldiers deploying to OIF to those lessons taught in the Army’s institutional education system:

1. FORSCOM directs soldiers learn basic Iraqi language phrases. The institutional Army conducts no language training in company-level and below OES and NCOES.

2. FORSCOM directs leader training in negotiating. The institutional Army has no such education allotted in its company-level OES or NCOES curricula.

3. FORSCOM directs cultural awareness as specific to Iraq. The institutional Army in BNCOC Phase I and IC3 conducts cultural awareness classes. However, WLC, BOLC II/III do not.

4. FORSCOM directs ROE training and specific instructions on the deadly use of force. IC3 is the only course which has formal lessons on ROE.

5. FORSCOM directs media awareness training. IC3 does teach media awareness and planning in its course. However, BOLC II/III, WLC, BNCOC, and ANCOC do not.

6. FORSCOM directs units comply with the Law of War, the Geneva and Hauge conventions. IC3 students do receive law of war doctrinal lectures. However, BOLC II/III, WLC, BNCOC, and ANCOC do not.

7. FORSCOM directs units to conduct IO in accordance with FM 3-13. Only IC3 conducts doctrinal lectures on IO. The prototype M-ANCOC course has IO as a proposed addition. Doctrinal IO is not taught in BOLC II/III, WLC, or BNCOC Phase I.

8. Ethics and ethical decision making are taught in BNCOC Phase I and IC3. These topics are not formally taught in BOLC II/III or WLC. They are proposed in the M-ANCOC prototype courseware.
IO: A Tactical Collective Task


(FM 7-15) provides a standard, doctrinal foundation and catalogue of the Army’s tactical collective tasks. Units and staffs perform these tactical collective tasks at corps level and below. . . . The AUTL provides a common language and reference system for doctrine, combat, and training developers. The link between planners and trainers helps ensure that forces train the way they will fight. The AUTL also provides a basis for establishing unit-specific ARTEP MTPs. It provides a catalogue of tasks to assist in identifying those tasks that are essential to accomplish the organization's operational mission. (2003c, viii, x).

FM 7-15 lists the tactical collective tasks which directly support or relate to IO:

- ART 1.4.2, Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations
- ART 3.3.2, Conduct Nonlethal Fire Support/Offensive Information Operations addresses the conduct of offensive information operations.
- ART 5.3.7, Conduct Defensive Information Operations addresses the conduct of defensive information operations.
- ART 5.3.8, Conduct Tactical Counterintelligence addresses the conduct of that particular task which also relates to ART 5.3.7, Conduct Defensive Information Operations.
- ART 6.14, Conduct Civil-Military Operations in an AO, is one activity related to information operations.
- ART 7.10, Conduct Public Affairs Operations, is the other activity related to information operations. (2003c, 1-30)

For what the AUTL is designed to do, its IO collective tasks are inadequate.

Although these tasks may support or relate to IO per FM 3-13 there are no standardized and published individual or leader IO tasks associated with a unit ARTEP MTP. Hence, the IO collective tasks in the AUTL cannot be performed within an existing evaluation standard.
Throughout this chapter is evidence suggesting, (1) The incompleteness of IO doctrine, (2) The necessary skills and applications American soldiers should have to support IO, and (3) The disparity between the institutional and operational Army in education and training of IO. What the Army can do about each of these is the subject of the conclusions in the remaining chapter.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis is to determine: “Is the Army adequately preparing its tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT to conduct IO within the COE?” This thesis has determined the Army is not. Neither the institutional nor operational Army has comprehensive doctrine, curriculum, or training and evaluation standards for IO. Using the Army’s construct of DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities), my conclusions will specifically address doctrine, organizations, and training.

Doctrine

IO Doctrine

One reason the Army is not preparing its tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT to conduct IO is because Army IO doctrine is inadequate at the BCT level and below. FM 3-13 states “Commanders from brigade through echelons above corps conduct IO” (2003, 1-13) and when published in 2003 it was those echelons that were the focus of the doctrine. Regardless, IO doctrine is misaligned with the realities on the battlefield and the doctrinal concepts for the Army’s modular BCTs. Despite IO having strategic and operational application, the Iraq OE confirms that IO is also a tactical operation with associated tasks, skills, and applications that support or contribute to IO. The doctrine should properly reflect this.

FM 3-13, applied today, does not describe how IO are planned and executed by tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT. The Army does not have any individual, leader, or
collective standards published in ARTEP MTPs to evaluate proficiency of those IO skills. IO doctrine must properly recognize that tactical IO are performed by soldiers through their collective actions, behavior, choices and decisions and the perceptions these create. The Army must recognize there are IO skills and applications with corresponding individual and collective IO tasks. These skills, applications, and collective tactical tasks require identification, standardization, and implementation. Once the collective tactical IO tasks are implemented, updating the AUTL is required. Until then, the Army will continue to inadequately prepare its tactical leaders and soldiers in a BCT to conduct IO in the COE.

Recommendations for IO Doctrine

As FM 3-13 is currently revised and updated, there are additional areas that need to be addressed. In response to lessons learned in OIF, the manual needs to discuss tactical IO at the BCT level and below. There also needs to be a discussion that focuses on the dynamics of the cognitive properties of the information environment and the impact behavior and stereotypes have on individual perceptions, opinions, and behavior. Additionally, IO encompasses disciplines beyond the current core, supporting, and related capabilities. These disciplines include those soldier skills and applications discussed throughout this thesis. Each can be addressed in the next revision of FM 3-13.

Since IO are conducted throughout the tactical echelons in a BCT, IO FMs for each echelon could also be developed or IO chapters included in current operational FMs. Writing these FMs by tactical echelon would specifically address the execution of IO at those levels. Also, these FMs will correspond with current FMs by echelon. For example,

To fully implement IO throughout the units in a BCT, the Army can create ARTEP MTP standards for IO training and evaluation. This would involve identifying, quantifying, standardizing, publishing, and educating the institutional and operational Army on the individual and collective IO tasks at the BCT level and below.

Once these standards are established, the institutional Army must update the AUTL to include a more comprehensive approach to conducting IO since IO is at the forefront of military operations in the COE. An updated AUTL with IO will assist commanders in refining their METL tasks and assist in the allocation of time and resources to train IO tactical collective tasks.

**Organization and Training**

**Institutional IO Education**

The evidence presented in Chapter 4 proves the Army’s institutional education on IO is insufficient. Research conducted reveals there are few dedicated lesson hours throughout the OES and NCOES that support or directly relate to IO. The institutional Army has a responsibility to provide competent and capable soldiers, NCOs, and officers who can conduct full spectrum operations during sustained combat. The institutional Army does this. However, with the increasing importance of IO to BCT commanders, the institutional Army should adjust its current focus slightly and provide its company-grade officers, NCOs and soldiers the proper education to at least have a familiarity with IO.

To effectively do this, American soldiers must receive education on critical individual and leader IO skills and applications outlined in this thesis. OES and NCOES
would have to adjust course designs and courseware in order to teach these skills and applications. Additionally, creating and standardizing the lessons across OES and NCOES must also be addressed. Lastly, finding and training competent military or civilian instructors to teach and expand these lessons is also a requirement.

Recommendations for IO Education

Perhaps the greatest challenge to adding IO education to the institutional Army curriculum is determining the standard for IO education in OES and NCOES. This must be accomplished before any IO curriculum is implemented. The following are recommended focus areas for inclusion of IO into future course management plans.

Teaching intercultural communication requires experts who have written on and understand this subject area. Academia can develop appropriate lessons and integrate them into the Army’s requirements. Additionally, they can be a source of educating future course instructors. The current Functional Area 30 IO qualification course provides a framework for leveraging academia for cultural expertise and current Army foreign area officer courses already possess these specific cultural lessons. Lastly, opportunities for expanding this subject should also reside in the various interagency departments throughout the US government.

Not every soldier will have an affinity for languages. Achieving proficiency in a language will depend on individual intellect. However, incorporating languages into OES and NCOES will stress it is a priority. All soldiers can learn a few useful phrases in the target language, and basic daily sayings and courtesies should be the focus. Expectations for language skills should be realistic.
The ability of the Army’s tactical leaders to conduct effective negotiations with the host population’s leaders or figure heads are a requirement in the OE. It is a critical leader skill. Conducing negotiating classes, lessons, practical exercises, and training vignettes would assist in teaching and preparing the Army’s tactical leaders. To perform negotiating tasks, standards will require development and instructors will need training. This skill is necessary because it will create more confident leaders and provide more IO capabilities to commanders.

The embedded media program during OIF gave journalists unprecedented access to military commanders and their unit operations. The Army has a responsibility to prepare its tactical leaders for encounters with the media. Incorporating media education throughout all military professional development is required. Classes on working with journalists, conducting interviews, and understanding the importance media has on the battlefield will give commanders and soldiers greater confidence and competence.

The battlefield is already an uncertain environment. Educating American soldiers on the laws of war will assist in reducing battlefield uncertainty. Teaching soldiers about these laws, how they impact military operations, and the actions they must take to act within them are critical skills to learn. Lessons should be contemporary, engaging, and promote the laws of war as universal protections for combatants and civilians.

Coinciding with educating American soldiers on the laws of war is the necessity to educate them on ROE. Soldiers who understand how to apply ROE during any military operation will better protect themselves, their fellow soldiers, and those they are responsible to defend. However, ROE can be lengthy and hard to remember. Educating soldiers on ROE will make them better prepared for the complexities of the COE.
Techniques for teaching ROE must be performance and standard based. Students must be forced to actually think about ROE and what a commander means when he publishes ROE.

Actions by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison reinforce the importance of having a values-based Army that performs ethically and morally. These applications are enduring and expected throughout an American soldier’s service. Using contemporary examples of ethical and moral behavior, the failings or success of notable military leaders can be incorporated into student classes. Due to the maturity and experience of students throughout the various levels of professional education, levels of ethics and morals training can be standardized and implemented throughout OES and NCOES.

The course management plans which outline the lessons taught in each schoolhouse should include lessons on commander’s intent. Due to the importance Army doctrine places on commanders communicating intent and subordinates understanding and acting within it, this subject requires more education. Military operations are framed with commander’s intent and there must be common understanding at the tactical level of what the commander wants to accomplish. Failure to act within a commander’s intent for IO could have negative outcomes. To better prepare the American soldier to execute IO in the COE, his ability to accurately apply his commander’s intent is at the height of his capabilities as an American soldier.

Operational IO Training

Army commanders are responsible for the combat readiness and training of their units. Training is absolutely required to ensure the Army has combat-ready forces capable of joint expeditionary operations. Commanders determine their unit’s mission-
essential tasks and their staffs coordinate the proper resources and time, and synchronize his guidance to ensure that the intent for training those mission-essential tasks is fulfilled. With the increased importance placed on conducting IO in Iraq and elsewhere, BCT commanders may find that new mission-essential tasks are IO tasks.

Traditionally, BCT units have exclusively trained on individual and collective lethal combat tasks and the logistical tasks to sustain a BCT throughout major combat operations. Consciously including IO tasks as mission-essential ones would be a paradigm shift. This would require BCT commanders and the Army to invest time and resources to accomplish the education, training, and materials necessary. The OE reveals the heightened importance of IO. Elevating IO to a mission essential task would be a monumental step towards prioritizing IO training thereby increasing IO capabilities within a BCT.

BCT commanders who commanded in Baghdad insisted that to execute COIN operations, IO, in conjunction with intelligence gathering, was the most important operation they conducted in their AO. IO were deliberately planned and executed because the COIN environment required it. Clearly, from experiences in Iraq, there are very important individual soldier and leader skills that can significantly contribute to a BCT commander’s overall IO plan. No longer can the Army afford to solely focus on lethal combat operations. Within the Iraq AO and foreseeable COE, the Army must teach, train, and employ its soldiers to have a high degree of sophistication to properly interact with, respect, and gain the trust and confidence of a host population. American soldiers must be able to respond to the specific conditions of the Iraq OE, as well as anticipate other potential situations of the COE.
The tasks and skills supporting IO, as discussed in Chapter 4, are individual leader and soldier tasks performed primarily at the BCT level and below. IO therefore is conducted at the tactical level. The BCT commander’s IO plan may be synchronized and resourced at the BCT level, but like most military operations, the mission is accomplished by the soldiers, leaders, and commanders on the ground, not the staff officers in the headquarters, who are the current recipients of IO schooling in the Army.

Recommendations for IO Training

IO can be incorporated throughout all training and as part of a unit’s normal daily business. Traditional collective and individual combat-related training can be conducted with corresponding IO training. The Army has a need to develop training standards for IO but until then, commanders and staffs must use ingenuity to keep soldiers engaged with IO. AUTL IO tasks should provide sufficient specificity for BCT and subordinate commanders to develop METLs which incorporate collective tactical IO tasks. There must be constant application of ROE and laws of war throughout training. Commanders can create training situations which place his tactical leaders and soldiers in precarious situations which force them to make tough decisions with IO implications. During training events, embedded media can be incorporated. Commanders should constantly expose soldiers to these IO-related situations so when they actually encounter them on the battlefield it will not be their first time and they will know what to do.

Closing the Gap

Of concern, the deployment tasks in CHANGE 5 to FORSCOM Message R311051Z May 05 used for this thesis, are not generally or uniformly instructed in the
Army’s schoolhouses. Understandably, the institutional Army’s focus is to provide long-term, doctrinally sound education to its student-soldiers; however, it also has the responsibility to meet the needs of the operational Army. Regarding IO education and training, there is a clear gap between the two. The IO skills and applications proposed in this thesis will support the operational Army and meet many of the FORSCOM deployment training requirements. These IO skills and applications are relevant to any battlefield or region American soldiers will serve. They must become inherent to any military operation. By educating student-soldiers in a professionally developing curriculum and reinforcing that education with realistic training, the Army will reduce the risk the COE places on the Army’s tactical leaders and soldiers. As a result, American soldiers will have better chances of making the right decision, just as the Marine “Strategic Corporal,” when placed in uncertain situations that could have strategic impacts on the overall operation being executed.

**Final Summary**

IO is the most important nonlethal enabler a BCT commander has to use in his AO to influence the adversary, foreign friendly, and neutral audiences. In the COE, or specifically Iraq, COIN operations have shown tactical leaders and soldiers the importance of earning and protecting the trust and confidence of the Iraqi population. This is done through disciplined, ethical, warrior-statesmen soldiers who have the necessary IO skills to effectively communicate and negotiate with a cultural sophistication that belies stereotypes about Americans. If the BCT commander’s IO plan and intent are understood, his tactical leaders and soldiers will be well trained to execute
any IO plan using the IO skills both the institutional and operational Army have invested in its most strategically deployed combat system--the American soldier.
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