FACTORS IN ITALIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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Current events provide almost daily twists in the nature of the Trans-Atlantic relationship. As a result, European militaries are an attractive subject for analysis of the multiple factors contributing to change in those militaries, and the Italian military is no exception. With the development of programs such as the NATO Response Force (NRF) and a variety of burgeoning European Union (EU) military entities intended to spearhead European military modernization, NATO and the EU are the primary sources of external factors in Italian military modernization. Internal Italian factors, such as the recent elimination of conscription, also impact Italian military modernization. Analysis of internal factors concentrates on technological, systems, doctrinal, organizational, and resource management attributes. The literature indicates that internal factors, particularly organizational changes, military systems upgrades and resource management, are the most significant determinants of Italian military modernization.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ........ ii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... vii
ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................ ix
TABLES .............................................................................................................................. x

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1

### Military Modernization........................................................................................................ 6
- US Department of Defense .............................................................................................. 6
- US Army Transformation ............................................................................................... 7
- US Air Force “Transformation” ...................................................................................... 8
- European Military Transformation Initiatives .............................................................. 9
- Military Revolutions .................................................................................................... 9
- A Model for Military Modernization Analysis ............................................................ 11

### Post-World War II Italy .................................................................................................... 12
- The Italian Military ........................................................................................................ 12
- Current Italian Military Modernization ..................................................................... 18
- Social and Political Factors Impacting the Italian Military ........................................ 20

### European Military Paradigms since World War II ......................................................... 21
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization ............................................................................. 21
  - NATO Transformation ............................................................................................... 24
  - NATO Reorganization ................................................................................................ 25
  - NATO Response Force ............................................................................................. 26
- NATO as a Factor in Italian Military Modernization .................................................. 28
- The European Union ................................................................................................... 29
  - European Union Military Development ................................................................... 30
  - European Union Rapid Reaction Force ................................................................... 31
  - European Union Battle Groups ............................................................................... 32
  - European Union Gendarmerie Force ...................................................................... 33
  - European Capabilities Action Plan ........................................................................ 33
  - European Union Factors in Italian Modernization .................................................. 34

### Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 36
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>Aerospace Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>ARRC</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defence Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DSA</td>
<td>Defence Security Agency</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>European Defence Council</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU RRF</td>
<td>European Union Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security and Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JAMES</td>
<td>Joint Airborne Multisensor, Electronic Support</td>
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<td>MTR</td>
<td>Military-Technical Revolution</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Community</td>
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<td>NRDC</td>
<td>NATO Rapid Deployable Corps</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<td>SIACCON</td>
<td>Sistema Automatico di Comando e Controllo</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>Western European Union</td>
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ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Italian Military Force Projections</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Popular Support for Conscription Only Force, All-Volunteer Force, and Mixed Model Force</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Number of Conscripts vs. Opt Out Requests Lodged, 1989-1999</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Conscripts and Objectors by Italian Region of Origin</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Conscripts and Objectors by Education Level</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

Table 1. NATO Military Forces by Country ..............................................................13
Table 2. NATO Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GDP ..............................14
Table 3. GDP and Defense Expenditures per Capita in US Dollars .....................15
Table 4. Total Military Defense Expenditures ......................................................16
Table 5. Distribution of Total Defense Expenditures by Category .......................17
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Having inherited the defense structure that won the Cold War and Desert Storm, the Clinton Administration intends to leave as its legacy a defense strategy, a military, and a Defense Department that have been transformed to meet the new challenges of a new century.¹

William Cohen

Our overall goal is to encourage a series of transformations that in combination can produce a revolutionary increase in our military capability and redefine how war is fought. The capabilities demonstrated in Afghanistan show how far we have come in the ten years since the Persian Gulf War. But they are just a glimpse of how far we can still go.²

Paul Wolfowitz

Changes in latitudes, changes in attitudes, nothing remains quite the same.

Jimmy Buffett

Military organizations around the world are undergoing what is commonly referred to as a “military transformation.” Transformation is not the only word applied to the conglomeration of military organizational, doctrinal, and systems changes. Military revolution, Revolution in Military Affairs, and Military-Technical Revolution are also common names for this concept. Still, one recent Department of Defense-sponsored conference on transformation concluded that while “defense transformation has preoccupied the United States (US) Defense Department for more than a decade” there is still “no strong consensus . . . as to what defense transformation exactly entail(s).”³
evidence suggests, however, that there is confusion not only in the US over the multiple labels for the concept of military change.

Italy is one of many countries claiming to be transforming its military. Nevertheless, it is a matter of debate whether the armed forces of Italy or any other country is undergoing a revolution, or simply evolving. The US Department of Defense and the US military services tout their own transformation initiatives. NATO claims to be undergoing a transformation and the US is encouraging both NATO and individual countries within the Alliance to transform their own militaries. The European Union adds another dimension to military changes that impact the Italian military, as both current and projected capabilities and speculated missions for nascent EU military forces develop.

This thesis will first address these multiple flavors of transformation initiatives.

The purpose of this study is to determine the multiple factors that drive change--whether one terms it transformation, evolution, or revolution--within the Italian military. Therefore, the primary question of this thesis is: What factors influence Italian military modernization? This study will address both external and internal factors.

Developments within NATO and the EU are the two most significant external factors impacting the Italian military. NATO created the NATO Response Force (NRF) for the purpose of spearheading transformation within member nations’ militaries. The EU also established the European Capabilities Action Plan with the expressed purpose of spearheading development of the militaries of member nations.

The demise of the Soviet threat and the Warsaw Pact led to a reassessment of NATO’s mission and composition. NATO counted 16 countries among its membership at the end of the Cold War; as of the writing of this thesis that number stands at 26, and
NATO may continue to grow. Italian Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola admits that this compositional change is presenting challenges to NATO, and “only historians will be able to judge the organization’s evolution, among other reasons because the process of change is still ongoing.” Because of its geographic proximity to current regions of concern, Italy feels the impact of these challenges more directly than other NATO countries. Understanding NATO’s transformation establishes a framework for the way ahead for member nations such as Italy.

As Italy and other European countries modernize and transform their militaries, they do so under the auspices of both NATO and the EU. While NATO has existed for more than 50 years as a military entity, EU military capabilities are nascent, but expanding. The European Union Rapid Reaction Force and NATO Response Force concepts emerged at approximately the same time, and Deployable EU Battle Groups and police forces that had not been proposed a year ago are already billed as available for employment. EU military forces are in their infancy; still, the existence of EU military concepts and the rapid realization of those concepts allude to something much more significant than just internal US, NATO, EU, or Italian military transformation.

The internal factors behind military change must also be analyzed in order to assess whether a transformation is indeed underway, or if the changes taking place within the organization are merely evolutionary in nature. Andrew Krepinevich, a foremost authority on the subject of change in the military, identified four factors of a Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) which serve as the framework for analyzing and measuring military change: Technological Change, Military Systems Evolution, Operational Innovation, and Organizational Adaptation. He further posited that new technology is
the most important factor in an MTR. Although Krepinevich’s concept does not consider resource management among of the most significant factors in an MTR, he acknowledges that resources play a significant role.7

This thesis considers resource management a fifth factor in internal Italian modernization. It is an understatement that resources, particularly money, are a significant factor in almost any decision-making situation. Krepinevich addressed resource constraints as a consideration in his treatise. But he did so in the context of non-contemporary, US-focused examples, which may have led him to exclude resource management as a significant factor in an MTR. Europeans, however, often cite resource limitations as the primary constraint on military modernization efforts, and Italians are no exception to this rule.


6Ibid., 51.

7Ibid., 34.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

What factors influence Italian military modernization? In order to determine the issues inherent to this question, it is necessary to examine the current literature on armed forces modernization, particularly in relation to the ubiquitous concept of military “transformation.” Such initiatives are not uniquely American, nor are they solely a product of recent history. An abundance of material addressing military change throughout history is available: Sun Tzu wrote “one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.”¹ The focus of this thesis is on contemporary changes in the Italian military, therefore discussion of modernization will be limited to post-World War II modernization and transformation initiatives.

The general discussion about military modernization initiatives will be followed by a review of literature focusing on military modernization within Italy, as well as modernization initiatives originating from outside her borders that most significantly impact Italy. In the Italian Ministry of Defense, the word “transformation” is not formally used to address overall Italian military modernization efforts, although significant changes in the Italian military are underway. There are comparatively few English-language sources that consider Italian modernization. On the other hand, abundant English-language materials on the significant military modernization initiatives underway in both NATO and the EU are available.
Military Modernization

Utilization of the word “transformation” appears to be a prerequisite in many programs that propose military change. The US military services, for example, tout their ongoing transformation initiatives; likewise, the Office of the Secretary of Defense oversees a transformational process that drives the military services’ transformation initiatives. In order to determine what “transformation” is, it is useful to explore some recent and ongoing transformation initiatives, as well as related concepts of military change.

US Department of Defense

The US Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identifies defense transformation as: “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations” that exploit the US advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain the US strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.² OSD further explains that certain strategic, threat, technological, and risk mitigation imperatives make transformation a requirement in the Department of Defense.

While OSD identifies the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why” of defense transformation, the “how” is not as clear. Defense transformation will include strengthening joint operations, exploitation of US intelligence advantages, concept development and experimentation, and development of unspecified transformational capabilities. OSD foresees a US military culture and processes that will not only transform and strengthen joint and multinational operations, but also improve the
exploitation of intelligence assets, research and development, and force development. Finally, OSD makes a point of clarifying that national security does not rest solely on the shoulders of the military, but must also require the efforts of all our instruments of national power.\(^3\)

**US Army Transformation**

The US Army emphasizes the fact that Army transformation while at war requires a careful balance between “sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of the current force, while investing in the capabilities of future forces.”\(^4\) In the strategic context, the Army is projecting a “prolonged period of conflict for the US with great uncertainty about the nature and location of that conflict.”\(^5\) The Army’s transformation focus is on technology, core competencies, and a self-contained, supportable, military force that is as effective alone as it is in the joint and multinational environment.\(^6\)

Despite implications to the contrary, Army transformation does not necessarily mean just doing more with less; that is, reducing the number of troops while using technology to replace them. On the contrary, analysts point to smaller-scale specialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, and Patriot missile battery units as the most overstretched in the Army. Some analysts also point to the massive deployment to Iraq, as well as the incompetence of the Iraqi Army as proof that the US cannot afford to reduce forces based solely on recent success in Iraq. “Where are we going to find anyone as stupid as Saddam?” says retired Lt. Gen. Charles Otstott.\(^7\)
Transformational initiatives are not always labeled as such. The US Air Force, for example, demonstrated a transformational initiative in the early 1990’s. Much like the Army’s current transformation, military force application was not the only focus of this Air Force initiative. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak directed the process, explaining that “what we were trying to do was organize the Air Force in the best way to meet any kind of threat or any budgetary circumstance.”

The Air Force witnessed some of the biggest changes in its organizational structure during General McPeak’s tenure. Under the Air Force headquarters staff, regional and functional major commands make up the operational and support organizational structure. The Air Force reduced the number of these commands from 13 to eight during this period. The Air Force also instituted the Objective Wing Concept. Historically an Air Force base would consist of deputy operations, maintenance and support commanders subordinate to the wing commander with a rank of colonel, with another subordinate colonel designated as the base commander. The Objective Wing Concept, which carried the slogan “one base, one wing, one boss,” served to transfer base command duties to the wing commander, increased the wing commander rank requirement to brigadier general, and reorganized the subordinate command structure.

The Air Force now touts the Air & Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept as the contemporary transformational initiative. The AEF concept is the way in which the Air Force combines combat, mobility, support, and information operations assets into a deployable organization. However, while the AEF concept impacts Air Force organization and manning, it is also an indication that the use of the word
“transformation” is a slogan and far from the most significant change in the way the Air Force does business. In retrospect, the Air Force transformation of the 1990’s may have included more sweeping changes than the current Air Force transformation initiative.

European Military Transformation Initiatives

The concept of transformation is not uniquely American; it is alive and well across Europe. The German government touts initiatives focused on “network-centric operations” and “interoperability” with multinational partners, while maintaining a conscript force. Even new European NATO allies like Romania have begun transforming based on “the new missions of the armed forces (which) cover a large range of operational requirements, from hard security and war conduct to soft security, stabilization and reconstruction.” Organizational change often emerges as a significant component of transformation. In this vein, Spain, France and the Netherlands recently decided to eliminate conscription.

Military Revolutions

No discussion about transformation would be complete without addressing the related concepts of military revolutions, revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) and Military-Technical Revolutions (MTRs). All three concepts imply significant change in the paradigm of the application of military force. In some cases, the terms RMA and military revolution are even used interchangeably.

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, in “The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050,” identify RMAs as events that have occurred as a result of an associated military revolution. While both concepts are similar in that they denote
military change, the latter includes a social or political change that is lacking in the former. They also point out that RMA is, for all practical purposes, the same as a Military-Technical Revolution (MTR), a term coined by the Soviet General Staff.  

Knox and Murray identify five military revolutions that have occurred during the past 500 years. The first was the creation of the nation-state in the seventeenth century, which relied on the threat or application of military force to ensure survival, and included RMAs in European tactical and organizational reforms. The second military revolution was the marriage of politics and the military as a result of the French Revolution, and included the Napoleonic warfare RMA. The third was the Industrial Revolution era that featured RMAs associated with mass-produced weapons. Fourth was the advent of World War I, which combined the effects of the French and Industrial Revolutions, and featured combined-arms RMAs. The last military revolution was driven by the invention of nuclear weapons, and includes RMAs associated with massive increases in military lethality.

While military organizations invoke “transformation” as the catalyst to change, in some cases the word appears to serve more as an advertisement of the organization’s willingness to tackle the dizzying changes in the political, technological, and economic environments. There is precedent for this phenomenon, even in the US Army. Some regarded the Army’s “pentamic” experiment of 1956 as an innovative offspring of the atomic age, focused on the use of battle groups for concentrated speed and agility. The pentamic force would strike and seize the objective with tactical nuclear weapons, then depart the area of operations before a nuclear counterstrike could be launched. But the Army scrapped the much flawed and maligned program by 1961. Then-Army Chief of
Staff General Maxwell Taylor later admitted that he liked the pentamic designation because it “had the ring of a Madison Avenue advertising campaign,” while General Taylor’s Vice Chief of Staff enthusiastically recalled the accomplishment of “dress(ing) the Army up a great deal with a flag, an official song and new green uniforms.” So while military organizations around the world initiate programs in order to improve their capability to better accomplish the mission, the possibility exists that the characterization of the process does not always depict the true nature of the changes taking place.

A Model for Military Modernization Analysis

Andrew Krepinevich identified MTR as a more appropriate term for the RMA concept. Krepinevich, in “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” posited that new technology is the ultimate cause of an MTR, and echoed Murray and Knox’s supposition that an “Information Revolution” is currently underway. Krepinevich identified four prerequisites for an MTR: technological change, military systems change, doctrinal (strategy and tactics) change, and organizational change. These four changes constitute a model for military modernization analysis.

It is an understatement that resources, particularly money, are a significant factor in many military policy decisions. Resource constraints are not included among Krepinevich’s primary factors that contribute to an MTR, but he did acknowledge that resources are a consideration:

Resources can be constrained, but that need not impose an insurmountable barrier to innovation. Revolutionary changes occurred between 1919 and 1939 in an era of severe resource constraints for most military organizations, especially in the United States. Yet the U.S. Navy was able to develop the concept of carrier task forces, the U.S. Marines modern amphibious operations, and the U.S. Army Air Corps the foundations for strategic aerial bombardment, all remarkable accomplishments.
Post-World War II Italy

Rome, the home of one of the greatest military empires in history, now suffers from sporadic accusations that “gl’italiani non si battono” (Italians don’t fight). It is a view that, in the eyes of some critics such as John Whittam, writing in “The Politics of the Italian Army: 1861-1918,” is more than a stereotype and is now almost an assumed law of nature. In truth, Italy has been a willing and able participant in recent conflicts, including the campaigns in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The Italian Military

Italy historically has maintained one of the largest militaries among European NATO countries. As demonstrated in table 1, only France and Turkey consistently have maintained larger military forces. Additionally, since 1990 the Italian military has employed an above average proportion of Italy’s total workforce.

The Italian Army has been downsizing for several years, from a total force of 300,000 in 1997 to a projected all-volunteer force composed of 190,000 men and women. The Italian Army advertises this new force as “a quick, rapidly deployable force, able to integrate with multinational forces.” In addition, this force will no longer be focused exclusively on the defense of Italy and NATO, but will also support the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy.
Conversely, Italy’s military expenditures as a percentage of total annual gross domestic product have remained consistent at approximately two percent (CIA places this figure at 1.9 percent in 2003), which is on par with other NATO countries (see table 2). Italy’s total gross domestic product is above the NATO average, and well above the

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average of European NATO countries (see table 3), while total defense expenditures per capita is slightly above average for European NATO countries.

Table 2. NATO Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GDP

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<td>République tchèque</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>580</td>
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<td>678</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>651</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NATO - Total</td>
<td>3576</td>
<td>3655</td>
<td>3604</td>
<td>3487</td>
<td>3126</td>
<td>3076</td>
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Italy spends a significant total amount of money on defense, and holds a solid eighth place in the world in total defense spending (see table 4). But since 1995, Italy has consistently allocated more than seventy percent of its military budget to personnel expenses--more than any other NATO country except Portugal (see table 5). At the same time, expenditures for equipment and infrastructure have suffered at exceedingly low...
rates compared with other NATO members. Therefore, it is apparent that Italy is not really resource constrained--Italy simply chooses to devote resources to people, while investments in new systems and infrastructure suffer in comparison.

Table 4. Total Military Defense Expenditures

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Defense Expenditures (1999 Data)</td>
<td>% GDP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>281,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>China – Mainland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>8,700</td>
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Table 5. Distribution of Total Defense Expenditures by Category

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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>61.5%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
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<td>68.2</td>
<td>71.7</td>
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<td>54.7%</td>
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<td>45.9</td>
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<td>21.7%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
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<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>58.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
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<td>61.1%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
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<td>59.4</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>62.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>75.9%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>78.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55.3%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
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<td>52.5%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>56.0%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
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<td>67.7%</td>
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<td>76.9</td>
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<td>64.9%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
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<td>67.5</td>
<td>66.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>58.9%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% devoted to personnel expenditures / % affecté aux dépenses en personnel

% devoted to equipment expenditures / % affecté aux dépenses d’équipement

% devoted to infrastructure expenditures / % affecté aux dépenses d’infrastructure

% devoted to other expenditures / % affecté aux autres dépenses

Current Italian Military Modernization

Most source materials identifying evolutionary changes in the Italian military for this thesis are in the English language. Nevertheless, one Italian language source stood out as particularly useful in addressing this topic. “L’Esercito Italiano oggi e gli sviluppi future” (The Italian Army Today and Future Developments) sets out the Italian Army General Staff’s planned modernization initiatives and complements the English language material on the topic.

Another Italian-language resource is the White Book, published by the Italian Ministry of Defense in 2002, which outlines Italian defense policy guidelines. Only two White Books have ever been written in the history of the Italian military; the previous one was published in 1985, before the end of the Cold War. The 2002 White Book establishes four missions for the armed forces: homeland defense, security within the NATO sphere, crisis management and out-of-area operations, and domestic emergency relief and internal security. Nevertheless, the dearth of detailed English language information about the White Book infers a lack of interest and effort by Italian military observers to sell the document to a larger Euro-Atlantic audience as a basis for Italian military change.

Invariably, the most obvious component of Italian military modernization appears to be the recent elimination of conscription which will have significant repercussions for the Italian military. While this action poses a major personnel and organizational challenge, Italy is well-positioned to address it since the government allocates more than two-thirds of the military budget to personnel costs.
Another major component of Italian military modernization is a collection of organizational initiatives. These initiatives are focused on the concept of “Crisis Response Operations,” and include several organizational changes. For instance, Italy adopted an operational cycle in which longer-term operations should be manned by up to four troop rotations that last approximately four months each. The Army also reduced the number of brigades from thirteen to eleven, while ostensibly maintaining the capability to support operations in up to three theaters. Finally, the overall military force is being cut to a total of 190,000 personnel, including 112,000 Army personnel (see figure 1.)

Figure 1. Italian Military Force Projections
Source: Italy's All-Volunteer Army: An Analytical Framework for Understanding the Key Policy Issues and Choices During the Transition, The Overall Transition Plan up to 2020 (California: Rand, 2002), 11.
Systems upgrades are underway in the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Air Force is adding 121 Eurofighters to its current force, and is a participant in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Navy’s focus is on a “trident” of power projection capabilities: naval aviation, amphibious forces, and special operations forces. The Navy is also building the largest Italian aircraft carrier since World War II, the “Cavour.” Re-organizational issues, particularly to adjust to an all-volunteer force, preoccupy the majority of Army modernization. But upgrades to Army air defense with the EuroSAM and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) with SIACCON and SIACCONA are also underway.  

Social and Political Factors Impacting the Italian Military

Italy made the choice to be militarily dependent on allies following World War II. Concern for European military expenditures became an issue to US policy makers not long after the end of the war, because Italian politicians recognized the significant financial burden the military places on an economy. Italians furthermore expressed a wariness to render themselves vulnerable to domestic political pressure without explicit reassurances of financial support from the US. Italians do not deny they have made this socio-political choice of military reliance on allies, particularly on the US. For example, former Italian Ambassador to NATO Sergio Romano recalled a situation during the Vietnam War era in which US expenditures were placing excessive burden on the European economic market. Ambassador Romano asserted that Italy opposed European-proposed remedies primarily because Italy “had abandoned the task of its own defense in the hands of the United States.”
The evolution of the center-left and center-right political coalitions in the 1990s resulted in an evolved Italian political system, and, according to the US State Department, “represents a major break from the fragmented, multi-party political landscape of the postwar era.”\(^{27}\) This change provided much-needed stabilization to the Italian national political system; a system notorious for regularly collapsing. Nevertheless, the Italian populace is somewhat skeptical of this newfound stability: despite Silvio Berlusconi’s unprecedented post-World War II run as Prime Minister, a quarter of Italian respondents in a 2004 poll still considered the collapse of the current government as a possible scenario before his term ends in 2006.\(^{28}\) Additionally “the Italian political system . . . along with the economy has still not undergone a thorough reconstruction.”\(^{29}\) The Mafia remains a significant threat, and domestic anarchists have resurfaced alongside the ongoing presence of radical Muslim extremists preying on Italy’s contribution to the GWOT. Illegal immigration also continues to haunt Italian economic and political stability. These challenges create significant obstacles for Italian politicians who are also responsible for determining the scope of Italian military modernization, and therefore cannot be separated from the internal factors affecting Italian military modernization.

**European Military Paradigms since World War II**

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Following World War II, Europe faced the need for economic, military, and political reconstruction while simultaneously coping with the threat presented by the Soviet Union. In March 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty, which foreshadowed the development of a
common system of defense against the ideological, political and military security threats. The US and Canada followed, in addition to Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. In April 1949 all 12 countries signed the Washington Treaty that formed the collective defense system known as NATO. Turkey and Greece joined in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany acceded in 1955, and Spain joined in 1982.  

More than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO continues to address changes, such as expansion and multiple partnership programs, which impact its current and projected operations. Nine former Warsaw Pact nations are now members of NATO. Since 1994, 30 countries have joined the Partnership for Peace, which reinforces stability among non-NATO member nations. Ten of those countries subsequently became members of NATO. Multiple partnership programs, such as the South East Europe Initiative, the NATO-Russia and the NATO-Ukraine partnerships, and the Mediterranean Dialogue, signify NATO’s ambition to reach out to neighbors during the post-Cold War era. While NATO still serves a legitimate purpose as a collective defense alliance, the challenges inherent in the current environment have at times caused these friends to question the nature of their relationship.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999, and in 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia completed the current NATO membership. And while NATO membership grows, fundamental changes in relations with NATO’s erstwhile adversary continue to increase in complexity. Italian Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini stated that “there would be no exaggeration to say that Italy is now among the closest Russian partners and friends” and that “such a
state of affairs meets the interests of not only Russia and Italy but also the interests of the European Union and the entire international community.\(^{31}\)

In fact, the Soviet threat was not the only justification for the establishment of NATO. In the years following World War II, European countries and the US recognized that the best way to contain possible future German expansion initiatives was to include Germany in the new alliance.\(^{32}\) Many European countries further reasoned that there was no better way to counter a possible German threat than to put American forces on German soil.\(^{33}\) As a result, although NATO was an alliance of equals, Europe intended the US role to be more equal than others from the beginning, and the US accepted that leadership role.

NATO gained its first operational experience with the employment of military force in the former Yugoslavia in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The extent of American leadership in NATO became clear during Operation ALLIED FORCE: the US contributed 60 percent of all sorties during the Kosovo War, including ninety percent of all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and electronic warfare sorties, and dropped more than eighty percent of the ordnance during the conflict.\(^{34}\) NATO’s out-of-area operational experience expanded when the Alliance subsequently assumed leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in April 2003 under a United Nations mandate and without US participation.\(^{35}\) However, while on the one hand NATO touts its contribution to these activities, it is no coincidence that major changes in NATO were being considered as operations in the former Yugoslavia concluded.
NATO Transformation

We are NATO’s forcing agent for change, leading the continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to uphold NATO’s global security interests.

“Allied Command Transformation Vision Statement”

The roots of NATO transformation are in the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) as outlined in April 1999, and no doubt driven by the imbalance of US force contributions compared with allies’ force contributions to then-ongoing NATO military operations in Kosovo. The goal of this initiative was to improve defense capabilities in response to any current and foreseeable challenges. It encouraged a particular focus on improved interoperability among NATO forces and potential coalition partners. The five capabilities that served as the focus of the DCI were “deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of forces and infrastructure; command, control, and information systems.”

The 2002 NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Istanbul Declaration on NATO Transformation expanded NATO’s transformation initiative. The Istanbul Declaration proclaimed that “NATO was created to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means; its core role is the commitment to collective defence in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.” The Istanbul Declaration further identified the need for a more flexible and adaptable alliance, continued enlargement, revised roles and missions, internal re-organization, as well as developing NATO relationships with the European Union, Russia, Ukraine, and other non-NATO countries. Furthermore, it established a list of roles, missions, and structures to deal with new threats, as well as NATO’s relations with the European Union.
simultaneously issued the Prague Summit Declaration, which provided a formal welcome
to the seven most recent NATO members, and also identified the need to further
transform NATO via the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). NATO Defense
Ministers agreed to “re-focus”\textsuperscript{39} the DCI on the development of several areas of interest,
to include combating terrorism, NATO’s operational capabilities related to weapons of
mass destruction and rapid deployment of troops, streamlining NATO’s command
structure, NATO’s operational roles particularly in the Balkans, and Russian-NATO
relations especially with respect to terrorism and the Balkans. At the Prague Summit,
NATO also formally adopted the establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF), an
initiative first proposed by the US.\textsuperscript{40}

On 4 March 2004, NATO’s Secretary General addressed multiple NATO
Transformation goals; explicitly stating an economic commitment, and implying
technological and organizational adjustments:

\begin{quote}
I intend to press nations--all NATO nations--for more concrete targets and clear-cut timelines to develop the necessary capabilities. I want all Allies to pull their weight. To carry on with the necessary defence reforms. To face the challenge of military transformation. And to put their money where their mouth is. Because, as our Supreme Allied Commander, General Jones, is fond of saying, a vision without resources is a hallucination.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

**NATO Reorganization**

NATO transformation is going forward in three key areas. First, NATO is
reassessing its mission and purpose following the end of the Cold War and the emergence
of new terrorist and other unpredictable threats. Second, the alliance carried out a
significant re-organization, reducing its headquarters from twenty to eleven regional
commands. Third, NATO is managing the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF)
NATO’s desire is that “the NRF will be . . . a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable.”

NATO created the new Allied Command Transformation (ACT) for the purpose of spearheading NATO’s transformation. ACT is co-located with US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia with a liaison element located in Belgium, and command elements in Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Italy. While the expressed mission of ACT is to transform NATO’s military capabilities, ACT established a list of Standing Priorities that augment this mission statement, to include the preparation, support, and sustainment of NATO capabilities, implementation of the NATO Response Force and related deployable operations, and direct support to NATO members’ transformation initiatives. ACT is organized in order to provide a direct link to those Standing Priorities: ACT subdivisions include Strategic Concepts, Policy and Interoperability, Defence Planning, Future Capabilities Research and Technology, Joint Education and Training, and Joint Experimentation, Exercises and Assessment.

NATO Response Force

What is wrong with our system that we cannot generate small amounts of badly needed resources for missions that we have committed to politically? It is not an ideal situation that the secretary-general of NATO has to go around with a begging bowl for more helicopters and C-130 transport planes.

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

On 22 September 2002, NATO informally announced the establishment of four NRF international military headquarters. These headquarters are capable of commanding forces of up to 20,000 personnel, and include the NATO Rapid Deployable
German/Netherlands Corps HQ (NRDC-GE/NE) headquartered in Münster, Germany, the NATO Rapid Deployable Italian Corps HQ (NRDC-IT) headquartered in Milan, Italy, the NATO Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps HQ (NRDC-SP), headquartered in Valencia, Spain, and the NATO Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps HQ (NRDC-TU), headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey. In addition, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Rheindahlen, Germany and the France-based Eurocorps, which signed a “technical agreement” with NATO, could be committed under NATO operational command.47  

NRF national force contributions will rotate through periods of training and certification as a joint force, followed by an operational “stand by” phase of six months. Allied Command Operations (ACO) will generate the NRF through force generation conferences. ACO will be responsible for certification of forces and headquarters. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) will develop future capabilities and further refine the NRF concept based on joint lessons learned.48  

In November 2002, NATO declared that the NRF would be composed of about 20,000 soldiers, would meet initial operating capability in 2004, and would be fully operational by 2006.49 NATO considers the NRF and its components a significant instrument of change:  

The NATO Response Force (NRF) . . . will be tailored as required to the needs of a specific operation and able to move quickly to wherever needed. It will not be a permanent or standing force. The NRF will be able to carry out certain missions on its own, or serve as part of a larger force to contribute to the full range of Alliance military operations. The NRF can sustain itself for duration of up to one month or longer if re-supplied. Its precise size and composition is under study and will be the subject of further definition and refinement, up to its full operational capability.50
One of the biggest challenges to European countries is the financial requirements inherent in building and maintaining a strong military. The NRF does not help this situation. The alliance does not share the cost of deploying and sustaining the entire NRF. Countries who contribute forces must pay for the deployment and sustainment of their own troops.  

**NATO as a Factor in Italian Military Modernization**

Among external factors, the NRF must be considered when analyzing contemporary Italian military modernization. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) General James L Jones (US Marine Corps) singled out the NRF as “one of the most important changes in the NATO alliance since the signing of the Washington Treaty over fifty years ago.” He identified two explicit purposes for the NRF:

- to serve as a NATO high-readiness force, fully trained and certified able to deploy quickly as a combined, joint force in order to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions, as required.

- to spearhead allied focus on capability development and force transformation.  

General Jones is not alone in his view that the NRF’s purpose is to serve as a change agent for European militaries. German General Harald Kujat, then-Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, described the purposes of the NRF as “two distinct but mutually reinforcing purposes”

- First, it would provide joint and combined high readiness force able to react very quickly to crises in or beyond Alliance territory for the full range of Alliance missions.
- Second, the NATO Response Force would be a mechanism for spurring NATO's continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges. This second purpose of the NRF is what I call the cornerstone of an integrated NATO transformation process.53

NATO operational capability initiatives such as the DCI and PCC are also components of NATO’s transformation, and logically would impact Italian military modernization. The DCI encouraged the improvement of NATO capabilities, specifically “the resource dimension” and “better coordination” among alliance members. The DCI emphasized the European-specific capabilities by taking into consideration European allies’ capabilities to undertake European-led missions. In essence, as argued by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, the focus of the DCI was in gathering forces in a method that would avoid an American-heavy fighting force similar to that developed to fight the Kosovo conflict. Nevertheless, in their opinion, by following the DCI approach, “At best, in times of crisis, NATO will still be cobbling together an untrained multinational force rather than drawing upon an integrated and flexible force that already exists.” The focus is on developing capabilities, when it should be focused on developing a force capable of achieving a set of desired effects.54 The DCI has since been augmented by the PCC and the associated NRF concept, and their ultimate impact on Italian modernization remains to be seen.

The European Union

NATO, although the only alliance of European nations during the post-World War II era, is not the only initiative conceptualized to organize European militaries for a common purpose. As early as 1950, when the US proposed German rearmament, all NATO countries concurred except France, which feared German militarism. France,
however, recognized that it could lose influence without an alternative, and Germany
would become the primary US ally on the European continent. Therefore France
proposed the development of a European Defence Council (EDC), under which would be
organized a separate national series of military units (battle-groups) placed side by side
within multinational corps under NATO command. This served as the first significant
proposal for a European-only military force during the NATO era. Ironically, by 1953 the
French Assembly determined that the perceived potential loss of political independence
overwhelmed the desire for balancing European continental influence, and therefore
defeated the measure.55

Since the end of the Cold War, Europeans have developed several European
Union-sponsored entities of differing sizes for various security challenges.

**European Union Military Development**

In 1991, the Western European Union (WEU), the consortium of European
NATO countries that was founded in 1954, developed a concept of European security and
defense in accordance with the new provisions in the Treaty of Maastricht. At the same
time, several European countries requested that the WEU determine options for the
development of a European-only military force in response to events surrounding the
beginning of the end of the Yugoslav republic; one that would not rely on US or NATO
assets. France and Belgium proposed four scenarios including one for a 30,000-strong
force. Meanwhile the WEU remained as a bridge between NATO and the European
Union, a role endorsed by the Atlantic Alliance at the Brussels Summit (1994) and Berlin
Ministerial Meeting (1996).56
In 1992, Western European Union member nations adopted the Petersburg Declaration. This document once again reinvigorated the push for the establishment of a European security capability outside of NATO. The proposed tasks for a European military capability set out at Petersburg included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and other crisis management tasks that might require combat forces, but not collective defense.\textsuperscript{57}

In December 1998 at the St Malo summit, European Union countries agreed to derive appropriate force as necessary from NATO's European capabilities, or a national or multinational European consortium outside NATO’s capabilities, as required. The European Council further emphasized its determination at its Helsinki summit in December 1999 “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct European Union-led military operations in response to international crises.”\textsuperscript{58}

European Union Rapid Reaction Force

The countries of the European Union hold the potential to muster over 1.8 million troops. From these, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council Headline Goal set as a target to make available to the European Union the necessary ground, air, naval, command and control, intelligence, and logistics assets and capabilities to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops within sixty days. The Headline Goal required a force sustainable for one year; therefore it would require a total pool of some 180,000 to include standby forces.\textsuperscript{59}

The WEU Assembly proposed that both a European Union Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) and NATO Response Forces could be drawn from the same pool of standby
and national forces, and could be deployed upon short notice. Ground force components already exist and are declared available both for NATO and the European Union purposes. The requirement is for very rapid deployment of a diverse combat unit with significant combat support components. But while the European Union recognizes that their rapid reaction forces would be drawn from these same units, they would also need to draw on a wide range of other units in order to field a 60,000-strong force adapted to a specific mission.

Current projections of air and naval components for both the NRF and European Union forces are not yet fully developed, but both NATO and the EU project shared resources in both realms. European Union force projections include 400 fighter aircraft, while the NRF projects 200 daily sorties; airlift requirements are not addressed. A limited number of aircraft carriers and large amphibious NRF and European Union naval vessels will also be pooled. The WEU Assembly further expressed that “the only real difference (between the EU RRF and NRF) lies in the chain of command: the European Union must have its own chain of command if it is to meet the requirement of a “capacity for autonomous action” that was laid down first in Cologne and then in Helsinki in 1999.”

European Union Battle Groups

In November 2004, EU defense ministers announced the formation of thirteen Battle Groups. Composed of 1,500 combat soldiers and support assets, EU Battle Groups are considered the smallest independent, deployable military unit and are projected to be deployed with ten days notice, in place within fifteen days, and sustainable for at least thirty days. Most battle groups will be composed of troops from up to five EU countries;
France and the United Kingdom are each prepared to commit complete, on-call battle
groups in 2005, with Italy and Spain each prepared to do the same in 2006.63

European Union Gendarmerie Force

Though not technically a full military force on the scale of the EU RRF or even
the EU Battle Group, five EU countries have committed to the establishment of an EU
Gendarmerie Force. Headquartered in Vicenza, Italy, it will be composed of forces from
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The EU gendarmerie will maintain an
initial operating capability of 800 men prepared for employment within thirty days
notice.64

European Capabilities Action Plan

In December 2001, the EU launched what seems to be its own version of the
NATO Defence Capability Initiative (DCI). The European Capabilities Action Plan
(ECAP) is guided by four core principles:

1. Improved European defense capacity
2. Reliance on voluntary national commitments from members
3. Coordination between EU nations and with NATO
4. Public support

The EU’s new European Defence Agency65 (EDA) assumed responsibility for managing
the ECAP in July 2004. The purpose behind the ECAP is to “(improve) member states'
defence efforts by increasing military cooperation among them.” Panels were established
to analyze shortcomings in nineteen areas:

1. Attack helicopters and support helicopters
2. Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection
3. Special operations forces
4. Suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD)
5. Air-to-air refueling
European Union Factors in Italian Modernization

While the EU Battle Group concept and the EU Gendarmerie Force may eventually serve as significant factors affecting national modernization efforts, both initiatives are too immature to consider their true impact at this time. But two factors within the EU have analogous entities within NATO, and therefore require further assessment in that capacity. The EU’s ECAP is roughly equivalent to NATO’s DCI, as augmented by the PCC, and the EU’s RRF parallels NATO’s NRF.

Like the DCI/PCC, the ECAP serves as a catalyst for transforming the national militaries of European countries by highlighting the required capabilities for their respective organizations. The DCI/PCC and ECAP take differing approaches to managing the change process. NATO established a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) to oversee the implementation of the DCI/PCC. The EU seems to have taken a more substantive approach with the establishment of individual panels focused on shortcomings in specific capabilities. Member nations’ commitments to implement panel recommendations remain a question, but may be rendered moot by the ECAP.
realignement under the new EDA organization. Therefore, the ECAP remains a factor when considering external EU factors that might impact Italian military modernization.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU enthusiastically touts the shared role of the EU RRF and NRF:

**Shared mission:** “The two forces share the same objective: developing and strengthening European defence capabilities and achieving more autonomy.”

**Shared forces:** “In the European Union and NATO the same forces and assets are concerned (the same units are assigned to serve in the forces of both organisations) and government choices are limited.”

**Shared direction:** “Over the years ahead the progressive enlargement of both the EU and the Alliance will result in an overlap between these two institutional frameworks.”

**Shared fate:** “Convergence will happen gradually and at different speeds, but integration is almost inevitable in the longer term.”

SACEUR General Jones echoed the requirement for sharing between the NRF and EU RRF; he reiterated that budget constraints will cause European nations to share the resources allocated to the European Union and NRF: “EU and NATO deployments will use the same forces . . . just wearing different hats.” If the only thing separating the EU RRF and NRF is a uniform, then the eventual fusion of these resources is foreseeable. As a result, the NRF’s mission of spearheading European national transformation initiatives would become a mission of the EU RRF as well.
Conclusion

As Gen Jones indicated, the NRF is the most significant component of NATO’s transformation. Both NATO and EU military progress continues, and the US takes a guarded approach to the European Union’s developing Rapid Reaction Force with respect to how it will contrast with NATO rapid reaction military capabilities. Europe must be prepared to address challenges inherent in this split military personality. Italy, Germany, and France have recently requested an easing of European Union imposed budget restrictions on member nations in order to increase defense spending. All requests were denied, reinforcing the monetary facts of life of expanding military capabilities, while also signifying a possible future conflict of interest between the EU’s economic and political concerns and NATO military programs.


5“Why We Are Changing the Army,” Modularity Overview Briefing to CGSC Faculty and Staff, TRADOC, 13 August 2004.

6Ibid.


9 Ibid., 17.

10 Ibid., 3.


16 Ibid., 13.


19 Ibid., 34


Data provided by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) *The Military Balance*, and the U.S. State Department’s *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (WMEAT).


“Internal Affairs,” *Janes Information Group*, 2004 [article on-line]; available from http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/weursu/itals070.htm@current&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3E%28%5B80%5D%28country+%3CAND%3E+briefing%3A+%3CAND%3E+italy%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%2C%28%5B100%5D%28country+%3CAND%3E+briefing%3A+%3CAND%3E+italy%29+%3CIN%3E+title%29+%3CAN+D%3E+%28%5B100%5D%28country+%3CAND%3E+briefing%3A+%3CAND%3E+italy%29+%3CIN%3E+body%29%29%29%29&Prod_Name=WEUR&; Internet; accessed on 14 January 2004.


Bruce Russett and Allan Stam, “Russia, NATO, and the Future of U.S.-Chinese
Relations,” (Political Science Department, Yale University) [paper on-line]; available from http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/nato-final_vs.htm#N_34_; Internet; accessed on 21 January 2005.


38 Ibid.


40 The NATO Response Force.


42 “Lord Robertson signals a new NATO, a NATO transformed,” Centre for South East European Studies, 12 June 2003 [article on-line]; available from http://www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=157; Internet; accessed on 19 September 2004.

43 The NATO Response Force.


47. The NATO Response Force.

48. Ibid.


50. The NATO Response Force.

51. Joris Janssen Lok, “NRF on track for full capability but its purpose remains a matter of debate,” *International Defense Review*, 1 January 2005 [article on-line]; available from http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=A&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/idr/history/idr2005/idr03572.htm@current&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3COR%3E%28italy++%3CAND%3E%28%3E%28italy+++%3CAND%3E++transformation+%29%29%29%29&Prod_Name=IDR&; Internet; accessed on 30 December 2004.

52. Ibid.


58. Ibid.


61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.


The multiple factors spearheading recent changes in the Italian military come from both internal and external sources. This thesis uses the four factors that Andrew Krepinevich set out in “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” as the basis for an analysis of internal factors – particularly the recent elimination of conscription – that characterize Italian military change. NATO transformation, including the establishment of the NATO Response Force, and the emerging EU military concepts and capabilities, provide the context for the thesis’ analysis of external factors that influence Italian military change.

Internal Factors in Military Modernization

The goal of Andrew Krepinevich’s “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” is to convince the reader that the world is now undergoing a Military-Technical Revolution (also known as a Revolution in Military Affairs), and he is effective in his argument. Krepinevich identifies four factors of a Military-Technical Revolution as the framework for analyzing and measuring military change: Technological Change, Military Systems Evolution, Operational Innovation, and Organizational Adaptation. He also stresses the importance of resource availability in effecting change. In brief, the four factors can be explained as follows.

Technological Change

Krepinevich claims that “new technologies are the ultimate cause of a military-technical revolution.” He identifies three areas of information progression to
demonstrate the existence of a contemporary MTR. First, the capability to collect, analyze, process, and disseminate information has significantly increased. Second, the accuracy, range, and lethality of weapons have significantly improved the commander's ability to accomplish his mission. Finally, advanced simulations and computer-assisted design and manufacturing (CAD-CAM) offer the potential for significant improvements in the training and employment of human and material resources.

Military Systems Evolution

The second factor involves the integration of technological changes into military systems, for new technology is useless if it is not effectively employed. Systems improvements will focus on the establishment of information dominance, as well as target identification and tracking at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In the current MTR, these systems include spacecraft, UAVs, computers, and long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs). In addition, information systems will provide relevant tactical data directly to the lowest-level tactical commander.

Operational Innovation

Technology and systems do not by themselves guarantee success for those who possess them. Krepinevich wrote that “The manner in which these capabilities are employed also will determine whether their full combat potential is realized.”² He further clarified the significance of tactics, operations, and strategy in the employment of systems and technology. Employment of blitzkrieg tactics is his most favored example to provide a framework for the significance of evolving doctrine in a Revolution in Military
Affairs. Without this new doctrine, the technological and systems changes achieved by the German Army during the 1920s and 1930s would not have constituted an MTR.

Organizational Adaptation

Organizational change is a significant component in military change. Krepinevich primarily uses historical examples to support this argument, but what is important about organizational change is the result of the reorganization. Today, organizational change should result in an environment that fosters innovation and change, producing a synergy with the incorporation of technological, systems, and doctrinal changes.

Resource Management

Although not explicitly noting resources as a component of RMA, Krepinevich identified resources as another significant factor in military modernization. He acknowledged that while technology will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of human and material resources, the need remains to balance these improvements with the shortage of resources in the application of technology. He also acknowledged the importance of managing resource utilization within the realms of systems, doctrine, and organizational change.³

Krepinevich further demonstrates, with historical examples, that resources should be considered a fifth dimension in military modernization analysis. He asserts that: “Resources can be constrained, but that need not impose an insurmountable barrier to innovation.”⁴ He cited the development of carrier operations, blitzkrieg, Marines Corps amphibious operations, and strategic bombing during the interwar Depression era as historical examples of revolution in a resource constrained environment. As a result, it is
apparent that resources bear consideration, yet the lack of resources need not preclude revolutionary military change.

External Factors in Military Modernization

NATO

An analysis of Italian military modernization must take into consideration NATO transformational initiatives. The NATO Response Force (NRF) emerges as the most influential initiative to be considered in the analysis of modernization in any European NATO country. Italy’s voluntary contribution of the NRDC headquarters near Milan signals the importance of the NRF to understanding Italian modernization. The significant dedication of resources attendant to this contribution in and of itself represents Italian buy-in to the NRF concept.

The effects of NATO capabilities improvements such as the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) also bear consideration in any analysis of European NATO military modernization. The expressed purpose of the DCI gives the clearest identification of the significance of this concept to the development of NATO military members to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces.5

The DCI is augmented by more recent initiatives, particularly the PCC. Although some might consider the DCI “overcome by events,”6 it retains some significance in the eyes of the Italian army.
The emergence of EU military concepts provides the most apparent justification for the inclusion of the EU as an external factor in Italian military modernization. The EU RRF, in contrast to the NRF, was not expressly created to spearhead European military modernization. But the literature indicates that the only differences between the NRF and the EU RRF are superficial; the heart of both forces remains the same.

Likewise, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) also stands out as an external component of the EU’s impact on Italian military modernization. The ECAP might be viewed as the EU version of the DCI/PCC, and the significance of the ECAP within the EU may grow with its formal incorporation into the new EU Defence Security Agency (DSA).

A number of factors, then, offer possible starting points for understanding the changes ongoing in the Italian armed forces--be they transformational, revolutionary, modernizing or evolutionary. Krepinevich’s factors of an MTR, plus resources, offer internal factors. NATO and EU initiatives, which Italy, by virtue of its membership in both groupings, is party to, provide some possible external factors. To what extent do any or all of these factors influence developments in the Italian armed forces? The following chapter will address this question.

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2 Ibid., 18-19.

3 Ibid., 27.

4 Ibid., 34.

These days the military guarantees the defense of national security in contexts that are a long way from their home country. This involves the creation of trained units, means of communication, and transportation. But one of the fundamental priorities is to change mentality. People have to have a good understanding of the way in which the soldier in Afghanistan is guaranteeing their security at home. In turn, the volunteer soldiers have to acquire an awareness that they will live abroad. Their work will be an away fixture.¹

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Italian Defense Chief of Staff

Internal Factors in Italian Modernization

Italian Technological Change

Like other modern military organizations, Italy is embarking on an upgrade of its technological capabilities. This upgrade is necessary not only to exploit information technology to improve the organization’s capabilities, but also in order to guarantee multinational interoperability, particularly in response to NATO and EU requirements.² But while Italy is projected to introduce some of the more common technological advances into the armed forces, there is no indication that any revolutionary technology will originate from the Italian military, itself. This is not to say that Italy is not implementing any significant technological change; only that Italy, itself, is not a source of technological innovation.

Italy has undertaken short-term and long-term modernization projects, particularly in the realm of digitization. Conversion from analog to digital systems will take place through both short-term upgrades involving the SIACCON command and control system,
an armored vehicle battle management system, for integration into current units and platforms. Chief among long-term projects is the Land Integrated Brigade, which by 2020-2025 would be completely digital and interoperable in all joint and combined scenarios.\(^3\) However, while upgrades in the digital realm are laudable, the “Information Revolution” is in fact universal in nature, and research on the topic does not point to a revolution along the lines of a “blitzkrieg” in information technology originating in Italy in the foreseeable future. The lack of indigenous technological innovation--the significant technological changes the Italian military is making notwithstanding--mitigate against characterizing Italian military modernization as “transformational.”

Change in Italian Military Systems

Italy is implementing multiple system upgrades, the majority of which are the result of the worldwide information technology revolution. Michael D’Abramo identified multiple upgrade programs in which Italy is participating, many of which involve airborne systems, in his study “Military Trends in Italy: Strengths and Weaknesses”.

Expansion of current programs for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) includes the Falco tactical, medium altitude, medium endurance UAV that will offer advanced target identification, surveillance, and search and rescue capabilities, while contributing to mitigation of illegal immigration and environmental disaster control. Italy is also working with France on two additional surveillance and combat UAV projects.

Italy is upgrading its aging fighter aircraft inventory with the acquisition of 121 Eurofighters of a 620 aircraft order jointly purchased with Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain. In order to improve its intelligence and command and control
capabilities, Italy is also considering acquisition of the Joint Airborne Multisensor, Electronic Support and C3 (JAMES-C3,) a system which incorporates intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), airborne electronic warfare and command, control, and computer (C3) capabilities. The Italians are also working with the US to upgrade defensive aid systems aboard the C-130J Hercules transport aircraft. Other systems upgrades include (1) design and development of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) in cooperation with Germany and the US, (2) installation of the Integrated Electronics Suite (IES) aboard the new intelligence-collection ship Electra, and (3) purchase of seventy PzH 2000 howitzers.⁴

**Italian Doctrinal Change**

Italian doctrinal change, indeed any NATO European military doctrinal change, is predicated on a change in the threat. While the move away from a Cold War focus caused a change in Italy’s perception of the threat and expressed response to it, these changes have not yet significantly impacted the Italian military’s spending habits.

A definitive statement of a new Italian military doctrine is elusive. Therefore, both explicit and implicit statements bear consideration. While the move away from a Cold War mindset is the most significant change in doctrine within the Italian military, the concept of “Crisis Response Operations” comes closest to defining a post-Cold War Italian military doctrine: “The future will see an Army, not only dedicated to the defense of Italy and the Atlantic alliance, but also able to conduct crisis response operations either in the framework of the NATO strategic concept or within the European Union Security and Defence Initiative.”⁵
In 2002, the Italian Ministry of Defense released its first “White Book” in seventeen years, and only the second in its history. The voluminous White Book outlines Italian defense policy guidelines and establishes four missions for the armed forces: homeland defense, security within the NATO sphere, crisis management and out-of-area operations, and domestic emergency relief and internal security. It also, among other things, establishes a goal of sixty percent of military personnel assigned to operational units while merging many current operations carried out at the single-service level. Interestingly though, references to the White Book as a significant source of strategic direction are few, and it is not evident that the White Book either defines or influences doctrinal changes.

The employment of the Milan-based NRDC-I and the NRF might offer insights into Italian doctrinal change. However, diplomatic disagreement led to controversy surrounding the recent deployment of forces associated with the NRDC-I. Components of this force contributed to operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. But other NATO countries’ governments, such as France and Germany’s, were and continue to be opposed to providing troops in Iraq. Controversy also arose regarding an Italian national force contribution to the NRF. In late 2004, an Italian battalion deployed to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was, at the same time, assigned to the on-call NRF. However, according to Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, the Susa Alpini battalion had been removed from the NRF force package to be deployed outside the NRF framework. Senior officers of the Italian Taurinense Alpini brigade, the core unit for NRF, stated that the battalion was in fact deployed as an NRF asset, apparently following an order from NATO to deploy an Alliance asset to reinforce
ISAF. NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer ultimately explained, “there were conflicting views within the alliance on whether or not the Italian battalion was inside or outside the (NRF concept) when it deployed to Afghanistan.” At best, the controversy regarding the incorporation of Italian forces into the NRF points to confusion; at worst, ambivalence toward a commitment in its direction.

Another aspect of the post-Cold War environment that might affect Italian military doctrine is Italy’s relationship with the US. While Italy militarily relies on NATO, the close personal ties between the Italian Prime Minister and the US president imply close political relations between the two countries. Given the pace of change over the past few years within Italy as well as within Europe, it is difficult to predict Italy’s political and military relationships after either of these leaders depart. Some regarded Italy as the United States’ closest non-English speaking European partner in 2004. However, events such as the US attack on an Italian journalist’s car in March 2005 following her release from captivity by Iraqi insurgents, combined with the Italian public’s ambiguous support for the war in Iraq, threaten the relationship.

President Bush and Prime Minister Berlusconi share a rare relationship between US and European leaders. Their relationship is such that the Italian press considered Prime Minister Berlusconi a trusted communications agent on President Bush’s behalf regarding recent events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Such perceptions, however, may not last beyond Prime Minister Berlusconi’s current term in office. Northern League Secretary and member of the European Parliament Umberto Bossi indicated that the next Italian prime minister may not choose Prime Minister Berlusconi’s
approach, stating “we will go into the next election with the same coalitions, but with a profile different from the present one.”

Prime Minister Berlusconi’s popularity does not appear to be at its height in Italy, according to two recent polls. But this is not an indicator of poor perceptions among the Italian public of the Italian Army or the US. Indeed, Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Giulio Fraticelli highlighted a December 2004 poll indicating that 73 percent of respondents declared they had a positive image of the Italian military, a number that increases to 78 percent when only youths’ perceptions are considered. Likewise, a poll of media perceptions of the US among Great Britain, Spain, Germany, France, and Italy found that only in Italy do positive media perceptions outweigh the negative.

The end of the Cold War, the resulting change in the threat, and political factors are significant for the evolution of all European militaries, including Italy’s. It is not easy to divine how military doctrine is evolving in light of these changes, particularly when political factors that influence the Italian military are so closely tied to Prime Minister Berlusconi’s tenuous government. The most solid evidence of Italian doctrinal change resulted from the end of the Cold War, and manifests itself primarily in the multiple organizational changes that characterize the majority of Italian military modernization.

Organizational Change in the Italian Military

The people you really want (in the military) are pretty well educated and conversant with information technology.

Charles Hayman, *Jane’s World Armies*

Organizational change is the single most significant factor in Italian military modernization. Four general principles form the basis for this organizational change. The
guiding principle is the determination of the right mix of operational versus support components. The “modularity” concept borrowed from the US Army’s Transformation concept is a principle that ensures increased flexibility to meet the ever-present need for a quick reaction force of any possible size and for any possible mission. Force readiness that will meet operational needs is also a principle. Finally, the principle of extended deployments is supported by a new policy of four consecutive periods of four to six month deployments, supporting Italian participation in a protracted crisis response operation of up to two years.\textsuperscript{13} The principles notwithstanding, it is manning that most influences and reflects organizational change in the Italian armed forces.

Chief of the Italian General Staff Admiral DePaolo has acknowledged that Italy does not have the appropriate number of forces needed for the missions that it carries out abroad, particularly special operations forces. At the same time he has recognized the long-term impact of developing professional forces in the current environment. He has anticipated the new Joint Special Forces Command will fill an operational need as Italy struggles to find the right division of labor within its military.\textsuperscript{14}

Italy also is challenged with finding the right mix of technologically-savvy troops. Referring to Italy’s pre-World War II failure to harness the capabilities inherent to mechanized arms, John Sweet wrote, “The mechanization of an army depends on the mechanization of the society that supports it.”\textsuperscript{15} He pointed out that “the exposure of recruits to motor vehicles determine(d) their acceptance and understanding of mechanization.”\textsuperscript{16} Replace “mechanization” with “information technology” and the same argument applies to Italy today. Harnessing information technology must occur if Italy
wants to maintain a force that is interoperable with her friends. Italy is meeting this requirement with the evolution of an all-professional military force.

**End of Conscription**

While significant force structure changes are underway in the Italian military, the most visible component of change in the Italian military organizational structure is the elimination of mandatory conscription that occurred at the end of December 2004. This is the first step in changing the Italian military to a completely professional force, and the effects of this change will have repercussions for at least a decade.

For several reasons, Italy no longer feels the need to maintain a large force that requires conscripts. Following the end of the Cold War, Italy no longer perceives a threat of a large ground force attack. However, Italy recognizes the potential for military action outside her borders in cooperation with other nations. This need for cooperation and interoperability pressured Italy to follow the recent elimination of conscription in France, Spain, and the Netherlands, so that Italian forces would be capable of working with soldiers of a similar level of skill and professionalism. The need to deploy quickly with a multinational force, which involves more complexity in hostile environments, requires a higher skill level than that achievable in a ten-month term of conscript service.

Domestic considerations also led Italy to eliminate the draft. Popular opinion, for example, provided a significant impetus. As shown in figure 2, popular support for an all-volunteer Italian military steadily increased from 30 percent to almost 65 percent from 1994 to 1999. As shown in figure 3, requests to opt out of the draft since 1989 have increased significantly. At the same time, the total number of conscripts in the Italian military steadily dropped. As demonstrated in figure 4, representation from the south...
outweighs contributions from the wealthier north and center; likewise, the north has a significantly higher percentage of opt-outs from service. Analysis of levels of education presented in figure 5 further emphasizes the perceived disparities among societal groups.

Despite the many good reasons for elimination of the draft, there is a major drawback associated with this action. A negative effect of the elimination of conscription is that the change will be felt through the year 2020 because fewer junior enlisted soldiers will be in the ranks. New volunteers who progress through the ranks will eventually alleviate the situation, but “the military will have to wait until 2007 before it can sense any significant increase in the number of career volunteers.”

![Figure 2. Popular Support for Conscription Only Force, All-Volunteer Force, and Mixed Model Force](source)

Figure 3. Number of Conscripts vs. Opt Out Requests Lodged, 1989-1999
Source: Italy's All-Volunteer Army: An Analytical Framework for Understanding the Key Policy Issues and Choices During the Transition, Number of conscripts vs. opt out requests lodged, 1989-1999 (California: Rand, 2002), 8.

Figure 4. Conscripts and Objectors by Italian Region of Origin
Figure 5. Conscripts and Objectors by Education Level

Source: Italy's All-Volunteer Army: An Analytical Framework for Understanding the Key Policy Issues and Choices During the Transition, Conscripts and objectors by region of origin and education level. (California: Rand, 2002), 9.

Italian Army Operational Reorganization

Italy’s “Crisis Response Operations” concept is not only a doctrinal change; it also includes a significant organizational component. The crisis response concept includes a reduction in the number of Army brigades (from thirteen to eleven) in order to better meet the new crisis response operations. This new force structure includes a combination of three heavy, three medium, and three light brigades, in addition to a Special Operations Forces brigade and a new airmobile brigade. But while Italy plans for employment of these eleven brigades in up to three theaters under the new four-rotation concept, it is notable that Italy is relying on NATO (probably the NRDC in Milan) to lead
a response to any threat that requires a corps-sized response,\textsuperscript{19} indicating that Italy continues to rely on allies for her defense.

**Italian Military Resource Management**

Europeans often claim a lack of resources, particularly financial, as the most significant factor preventing the attainment of significant improvements in military capabilities, and the Italians are no exception. One encounters this line of reasoning from any variety of Italian sources, from personal interviews with Italian Army officers\textsuperscript{20} to the Italian Army’s official annual reports, the latest of which makes the blunt statement that “financial resources continues (sic) to be insufficient for the (military’s) needs.”\textsuperscript{21}

Historically, Italy learned to rely on NATO for its defense during the Cold War. Reliance on outside actors for defense in fact goes back at least before World War I with Italy’s membership in the Triple Alliance. Even after the Cold War, Italy continues to anticipate that NATO forces will be a major contributor to any theater war that requires more than a division. Despite the US leadership role in NATO, the concept of self-reliance is uniquely American, especially compared with other NATO members.

The end of conscription is not only seen as a boon to the Italian capability to work in a multi-national environment with an all-volunteer force. Italy also enacted this change in order to reduce military costs over the long-term, despite the fact that Italy anticipates short-term expenditures to increase by 6.7 percent in order to provide incentives to maintain this professional army.\textsuperscript{22} A US Government Accounting Office (GAO) report confirms that the shift from a conscript to an all-volunteer force can be more expensive than planned, and result in fewer savings to the armed forces than expected.\textsuperscript{23}
Interestingly, despite the change in the threat, Italy did not in fact change its defense budget after the Cold War. In retrospect, Italy never realized a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War that almost every other NATO country realized. By comparison, as shown earlier in table 2, by 1995 the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the US reduced military expenditures as a percentage of GDP by at least twenty-five percent; Germany realized a fifty percent reduction.

Monetary resources are not the only concern: Italian population dynamics (or the lack thereof) threaten the Italian military’s way ahead. While the average age of the Italian population continues to increase, the birthrate is now almost zero. Dr Daniel Goure asserts that global aging will affect military security in three ways: reduced economic performance and increased scarcity of labor, reduced military funding, and resultant reduced military capabilities and worldwide presence.\(^{24}\) This trend is not encouraging, considering that it is occurring at the same time the Italian military projects increased employment of military forces outside Italy.\(^{25}\)

**External Factors in Italian Modernization**

**NATO**

The impact of the NRF on Italian modernization must be considered in order to appreciate the road ahead for Italy. Italy developed a framework for the employment of forces in a range of missions, from low intensity conflicts to theater warfare. Italy is also committed to a long-term operational employment plan, ensuring it is able to support the rotation of forces every four months during a sixteen-month period. Italy does not have a plan to man and employ a purely Italian military force above the division level, instead relying on the Italy-based NRDC headquarters as the framework for a multinational
Corps-sized military force in which Italian defense resources might be employed. As a result, it is apparent that Italy will lean on the NRF to cope with its most serious military challenges. This indicates that the NRF will not spearhead improvements in Italy’s organic national defense capabilities, as is its intent. Rather, it appears that the NRF will provide a means by which Italy—dependent on allies for defense—can sidestep the need to transform its own armed forces.

This limitation is understandable considering the commitment Italy made to NATO and the NRDC. Italy is responsible for the costs of running the NRDC, and its loyalty to NATO is reinforced by this commitment of monetary and other resources encumbered in hosting the NRDC in Italy. The Italian commitment to an all-volunteer force, coupled with a limited pool of human resources, further justifies Italian reliance on the NRDC and NATO. Nevertheless, NATO’s overt intent of the NRF is to serve as an external factor in allies military transformation, yet no significant data are available to demonstrate that the NRF is spearheading Italian modernization.

Elements stemming from DCI, such as the PCC, might eventually support Italian military changes, the current lack of supporting evidence notwithstanding. Italy views the DCI as a consideration behind equipment upgrades, stating that restructuring and new equipment will “increase our capacities for the achievement of the objectives established in the DCI.” But no evidence indicates that the NRF or PCC have any significant impact on current Italian military modernization initiatives. The current concept of NATO and the collective defense agreement is indeed of paramount significance to Italy; Italy historically relied on support from outside for her defense and Italy continues to acknowledge the need for external military support. But recent NATO operational
capabilities improvement initiatives and programs will not spearhead changes in the Italian military.

EU

The EU, like NATO, is a factor impacting Italian military modernization. While the EU RRF is planned to be utilized when NATO forces are determined to be inappropriate in a given situation, there is another important difference between the EU RRF and the NRF. The EU RRF was not expressly designed to spearhead national military transformation initiatives. As is the case with the NRF, there is therefore no proof (nor reason to expect there to be any) that the EU RRF, in and of itself, is spearheading Italian military transformation.

The Italian Army’s capstone document on future force development does not address the ECAP, and makes just a single passing reference to support for ESDI that echoes similar comments about the NATO DCI.\(^2\) It seems evident, therefore, that the ECAP, the EU’s version of NATO’s DCI, also has limited impact on Italian modernization.


5“Italia” (slides, Italian Planning Staff, Rome, 2004).

6Andy Nativi, “Italy Grapples With Future Force Needs, Aviation Week & Space Technology; 156, no. 23 (June 2002), 56.

7Joris Janssen, “NRF on track for full capability but its purpose remains a matter of debate,” 2005 International Defense Review [article on-line]; available from http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=A&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/idr/history/idr2005/idr03572.htm@current&QueryText=%3CAND%3E%28%3CAND%3E%28italy++%3CAND%3E++transformation+%29%29%29&Prod_Name=IDR&; Internet; accessed on 30 December 2004.


13“Italia,” slides.


16 Ibid.

17 Much of the following discussion, to include figures, is drawn from Michele Zanini, “Italy’s All-Volunteer Army: An Analytical Framework for Understanding the Key Policy Issues and Choices During the Transition,” especially Chapter 1, “The policy context and problem.”

18 Michele Zanini, “Italy's All-Volunteer Army: An Analytical Framework for Understanding the Key Policy Issues and Choices During the Transition” (California: Rand, 2002), 11.

19 “Italia,” slides.

20 Captain Filippo Gabriele, Italian Army, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 November 2004.


25 “L’Esercito Italiano, 7.

26 “Italia,” slides.

27 “L’Esercito Italiano, 1.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Italy as a nation is famous for, among other things, its art, fashion, racing cars and beautiful women. Throughout its history great geniuses from da Vinci to Marconi have contributed immeasurably to the well-being of mankind. From Italian soil have emerged great Roman legions and military giants such as Napoleon, Machiavelli and Garibaldi--men who have shaped the very course of history.

In view of this great cultural and military heritage, one of the great enigmas, at least to the casual student of military history, is that of modern Italy's failure to produce a military system capable of effectively projecting the country's national policy.¹

Eric G. Hansen, *The Italian Military Enigma*

Transformation versus Modernization

The world is indeed experiencing the beginning of a military “transformation” that might also be characterized as a Military-Technical Revolution. Krepinevich asserts that the revolution’s technological component was introduced in the 1950s with the invention of the transistor, and continued with the incorporation of missiles (both ballistic and precision guided), satellites, and other computer-based weapons systems. Operationally, the first Gulf War introduced these systems to the battlefield.²

Contrary to the assertions of some articles that discuss changes the Italian military is undergoing, Italy is not experiencing a transformation.³ The Italian military is changing and modernizing, but it is not undergoing an internal revolution. Organizational changes are by far the most significant factor in Italian modernization. The end of conscription serves as the first and foremost example of change in the Italian military, and the impact of that single action will be felt for many years. Other organizational changes, including the reduction in the number of Italian Army brigades associated with
Crisis Response Operations, as well as systems upgrades, are components of Italian military modernization.

Italy is, at the end of the day, undergoing an evolution and modernization, not a transformation. SACEUR General Jones stated that the single most transformational occurrence in the US military history occurred in the 1970s with the establishment of an all-volunteer force.\(^4\) But he further stated that the word “transformation” is “the most overused and ill-defined term today,”\(^5\) implying that the word simply stands for change.

The Italian military situation seems to exemplify General Jones’ observation. Many organizations and militaries are reorganizing themselves, while at the same time trying to figure out how best to harness the information revolution. Such reorganization does not, however, necessarily equate to transformation. This is the case with Italy’s current reorganization and modernization initiatives, which are evolutionary changes.

**Internal and External Factors**

One of the intents behind the NRF is to serve as the catalyst for NATO members to transform their national militaries. This intent notwithstanding, the NRF is not spearheading Italian transformation. The NRF and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ in Milan (NRDC-IT) continue to affect Italian military modernization, because Italy views the NRF as a framework for the employment of a corps-sized force. The NRDC-IT serves as a tangible signal of Italian will to participate in out-of-area operations by virtue of its location in Italy. The NRF, however, also serves as an excuse not to evolve further, allowing Italy to avoid fielding an all-Italian military force organized into formations above the size of an Army division. Likewise, the same argument can be made about the impact of the EU RRF, ECAP, DCI and PCC on Italian modernization. The evidence
suggests that external factors have a relatively minor impact on the Italian military, and they are not spearheading Italian modernization.

Both historical and contemporary evidence suggests that internal factors provide the overriding answer to Italy’s question about the way ahead for its armed forces. Italy’s move to an all-volunteer force is in line with the European trend away from conscription. Italy recognizes that volunteer Army personnel will be ineffective without technologically advanced systems that facilitate interoperability with multinational partners. Italy maintains, at the very least, a perception that it lacks sufficient resources to spur further modernization. Perception is reality; whether Italy lacks the resources, or lacks their proper allocation, resource management continues to impact Italian modernization.


5 Ibid.
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72


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