THE CLINTON DOCTRINE: AN UNFINISHED WORK OF STRATEGIC ART

A CALL FOR A STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE SUBNATIONAL WMD WARFARE THREAT AGAINST THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

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“In the increasingly complex world that we foresee, the Department of Defense and its armed forces cannot preserve U.S. interests alone. Defense is but one element of a broader national security structure. If we are to be successful in meeting the challenges of the future, the entire U.S. national security apparatus must adapt and become more integrated, coherent, and proactive... It is our belief, however, that if we refuse to change in a timely manner we could be fundamentally unprepared for the future, and put at risk the safety of future generations of Americans. We have the time and the opportunity to adjust. But we cannot equivocate. We must begin now.”

Report of the National Defense Panel
December 1997

The Clinton Doctrine

Retired Marine General, Bernard Trainor, contends that President Clinton’s showdown with Iraq in the early months of 1998 “represents that rarest of moments, when a presidential decision can define an era,” comparable in its significance to the Truman Doctrine of containment. A key element of the Truman Doctrine was that it would be implemented with allies if possible, but executed unilaterally, if necessary. Currently, the United States is confronted with a threat that “may prove harder to contain - the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” General Trainor notes that since the end of the Cold War, we have searched for “an organizing principle for our national security interests.” Today, many national security professionals argue that the greatest risk to our national security interests is from asymmetrical threats, i.e., those posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons used either by rogue nation states or subnational entities, such as terrorist groups. For this reason, Trainor emphasizes that President Clinton’s stand against Iraq was of critical significance and established an important
principle for the 21st Century. He suggests that today’s generation is no more aware of the historical implication of Bill Clinton’s decision than his generation was of Harry Truman’s in 1950. The Clinton Doctrine essentially is a response to the threat of WMD and a statement of the willingness of the United States “to shoulder the principal responsibility for their containment.” While the United States, ideally, would prefer to contain WMD with the aid of multinational organizations, “the United States will act alone if necessary.” In closing, Tramor suggests that the President’s legacy “will not be sex and scandal, rather it will be the Clinton Doctrine.”

The Thesis of this Paper: A Strategy of Homeland Defense

The Clinton Doctrine, in its current form, is not a finished piece of strategic art. First, its initial and preponderant focus rests explicitly on other nation states, it is not focused adequately on subnational entities. Second, as an emerging concept the Doctrine lacks an effective underlying strategy which successfully integrates this nation’s resources and power into a cohesive and effective framework that deals not only with threats from other nation states, but with subnational threats, as well. Today, the overwhelming focus of our nation’s WMD effort is directed against WMD threats emanating from other nation states, and insufficient emphasis is placed on WMD threats posed by subnational entities—principally terrorist groups. Absent an enlarged scope and effective supporting strategy, the Clinton Doctrine will not achieve its ultimate goal of protecting the American people and their homeland from WMD threats. This nation needs to address this shortfall and begin to structure a new innovative strategy which effectively will integrate our nation’s resources to thwart the subnational WMD threat. The author of this paper suggests that
the post-Cold War organizing principle for our national security interests should be a "strategy of homeland defense."

The challenge facing the United States national security community is to find a solution to the WMD threat facing our nation. Specifically, this paper focuses on the threat from subnational entities and proposes an initial and broad strategic framework on how the United States can integrate its available national power and resources into an effective strategy that will thwart the use of WMD against our homeland. The Clinton Doctrine is a start, but to keep America safe in the 21st Century, the Doctrine needs an underlying and supportive strategy for countering subnational WMD threats. The challenge of this paper is to prompt the reader to abandon the status quo, "business as usual" approach to national security and consider a new perspective, a new paradigm, and a new strategic framework. In addition, this author hopes that the reader will become more aware of the nontraditional character of the 21st Century, and that this paper will stimulate further discussion and debate on how best to deal with the subnational WMD threat. Ultimately, the objective of the paper is to force people to consider the implications and consequences of inaction and to prompt others to take action - while time remains to do so.

Some Assumptions

This paper is based on several assumptions: 1) A cohesively integrated and effective strategy to deal with potential subnational WMD threats to our homeland is needed if the U.S. hopes to defend its people from attack. 2) The failure or lack of resolve to develop an effective strategy is unacceptable in the face of the WMD threat which exists today.
We cannot simply throw up our hands and accept the inevitability of a WMD attack on our people and our homeland.  
3) Nontraditional threats require a nontraditional approach (read as strategy).  
4) The WMD genie is out of the bottle and can not be put back into the bottle.  
5) Overall, our nation is not adequately prepared to respond to a WMD terrorist event.  
6) The risk of an actual attack is much greater than that currently acknowledged.  
7) Subnational actors will use indirect and asymmetric approaches to confront a technologically superior superpower such as the United States. They will indirectly attack our nation with WMD at our most vulnerable point - our cities.  
8) Finally, a successful subnational WMD attack may cause the American people to completely reassess their interests, objectives, and strategies, and may result in a strong movement towards isolationism, which could result in the loss of world stability.  

What impact will this have on the international system and world politics? As one can imagine, use of WMD may have far-reaching implications. The current assessment of the risk, this author will argue, should be reexamined. We must ask ourselves how much risk we can tolerate. The answer to that question will have a significant influence on the means that this nation will devote to countering the WMD threat. Heretofore, our nation has accepted, in this author's view, too much risk - counting on the hope that a massive WMD attack will not occur, and hoping that our good luck will continue. Many national security analysts declare it a given that it is impossible to protect the American homeland from subnational WMD attack. Even General Trueman suggests, "it is almost impossible to protect against them." This author argues that waiting for the next "Pearl Harbor" to occur before taking the appropriate action is not a responsible approach to protecting the American people.
Need for Change: A Call for Debate

The December 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel. "Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st Century" focused on the long-term issues facing our national security. To meet the challenges, the NDP Report suggested that "fundamental change to our national security institutions, military strategy, and defense posture" is required. The report did not attempt "to provide all the answers." Rather, its intent was "to stimulate a wider debate on our defense priorities and the need for a transformation to meet the challenges" facing our nation. Such a debate "is critical in building the necessary support of the Congress and American people for the extensive changes that must be made."

The NDP Report argues for the need to "launch a transformation strategy now that will enable it to meet a range of security challenges." The Panel Report treated the threat to the American homeland from WMD as only one of many threats. This paper, however, is limited in scope and focuses on the threat of WMD by subnational terrorist groups against the American homeland and suggests an initial strategic approach to counter it. This author argues that the most significant threat to our people and our homeland in the next twenty years will come from subnational terrorist threats - emanating both from abroad and internally from within the U.S. The strategic framework is not intended to be "the" solution nor is the framework meant to be "the" answer, rather, it is provided to stimulate further debate and investigation. Inherent in this discussion is an implicit warning. Absent a new and effective strategy, it is merely a question of time before a potential nightmare scenario as outlined in Appendix A of this paper, or a similarly horrific attack, occurs.
If the message of this paper is to be understood, the reader must be able to think in abstractions and to understand the potential for terrible and shocking events. The author is calling upon the reader to be creative, to see beyond the past and the limitations of the present, to sense new opportunities, and to engage in the debate and offer new ideas. The author's goal is to inspire others to think nontraditionally and to ponder about a nontraditional future.

The American People Must Be Included in the Debate

The debate must not be limited to the national security "elite" of this country. The issues, the risks, and the stakes involved must be shared with the American people, most importantly, the American people must be part of the debate. To date, mainstream Americans have not been sensitized adequately to the subnational WMD terrorist challenges they face. They have been overlooked and not engaged effectively and actively in this debate. It is time to tell the people the unsettling truth about the fate that, according to many knowledgeable officials, awaits them. It is the people who have the most to lose if their government does not serve their interests. The people are, and always will be, an integral part of the Clausewitzian "trinity" of government, military, and citizens. Ultimately, if the debate is successful, it will be the people who will bring about the changes in our government's operations and structure necessary to protect the population's security. If for no other reason, the people must be brought into the debate for it is they who will have to pay to implement the new required strategy. If the public is not actively involved and convinced of the threat, it will be difficult to obtain the necessary resources to fund a strategy.
Over the past decade the trend has been to spend less on defense. From 1987 to 1996, there was a 34 percent reduction in spending on national defense. During the same timeframe, defense and foreign affairs spending fell from 6.9 percent of GDP to 3.7 percent. The administration proposal would reduce that to 3.0 percent in FY 2002. Of that, defense spending would be 2.8 percent of GDP - its lowest level since the 1930's. Clearly, significant reductions have been made in defense costs. The question that must be included in the debate is, "how much can we continue to cut and still defend our people and our homeland?" This nation can afford to spend more on defense, but there must be a recognition of the threat and an appreciation of the risks of inaction - and perhaps more importantly - the people themselves must have the will to pay the necessary costs. The people must be involved if there is to be an increase of resources targeted against the subnational WMD threat.

**The Key to Change: The American People**

There is time to take the necessary actions required to address our nation's vulnerability to terrorist attack. However, there must be a groundswell of public support and political will to invest the necessary resources, reshape and forge new bureaucratic relationships within the government, and fundamentally change our national security infrastructure and defense strategy. The American people are the key to change. If all politics are local, as Tip O'Neill suggested, then the Members of Congress must feel the urgency to act from the people. Similarly, the people must influence the President to use the bully pulpit of the President's Office and provide the leadership necessary to do what
needs to be done. The American people are the targets of the terrorist, and it is they who will suffer if appropriate steps are not taken to protect them.

*The Government Must Uphold Its Duty to the American People*

The people must receive the protection they deserve from those in government service who are sworn to be bound by and to support the Constitution of the United States. It is useful to review some fundamental elements of both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. It is after all, in reference to the government, the “right of the people to alter it,” and to focus on organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” Let us never forget that the government was created by the people “in order to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty.” After reviewing some of the statements and findings contained in this paper, one may question whether the way in which the executive department of the government is organized, resourced, and conducts its operations to safeguard America from subnational WMD terrorist attack will guarantee the peoples’ unalienable rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” The protection of those unalienable rights is the ultimate litmus test on how effective and responsible our government is in carrying out its duties.

If a successfully executed WMD terrorist attack is carried out against our homeland the political fallout will be immense. It is questionable whether any President politically could survive a devastating subnational WMD attack against the American homeland. One might assume that an outraged public may sense the President was impotent and...
incapable of protecting them. Arguably, Congressional representatives would find it difficult to retain their seats. The obvious reaction of the people, at least from those fortunate survivors of a WMD attack, will be to question their political leaders as to why the latter did not take steps to protect them. This author suggests that it is in the interests of politicians to take action now, while they still have time to do so. The questions that should be in our leaders' minds are, "What do I tell the American people when they ask me - What did I do to prevent this? and Did I do all that could be done?" Finally, the senior military leadership should reflect on its responsibility to protect the American people. Any serious reflection on the matter inevitably will lead to consideration of alternative means required to defend our nation. Some approaches will be controversial and counter to established practice. However, the risks, costs, and benefits must be weighed and balanced. Ultimately, it is hoped the decision taken is right for America. However, if the choice is unwise, the leadership should be prepared to live with the consequences.

The Threat of WMD

The potential motives for subnational entities to use WMD against the American people are many. A few reasons that subnational elements might use WMD may include:

1) Deter U.S. from overseas involvement, 2) Retaliate against U.S. overseas involvement, 3) Punish U.S., 4) Obtain concessions, 5) Undermine confidence of Americans in their own institutions and government. 6) Cause instability in the international political system. 7) Force U.S. into an isolationist posture. Ultimately, the aim of an attack may be focused on America's resolve to be engaged as a world leader.
and to undermine the "will" of the American people to support our nation's foreign policies. Subnational groups may concentrate on destroying the American spirit, forcing Americans to answer the questions: "Is the American policy at issue worth the cost? Is it really a vital American interest? Does it merit having our cities destroyed over this policy?" There are, of course, many other potential reasons for which an attack against the U.S. may occur.

The threat is real and the potential of a WMD attack is not beyond the possible. Former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) stated, "The scenario of a terrorist group either obtaining or manufacturing and using a weapon of mass destruction is no longer the stuff of science fiction or adventure movies. It is a reality which has already come to pass, and one which, if we do not take appropriate measures, will increasingly threaten us in the future."

The NDP Report acknowledges the threat from WMD to our homeland. The report states, "Our current course is unlikely to produce the military capabilities necessary to meet the range of challenges we foresee. We believe that the current and planned structure, doctrine, and strategy - that is to say, our current security arrangements - will not be adequate to meeting the challenges of the future. The force structure of the future must have the ability to respond effectively to the use of weapons of mass destruction - especially against civilian and commercial targets. Threats to the United States have been magnified by the proliferation of, and the means to produce and deliver, weapons of mass destruction - the capability to fabricate and introduce biotoxins and chemical agents into the United States means that rogue nations or transnational actors may be able to threaten our homeland."
Potential WMD attacks against our homeland could range from the isolated use of a chemical agent resulting in only a few casualties to a catastrophic scenario where multiple attacks are executed against several cities to create mass casualties. A possible, repeat possible, scenario of a terrorist attack against the U.S. was prepared by the author and is included in this paper in order to highlight our nation's vulnerability to WMD attack, as well as to assist the reader in gaining a better understanding of the implications of such an attack. It is attached as Appendix A. This author strongly encourages the reader to take a moment to read through the scenario in Appendix A and to reflect on its implications before proceeding with the remainder of this paper.

Our Nation's Unpreparedness Exposed

Much can be written about our nation's unpreparedness to deal with the subnational WMD threat, however, it is not the objective of this paper to document the record on this subject. There is a growing consensus of opinion that the subnational WMD threat is real and our nation is unprepared to counter it. The March 27, 1996 Staff Statement of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Minority Staff: Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Response to Domestic Terrorism) report summarizes a generally acknowledged and objective assessment of the current situation. The Senate Staff Statement concluded that overall our Nation is not adequately prepared to respond to a WMD terrorist event. The key findings of the Senate Staff were:

* The threat of a terrorist group using a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction in the United States is real. It is not a matter of "if" but rather "when" such an event will occur.
* Government efforts of the Federal, state and local level need to be better coordinated to respond to such events despite improvements from the recently issued Presidential Decision Directive 39

* Intelligence is our best and first line of defense against terrorism, but problems of coordination and information sharing among agencies still appear to continue despite recent efforts to resolve them.

* The local government entities such as fire, police, ambulance, rescue and emergency rooms, who will be called to respond in the first critical hours of a WMD terrorist incident, are generally inadequately trained and ill-equipped to handle the difficult challenges posed by WMD incidents.

* Our ability to respond to a nuclear incident, although significantly improved within the last two years, still needs greater attention and increased financial support.

* The use of chemical and biological weapons, in a civilian setting, which most experts agree is more likely, presents unique problems and requirements that do not appear to be adequately addressed under current Federal policies and programs.

* Overall funding needs to be increased to prepare for the consequences of a WMD terrorist incident, especially for joint training and field exercises.

There is much rhetoric given to the need to respond to the WMD threat. It can be found in the NDP Report, in the 1997 National Military Strategy, in Presidential Decision Directive 39 and in myriad other documents. This author acknowledges that there is wide recognition of the WMD threat and that this nation does indeed have antiterrorist/counterterrorist capabilities and plans, however, they are inadequate to protect our people and our homeland.

**Crisis Management and Consequence Management**

The Federal response to WMD terrorist attack is divided into two components. The first is Crisis Management Response which "is under the primary jurisdiction of the"
Federal government” and “involves measures to confirm the threat, investigate and locate
the terrorists, capture, and prosecute them under Federal law The designated lead agency
overseas is the Department of State For domestic acts of terrorism, the Department of
Justice/FBI is the lead agency “

The second is Consequence Management Response which “is under the primary
jurisdiction of the affected state and local governments” and “involves measures to
support the affected community in preparing for and managing the consequences of a
terrorist incident on lives and property The Federal government provides assistance
under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) when required The designated lead agency is the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Resources are provided by 27
Federal departments and agencies grouped into 12 Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) ” The National Security Council has been designated as the coordinating
organization for both crisis management and consequence management 10 However,
despite the best efforts of many well intentioned people, our nation lacks an effective
strategy to integrate its power and resources to counter the WMD subnational threat
There is a glaring discrepancy between what our policy is and what our actual capabilities
are

Requirement for a Paradigm Shift

A paradigm shift in how we think about national security and defense may be required
One could argue that our nation’s approach to national security and our national military
strategy are too focused on threats from other sovereign nation states While this writer
does not suggest that we can afford to ignore the threats posed by other nation states, he
does however, ask the reader to pause and reflect on whether we have the balance right today, and whether the decisions we make today will protect our homeland in the future. This author suggests that a new paradigm is needed with which to understand the changing world in which we live, and the subnational WMD terrorist threats our nation faces. It is not an all or nothing approach, rather, it is a suggestion that a new paradigm is needed which acknowledges that both the world and the subnational threats our nation faces are in transition. It is a world where traditional threats from nation states still exist, however, it is also a world where non-nation state actors threaten our nation, as well.

This writer suggests that a strategy dealing with the subnational terrorist threat will require a new framework for understanding and dealing with the world. Adoption of a new framework may lead to the realization that our nation's current structures, organizations, relationships, laws, and resource allocations require significant change. The paradigm is yet to be finalized. Indeed, the action of focusing on the need for, and development of, a new integrated, cohesive strategy that deals with subnational WMD threats to our homeland will lead to that new paradigm.

Undoubtedly, there will be resistance to the adoption of a new perspective and framework for understanding and dealing with the subnational WMD threat. Some critics will argue that our nation is in fact prepared to deal with the subnational WMD threat and they will support the status quo. Others may default to a "it's too hard to think about and too hard to do anything about" position. Some critics, who can not move beyond the status quo, may argue that traditional concepts will prevent radical change. For example, frequent reference is made to the concept of posse comitatus (to mention just one traditional concept) as an impediment to developing a radically new internal defense.
mission for the Department of Defense. In a world where the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic threats is becoming increasingly unclear, this author suggests that perhaps a reexamination of traditional concepts and the roles of all relevant government agencies and organizations should be considered, to include (but not be limited to) the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, the FBI, FEMA, and the Intelligence Community. The review also should include state and local government organizations. Ultimately, a reassessment of civil rights may be in order, requiring the active involvement of the Supreme Court. The author asks the reader to adopt a nontraditional approach and engage in “out of the box” thinking. As the debate unfolds, some proposals for change may appear too radical. However, all proposals should be considered on their merits. The goal is to adopt a paradigm that will cover the spectrum of threats and required capabilities needed to protect our nation’s interests and people. The debate should evolve a new national security paradigm that addresses the WMD subnational threat.

A New Era of Warfare is on the Horizon

Ultimately, our nation must “deal with the essential paradox of grand strategy faced by the Roman Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries. Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum - if you want peace, prepare for war.” The current challenge is to consider that the character of war is changing. This author argues that warfare of the future will not be conducted only between nation states, but war will be waged increasingly between subnational elements and nation states. This new era of warfare requires a new strategy and new approaches to deal with the subnational actors emerging on the world scene.
However, the underlying message of *St Vis Pacem, Para Bellum* is still valid. If we are to protect our homeland and maintain the peace, then we must prepare for this new type of warfare. The concept of defense needs to be reexamined, to include the National Security Act of 1947. The fundamental purpose and mission of the Department of Defense should be raised. Is it focused too much on offense, and not enough on defense? Is our nation’s Defense Department too focused on threats from nation states instead of non-state subnational threats? Is the balance right? One must examine the force structure and contrast it with the Defense Department’s missions. Are two near-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts or Major Theater Wars the right approach? Is such an approach too traditional? Does it overlook the untraditional threats from subnational actors?

The 1997 National Military Strategy clearly states that the President’s National Security Strategy highlights the requirement to protect American lives. However, the National Military Strategy states that the primary focus of the U.S. Armed Forces is to deter threats of “organized violence.” Do subnational entities meet the Department’s definition of organized violence? While acknowledging asymmetrical threats, the National Military Strategy document clearly states that the primary task of the military is to fight and win wars—a nation state focused task. The protection of our national interests also is listed, to include our nation’s survival and security. However, it can be argued that the discussion of asymmetrical threats is pursued primarily in the context of protecting U.S. military forces, rather than the American people. This is an extremely important distinction.

This writer argues that the military should give serious consideration to shifting more emphasis to protecting the American people and their homeland. Failure to do so, in the
wake of a successful WMD attack on America, may contribute to a perception by the American people that the Department of Defense has become both irrelevant and ineffective. The adequacy of the forces to support the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy should be reviewed relative to the subnational WMD threat. Will the Department of Defense become impotent and irrelevant, unable to deal with the subnational WMD threat? If so, what implications does this have for the future of the Department? It would be both prudent and wise for the Department to step up to the plate and seriously reflect upon, and deal with, the subnational threat - while there is still time to do so.

In conclusion, Colin Gray identifies seven paradigms of war. Perhaps an eighth paradigm of war for the 21st Century should be added to his list. This writer proposes that “Sub National WMD Warfare” be added. The debate can analyze and critique this proposition. The “foot stomping” point to be made in this section of the paper is that subnational organizations which exist within nation states will be waging and conducting WMD warfare against other nation states (and possibly their own as well) in the 21st Century. The term used may not be the best. Others who join in the debate may indeed devise a better one - but it will serve its purpose for now if it gets the point across to those readers who are willing to “intellectually stretch” and “get out of the box” of traditional thinking.

A Proposed Strategic Conceptual Framework to Jump-start the Debate

This paper will outline a proposed “strawman” strategic framework as to how our nation’s resources and power may be integrated to address effectively the subnational
WMD terrorist threat and provide the necessary means to support an expanded Clinton
Doctrine. If our vital national interest is the protection of our people and homeland, and it is agreed that the subnational WMD capability is a threat to that vital interest, then a strategy should be developed to 1) protect that vital national interest, and 2) counter the threat to that vital interest. Government structure, organization, relationships, authorities, jurisdictions, and resources should be adjusted accordingly. This is the essence of strategy. Strategy is about ends, ways, and means. A strategy is a concept for relating ends and means. Drawing upon the views of Lieutenant General Chilcoat, USA and current President of the National Defense University, strategic art involves the "skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests." The concept of risk is very important in the strategic art. Risk, and the relative ranking given to possible outcomes, impacts what means a nation is willing to apply to a threat.

A cohesive, integrated strategy will focus a broad range of capabilities, organizations, programs, and resources to thwart the threat of subnational use of WMD. The proposed strategy requires the cohesive integration of the elements discussed below. Briefly, an appropriate initial, "quick fix" approach might include designation of a government-wide subnational WMD threat point of contact, conduct some initial restructuring and reorganizing to focus more efficiently on the WMD threat, realistically and objectively assess our baseline architecture for WMD defense, identify our current vulnerabilities, assess our current strengths and readiness, determine what our objective architecture for WMD defense should be, assess our shortfalls between our current baseline and required objective architectures, develop some quick fixes, refocus our research and development.
assign top notch people to tackle the challenge, address and begin to resolve the legal issues, and provide the necessary resources for success.

However, a longer term solution is required to deal effectively with the threat. Again, it is hoped that further debate will lead to the revision of the following proposed elements of a longer term strategy, and most importantly, lead to recommendations on how to organize, resource and integrate more effectively a new strategy to support a revised Clinton Doctrine that is expanded further to address and emphasize subnational WMD threats.

Elements for a Proposed Strategy to Counter the Subnational WMD Threat

1. A Properly Tasked, Resourced, and Focused Intelligence Community Capable of Supporting All Elements of the Strategy is Required.

The Intelligence Community is the foundation, the backbone, the indispensable element of the strategy to thwart the subnational WMD threat. Intelligence is the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end of any successful strategy. However, for it to be effective it must first be tasked with specific requirements and given clear and unambiguous guidance on what the requirements are. The Intelligence Community must be resourced and equipped for success.

Key functions of intelligence will include (but not be limited to) development of a subnational WMD threat order of battle identifying all subnational WMD threats, identification of their organization, key leadership, weaknesses, strengths, capabilities, and activities. The Intelligence Community will be “on top” of all subnational entities posing a threat to our nation. It will know precisely what the “center of gravity” is of...
each and every subnational group capable of using WMD against the American homeland

The concept of center of gravity is a key element because it is the main source of power, strength, and sustainability which, if destroyed, will debilitate and undermine the effectiveness of a subnational organization. Intelligence is absolutely critical to the development and maintenance of a new deterrence theory and policy designed to deter and counter subnational entities from using WMD against the American people. Intelligence will be of critical importance to support the preemption, interdiction, and (if deterrence should fail) the retaliation components of the deterrence strategy. It is intelligence that will permit the location, attribution, and facilitate the rapid retaliation capabilities of our new and more effective deterrence forces (that will be a major component of the strategy) against the perpetrators of an attack. The Intelligence Community must inform us where the centers of gravity are so we know precisely where and when to preempt or interdict, and where to retaliate. In addition, to support a new deterrence theory, intelligence must help us understand what is needed to deter these subnational threats.

The Intelligence Community is an integral part of the deterrence theory. This new deterrence theory is a major element of the overall proposed strategy to thwart the subnational WMD threat and is discussed in more detail below. The Intelligence Community will support all elements of the new strategy. In order to accomplish the task, a thorough reexamination of the Intelligence Community will be required. Significant restructuring, reallocation of resources, R&D and fielding of new technical capabilities also will be required.
Effective Human Intelligence will become vital to the success of the strategy. Moreover, intelligence sharing relationships with domestic law enforcement authorities must be improved. Similarly, sharing of information from domestic law authorities with the Intelligence Community must be improved, as well.

Serious attention must be given to the civil rights issues raised when rights of individuals conflict with the necessity to protect our nation from attack. These competing interests must be discussed and debated openly. Ultimately, it will be the responsibility of our elected officials at the Federal, State, and local levels to reconcile the competing interests in a democratic and constitutionally compliant process. Clearly, the Supreme Court may have to be involved in this issue. Without question, a new approach to intelligence oversight will be part of the debate to guarantee that abuses are not permitted.

Critics may argue that the Intelligence Community will never achieve the required capabilities to support the new strategy. However, the author requests these critics focus their energy on determining how we can overcome current shortfalls and achieve the new required capabilities. There are significant challenges involved and it will be a tough job for the Intelligence Community to accomplish these tasks. However, the alternative of inaction will lead to consequences that are not acceptable. We must try our very best and do what is necessary to defend our homeland.

2. Unilateral and Multilateral WMD Nonproliferation Efforts Must Continue.

Nonproliferation efforts that heretofore have been directed primarily against other nation states must continue. Both unilateral and multilateral nonproliferation efforts are necessary. On the nation state level, there must be a continued effort to reduce the
proliferation of WMD materials, precursors, delivery systems and other associated items. However, specific focus must be directed to countering the subnational threat from WMD. To date, most nonproliferation efforts have been focused on the nation state. Exploration of new and innovative multinational agreements, organizations, and supporting infrastructure should be pursued to assist in developing a global capability to counter the subnational WMD threat. Chemical and biological weapon control is difficult because equipment and supplies are relatively cheap and widely available. Further, to make things worse, the materials often are dual use. Therefore, increased efforts are required to control nuclear, biological, and chemical precursors and materials used in their manufacture. Nonproliferation efforts directed at both nation states and subnational entities are an important component of the strategy.


Nuclear deterrence worked well during the Cold War. The challenge now is to develop a new deterrence theory that specifically focuses on deterring subnational entities from using WMD against the American homeland. Deterrence is an essential element of the new strategic framework for dealing with the subnational WMD threat. A great deal of effort must be given to the development of an effective approach to deterrence.

According to U.S. Joint Pub 1-02 deterrence is “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.” This is the traditional approach to deterrence, however, deterring subnational actors will require a new theory of deterrence.
and a new revolutionary approach to make it viable. Nontraditional threats will require nontraditional solutions. Nowhere else is this more true than with the issue of deterring the use of WMD by subnational organizations. Risk, fear and uncertainty are at the heart of deterrence. Our new deterrence theory must, at a minimum, use the concepts of risk, reward, uncertainty, and fear to deter potential terrorists.

Alan Zimm wrote an excellent article entitled “Deterrence Basic Theory, Principles, and Implications” which contains an approach to deterrence that may well serve as a point of departure for our development of an effective deterrence theory. He argues that the concept of deterrence must be reexamined in light of the changing security environment, and believes that the correct approach may lead to a safer, more secure world. Zimm suggests that the traditional definition of deterrence is inadequate and requires expansion.

Zimm argues that the key to deterrence is to get the decisionmaker to answer “no” to either the primary question, or one or more of three secondary questions. The primary question is “Will the action be successful?” The secondary questions are “Will it cost too much?”, “Can the gains be retained?”, and “What else is at risk - can I protect my other vital assets from risk of capture or destruction, the value of which exceeds the value of the goal?” Zimm suggests that the DoD definition of deterrence should be revised to “Deterrence is causing an adversary or potential adversary to decide against taking a specific action or actions. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction, the perception that the cost of the aggression will exceed any possible gain, and/or the perception that the action(s) would not be successful.” All four of his deterrence strategies are contained in his new.
definition These strategies are Capability Denial ("Will it succeed?"). Acquisition Cost
(Will it cost too much?"), Takeback ("Can the gains be retained?"), and Asset Hostage
("What else is at risk?") Zimm is on the right track, but more thought and attention must
be given to the development of a new deterrence theory to deter subnational actors

One reason Cold War deterrence worked was that the theory and policy were public
Our deterrence policy was declared openly to the world Although there was some
ambiguity about our policy, there was no uncertainty about our nation's capability to
carry it out Our forces were robust and our resolve was strong Today, there is no
public, openly stated deterrence policy directed to deter subnational actors Nor do we
share with the world details of our operational capabilities to carry out our deterrence
policy Too much is left unsaid, and there is too much ambiguity This lack of clarity on
our intentions and capabilities does not create the conditions for deterrence that Zimm
outlines Remember, the goal is to get the subnational decisionmaker to answer "no" to
the primary question and the secondary questions

Therefore, once a deterrence theory is developed it is an essential part of the proposed
new strategy to make it public It must be understood by all subnational organizations in
the world It is anticipated that our deterrence policy will require a preemption and
interdiction capability Therefore, it must be a matter of public knowledge that the U S
will, to protect its vital interest, send operational forces anywhere in the world to preemt
an attack on its homeland

It may be prudent to make it public knowledge that any subnational attack against the
U S homeland that is state sponsored will result with attacks on both the subnational
actor and the state that sponsored it Support of a "zero tolerance" policy against WMD

25
use against the American homeland will require timely and decisive retaliation. Our intent to retaliate must be made public and be part of our declared deterrence policy. The U.S. must be able to link retaliation, if deterrence fails, to the nation state that supported subnational states. We must publicly put the world on notice that any linkage will result in the U.S. using its entire spectrum of national power and resources in retaliation—ranging from diplomatic response to the use of our nuclear arsenal. The goal of such a policy is to deter nation states from sponsoring subnational groups and to reinforce in their minds that they will be held accountable if they decide to do so.

4. Development of Effective Counterterrorist “Prevention” Capabilities that Permit Preemption and Interdiction.

Hand in hand with a new deterrence theory is the requirement for counterterrorist capabilities that will allow our nation to preempt preparations being made by a subnational entity. This capability will permit the projection of force anywhere in the world to preempt an attack on the United States. Here again, intelligence is absolutely critical. It is anticipated that this capability may require consultation with foreign governments and/or multinational organizations prior to implementation. However, it can be anticipated that in some cases the U.S. will conduct a preemption operation unilaterally and without any advance notice given to other nations. Certain contingencies may require extraordinary measures. To meet this requirement, extraordinary cooperation must exist between the Department of Defense and the domestic law enforcement community. In addition, the groundwork for preemptive operations in other sovereign states must begin now. Our intent to conduct such operations must be an integral part of
our publicly declared deterrence policy. Terrorists must know that there is no place
where they can safely plan and from which they can launch an attack on the United
States, nor is there any place they can hide from our nation’s worldwide reach.

Both domestic law enforcement organizations and the Department of Defense will
have to train and equip for this mission. It is suggested that the U.S. Special Operations
Command be given this mission within the Department of Defense. Serious
consideration should be given to reconstituting the ability of the CIA to carry out a full
range of covert operations overseas in order to support this mission. Enhanced and
effective coordination with domestic law enforcement agencies will be necessary, as well.

Capabilities that will permit the interdiction of an unfolding subnational WMD attack
on the U.S. are required. In such a time-critical situation there is no time available to deal
with turf battles between the domestic law enforcement community and the Department
of Defense’s Special Operations Forces. In the execution phase of an attack, some
aspects may be unfolding concurrently both overseas and domestically. In such a
scenario, there will be a requirement for joint capabilities akin to joint military operations
in the Department of Defense. Both Defense Department and law enforcement agencies
must be able to execute seamless, joint operations in order to expeditiously interdict an
unfolding attack on the United States. Current policies, bureaucratic boundaries, laws,
and communication barriers will hamper integrated operations. These obstacles to
successful interdiction operations must be overcome as part of a new strategy.

Preemption operations should focus on the “center of gravity” of subnational
organizations. A traditional definition of center of gravity is “those characteristics,
capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action,
physical strength, or will to fight.¹ The debate will, it is hoped, develop a new
definition of center of gravity with regard to subnational entities. Again, once we
understand the concept better as it applies to subnational groups, the intelligence
community must be redirected to identify what it is for each potential and actual WMD
subnational threat. The real value of a center of gravity approach may be in its ability to
focus our planning efforts, and our intelligence efforts. Again, the key is to focus on the
threat and integrate our nation’s resources and means efficiently and effectively.

Consideration also should be given to the use of other instruments of national power to
preempt subnational groups. Political, diplomatic, and economic instruments should be
used as well, if time permits. The center of gravity assessments should assist in
identifying what means can be used to assist in preemption of subnational organizations.

Finally, further consideration should be given to restructuring our National Military
Strategy and forces to address the WMD threat. More focus is required on protecting our
homeland.

5. Effective and Immediately Available Retaliation Capabilities Are Needed (If
Deterrence Fails).

If, despite our nation’s best efforts, deterrence fails, we must be able to retaliate
immediately against the subnational actor that perpetrated the attack. This requires an
ability to identify the source of the attack and precise knowledge of where to strike.
Again, the Intelligence Community is a key element in this capability.

Rigorous, deliberate, and detailed planning should be undertaken long in advance of a
terrorist attack on this nation. This planning should focus on what targets will be struck.
and with what means. This author proposes that some type of automated planning and execution plan, perhaps similar in design to the current Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), needs to be developed and maintained containing relevant information on all subnational terrorist groups (and potential groups). The key components of such a database/plan is specific information on the location of the subnational actor, its assets that it holds dear, center of gravity related information, a range of attack options, a range of targets, and a range of weapons that can be used. The goal is to have most of the planning work done and available for immediate consideration by the President, and if so directed by the President, to facilitate an immediate military retaliatory strike. This capability will reinforce and support the deterrence theory.

To reiterate, it should be widely known that the United States possesses an integrated target list on subnational actors and has weapons targeted on “their vital interest” and on the assets they hold dear. There can be no doubt in the minds of any potential terrorists that they can achieve their political objectives through terrorist attack on the American homeland. The terrorists must know in advance that the costs will be too high, and must know that they can not retain any gains from the use of WMD. They must know that they will suffer certain destruction and all they value will be destroyed. This should be the objective of our retaliation and it should be declared publicly.

It is interesting to reflect on the fact that the actual SIOP of the Cold War was more than just a database, but it also was a process that significantly impacted the structure and capabilities of the Department of Defense. It spawned many activities within the Department of Defense. A new modified SIOP, focused on subnational threats, may assist the Department of Defense to adapt to countering the threat of WMD on our
homeland in much the same way the Cold War SIOP influenced the Department to adapt to the Soviet threat


An extremely important element of the new strategy is the use of civil defense measures to protect the American people. Civil defense measures also serve to support the deterrence theory since civil defense can degrade the potential impacts of WMD. This degradation can enter into a potential terrorist's calculation of risk in determining whether to conduct an attack or not. It may assist in deterrence. However, the primary value of civil defense is that it represents a tangible effort by the government to offer the people some protection against WMD.

Despite our best efforts, deterrence may fail. In the final analysis, the deterree must agree to be deterred, and if the deterree is not willing to be deterred, then deterrence will not succeed. Some measures that should be taken include the following: inoculation of the population against selected potential biological agents, stockpiling of vaccines, stockpiling of antibiotics and other appropriate medicines, issuance of protective masks and clothing, and extensive training. The Senate Staff Statement cited earlier contains many excellent recommendations that deserve special consideration. The most germane point to be made here is that our nation is fundamentally unprepared in the civil defense area to respond to a WMD attack. This situation should be corrected as part of a strategy to deal with the subnational WMD threat. Our people are extremely vulnerable and are threatened by unnecessarily high levels of risk. Civil defense is a relatively inexpensive
response with potentially high payoffs for the American public. What specifically to do, how much is needed, and other relevant questions should be an integral part of the debate.

7. Effective, Prepared, and Robust Consequence Management Capabilities.

The Senate Staff Report assessed "there is no integrated Federal-State-local plan to manage the consequences of a nuclear, biological or chemical attack. A preliminary and anecdotal survey of state and local communities by the Staff indicates that their preparedness is insufficient to meet the threat." The report listed eleven major deficiency areas. It is not the purpose here to list them or further highlight the problem. Suffice it to say that any strategy which is to deal effectively with subnational threats must address our nation's consequence management capabilities. The debate must address this area.


The law enforcement community must change and difficult issues involving its roles and responsibilities must be addressed. New innovative approaches and solutions must be found to ensure that the law enforcement community is capable of addressing the subnational threat. The law enforcement community currently is focused on the collection of evidence and the prosecution of criminals. This emphasis may, in some instances, have a negative impact on a counterterrorist mission. The law enforcement community, due primarily to its concern with the handling of evidence and its effect on
future criminal trials, has not always shared information with other members of the Intelligence Community. Some solution to this problem must be found.

9. A Reorganized, Refocused and Appropriately Resourced Department of Defense, Department of Justice/FBI, Department of State, and State/Local Entities.

Some reorganization is necessary to meet the challenges of thwarting the subnational WMD threat. Adjustments in mission and allocation of resources is required. The author will not attempt to state what these changes should be, that should be a matter of extensive discussion and analysis in the debate. What is clear is that change in these organizations is necessary to support an effective strategy. The debate should not limit itself to only these organizations. Other organizations should be addressed as needed.

10. Establishment of international relationships to facilitate deterrence theory and policies.

Special attention must be given to the creation of innovative and responsive international relationships that will support the new deterrence theory and policies. Multi-national approaches will aid the objectives of the strategy. There must be agreement among the nation states of the world that any subnational organization using WMD will be tracked down and dealt with.
11. Redirect, as appropriate, the Revolution in Military Affairs to address this threat.

Much is said about the importance of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This author believes that, to the extent it is appropriate, the RMA needs to be redirected towards supporting the subnational WMD threat strategy.
APPENDIX A

A Nightmare Scenario:

A Subnational WMD Terrorist Attack Against the American Homeland

The Objectives  It is January 1999, and the members of a small Middle East-based terrorist group are prepared to execute their attack on the American people. The terrorists have prepared for this attack for many years. Their goal is to undermine the American people's will and support for the U.S. Government's continued "meddling" in Middle Eastern affairs. The terrorists will not attack the United States' strengths, rather, they will use asymmetric means to attack America where it is weak - its homeland. They intend to exact a price so high that America will withdraw from pursuing its worldwide interests and force her to become an isolationist and non-engaged island full of fear-stricken victims.

The absence of America's stabilizing influence in the world will permit the rise of unchecked regional hegemons and worldwide instability. This is the world environment the terrorists seek. The key element of their strategy is to break the will of the American people to continue to be engaged with the world and serve as the world's policeman. Their goal is nothing less than to undermine America's National Security Strategy of engagement and turn America's National Military Strategy on its head.

The Plan  The terrorists will use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to achieve their objectives. First, they will detonate a 10 kiloton nuclear device in the heart of Washington, DC during the President's State of the Union Address. The attack will
effectively and rapidly decapitate the nation’s government, killing the leadership of all three elements of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, to include key military leadership. The crude, yet effective, device was assembled by members of the terrorist group who obtained their PhD’s at American graduate schools. The 10-15 pounds of plutonium contained in the bomb were obtained through via the international black market.

Second, the terrorists will execute simultaneous attacks using both contagious and non-contagious biological agents against three American cities - New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco. These cities were chosen due to the presence of very high skyscrapers from which the terrorists will release the agents into the air. The most effective biologicals are dry powders made up of very small particles that lodge in the human lung. The powders containing the particles are designed to separate from one another when thrown in the air and are invisible and odorless. The relatively high altitude release of the agents from the World Trade Center, the Sears Tower, and the TransAmerica Building will ensure effective dispersal. The use of the biological agents was possible since the terrorists have in their employ a former Soviet scientist who is skilled in their development.

Implementation of the Plan

(The Nuclear Attack) It is the afternoon of the President’s State of the Union Address and the two terrorists assigned to position the nuclear device in the Nation’s Capitol leave their rented farmhouse in rural Loudoun County, Va. In the trunk of their car is a 10 kiloton nuclear device preset to go off approximately thirty minutes into the President’s
They drive east on Route 7, turn onto Interstate 66, and cross over the Potomac River on Roosevelt Bridge. They turn left off Constitution Avenue and park their car in a public parking space on the Ellipse. They quickly walk to a nearby phone booth and report that the object has been delivered. They walk to the nearby Metro subway and within a few minutes are at Reagan National Airport. After a short wait, they board a plane that will take them to Philadelphia where they will catch a connecting flight to London’s Heathrow Airport. When the nuclear device goes off they will be on board a United Airlines 777 cruising at 36,000 feet halfway over the Atlantic.

*The Biological Attack:* The terrorists executing the biological attacks on the three American cities will not fare as well as the two heading for London. All three understand that they will be infected by the agents that they release into the air over the American cities later in the evening. They not only accept their fate but they relish the opportunity to be part of an operation that will inflict terror and destruction on the American people. These women are true zealots, infused with fanatical motivation. The simplicity of the attack guarantees its success.

Each terrorist will have a backpack, each with four containers about the size of a large mayonnaise jar. One container will contain a noncontiguous genetically engineered form of anthrax, known as Obolensk anthrax, which reportedly is resistant to standard anthrax vaccine. The cold, calculating decision to use a resistant form of anthrax was made years earlier after the U.S. Government announced its decision to inoculate its Armed Forces against anthrax. The second container holds the highly contagious and lethal smallpox virus known as *Variola major.* Again, the choice of smallpox was made with similarly
Natural smallpox was eradicated from the earth in 1977, when the last case was reported in Somalia. Since then, smallpox has only lived in laboratories. Consequently, Americans have not been vaccinated against smallpox. Reportedly, there are only seven million usable doses of smallpox vaccine in the U.S., all of which is stored in Pennsylvania. The third container holds a recombinant Ebola-smallpox chimera, called Ebolpox. It is believed that Russian researchers made a DNA copy of Ebola and inserted it into smallpox. It is believed that the Ebolapox could produce a form of smallpox called blackpox. Sometimes referred to as hemorrhagic smallpox, it is the most severe type of smallpox disease. The fourth container holds a strain of the highly contagious Marburg virus, a close cousin to the Ebola virus, initially developed at a Biopreparat facility in the former Soviet Union in the 1980's. Again, the simplicity of the attack is a key to its success.

Each terrorist simply takes an elevator to the highest floor of their assigned building and either opens a window, or breaks a window if necessary, and releases the contents of their four containers into the night air. The biologicals had a friendly environment in which to be released - it was dark and the temperature was appropriate. All three terrorists will die from exposure to the agents. Yet, they are aware that the effects of the agents will not begin to appear immediately. Therefore, they will quickly dispose of the containers, quietly exit the buildings undetected, and wait for the effects to take place.

The Effects of the Attack

(Day One) The effects of the nuclear device in Washington, DC have completely destroyed a circular area with a radius of 3/4 of a mile to a mile from the spot the
terrorists parked their car The U S Capitol, The White House, The Mall Area, and even the Pentagon Building have suffered heavy to near complete destruction All three branches of the government, as we know them, have been effectively neutralized The death and destruction is comparable to the damage that was done by the bomb at Nagasaki in World War II 30 The entire Washington DC area has been affected by this attack The outlying hospitals and support infrastructure are totally overwhelmed by the incident There was no effective plan nor supporting infrastructure in place to effectively handle the immediate consequences of this attack As is the custom, one Cabinet Officer was not in attendance at the President's State of the Union Address The Secretary of the Interior was aboard the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) en route to California for a scheduled meeting that same evening in San Francisco with the Governor of California

As the NEACP aircraft landed at San Francisco International Airport, the new President turned to the assembled staff aboard the plane and in desperation asked How did this happen? Who carried out this attack against us? Who do we respond against? What should be the nature of our response? Who do we retaliate against? How do we know if the attack is over? Will there be other attacks? Why didn't we do something earlier to prevent this from happening? What could we have done? No one on the staff could answer the new President's questions The President, as she stepped out of the aircraft and into the San Francisco night air, took a deep breath and hurried down the steps to the tarmac below Her military adviser followed her but he had no advice to give her
(One Week Later) The situation in Washington remains chaotic. The U.S. Army Forces Command mobilized emergency response forces and the initial units are on the scene. Reservists have been called up for active duty from around the nation. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is doing what it can. However, there have been several cases of severe illness detected in some reservists who were called to active duty from the areas of New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco. They are exhibiting signs of anthrax, smallpox, and other serious and unusual contagious viral infections. These illnesses are degrading the efforts to respond to the situation in Washington. These soldiers infected other soldiers with their viral infections. Efforts have been taken to quarantine the infected soldiers. To make matters worse, viral disease has begun to show up in the general population in Washington.

The situation in New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco a week after the release of the biological agents is one of indescribable suffering and misery. It is almost impossible to describe the situation. Hospitals are overwhelmed. There are not enough doctors, nor medicine, nor space to handle all the sick, dying, and dead. Literally millions of people are either dead or dying. Statistics can cover up the personal, individual suffering. To convey a sense of the horror and suffering one has only to look closely at a smallpox victim. "About a third of the people infected with smallpox will die. The skin puffs up with blisters the size of hazelnuts, especially over the face. A severe case of smallpox can essentially burn the skin off one's body." Those people infected with the highly contagious Ebolpox or Blackpox do not develop blisters. Instead, their "skin becomes dark all over. Blood vessels leak, resulting in severe internal hemorrhaging. Blackpox is invariably fatal." Those infected with the Marburg may suffer from intense
vomiting, to include vomiting blood, hemorrhaging from the mouth and nose, development of starlike hemorrhaging in the underlying skin, and sweating blood directly from the pores of the skin. Death from these viruses would be agonizing under the best of medical conditions. One can not imagine the pain and suffering of the those people receiving no medical care whatsoever.

The new President succumbed to a combination of anthrax and Blackpox during the week. There is a constitutional crisis over who her successor should be at this time.

(Two Weeks Later) Cases of viral disease have now been detected throughout the country. The spread of disease was assisted by the movement of infected victims by plane, car, and rail through the targeted cities before the effects of the agents began to manifest themselves.

The Warning

CNN, operating out of Atlanta, received and broadcasted a message from an anonymous source. The message reads, “You do not know from whence the attack on your homeland came. We are a subnational terrorist group, hidden within a sovereign nation state. We are not a state supported group. We are representative of a new actor on the international stage to be reckoned with. We can attack you anytime we wish. These are our two demands: 1) Focus on your own country and its own internal needs. Engage yourself. 2) Don’t involve yourself in the affairs of others outside your borders. Don’t engage the rest of the world in pursuit of your own parochial interests. If you do not heed this request, we will attack you again!”
END NOTES

3 Ibid See NDP Executive Summary p 1 The NDP acknowledged the threat from WMD Our domestic communities and key infrastructures may also be vulnerable Transnational threats may increase As recently stated by Secretary Cohen, the proliferation of nuclear chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery means will pose a serious threat to our homeland and our forces overseas The NDP did not offer any detailed recommendation on a proposed strategy to deal with the threat of WMD
4 Hans Binnendijk, editor-in-Chief, 1997 Strategic Assessment, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, pp 3-5 There has been a steady decline in national defense spending In FY 97 dollars, budget authority declined from $386 billion in 1987 to $254 billion in 1996, a 34 percent decline
5 We should not forget the second sentence of the Declaration of Independence, ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness’ The Preamble of the Constitution reads, ‘We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America’
6 Staff Statement U S Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Minority Staff) Hearings On Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Response to Domestic Terrorism, March 27, 1996
7 NDP Report pp 21 and 25 The Staff’s report was the result of a five month study which included interviews and briefings with Federal state, and local officials who would be involved in the response to a terrorist incident
8 Senate Staff Report, p 11
11 The NMS defines asymmetrical threats as ‘unconventional or inexpensive approaches that circumvent our strengths, exploit our vulnerabilities or confront us in ways we cannot match in kind’ p 9
12 Ibid p 9
14 Chilcoat p 4
15 See the Senate Staff Report for its conclusions and recommendations on pp 32-35
16 See Russ Travers, ‘The Coming Intelligence Failure,” Studies in Intelligence CIA 1997 He argues that the Intelligence Community, as presently organized, is dysfunctional and his article highlights the areas of weakness He questions the ability of the Intelligence Community to meet the needs of the 21st Century and his article, similar to this article, is a call for proactive action
17 See Jeffrey A Hartley Information, Technology and the Center of Gravity,” Naval War College Review, Naval War College Review (Winter 1997), pp 86-91 This article is an excellent article on the concept of center of gravity
See Alan D Zimm, Deterrence Basic Theory, Principles, and Implications, Strategic Review, U.S. Strategic Institute (Spring 1997) The views on deterrence in Zimm's article are referenced extensively.

See Hartley.


Colin Gray, Is Deterrence Reliable?, Explorations in Strategy, Chapter 3. Colin Gray provides an insightful discussion of the many reasons why deterrence is not always reliable.


Senate Staff Report, p. 19.


Ibid, pp. 8-9. A chart prepared by Dr. Theodore Postol, MIT Professor, shows the approximate area of immediate blast and fire damage from the detonation of a ten kiloton nuclear device placed on the Mall near the Museum of Natural History. Dr. Postol estimates that such a device would destroy a circular area with a radius of 3/4 of a mile to a mile. A device that would cause this type of damage would probably contain from 10-15 pounds of plutonium.


Ibid.

See Senate Staff Report, p. 8.

See Preston.
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