SPECIAL K: THE KOSOVO DILEMMA

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The recent clashes in the Serbian province of Kosovo have exposed ethnic and political tensions that have been simmering between its majority Muslim population and Serbian authorities for nearly a decade and a half. The uneasy status quo has been maintained largely by periodic fear of repression alternating with periods of hope for a negotiated settlement. It has recently become apparent that both parties in Kosovo are tired of waiting. Tensions have escalated in the past two years since the emergence of the clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996. KLA actions have re-ignited Serb nationalism and repression. There is international concern that Kosovo could easily become a new, more volatile Balkan tinderbox whose explosion will threaten democratic development and NATO cohesion. Nations are again turning to the United States to deliver the Balkans from violent chaos. But how important is Kosovo to US national interests? If the US does decide to turn its attention to Kosovo, what actions should be taken to achieve what end? This paper will examine the Kosovo situation, assess possible policy options, and propose a direction for policy choices.

**Context**

Although it is tempting to compare Kosovo to other “flash points” throughout the world, it is an area with a unique history and culture. Serbs regard Kosovo as an integral part of their nation and history. The area is the heart of national folklore as it is the site of the 1389 defeat of Međimurje. Serb heroes by Ottoman Turks, a key event in national consciousness. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic used the Kosovo issue to spur Serbian nationalism and gain power.

Ethnic Albanians began settling in Kosovo during Turkish rule. As their numbers grew—especially following the Second World War—the population ratio began to change, and that trend...
has continued to the present. Owing largely to a Serb exodus and a higher Albanian birth rate, Kosovo now has a 90% Albanian majority.

Kosovo was given autonomy in the revised Yugoslav constitution of 1974, allowing Albanian language in schools, the observance of Islamic holy days, and Albanian representation in the collective federal presidency. Slobodan Milosevic revoked the province's autonomous status in 1989, inserted a considerable number of Serbian police and soldiers, declared the Albanian language unofficial, and changed school curricula. This led to an Albanian boycott of official institutions and services and the creation of a parallel/shadow government, with its own health, taxation and education systems.

Two mutually exclusive viewpoints evolved from different interpretations of Milosevic's 1990 constitutional amendments which ended the autonomy of the province. According to Serbian authorities, the amendments legally terminated Kosovo's self rule and reintegrated the province into Serbia. To the Albanians, the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy was unconstitutional because it was forced and, therefore, justified a legal break in the province's link with Serbia. The Kosovars convoked a constituent assembly comprised of legislators from the dissolved Parliament. In September 1991, a clandestine referendum on the region's status was organized, and the Parliament proclaimed Kosovo an independent and sovereign state. Based on their independence claim, the Albanians have requested United Nations or NATO intervention in Kosovo, without the approval of the Serbian government. However, no international organization has called Serbia's territorial integrity into question, including Kosovo's status as part of Serbia. It is acknowledged that Kosovo gaining independence would destabilize the region and create a domino effect in other states where ethnic/religious minorities comprise a majority in selected regions. Given the ethnic mix in the Balkans, the results could
be disastrous. The Contact Group of Western powers\(^4\) has indicated that it favors neither the status quo nor independence for Kosovo, but an enhanced status within Yugoslavia.

The shadow Albanian administration, led by “President” Abrahim Rugova, is not in favor of achieving change through violent means, but its failure to win any concessions from President Milosevic has encouraged groups like the KLA to become more aggressive in an attempt to muster popular support. The KLA has claimed responsibility for several attacks in which more than 50 people were killed. Earlier this year, the KLA also claimed responsibility for an attack in neighboring Macedonia, which—if confirmed—would mark a widening of its theater of action. The KLA is believed to be funded by Albanian exiles in Germany and Switzerland using arms smuggled from Albania. It is the actions of the KLA (which, to date, has received no political backing from the ethnic Albanian leadership) that have led to the violent Serb police crackdown in Kosovo, attracting international attention\(^5\).

**US Interest?**

Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, recently commented.

> If warfare breaks out anew and continues unabated, it could suck in other nations to the north, south, and east. Albania could intervene to protect ethnic Albanians. Fighting there could cause a massive flow of refugees into Macedonia, destabilizing that fragile, newly independent country, and perhaps drawing in, on opposite sides, Greece and Turkey.\(^6\)

Secretary Talbott’s comment captures the essence of US interests at stake in Kosovo. Unlike Bosnia, there are no US vital interests at stake, but there are several important interests. The overarching US interest in Kosovo would be to maintain stability for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, stability and security would enable Dayton initiatives to continue in Bosnia. Conflict in Kosovo could plunge Bosnia back into violence and mar US credibility as author of the Dayton Accords. Any conflict in Kosovo must be contained.

Stability allows for the promotion of democratic/humanitarian concepts and improved economic growth, an interest clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy.

NATO cohesion could quite possibly be threatened as a result of open conflict between Greece and Turkey over Kosovo. Although it can be argued that the same was true in the case of Bosnia, Kosovo is widely viewed as Serbian repression as opposed to warring factions with deep-rooted ethnic hatreds. The Albanian government has already warned that it will "act as one nation" if Serbian persecution of Albanian Kosovars results in war.

Again, as with Bosnia, but to a lesser degree, the credibility of the US as a world leader and ally could be called into question by European nations unable to assume leadership responsibility in addressing the Kosovo issue.

There are several threats to US interests in Kosovo. Serbian repression is accelerating Kosovar radicalization as seen in the KLA. The emergence of the KLA is causing a decline in the more moderate shadow government's authority (led by Rugova). Milosevic is pushing Kosovo toward increasing confrontation and worsening violence, which will increase threats and risks for Macedonia (mass migration tipping the ethnic balance), and Albania (Albanian terrorist bases in refugee camps and mass migrations). It is unlikely that a return to the uneasy status quo is possible in Kosovo. KLA violence and student activism will not allow it.
The US and its allies face several challenges in attempting to resolve the Kosovo situation. Russia's relationship with Serbia presents a challenge to a peaceful solution. Russia is anxious to collect on a multi-hundred million dollar arms deal and frowns on any economic sanctions for fear it will not receive payment. A formidable challenge to US efforts will be the nature of the Kosovar Albanian leadership. At present, it is fragmented, seriously complicating efforts to pursue a dialogue. "President" Rugova is ineffectual, extreme in his goals but moderate in tactics. Intense efforts will be needed to buttress Rugova, assemble a negotiating team, and develop credible proposals. The most daunting task for the US, however, will be to muster sufficient pressure on Serbia to initiate serious negotiations on Kosovo's status while simultaneously taking steps to reduce tensions.

A significant constraint operating against a Kosovo resolution is that time may not be available for a negotiated settlement. Current leaders on both sides stand to lose considerable authority as violence continues and radicalism gains more support. It is possible that neither Milosevic nor Rugova may be in a position to deliver effective promises (and enforce them) for a political solution. Ironically, the police crackdown, by raising the costs and risks for all sides and attracting international attention, has created an opportunity to end the stalemate.

US involvement will be essential to achieve a solution in Kosovo, but perhaps it can be more indirect than direct. In either case, it appears that the road to success in Kosovo runs through Belgrade. In military parlance, Slobodan Milosevic is the Serbian center of gravity. Any effort to arrive at a solution in Kosovo must consider the impact of Milosevic's leadership and take action to influence his thinking.
**Milosevic: The Center of Gravity**

Milosevic remains the indispensable figure in Serbia. Despite a decline in his authority, Milosevic still dominates the Yugoslav political scene. He keeps an otherwise unified coalition off balance by flaunting a strong relationship with Russia. No other Serbian politician conceivably could impose a political solution granting self-administration to the Kosovo Albanians. While Milosevic holds the keys to a solution, he won’t move unless forced to do so. Stoking Serb nationalism toward Kosovo was Milosevic’s original ticket to power and he has already scored substantial short term political gains due to the crackdown on what the Serbian press terms “terrorists” in Kosovo. Reversing course will be both psychologically and politically costly. Persuading Milosevic to cooperate requires convincing him that such a reversal is his only recourse for remaining in power.

Milosevic still believes he can control the province through repression at an acceptable international cost, play the “Kosovo card,” and make cheap domestic gains. To weaken him, we must attack three essential pillars on which Milosevic’s authority rests: (1) economic patronage (black market contacts, customs control, and privatizing government assets to cement party loyalty and provide minimum support to key constituencies), (2) the Serbian Republic police force (the primary repressive tool in Kosovo and for dissent in Serbia proper), and (3) his image of inviolability. (Milosevic as Serbia’s irreplaceable strongman and last line of defense).

In developing a strategy to reduce Milosevic’s influence, the US must deal with two Milosevic’s. First, if possible, with the support of its allies, the US must stop Milosevic the aggressor—the head of a regime that has killed Kosovars and refuses to open meaningful autonomy dialogues with Kosovar elected officials. Second, the US must address Milosevic the political leader who, hateful as he is, has a legitimate concern for the integrity of his country (a
Serbia including Kosovo) Up to this point, the US has supported the integrity of Serbia. painfully aware that Milosevic profits from such support. An excellent example of Milosevic’s opportunism is exhibited by his actions against Albanian families in Kosovo, where he claimed to be following Robert Gelbard’s call to combat “terrorists”.

Finally, Milosevic is convinced that his influence in Bosnia, and role in securing the election of Prime Minister Dodik, give him sufficient leverage over the US to offset any risk of US unilateral measures against him. If past experience is any guide, Milosevic will try to up the ante in Bosnia to force us to accommodate him on Kosovo. A fundamental point of our strategy, therefore, must be to reduce Milosevic’s perceived and real leverage over Dayton. This should be done in the first instance by building up Dodik and providing the economic aid and political backing needed to counterbalance his ties to Belgrade. Secondly, we must find ways to communicate unmistakably to Milosevic that, with regard to Dayton, he is both dispensable and vulnerable.

**Tools of Statecraft**

The US has several tools of statecraft with which it can develop a strategy to deal with Milosevic. Although Milosevic controls the press in Serbia, he does not control all information links into the country. The US can tap into significant information operations capabilities from several different sources to create a climate of distrust and insecurity in the Milosevic regime. USIA, USIS, Radio Free Europe, and internet websites and communications networks can be used to wage an information war in Serbia and Kosovo. Information operations will permeate any strategy and can enhance the employment of other tools of statecraft. An aggressive public information campaign would mobilize domestic popular support and penetrate the Serbian electronic “iron curtain” to call Milosevic’s motives and actions into question.
The new economic sanctions adopted at the London Contact Group meeting on 9 March 1998 were directed toward Milosevic's sources of power but, given European unwillingness to do more, their impact is principally psychological and symbolic. The economic effect of the new sanctions will take time to take hold, and will probably not be as effective as the US would like. Still, the London Conference launched a useful process for further increasing pressure in the weeks ahead, in spite of European and Russian reluctance to reimpose stiff UN sanctions, as was done in 1992. An in-depth analysis reveals that, although economic measures will have an impact upon the Serbian economy, they are unlikely to convince Milosevic that his position is at risk. While the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) economy is sinking, Serbs are likely to tighten their belts and blame outsiders rather than turn against Milosevic. Moreover, Milosevic knows how to maneuver around economic sanctions, and will use them to deflect blame for his own failures, all the while tapping into his black market connection to assure his personal comfort. Other measures will be required to bring him to the negotiating table.

Diplomatic efforts supported by other tools of statecraft may have more success in dealing with Milosevic. By working through international organizations, the US can muster support and build a case for world pressure to force Milosevic to negotiate. It could use its diplomatic influence in the UN to press for a Security Council (UNSC) resolution condemning Milosevic's actions in Kosovo. Such a measure would quantify and solidify world opinion, send a message to Milosevic and Serb hard-liners, and perhaps influence Russia to allow such a resolution to pass in spite of their economic interests with Serbia. Close consultation/exchanges with the EU can galvanize sentiment to establish and maintain trade embargoes, as well as provide a start point for possible NATO involvement. Such cooperation is evidenced in the Contact Group, which has been the catalyst for Western response to Kosovo.
Further, the US, in conjunction with its European allies, could reenergize the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) activities in the area. An OSCE monitoring presence would enhance information and data collection as well as keep an eye on Milosevic activities in Kosovo.

The US could also, together with the EU, sponsor a regional organization involving EU and NATO “wanna-be” states that comes together to provide security and stability to member nations. Using the incentives of EU and NATO membership consideration/support would be very influential in garnering support from the “rim” countries encircling Serbia and Kosovo (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary).

The US could take advantage of the threat of International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) prosecution as a deterrent to heavy-handed security operations. Diplomatic pressure can up the ante by targeting Milosevic himself. The Tribunal could be persuaded to open an investigation of Milosevic, for actions in Bosnia as well as Kosovo. This may be useful but not necessarily decisive leverage, as Milosevic will conclude he is secure within FRY borders and will continue to manipulate the press to portray a positive image. Increasing Milosevic’s sense of vulnerability would give more potency to the ICTY threat. The most effective way would be a clandestine operation to pick up one or more indicted war criminals in the FRY. For example, apprehending acknowledged war criminal Karadzic would certainly attract Milosevic’s attention. Karadzic’s testimony on Bosnian war crimes would be a direct threat to Milosevic’s image both domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, actively pursuing clandestine operations does not endear the US to the world community. A more subtle and perhaps useful way to achieve the same end would be to support/boost the Plavsic-Dodik government in Republika Srpska (RS). Such support may result in Karadzic being remanded
into custody as part of a support arrangement that would benefit RS. By keeping Milosevic off guard, we also reduce the risk that he will stage some spectacular event in Bosnia in an effort to blackmail the Western community into allowing him a free hand in Kosovo.

A more friendly posture toward Croatia could also rattle Milosevic, and play on his fears of a new influx of refugees from Eastern Slavonia. Deploying some visible carrots with President Tudjman—contingent upon Croatia improving relations and making real progress within the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Dayton Accord implementation—would send the message. Moves to improve U.S.-Croatia military cooperation, such as approval of arms sales or opening of talks for Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership would worry Milosevic most and could also be used to extract major concessions from Zagreb in support of U.S./EU Balkan policies. We should consider such a move carefully, however, as this might provoke the Yugoslav Army and provide Milosevic with yet another threat to Serb nationalism on which he can capitalize.

Strengthening Montenegro’s independent voice is a direct challenge to Milosevic. We could intensify our efforts to boost President Djukanovic (a political thorn in Milosevic’s side) before the May elections. The US could praise and reward Djukanovic for a moderate stance on Kosovo and Bosnia with tangible economic assistance.

Milosevic leads what Ralph Peters has called a “warrior” regime that may only respond to power and not always act rationally or with humanitarian restraint. As a result, US/Coalition leaders may have to present a credible military threat to Milosevic and Serbia to move him toward a settlement. The US could
• Preposition combat forces in the region to intervene if Serbian police mishandle the next Albanian Kosovar challenge. This would include moving US air and naval assets to forward locations to facilitate punitive strikes. Such moves would be transparent and easily detected by Belgrade. JCS and CINCEUR could easily design the right mix of forces to signal readiness embargo/blockade enforcement operations and/or selected intervention into Kosovo to stop the killing and check Serb aggression. With appropriate incentives and fear of escalating Albanian refugee problems if violence worsens in Kosovo, both Skopje (Macedonia) and Tirana (Albania) would welcome US forces. Advance Congressional consultations would be essential.

• At NATO, begin consultations to build consensus and develop contingency plans for operations in Kosovo in the event Serb repression were to continue. This would not be a carte blanche operation within NATO—there would be some reluctance to act because of political and economic ties with Serbia.

• Send a high-level military delegation as part of a diplomatic effort to meet with Serb leaders and demonstrate allied resolve to settle the Kosovo issue.

• As mentioned earlier, employ covert/special operations forces to conduct "snatch" operations on Serb leaders initiating violence in Kosovo. This is a high-risk tool whose benefits would probably not outweigh its cost of use. Nevertheless, information campaigns outlining this asymmetric approach.
would cause Milosevic some concern that perhaps he could be a target in the future.

- As a show of force, build up US and NATO forces on the FRY periphery to demonstrate both capacity and determination to maintain security and stability for all parties, including the Serb minority in Kosovo, who could be at considerable risk if violence erupts again. These forces could also prevent arms smuggling and preclude access to “safe havens” in Albania for KLA activists. Increased PfP exercises and activities, including Bulgaria and Romania, could be a part of this effort. While such activities in Albania and Macedonia would be significant challenges, our planning should recognize that a “NATOized UNPREDEP” force probably provides the best environment for US troops in Macedonia and, possibly, Albania.

**Proposed Actions**

The goals of US strategy toward Kosovo would be linked to its interests. The primary objective would be to prevent escalation of the conflict beyond Serbia’s borders. Ideally, we would be able to assist in stopping the violence immediately. Pragmatically, we would at least like to contain the violence regionally—strictly to Kosovo, if possible. We would like to see a multi-national coalition acting in concert with a UNSC resolution to resolve Kosovo, completely separate from any actions or issues ongoing in Bosnia. We would not allow anything to derail the hard-fought peace process that is still moving forward (albeit slowly). The US would prefer to support an allied-led coalition. Our European allies were unable to take the lead in Bosnia, but perhaps we could get them more involved in resolving Kosovo as part of a “growth process.”
We would be there to support allied decisions and provide assistance as required. The EU could be particularly effective in unifying the “rim countries” and perhaps, in the long term, encourage the development of a regional association of Balkan states to participate in resolving Balkan problems. From a human rights perspective, we would like to see Non Governmental Organizations/International Government Organizations (NGO/IGO) involved in providing humanitarian assistance, investigating the violence, and acting as monitors in Kosovo to ensure that violence does not resurface. Finally, we would advocate keeping our military out of the fray, but would use them in supportive roles to augment other political and diplomatic and/or economic initiatives. Our short term goal would be to set the conditions for the establishment of an effective dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

The first step to achieving our goal would be a comprehensive information campaign to inform the US and world public of the situation (as we see it) in Kosovo. Unlike previous foreign policy endeavors, the President should take his case to the American people early, as should our allied leaders. We should use every means to penetrate Serbia and Kosovo electronically to inform both sides that violence from either side will not be regarded favorably. This public information campaign will set the conditions for an active diplomatic campaign.

US/EU should push for a UNSC resolution on Kosovo. With that in hand, US/EU leaders should be clear with Milosevic about what we want—serious engagement and commitment to reaching a negotiated solution in the short term. We will demand that Milosevic agree to public measures to lower tensions and build confidence with the Kosovo Albanians (expanding on the London statement, e.g., cooperation with humanitarian organizations). We should also signal to Milosevic that if he cooperates in good faith, he will be rewarded. As concrete public steps are taken to reduce tensions, he can expect an incremental removal of the
new sanctions. We should tell Milosevic now, however, that progress depends on getting a dialogue underway. To move Milosevic in the right direction, we should signal that we are prepared to consider FRY membership in the International Financial Institutions (IFI) if Kosovo is resolved.

In order to effect a durable settlement of the conflict in Kosovo, the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities need to respect the international engagements regarding human rights that were endorsed by the former Yugoslavia (of which the current Yugoslav and Serbian authorities claim to be the legitimate successors). The authorities should halt the violation of the right to a fair trial, withdraw discriminatory laws, reopen schools and cultural organizations, and allow use of the Albanian language. They should halt any mistreatment of individuals and permit the OSCE missions to return in order to carry out their activities. In addition, the Albanian Kosovars must not mistreat the Serb minority citizens in Kosovo.

It is unlikely that political settlement can be left to the Serbs and Albanians alone. The EU, under the auspices of the UN with support of the US, should establish an international conference/commission to address the Kosovo situation. Regional states should be included in this conference to provide insights and demonstrate that they are capable of full participation in an EU/NATO-like organization.

In order to provide a political settlement which has a chance to succeed in the long term, a formula by which Albanian representatives are directly involved in talks on the issue of Kosovo needs to be found. A political settlement will have to meet the justified demand put forward by the Albanians to allow them autonomy with respect to important social issues. Also, it will have to guarantee the Serbs influence in political decision making, as well as the protection of and access to their cultural and religious heritage. In this respect, the activities of
the London Conference, which took place on 26-28 August 1992, may serve as a point of departure. On this occasion, all parties— including the Serbian authorities—declared the intention to restore in full the civil and constitutional rights of the inhabitants of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Within the framework of such negotiations, after a number of minimum conditions regarding human rights have been met and some political and social institutions in Kosovo are allowed to function again, the Albanians would end their boycott of elections in Yugoslavia and Serbia. Their participation in the political life of Yugoslavia and Serbia may indicate their willingness to reach a compromise. Also, it may establish a first permanent form of contact and dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. Most Kosovo Albanian leaders insist on independence, but an interim solution providing effective self-rule and real autonomy from Belgrade would likely still be acceptable to the majority of Kosovo Albanians if imposed and accompanied by credible guarantees from the US/EU.

When the international sanctions against Serbia, established by the UN Security Council, are lifted, the full readmittance of Serbia to international organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, should be subject to certain conditions. This should only be done, however, if independent international observers evaluate the political and human rights situation in Kosovo positively. Meanwhile, international presence in Kosovo with the objective of monitoring the human rights situation and maintaining political contacts with all parties in the conflict should be strengthened and extended. This international presence will prevent the recurrence of repression and or escalation of conflict.

We have used economic tools as punitive measures so far (sanctions, embargo, etc.), and the pressure must be maintained with the threat of intensifying if Serbia does not enter into meaningful negotiations. Contingent upon genuine progress in the eyes of the Commission, the
time would be ripe to offer a few carrots to Milosevic such as lifting the sanctions that have been
re-imposed and allowing Serbia access to International Financial Institutions.

Future grants and financial credits by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank to Serbia Montenegro, and the provision of aid by the European Union, should also be
subject to the conditions regarding respect for human rights. Moreover, the conditions for
granting financial aid should contain a clause that ensures allotting part of the money to the
improvement of living conditions and infrastructure in Kosovo. These financial means are not to
be used as measures to alter the ethnic balance in Kosovo. The expenditure of the money should
be supervised by the donors and representatives appointed by the Kosovar population.

Perhaps even more beneficial would be to play the economic card with Russia to obtain
support for the Contact Group and influence Milosevic to "come around." Macedonia could be
brought further into a coalition with promises of sponsorship for World Trade Organization
membership.

Any use of the military, while signaling firmness of resolve, could also provoke a violent
response from a Milosevic who sees his survival at stake. Extreme caution must be employed in
any operation involving military forces. Further, the US and its allies must be prepared to take
"the next step" and escalate combat operations if Milosevic reacts with violent combat force in
Kosovo. The costs and risks of employing military force in Kosovo would be significant. and
may not be supported by the US Congress or domestic public opinion. It may be, however, that
the military tool will be the only one that threatens Milosevic. In that case, the threat must be
credible (i.e., of sufficient force to convince Milosevic that intervention is not only possible, but
probable if he resumes his aggressive behavior) and involve NATO as well as other nations.

Although the military must be capable to intervene in Kosovo, its primary mission would be to
secure the "rim" countries and prevent conflict from spreading. PfP exercises will be conducted involving regional countries aspiring to NATO membership to provide a conflict containment zone in the Balkans.

These exercises are not about bluffing, the costs of not following through on any threat are too high. Proceeding in a deliberate but careful manner will provide enormous leverage to our diplomacy and show the Kosovars that they will not be left to fend for themselves. Such action guarantees continued US influence that allies can use to moderate independence aspirations, while undermining the Islamist "freedom fighters" that provoke Belgrade and Moscow.

Conclusion

Our fundamental goal is to move Belgrade and the Kosovars to resolve this conflict with a negotiated settlement. Progress in Kosovo will open the way for real movement on FRY democratization, ease the integration of the FRY into Europe, and reinforce progress on Dayton and Balkan stability. However, given the tremendous lack of trust, compounded by the recent violence, achieving success will be extremely difficult. Only if much more pressure is brought to bear on Milosevic will we have a real prospect for calming Kosovo, establishing an effective dialogue, and achieving a viable solution.
• All six nations agreed to support a UN Security Council resolution to impose a comprehensive arms embargo against Yugoslavia.

• All except Russia agreed to deny visas to senior Yugoslav and Serb officials responsible for the repression and to impose a moratorium on credit for government-financed exports.

Long-term Action

• All nations except Russia agreed to freeze Yugoslav and Serb government assets abroad unless Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic within 10 days makes a public commitment to begin a dialogue with the Albanian majority on Kosovo’s political status, halts action against civilians, withdraws special police units and allows international representatives into the province.


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