A Woman's Place Is In . . . the Army

Implications of Expanding Roles for Women on Future Defense Policy
**Report Documentation Page**

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
A WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN . . . THE ARMY
Implications of Expanding Roles for Women on
Future Defense Policy

"'Ground combat is no place for women,' said the commission's chairman, Gen Robert Herres. These are clearly the words of a man who still imagines that women have a 'place' and that they are to be kept in it."¹

INTRODUCTION

The issue of women serving in the Armed Forces and, particularly, of their place in combat, has long been an emotional one. It is largely emotional because it is a story of the integration of women into military culture, a traditionally male domain. Like that of the first women struggling to be doctors and lawyers, it was and is the story of a woman's "place." The issue was and is that of the role of women in American society.

"'These forms of segregation are not the product of considerations peculiar to the military, they grow out of the same cultural and political origins that produce discrimination in civilian society."²

Given that the number of women in the Services stands at an all time high, and that women continue to join in ever increasing numbers, I propose that their expanding roles will have serious implications for future defense policy. I will review what I believe to be key events of this decade, and then examine some of those implications and how they may change the way we think about personnel utilization. While the issues affect women in all Services, I will focus on the Army because I submit that it is the image of a soldier in combat boots that most readily comes to mind when discussing the role of women in the military, and particularly in combat. It is also the Army that has been the
focus of the most recent sexual harassment incidents to gain the attention of the American public. Lastly, as an Army officer, it is my own experience base.

**A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Women have served in the military since the birth of this country, the “Molly Pitcher” of revolutionary battlefields was not a mythical creature. Some 34,000 women served during World War I, 200,000 in World War II, and The Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 finally gave women a permanent place in the regular military. By 1970, however, women still comprised only 1.4% of active component personnel, a recent Rand Study commissioned by the Pentagon notes that the number now stands at 13.6%. This equates to some 195,000 women currently in uniform.

Four reasons are most often cited for the relatively large increase over the past twenty-seven years: (1) the end of the draft and beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, (2) the civil and equal rights movements, (3) the performance of women in the Gulf War, and (4) the Tailhook scandal. Putting reasons aside for the moment, however, this increase has not come without a hard-fought struggle both within and outside the military. Both advocates and opponents of women in service have literally spanned generations among service leaders, elected officials and the American public.

During the 1990’s, combat roles for women have been the crux of the issue along with the expansion of other career fields and specialties.

**AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR: THE COMMISSION**

Because 40,000 women deployed to the Persian Gulf with Operation Desert Storm and demonstrated their ability to perform, the war led to discussions about
whether women should serve in combat or combat related positions and thus to questions about the only remaining statutory and policy restrictions on their assignments. The Congressional Research Service reported “Operation Desert Storm showed that women could satisfactorily perform many jobs traditionally held by men and that they could be in danger even if restricted from combat posts.” Even though women had demonstrated their ability long before, it was Desert Storm that seemed to confirm this to the public. Congressional debate on the subject led to two amendments to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 Defense Authorization Act. The first repealed the provision that excluded Navy women aviation officers and Air Force women from duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions. The second led to the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces.

The Commission, chaired by Maj. Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF (Ret.), was appointed by the Bush Administration to study duty assignments available to women, to look at earlier studies on women in the service, and to conduct any further research needed to assess laws and policies restricting the use of women. In addition to examining the issue of women in the military, the Commission was also to look into family policy issues. According to then Captain Mimi Finch (U.S. Army), one of the commissioners, the study made very slow progress because of great divisiveness within the Commission. She noted that some issues were not well researched because so much time was spent looking into women in combat aircraft, and that there was no real consensus on most issues despite the outcomes of the final votes. The argument boiled down to two major philosophies, opposite sides of how women in combat would affect military readiness. In that regard, the biggest issues were women as prisoners of
war, female physical strength and endurance, public opinion, unit cohesion, pregnancy and deployability, family policy issues, and conscription

The Commission completed its study and provided its report to the President on 15 November 1992. In summary, they recommended the following regarding the role of women in combat: (1) to exclude women from direct combat units and positions, (2) to retain and codify “the Service’s policies prohibiting the assignment of women to combat aircraft”, (3) to allow women to serve on combatant vessels, except submarines and amphibious ships, (4) to exclude women from special operations forces, and (5) to retain the Risk Rule, with an exception to allow for the assignment of women to ships.

The President passed the Report to then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.

THE SECRETARY’S DECISION

Secretary Aspin rescinded the 1988 “Risk Rule” which prohibited women from serving in units which collocated with direct combat units, and then told the services to review their personnel policies in accordance with a new rule based on three criteria of direct ground combat. He directed all Services to allow women to fly combat aircraft, on combat missions. He directed the Navy to open additional ship billets to women under current law, and to prepare a proposal to repeal the combatant ship exclusions under Title 10. Further, he required the Army and Marine Corps to study opening ground positions to women, to include field artillery and air defense artillery. The Secretary also instituted an implementation committee to ensure consistent application of policy changes across the Services.
The legislative proposal to remove the combat ship exclusions resulted in a hearing on women in combat before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on 12 May 1993. The subcommittee had to determine whether to lift the prohibition, and the hearing focused on how the Services would implement the policy changes. While Secretary Aspin could not appear at the hearing, he sent the subcommittee a letter to explain his decisions. In this letter he noted the expansion of opportunities to women over time, demonstrated female performance "in difficult and dangerous environments" and the need to "have the most effective and ready force possible, drawn from the largest pool of qualified individuals." Congress did, in fact, in the Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994, repeal the ban on women on combatant ships, with the exception of submarines and amphibious vessels.

In the meantime, the Army studied expanding roles for women as directed. Then, in a 1 June 1994 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army Togo West recommended opening some combat assignments to women. Specifically, he recommended women be assigned to Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units, as well as to other field artillery units, air defense artillery, combat engineer battalion headquarters, special operations aircraft, and air cavalry units. He also recommended putting women in ceremonial units, and Special Forces group headquarters. Secretary West additionally wanted to open military occupational specialties (MOS) 12C, Engineer Bridge Crewmember, 12Z, Combat Engineer Senior Sergeant, and 82C, Field Artillery Surveyor. "The important issue, said West, is not
whether women should be in combat but whether they are being blocked from reaching their full potential. Women should be assigned to any job they can perform.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{ARMY INFIGHTING}

The West memorandum, intended to be confidential, was leaked to the Center for Military Readiness, a conservative think-tank run by 1992 Presidential Commission member Elaine Donnelly. Instead of being briefed on Secretary West's views, the Army's senior generals were surprised and disturbed by his recommendations when the memo became public – and were in immediate opposition on some key issues.

Although service officials denied there was ever a "hostile squabble," the debate was clearly heated enough for an unnamed Army personnel official to note that the Secretary of Defense would have to personally intervene between Secretary West and General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, to forge an agreement.\textsuperscript{17} It was also heated enough for the Secretary to withdraw his memo two weeks after submitting it to the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{18}

Central to the dispute were West's recommendations to assign women to MLRS units, special operations aircraft and air cavalry troops. These were significant because they would have blazed the trail for women into the combat arms branches, from which the Army's most senior generals have been chosen.\textsuperscript{19} Most controversial was Secretary West's position on MLRS. The Secretary said that women should be assigned to those units because, with a range of 32 kilometers, they do not engage in direct combat or routinely collocate with units that do. Military officers, however, noted
that his position reflected a lack of understanding of MLRS employment as far forward as possible as a counterfire weapon.

General J H Binford Peay III, then the Army's Vice Chief of Staff and President Clinton's nominee for Commander-in-Chief (CINC), United States Central Command (CENTCOM), strongly opposed Secretary West's recommendations. During his Senate confirmation hearing, Peay said that “Clinton administration policies that open more combat positions take a 'clinical' approach to the issue.” This could be interpreted as another way of saying that he thought that Secretary West was putting female career opportunities ahead of military readiness.

Most critics believe that women in combat would degrade military readiness for two basic reasons: (1) because they supposedly lack physical and emotional strength and (2) because they purportedly would cause friction and degrade unit cohesion. However, the degraded cohesion theory did not hold true in a 1993 General Accounting Office (GAO) study of co-ed units deployed to Desert Storm, most assigned soldiers believed cohesion was good. The U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, which showed that the proper training could prepare most women to do jobs classified as very heavy, disproved the argument against physical strength. Women's emotional stamina has also been proven by performance from World War II through Desert Storm.

Despite the facts, Secretary of Defense Perry, who followed Secretary Aspin in February 1994, believed that the possibility of “compromising standards” was at the heart of the dispute between Secretary West and General Sullivan. While moving forward to expanding opportunities for women, “we must also ‘take into account the
functions that have to be performed, the missions that have to be performed, and we don't compromise those missions or functions. Concerned about a smoothly running Army and worried that "bad feelings may linger," Secretary Perry directed West and Sullivan to give him a recommendation that they could both endorse.

THE OUTCOME

Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense "was concerned with fostering harmony between the secretary of the Army and its chief of staff, he said. In addition, he feared that previous ground gained by women would be lost if the Pentagon's civilian leadership moved too quickly." Finally, Secretary Perry "decided to side with Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon Sullivan, who did not want to go nearly as far in opening women's combat roles as Secretary of the Army Togo West." He clearly felt that to do otherwise would have been forcing a decision on General Sullivan. "I did so because I wanted a harmonious relationship between the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff," Perry said. "That wasn't going to happen if the secretary of defense and the secretary of the Army rammed [a decision] down [Sullivan's] throat."

The final decision was a compromise that resulted in assignment rules excluding women from special operations aircraft and MLRS units, the combat arms branches of infantry, armor and artillery would remain all male. Additionally, jobs would open to women in headquarters units of combat engineers, division air defense artillery battalions, some air defense headquarters units and some ceremonial units like the CId Guard. The specialties of 12C, 12Z and 82C would also open to women, but female 82C's would be excluded from field artillery battalions. The changes were announced
on 29 July 1994, and would result in about 14,000 more positions available to women. It was considered an incremental, rather than a radical change. More women would be able to compete for First Sergeant and Command Sergeant Major. Some of the changes, like opening the Old Guard, were considered symbolic. "For the foreseeable future, Army women will not have a direct ground combat role. But women will be all over the theater of war — piloting Apaches on scout missions, manning combat ships and flying fighter planes." These changes were a definite step forward. "This, in the words of Army Secretary Togo West, is a maturation process. As Congress and the American people see women performing missions well, the resistance to equal opportunity will continue to fade."

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION

Unfortunately, sexual harassment and gender discrimination issues, a long-standing problem but increasingly in the spotlight in the last few years, have accompanied the growth of job opportunity. Both The Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute agreed to admit women only after protracted court battles, and Army drill sergeants have been convicted of sexually abusing young soldiers in their charge. Even the Army's top enlisted man stood accused and was tried by court martial. Despite the results of a 1995 Department of Defense Sexual Harassment Survey which showed a significant decline in sexual harassment, the incidents at Aberdeen Proving Ground and across the Army led the Secretary of the Army to appoint a Senior Review Panel to conduct an investigation of sexual misconduct. He also tasked the Army's Inspector General (IG) to conduct a parallel investigation.
In the most extensive review of sexual misconduct to date, the Senior Review Panel interviewed over 30,000 soldiers at fifty-nine installations around the world. Its charter was to examine equal opportunity and sexual harassment in all areas except initial entry training. In a report released on 10 September 1997, it concluded that leadership failure is the main cause for sexual harassment. "The panel concludes that the human relations environment of the Army is not conducive to engendering dignity and respect among us. We are firmly convinced that leadership is the fundamental issue. Passive leadership has allowed sexual harassment to persist, active leadership can bring about change to eradicate it." The following is a summary of other major findings: sexual harassment exists across the Army, but sex discrimination is more common, fifty-one percent of women said they received different treatment because of their gender, soldiers do not use the complaint system because they fear reprisal, the chain of command does not always use the formal system to resolve problems, commanders are not committed to equal opportunity and do not always understand its value, women feel that they are not regarded as essential and hear that they have taken jobs from men, there is a shift from perceiving the military as a way of life to seeing it as "just a job." The Army Inspector General, tasked to do a similar study, also looked at initial entry training. The IG's findings were similar, but concluded downsizing and reductions in resources left initial entry training bases with too few soldiers [trainers] who have too much to do." In other words, there may be too few leaders to provide adequate supervision at these bases.
In addition to the studies being done by the Army, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen appointed a Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues on 27 June 1997 to answer questions about the success of gender-integrated training. The committee was to assess the current training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to determine how best to train our gender-integrated, all-volunteer force to ensure that they are disciplined, effective and ready.

The Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense made thirty recommendations concerning the recruiting and training process. After reviewing the report, Secretary Cohen directed the Services to find ways to highlight the importance of assignment as a trainer, emphasizing the importance of leadership in basic training. He also directed a toughening of physical fitness standards, and ordered separate living areas for male and female trainees. The Secretary did not agree with the committee’s most controversial recommendation, that of separating the sexes during basic training like the Marine Corps does.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE**

In the words of Secretary of Defense Cohen, “I think it should be clear that our all-volunteer force, a force that has produced the best military in the world, cannot meet its obligations without the continued strong contribution of men and women working together.” In other words, women are in the Services to stay. As noted earlier,
women now comprise almost fourteen percent of active military personnel, a dramatic increase over the course of the past three decades. Equally dramatic have been the changes in both legislation and policy over this period, particularly during the 1990's. Over eighty percent of all positions within the Department of Defense are now open to women.

The integration of women into the Armed Forces is far from over, however. Progress has not been without its problems. For example, women may now be assigned to ninety-one percent of Army occupations and seventy percent of Army positions. Hidden behind these seemingly good news numbers, though, is the fact that the assignments still closed to women are those which have traditionally resulted in promotion to the highest levels of leadership. Those assignments, notably, are in the combat arms. Their closure to women is a result of the direct ground combat exclusion rule. While an improvement over the 1988 “Risk Rule,” it still effectively limits advancement opportunities. It also relegates women to second-rate status by virtue of their inability to even compete for the top jobs.

Where, then, do we go from here? Since integration of women is not yet complete while their presence is a reality, the question becomes one of how best to proceed. Time is needed to effect change, of course, but time alone is not enough — and can often be a “cop out” when cited as a solution for gender problems within the Services. Time must be “nudged along” by goals for the future.

I would argue that Joint Vision 2010, if executed as written, provides an opportunity to establish and achieve such goals. It will require the military to adapt structure and skills to meet the technological scenario it envisions. It notes that, “The
judgment, creativity, and fortitude of our people will remain the key to success in future joint operations. Turning concepts into capabilities requires adapting our leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizations, and materiel to meet the high tempo, high technology demands posed by these new concepts.  

**Concept for Future Joint Operations:** The **Expanding Joint Vision 2010** carries this thought a step further by stating, “By 2010, a wide variety of improvements will enhance a warrior’s survivability, lethality, mobility, and access to any relevant information sources.” Both documents convey the image of a “high tech” force prepared to engage the enemy on a digitized battlefield. To operate in that environment, tomorrow’s warrior will require skills that emphasize capabilities other than brute strength. In fact, smaller, lighter equipment will reduce the attention to size differences between the genders. Physical size and capacity, while remaining consequential in some regards, will not be as important as the ability to operate technologically complicated equipment and understand complex political-military situations. In this sense, then, the vision of our Armed Forces, over time, will result in a further leveling of assignment opportunities for women.

Similarly, the Report of the National Defense Panel predicts a transformation of both our forces and their characteristics for the period 2010-2020. It calls for greater emphasis on the following systems architecture, information system protection, information operations, automation, small logistics footprint, mobility, stealth, speed, increased operational and strike ranges, and precision strike. Again, this vision calls for skills that will only further enhance the integration of women into the Services.

All of these visions serve to illustrate the real solution to integration, that of making personnel assignments on the basis of actual job qualifications. Obviously, the
future view may well lend itself to this solution because it does not seem to place as much emphasis on physical requirements. Even today, though, I can find no reasoned, factual argument against this proposition. There is nothing written that says employment credentials are gender based. While every woman cannot meet the physical demands of the infantry, neither can every man. In fact, "the arguments against integrating women into the military seem to echo similar discredited arguments previously made against integrating some professions in the civilian workforce (e.g., police officers and firefighters)"45 If actual work standards can be established for civilian occupations, it does not seem impossible to assume that they could be applied across the Services.

Of course, this means that the Department of Defense must undertake an effort to study and classify all occupational specialties. It must establish a "gender-neutral" standard that would apply to all individuals, male or female, who could then apply and compete for positions based on skills. Such a standard would not only ensure equal opportunity for women, but would also guarantee that positions would be filled by those most capable of doing them.

Gender-neutral personnel utilization cannot, of course, be achieved overnight. It will take both a transformation in force requirements and steady pressure for change between now and then to accomplish. It will also require education and sensible adjudication to eliminate both gender discrimination and sexual harassment.

The Senior Review Panel, the Army's Inspector General, and the Kassebaum Baker Committee all made important recommendations as a result of their findings. They focus on "leader development, EO [Equal Opportunity] policy and procedures, IET
[Initial Entry Training] soldierization, unit and institutional training, command climate and oversight. Perhaps most telling is the Senior Review Panel’s recommendation to “Incorporate the human dimension of warfare into Army operational doctrine.” This clearly dovetails with their finding of leadership failure as the root of the problem.

While we can easily train soldiers and leaders to follow processes, we face a much more difficult challenge in educating them on appropriate human behavior. It is much easier to teach an individual to fire the M-16 rifle than it is to educate him on its proper use. Similarly, it is also easier to teach someone the procedure for responding to an equal opportunity complaint than it is to instill an understanding of the causes for such complaints. It is elementary to teach facts, but not so easy to impart a realization of what the facts really mean. While I am not an educator by profession, I believe this is caused by the basic differences between training and education. We train to convey processes and procedures, systematic methods of accomplishing given tasks. We educate to produce thought, to cause questioning, to instill core values and understanding. Education speaks to culture, and is often itself the process by which we seek to break cultural bias.

We must increase educational efforts now because the Army, as an organization, was unprepared to bring in women in the numbers it has - particularly over the last twenty-seven years. Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, who was recalled to active duty as Vice Chair of the Army’s Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment, noted the Army never did anything to prepare itself for large increases in the number of women. Similarly, Charles Moskos, noted military author and sociologist, says “I also don’t
believe the services ever fully came to grips with the implications of recruiting more and more women over the years.\textsuperscript{48}

We must, today, "come to grips" because women are in the military to stay. They have been shot at, taken prisoner, and died in the service of their country. Despite loud outcries to the contrary, studies have proven that women are as capable as their male counterparts - and can even do jobs classified as very heavy if provided appropriate training and opportunity. There are still many concerns about the readiness impacts caused by pregnant women. In fact, though, "statistics show it [pregnancy] has little bearing on military readiness. In fact, women on the average spend a mere one fewer hour per month at work than their male counterparts. When one excludes pregnancy leave, women have a lower rate of lost time at work than their male counterparts.\textsuperscript{49} A recent Rand Study resulted in findings that showed "integration of women has had a small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale – leadership, training, and the unit workload are perceived as having a far more profound influence.\textsuperscript{50}

These are the facts, and they have significant implications for future defense policy. We can no longer draw a clear line between combatants and noncombatants on the battlefield, and can expect that line to grow even hazier as force requirements change to support the scenarios of 2010 and beyond. We cannot afford to ignore any element of our population if we are to continue to field the most proficient military in the world. We need the best and the brightest, regardless of gender, in the jobs they are most capable of performing. We must educate our force, and the public at large, to understand that, and march firmly down the road toward gender-neutral personnel utilization.
We must also remember that our path forward, much like the one we have followed so far, will not be without problems. It will call for sensible adjudication of claims of sexual harassment, bias and assault. The dilemma, of course, is the definition of "sensible adjudication." By this term I mean a quick, sensitive response based on the nature of the complaint and the actual facts pertinent to the charge. It does little good to have a formal complaint system that is not used because victims fear reprisal, both for themselves and those they accuse.

I believe we must, as recommended by the Senior Review Panel, "Re-engineer the EO program from top to bottom to [sic] make it responsive to leaders and soldiers, to protect those who use it, and to ensure that those working in it are not stigmatized. Ensure that professionals and leaders who are expected to deal with soldiers reporting incidents of inappropriate sexual behavior are trained and qualified." I also believe that the outcome of these recommendations must be the establishment of a separate channel for the reporting and investigation of these types of claims. While the commander must be involved, I would require him to report all complaints to an outside organization for review and response. Equal opportunity offices could serve this function if appropriately qualified and staffed. I believe this would minimize individuals' fear of reprisal and result in a more objective examination of each circumstance. Given the damning overall finding of leadership failure, it will at least provide a channel for investigation and appropriate action – a route to sensible adjudication.

Critics of this recommendation will likely argue that the chain of command should not be removed from the investigation and resolution process. While I would normally agree, I do not believe that leadership failure can be turned into success overnight.
Equally important to resolving the situation is the education I spoke of earlier, not only for junior soldiers but also for every leader in the chain of command. All must learn basic constructs, but education must also be tailored for officers and noncommissioned officers, civilian supervisors, commanders and first sergeants. Education must provide the basis of understanding necessary to shape the appropriate command climate and, ultimately, set the stage for leadership success.

In the interim, because the educational process takes time, I believe it is essential to make an organization outside the chain of command responsible for review of and response to sexual harassment and gender discrimination complaints. I cannot predict how many years such an interim organization will be necessary because I do not have the expertise to forecast how long it will take the educational process to bring about the desired effect. I do know that the current system is not working, and that we must fix it. I believe that an interim organization designed to provide sensible adjudication is one way to start.

**CONCLUSION**

"Nowhere in the civilian world, I knew, was it so common to find women in nontraditional jobs, working as jet mechanics and machinists and, yes, fighter pilots. The military may still have an 'armor-plated' ceiling limiting women's advancement, but beneath it there lurked the beginnings of a gender-neutral workplace."  

Jean Zimmerman, in *Tailspin*

Women truly have come a long way on the path to integration in the Services. They will not be truly integrated, however, until they are recognized as equals by their male counterparts, able to go as far as their capabilities and dedication will carry them.
We must also recognize that the problems of sexual harassment and gender bias encountered along the way are unlikely to disappear soon. We can and must, however, develop better means of recognizing them for what they are and dealing with them accordingly. And we must educate as well as train, for that is the only sure way to eventually overcome the cultural bias women face in a traditionally male environment.

Women have demonstrated their competence around the world, in peace, combat and operations other than war. They have proven that they can perform as well as their male counterparts. These are facts. We must base personnel utilization on ability to meet actual job qualifications, facts, instead of tradition or emotion. Women are here to stay, and we must "come to grips" by using facts to make decisions on their continued role in the Armed Forces. It is in the facts that we also find what is perhaps the most significant implication for the future -- that women do, indeed, have a place. It is in the Services. It is in the Army.

Jean Zimmerman, Tailspin Women at War in the Wake of Tailhook, (New York Doubleday, 1995), 251

For a discussion of Molly Pitcher and women who served with the Continental Army, see Women in the Military An Unfinished Revolution by Maj Gen Jeanne Holm, USAF (Ret)

Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military An Unfinished Revolution, (Novato, CA Presidio Press, 1982), 10

Congressional Research Service, 92008 Women in the Armed Forces, 1996, by David F Burrelli, 12 December 1996, 2 [on-line], available from http://www.fas.org/man/crs/92-038.htm, Internet, accessed 18 November 1997 The provisions of the act are worth noting female strength was limited to 2% of enlisted strength, with female officer numbers limited to 10% of female enlisted strength (excluding nurses) Women also could not exceed the rank of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander

James Kitfield, “Front and Center,” National Journal 29 (25 October 1997) 2125 Note that the 2% rule was lifted in 1967 by Public Law 90-130

The only law governing women’s assignments was 10 U.S.C. 6015, which was the combat aircraft and combat ship exclusionary provision Rules against using women in combat units in the Army were never codified, but were always a matter of policy The so-called Risk Rule, adopted by DOD in 1988, governed the assignment of women to non-combat positions and was interpreted differently by each service

Congressional Research Service, 92008, 5

The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to the President (Washington, DC GPO, 1992), iii


Ibid

Presidential Commission Report, 22-36

Congressional Research Service, 92008 Based on the new rule, women cannot be assigned to units that engage an enemy on the ground, are exposed to hostile fire, and have a high probability of direct physical contact with the personnel of a hostile force

Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Women in Combat Hearing before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 103rd Cong, 1st sess, 12 May 1995, 3


22 "Women Move Closer to Battlefield," *Army Times*, 3


26 Karen Jowers, "Perry Played Mediator in Designing Women's Role," *Navy Times*, 7


34 Tranette Ledford, "Panel Finds Pervasive Harassment/Reimer Calls Abuses of Authority A 'Cancer'" 3

35 It is worth noting that integrated basic training is fairly new. According to a 17 March 1998 article in *The New York Times*, "Cohen Rejects Segregation of Sexes for Military Training," the Army conducted a short experiment with it in the late '70s and early '80s, but did not actually start integrating the sexes in basic training until 1993. The Navy began in 1994. The Air Force is the service with the most experience. Its program started in 1976. It is also interesting to note that the percentages of males training with females in basic training is lower than expected because of the ratio of female trainees and the manner in which units are organized. See the Kassebaum Baker Report for further discussion.


40 Ibid


48 James Kitfield, 2126


52 Zimmerman, xvi
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