PARSIMONY OR POLICY? CONGRESS’S ATTEMPT TO MERGE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES IN 1995

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Introduction

From November 1994 to April 1996 a major legislative battle took place between Congress and the Executive Branch over the issue of restructuring the foreign affairs agencies. Specifically, Congress proposed merging three small agencies--the United States Information Agency (USIA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)--into the Department of State. This paper will focus specifically on Congress's attempt to consolidate foreign assistance into the State Department and eliminate USAID. It will take as its point of departure the initiative by Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC) to abolish USAID, sharply reduce US funding for foreign assistance by eliminating development aid, and place the responsibility for humanitarian and emergency assistance programs directly under the Secretary of State. The discussion below will examine how a number of factors such as jurisdictional disputes between appropriations and authorization committees, confusion over the purpose of consolidation as being budgetary or policy-driven, the issue's disproportionate complexity to the political benefit to be gained from supporting it, and simply Helms's own style in pushing the issue, all undermined its prospects for success. It will also examine Executive Branch strategy to resist and ultimately defeat this initiative through an unwillingness to engage in a dialogue with Congress on foreign affairs restructuring, threats of Presidential vetoes at key junctures, and the astute use of public speeches and press placements by USAID to compel the Department of State and key White House staff to publicly close ranks and oppose consolidation.


Merging foreign affairs functions in information, arms control and foreign assistance was not a new idea that sprang from the mind of Jesse Helms. In fact, in late 1992, the Administration
released a report entitled *State 2000* that explored the idea of such a consolidation. Brian Atwood, as an undersecretary of State at the time, officially forwarded the report to Congress.¹

More recently, after the Republican capture of Congress in November 1994, staff of the National Performance Review in the Vice President’s Office, and White House political strategists in assessing the impact of the election concluded that radical changes in government structure would be necessary to recover public support for the Administration. Reinventing government, which Vice President Gore had directed from the beginning of the Administration, took on greater importance. At about this time, State Department officials, notably Strobe Talbott and Craig Johnstone (State’s chief budget officer), began to draft proposals on how to merge the other foreign affairs agencies into the Department. Johnstone’s role as a primary drafter of these proposals suggests that budget pressures may have been a driving force since State’s salaries and expenses budget was under severe strain. It is also possible that State was having informal conversations with Steve Berry of Sen Helms’s staff. Berry, who had been a Bush political appointee in the Department, and who was not known to be as antipathetic to foreign assistance as was Sen Helms, seized upon the consolidation idea as the basis for developing a legislative proposal for the new SFRC chairman.² Berry was the intellectual leader, and enlisted a House colleague (Gardner Peckham) who helped draft a similar proposal for House International Relations Committee (HIRC) Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY). Berry’s objective (which Gilman’s staff did not share with the same fervor) was to restructure the foreign policy apparatus to ensure better coordination between policy and program in a post Cold War environment.

By mid-December, State had developed a consolidation plan and Christopher proposed it be vetted by the NPR. USAID did not have the opportunity to comment on or even review the plan in advance, something viewed by its senior management as a classic bureaucratic end run. Although Christopher did not explicitly endorse the plan, it was clear he was enthusiastic about it...
The fact that Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Tenn), the new chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee in charge of the foreign assistance account, also announced a proposal to abolish USAID and consolidate its functions into State convinced Christopher and his staff that an Administration plan had to be developed quickly so as not to lose the initiative.

On January 6, an NPR meeting was called on short notice to discuss the State proposal. In the interim, Helms had rebuked McConnell’s plan by asserting the latter’s usurpation of the authorizing committee’s prerogatives and assuring that McConnell’s bill would never get a hearing in the SFRC. Ironically, at about this time Helms himself was taking the unusual step of stepping on the turf of his HIRC counterpart Ben Gilman (R-NY) by going directly to Speaker Newt Gingrich to propose a coordinated effort on foreign affairs restructuring in both houses of Congress. Gingrich agreed and made it clear to Ben Gilman that this would be his committee’s contribution to the Contract with America’s goal of deficit reduction and smaller government. Gilman, a moderate and past supporter of foreign assistance, realized that to keep his chairmanship he would have to produce a bill along the lines the Speaker requested.

Meanwhile, the Vice President’s office held two more NPR meetings on January 6 and 10, 1995. They were rancorous, with AID Administrator Atwood and ACDA Administrator Holum accusing the State Department (and specifically Christopher) of not being forthcoming about plans for consolidation. Vehement opposition to their proposal surprised State officials attending the NPR meetings. The affected agencies also presented papers detailing the reasons why merger was impractical, with the end result being no decision. Rather, NPR staff directed the agencies to work together on some sort of restructuring proposal for inclusion in the January 20 State of the Union message. In the meantime, leaks about Christopher’s support for consolidation had appeared in the press. USAID led the opposition to putting a specific consolidation proposal on the table. The interagency effort produced little of substance for inclusion in the State of the
Moreover, Brian Atwood began to go public, giving a series of speeches and interviews starting in late January and continuing through April directly opposing merger and arguing forcefully for a strong foreign assistance budget. On January 27, Gore's office announced that some restructuring of the foreign affairs agencies would take place, but decided against merger of agencies. At this point, while State personnel had shelved their "official" proposal for merger, their informal contacts with the White House and Congress on the issue continued. There appeared to be support within the NSC (Halpern) and interest in the President's staff (Erskine Bowles) that State continued to cultivate. This made Atwood's job at public relations more difficult, as his external affairs office launched a counterattack that included press placements, speeches, and interviews. It is likely that Atwood's public campaign was directed more at the White House, which was still agonizing over whether to preempt Helms and propose a plan of its own as part of the State Department authorization bill, than it was to NGOs, private contractors and other groups who are AID's natural constituency and who do support foreign aid on the Hill. In the end, OMB broke long-standing precedent and decided not to send draft authorizing legislation for the Department of State to the Hill. For its part, the State Department receded into the background and allowed Atwood to carry the public burden of an issue that was not of his making.

Of course, Sen. Helms would not allow the Secretary of State to be a bystander for long. He began his campaign with a February 14 Op-Ed piece in the Washington Post declaring that Christopher was right to propose merging the foreign affairs agencies. He stated that he would support the secretary against bureaucratic entrenchment. On March 15 he did just that when he announced his merger proposal flanked by Ben Gilman and Olympia Snowe (R-ME). It was remarkably similar to the "shelved" State plan except for a foundation that would channel funds to NGOs. Recognizing the strong alliance AID normally has with NGOs, this was Helm's attempt
to win their support by freeing them from their attachment to AID while guaranteeing them a budget (at least for a while) Gilman did not openly endorse the Helms plan at the press conference. Privately, however, he had been in touch with AID officials encouraging them to make a counterproposal that would save the Agency but allow for the budget savings anticipated under a more radical reorganization. Two weeks of Senate hearings followed (the HIRC had been holding hearings as well) with appearances by Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker scheduled. He also solicited and publicized letters from George Schulz and Alexander Haig (former secretaries of state) supporting his proposal. As his own public relations campaign intensified, White House opposition became more vocal. However, the issue of whether the Administration should offer a counterproposal was under discussion. While Helms held his hearings, the interagency atmosphere deteriorated as AID, USIA and ACDA accused State of continuing to work with Helms and Gilman staffers in the framing of their respective bills. Gilman’s dilemma, having been told his chairmanshp was at risk if he did not produce a bill, was that of generating GOP support for foreign assistance while not giving in on consolidation.

Defeat of the House Initiative: HR 1561 (April-June 1995)

By April, it became clear that the issues of reorganization and budget were inseparable. It was the primary motive for the Helms and Gilman bills and the Administration feared it would act as a drag on being able to get a foreign assistance appropriation of adequate level to meet minimum requirements. Brian Atwood saw this as an opportunity, however, emphasizing in his speeches the need to preserve the foreign affairs budget ("the money side is the more significant threat to us than the reorganization") and stressing less for his audience outside the beltway the issue of consolidation of USAID into State. He may have believed that preserving an adequate foreign assistance budget would also work in favor of preserving USAID as an organization. It seemed to be the right conclusion as input from NGOs to both the HIRC and SFRC seemed
largely to oppose the foundation approach in both bills, meaning Atwood may have convinced them they were more vulnerable relying on Helms and the Republican Congress for their funds than on USAID. Moreover, Atwood's launching of the New Partnership Initiative early in the year convinced the NGOs (especially Interaction's Julia Taft) that AID meant business in its stated intention to channel more AID funds to NGOs and improve working relationships. At the same time, Helms was revealing that his proposal to merge USAID reflected more his antipathy to foreign assistance in general, and not motivated by better foreign policy coordination. For its part, the White House finally decided in April that there was to be no discussion or cooperation with Congress on the merger idea, and no contingency planning inside the Administration in anticipation of possible merger.13

Meanwhile, the situation in the HIRC was turning ugly. Markups were contentious and at one point Dan Burton (R-Ind) physically threatened a senior USAID official attending one of the sessions. Meanwhile, church organizations, NGOs and the Black Caucus were coming out against the HIRC bill (HR 1561) more on the basis of its funding cuts than on the consolidation issue. Democrats, by and large, decided to hold their opposition until the bill reached the House floor.14 When it did on May 23, the House found itself locked in a two-week struggle that few GOP leaders expected or wanted. It began with President Clinton threatening to veto the bill in its current form. The President's lead argument focused on funding levels, but at the end of his statement he referred to the bill's restricting his ability to conduct foreign policy as required by the Constitution.15 Secretary of State Christopher, on May 22, had been even more forceful when he wrote that the House bill "wages an extraordinary assault on this and every future present's constitutional authority to manage foreign policy."16 Despite the obvious defection of a major Israeli lobby group, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which supported the bill because of its full funding for economic assistance for Israel, in fact, AIPAC-supported
Democrats stuck with the President. However, ethnic groups representing Irish, Turkish and Greek interests, all of whom stood to gain substantial sums from the bill, supported it. Nevertheless, the veto threat and more than 100 mostly Democratic floor amendments forced Gilman to pull the bill from consideration. In the aftermath, the New York Times observed that the “constitutional issue” had obscured the real issue with the bill, and that being numerous other policy restrictions and dramatically reduced funding levels that threatened US global leadership.

On the other hand, the Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland asserted that the White House had invited the assault on Presidential authority through its “expediency” driven foreign policy. Yet even Hoagland admitted that the veto would “rescue the Republicans from the full impact of their assault on the presidency,” and the wrong messages it would send to the rest of the world. It was just this type of press involvement that the Administration likely welcomed. It served the purpose of pointing out to Congress the risks of becoming bogged down in a battle over foreign policy vision using structural fixes as the means.

Between May 25 and early June negotiations between GOP and Democratic House members were intense, as was lobbying by AIPAC and other ethnic groups supporting the bill. For the GOP the difficult part was convincing fellow Members who had never voted for foreign aid that this was a bill they should support. Their argument was that the bill would cut aid and reform the foreign aid agency, an appealing mix. The effort finally yielded passage of HR 1561 on June 8 by a veto-proof 222-192 margin with AIPAC Democrats supporting the President.

While the House decided the fate of HR 1561, the SFRC began markup of S 508 to reorganize the foreign affairs agencies, and eliminate funding authorization for foreign assistance. The vote to approve the bill in committee was straight party-line with numerous compromises (including one by Sen. Kerry to allow the Administration to propose eliminating at least one agency) rejected. The bill dropped the foundation idea for lack of NGO support. On June 9, the
day after HR 1561 passed, the SFRC issued its committee report and the text of S 908. The report made clear that the Committee viewed foreign aid as no longer serving US interests. The bill’s purposes were to maximize efficient use of foreign affairs resources and improve management within the State Department, help balance the budget by the year 2002, and strengthen coordination of US foreign policy by clarifying the leading role of the Secretary of State and abolish USIA, USAID, and ACDA. Reintegration of the foreign affairs agencies would make their programs “more responsive to policy” The report made clear that the Committee felt compelled to proceed with its bill despite failed attempts to engage the Administration in a dialogue to draft a bill. In fact, the committee report cited the Administration as openly advocating “delay, derail, and obfuscate” as its means of dealing with the issue, including refusal to share cost estimates with the CBO so that the bill could be “scored” for budget purposes.21

It was during the markup that Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass) emerged as the SFRC’s main link with the Administration. Actually, Kerry assumed this role without apparent encouragement by the White House or USAID. Kerry proposed a compromise substitute that would have allowed the Administration to save one of the three agencies and proposed slightly different amounts for savings over a different timeframe. This amendment had Democratic support and could have formed the basis of a bipartisan bill that would have made it difficult for the Administration to “stonewall” the initiative.22 GOP members, however, firmly rejected the compromise. It was at this juncture that the issue may have passed from the realm of substance to politics, polarizing the committee and providing the minority the incentive to block the bill on the Senate floor.

Endgame: Passage of S 908 but initiative fails (July 1995-April 1996)

On July 26, the Senate took up S 908 with the consolidation provisions attached. Democrats mounted a filibuster and attempts at cloture failed even with Claiborne Pell (D-RI)
voting with the GOP. The feeling in June among House and Senate committee staffers of both parties that the Hill was winning the issue in light of the Administration's perceived weakness in foreign policy and its unwillingness to discuss policy with the Hill had begun to change. Senate Democrats succeeded in casting the issue as "foreign policy on the cheap" (Sen. Biden), rather than framing the debate around what type of foreign policy apparatus the US requires in the post-Cold War world. Senate consideration of S 908 from July 26-August 1 may have represented the high watermark of the intrusion of domestic politics into foreign policy with the budget being the driving force. On July 26, President Clinton issued yet another statement rejecting the bill as "deny(ing) us the resources we need to lead the world," and "attack(ing) the President's constitutional authority to conduct America's foreign policy." Just as he did with HR 1561 in May, the President vowed to veto S 908 in its current form and issued that vow just as debate started in the Senate.23

After an attempt at cloture failed on August 1, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole pulled the bill, warned that other more pressing legislative items were becoming backlogged after four days of unproductive debate. Helms reacted by blaming the Administration for the gridlock, and refusing to act on Ambassadors' nominations and foreign service promotions. He also put holds on several AID projects. It is important to note that all this happened three weeks after House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Sonny Callahan put together a surprisingly strong bipartisan coalition to pass a $12 billion foreign aid appropriation by a 333-89 vote. The bill gave greater flexibility to the Administration in deciding how to spend foreign aid and restored some funds for economic development, especially for Africa. While the Administration was not happy with the bill's total levels, it believed that this was the best foreign aid bill it could get from a GOP controlled Congress and, therefore, did not threaten a veto24
On August 7, word circulated in Foggy Bottom and on the Hill that State wanted to open a dialogue and had approached Helms's chief of staff, Bud Nance. Helms viewed this as progress and began to consider some nominations on August 10. On August 11, Atwood and others vehemently protested State's unilateral approach and insisted that any meeting with Helms and his staff must include representatives of the other foreign affairs agencies, and Sen. Sarbanes (D-Md), a strong supporter of the Administration position. A meeting was for August 16.

While this exchange was occurring a secret meeting between Helms, Steve Berry and the President occurred on August 11. Erskine Bowles, deputy chief of staff (and a fellow North Carolinian), set up the meeting at Helms's request. Reportedly, the President listened to the Helms proposal but offered no reaction. Vice President Gore responded with the same arguments used in his January statement that rejected the idea of consolidation. The meeting ended with nothing being accomplished, except for the fact that the "ice" had been broken by a face-to-face meeting of key decision makers. The August 16 meeting with Senate, State, USIA and AID staff took place with no commitments by the Administration except to provide a list of problems with the Helms bill.

On September 19, the foreign aid appropriations came to the Senate floor. Helms tried twice on September 20 and 28 to attach a new version of his bill (one which Sen. Kerry had at one time proposed in committee) to allow the President to abolish two agencies and save one. By this time, McConnell (perhaps remembering his brusque treatment by Helms in January) made it clear he did not wish to have reorganization attached to an appropriations bill. He negotiated language with Helms on September 20 that led Helms to think that if the Administration did not submit a merger plan by March 31, 1996, then consolidation would automatically take place. However, the amendment was more permissive and Helms's staff did not realize this until the next day. When Helms tried to attach his amendment again on September 28, some in the White
House and Senate Democrats began to sense that the issue was becoming so bogged down that a free-standing up or down vote on the issue might settle (and kill) the issue once and for all. On September 29, the Senate accepted that strategy and the appropriations bill to passed containing both funding levels and conditions that the Administration found acceptable. Passage of that spending bill, however, effectively severed the link between budget and consolidation.  

During early October as the Administration struggled with developing a position on S 908, OMB argued to use dollar figure cuts and not propose abolishing a set number of agencies. Only State objected to this. Gore met with Kerry the next week as Kerry sought guidance on how to handle negotiations with Helms to arrive at a manager’s amendment to S 908 that the Administration would not veto. Those meetings were inconclusive and Kerry went into talks with Helms without a real brief. Those talks rapidly disintegrated on October 18 as Kerry offered dollar reductions rather than eliminating specific agencies, and proposed changing some other provisions. Helms, angry at the backpedaling, froze ambassadorial nominations the next day. By October 31 he had also gained Senator Dole’s approval to hold up extension of authority for the PLO office to operate in the US because the Administration would not negotiate over consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies. However, on November 2, Dole reversed himself, clearly worried about the impact this move would have on Middle East peace.  

At this point, it appeared the issue should have lost its power. However, Kerry continued to negotiate with Helms, finally agreeing on $1.7 billion in budget reductions from FY 95 enacted figures, with set percentages on how much could come from specific accounts, and specific staff cuts by Agency. The White House, perhaps puzzled why Kerry persisted in seeking a compromise on an issue where the momentum was running against Helms, undercut Kerry and disavowed the deal. On November 17, SFRC Republicans closed ranks and sent Kerry a letter supporting Helms. Undaunted, Kerry continued to hold talks with Helms through December 5.
Agreement was finally reached to include severance pay for USIA employees in 1995 to the base calculation for the $1.7 billion cut, a move that, ironically, assured that USAID and USIA would still exist after four years by absorbing only $450 million in cuts between them (a figure they would likely reach in any event).\textsuperscript{31} The agreement, which was substantially more permissive than Helms’s original proposal, was announced on December 8, thereby clearing 18 ambassadorial nominations and actions on a number of treaties. On December 14, the Helms-Kerry manager’s amendment to S 908 passed by a vote of 82-16.

Although the story should end here, it does not. The foreign aid appropriations process continued to follow a tortured path in January and February over abortion language and attempts arose from time to time to attach the consolidation language to continuing resolutions, moves which the appropriations committees rejected. When HR 1561 and S 908 were conferenced, however, the Helms-Kerry deal fell apart as the conferees (including Helms and Gilman) agreed to a merger plan that abolished the three agencies but allowed the president to waive two of them. The House passed the conference report on March 12, the Senate passed it on March 28, and the President vetoed it on April 12. The House sustained the veto on April 30.

**Why did the initiative to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies fail?**

A number of complex organizational, bureaucratic, policy and personality factors explain why Congress failed to force a merger of the foreign affairs agencies. Based on press analysis and interviews of key players in both the executive and legislative branches, several key ones emerge:

- **Organizational** Congress was unable to form a bipartisan and institutional coalition to mandate change in the foreign affairs organizational structure. Turf battles between authorization and appropriation committees ultimately derailed any support appropriations committee and subcommittee chairmen might have offered in the end. Ultimately, appropriations subcommittees in charge of the 150 account realized that the Helms and
Gilman consolidation plans would either eliminate or sharply curtail their jurisdiction over foreign assistance. This, combined with the pressure in late 1995 and early 1996 to pass appropriations bills in the face of continued government-wide shutdowns, compelled appropriations committee and subcommittee chairmen to give priority to passing spending bills and to keep these bills clean of contentious policy issues. Within the SFRC, the lost opportunity in May 1995 for Kerry and Helms to negotiate a compromise during markup that would have been closer to the Helms proposal than the one Helms finally agreed to in December, moved the issue from substance to politics in short order. This outcome played out in strict partisan voting on foreign affairs appropriations bills and consolidation proposals. It also resulted in parliamentary maneuvers that frustrated quick debate and votes on foreign affairs restructuring, particularly in the Senate, thereby threatening other more important parts of the legislative calendar.

- *Bureaucratic* The entire eighteen month struggle over the issue of consolidation was a textbook study in bureaucratic infighting and maneuvering by Sen. Helms and Brian Atwood to gain the upper-hand with decision-makers and public opinion. Sen. Helms sought to compel Rep. Gilman to pass foreign affairs consolidation legislation through back-channel contacts with Speaker Gingrich. Helms also walled off his committee’s jurisdiction from involvement by the appropriators (e.g., Sen McConnell) and used his power to hold up ambassadorial nominations and treaties to coerce the administration into some form of consolidation plan. He used the public arena by inviting ex-Secretaries of State and key members of the foreign policy elite to submit testimonials supporting his plan. And he tried to undercut USAID support among NGOs and universities by proposing a separate foundation to finance their efforts. USAID Administrator Brian Atwood fought a rear-guard action against Secretary of State Christopher and his key senior staff to prevent further development.
of consolidation plans for presentation to the NPR and White House. Despite eventual public statements by Christopher opposing the Gilman and Helms bills, Atwood relied on the public media at key junctures to shore up support within the administration to keep USAID separate.

- **Policy** Neither the executive nor the legislative branch based its respective positions on clearly drawn policy visions laying out American strategic priorities in a post-Cold War world. Rather, the executive branch played the constitutional issue, claiming that the Helms and Gilman proposals (and budget cuts) would interfere with the President's constitutional prerogative to conduct foreign policy. Congress did not join that discussion but, generally, portrayed the plan as being part of deficit reduction intended under the Contract with America. Both sides understood that the reorganization issue was an "inside the Beltway" fight that would mean little to voters outside Washington. Therefore, the structural and budget issues were joined at the hip for public consumption by both branches. However, over time as the budget and structural issue became de-linked under pressure of the appropriations process, the administration's strategy of "stonewalling," refusing to offer alternative proposals for consolidating USAID, USIA and ACDA or even to discuss the problems of the Helms plan in detail, gained greater saliency. Recognizing how fragmented Congress was over the issue (even disagreements between Gilman and Helms), the administration reasoned that its more centralized control over its position on this matter would ultimately be decisive.

   Tactically, that is what happened; however, it is clear that the issue is far from being resolved.

- **Personality:** It is difficult, often dangerous, to reduce the outcome of important political confrontations to personality conflicts. However, most interviewees agreed that had anyone other than Senator Helms been the architect of foreign affairs agency restructuring it might have fared better. The administration might have engaged in discussions earlier had it perceived the proponent to have been more reasonable and less eccentric. Once the issue
entered the public arena, however, animosities that developed between Atwood, on the one hand, and Helms and even Christopher, on the other, frustrated potential compromise.

**Conclusion**

President Clinton's veto of the Helms/Gilman consolidation bill was but the first salvo of what may become a continuing debate on the structure and funding of foreign affairs. What was interesting in the to and fro between Congress and the administration during the eighteen month period in question was the lack of an "iron triangle," specifically a robust set of private interests to support groups in both Congress and the administration in promoting foreign affairs restructuring. Clearly, there were individuals in the White House, State Department, the House and Senate that believe consolidation would strengthen the foreign affairs apparatus and achieve significant budget savings. However, NGOs, private contractors and private industry either stayed on the sidelines of the debate, or provided modest support to USAID in opposing consolidation. Although AIPAC and various ethnic groups supported the Gilman bill, their support was more for the aid levels contained in it than for the structure it proposed. Despite large amounts of foreign assistance contracts going to states whose senators or congressmen served on the relevant authorizing committees (e.g., Massachusetts, New York, or California each of which receives from $700-900 million in AID contracts), there was limited visibility on the part of those who benefit from this largesse. Public opinion played an ambiguous role, favoring a US foreign aid program in general, but misinformed about the levels and believing the budget should provide far more than it actually provided. Finally, foreign service professionals took a low profile. The American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) stayed on the sidelines, fearing a rupture in its board between State, USAID, and USIA representatives if it took a position on the issue.

What all this means for the future of this issue is unclear. However, sources interviewed for this paper agree that the tactics the administration used in 1995-1996 may not work again.
Moreover, the contending parties in the authorizing and appropriating committees may have learned more about their respective interests in this issue to permit a more effective merging of interests the next time around.
Notes

1 Bill Bacchus, USAID Quality Council, interview by author, 27 November 1996
2 Ibid. Also, Bill Bacchus, “The Price of American Foreign Policy Congress, the Executive and International Affairs Funding” (photocopy), unpublished manuscript, pp. 269-270
3 Ibid, p 269 Also, Kelly Kammerer, USAID Assistant Administrator for Program Policy Coordination, interview by author, 29 November 1996
4 Bacchus, p 269
5 Bacchus interview. Also, Ken Nakamura, Director of Congressional Relations, American Foreign Service Association, interviewed by author, 27 November 1996, and confidential interview source, House International Relations Committee, interviewed by author, 5 December 1996, and Kammerer interview. See also Carroll J. Doherty, “Republicans Poised to Slash International Programs,” Congressional Quarterly, 27 May 1995, p. 155
6 Bacchus, pp. 270-272
7 Kammerer interview, also Jill Buckley, Assistant Administrator for Legislation and Public Affairs, interviewed by author, 4 December 1996
10 Bacchus interview.
11 Bacchus, pp. 276-277, also confidential interview, IIIRC staff member, 4 December 1996
13 Confidential interview, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member, 10 December 1996, also Kammerer interview
14 Bacchus interview; also Bacchus, pp. 277-278
15 Remarks by President Bill Clinton, Tuesday, May 23, 1995, accessible through www.usaid.gov
21 See Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995. 104th Congress, 2d Session, 9 June 1995, 2-6, also Chris Walker, staff member Senate Foreign Relations Committee, interviewed by author, 10 December 1995
22 Walker interview, see also Sen. Richard Lugar’s perspective on the lack of bipartisanship on this issue in Washington Post, 24 June 1995, sec. A, p. 4
25 Bacchus, p. 279
26 Bacchus, p. 280, also Kammerer interview
29 Bacchus interview, Kammerer interview, and Buckley interview
31 Bacchus, p. 285
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